IR 05000335/1995006
| ML17228B129 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 05/05/1995 |
| From: | Robert Carrion, Decker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17228B128 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-95-06, 50-335-95-6, 50-389-95-06, 50-389-95-6, NUDOCS 9505110027 | |
| Download: ML17228B129 (16) | |
Text
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- 0 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 303234199 May 5, 1995 Report Nos:
50-335/95-06 and 50-389/95-06 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 Facility Name:
St.
Lucie 1 and
Inspection Conducted:
April 3 - 7, 1995 License Nos.:
R.
P. Carrion, Radiation Specialist Date Signed Approved by:
~r-T.
R. Decker, Chief D
e S gned Radiological Effluents and Chemistry Section Radiological Protection and Emergency Preparedness Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of the organization of the Chemistry Department and Radwaste Group, audits, primary water chemistry, the Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, Information Notice (IN) 94-81, the leaking Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)
Ion Exchanger, monitoring of the Refueling Water Tank (RWT) leak migration, the status of the Unit 1 nitrogen system check valve installation, the Meteorological Monitoring Program, radioactive waste handling and transportation documentation, and contaminated sludge disposal.
Results:
The licensee's organization of its Chemistry Department and Radwaste Group satisfied Technical Specification (TS) requirements.
(Paragraph 2)
The licensee's audit process was capable of identifying programmatic weaknesses and making recommendations for corrective action.
(Paragraph 3)
The licensee's primary water chemistry continued to be effectively
~
~
implemented.
(Paragraph 4)
9505ii0027 950505 PDR ADQCK 05000335
The Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report indicated that the licensee had met the requirements of the TSs and that doses to the public were minimal.
(Paragraph 5)
The licensee had taken a very proactive position concerning the.issues raised by IN 94-81.
(Paragraph 6)
The licensee had taken a proactive position in the resolution of the leaki'ng Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)
Ion Exchanger.
(Paragraph 7)
The licensee continued to monitor isotope migration due to the RWT leak.
(Paragraph 8)
The licensee had completed the installation of the double check valves and completed the upgrade of the Unit 1 nitrogen system to prevent future valve leakby potential.
(Paragraph 9)
The licensee's Heteorological Heasurement System was capable of fulfillingits required functions.
(Paragraph 10)
The licensee's radwaste processing and shipping was conducted in a competent, professional manner and the radwaste shipping documentation was thorough and in compliance with the applicable regulations.
(Paragraph ll)
The licensee had succeeded in 'its efforts on the issue of contaminated sewage sludge disposal.
(Paragraph 12)
REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
- E. Benken, Licensing Engineer L.
W. Bladow, guality Manager
- H. F.
Buchanan, Health Physics (HP) Supervisor
- C. L. Burton, Plant Manager
- L. Clark, Electrical Maintenance
- R. E.
Cox, Chemistry Effluents Supervisor
- R. Dawson, Licensing Manager
- D. H. Faulkner, Primary Chemistry Supervisor
- R. J. Frechette, Chemistry Supervisor D. A. Harte, Water Treatment Plant/Sewage Treatment Plant Supervisor E. Meyer, Chemistry Technician
- L.
WE Neely, Instrumentation and Controls ( I&C)
R.
D. Pitts, I&C Plant Supervisor
- L. Rogers, Acting Maintenance Manager
- J. Scarola, Operations Manager
- R. B. Somers, HP (Radwaste)
Supervisor
- J. T. Voorhees, guality Assurance (gA) Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included technicians and administrative personnel.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
- R. Prevatte, Senior Resident Inspector
- M. S. Miller, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview Acronyms and Initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
Organization (84750 and 86750)
Technical Specification (TS) 6.2 describes the licensee's organization.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's organization, staffing levels, and lines of authority as they related to the Chemistry Department and Radioactive Waste Group to verify that the licensee had not made organizational changes which would adversely affect the ability to control radiation exposures or radioactive material.
There had been no structural changes in the Chemistry Department since the previous inspection.
However, two technicians had left the department and discussions with the Chemistry Supervisor indicated that only one would be replaced, thereby reducing the Chemistry Department to
twenty-two positions.
The vacancy was expected to be filled from current FPKL employees.
There had been no changes in the Radwaste Group since the last time this area was reviewed.
(Refer to Inspection Report ( IR) 50-335, 389/94-16, Paragraph 2.)
The inspector concluded that the licensee's organization in the areas of Chemistry and Radioactive Waste satisfied the requirements of the TS.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Audits (84750)
TS 6.5.2.8 specifies the types and frequencies of audits to be conducted under the cognizance of the Company Nuclear Review Board (CNRB).
The audits are done by the Quality Department.
The department's auditing sections had been reorganized in January 1994 to combine the Performance Monitoring Group and the Regulatory Compliance Group to form the Quality Assurance (QA)/Performance Auditing Section.
In addition to the formal TS-required audits (conducted through the Functional Area Audit Program),
the section conducted periodic assessments called Performance Monitoring Surveillances (PHONS).
PHONS are mini-audits conducted for selected real-time in-plant operating, maintenance, and service activities to provide objective evaluation and qualitative verification that those activities are being performed in accordance with specific technical and quality-related requirements, as specified in the St.
Lucie Quality Department Quality Instructions (SLQD QI) 18.2, Rev.
0,
"PHONS," issued on July 29, 1994.
Their focus is to identify and document deficiencies, to obtain timely corrective action, and to provide assistance in the development of improvements where weaknesses are identified.
The inspector reviewed the following audits conducted by the QA/Performance Auditing Section within the scope of this inspection in order to evaluate compliance with the TSs and assess quality of the licensee's programs:
"Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Process Control Program, Effluents," QSL-OPS-95-04, dated March 30, 1995.
The following PHONS were incorporated into this QA audit:
PHON-94-006,
"Liquid and Gaseous Releases (Radioactive Effluents)"
PHON-94-007, "Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCH)"
PMON-94-008,
"Annual Radiological Effluent Report (In-Process Evaluation)"
PHON-94-076,
"PSL Chemistry QC Practices for Various Analytical Instruments" PHON-94-099,
"Sampling and Analyzing Continuous Vent Release Points"
"HP Department Audit," QSL-OPS-94-13, dated April 1992
"Secondary Water Chemistry,"
QSL-OPS-94-14, dated Hay 1994
"Performance Monitor Audit for January 1994," gSL-OPS-94-02, dated March 1994.
The following PMONS were incorporated into this gA audit:
PHON-94-02-06,
"Liquid and Gaseous Effluent Releases" PMON-94-02-08,
"Development of the Annual Radiological Effluent Report" PHON-94-02-11,
"In-Place Filter Testing" The audits were found to be well-planned and documented, aided substantially by the PHONS.
Findings of weakness were addressed by the responsible group via a written response which included:
actions taken/planned to correct and/or prevent recurrence of the identified finding; date when the corrective action was (or will be) achieved; identification of the individual(s) responsible for the corrective action; and the results of their review and investigation of the findings.
The inspector noted that the comments and recommendations were detailed and would aid the implementation of adequate corrective actions.
The inspector verified that the audit program was conducted in accordance with,the TSs.
The inspector concluded that the audit process was capable of identifying programmatic weaknesses and making recommendations for corrective action.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Primary Plant Water Chemistry (84750)
During the inspection, both units were operating at one hundred percent power.
Unit 1 was in its thirteenth fuel cycle, having completed its twelfth refueling outage during the autumn of 1994, and Unit 2 was in its eighth fuel cycle.
The next Unit 2 refueling outage was scheduled to begin in the autumn of 1995.
The inspector reviewed the plant chemistry controls and operational controls affecting primary plant water chemistry since the last inspection in this area.
TS 3.4.7 specifies that the concentrations of dissolved oxygen (DO), chloride, and fluoride in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
be maintained below 0. 10 parts per million (ppm), 0. 15 ppm, and 0. 10 ppm, respectively.
TS 3.4.8 specifies that the specific activity of the primary coolant be limited to less than or equal to 1.0 microcuries/gram (pCi/g) dose equivalent iodine (DEI).
These parameters are related to corrosion resistance and fuel integrity.
The oxygen parameter is established to, maintain levels sufficiently low to prevent general and localized corrosion.
The chloride and fluori.de parameters are based on providing protection from halide stress corrosion.
The activity parameter is based on minimizing radiation exposure to Control Room personnel during emergency operations.
Pursuant to these requirements, the inspector reviewed daily summaries for both units which correlated reactor power output to chloride,
fluoride, and dissolved oxygen concentrations, and specific activity of the reactor coolant.
For both Units 1 and 2, the arbitrarily-chosen period of February 1,
1995 through Harch 31, 1995 was reviewed and the parameters were determined to have been maintained well below TS limits.
Typical values for DO, chloride, and fluoride were less than five parts per billion (ppb), six ppb, and twelve ppb, respectively, for Unit 1'nd less than five ppb, less than four ppb, and six ppb, respectively, for Unit 2.
Typical DEI values at steady-state conditions were 5.0E-3 pCi/g for Unit 1 and 6.0E-3 pCi/g for Unit 2.
Neither unit had shown any evidence of leaking fuel.
The inspector concluded that the Primary Plant Water Chemistry was maintained well within the TS requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report (84750)
TS 6.9. 1.7 and
CFR 50.36(a)(2)
require the licensee to submit an Annual Radiological Effluent Release Report within the time periods specified covering the operation of the facility during the previous year of operation.
The TS also states the requirements for the content and format of the report.
The inspector reviewed the Annual Radiological Effluent Release Report for 1994, including the liquid and gaseous effluent results for that period.
The results were compared to those of 1991, 1992, and 1993.
The data for those years are summarized as follows.
St.
Lucie Radioactive Effluent Release Summary 1991 1992 1993 Unplanned Releases a.
Liquid b.
Gaseous 1994 Activity Released (curies)
a ~
b:
Gaseous 1.
Fission and Acti-vation Products Iodines Particulates Tritium 2.
3.
Liquid 1.
Fission and Acti-vation Products 2.
Tritium 3.
Gross Alpha 1.28E+0 1.02E+0 1.43E+0 1.67E+0 l. 25E+3 3.10E-5 8.00E+2 3.27E-5 5.09E+2 5.20E+2 6.00E-5 ( LLD 1.43E-2 2.96E-4 1.74E+2 5.69E-3 2.31E-4 6.04E+1 2.46E-3 1.22E-4 2.50E+1 7.34E-4 5.42E-4 3. 72E+1 4.24E+3 9.90E+2 3.47E+2 1.70E+2
Dose Estimates a.
Gaseous Effluents*
2.
3.
1.90E-3 3.45E-3 Noble Gas Gamma Dose (mRad)
Noble Gas 7.93E-2 2.78E-2 1.09E-2 Beta Dose (mRad)
Infant Thyroid (mrem)
1.60E-1 9.45E-2 5.42E-2 1.71E-2 b.
Liquid Effluents (mrem)
Critical Organ (Lung)
3.22E-1 8.60E-1 1.61E+0 6.25E-I Adult Whole body 7.99E-2 2.08E-1 3.72E-I 1.51E-l
- Estimated individual organ dose using the Land Use Census for the worst sector and existing pathways.
A comparison of,the activity released from liquid fission and activation products, tritium, and gross alpha, as well as gaseous fission and activation products, iodines, particulates, and tritium data for 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994 showed decreasing trends for gaseous releases of fission and activation products and iodines.
Discussions with the licensee determined that this decrease was due to a new design of the fuel pins, which made them less susceptible to damage from fretting which could lead to leaking fuel.
This new fuel had been placed into the core of both units over the last few refueling outages until both cores were totally composed of this new fuel.
No significant changes were noted in the other results.
For 1994, St.
Lucie liquid and gaseous effluents were maintained well within TS,
CFR 20, and
CFR 50 effluent limits.
In addition, the dose estimates due to liquid effluents showed no significant changes.
However, the dose estimates due to gaseous effluents showed decreases over the four-year period reviewed, attributed to the previously-referenced new fuel.
The maximum-exposed real member of the public due to releases of airborne I-131, tritium, and all radionuclides in particulate form with a half life of greater than eight days was identified as an infant, with the critical organ being the thyroid.
The licensee reported the maximum-exposed organ of a member of the public due to radioactive materials in liquid effluents in unrestricted areas to be the lung of an adult.
The maximum whole body dose was reported to be that of an adult.
Revisions 14 and 15 were made to the Offsite Dose Calculation Hanual (ODCH) during this reporting period.
Editorial changes were made to have the ODCH reference the specific section in the revised
CFR 20, the use of Effluent Concentration Limit instead of Haximum Permissible Concentration, and to correctly reference the exact wording of the TSs where the TS revision implemented wording using "Total Body" instead of
"Whole Body."
No revisions had been made to the Process Control Program (PCP) during 1994.
The following table summarizes solid radwaste shipments for burial or disposal for the previous three years.
These shipments typically include spent resins, filter sludge, dry compressible waste, and contaminated equipment.
St.
Lucie Solid Radwaste Shipments 1991 1992 1993 1994 Number of Waste Disposal Shipments
28
16 Volume (cubic meters)
182.1 213.8 88.1 150.3 Activity (curies)
825.7 388.2 12395 368.9 For the calendar year to date, April 6, 1995, the licensee had made three radwaste shipments to the disposal facility.
For solid radwaste, the most significant change noted for the period reviewed was that the volume of the shipments had declined.
Discussions with the licensee representative responsible for shipping radioactive materials indicated that the volume was somewhat suppressed in 1993 due to the processors giving priority to non-members of the Southeast Compact who were trying to dispose of their radioactive material prior to their official exclusion from the Low Level Radioactive Material Disposal Facility in Barnwell, South Carolina. 'owever, when averaged over the last two years to account for this aberration, the volume became about 120 cubic meters, considerably less than -the volumes of previous years, indicating that past efforts in volume reduction were effective.
The large activity reported for 1993 was due to a shipment of irradiated hardware.
Furthermore, in an effort to reduce/minimize future radwaste volumes, the licensee had recently established several teams to investigate alternative methods.
The inspector concluded that the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report was complete and satisfied TS requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Information Notice (IN) 94-81:
Accuracy of Bioassay and Environmental Sampling Results (84750)
IN 94-81 raises questions about the reliability of sample results and analyses performed by a bioassay and environmental contractor, Controls for Environmental Pollution (CEP).
The IN urges licensees who may have used the services of CEP within the last few years to consider how the results were used and whether potentially-inaccurate results would have any safety significance.
Furthermore, if inaccurate results could cause
significant safety concerns, the licensee is urged to consider what actions would be appropriate to confirm their sample results.
The inspector discussed the IN with supervisors from the licensee's Chemistry Department.
The licensee had used CEP for the analysis of beta-emitting radioisotopes, specifically Fe-55, Sr-89, and Sr-90 (arid Y-90) in 1993 and 1994.
The licensee explained its policy for sending beta-emitting samples to vendors for analysis.
Each batch of quarterly effluent and NRC-spiked samples was accompanied by one to three plant-spiked samples containing Fe-55, Sr-90, and usually Sr-89.
The results were reviewed for accuracy.
If the results of the spiked samples were good, the sample results were accepted.
If those results were unsatisfactory, the vendor was requested to re-analyze the samples.
The results reported by the licensee (via its contract laboratory, CEP) in 1993 were within four percent of the reference values of the NRC-spiked samples (as prepared by the Radiological and Environmental Sciences Laboratory (RESL) for the NRC), demonstrating very good analytical capability.
(Refer to IRs 50-335,
-389/93-27, Paragraph 7.a.)
Upon receipt of the IN, the Chemistry Supervisor directed a review of the licensee's recent dose results to determine the potential magnitude of error in dose calculations using the results from CEP.
Only less-than-conservative instances, i.e.,
when CEP reported lower results on a
spiked sample, were evaluated for the error.
For the second and third quarter results of 1994, only one instance was found to be less conservative, i.e., the CEP result was less than the spiked result.
The licensee calculated that this result would increase the quarterly dose by 0.01 mrem (or 0.7% of the quarterly Limit of 1.5 mrem).
Furthermore, until the issue with CEP is resolved, the licensee had contacted another contractor laboratory early this year to analyze for beta-emitting radioisotopes.
The licensee had sent spiked samples for analysis and was satisfied with the reported results.
Therefore, the licensee planned to use the services of this laboratory.
The inspector concluded that the licensee had taken a very proactive position concerning the issues raised by the IN.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Leaking Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Ion Exchanger (84750)
On January 30, 1995, several retention elements of the Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)
Ion Exchanger were found to have failed.
The retention elements are 1 1/2" diameter cylindrical screens of varying length which allow the water of the SFP to pass through a header system while retaining the bead resin within the ion exchanger.
The failure of the retention elements resulted in a loss of resin beads and the eventual failure of a downstream strainer.
A failure analysis determined that the failure mechanism of the retention elements was a ductile overload, most likely resulting from the introduction of air into the system during a resin backflushing operation and subsequent water hammer even The licensee postulated the likely failure sequence, going back to July 1994, based upon a review of conductivity and pressure changes of various components in the affected systems, primarily the.SPF and the Unit 2 Refueling Water Tank (RWT) but also including the RCS and the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS), the High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)
and Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) Systems.
A plan was formulated to recover as much of the estimated 25 cubic feet of missing resin as possible and to reduce sulfate levels.
(Sulfates are produced from resin breakdown in a high radiation flux field, around the spent fuel, for example.)
The RWT and the ECCS have been cleaned of resin and their sulfate levels have been reduced to pre-event levels.
The clean up of the SFP was continuing at the time of this inspection and was expected to continue for several weeks more.
The sulfate in the SFP had been reduced from about
ppm to about 1.8 ppm during the week of the inspection.
Total resin recovered amounted to approximately
cubic feet.
The inspector observed part of the recovery effort in the SFP as the licensee used an underwater camera and vacuum machine to locate and collect resin.
The licensee also commissioned an engineering evaluation to assess the effects of a sulfate concentration of approximately 6 ppm with respect to the corrosion potential of the SFP liner, fuel storage racks, spent fuel assemblies, etc.
as well as the effects of sulfates on RCS components based on the possibility of resin transport from the SFP to the RCS.
The inspector concluded that the licensee had taken a proactive position in the resolution of this event.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Refueling Water Tank (RWT) Leak Status (84750)
The RWT leak was,addressed in IRs 50-335, 389/93-17, 50-335, 389/93-27, and 50-335, 389/94-16 which described the circumstances surrounding the leak, measures taken by the licensee, and planned actions to monitor the released material.
The licensee had treated the event as an Unplanned Release and had incorporated this information into the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the second half of 1993 and the Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 1994.
The licensee had continued to monitor the migration of the tritium released through a system of twenty monitoring wells and four recovery wells, originally established to monitor and recover diesel product from a nearby diesel fuel tank leak.
The inspector went to the RWT location to review the general area, including nearby structures and monitoring wells.
The inspector also reviewed results of analyses from quarterly well samples taken in August and December 1994 and April 1995.
For the three wells nearest the RWT (Honitoring Wells Nos.
4 and 18D and Recovery Well No. 2), the tritium concentrations had dropped relatively
continuously for Monitor Well No.
4 (to 1.08E-5 pCi/ml in April) since the initial leak and had dropped steadily for Monitor Well No.
18D (to 6.99E-5 pCi/ml in April).
Recovery Well No.
2 had shown erratic but generally decreasing concentrations (to 2.27E-4 pCi/ml in April) of tritium.
In wells located more distant from the RWT, tritium activities were reported to be less than the Minimum Detectable Activity (HDA) to a
maximum of 6. 16E-5 pCi/ml (for the two other wells reporting activity in April).
The inspector concluded that the licensee was adequately monitoring the migration of the release and that the public health and safety was not adversely affected by this release.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Check Valve Installation Status (84750)
Due to two similar unplanned releases in late 1992 and early 1993 via leakby of the ni.trogen supply valve, the licensee had decided to install a double check valve on the nitrogen supply line to the Unit 1 Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) identical to that of Unit 2 to prevent back flow from the potentially radioactive RAB to the Secondary Plant side of the nitrogen system.
(The installation brought the Unit 1 design up to a level equal to that of the Unit 2 design for the nitrogen supply line, which had incorporated the double check valve into its original design.
Refer to Paragraph 7 of IR 93-09,)
The licensee executed the check valve installation via Plant Change/Modification (PCM)-142-193M and its associated Construction Work Order (CWO) 6519.
The work was completed and turned over to the Startup Department on August 10, 1994.
The inspector verified the installation in the field and noted the check valve numbers to be V29191 and V29196, respectively.
The inspector concluded that the licensee had taken appropriate action to upgrade the nitrogen system to prevent future valve leakby potential by the installation of the double check valves.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Meteorological Monitoring Program (84750)
The information obtained from the Meteorological Monitoring Program is integral to the determination of offsite dose projection.
TS 6. 10.2.o requires an annual summary of hourly meteorological data collected over the previous calendar year, including wind speed, wind direction, atmospheric stability, and precipitation (if measured).
The inspector reviewed the Meteorological Monitoring Program of St. Lucie.
The review included direct observation and discussions with a cognizant licensee representative.
The inspector determined that St.
Lucie still had one meteorological tower and that it was unchanged from the previous review.
(Refer to IR 50-335, 389/92-02.)
Heteorological Tower TS 3.3.3.4 requires operability of the meteorological monitoring instrumentation at all times.
The inspector walked down the meteorological tower and associated instrumentation to verify by direct observation that the meteorological monitoring instrumentation and related channels were operable and maintained.
Instruments utilizing continuous-recording tape were used to save information concerning the various meteorological parameters.
The upper wind speed and direction were recorded on one plot and the lower wind speed and direction on another.
On yet another, upper temperature (both channels),
lower temperature (both channels),
differential temperature (both channels),
and rainfall were all recorded.
Also, a digital readout which averaged the data of the last fifteen minutes was available.
The inspector also noted that backup power was supplied by batteries.
From discussions with the licensee while reviewing the instrumentation, the licensee was planning to replace the existing structure which houses the instrumentation with a more-durable concrete structure.
Heteorological information was supplied to the Emergency Response Data Acquisition and Display System (ERDADS) in the control room by a VHF radio transmitter or a redundant hard-wired landline.
In the event that the tower was out of service, there was no back-up system on the site.
However, the essential parameters could be obtained from the commercial airport of West Palm Beach, Florida, about fiftymiles south of the plant.
Calibration of Instrumentation The licensee completed its most recent semiannual calibration of the meteorological instrumentation (as required by TS 4.3.3.4)
in December 1994.
The inspector reviewed records of the previous three calibrations.
IKC Procedure No.
1400055,
"Environmental Data Acquisition Semi-Annual Calibration," was used for the calibrations.
The earliest of the three reviewed calibration was done in late October 1993 and the next in late Hay 1994.
All calibrations were satisfactorily performed.
Control Room The inspector went to the Unit 1 control room to verify the capability of the ERDADS to call up the required meteorological data.
The system functioned well, supplying wind speed, wind direction, and air temperature at both the 10-and 57.9-meter stations.
In addition, the inspector observed a cabinet which housed the Meteorological Data Acquisition System, which received its information via radio transmission from the meteorological shack at the base of the meteorological tower.
In addition to the differential temperature, wind speed, wind direction, and air temperature at both the 10-and 57.9-meter stations were availabl Based on the scope of this review, the inspector determined that the Meteorological Measurement System was capable of fulfillingits required functions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
ll.
Radwaste Processing and Transportation (86750)
CFR 71.5 (a) requires that each licensee who transfers licensed material outside of the confines of its plant or other place of use, or who delivers licensed material to a carrier for transport, shall comply with the applicable requirements of the regulations appropriate to the mode of transport of the Department of Transportation (DOT) in 49 CFR, Parts 170 through 189.
The licensee's program for the packaging and transportation of radioactive materials, including solid radwaste, was conducted by the Radioactive Waste Group within the Health Physics Department.
Radwaste was processed and packaged (including the preparation of shipping documentation)
by the Radwaste Group, with the assistance of Radiation Protection Hen (RPH) loaned from the Health Physics Operations Department to complete specific tasks, such as loading a shipment or compacting contaminated material.
a ~
b.
Radioactive Material Shipping Documentation Packages Because no radioactive material shipments were scheduled during the period of the inspection, the inspector reviewed the documentation packages for shipments which had been made since the last inspection, including:
Radioactive Material Shipment No. 94-53, a Limited guantity Shipment containing Pressurizer Code Safety Valves, Hain Steam Valves, and spare parts, destined for decontamination; Radioactive Material Shipment No. 94-54, a
Low Specific Activity (LSA) Type A shipment of non-compacted Dry Active Waste (DAW), destined for processing (incineration and/or compaction)
before final disposal; and Radioactive Material Shipment No. 95-11, a
LSA shipment of dewatered bead resin and dewatered filters destined for disposal.
The packages contained thorough documentation about the shipments and included items such as unique shipment and shipping container numbers, waste content and volume, total activity, analytical summary and breakdown of isotopes with a half-life greater than five years, special comments, etc.
The radiation and contamination survey results were within the
CFR requirements.
Emergency telephone numbers and instructions were included in the shipping papers.
Solid Radwaste Volume Reduction The licensee had assembled task teams solid radwaste in an effort to reduce on plastic reduction)
at all steps of changing work processes to procedural to review all aspects of it (with a special emphasis the generation cycle, from changes to using washable
materials in place of disposables for everything from protective clothing and shoe covers to tool bags.
The licensee was also evaluating water-dissolvable disposable material for use in protective clothing, shoe covers mop heads, etc.
c.
Status of St. Lucie LLW Storage Contingencies The inspector requested an update on the contingencies being pursued by the St. Lucie management with respect to LLW long-term on-site storage and discussed those with cognizant licensee personnel.
Detailed plans were not reviewed but the licensee indicated that the plans originally developed prior to the life extension being granted to the disposal facility were being resurrected for implementation now.
(Refer to IRs 50-335, 50-389/92-02.)
The licensee planned to use concrete storage containers on a concrete pad surrounded by modular shield walls.
Soil core-borings of the prospective storage sites had been made and were being analyzed.
The licensee estimated required construction time to be a few months.
Meanwhile, the licensee planned to dispose of as much radwaste as possible prior to the closing of the disposal facility to maximize its current storage capabilities.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's program for the documentation of radioactive materials shipments was adequate to satisfy regulatory requirements and that the shipping documents were being maintained as required.
The inspector further concluded that the licensee was making a good effort to reduce radwaste and that the storage contingencies were appropriate.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Contaminated Sewage Sludge Disposal (84750)
The issue of contaminated sludge and its disposal was addressed in Paragraph 12 of IR 50-335, 389/93-17, Paragraph 11 of IR 50-335, 389/93-17, and Paragraph 10 of IR 50-335, 389/94-16.
Since the last inspection (94-16), the licensee had begun shipping the material to the Gifford Regional Waste Treatment Facility for normal treatment and processing, as approved by the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) via letter dated December 9,
1994.
Specifically, three shipments had been made; the first of which was made on December 15, 1994, the second on February 1,
1995, and the third on March 14, 1995.
Each shipment contained approximately 2500 gallons of material.
Sampling done by the State prior to leaving the site determined the maximum concentration of Co-60 to be 0.222 pCi/g, 0.365 pCi/g, and 0.309 pCi/g for Shipment Nos.
1, 2 and 3, respectively.
The licensee planned to continue to dispose of its contaminated sludge in this manne The inspector concluded that the licensee had proceeded in a prudent manner on this issue.
No violations or deviations were identified.
Exit Interview (84750 and 86750)
The inspection scope and results were summarized on April 7, 1995 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection results, including likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents and/or processes reviewed during the inspection.
The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietary.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Acronyms and Initialisms CEP CFR Ci CNRB CWO DAW DEI DHRS DO DOT ECCS ERDADS FPL g
LLD LPSI LSA pCi MDA ml mRad mrem No.
NRC ODCM pCi PCM ve Control nd Display System
- Control,s for Environmental Pollution
- Code of Federal Regulations
- curie
- Company Nuclear Review Board
- Construction Work Order
- Dry Active Waste
- Dose Equivalent Iodine
- Department of Health and Rehabilitati
- Dissolved Oxygen
- Department of Transportation
- Emergency Core Cooling Systems
- Emergency Response Data Acquisition a
- Florida Power and Light
- gram
- Health Physics
- High Pressure Safety Injection
- Instrumentation and Controls
- Information Notice
- Inspection Report
- kilogram
- liter
- Lower Limit of Detection
- Low Pressure Safety Injection
- Low Specific Activity
- micro-Curie (1.0E-6 Ci)
- Minimum Detectable Activity
- milli-liter
- milli-Rad
- milli-rem
- Number
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- Off-site Dose Calculation Manual
- pico-Curie (1.0E-12 Ci)
- Plant Change/Modification
- Process Control Program PHONS
- Performance Monitoring Surveillances ppb
- parts per billion ppm
- parts per million PSL
- Plant Saint Lucie QA
- Quality Assurance QI
- Quality Instructions RAB
- Reactor Auxiliary Building RCS
- Reactor Coolant System RESL
- Radiological and Environmental Sciences Laboratory Rev
- Revision RPM
- Radiation Protection Han RWT
- Refueling Water Tank SFP
- Spent Fuel Pool SLQD
- St.
Lucie Quality Department STP
- Technical Specification