ML11286A202

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Correction Letter-Transmittal of Final Accident Sequence Precursor Analysis for Susquehanna, Unit 1
ML11286A202
Person / Time
Site: Susquehanna Talen Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/13/2011
From: Bhalchandra Vaidya
Plant Licensing Branch 1
To: Rausch T
Susquehanna
Vaidya B, NRR/DORL/LPL1-1, 415-3308
References
Download: ML11286A202 (3)


Text

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555*0001

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Mr. Timothy S. Rausch Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer PPL Susquehanna, LLC 769 Salem Boulevard Berwick, PA 18603-0467

SUBJECT:

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 1 - CORRECTION LETTER RE: TRANSMITTAL OF ACCIDENT SEQUENCE PRECURSOR ANALYSIS FOR SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 1

Dear Mr. Rausch:

By letter dated October 12, 2011 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML11276A135), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) transmitted the final result of the Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) analysis of an event which occurred at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit No.1 as documented in licensee event report 387/10-003-01 and inspection reports 50-387/10-04,50-387/10-08. On July 16, 2010, at approximately 1520, Unit 1 received a condenser bay flood alarm. Plant operators verified that flooding was occurring into the 656' elevation of the condenser bay. Reactor power was reduced to 40 percent via control rod insertions and a recirculation runback. Operator attempts to isolate condenser waterboxes remotely were unsuccessful. Unit 1 was subsequently manually scrammed, main steam isolation valves were shut, and the main condenser was isolated so that the circulating water system could be shutdown. Concurrently, plant operators manually closed waterbox isolation valves and isolated the leak.

Because of an inadvertent typographical error, the transmittal letter incorrectly stated that the ASP analysis calculated a conditional core damage probability of 3.7 x 10-5. The correct value, as reported in the enclosure to the transmittal letter dated October 12, 2011, is 3.7 x 10-6.

No change to the enclosure to the transmittal letter dated October 12, 2011, is required.

T. S. Rausch

- 2 Please contact me at 301-415-3308, if you have any questions.

Sincerely, Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 1-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-387 cc: Distribution via Listserv

T. S. Rausch

-2 Please contact me at 301-415-3308, if you have any questions.

Docket No. 50-387 cc: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION:

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GDemoss, RES/DRA Sincerely, IRAI Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch 1-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation RidsNRRDorILPI1-1 RidsNRRPMSusquehanna RidsOGCMailCenter RidsAcrsAcnw&mMailCenter RidsRg 1MailCenter PKrohn, R 1 ADAMS Accession No. ML11286A202

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OFFICE LPL 1-1/PM LPL1-1/LA LPL1-1/BC NAME BVaidya SLittie NSalgado BVaidya DATE 10/13/11 10/13/11 10/13/11 10/13/11 I

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