ML18051B528

Revised Psar,Spds

ML18051B528
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	08/21/1985
From:	CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML18051B527	List: ML18051B526 ML18051B528
References
NUDOCS 8508280261
Download: ML18051B528 (56)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:ATTACHMENT 1 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 Revised Preliminary Safety Analysis Report Safety Parameter Display System August 21, 1985 r* B5082B026i *a5082l '~ PDR ADOCK 05000255 PDR 50 Pages IC0885-0053S-NL01

Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant - Docket 50-255 Revised Preliminary Safety Analysis Report Safety Parameter Display System MI0785-0559A-TC01-NL04

I 1.0 Introduction Consumers Power Company's submittal dated July 31, 1984 forwarded a Preliminary Safety Evaluation Report for the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS). This report described a single CRT display page consist-ing of bar charts of various plant parameters, which were to provide the control room operator with the information necessary to assess the safety status of the plant. During our evaluation of the proposed display, it was noted that additional parameters were required to provide adequate information sufficient to identify the plant's status. Incorporation of these additional parameters increased the number of bar charts to be displayed to a point where the information to be displayed on a single CRT screen was becoming congested and would be difficult to read and interpret. As a result of the single display page becoming overly congested, Consumers Power reviewed the design concept of the computer based Criti-cal Function Monitoring System (CFMS) provided by Combustion Engineering to reevaluate its use as a Safety Parameter Display System. The CFMS is a multicolor CRT based system providing multiple fixed format graphic displays. These displays are arranged in a hierarchy for efficient operator access. The top level display consists of status indicators providing an overall status of plant safety functions and allows for quick access to lower level displays which provide more detailed inf or-ma tion. Because the parameters to be included in the SPDS display were generated by the CFM they will remain available to the operators. Based on our evaluation of the CFMS against the guidelines provided in Section 18.2 of NUREG-0800, Consumers Power has concluded that the CFMS currently installed and being upgraded at Palisades meets the intent of the Safety Parameter Display System required by Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. This report provides the preliminary safety analysis of the CFM for use as the SPDS and supersedes the SPDS description provided in Consumers Power Company's July 31, 1984 letter. MI0785-0559A-TC01-NL04

The Critical Function Monitor as described in this report, with the exception of the data link to the meteorological tower and several inputs from radiation monitors, is currently installed and functioning. An evaluation of the alarm algorithms used in the top level display is being performed to assure that these algorithms are consistent with information provided in the Combustion Engineering Emergency Procedure Guidelines (CEN-152) and to incorporate core cooling instrumentation. Modifications to the software are expected to result from this evalua-tion. Addition of the data links to the meteorological tower, incorpor-ation of additional radiation monitor inputs and software modifications based on evaluation of the alarm algorithms will be completed and the CFM/SPDS declared operational by December 1986. This date is consistent with implementation of revised Emergency Procedures based on the CEN-152 Guidelines. 2.0 CFM/SPDS Computer Hardware Description Figure 1 shows a block diagram of the CFM/SPDS computer system. The computer system with the exception of the safety channel input multi-plexer cabinets is non-class lE. Major components of the system include the input multiplexers and communications station, the central process-ing unit, and the CRT displays and keyboards. Inputs to the CFM/SPDS computer are provided through three separate multiplexer cabinets. One cabinet is provided for left safety channel input signals, one for right safety channel input signals and one for non-safety input signals. The use of three separate cabinets provides for separation between safety and non-safety signals. Signal isolation is provided by the use of fiber-optic communication links between safety and non-safety input multiplexer cabinets and between the redundant division safety channel multiplexer cabinets. As the fiber-optic links are non-metallic, electrical faults in one multiplexer cabinet cannot propagate to any other multiplexer cabinet. MI0785-0559A-TC01-NL04 2

Additional inputs to the CFM/SPDS computer are provided from the non-class lE meteorological tower computer. Parameters such as wind speed, direction and air temperature at various elevations are data linked to the CFM/SPDS computer over in-plant telephone lines. The Central Processing Unit (CPU) receives input data from the multi-plexers every two seconds. Analog values received from the multiplexers are converted to engineering units, limit checked to assure they are within expected range, alarm checked against programmed set points and then are processed to update displays at the various CRT's. Digital inputs received from the multiplexers (status inputs) are processed to update appropriate CRT displays. Historical data is stored on the system disk. Multicolor CRT's and keyboards are provided in the Control Room, the Technical Support Center, the Emergency Operations Facility and Consumers Power Company's General Office in Jackson, Michigan. Hard-copy devices which allow reproduction of a CRT display in black and white are provided in the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility. The location of the CFM/SPDS CRT in the Control Room is shown in Fig-ure 2. The CRT is located on the operator's desk to allow the operators access during routine operations. During emergency or upset conditions, the operators will be at the control consoles and the CFM/SPDS will be utilized by the Shift Supervisor and Shift Engineer to evaluate plant status and coordinate recovery efforts. MI0785-0559A-TC01-NL04

1 3.0 CFM/SPDS Displays and Functions The primary man-machine interface to the CFM/SPDS are multicolor CRT display stations. The stations can provide any of the multiple stored fixed format graphic displays. These displays are arranged in a hierarchy for efficient operator access. This hierarchy consists of three levels: Level 1 - Overall status Level 2 - Function status Level 3 - Subfunction diagnostic The Level 1 critical function display (Figure 3) provides the operator with a concise display of the status of the critical functions. This display consists of a 3 x 3 matrix of alarm windows providing the status of critical plant functions. The functions monitored include: Core reactivity PCS inventory PCS pressure Core heat removal PCS heat removal Containment temperature/pressure Containment isolation Environmental 4 The first seven of these critical functions are those safety functions identified in the Combustion Engineering Emergency Procedure Guidelines (CEN-152). This provides consistency between the CFM/SPDS status display and the Emergency Operating Procedures which will be prepared from the CEN-152 guidelines. The last status window, Environmental, was included to indicate to the operator the potential for of.f-site radiation releases from various plant sources. A more detailed description of the critical function display is provided in Section 5. MI0785-0559A-TC01-NL04

/ - 5 Associated with each critical function alarm window is a sector number. This sector number is utilized by the operator to access more detailed information on the affected function by calling up a Level 2 display. Figure 4 shows a typical Level 2 display. Level 2 displays are gener-ally mimic diagrams of major plant systems showing values of important parameters and the status of major components. Additional sector numbers are located on the Level 2 displays which are utilized to guide the operator to Level 3 displays. A typical Level 3 display is shown in Figure 5. Level 3 displays are generally mimics which provide additional information on subsystems of major systems. For example, Figure 4 shows a Level 2 diagram of the Primary Coolant System, Figure 5 shows the Level 3 display of the Pressurizer which is a subsystem of the Primary Coolant System. Descriptions and figures of the current Level 2 and 3 displays are provided in Appendix A. In addition to the critical functions top level page and Level 2 and 3 mimics, additional displays are incorporated to provide the operator information concerning computer system and plant status. These include the following:

1.

Display Directory - Provides a listing of all displays and associated page numbers

2.

Bad Data List - Provides a listing of all inputs which have failed on a multiplexer chassis

3.

Computer Status List - Provides information on the present status of the computer

4.

Out of Range List - Provides a listing of those sensors which have failed range validity tests

5.

Current Alarm List - Provides a listing of current alarms, and indi-cates those which are unacknowledged MI0785-0559A-TC01-NL04

/

• 4.0 The capability to trend input parameters to the CFM/SPDS is provided.

Two display pages of trend information can be accessed by the operator. Each trend page can display the time history of up to four parameters simultaneously. The parameters to be trended on a page and the time base to be utilized on that display page are selectable by the operator. Figure 6 shows a typical trend display. 6 The CFM provides the capability for historical data storage and retrieval. All inputs to the CFM database are included in the data storage. Data is stored at two resolutions. High resolution data is stored at two second intervals for the previous 16 hours while low resolution data is stored at one minute intervals for the previous two weeks. Capability is pro-vided to dump the data to magnetic tape or the line printer for long term storage, or to view the data in graphic form on a system CRT. Human Factors Considerations As previously discussed, the CFM/SPDS consists of multicolor CRT displays. Consideration of human factors criteria was provided in designing the dis-plays and the man-machine interface utilized for display selection. This section discusses the human factors features of the CFM/SPDS. When utilizing a hierarchical display i.t is vital that the operator be able to quickly move from display to display in order to rapidly obtain required information. The man-machine interface of the CFM/SPDS was designed toallow the operator to "zoom in" on problem areas in a rapid, straight-forward manner. The following paragraphs describe the man-machine interface used in the CFM/SPDS to allow for rapid movement from display to display. MI0785-0559A-TC01-NL04

Figure 7 is a diagram of the CFM/SPDS display hierarchy. To move from display to display within this hierarchy the operator utilizes the key-board shown in Figure 8. Through this keyboard the operator has several options for moving from display to display. Each display has its own individual three digit page number. The first digit in the page number is the level associated with the page. There are three methods of getting to any particular page. The first method uses the "PAGE" function key on the keyboard. "PAGE" provides direct operator access to any display in the system. The second method utilizes the "SECTOR" key to provide a pre-engineered hierarchical access that automatically leads the operator to the source of critical process problems. 7 To access a Level 2 display upon the occurrence of a sector alarm, the operator would press the "SECTOR" key, followed by the number, one through nine, indicated in the flashing alarm color near the affected critical function, followed by the "EXECUTE" key. This sequence would cause the correct Level 2 display of the detailed status of the alarmed function to appear on the operator's CRT. Should further diagnosis be necessary, the Level 2 display would also have a sector alarm indicator that would lead the operator to a Level 3 display of detailed function diagnostics. Should the operator desire to return to a higher level display, depress-ing "SECTOR" zero will cause a return to the higher level display pre-viously selected. "FORWARD" and "BACK" key functions allow for multi-page display capabil-ity and for "lateral" movement through hierarchy of displays. For example, if the operator has a Level 2 "page" currently displayed, he can scan all the other Level 2 displays simply by repeatedly pressing "FORWARD." This will cause a sequential access of all Level 2 pages in a closed, circular manner such that the operator would end up with his original display page, after he had scanned all existing pages in that level. MI0785-0559A-TC01-NL04

The lower level mimic displays of the CFM/SPDS have been developed to provide information to the operators using standard display techniques including the use of: Standard color codes Standard symbol shapes Standard symbol behavior The use of these standard techniques is based on accepted human factor design criteria. Each of these standard display techniques is addressed in the following paragraphs. Colors are used in the CFM/SPDS to classify information and assist the user in the search task. Eight colors are used on a black background. The use of colors to classify information is standardized in the design. The standard color usage is as follows: Blue Cyan Red Green White Yellow - Non-essential, failed, bad data, static components - Essential information, normal - Active, on, open, energized - Passive, off, closed, deenergized - Intermediate, throttled - Caution Magenta - Danger, immediate action required The use of red/green to indicate equipment status is consistent with the use of red/green utilized on the main control panels. Standard symbol codes are used to indicate major components for the operational displays. Figure 9 shows typical display shapes utilized in the CFM/SPDS. These standard symbols were developed by Combustion Engineering from standard piping and instrumentation diagram symbols, operator feedback and simplified physical depictions of function. MI0785-0559A-TC01-NL04 8

The graphical symbols on the displays are either static or dynamic. Static components are shown in blue. Dynamic symbols, however, change color and shape to indicate their status. Figure 10 summarizes typical behavior of active components showing the methodology used to indicate component status. 5.0 Critical Function Display 9 The heart of the CFM/SPDS is the top level critical function display (Figure 3). This display utilizes a set of alarm algorithms to monitor the status of the critical safety functions and alert the operator when one of the safety functions is not being maintained. The alarm algo-rithms are a set of mathematical representations of the logic an operator would use to monitor the status of each critical safety function. The alarm algorithms have been designed to be applicable during any plant mode of operation. A unique alarm algorithm-is provided for each criti-cal safety function. The following paragraphs describe the major features of each alarm algorithm currently programmed in the CFM computer. As _part of our validation of the CFM/SPDS, these algorithms are being evaluated against the Combustion Engineering Emergency Procedure Guidelines (CEN-152) to assure that there is consistency between the information provided in the Procedure Guidelines and that provided by the CFM/SPDS. Further, we are evaluating incorporation of core cooling instrumentation into the criti-cal function algorithms and displays as this instrumentation becomes operable. Therefore, the following information may not reflect the _final design. MI0785-0559A-TC01-NL04

10 A. Core Reactivity Control The core reactivity control func~ion is an indication of the reactiv-ity in the reactor core. The alarm logic is based on losing control of reactivity, ie, uncontrolled positive reactivity insertion rather than an absolute bound such as criticality. The logic legs for core reactivity control are:

1.

Hi post trip count rate

2.

Thermal reactivity addition B. PCS Inventory Control The PCS inventory control function is comprised of that group of actions which serve to maintain control over either coolant volume or mass. The critical function inventory control involves the initial loss of ability to control the PCS coolant inventory. The logic legs for PCS inventory control are:

1.

Pressurizer level

2.

Quench tank level

3.

Quench tank pressure

4.

Relief valve discharge

5.

Steam generator primary/secondary 6.P low

6.

Hi pressurizer level rate C. PCS Pressure Control The PCS pressure control critical function serves to maintain the reactor coolant system pressure in the range between the upper bound, which is the high pressure reactor trip set point, and the lower MI0785-0559A-TC01-NL04

11 bound, which is the pressure required to maintain the reactor coolant subcooled. Alarms are activated by the CFMS when these bounds are exceeded, or when the coolant system pressure control will not be able to prevent exceeding these bounds. The logic legs for PCS pressure control are:

1.

High pressurizer pressure

2.

Minimum pressurization temperature exceeded

3.

Pressurizer pressure rate

4.

Subcooled margin D. Core Heat Removal Control The core heat removal function is the capability to transfer heat from the core to the primary coolant and transport the primary cool-ant away from the core by any of these methods:

1.

Forced circula.tion by primary coolant pumps

2.

Forced circulation by the shutdown cooling system

3.

Natural circulation The loss of the core heat removal critical function will be indicated by excessive reactor coolant temperature conditions which signals the inability to transport the coolant away from the core, or will be indicated by a high degree of voiding in the coolant system signaling the inability to transfer heat to the coolant. The logic legs for core heat removal control are:

1.

Saturation margin

2.

Low PCP load

3.

Loop/core void

4.

Low loop flow

5.

High maximum ~T MI0785-0559A-TC01-NL04

12 E. PCS Heat Removal Control The PCS heat removal critical function is to transfer the stored heat and the decay heat from the reactor to the heat sink outside the con-tainment. These heat transfer mecahnisms are:

1.

Heat removal via the steam generators

2.

Heat removal via the shutdown cooling system

3.

Heat removal via the emergency core cooling system The logic legs for PCS heat removal control are:

1.

SIS not cooling

2.

SDC not cooling

3.

Steam generators not cooling F. Containment Pressure/Temperature Control The containment pressure/temperature control function monitors con-tainment pressure and temperature and the effectiveness of those systems which maintain these pressures and temperatures. The bounds which are maintained are a result of safety limits designed to pro-tect the containment integrity. The logic legs for containment temperature/pressure control are:

1.

Fan coolers status

2.

Containment spray flow

3.

Containment pressure change

4.

High containment pressure

5.

Low containment pressure

6.

Containment temperature MI0785-0559A-TC01-NL04

13 G. Containment Isolation The containment isolation control function is the monitoring of those valves necessary to the complete isolation of the containment struc-ture. These valves are normally shut in response to the engineered safeguard (ESG) signals generated in response to reactor safety func-tions. The ESG signals may be placed in three general categories:

1.

Containment High Pressure (CHP)

2.

Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS)

3.

Containment High Radiation (CHR) The logic legs for containment isolation control are:

1.

Steam generator valves not shut

2.

Quench tank, nitrogen valves not shut

3.

Containment sump, drain and vent valves not shut .4. Misc. valves not shut

5.

Clean waste receive valves not shut

6.

Containment purge fan valves not shut H. Environmental The environmental safety function is an indication of radioactive releases and release rates for the purpose of alerting operating personnel that Emergency Implementing Procedures may be required. The logic legs for the environmental safety function are:

1.

High off gas radiation

2.

High stack radiation

3.

High failed fuel radiation

4.

High containment radiation

5.

High steam line radiation

6.

High liquid discharge radiation MI0785-0559A-TC01-NL04

14 6.0 Input Signal Validation 7.0 Analog inputs to the CFM/SPDS are checked for out of range conditions prior to display. Inputs found to be out of range are indicated on the out-of-range display page and indicated on operational displays by ques-tion marks ("????") in the value field. An alarm quality flag is also carried by the signal and utilized in algorithms which require the input. The alarm flag is used to generate an alarm quality signal for the algo-rithm and to signify the status of the algorithm inputs to the operator through the use of color coding of the critical function matrix boxes. There are four conditions which could arise considering failed/not failed inputs and alarm/not alarmed status of the algorithm. The color coding utilized to display these four conditions on the critical function matrix is shown in Figure 10. Verification and Validation Consumers Power Company began procurement and installation of the Combustion Engineering Critical Function Monitoring System (CFM) prior to issuance of the requirements of NUREG-0737, Supplement 1. No specific verification and validation procedures were developed for the design process, however design and testing of the CFM was carefully controlled during the process to provide assurance that the final product would perform as specified. Controls utilized in designing the CFM included the development of functional design specifications for each aspect of the design. These specifications received reviews both within Combustion Engineering and Consumers Power. The installed CFM was tested against criteria in the design specifications to assure proper functioning of both hardware and software. Design specifications and test results are documented and are retrievable for future reference. The level of effort incorporated into the design and testing of the CFM meets the intent of verification and validation prescribed by documents such as NSAC-39

• MI0785-0559A-TC01-NL04

15 As discussed earlier, the design of the critical function alarm algorithms is being reviewed and may be modified and additional displays may be added or existing displays revised to incorporate core cooling instrumentation. Software modifications resulting from this review will be documented in software change specifications. This specification will specify in detail the software changes required and will receive independent technical reviews to assure adequacy of the design. Following software modifica-tion, validation testing will be performed to assure that the modified software performs as specified. Future modifications to the CFM/SPDS computer software will be performed in accordance with our Software Quality Assurance Plan (SQAP) for the CFM. This plan requires that proposed changes to the CFM computer soft-ware be documented and technically reviewed prior to implementation and tested against design criteria_following implementation. The SQAP also provides requirements for configuration control and control of hardware and software documentation. MI0785-0559A-TC01-NL04

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Appendix A CFM/SPDS Level 2 and Level 3 Displays MI0785-0559A-TC01-NL04

A-1 This appendix provides descriptions and figures showing the current Level 2 and 3 CRT displays. These displays are mimics of plant systems showing the values of important parameters and the status of major components. A three by three block matrix of the Level 1 critical function display page is displayed in the lower left-hand corner of each screen. This matrix is used to alert the operator if any critical function should enter the alarm state while lower level displays are being viewed. The status of engineered safeguards actuation alarms are also located in the lower left-hand corner of the display to the right of the critical function matrix. They are normally invisible and will be displayed in yellow following actuation of a engineered safeguards system. Level 2 of the hierarchy contains five pages. These deal with primary systems of the Palisades Plant. Level 2 pages include: 1 *

2.

THE CORE (Figure A-1) - This page display is concerned with presenting information about the reactor core. Hot and cold leg temperatures, pres-surizer pressure and level, excore detector outputs, and the eves system status including boron concentration are displayed on this page. THE PRIMARY SYSTEM (Figure A-2) - This page provides an overview of the primary coolant system including the primary coolant pumps, steam gener-ators, pressurizer, core and charging system connections.

3.

THE SECONDARY SYSTEM (Figure A-3) - This page provides information con-cerning the status of the steam generators, main condenser, condensate storage tank, main and auxiliary feed pumps, and condensate pumps.

4.

THE CONTAINMENT SYSTEM (Figure A-4) - This page displays the information relevant to the containment environment, containment spray operation, con-tainment radiation monitors status, hydrogen concentration and sump levels

• MI0785-0559A-TC01-NL04

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5.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL (Figure A-5) - This page displays the radiological and environmental status of the plant including gas and liquid discharge radia-tion monitors and wind speed and direction. Level 3 of the hierarchy associateq with the Primary System contains six pages of information displays. These are:

1.

SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS (Figure A-6) - This page displays information con-cerning the safety injection systems. Pump and valve status, as well as important system parameters are provided.

2.

SAFETY.INJECTION TANKS (Figure A-7) - This page presents the status of the safety injection tanks and their associated valve positions.

3.

LETDOWN/CHARGING (Figure A-8) - This page shows the status of the letdown and charging systems. The pumps status as well as the condition of the volume control tank, boron concentration, and charging and letdown flows is provided.

4.

BORATION/DILUTION (Figure A-9) - The information displayed on this page is relevant to the boric acid tanks, their associated pumps and piping sys-tems.

5.

PRESSURIZER (Figure A-10) - The information presented here is vital to the functions of PCS pressure and inventory. The summary of information pre-sented here provides that data necessary to assess the condition of the plant's overall PCS pressure and inventory safety functions.

6.

SHUTDOWN COOLING (Figure A-11) - Data presented here allows the operator to monitor the shutdown cooling system and to determine if there is a heatup or cooldown rate inappropriate to the plant's required condition. The display also shows the status of pumps, valves and heat exchangers. MI0785-0559A-TC01-NL04

The lower level of hierarchy associated with the secondary system contains three pages of informational displays. They are as follows: A-3

1.

MAIN STEAM (Figure A-12) - This page presents information pertaining to the main steam system from the steam generators to the turbines. It covers data presenting main and auxiliary feed flows, relief valve posi-tions, turbine sump radiation levels, as well as heatup and cooldown rates. (The pressurizer pressure and temperature are also shown.)

2.

MAIN FEED (Figure A-13) - This system is presented in detail because of the importance it bears on the core heat removal.function. The system's main condenser, condensate pumps, feed pumps, and feedwater control valves status are displayed. The pressurizer pressure and temperature are also shown.

3.

AUX FEED (Figure A-14) - The auxiliary feed system as an alternate feed-water source during plant emergencies is required, thus the status of this system is invaluable to the plant operator. The auxiliary feed system is also required for plant cooldown. This page displays the status of the condensate storage tank, auxiliary feed pumps, and associated important valves. The pressurizer pressure and temperature are also shown. The lower level hierarchy associated with the containment system contains three pages of informational displays. They are as follows:

1.

CONTAINMENT COOLERS (Figure A-15) - This page shows the layout of the con-tainment air cooler fans, and associated important valves. Also shown is the reactor building heater isolation valves.

2.

CONTAINMENT SPRAYS (Figure A-16) - This page shows the layout of the con-tainment spray cooling systems, including the containment spray pumps and spray coolers

• MI0785-0559A-TC01-NL04

A-4

3.

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (Figure A-17) - This page displays the valves needed to isolate the containment. The valves are presented in groups and close on CHP, CHR or SIS signal. The lower level hierarchy associated with the environmental page contains two pages:

1.

METEOROLOGICAL (Figure A-18) - This page displays information data linked from the meteorological tower. The information includes wind speed and direction and the tower temperature.

2.

RADIOLOGICAL (Figure A-19) - This page displays radiation monitors inside containment as well as liquid radiation monitors *. Monitors in various locations are also displayed. MI0785-0559A-TC01-NL04

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ATTACHMENT 2 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 Response to Request for Additional Information Electrical Isolation of SPDS August 21, 1985 4 Pages IC0885-0053S-NL01

Response to Questions Concerning the Palisades SPDS Isolation Devices Question a: For each type of device used to accomplish electrical isolation, describe the specific testing performed to demonstrate that the device is acceptable for its application(s). This description should include elementary diagrams when necessary to indicate the test configuration and how the maximum credible faults were applied to the devices.

Response

The Safety Parameter Display System is incorporated into the Critical Function Monitor System (CFMS) computer provided by Combustion Engineering. Figure 1 shows a block diagram of the CFM input configuration. Field inputs to the computer are provided to three separate input multiplexer cabinets. One cabi-net is provided for left safety channel input signals, one for right safety channel input signals and one for non-safety input signals. The use of three separate cabinets provides for separation between safety and non-safety signals. Digital communications are provided through redundant loops from multi-plexer to multiplexer and then to the CPU. Communication links between multi-plexer cabinets are accomplished via fiber-optic links. Communications to the CPU are over twin-ax cable. All communications over twin-ax cable to and from the CPU are terminated in the non-safety input multiplexer cabinet. Isolation between non-safety and safety multiplexers and between redundant divisions of the safety channels is provided by the fiber-optic communication links. Electrical faults within any multiplexer cabinet or faults applied to inter-cabinet fiber-optic cabling cannot propagate as the fiber-optic cable is non-metallic. As electrical faults cannot propagate over the non-metallic fiber-optic links, no specific testing of the isolation capability was per-formed. Question b: Data to verify that the maximum credible faults applied during the test were the maximum voltage/current to which the device could be exposed, and define how the maximum voltage/current was determined.

Response

See response to Question a. IC0785-0563A-TC01-NL04

L Page 2 Question c: Data to verify that the maximum credible fault was applied to the output of the device in the transverse mode (between signal and return) and other faults were considered (ie, open and short circuits).

Response

See response to Question a. Question d: Define the pass/fail acceptance criteria for each type of device.

Response

See response to Question a. Question e: Provide a commitment that the isolation devices comply with the environmental qualifications (10 CFR 50.49) and with the seismic qualifications that were the basis for plant licensing.

Response

The fiber-optic cables providing electrical isolation are contained within a mild environment. Equipment located in a mild environment is not subject to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.49. One representative multiplexer cabinet containing the fiber-optic couplers was seismically qualified. This test demonstrated the seismic qualification of the multiplexers and fiber-optic coupler. Isolation, however, is provided by the fiber-optic cable and no specific seismic qualification of the cable was performed. Breakage of the fiber optic cable during a seismic event would result in a break in communications to the CPU, but would not result in any effect on the lE inputs to the multiplexer cabinets. Question f: Provide a description of the measures taken to protect the safety systems from electrical interference (ie, electrostatic coupling, EMI, common mode and crosstalk) that may be generated by the SPDS.

Response

Measures which protect the safety systems from electrical interference that may be generated by the CFM/SPDS include the following:

1.

Inputs to the multiplexer system are provided over twisted shielded pairs of wires grounded at one end. IC0785-0563A-TC01-NL04

Page 3

2.

Communications between multiplexer cabinets and to the CPU utilize either fiber-optic cables or shielded twin-ax cable.

3.

The input multiplexers are located in grounded cabinets.

4.

The computer equipment is located remote from the input multiplexer cabi-nets.

5.

Instrument cables are not run in the same cable trays or conduit with power cables. The CFM/SPDS computer has been functional in the plant for over one year with no adverse effects from electrical interference noted. IC0785-0563A-TC01-NL04

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