IR 05000335/1992001
| ML17227A383 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 03/24/1992 |
| From: | Rankin W, Wright F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17227A382 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-92-01, 50-335-92-1, 50-389-92-01, 50-389-92-1, NUDOCS 9204150225 | |
| Download: ML17227A383 (58) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
[j II
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(P Report Nos.:
50-335/92-01 and 50-389/92-01 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 Facility Name:
St. Lucie 1 and
Inspection Conducted:
February 1 -14, 1992 Inspectors:
F.
N. Wright, Team Leader ate igned Team Members:
L. Cohen B. Haagensen (Sonalysts, Inc.)
Schi S
a e Signed Approved by:
W H.
anki
, Chief Emergency eparedness Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY x
Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the annual emergency preparedness exercise.
This one day full participation exercise was conducted on February 10, 1992 between the hours of 7:00 a.m.
and 3:00 p.m.
Selected areas of the licensee's emergency response facilities and organization were observed to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensee's implementation of the Emergency Plan and procedures in providing for the health and safety of the public and onsite personnel during a simulated emergency.
The inspection also included a review of the exercise scenario and observation of the licensee's post exercise critique.
9204150225 920324 PDR ADOCK 05000335
In the areas inspected, no violations, deviations, or exercise weaknesses were identified.
The licensee demonstrated the ability to identify initiating conditions, determine Emergency Action Level parameters, and correctly classify the emergency throughout the exercise.
Overall the licensee's performance during the exercise was good, with the licensee meeting the majority of their exercise objectives and 'demonstrating a
capability to protect the public health and safety in the event of a radiological emergency.
The licensee demonstrated strength in the emergency response. organization by using a significant number of alternate players in key positions during the exercis REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
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- E Ashley, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Bailey, Quality Assurance Supervisor Bailey, Health Physics Dose Assessment Boissy, Plant General Manager Boll, Operations Training Buchanan, Health Physics Supervisor Burton, Operations Manager Casto, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Cost'e, Operations Support Center (OSC)
Lead Controller Czarnecki, Security-Dawson, Maintenance Manager Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor Grazio, Director Nuclear Licensing Harris, Senior Vice President Nuclear Operations Hayes, Recovery Manager Assistant Holt, Licensing Engineer Large, Health Physics Lowens, Quality Assurance McCullers, Health Physics
'Mercer, Health Physics Miller, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Mothena, Manager, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Patrissi, Corporate Quality Assurance Pell, Recovery Manager Pearle, Corporate Health Physics Roberts, Site Engineering Manager Sager, Plant Vice President Snodgress, Emergency Preparedness Technician Stewart, Technical Staff Valdes, Technical Support Center (TSC)
Lead Controller Walker (Richard),
Emergency Preparedness Coordinator Walker (Roger),
Operations Instructor, Control Room Controller West, Technical Manager West, Operations Supervisor Williford, ISEE Wunderlich, Reactor Engineering Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection i~eluded engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personne Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- S. Elrod, Senior Resident Inspector
- M. Scott, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios For Power Reactors (82302)
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~
Scenario The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's Emergency Plan and organization as required bye 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F, and specific
.
criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
I The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives.
The scenario was adequate to exercise fully the onsite and offsite emergency organizations of the licensee and provided sufficient emergency information to the State for their participation in the exercise.
The scenario sequence of events, in the initial stages of the exercise, made some emergency classification activity straight forward and did not substantially challenge control room personnel in some areas.
However, the scenario was substantially challenging in the later stages.
The exercise began during the regular day shift at about 8:00 a.m., with Unit 1 operating at 100 percent power, in the middle of core life.
The plant had been operating at full power for the last 180 days.
Unit 2 was in day 12 of a 30 day scheduled maintenance outage.
The initiating event was a fire in the 1B5 Motor Control Center, located inside the 1B Switchgear Room, requiring offsite fire fighting support.
'
medical emergency also occurred reguiring a contaminated worker to be transported offsite for treatment.
A loss of condenser vacuum resulted in a manual turbine and reactor trip and problems with feed, water systems produced minimal flow to the Steam Generators (SGs) until a lack of heat rejection caused the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
temperature and pressure to increase.
Fuel damage and loss of containment.via SG tube ruptures and a stuck open Atmospheric Dump Valve resulted in the release of airborne radioactivity to offsite areas.
Emergency
e
classifications up to a General Emergency Classification and Protective Action Recommendations (PARs)
were made to the State and local agencies.
The exercise concluded at about 3:00 p.m.
The exercise d ta p g
inaccurate= data for the subcooled margin monitor.
The data provided-was reported as
,subcooled margin between the vapor space in the reactor vessel head. and RCS saturation.
The correct value for subcooled margin monitor was the temperature difference between core exit thermocouple temperature and RCS saturat'ion temperature.
The TSC staff identified the incorrect dat'a and calculated the correct value for this parameter.
The exercise control over the restoration of Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) flow was not coordinated and surprised the control room staff.
The scenario caused a loss of all feedwater to the SGs at 9:45 a.m.
and licensee attempted to regain the use of,at least one Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (AFP).
However, the Emergency Repair Team (ERT)
tasked with that assignment did not leave the OSC until 11:54 a.m.
The scenario called for the A-AFP to start feeding cold water from the Condensate Storage Tank to the hot and dry SGs at 12:00 a.m.
The operations staff was not prepared for the sudden restart.
The Problem Solving Team in the -Technical Support Center (TSC)
had identified thermal shock concerns associated with restoring cold AFW to a dry SG, as early as 10:25 a.m.
They notified the EC regarding these concerns and were working on methods of sluicing hot water to the generator when the feedwater was suddenly restored.
Had the controllers provided more information regarding the estimated restart of a feedwater pump to the control room and TSC players they could. have been better prepared to implement an accident mitigation strategy and control plant evolutions.
Xdentified scenario and exercise areas of potential improvement included the following:
a acka e contained
e
L The inspector discussed the initiating events associated with the scenario with licensee representatives.
The scenario, in part, consisted of a NOUE with a fire affecting a safety system longer than 10 minutes and an Alert with a request for offsite assistance.
The inspector noted that the licensee had initiated the exercise with similar conditions utilized by the utility's other licensed facility during their last two exercises.
The licensee reported that the similar events-were selected to facilitate request'of local emergency response agencies.
The licensee committed to develop a different set of initiating emergency conditions for the next graded emergency exercise.
In general, the controllers provided adequate guidance throughout the exercise.
The inspector observed adequate interactions between the controllers and the players, and no controller prompting was observed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Exercise objectives Although the licensee indicated in their post exercise critique that all exercise objectives had been substantially met, the inspector identified three issues that were not fully met:
Notification objective B.2.
was to "Demonstrate the capability to promptly notify U.S.
NRC, State and Local Authorities of an emergency declaration or change in emergency classification."
The inspector determined that the licensee did not contact the NRC Headquarters during the conduct of the exercise.
The issue is discussed in paragraph 6 of the report.
o Emergency Response exercise objective C. 12.
was to "Demonstrate the availability of qualified personnel and timely organization of reentry teams to assist in accident assessment and mitigation".
The inspector determined that there was not adequate emphasis or focus of resources to expedite the progress of an Emergency Response Team (ERT), assigned to place A-AFP back in service, in a timely manner.
The issue is discussed in paragraph S.d of the repor tp
-o Exercise scenario objective D.2 required the dose assessment team to "Demonstrate the capability to perform dose assessment".
't The inspectors determined that the TSC dose assessment team did not provide sufficiently useful or timely dose projection estimates to the EC.
The issue is discussed in paragraph 9 of the report.
No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Assignment of Responsibility, Evaluation of Exercises For Power Reactors (82301)
This area was observed to determine that primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee had been specifically established and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(1),
3.0 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specified criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A.
The inspector observed that the onsite and offsite emergency organizations were adequately described and the responsibilities for key organization positions were clearly defined in approved plans and implementing procedures.
The inspector observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the Control Room (CR),
TSC, the OSC, the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF),
and the Emergency.
News Center (ENC).
The required staffing and assignment of responsibility were consistent with the licensee's approved procedures.
Because of the scenario scope and conditions, long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not required.
Discussions with licensee representatives indicated that sufficient technical staff were available to provide continuous staffing for the augmented emergency organization, if needed.
Real time staffing and activation of the EOF and the ENC were not demonstrated for this exercise.
These real time activities were not exercise objectives.
No violations or deviations were identifie Onsite Emergency Organization, (82301)
The licensee's on-shift emergency organization was observed to determine that the responsibilities for-emergency response were unambiguously defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces were specified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.B.
The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined; the responsibility and authority for directing actions necessary to respond to the emergency were clear; that staff were available to fillkey functional positions within the, organization:
and that onsite and offsite interactions and responsibilities were clearly defined.
The Nuclear Plant Supervisor (NPS)
assigned to the exercise assumed the duties of EC promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency, and directed the response until formally relieved by the Plant Manager.
The Plant Manager became the EC and directed site activations of the TSC.
The licensee adequately demonstrated the ability to alert, notify, and mobilize FPL emergency response personnel.
Augmentation of the initial onsite emergency response organizations was accomplished through mobili'zation of additional day-shift personnel.
Following the Alert declaration, the on-shift emergency organization was augmented with the activations of the TSC, OSC, and EOF Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs).
The inspector observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organizations in the ERFs and determined that the licensee was able to staff and activate the facilities in a timely manner.
The licensee demonstrated strength in the emergency response organization by utilizing a large number of alternate players during the exercise.
The use of alternate players for training and experience purposes was considered a
program strength.
No violations or deviations were identifie Emergency Classification System, (82301)
This area was observed to determine that a standard emergency classification and action l'evel scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.D.
Licensee Emergency Plan Implementing.- Procedure (EPIP)
No.
310022E titled "Classification of Emergencies" was used to promptly identify and properly classify the scenario simulated events.
The, Notification Of Unusual Event (NOUE), Alert-, Site.Area Emergency, and General Emergency classifications were timely and correct by procedure.
The, NOUE was declared at about 8:16 a.m.
on the basis of Emergency Action Level (EAL)
3 (Uncontrolled fire within the plant lasting more than 10 minutes, affecting safety equipment).
The Alert was declared at about 8:20 a.m.,on the basis of EAL 3 {Uncontrolled fire within the plant lasting more than 10 minutes, affecting safety equipment AND requiring offsite fire fighting support).
The Site Area Emergency was declared at about 9:57 a.m.
on the basis of the loss of plant functions required for hot shutdown.
o A General Emergency was declared at about 11:09 a.m.
on the basis of a potential core melt scenario.
The Emergency Coordinators accurately assessed the conditions of the plant, demonstrated the ability to identify initiating conditions, determined EAL parameters, correctly and rapidly classified the emergency throughout the exercise, and properly provided for the activation of emergency response organization.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Notification Methods and Procedures
{82301)
This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of State and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations were established.
This area.
was further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the population within the, plume exposure
pathway were established pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),
paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of. NUREG-0654.
Exercise objective B.2.
was to "Demonstrate the capability to promptly notify U.S.
NRC, State, and Local Authorities of an emergency declaration or change in emergency classification."
The inspector determined that the licensee did not fully meet exercise objective B.2, in that the licensee did not directly contact the NRC Headquarters during the conduct of the exercise but simulated NRC play..
Exercise objective B.3 required the licensee to "Demonstrate appropriate procedure for both initial and follow-up notifications".
The inspectors found it difficult to evaluate the licensee's performance of this objective since the licensee's procedures for making initial and follow-up notifications are not clearly established in written procedures.
The EOF had been activated at 10:21 a.m.
and assumed the responsibility for making off-site notifications to State and local agencies at that time.
The EOF staff completed their first State of Florida Notification Message Form and made a State notification at 11:22 a.m.
upon declaring a General Emergency at 11:11 a.m.
and issued a followup notification with updated PARs at about 11:39 a.m.,
due to decreasing condition of the plant.
At approximately 12:00 a.m.,
licensee representatives detected a radiological release through open ADVs.
However, the licensee did not document the release on a State of Florida Notification Message Form until 1:00 p.m.
When the inspector inquired about the delay, the licensee reported that once the release was detected the staff began discussing it with the State and local officials which were located in the EOF and that notification of the start of.a radiological release and estimated dose projections were made at that time.
According to.the licensee personnel, representatives from the State and all affected local agencies were in the licensee's EOF and were aware of the changing emergency conditions as they occurred.
The licensee representatives also pointed out that, at that time, the licensee had already recommended evacuating all sectors up to 2 miles and affected sectors 2-5 miles and recommended sheltering all sectors up to.10 miles.
The inspector determined that completed Notification forms to offsite authorities included appropriate information including; emergency conditions, emergency classifications,
radioactivity release status, potentially affected population,. projected population doses; recommended protective, actions, and any changes to these conditions.
The Alert Notification System (ANS), consisting of 81 Sirens, for alerting the public within the emergency planning zone
'(EPZ)
was actuated during the exercise.
The public was forewarned of the siren activations through the Emergency Broadcasting System and local advertisements.
The licensee received less than 5 calls regarding its activation from the public.
The system's activation in the drill was not part of the licensee's system reliability and testing program for the ANS and was not evaluated by the licensee; No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to determine that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency personnel as required by
CFR 50.47(b)(6),
CFR '50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.
The inspector observed that adequate communications existed among the licensee.'s emergency organizations, and between the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authorities.
Radio communications between the Field Monitoring Teams and TSC were adequate to dispatch. and direct field team activities.
The licensee demonstrated the adequacy, operability and effective use of emergency c'ommunications equipment.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency, Facilities and Equipment (82301)
This area.was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response was provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.
The inspector observed the activation, staffing and operation of key ERFs, including the Control Room, TSC, OSC, EOF, and ENC.'n addition, the inspector observed the fire and emergency medical dril Emergency Medical Drill This area was observed to determine whether first aid to an injured individual contaminated with radioactive material is effectively provided and to 'assure appropriate actions are taken to transport the worker to the offsite hospital.
An inspector observed the response of the first aid and HP team to the simulated contaminated injured worker.
Immediate response to the scene was by two persons, one of whom was a non-licensed operator on shift who was trained, in firstaid and CPR.
Efforts were properly directed to the life-threatening injury.
The licensee trained all'on-licensed operators on shift in first aid and CPR.
The team considered this an area of licensee strength.
Contamination monitoring and control were provided, but in a manner not to impede the first aid treatment.
The simulated contaminated injured,worker was transported to an offsite hospital in the licensee's emergency vehicle.
A qualified radiological control technician accompanied the injured person to the hospital.
First aid, contamination control, and transfer to an ambulance were effective and efficient.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Control Room Overall, operations personnel adequately assessed the problems faced during the exercise and their responses were timely and appropriate to the circumstances.
The Nuclear Plant Supervisor (NPS)
ensured that the classifications and notifications were accomplished in a timely manner.
Both reactor operators and supervisors demonstrated good use of the normal, abnormal, emergency operating procedures, and the EPIPs throughout the exercise.
Offsite officials, including simulation to the NRC, were promptly informed of the following:
emergency.
conditions; emergency classifications, activation of the emergency organization facility, radioactivity release status, potentially affected population, projected population doses, recommended protective actions, and changing condition Communications were maintained between the, ERFs.
A qualified staff member was available to notify the Federal, State, and local authorities of the emergency and to maintain communications 15 minutes after the emergency is declared.
The shift supervisor directed simulated accountability of all onsite personnel within 30 minutes of the order, to assemble nonessential personnel and requested periodical habitability assessments of assembly and emergency centers.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Technical Support Center The inspector observed the initial activation and personnel response in the staffing of the TSC.
The TSC was activated at 8:23 a.m.,
upon.declaration of the Alert classification, by the NPS (Emergency Coordinator).
The TSC was declared operational at 8:47 a.m.
by the TSC Supervisor.
The TSC was activated, fully staffed, and functional in a timely manner.
The TSC Supervisor was well qualified, appeared knowledgeable of his duties and responsibilities, and assumed the responsibility in a professional and organized manner.
Technical assessment and mitigation activities were aggressively and properly pursued by the TSC staff and periodic briefings regarding the incident status and on going mitigating actions were frequently given.
The licensee demonstrated the functional and operational adequacy of the TSC.
The facility layout provided for good interface between the Emergency Coordinator and his staff.
In general, communication and information flow in the TSC was accurate and timely.
The status boards were frequently updated and adequately maintained throughout the exercise and tracking and trending of plant-parameter data provided real time, accurate information for the TSC staff.
However, the inspectors made the following observations as potential improvement items during the exercise:
Status boards were not readily observable for the problem solving team and the dose assessment personnel while seated at their work statio o The inspector observed that the TSC staff did not appear to notice or diagnose a rapid step change in the subcooling margin (from -77 degrees to 0 degrees)
at 1400 when related plant parameters did not justify the cause for this change.
The EC'
routine briefings were informative.
Congestion and noise levels, were kept to a minimum.
All primary communication systems functioned properly.
In the TSC, engineering assessments were pursued aggressively, and both timely and quality support was provided to the EOF regarding plant mitigation Onsite and offsite radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the simulated plume.
The teams effectively demonstrated their capability to collect those data points'nd relay those data to the emergency response facilities.
The licensee's staff responsible for protective action recommendations communicated with the reactor systems status personnel to comprehend plant status and trends and anticipate radiological consequences of the progression of events.
The licensee maintained an awareness on the status of offsite protective actions.
The licensee demonstrated.
the ability to promptly recommend offsite protective actions that axe consistent with those in the approved on site emergency plan.
The licensee was able to maintain communications with offsite authorities and demonstrate the ability to promptly inform.offsite officials of emergency conditions, emergency classifications, radioactivity relief status, potentially affected population, projected population doses, recommended protective actions, and any changes in these conditions.
The licensee periodically assessed the habitability of the TSC.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Operational Support Center The inspector observed the initial activation and personnel response in the staffing of the OSC.
Upon the direction by the EC, the OSC was activated in a timely manner.
Approximately 10 minutes after the
Alert declaration the OSC was considered operational, however, the licensee's requirements for activating the OSC were minimal.
The licensee did not have an activation checkoff sheet similar to the one utilized in the licensee's TSC and the facility was declared operational once the minimum OSC staff had been assembled.
OSC facilit'ies and supplies were adequate to support radiological surveys and emergency repairs.
The inspector discussed possible ventilation controls as an improvement item with licensee representatives in order to minimize exposure to airborne radioactivity in the OSC as low as reasonably achievable (ALUM).
In general communications in the OSC were good.
The OSC Supervisor gave frequent status briefings to OSC personnel addressing plant conditions, radiological conditions, and emergency status.
Telephone communications with the TSC were good, event and repair team status boards were kept updated, and the interface between, the OSC Supervisor and the Emergency Coordinator was good throughout the exercise.
Congestion and noi'se were kept to a minimum.
HP personnel anticipated probable contamination, and started early on to take precautions to prevent contamination of the OSC.
Step-off pads and/or manned frisking stations were established to prevent spread of contaminants into clean areas.
Frequent radiation and contamination surveys were made in, the OSC to insure that the environment was free of radioactive contaminants.
ERTs were briefed on current and potential radiological conditions and protective measures including personnel dose reduction practices prior to departing the OSC.
The team considered this area a licensee strength.
Communications with the teams were maintained.
Radiological conditions were monitored by HP technicians who accompanied teams.
Emergency Response exercise objective C.
12.
was to
"Demonstrate the availability of qualified personnel and timely organization of reentry teams to assist in accident assessment and mitigation".
The inspector identified a lack of timely deployment of, an Emergency Response Team (ERT) for repair of the
"A" Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (A-AFP).
A Site Area Emergency had been declared because of the loss of all main and auxiliary. feedwater to the steam generator When the Site Area Emergency and related site evacuation were announced, the maintainance crew that had been repairing the A-AFP (since prior to staffing the OSC)
stopped work and evacuated the area.
This repair team was not listed on any'SC status board.
Subsequently, completion of the A-AFP repair was identified by the EC and the OSC Supervisor as the number one priority job.
However, dispatch of an assigned ERT was delayed for over two hours following the total loss of feedwater and for over one hour after the OSC supervisor stated that it was the number one priority job.
Delays were primarily for precautionary radiological considerations including the anticipation of potentially worsening radiation levels and potential future airborne contamination.
These precautions included waiting for additional field radiation surveys, having the repair team dress out in full anti-Cs and portable air breathing equipment, requesting higher than normal radiation dose authorization for the repair team, and waiting for that authorization from the TSC.
In this exercise scenario, a promptly dispatched A-AFP ERT could well have effected repairs in time to prevent core melt.
'There was no release of airborne contamination until after the AFW pump was repaired and placed in operation.
The inspector determined that there was not adequate emphasis to repair the A-AFP in a timely manner.
A time line of related activities for the task revealed the following:
45 09:50 09:57 10:01 10:07 10:17 10:17 10:25 10:27 10:41 11:00 11:02 Loss of only available feedwater, C-AFP Damage Control confirmed loss of C-AFP Site Area Emergency declared A multi disciplined ERT departs OSC to
"
examine condition of C-AFP ERT reports severely damaged C-AFP A-AFP repair team returns ERT returns to OSC.
C-AFP Plant Safety Team concerned about thermal shock problems associated with delivering cold feedwater to SGs SGs are reported 'dry Coupling A-AFP is stated to be the number one priority by the OSC Supervisor Loss of High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)
Team sent to jump power from A-AFP to B-AFP returned due to high radiation levels
11:30 11:54 12:00 EC in a TSC Briefing reports that HPSX and AFW restoration are priority number one Core damage occurs, Health Physics holds up the A-AFP ERT for an updated survey based on changing plant'onditions TSC EC authorizes personnel exposures up to 12 rem for A-AFP ERT A-AFP ERT dispatched A-AFP starts as required by scenario e
There was a period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 9 minutes between loss of feedwater at 09:45 and dispatch of the ERT to repair A-AFP at 11:54.
The inspector reported to licensee management that the time to determine the need for A-AFP repair, preparations and authorizations for the ERT, and their actual dispatch did not appear to meet the licensee's objective concerning timeliness.
The inspector also identified a concern with licensee procedural 'control of ERT activities.
The inspector noted that normal work control procedures were not followed and emergency procedures did not address alternate control measures for written maintenance work requests with review and approval, work clearances/tagouts, and use of qualified operators to operate safety equipment.
Some of the work instructions given to repair teams were verbal and some were written, but all of these work instructions lacked appropriate review and approval.
The work instructions did not include clearances/tagouts or other provision for personnel or equipment safety.
One written work instruction directed maintenance personnel to operate saf ety equipment (an electrical breaker)
.
The team also noted that operators were not involved in OSC supervision or included on ERTs from the OSC.
The inspectors observed the following contributing factors that appeared to delay the ERT deployment and reported them to licensee management:
The EC did not appear to maintain awareness on the status and progress of the A-AFP repair, Lack of prioritization controls and focused resources in support of the A-AFP repair efforts,
e
Lack of procedural guidance for control of emergency repairs, including:
maintainance work requests and authorizations, clearance and tagging procedures, and operation of safety equipment, Health Physicis (HP) personnel in the OSC delayed the ERT for precautionary radiological considerations, as discussed above, The EC was slow in authorizing personnel emergency dose extensions, and The OSC and TSC status boards did not include job priorities.
In response to the inspectors observations, the EC reported that, while it may not have been clear to the inspectors, he was maintaining awareness of the A-AFP repair status and was monitoring the repair progress through on going discussions with his staff in the TSC and OSC.
The EC also reported that it was his staff's opinion that it would take more than a couple of hours to repair the feedwater pump based on previous maintenance experience with the task and that other reactor protection activities such as HPSI and once-through-cooling were preferable to starting A-AFP.
As a result of the discussion, the licensee committed to:
o
'eview and revise, as necessary, the process and procedures for prioritization and tracking of emergency tasks and o
Review and modify procedures and policies, as necessary, that would focus attention and provide timely supporting resources for expediting ERT response teams, while meeting safety and regulatory requirements.
The correction of this problem area's of interest to the NRC and thus will be carefully examined during-the next exercise.
The inspector indicated to the licensee that this area will be tracked as an Inspector Followup Item (IFI) (50-335/92-01-01:
Ability to prioritize, control, and dispatch ERTs in a timely manner).
e
Another issue discussed with licensee personnel
.concerned the use of non-qualified personnel as exercise players.
While Health Physics (HP) personnel reviewed the qualifications of personnel assigned to the A-AFP ERT, they discovered that one of the team members (HP)
had elapsed respiratory 'protection qualifications for training and that two of the team members (Electric Maintenance)
were not qualified to wear the self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)
since they had not received training on the respirators.
While it was known that these personnel did not have valid SCBA training they were allowed to don the equipment and participate on the team.
=Following the exercise the inspector determined that-
.
only a small number of EM personnel were participating in the exercise and that two EM personnel that had previously been identified as players were removed from exercise participation to attend other training.
The inspector reported that failure to have qualified emergency response personnel available for participation in the exercise indicated a lack of commitment to the emergency preparedness program.
Licensee representatives reported that failure to have the qualified personnel available was a mistake made by a plant supervisor who had been counseled about the importance of supporting and contributing necessary resources to the plants emergency preparedness program.
The licensee also reported that the issue had been identified. as a finding by the corporate Quality Assurance staff conducting a audit of the site Emergency Preparedness program during the exercise.
The licensee reported that the finding would be tracked in the licensee's corrective action program.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Emergency Operations Facility Emergency response responsibilities were transfered to the EOF in a timely manner when the facility became operational at 10:21 a.m.
The EOF was staffed and activated with qualified personnel.
Licensee procedures allow for the activation of the EOF at an Alert emergency classification.
However, neither the Emergency Plan nor implementing procedures contain a firm commitment time for facility activation.
The inspector noted the following:
08:20 a.m.
08:45 a.m.
Emergency Coordinator declared an Alert, The EC requested the activation of the EOF,
I
'
o 09:57 a.m.
o 09:59 a.m.
Emergency Coordinator declared a
~
Site Area Emergency, and The first key staff members arrived at the EOF.
It took the licensee 96 minutes to activate the EOF, following the Emergency'Coordinators request.
The inspector determined that the activation time was not significantly different than previously demonstrated, The inspector determined through discussions with licensee representatives, that the licensee plans to develop and implement an intermediate EOF emergency response organi'zation in 1992 that will enable the licensee to activate the EOF in a shorter period.
The Recovery Manager demonstrated good command and control, appeared knowledgeable of his duties and responsibilities, and assumed the responsibility in a professional and organized manner.
EOF staff communicated frequently with each other and with offsite authorities.
All primary communication systems were functioning properly.
Communications with the State and local agencies was excellent since their representatives were located in the EOF.
Congestion and noise levels were kept to a minimum.
The Recovery Manager (RM) provided timely and accurate status updates to the EOF staff.
The EOF staff worked efficiently to support and provide offsite resources to the onsite staff when requested.
In the EOF, engineering assessments were pursued aggressively, and both timely and quality support was provided to the TSC regarding plant mitigation activities.
The licensee demonstrated the ability to assess and integrate information from the reactor system's status and trends, radiological monitoring, source-term assumptions, and meteorological information to define the magnitude and location of radiological relea'ses.
Offsite dose assessments were updated with changes in plant status and release.
The staff interfaced extremely well with the State of Florida staff concerning offsite dose projections and coordinating offsite radiological monitoring.
The licensee demonstrated the ability to promptly recommend offsite protective actions that were consistent with those in the emergency plan.
The staff worked closely with State and local officials inside the EOF in the protective action decision proces ~
~
The EOF was well equipped with status boards and computer information systems. 'pace was sufficient to allow the staff to perform their duties.
Security personnel provided good 'coverage in controlling center-access and the Radiation Protection staff periodically
assessed the habitability of the EOF.
No violations or deviations were identified.
f.
Emergency News Center The ENC was staffed and activated by.pre-staged response personnel.
The inspector observed the preparation of news releases and the preparation of material for briefings.
The Joint Information Center facilities for utility, state, local, and NRC representatives were adequate, however, inspectors noted that the media work area space was limited and could become unsatisfactory with a large cadre of media personnel.
The inspector determined that the licensee had plans to secure a large tent to be used at the facility to accommodate a large media population if needed.
The licensee exercised alternate players in the ENC during the exercise.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Accident Assessment (82301)
This area was observed to determine whether. adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and
'specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.
The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.
Both programs appear effective during this exercise on analyzing the plant status so as to make recommendations to the EC concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant equipment, to prevent release of radioactive materials, and to terminate the emergency condition.
The accident assessment program included both an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the simulated accident.
During the exercise, the engineering
e
accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing the plant status so as to make recommendations to the Emergency Coordinator concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant equipment; to prevent release. of radioactive materials; and to terminate the emergency condition.
Exercise scenario objective D.2 required the dose assessment team to "Demonstrate the capability to perform dose assessment".
The inspectors determined that the TSC dose assessment team did not provide useful or timely dose projection estimates to the EC.
The EOF was activated at 8:23 a.m.
upon the request of the NPS and was declared operational at 10:21 a.m.
Once the EOF was operational it acquired the responsibilities for calculating dose projections for any release and the TSC dose projection staff's responsibility was to perform parallel calculations to validate the EOF staff's calculations,.
The release started at 12:00 a.m.
and was rapidly identified.
The EOF and TSC began their dose calculations immediately.
The dose assessor in the EOF completed dose estimate calculations at 12:43 a.m.,
however, the inspector noted that the dose assessor in the TSC was experiencing problems in calculating the dose estimates for the release and did not provide the first dose rate projections to the EC until 13:05 p:m.
The release rate had significantly decreased when the first dose rates were posted.
The inspector determined the following:
The TSC dose assessor was an alternate player.
The initial source term estimate was based on inappropriate default values.
This was identified by the dose assessment team at 12:55 a.m..
They elected to change the inaccurate values and recalculate the dose projections.
This contributed to a delay of over one hour from the onset of the release to the first dose projection estimate in the TSC.
o The dose assessment team in the TSC did not calculate integrated dose projections.
These estimates are required by EPIP 3100021E for PARs figures A-2 and A-3 by the EC as stated in precaution 4.9 and responsibility The inspector learned that the TSC dose assessor had keyed
'in a wrong value into a computer program that had cause a
different dose projection estimate than that determined by the EOF.
The dose assessor decided to recalculate the dose calculations which caused the delay.
Following the exercise the inspector discussed the problems with licensee representatives.
In a subsequent telephone communication with the licensee following the exit meeting the licensee committed to a full review of the event to determine the need for additional training or procedural guidance in this area.
The correction of this problem area is of interest to the NRC and thus will be carefully examined during a future inspection or the next exercise.
The inspector, indicated to the licensee that this area will be tracked as an Inspector Followup Item (IFI) (50-335/92-01-02:
Calculating radiological release dose projections).
Onsite and offsite radiological monitoring teams were dispatched to determine the level of radioactivity in those areas within the influence of the simulated plume.
The teams effectively demonstrated their capability to collect those data points and relay those data to the emergency response facilities.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10.
Protective Responses (82301)
This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, were developed and in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR.50.47(b)(10),
and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.J.
The inspector verified that the licensee had and used emergency procedures for formulating PARs for offsite populations within the 10 mile emergency planning zone (EPZ).
The Recovery Manager in the EOF provided timely and accurate PARs to State personnel.
PARs were routinely reevaluated for accuracy and status updates were provided to the offsite authorities.
The protective action recommendations were made correctly and,accurately.
The PARs provided the optimum protection for the public health and safety.
Having the representatives of the State and local agencies in the EOF allowed for good interface and exchange of information in formulating the PARs.
No violations or deviations were identifie Ra'diological Exposure Control (82301)
This area was observed to determine that means for controlling radiological exposures, in an emergency, are established and implemented for emergency workers and that they include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendations as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b) (11),
and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.K.
Licensee procedures required that the station provide and distribute dosimeters to emergency response personnel.
In addition, dose records were required to be maintained throughout the emergency.
The inspector noted that emergency response personnel in the ERFs were issued radiation monitoring devices and control of personnel radiological exposures for'eams out of the OSC was good.
The inspector noted that the licensee established radiological control points for the CR/TSC and OSC and habitability was confirmed and periodically assessed by, radiation protection personnel throughout the exercise through radiological surveys in the CR, TSC, EOF, and OSC.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine whether shortcomings in the performance of the exercise were brought to the attention of management and documented for corrective action pursuant to
CFR 50.47(b)(14),
CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The licensee conducted facility critiques with exercise players immediately following the exercise termination.
Licensee controllers and observers conducted additional critiques prior to the formal critique to management on February 14, 1992.
Issues identified by the licensee's staff during the exercise were discussed by licensee representatives during the critique.
The inspector reported that licensee action on identified findings will be reviewed during subsequent NRC inspections.
The conduct of the critique was consistent with the regulatory requirements and guidelines cited above.
No violations or deviations were identifie Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at. the conclusion of the inspection on February 14, 1992.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any documents or processes as proprietary.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
On February 28, 1992, in a telephone communication between licensee representatives (corporate and site organizations)
and the inspector,'dditional information concerning the February 12, 1992 emergency exercise was requested and discussed.
In the discussions the licensee committed to make reviews of several program areas and make procedural modifications as necessary to improve emergency response capabilities.
A second IFI concerning radiological dose projection calculations was identified and reported by the inspector.
Item Number 50-335/92-01-01 Descri tion and Reference IFI: Ability to.prioritize, control, and dispatch ERTs in a timely manner.
(Paragraph S.d)
50-335/92-01-02 IFI: Calculating radiological release dose'projections.
(Paragraph 9)
Attachments:
Exercise Objectives, Narrative Summary, and Time Line
ST.
LUCIE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE REPORT CHRONOLOGY:
Event 0730 The exercise started in the control room.
0800 0804 0806 A fire alarm actuated in the control room and an operator was dispatched to investigate the alarm.
The operator reported heavy smoke in the B switchgear room.
The fire alarm was.actuated and the Fire Brigade was directed to respond to the B switchgear room.
The NPS directed the operators to commence a plant shutdown.
0808 The Fire Team responded to the scene.
The Fire Team Leader reported heavy black smoke from the BS motor control center (MCC).
0816-The NPS declared a notification of an unusual event (NOUE)
on the basis of. EAL 3 (Uncontrolled fire within the plant lasting more than 10 minutes)
and assumed the role of the Emergency Coordinator (EC) in the control room.
0818 0820 0827 0834 0839 The EC requested assistance from the St Lucie Fire Department.
The EC declared an alert on the basis of EAL 3 (Uncontrolled fire potentially affecting safety systems AND requiring off-site support...).
The NPS directed the operators to de-energize all B side electrical equipment and to trip the unit.
The controller directed the NPS to stop this action because it would have decouple the data and scenario timeline.
The NPS/EC called the state warning point and transmitted the initial notification message.
The fire was reported to be under control.
The St Lucie Fire Department was reported to have arrived on-site.
0839 The NPS was relieved as the EC.
The EC departed for the TSC.
0841 The fire was reported to be ou ST.
LUCIE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE REPORT 0843 0845 0848 0853 The Fire Team Leader reported that the 1B5 MCC was destroyed and cable trays were damaged.
The NPS notified the corporate organization.
The plant secured.,from the fire casualty.
The NPS informed the EC that the alert EAL was no longer required and event termination was appropriate.
The EC elected to remain at the alert classification.
0900 0908 A contaminated injured person was reported outside the drumming room.
The NPS directed the first aid team to respond.
The NPS requested assistance from the off-site ambulance.
0911 0917 0918 The injured victim was reported to be contaminated.
.He had a head injury and lacerations on the arm.
Arrived in the TSC The ambulance arrived on-site.
0928 The control room reported that a unit trip had occurred.
0932 0935 The control room reported that a feedwater suction header rupture had occurred.
The B3 4160 volt bus lockout had actuated and the B diesel generator breaker was inoperable.
The B side condensate flex joint had separated.
Off-site radiation monitoring teams were dispatched from the OSC.
0940 0945 The control room entered EOP 2, Post Trip Recovery.
I The C Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (AFWP) stopped operating.
The NPS diagnosed that a total loss of all feedwater had occurred.
0946 0949 The NPS recommended'that the plant conditions were appropriate for the declaration of a general emergency.
The NPS transitioned to EOP 6, Loss of Feedwater.
0950 The damage report on the C AFWP indicated that the pump was severely damaged.
0957 1000 1002 1005 ST.
LUCIE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE REPORT The EC declared a Site Area Emergency on the basis of the loss of plant functions required for hot shutdown.
The EC directed plant accountability and the evacuation of unnecessary personnel.
The off-site monitoring team reported no indication of any release.
The TSC commenced transmitting the Site Area Emergency notification message to the state authorities and the NRC.
1009 1015 1025 1027 1030 1036 The NPS transitioned from EOP-6 to EOP-15.
The operators initiated once-through cooling using the high pressure safety injection (HPSI)
system and the pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs).
The injured victim was reported to have been successfully decontaminated and stabilized.
The Problem Solving Team warned the EC that restoration of AFW to a dry steam generator could result in a tube rupture.
The steam generators had steamed to a dry condition.
Security reported that the site evacuation had been completed.
The NPS directed the operators to swap charging suction from the Boron Acid Makeup Tank (BAMT) to the Refueling Water Tank (RWT).
1100 1109 1112 1115 1116 The only HPSI pump stopped operating.
All cooling water flow stopped.
The EC declared a.General Emergency on the basis of a potential core melt scenario.
A monitoring team reported 2000 R/hr on the containment.
The EC requested confirmation.
The previous report was corrected to be 2000 mR/hr.
The A containment spray pump did not start when containment spray was actuated.
The Recovery Manager in the EOF reported that PARs consisted of an evacuation of the 2 mile radius and the
1120 1130 ST.
LUCIE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE REPORT 5 mile downwind sectors.
I The TSC predicted core damage to occur at 1140 without cooling water restoration.
Core exit thermocouples (CETs)
and Containment High Range Radiation Monitors (CHRRMs) indicated that fuel damage had commenced.
1137 1200 The exercise scenario controllers inserted a message informing the TSC that repairs would be completed on the AFW pump in 20 minutes.
The EC authorized an emergency exposure limit of 12 Rem for the AFWP repair team.
The team had not yet entered the plant.
The scenario exercise controllers restored the A AFW pump and immediately started full AFW flow to the A steam generator.
Multiple tube ruptures occurred and'he RCS depressurized rapidly to saturation conditions.
A release started through the atmospheric dump valve (ADV).
1206 1208 The NPS reported the tube rupture and release to the TSC.
The A low pressure safety injection pump (LPSI)
was aligned for injection to the RCS.
1210 The TSC and control room envelope was locked down due to high airborne contamination levels.
1215 The NPS reported that operators had shut the ADV on the A steam generator.
(This report was in error, the valve did not shut.)
1223 1233 1305 The TSC realized that the release was still in progress based on field team reports.
The field team reported that the steam line to the ADV had ruptured and steam was continuously escaping.
The first dose projection results were posted in the TSC.
1315 1334 1337 The release rate had decreased to 1/10th of tech specs.
The repair team reported that the A HPSI pump had seized and was inoperable.
The hydrogen recombiner was started to remove the
ST.
LUCIE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE REPORT hydrogen gas from containment.
1405 1409 The PASS sample was reported to have been collected and was in the process of being analyzed.
The EC and the RM discussed the need to open the reactor vessel head vent.
1430 1434 The Problem Solving Team briefed the EC on a special procedure to initiate shutdown cooling.
The exercise scenario was terminated by the controllers.
'8
ST.
LUCIE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE REPORT
FLORIDAPOWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT 1992 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATEDEXERCISE FEBRUARY 12, 1992 3.2 SCENARIO TIMELINE TIME EVENT 0730 0800 Initial conditions establish Unit 1 operating at 100% power, in the middle of core life. Power history has been full power operation for the last 180 days.
Unit 2 is in day 12 of a 30 day scheduled maintenance outage.
The",1A" Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW)
Pump was placed on a clearance for motor bearing replacement at 1600 on February 11, 1992, starting the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LimitingCondition for Operation (LCO) clock at that time.
Demand on the system is moderate with an anticipated peak of 12,000 MWe, Service area conditions are normal.
Weather has been sunny and mild for the last week with occasional late afternoon and evening showers.
Forecast is for panly cloudy skies, temperatures in the upper 80's and occasional showers for the next four days. Current temperature is 78'ith winds from the East at 4-8 mph.
A fire occurs in the "B" Switchgear Room of the Unit 1 Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) in the "IB5" 480 Volt Motor Control Center (MCC).
0805 Senior Nuclear Plant Operator (SNPO) verifies fire. Fire alarm is sounded and Fire Team is dispatched.
0815 Fire fighting efforts are hindered by the lack of fixed suppression system and difficulties experienced by the Fire Team.
The fire burns gieater than 10 minutes, affecting safety equipinent.
0830 Due to difficulties experienced in fighting the fire, a request for off-site fire assistance (simulate4 is made, by the Fire Team, A
NOTIFICATIONOF UNUSUAL EVENT should be declared'.
FPUPSL Rev. 5 3.2-1 02/10/92 92EX
3.2 SCENARIO TIMELINE(Continued)
TIME EVENT 0835 Operators start a down power by injecting boric acid into the, Volume Control Tank (VCT).
0840 The off-site fire assistance is simulated to arrive at the East Gate by Security Controller message.
0845 An ALERTshould be declared based upon the request (simulated)
for off-site fire assistance
~
0845 (Approx.)
0900 Upon amval and setup (simulated) of the off-site fire assistance team, the fire is out.
The off-site fire assistance team is simulated to have departed site by Security Controller message.
0905 A person is reported to be injured in the Unit 1 RAB Drumming Room, a Player or Controller makes notification of the injury.
0910 (Approx.)
The First-Aid Decon team is dispatched to the injury scene.
The injured person is examined by the First-Aid Decon Team, triage and radiological assessment is performed, Off-site medical assistance is required and the individual is contaminated.
Off-site medical facility is informed, ambulance ordered and injured individual prepared for movement to the off-site treatment facility.
0930 A flexiblejoint fails on the suction header of the Unit 1 condensate pumps resulting in a large leak of condensate.
A rapid loss of condenser vacuum caused by the damaged suction header and loss of hotwell inventory causes the operators to trip the turbine and reactor.
Both main feed pumps trip on low suction.
The "1B" AFW Pump autostarts on the Auxiliary Feed Actuation Signal (AFAS) and heat damage causes the "1B3" 4160 Volt switchgear to fault. The "1B3" 4160 Volt switchgear trips as a result of the previous fire in the adjacent "1B5" 480 V. MCC. The "1C" AFW Pump controller only brings the turbine up to reduced rpm, producing minimal feed to the Steam Generators (S/G)s.
The severely reduced feed to the operating S/Gs begins to steam down the S/Gs, FPIJPSL Rev. 5 3.2-2 02/10/92 92 EX
GSPSQKAt.
TIME 3.2 8QENARIO TIMELINE{Continued)
EVENT 0945 (Approx.)
The injured individual has been transported to the off-site medical facility {Martin Memorial Hospital) by ambulance.
0945 The operators establish cool-down on the Steam Generator Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADV)s. The "1C" AFW Pump turbine experiences a loss of lubricating oil and locks up.'015 When S/G levels reach 15% Wide range, operators begin once-through cooling on the one available High Pressure Safety Injection
{HPSI) pump and the available Power Operated Relief Valves
{PORV)s.
1030 A SITE AREA EMERGENCY should be declared as a result of the loss of feed and initiation of once-through-cooling by opening of the PORV.
1100 1115 The one operable HPSI pump fails, stopping once-through cooling.
The lack of heat rejection causes Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
temperature and pressure to increase.
The PORVs blow down excess pressure to the Quench Tank and containment.
AGENERAL EMERGENCY should be declared based upon total loss of feedwater followed by failure of once-through-cooling.
Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) are generated on plant conditions.
1130 The lack of heat removal in the RCS and decay heat causes full voiding and the core uncovers as indicated on the Core Exit Thermocouples (CET)s.
Uncooled and uncovered fuel begins to release gas gap activity and fuel overheat begins to cause zirconium-water reaction, liberating hydrogen.
Containment High Range Radiation Monitors (CHRRM)s increase sharply.
Containment hydrogen increases.
1145 CHUMS have exceeded 4.2X10'/hr.
Protective Action Recommendations (PARs)
are upgraded based upon plant conditions.
FPUPSL Rev. 5 3.2-3 02/10/92 92EX
a
~
~
~
3.2 SCENARIO TIMELINE(Continued)
TIME EVENT 1200
.The recovery of the "1A" AFW Pump allows the'feeding of the
"1A" S/G and resumption of heat rejection through the "lA"S/G
'nd atmospheric dumps.
The addition of cold feed water to the hot and dry ",1A" S/G results in the rupturing of approximately 50 U-tubes in the "1A" S/G.
The necessity of rejecting heat mandates utilizing the one available leaking S/G to release contaminated steam.
On the initiation of feed to the dry S/G, the open atmospheric dump valve (ADV) fails as is, preventing the remote closure of the ADV. Off-site release rates increase sharply. PARs are upgraded based upon plant conditions.
1400 Cooldown of the RCS has reduced primary pressure and reduced the primary to secondary flow in the S/G being, utilized for cooldown, Auxiliary feed has refilled the "1A" S/G covering and partitioning the tube ruptures.
Release radiation readings begin to decline.
Field monitoring activities continue.
The emergency response teams continue to stabilize the reactor, verify safe shutdown and evaluate system integrity.
Discussions of recovery and reentry should begin as the release rate continues to decline.
1500 Termination of Exercise Play.
FPL/PSL Rev. 5 3.2-4 02/10/92 92 EX
L FLORIDAPOWER AND I IGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT 1992 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATEDEXERCISE FEBRUARY 12, 1992 3.1 NARRATIVESUMMARY 3.1.1 Brief Narrative
'The scenario begins with a fire occurring in the "1BS" 480 Volt Motor Control Center (MCC) in the Unit 1 "B" Switchgear Room (Unit 1 Reactor Auxiliary Building [RAB]). As a result of the fire uncontrolled'or greater than 10 minutes, a NOTIFICATIONof UNUSUAL EVENT (NUE) should be declared.
Due to inoperative equipment and valves associated with the "1BS" MCC, operators begin a reactor power, reduction.
Difficultyin extinguishing the fire prompts a request for off-site fuc assistance (simu)ated) which should produce a declaration of ALERT. A radwaste worker in the Unit 1 Drumming Room is injured and contaminated.
The severity of the injury requires transport to the off-site medical treatment facility(Martin Memorial Hospital).
A flexible bellows assembly in the Unit 1 condensate pump suction header fails, dumping condenser hotwell contents and breaking vacuum in the main condenser, The reactor and turbine are tripped and steam is dumped through the Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs).
Heat damage to the "1B3" '4160 Volt Switchgear caused by the previous fire in the adjacent
"1BS" 480 V. MCC causes a loss of the "1B3" 4160 V. Switchgear.
Reduced output on the "1C" Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) Pump causes a decreasing Steam Generator (S/G) level.
The
"1C" AFW Pump fails, resulting in total loss of feed to the S/Gs. When operators establish once-through cooling on the one operable High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) pump and Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV), a SITE AREA EMERGENCY (SAE) should be declared.
Failure of the HPSI pump results in loss of once-through cooling and should produce a
declaration of GENERAL EMERGENCY (GE). The lack of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) feed and steaming down through the PORV uncovers the core and causes fuel damage.
Recovery of the "1A" AFW pump allows restoration of feed to the "1A" S/G.
The addition of cold feed water to the dry generator causes tube ruptures and a release of contaminated steam to the environment through a failed open ADV.
RCS reflood, cooldown, feed up of the S/G and
'losure of the ADV isolation valve terminate and contain the radioactive release.
FPIJPSL Rev. 4 3.1-1 01/30/92 92EX
3.1 AMATIVESUEY (Continued)
3.1.2 Detailed Narrative Initial conditions establish Unit 1 operating at 100% power, in the middle of core life.
Power history has been full power operation for the last 180 days.
Unit 2 is in day 12 of a 30 day scheduled maintenance outage.
The "1A" Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) Pump is tagged-out for motor bearing replacement.
The pump motor has been lifted from the baseplate and the end bells and bearing housings disassembled.
The "1A" AFW Pump was taken out of service at 1600 on February 11, 1992, starting the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) clock at that time, and is anticipated to be restored to service in another 6 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
Demand on the system is moderate with an anticipated peak of 12,000 MWe.
Service area conditions are normal.
, Weather has been sunny and mild for the last week with occasional late afternoon and evening showers.
Forecast is for partly cloudy skies, temperatures in the upper 80's and occasional showers for the next four days.
Current temperature is 78'ith winds from the East at 4-8 mph.
At 0800, fire alarms at Delta 1.07.01 and 1.07.02 (Unit 1 Zone ¹7 A&B)occur. Trouble alarms occur for the "1B5" 480 Volt Motor Control Center (MCC). The "1B5" MCC trips. The Fire Team responds and fights the fire. The Senior Nuclear Plant Operator (SNPO) is dispatched to investigate the alarms.
Within minutes, the SNPO reports verification of fire and smoke in the Unit 1 Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) 43'levation in the "B" Switchgear Room.
The Fire Team responds and sets up to fight the fire in the "1B5" MCC. Due to a lack
'f fixed fire suppression and fire burning in the overhead cable trays uncontrolled for greater than
'0 minutes, a NOTIFICATIONof UNUSUALEVENT (NUE) should be declared in accordance with Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP
) No. 3100022E, Classificarion of Emergencies, EVENT/CLASS 3,
FIRE UNUSUAL EVENT ncontroll f
within th lant lastin mor than
~lminutt, Operators should have evaluated the consequences to the electrical system and operational status utilizing Off-Normal Operating Procedure (ONOP) 1-0910054, Loss of a Safery Relared
'.
C. Bus, and begun a down-power of the reactor utilizing boric acid feed to the Volume.
Control Tank (VCT).
FPIJPSL Rev. 4 3.1-2 01/30/92, 92EX
e
L 3.1 NARRATIVESUMMARY(Continued)
The Fire Team submits a request for off-site fire assistance (to be simulated). This should result in a declaration of ALERT in accordance with Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP ) No. 3100022E, Classificarion of Emergencies, EVENT/CLASS ALERT 3.
FIRE Uncontrolled fire 1.
Potentially affecting safety systems.
AND 2.
Requiring off-site support in the opinion of the NPS/EC.
r A radwaste operator (simulated medical emergency volunteer victim) working in the Unit 1 Radwaste Building Drumming Room is injured severely when a B25 box lid falls on the victim. A coworker (Medical Controller) carries the injured person out of the Drumming Room and makes a report to the Unit 1 Control Room.
The First-Aid Decon Team is dispatched to the scene.
The injured individual is verified to be contaminated and the severity of the injury requires rapid transport to the off-site treatment facility (Martin Memorial Hospital). (Due to the levels of simulated contamination and the life-threatening nature of the simulated injuries, the patient will be transferted to the off-site facility still simulated to be contaminated.),
The ambulance is ordered, the victim is given initial care and prepared for transport.
The simulated amval of the off-site fire assistance team will provide the final step to extinguish the fire in the "1B5" 480 V. MCC.
Fire cleanup and appraisal of damages in the
"B" Switchgear Room willbegin.
A sudden failure of a flex joint in the condensate header upstream of the pumps in Unit
results in the rapid loss of main condenser hotwell inventory and vacuum.
Hot water fills the pump pit area under the Unit 1 Turbine Deck. The turbine and reactor are tripped due to rapidly decreasing vacuum.
The condensate and main feed pumps trip on low suction pressure..
When the Auxiliary Feed Actuation Signal (AFAS) occurs, the "1B" AFW pump autostarts.
Heat damage as a result of the previous fire in the adjacent "1B5" 480 V. MCC causes the "1B3" 4160 Volt switchgear to fail.
The instabilities in affected control relays that tripped the "1B3" switchgear prevent it from being reenergized.
Loss of the "1B3" switchgear also causes the temporary loss of the "1AB" 4160 Volt and 480 Volt loadcenters until they are realigned to the
"A"side 4160 Volt and 480 Volt supplies.
When the "1C" AFW pump is started, the controller only brings the pump turbine up to 3000 rpm, providing only about 100 gpm of feed to the S/Gs, Operators stabilize the plant and begin cooling down on the S/G Atmospheric Duinp. Valves (ADV)s. The injured person should have been loaded and transported off site in the ambulance by this time.
FPL/PSL Rev. 4 3.1-3 01/30/92 92EX
3.1 NARRATIVESUMiMARY(Continued)
The "1C" AFW pump has been losing oil since starting up and the turbine seizes, The lack of feed to the S/Gs being utilized for heat rejection begins to steam down S/G level.
When the S/G levels reach 15% wide range, operators begin once-through cooling of the RCS utilizing the one operable High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) Pump and the one available Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV).
Upon the opening of the PORV, a SITE AREA EMERGENCY (SAE) should be declared in accordance with Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP ) No. 3100022E, Classij7carion of Emergencies, EVENT/CLASS SITE AREA EMERGENCY 1.C.
LOSS OF SECONDARY COOLANT TLOF. with once-throu h coolin initiated 2.
No main or auxiliary feedwater flow available.
PORV(s)
have been opened to facilitate core heat removal.
The one operating HPSI Pump bearings fail and the pump locks up, stopping once-through cooling.
RCS temperature and pressure increase as a result of the lack of heat removal.
The open PORV continues to blow down RCS inventory to the containment through the Quench Tank.
A GENERAL EMERGENCY (GE) should be declared based upon Total Loss of Feed (TLOF) followed by failure of once-through cooling in accordance with Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP ) No. 3100022E, Ckrssificarr'on of Emergencies.
EVENT/CLASS
'.A.
IN REA ED AW NE OF POTENT]M. C RE MELT'ENERAL EMERGENCY Ern r n
din r'
m ntth t lant conditi n exi t that m
f lar amounts f ra i tivi h rt rioda ar o
i leor IReR1, (Any core melt situation.)
3.
Total loss of feedwater followed by failure of once-through cooling (ECCS)
to adequately cool the core.
Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) should'be generated based upon plant conditions.
FPL/PSL Rev. 4 3.1A 01/30/92 92'
3.1 NARRATIVESAC'~Y (Continued)
The lack of sufficient heat removal and feed to the RCS causes reactor vessel level to decrease until the core is uncovered as indicated on the Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System (RVLMS). Uncooled and uncovered fuel begins to release gas gap activity and fuel overheat begins to cause zirconium-water reaction, liberating hydrogen.
Containment High Range Radiation Monitors (CHRRMs) increase sharply.
When CHRRM readings have exceeded 4.2X10'/hr, PARs should be'pgraded based upon plant conditions, The "lA"AFW pump is reassembled and restored for feed to the S/Gs.
The failure of feed valve controllers caused by the previous electrical casualties necessitates feeding of the "1A"
. S/G.
When the cold auxiliary feedwater is admitted to the hot and dry "1A" S/G, approximately
., 50 U-tubes rupture.
RCS equalizes into the S/G and the release of contaminated steam begins through the open ADV on the "1A" S/G.
(NOTE: ifoperators attempt to close the ADV, the ADV controller has failed "as is" and may not be operated remotely.)
The current system availability and the need to remove heat from the RCS necessitates steaming the damaged S/G to the atmosphere and releasing radioactive material.
The flooding up of the affected S/6 with AFW covers the ruptured tubes, dilutes and partitions the release.
Release radiation readings decline. Cool down and depressurization of the RCS reduces the primary to secondary flow. Repair and recovery team activities continue to stabilize the plant.
Field monitoring teams track and monitor the release from the S/6 ADV.
Cool down and the establishment of long-term cooling allow the closure of the affected S/6 ADV isolation valve, terminating the release',
Field monitoring activities continue on the plume in the environment.
Repair and recovery teams and discussions are continuing in the Emergency Response Facilities.
The exercise is terminated.
FPUPSL Rev. 4 3.1-5 01/30/92 92EX
e
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHTCOMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT 1992 EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EVALUATEDEXERCISE FEBRUARY 12, 1992 2.2 OBJECTIVES The St. Lucie Plant (PSL) 1992 emergency preparedness evaluated exercise objectives are based upon Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements provided in 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Producnon and Utilization Facilities.
Additional guidance provided in NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, Criteria for Preparanon and Evaluation ofRadiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support ofNuclear Power Plants, was utilized in developing the objectives.
The exercise will be conducted and evaluated using a realistic basis for activities.
Scenario events will escalate to core damage and subsequent release of radioactive material to the environment.
The following objectives for the exercise are consistent with the aforementioned documents:
A, Ac id nt m nt and Cl ificatio 1.
Demonstrate the ability to identify initiating conditions, determine Emergency Action Level (EAL) parameters and correctly classify the emergency throughout the exercise.
B.
~Notificati Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify and mobilize Florida Power and Light (FPL) emergency response personnel.
'.
Demonstrate the capability to promptly notify the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
State and Local Authorities of an emergency declaration or change in emergency classification.
3.
Demonstrate appropriate procedures for both initial and follow-up notifications.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to provide follow-up information to State. Local and Federal Authorities.
FPL/PSL Rev. 2 2.2-1 01/30/92 92EX
2.2 OBJECTIVES (Continued)
'.
Notification (Continued)
5.
Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate and timely information to State, Local and Federal Authorities concerning radioactive releases in progress.
C..Emer enc Res onse l.
Demonstrate staffing and activation of Emergency Response Facilities (ERF).
2.
Demonstrate planning for 24-hour per day emergency response capabilities.
3.
Demonstrate the timely activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC)
and Operational Support Center (OSC).
4.
Demonstrate the functional and operational adequacy of the TSC, OSC, Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and Emergency News Center (ENC).
5.
Demonstrate the adequacy, operabiliej and effective use of designated emergency response equipment.
6.
Demonstrate the adequacy, operability and effective use of emergency communications equipment.
7.
Demonstrate the ability of each emergency response facility manager to maintain command and control over the emergency response activities conducted within the facility throughout the exercise.
8.
Demonstrate the ability of each facility manager to periodically inform facility personnel of the status of the emergency situation and plant conditions.
9.
10.
Demonstrate the precise and clear transfer of Emergency Coordinator responsibilities from the Nuclear Plant Supervisor to designated senior plant management and transfer of Emergency Coordinator responsibilities to the Recovery Manager.
Demonstrate the ability to promptly and accurately transfer information between Emergency Response Facilities.
FPL/PSL Rev. 2 2.2-2 01/30/92 92EX
1 ~
Cr 2.2 OBJECTIVES (Continued)
C.
Emer enc Res nse (Continued)
11.
Demonstrate the ability of the TSC and OSC to coordinate the deployment of emergency teams.
12.
Demonstrate the availability of qualified personnel and
- timely organization of reentry teams to assist in accident assessment and mitigation.
13.
Demonstrate the capability for development of Protective Action Recommendations (PAR) for the general public within the 10 Mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).
14.
Demonstrate that PARs can, be communicated to State and Local Authorities within the regulatory time constraints.
D.
Radi lo ic ment and ontr I 1.
Demonstrate the coordinated gathering ofradiological and non-radiological (meteorological)
data necessary for emergency response, including collection and analysis of in-plant surveys and samples.
2.
'emonstrate the capability to perform dose assessment.
3.,
Demonstrate the ability to compare onsite and.off-site dose projections to Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) md determine and recommend the appropriate protective actions.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to provide dosimetry to emergency response personnel as required and adequately track personnel exposure.
5.
Demonstrate the capability for onsite contamination control.
6.
Demonstrate the ability to adequately control radiation exposure to onsite emergency workers, as appropriate to radiological conditions, 7.
Demonstrate the decision making process for authorizing emergency workers to receive radiation doses in excess of St.
Lucie Plant administrative limits, as appropriate.
FPUPSL Rev. 2 2.2-3 01/30/92'2EX
~ P
~
~
~
tw I
2.2 OBJECTIVES (Continued)
D.
Radiolo ical Assessment and Control (Continued)
8.
Demonstrate the ability to control.and coordinate the flow of information regarding off-site radiological 'onsequences between radiological assessment-personnel stationed at the TSC and EOF.
Demonstrate the ability of field monitoring teams to respond to and analyze an airborne radiological release through direct radiation measurements in the environment.
10.
Demonstrate the collection and analysis of air samples an'd provisions for effective communications and recordkeeping.
Demonstrate the ability to control and coordinate the flow of information regarding'ff-site radiological consequences with State radiological assessment personnel in the EOF.
E.
Pu ic Inf rmati n Pro ram 1.
Demonstrate the timely and accurate response to news inquiries.
2.
Demonsuate the ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the preparation, review and release of public information with Federal (NRC), State and Local Government Agencies as appropriate.
4.
Demonstrate, the ability to establish and operate rumor control.
F.
~MCh I E Demonstrate the ability to respond to a radiation medical emergency in a timely manner.
2.
Demonstrate the capability of the First Aid and Personnel Decontamination Team to respond to a medical emergency, administer first aid and survey for contamination on a simulated contaminated injured individuaL 3.
Demonstrate the capability to arrange for and obtain transportation and off-site medical support for a radiological accident victim.
FPUPSL Rev. 2 2.2-4 01/30/92 92EX
2.2 OBJECTIVES (Continued)
F
~MELEE FC 'd 4.
Demonstrate the ability of Martin Memorial Hospital personnel to ueat an injured and/or contaminated patient 5.
Demonstrate the administrative means to document and monitor status of a medical emergency victim.
G.
F~E 1.
Demonstrate the ability of the Fire Brigade to respond to a simulated fire emergency in a timely and appropriate manner.
H.
Evaluation Demonstrate ability to conduct a post<xercise critique to determine areas requiring improvement or corrective action.
I.
~Ex m tioo Areas of the PSL Emergency Plan that will ~N be demonstrated during this exercise include:
1.
Site evacuation of nonessential personnel 2.
Onsite personnel accountability 3.
Actual shift turnover (long term shift assignments willbe demonstrated by rosters).
4.
Actual drawing of a sample utilizing the Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS)'PL/PSL Rev. 2 2.2-5 01/30/92 92 EX