IR 05000270/1983035

IE Insp Rept 50-270/83-35 on 831117-19.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Containment Integrated Leakage Rate Testing

ML15224A915
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	12/12/1983
From:	Brooks E, Jape F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML15224A914	List: IR 05000270/1983035 ML15224A913
References
50-270-83-35, NUDOCS 8401090230
Download: ML15224A915 (4)

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Ehylrseer1.ng Progr~w gr&-xst DivISioiA uf [fgi eermnS epic IOperAtional Program 1hli, routine, Unnrntp~1f'ect.ion 16bvolwe Z4 If~ptCtor-hourS ()r Site lit thw area~s oft cortairr ltlt-r&att-Ileikt.; ratetvS.fq Of tt'e ireas In!0pet". rC violititns or 6t*ltlonS atre ldeeitifle~.3401090230 813311 pDR ADGCK 05000270 NPDA

REPOT DETAILS "ersons Contacted Lsceat*

Employe#%

J. E. Smith. Managr T. Katthevs, Licensing Technical Specialist T. Barr, Pe-formace Test [ngineer

• G. Devenoort, Performance Test Engieer hRC Resideunt inspector 0. Falconer

• Atten~dd exit interview Ex't Interview The inspection jcope and findings were sumrized on Movember 19..983, with those persons indicated in paragraph ! abov The licensee acknowledged the inspector's findings and agreed to Investigate And correct the cause of leakage from the Containment into the low pressure service vater service systes as discussed in paragraph. Licensee Act'Gn on Previous Inforcement Katter<

hot insecte.

Unresolved Iteas Unresolved itees were not identified during this inspectio Surveillatnce - Containment Integrated Leakage Rate Test (61719)

During the period of Kovemiber 17-19, 1983. the inspector witnessed perform

%nce of the containment integrated leakage rate test (CILRT)

for Oconee huclear Plant Unit The inspector reviewed the licensee's Reactor Suilding Int,%grated Leak Rate Test Procedure PT/2/A/01SO/03A dated October 10, 1983, and approved kovember 2. 198 Valve lineups and system venting an draining prior to the CILkT were performed in accordance with Reactor Building Integrated Leak Rate Tast Penetration Venting and Draining Procedure TT/2/A/0375/0 (rlbosures 13.3 and 13.4 of Procedure TT/2/A/0375/07 provided those steps "ccessary to assure restoration cf the contairv-nt to the post-t'st conditios The inspector reviewea the results of i4latioo vilve (Type C) leakage rate tests performed October 22, 1983, throuyh November 16, 1983, as documented in Procedure PT/2/A/0150/0 Instruffentation used during the CILRT was calibrated witnin six mnths preceding the CILRT in accordaoce with Duke Power Company StandArds and Testing Facility Reference Manua Through the use of these testing

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methods, traceability is Mintained to the National Sjreau of Standard Instrumentation included digital multimeter, temperature detectors, Kaye resp Scanner. Oe point hygrameters, dew point detectors and pressure gauge Containent pressuritation was initiated at 1640 hours0.019 days <br />0.456 hours <br />0.00271 weeks <br />6.2402e-4 months <br /> on November 17, 1983, and stopped at 0075 hours8.680556e-4 days <br />0.0208 hours <br />1.240079e-4 weeks <br />2.85375e-5 months <br /> on November 18. 1983, when Containment pressure of approximately 30.5 psig was achieve The licenee's Technical Specifi cations permit the CILRT to be conducted at a reduced pressure of not less than ?9.5 psig. During the initial phase of the CILRT calculations indi cated negative containment leakage. i.t. leakage into the containmen It was subsequently deteruined that nitrogen supply to the core flood tants had not been properly isolated and vented outside Containment. Accordingly, the antrogen source was isolated and verted thus, eliminating nitrogen inleak ag Containment penetration valve lineup was not affected by these change At approuaiwtely 0600 hours0.00694 days <br />0.167 hours <br />9.920635e-4 weeks <br />2.283e-4 months <br /> on kovember 18. 190, pressure was indicated at IA-110 on the local Instrument panel in the Unit 2 leak rate test room. It was Suspected that air from the instrument air header tas pressurizing the IA-110 sample line and the Inlet side of isolation valve 21A-90 at contain meet penetration 41. A flange was installed on the discharge side of valve IA-ll80 and IA-l0 %as opened to vent the line to isolation valve 21A.9 Accordingly, any possible sourCe of back pressure to the instr nt air line containment isolation valve ?!A-90 was removed and the leakage path via containment penetration 41 was subject to test pressure differentia At 0930 hourl on -ovember 1. mAinternce personnel cut into a cros!

over pipe on the I w pressure service water syste. near valve 2LPS-16 Air strted dischary.eg Irn the separated crossover pip Investigation upstresA and sow"n-:resa of valve ZLPS-167 resulted in the following findings and actions:

(Reference Drawings P0-1158. PO-1NB-2) Oressure gau9g M6G-190 reading 27 psi b. Valve ?tPS-1S verified close C. Low pressure service water line was then vented at pressure qauge 28G-190 and valve 2LPSW-14 d. Manual isolation valves to penetrations 33, 34 and 35 were close (ZLPSW-81. ?LPSk-S?. ?LPSW-83).

e. Kenual valves to RIA 31-10. RIA 31-11 and RIA 12 were close (?LPSW-243. 2LPSW-242. ?LPS W241) ENO valves from penetrations 33, 24 and 35 were manually tightened close (?LPSW-24, 2LPSW-18, 2LPSW-21).

g. Manual valves 2LPSW-776 and 2LPSW-777 in RIA instruments lines were close At 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> on Novemer 18, 1983, It was reported that air was no longer discharging from the separated crossover pipe near valve 2LPS-167 which was then close The licensee's position in this stter is that the low pressure service water to the reactor building cooling units via containment penetrations 33, 34 and 35 constitutes a closed loop inside containment and is not required to be vented and drained for a CILRT; and the valve adjustments did not alter any alignments required for venting and draining systems during the CILR Oconee Unit 2 Technical Specifications confirm the licensee's posi tio At_192.Qhours on November 18, 1983, and data set 83, containment stabiliza tion was considered to have been achieve At 0345 hours0.00399 days <br />0.0958 hours <br />5.704365e-4 weeks <br />1.312725e-4 months <br /> on November 19, 198 the test was concluded with the following test results based on the e

absolute test meth.d and mass point analysis:

Calculated leakage rate 0.1165 wt. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Upper 9M% confidence level 0.1209 wt.% 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Maximus allowable leakage rate (Lt.)

0.176 wt.% 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 75% of maximum allowable leakage rate (0.75 Lt.) 0.132 wt.% 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> The acceptance criteria for CILRT requires that the upperbound-.of the feikage rate calculated 'at 951 confidence leve1. plus any required local leakage rate additions, shall be less than 75% of maximum allowable leakage rat During the exit interview the licensee agreed to investigate and correct the cau'e of leakage from the contairmnt into the low pressure service water iystem. By telephone conversation with Region II on November 28, 1983, the ficensee advised that after depressurization of the containment the cause of the leakage was identified. Water from an open vent valve in containment was found to be spraying on the Reactor Building Cooling Unit-B (penetration 34).

The source of water to the LPSW system is a cooling water lake (Lake Keowee)

located at higher elevation than the containmen During plant operation the LPSW water system operates at approximately 90 psig thereby, providing a water sea Oconee Technical Specifications Section 3.3.5, Reactor Building Cooling System, requires that when the reactor is critical, the reactor building cooling units and associated ESF valves shall be operabl Accordingly, a water seal to containment lines via penetrations 33, 34 and 35 mst always be in effect.