IR 05000335/1995016
| ML17228B269 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 09/07/1995 |
| From: | Landis K, Prevatte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17228B268 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-335-95-16, 50-389-95-16, NUDOCS 9509180265 | |
| Download: ML17228B269 (15) | |
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Report No.:
50-335/95-16 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W., SUITE 2900 ATLANTA,GEORGIA 303234199 Licensee:
Florida Power E Light Co 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 License Nos.:
DPR-67 and NPF-16 Facility Name:
St.
Lucie
Inspection Conducted:
August 9 through August 30, 1995 Lead Inspector:
gP R.
revat
, Senior Resident Inspector Da e igned M. Mil er, esident Inspector Approved by:
. Landis, C ief Reactor Projects Section 2B Division of Reactor Projects Date Signed SUMMARY Scope:
Summary:
This special resident inspection was conducted onsite as a result of the licensee's identification of two Power Operated Relief Valves which were inoperable from the time of their installation in 1994 until they were repaired and reinstalled in the system in August, 1995.
Areas inspected included the licensee's identification of the inoperble PORVs, the immediate actions following the determination that the PORVs were inoperable, root cause determination, and 'corrective action taken by the licensee.
The licensee's root cause effort and corrective actions were found to be methodical and timely.
Post-maintenance and surveillance testing of the subject PORVs were found to be inadequate to ensure operability and, as such, constitute apparent violations.
The resultant inoperability of both Unit
PORVs was found to result in apparent violations of Technical Specifications on three occasions.
P 9509f80265'50908 PDR ADQCK 05000335
REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee. Employees
- R. Ball, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor C. Burton, Plant Services Manager
- R. Dawson, Licensing Manager
- D. Denver, Site Engineering Manager D. Dyer, Maintenance guality Control Supervisor
'J.
Marchese, Maintenance Manager
- C. Pell, Outage Manager
.
- D.'ager, St. Lucie Plant Vice President
- J. Scarola, St.
Lucie Plant General Hanager
- J. West, Operations Manager C.
Wood, Operations Supervisor Other licensee employees contacted included engineers,-technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Personnel
H. Hiller, Resident Inspector
R. Prevatte, Senior Resident Inspector
" Attended exit interview 2.
Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.
Back round Information St.
Lucie Unit 1 employed two PORVs.
The purposes for the PORVs were:
~
Pressure relief coincident with a high pressure reactor trip - The valves were designed to open at 2400 psia to minimize challenges to the pressurizer code safety valves.
Accident analyses did not credit the valves'ctuation.
Pressure relief under LTOP conditions
- The PORVs were designed to open at two selectable LTOP setpoints, based upon RCS temperature.
~
Once through cooling - The PORVs were credited in the licensee's EOPs for providing core cooling in the event of a loss of heat sink.
The Unit
PORVs were Dresser Industries Model 31533VX-30 pilot operated relief valves.
The valves'imensions were 2.5" inlet by 4" outlet valve with relief capacities of 153,000 ibm/hr.
The internals of the valves are displayed in Figure 1.
The principles of valve operation were as follows:
~
The main valv'e (responsible for actual RCS pressure relief) was opened by the force of water or steam acting on the main valve disc/seat interface.
The main disc moved within a guide cylinder and its movement was governed both by the differential pressure established across the disc and spring force which tended to move the disc into a closed position.
~
A differential pressure was established across the main disc when
'he valve's pilot valve was opened, venting a space inside the main disc to a low pressure area (the tailpipe).
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The pilot valve was actuated by a solenoid acting on the pilot valve lever.
~
When actuation was required, a signal was sent to the actuating solenoid, which stroked the pilot valve lever to open the pilot valve.
A vent path was thus established from the inside of the main disc, through the pilot valve, to a low pressure area.
The resulting differential pressure across the valve main disc opened the PORV main valve.
When pressure relief was no longer required, the actuating solenoid closed the pilot valve and the space inside the main disc was pressurized by system pressure through an internal orifice.
Differential pressure across the main disc was thus reduced, and the main disc was returned to the closed position under force of spring pressure.
Indications of valve operation included acoustic flow monitors at the discharge of each PORV, tailpipe temperature indication, and indication of solenoid energization.
PORV operation could also be inferred from changes in quench tank parameters (temperature, pressure, and level) or changes in RCS pressure.
The acoustic monitors employed in the PORV tailpipes were TEC Model 914 and registered a
0 to =-2V output in 10 discrete steps of 200mV each.
Output of the acoustic monitors was indicated in the control room, behind the main'ontrol panels.
The discretized output was indicated by ten LEDs per instrument channel.
On the energization of a single LED, a
control room annunciator was energized, alerting operators.
Indication of PORV Ino erabilit On August 4, 1995, the licensee performed ASME Section XI stroke testing on V-1402 and V-1404 (Unit
PORVs) per AP 1-0010125A, revision 39,
"Surveillance Data Sheets,"
Data Sheet 24.
The methodology of the test involved 1) placing the PORV control switches in "override" (which ensured that the valves would not open),
2) removing High Pressurizer Pressure bistables from the RPS cabinets (which would have sent an
"open" signal to the PORVs which would be blocked by the status of the
'control switches),
and 3) for each PORV, placing the control switch in
"normal," which would have sent the open signal to the PORV.
The stroke
time for each PORV was measured from the time the control switch was taken to "normal" to the time that acoustic monitors indicated that the subject valve had opened.
Once a valve stroke time had been obtained, the subject valve's control switch was returned to override to close the valve.
The results of the subject testing were that no acoustic signal was received in the control room, an increase in tailpipe temperature was observed, and an increase in acoustic levels was recorded on a plant computer.
The licensee then returned the valves to service while questions of acoustic monitoring calibration and threshold levels were considered.
The cooldown and depressurization of the unit, performed in preparation for RCP seal replacements (see IR 95-15),
continued and later that day, the pressurizer manway was removed, venting the RCS to the containment atmosphere.
Acoustic monitor calibration and verification were performed on August
and 7, 1995.
On August 9, 1995, the PORV surveillance test was reperformed with temporary acoustic monitors and the resulting acoustic signals indicated that both valves stroked in under one second.
LTOP was placed back in service.
The validity of the test results were questioned based on control room indications observed by operators.
The operators specifically observed RCS and quench Tank parameters in the control room.
The operators observed that the degree of change in the various parameters were less than expected.
The licensee then contacted the vendor to discuss possible reasons for the observed valve performance.
While evaluations were being conducted, the unit was taken to Node 4.
At 7:03 p.m.
on August 9, 1995, the valves were retested and found to be inoperable based, in part, on observations of RCS and quench Tank parameters.
Each PORV was declared out of service and the licensee entered TS 3.4. 13 Action (c), which required depressurizabion of the RCS and venting through a 1.75 square inch or..gr'eater opting within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.-
At 9:37 p.m., operators were directed by management to perform a
cooldown of the RCS.
When placing the SDC system in service, the SDC discharge relief valve lifted and would not reseat without securing the SDC pumps to reduce SDC system pressure at the relief valve.
This issue will be discussed in IR 335/389 95-15; however, the inoperability of the SDC system (due to the relief valve issue)
precluded the licensee from cooling down and depressurizing Unit 1.
Consequently, the licensee entered TS 3.0.3 at 10:45 a.m.
on August 10 and began a heatup to greater than 304'F, a plant condition for which TS 3.4. 13 did not apply.
The heatup did not involve a mode change.
A temperature of 305'F was achieved at 11:53 a.m.
The SDC system was returned to service on August 11, 1995.
A cooldown was commenced the same day.
The licensee made plans to re-enter TS 3.4. 13 AS (c) during the cooldown, and to create the required vent path by removing the bonnet of PCV-1100F, one of two pressurizer spray valves, which would create the required vent path to RCS cold leg 1B The subject AS was entered at 7: 15 a.m.
on August 11, 1995, and exited at 8:40 p.m. the same day, when the RCS was vented.
Dia nostic Maintenance As a result of the noted conditions, the licensee assembled a root cause team, comprised of personnel from Engineering, Maintenance and Technical Staff.
The team identified potential contributors to PORV inoperability, delineated test methods which would prove (or disprove)
the contributors, and summarized results.
Representative potential contributors included electrical/solenoid problems, pilot valve operability, tailpipe loads leading to internal valve binding, block valve stem/disc disconnection, and pilot valve vent line obstruction.
The inspector followed the licensee's root cause effort and found the licensee's actions to be methodical, comprehensive, and timely.
The subject PORVs were removed on August 12, 1995; and placed on a test bench for lift tests to be conducted under air pressure.
Both valves were tested at a number of pressures within the LTOP range and were found to be inoperable.
Disassembly and inspection revealed that the main disc guide was installed upside down, with the holes (required to vent the space below the main disc) located at the upper extreme of the main disc cavity such that proper venting below the main valve disc could not take place.
As a function of diagnosing the root cause, the licensee reversed the main disc guide orientations (to the proper orientation)
and retested the valves under air pressure.
Both valves tested satisfactorily.
The licensee also sent a spare valve of the same design to Wylie Laboratories for testing under water and steam pressure, as these conditions could not be established at the site.
The spare PORV was tested under water and steam with the main disc guide misoriented (the as-found condition of the Unit
PORVs) at pressures ranging from LTOP pressures to NOP ranges.
The PORV failed to open under any condition with the main disc guide misoriented.
Additionally, it was found that:
~
Under water pressure at 335 and 450 psig, 10-15 psig was developed at the discharge of the pilot valve, indicating that some leakage around the main disc guide was possible, but not enough to provide venting sufficient to open the PORV.
~
Under steam pressure from 50 psig to 450 psig in 50 psig
increments, 20-60 psig was developed at the pilot valve discharge.
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Under steam pressure at 2400 psig, 1500-1800 psig was developed at the pilot valve discharge.
The pressures and media flow detected at the pilot valve discharge indicated that acoustic data may be received during PORV testing without being indicative of a PORV changing stat Valve Maintenance Histor a ~
PORV Maintenance Prior to the identification of the subject PORV conditions, the subject PORVs were la'st reworked in November, 1994, as part of the Unit 1 refueling outage.
The rework was conducted by employees of Furmanite, which were used by the licensee for outage-related valve work.
Maintenance on the PORVs was performed by the same two workers.
The work package, which directed the rebuild, invoked the licensee's procedure 1-H-0037, Revision 6,
"Power Operated Valve Relief Valve Maintenance."
The licensee determined that step 9.8 "Reassembly of Hain Valve," step 7, which directed the installation of the main disc guide, did not include a
gC hold point to verify proper installation.
It was noted that this was the only component which could be installed improperly and result in undetected inoperability.
The procedure was revised on August 12, 1995, via TCR 1-95-195 to include a
gC Hold Point prior to reassembly.
The licensee contacted the Furmanite employees who performed the overhaul work in 1994.
The licensee prepared, and the workers completed, a detailed questionnaire regarding the work which was performed on the PORVs.
The inspector reviewed the responses provided to the licensee by Furmanite.
In summary, the workers stated:
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One worker had on-the-job training and experience on the PORV model in question, the other had no training or experience on this model.
Both workers felt they had adequate supervisory oversight and pre-job briefings prior to working the PORVs.
Both workers felt the procedure was clear during valve disassembly and reassembly and both stated it was worked in a step-by-step fashion, with each step initialed at the point it was performed.
~
Neither worker felt they were pressured by time constraints, although the supervisor for the two stated that pressure to accommodate the plant schedule existed, but that he had not applied this pressure to the two workers performing the job.
The inspector reviewed the work records for the two individuals involved in the PORV overhaul.
Both had extensive general experience.
Both were certified by Furmanite to meet the requirements for technicians delineated in ANSI/ANS-3. 1-1981 and ANSI N18.1-197 Post-Maintenance Testing The inspector questioned the licensee as to post-maintenance testing requirements as applied to the PORVs.
The licensee stated that post-maintenance testing was limited to a bubble test for seat leakage prior to reinstallation.
The inspector noted that I-M-0037 contained a note explaining that lift set point testing was not required, as the valve was lifted based upon solenoid valve input.
The procedure did not require a verification that the valve would change state under pressure prior to installation, but did include a check for main disc mechanical freedom.
In discussing post-maintenance testing with the licensee, it was stated that, while no documented lift test existed, air lifts were typically performed as a function of preparing for seat leakage tests.. It was explained that, upon initial reassembly, the PORVs rarely, if ever, satisfied seat leakage criteria due to relative misalignment between the main valve disc and its seat.
As a result, the licensee stated that lifts under air pressure were performed as a matter of course to allow the main disc to orient itself properly against its seat.
The inspector noted that the governing procedure included a note to this affect, but no evidence existed to indicate that lifts had occurred on the test bench.
The 1'icensee stated that, in discussions with the Furmanite Supervisor, who oversaw the rebuilding of the PORVs during the 1994 outage, the supervisor stated that he recalled at least
lifts under air pressure per PORV in attempts to obtain satisfactory seat leakage tests.
No documentation existed to validate the claim.
8oth of the workers who performed the valve maintenance reported that they did not recall air lift tests being performed; both recalled only seat leakage tests.
The inspector discussed the plausibility of air lifts with incorrectly installed main disc guides with the valves'endor representative on site.
The representative stated that, in principle, such lifts were possible if sufficient gaps existed between the main disc guide and the gasket below the guide.
The representative also state that such lifts were improbable.
The inspector concluded that post-maintenance testing, described in I-M-0037, was inadequate to verify that maintenance had been satisfactorily performed on the PORVs.
As described below, surveillance testing was performed on the PORVs during unit heatup and repressurization following the Unit I outage.
However, the inspector concluded that insufficient testing had been performed on the PORVs, prior to installation, to obtain a reasonable assurance that the PORVs would perform satisfactorily in the LTOP conditions which would exist prior to the subject surveillance tes The inspector discussed the issue of post-maintenance testing with operations personnel.
It was confirmed that operations had accepted the subject PORVs from maintenance with the assumption that they had been properly tested and, as such, considered them operable upon installation.
The inspector found this assumption to be counter to the understanding of maintenance personnel, as in-situ surveillance 'testing was considered to be the post-maintenance test of the valve overhaul.
The inspector concluded that the Haintenance and Operations Departments were under completely different impressions of the status of the PORVs following installation in the system.
As a result of this misunderstanding, the PORVs were placed in the RCS and were considered operable without adequate post-maintenance testing.
CFR 50, Appendix 8, Criterion XI required, in part, that a test program be established to ensure that all testing required to demonstrate that components wi,ll perform satisfactorily in service be performed and that the program include proof tests prior to installation.
FPL Topical guality Assurance Report TgR 11.0, revision 4, "Test Control," stated, in part, that a test program shall be established to assure that testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems and components will perform satisfactorily in service and that the program shall include proof tests prior to installation.
The inspector concluded that the licensee's failure to perform adequate post-maintenance testing prior to the installation of the PORVs into the Unit
RCS (and subsequent reliance upon the valves in an LTOP mode) constituted an apparent violation.
Surveillance Testin The inspector questioned the licensee as to whether any in-situ testing had been performed on the PORVs since their installation during the 1994 outage.
The licensee stated that two tests had been performed; the inspector reviewed the tests which were performed on November 25, 1994, with RCS pressure at 245 psia, and on February 27, 1995, with RCS pressure at 1750 psia.
Both tests were documented as satisfactory.
The satisfactory results were, by procedure, based upon acoustic data, as opposed to system parameter changes (e.g.
RCS pressure, quench tank conditions).
As stated above, results from testing at Wylie indicated that sufficient flow could be developed through bypass around a
misinstalled main disc guide (and then out an open pilot valve) to provide acoustic data without actual main valve movement.
The inspector concluded that the acceptance criteria provided for verifying PORV operability in OP 1-0010125A was insufficient to demonstrate valve operability in that tests performed on November 25, 1994, and February 27, 1995, did not detect the inoperability of the subject PORVs.
The inspector found that the root cause of this insufficiency was a failure to employ adequate acceptance criteria in AP 1-0010125A, revision 39, Data Sheet 2 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI required, in part, that a test program be established to ensure that adequate test instrumentation is available and used.
FPL Topical guality Assurance Report TgR 11.0, revision 4, "Test Control," stated, in part, that a test program shall be established to assure that testing required to demonstrate, that structures, systems and components will perform satisfactorily in service is performed and that the program shall include operational tests.
TgR 11.0 further states that test procedures shall incorporate requirements and acceptance limits in the applicable design and
'rocurement documentation.
The inspector concluded that on November 25, 1994, and on February 27, 1995, operational surveillance testing, performed under Administrative Procedure 1-0010125A, revision 39, Data Sheet 24, did not employ test instrumentation which was adequate to detect the inoperability of both valves and did not employ test acceptance limits derived from the valves'esign documentation.
Specifically, the use of acoustic data, as opposed to system pressure reduction derived from valve capacity, to indicate valve position was insufficient to discern the difference between bypass flow, through the PORV pilot valves and actual changes in main valve position.
The noted failure constitutes an apparent violation.
PORV 0 erabilit The inspector reviewed the licensee's activities with regard to root cause determination for the subject PORV conditions.
In particular, the inspector noted the following:
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Bench testing of both PORVs, once removed from the system and prior to individual valve disassembly, indicated that, the valves would not lift under air pressure at any process pressure from the LTOP range to the NOP range.
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Disassembly of each PORV resulted in the discovery of incorrectly installed main valve disc guides.
Upon correction of main valve disc guide orientation alone (i.e.
no other 'piece part changes or replacement)
for each PORV, bench testing under air pressure resulted in satisfactory lifts.
Wylie Laboratory testing of a spare PORV, under water and steam, under pressure conditions ranging from below LTOP setpoints to above NOP, indicated that no lift was possible with the main valve disc guide installed backwards.
As a result, the inspector agreed with the licensee's conclusion that the PORVs were inoperable from the time they were installed in the RCS during the 1994 refueling outage until they were removed and reworked in August, 1995.
Following the 1994 Unit 1 refueling, the unit was filled solid ori November 22, 1994.
The RCS was pressurized and in a condition requiring LTOP from November 22 through November 27, 1994.
The unit was
subsequently at NOP until a
SNO in February, 1995.
During the SNO, the unit was in conditions requiring LTOP protection from February
through March 1, 1995 (when pressurizer code safety valves were removed thus establishing a vent path)
and from March 2 through March 6.
Notably, on March 4, 1995, Unit 1 experienced a loss of shutdown cooling event with the unit in a solid water condition.
The condition was
- corrected by operators, but not before RCS pressure had exceeded the LTOP anticipatory alarm setpoint.
No LTOP lift of PORVs was demanded or experienced (peak pressure was 343 psia, LTOP setpoint at the time was 350 psia).
During the most recent SNO, which began with the unit shutdown as Hurricane Erin approached the area, LTOP was required from
, August 3 through August
(when the pressurizer manway was removed to establish a vent path for reduced inventory operations)
and from August 7 through August 10, 1994,
'(when the unit was heated to above 305'F to remove the requirement for operable PORVs).
On July 11, 1995, Unit 1 experienced a high pressure trip (see IR 95-14).
According to the licensee, at the time of the trip, both PORVs lifted.
The conclusion was supported at the time by the inherent design of the system, the fact that acoustic data indicated that the PORVs lifted, and noted increases in quench Tank temperature.
Upon a re-review of data (which suggested that pressure drifted above the PORV setpoint, as opposed to plateauing)
and an analysis which showed that the post-trip loss of heat source acts, in conjunction with steam reliefs to limit pressure increases, the licensee concluded that the PORVs probably did not lift following the trip.
The inspector reviewed the available data and agreed with the licensee's conclusion.
With regard to LTOP concerns, the licensee analyzed the impact of a loss of LTOP PORV function for the energy and mass addition events in the original LTOP design basis.
The licensee determined that, based upon current levels of Unit 1 reactor vessel neutron fluence, the maximum allowable vessel stress would not be exceeded for any of the previously-analyzed LTOP events.
Pressure relief by pressurizer code safety valves, or shutdown cooling relief valves (depending upon the event considered),
were found to be sufficient to limit peak pressures to below maximum allowable values.
The licensee's evaluation, JPN-PSL-SENJ-95-099, revision 0, "Evaluation of PORV Unavailability on Plant Operation," is currently under review by NRC.
TS 3.4. 13 required, in part, that two Power Operated Relief Valves be operable in "Mode 4 when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is less than or equal to 304'F, Mode 5 and Mode 6 when the head is on the reactor vessel; and the RCS is not vented through a greater than 1.75 square inch vent."
TS 3.4. 13 AS (c) required that, with two inoperable PORVs, at least one PORV'be returned to an operable status'or that the RCS be completely depress'urized and vented through a minimum 1.75 square inch opening within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The inspector concluded that, from November 22 through 27, 1994, from February 27 through March 1, 1995, from March 2 through March 6, 1995, and from August 7 through August 10, 1995, St.
Lucie Unit 1 was in conditions requiring operable Power
Operated Relief Valves.
However during the time periods stated above no operable relief valves were in service and the TS-mandated vent path was not established.
The failure of the licensee to complete the requirements of the subject AS is an apparent violation.
Im act on Unit 2 The inspector reviewed design data for Unit 2 PORVs and found that Unit 2 is not susceptible to the same failure, as Unit 2 employs Garrett/Crosby PORVs, which are of distinctly different design.
Additionally, the Unit 2 PORVs provide direct main valve position indication, provided by a indexing rod attached to the main valve disc which activates a reed switch.
The inspector reviewed AP 2-0010125A, revision 43, "Surveillance Data Sheets,"
Data Sheet 24, which directed surveillance testing for Unit 2 PORVs., The inspector found that the procedure directed that stroke time be based upon indicated valve position change, as opposed to acoustic data.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 30, 1995, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.
Proprietary material is not contained in this report.
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
EE I 50-335/95-16-01 Open LTOP Inoperability Due TO PORV Failure (Paragraph 5.b)
Abbreviations Acron ms and Initialisms ANS ANSI AS ASHE CFR DPR DS EA
'OP
~
FPL IR ibm LED LTOP mv NOP NRC American Nuclear Society American National Standards Institute Action Statement Code American Society of Hechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Code of Federal Regulations Demonstration Power Reactor (A type of operating license)
Data Sheet Enforcement Action Emergency Operating Procedure The Florida Power 5 Light Company
[NRC] Inspection Report pound mass Light Emitting Diode Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (system)
'illivolt Normal Operating Pressure Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OP PCV PORV psia psig PSL PWO QC QI RCS RPS SDC SNO St.
TS V
Operating Procedure Pressure Control Valve Power Operated Relief Valve Pounds Per Square Inch (absolute)
Pounds per square inch (gage)
Plant St. Lucie Plant Work Order Quality Control Quality Instruction Reactor Coolant System Reactor Protection System Shut Down Cooling Short Notice Outage Work Saint Technical Specification(s)
Volt(s)
~
e YPr.
l<Yrj, =
i~
///~~~i~l~~
343$ 6 Federal Register / Val. 60. Na. 12B / Friday, June 30, 1995 / Notices factors in arriving at the appropriate verity level witt be dependent an the stances ofthe violation.
owever. ifa licensee refuses to correct a minor violation withina reasonable time such that itwillfullyctmttnues, the violation should be categorised at least at a Severity Level R.
D. Violations ofReporting Requimments The NRC expects licensees to provide complete, accurate, and timely information and repoztL Accordingly, unless otherwise categorize in the Supplements. the severity level of a violation involvingthe failure to make a requimd report to the NRC willbe based upon the signiBcance ofand the circumstances surrounding the matter that should have been xepozted.
However, the severity level ofan untimely report, in contrast to no report, may be reduced depending on the circumstances surrounding the matter.
A licensee willnot nozmal1y be cited for a failure to report a condition or event unless the licensee was actually aware ofthe condition or event that it fatted to report. A licensee will.on the other hand, normally be cited for a failure to report a condition ar event ifthe licensee knew ofthe infazmation to be ze ported. but did not recognize that tt as required to make a report.
. Pzedechionsl Enforcement Conferences Whenever the NRC has learned ofthe existence ofa potential viohtion for which escalated enforcement action appears to be warranted, or rectzzxing nonconformance on the psxt of a vendor. the NRC may provide an opportunity fora pzedechtonal enforcement canfezence with the licensee, vendor, or ather person befom taking enfozcement action. The purpose ofthe conference is to obtain information that willasstst the NRC in determining the appmpzhte enforcement action, such as: (1) A common understanding offacts. root causes and missed opportunities associated with the apparent violations.
(2) a common understanding of corrective action taken or planned, and (3) a common understanding ofthe signiBcance ofissues and the need far lasting comprehensive corrective action.
Ifthe NRC concludes that ithas suiBcient information to make an informed enfozcement dechion. a conference willnot nmmally be held ess the licensee requests it. However, opportunity for a confemnce will ormally be pmvided before an order based on a violation ofthe rule on Deliberate Misconduct or a civil ty to an unlicensed person. Ifa canfmence is not held, the licensee willnormally be requested to provide a written response to an inspection report, if issued. as to the licensee's views on the apparent viohtions and their zoot causes and a description ofplanned or implemented coxmctive action, During the pmdecistonal enforcement conference. the licensee. vendor. or other pezsons willbe given an oppoztunity to provide information consistent with the puxpose ofthe conference, tnc)uding an explanation to the NRC ofthe immediate cozmctive actions (ifany) that warn taken followingidentiBcation ofthe potential violation or nonconformance and the long-term comprehensive actions that were taken or willbe taken to prevent recurxence. Licensees, vendors, or other persons willbe told when a meeting is a pmdecistanal enforcement conference.
Apredecisional enforcement conference is a meeting between the NRC and the licensee. Canfezences are normally held in the regional ofBces and aze not normally open to public observation. However, a tzial program is being conducted to open approximately 25 percent af all eligible conferences for public observation. t.e., every fourth eligible confezence involvingone of three categories of licensees (mactor, hospital. and other materials licensees)
willbe open to the public. Conferences willnot nozmally be open to the public ifthe enforcement action being contemplated:
(1) Would be taken against an individual. or ifthe action. though not taken against an individual, turns on whether an individual has committed wrongdoing; (2) Involves stgntBcant personnel fatlums where the NRC has requested that the individual(s) involved be pxesent at the confemnce; (3) Is based on the Bndings ofan NRC OIBce ofInvestigations report: or (4) Involves safeguards information, Privacy Act information, or information which could be considered proprietary; In addition, conferences willnot normally be open to the public if:
(5) The conference involves medical misadministrations or ovemxposures and the conference cannot be conducted without disclosing the exposed individual's name; or (6) The conference willbe conducted by telephone or the conference willbe conducted st a relatively small licensee's facility.
Notwithstandmg meeting any ofthese criteita, a conference may. stillbe open ifthe conference involves issues related to an ongoing adjudt~tozy proceeding withone or mora intervenom or whem the evidentimy basis for the conference ts a matter ofpublic mcozd. such as an adjudtcatozy decision by the Department ofLabor. In addition, with the approval ofthe Executive Director forOpeiattons. confmences willnat be open to the public whme good cause has been shown after balancing the beneBt ofthe public observation against the potential impact on the agency's enforcement action in a particular case.
As soon as it is determined that a conference willbe open to public observation, the NRC wittnotifythe licensee that the canfsxence willbe open to public observation as pazt ofthe agency's trial pzogram. Conshtent with the agency's policy on open meetings,
"StaffMeetings Open to Pub)tc,"
published September 20, 1994 (59 FR 48340), the NRC intends to announce open conferences normally at least 10 working days in advance ofconfemnces thxough (1) notices posted in the Public Document Room, (2) a toll-fme telephone recording at 600-952-9674, and (3) a toll-free electronic bulletin board at 800-952-9676. In addition, the NRC willaho issue a press release and notifyappropriate Stats liaison ofBcers that a pxedechional enforcement canference has been scheduled and that it is open to public observation.
The public attending open conferences under the trial program may observe but not participate in the conference. Itis noted that the purpose ofconducting open conferences under the trial program is not to maximize
'ublic attendance. but rather to determine whether pmviding the public with opportunities to be informed of NRC activities is compatible withthe NRC's abilityto exercise its regulatoxy and safety responsibilities, Therefore.
members ofthe public willbe allowed access to the NRC regional ofBces to attend open enforcmnent conferences in accordance with the "Standard Operating Procedures Far Providing Security Support For NRC Hearings And Meetings,".published November 1, 1991 (5B FR 5B251). These procedures provide that visitors may be subject to pezsannel scmentng, that signs. bannms, posters. etc.. not hxger than 18" be permitted. and that disruptive pmsans may be xemoved.
Members ofthe public attending open conferences willbe reminded that (1)
the apparent violations discussed at pmdectstonal enforcement conferences are subject to further review and may be subject to change prior to any resulting enforcement action and (2) the statements ofviews or expressions of opinion made by NRC employees at predecisional enforcement conferences, or the lack thereof, aze not intended to represent final determinations or beltefa ENCLOSURE
/ VaL 60, No. 126 / Friday, June 30, 1~
~ / Notices 34387 Pezsons attending open confezences will provided an opportunity to submit
'tten comments cancerning the trial program anonymously to the regional office. These comments willbe subsequently forwarded to the Director ofthe Office ofEnforcement forreview and consideration.
When needed to pmtect the public health and safety or common defense and security, escalated enforcement action, such as the issuance ofan immediately effective order, willbe taken before the conference. In these cases, a conference may be held after the escalated enforcmnent action is taken.
VLEnforcemeat hctioas This section describes the enforcement sanctions available to the NRC and spedfies the conditions under which each may be used. The basic enfarcement sanctions are Notices of Violation, civilpenalties, and orders of various types. As discussed further in Section VI.D.related administrative actions such as Notices of Nonconfozmaace, Notices ofDeviation, Confinaatory Action Lettezs. Letters of Reprimand. and Demands for Information are used to supplement the enforcement program, In selecting the enforcement sanctions or administrative
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actions, the NRC willconsider enforcement actions taken by other Federal or State regulatory bodies having concurrent jurisdiction, such as in transportation matters. Usually.
whenever a violation ofNRC requirements ofmore than a minor concern is identified, enfazcement action is taken, The nature and extent of the enforcement action is intended to reflect the seriousness ofthe violation involved. For the vast majority of violations. a Notice ofViolation or a Notice ofNonconformance is the normal action.,
h. Notice ofViolation h Notice ofViolationis a written notice setting forth one or more violations of a legally binding requizement. The Notice ofViolation normally requires the recipient to rovide a written statement describing 1) the reasons for the violation or, if contested, the bash for disputing the violation; (2) corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3)
corrective steps that willbe taken to pmvent recurzence: and (4) the date when fullcompliance wittbe achieved.
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The NRC may waive all or portions of a written xesponse to the extent relevant information has already been provided to the NRC in writingor documented in an NRC inspection report. The NRC may require responses to Notices ofViolatfon to be under oath, Nonaally, responses under oath willbe required only in connection with Severity Level I, H, or IHviolations or ozders.
The NRC uses the Notice ofViolation as the usual method for fozmalhtng the existence of a violation. Issuance of a Notice ofViolationis normally the only enforcemeat action taken, except in cases where the criteria'for issuance of civilpenalties and orders. as set forth in Sections VI.Band VLC,xespectively, are met. However. spedal circumstances regarding the violation findings may wanant discretion being exercised such that the NRC refrains from issuing a Notice ofViolation. (See Section VILB,
"MitigationofEnforcement Sanctions.")
In addition, licensees are not ordinarily cited forviolations resulting from matters not withintheir control, such as equipment failures that were not avoidable by reasonable licensee quality assurance measures or management controls. Generally, however, licensees
are held responsible for the acts oftheir employees. Accordingly, this poHcy should not be construed to excuse personnel erzars.
B. CivilPenalty A civilpenalty is a monetary penalty that may be imposed forviolation of (1)
certain spedfied licensing provisions of the AtomicEnergy hct or supplementary NRC rules or orders; (2)
any requtmment forwhich a license may be revoked; ar (3) repmting mquirements under section 206 ofthe Energy Reozgantsatton hct. Civil penalties are designed to deter future violattans both by the involved licensee as well as by other licensees conducting similar activities and to emphasize the need for licensees to identify violations and take prompt comprehensive corrective action.
Civilpenalties are considered for Severity Level IHviolations. In addition.
dvtl penalties willnormally be assessed for Severity Level Iand H violations and knowing and conscious violations ofthe reporting requirements ofsection 206 of the Energy Reoxganhatton Act.
Civilpenaltfes are used to encourage prompt identification and prompt and compzehensive canectton ofvtolations, to ema".ashe compliance fn a manner that deters future violations, and to serve to focus licensees'ttentian on violations ofsignificant mgutatory concmn.
Although management involvement, direct ar indirect. in a violation may lead to an increase in the dvilpenalty, the lack ofmanagement involvement may not be used to mitigate a dvil enalty. Allowingmitigation in the tter case could encourage the lack of management involvement in licensed activities and a decrease in protection of the public health and safety.
1. Base CivilPenalty The.NRC imposes different levels of penalties fordifferent severity level violations and different dasses of Hcensees, vendors, and other persona Tables 1h and 1B show the base dvil penalties forvarious reactor. fuel cyde.
materials, and vendor programs. (Civil penalties issued to individuals are determined on a case-by~ basis,) The structure of these tables generally takes into account the gravity ofthe violation as a primary consideration and the abilityto pay as a secondary consideration. Generally, operations involvinggmater nudear material inventories and greater potential consequences to the public and Hcensee employees receive higher dvil penalties. Regarding the secondary factor ofabilityofvarious dasses of Hcxmsczes to pay the civilpenalties, it4s not the NRC's intention that the economic impact ofa civilpenalty be so severe that it puts a licensee out of business (orders, rather than civil penalties. are used when the intent is to suspend or terminate licensed activities)
or advexsely affects a licensee's ability to safely conduct lfcensed activities.
The detenent effect ofcivilpenalties is best served when the amounts ofthe penalties take into account a Hcensee's abilityto pay. In determining the amount ofcivilpenalties for licensees forwhom the tables do not rellect the ability to pay or the gravity ofthe violatton. the NRC willconstder as necessary an increase or decrease on a case-by~ basiL Normally,ifa licensee can demonstrate finandal hazdship, the NRC wificonsider payments over time, induding interest.
rather than redudng the amount ofthe civilpenalty. However, whme a licensee daims finandal hardshIp, the licensee willnormally be zequimd to address why tt has suffictent resources to safely conduct lfcensed activities and pay license and inspection fees.
2. CtvilPenalty Assessment In4tn effortto (1) emphashe the importance ofadhmence to requirements and (2) reinforce prompt self-tdenttficatton ofproblems and root causes and prompt and compmhensive conection ofviolations, the NRC reviews each pzoposed dvilpenalty on its own merits and. after coasfdming all relevant circumstances, may adjust the base civilpenalties shown in Table 1h and 1B forSeverity Level I, H, and IH violations as described below.
NUREG-1600 ENCLOSURE 2