ML19330C512
| ML19330C512 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pilgrim |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1980 |
| From: | Mathis C BOSTON EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8008080448 | |
| Download: ML19330C512 (6) | |
Text
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o-a 30STON EDISON C0teANT
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TELECOPY MESSAGE Data / Time:
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Telephone Number h s Director, Region I' Trom: Pilgrim Nuc. lear Power Station offica of Inspection and Enforcement RFD #1 Rocky E111 Road U. 5. Nuclear Regulatory Cosmaission Plymouth, MA 02360 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406
Subject:
PROMPT RI?ORTA3LE OCCUR. NCE U
Docke: Kumber 50-293; Licer.se DPR-35~
Tills DOCUMENT CONTAINS' Assigned LER Number 80 -OMI/C/X-0 P00R QUAUTY PAGES I
Event
Description:
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7, cause and Corrective action:
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~ Etatus:
/dd I Therinal MW c) Rout.ae Startup g) Shutdown d) Routine Shutdown h) Refueling o) Steady State X
- 1) Other 4
f) Load Changinz j) Not Appliceple l
A written follow-up report will be sent within two useks.
ar!(S IA a,h I bbMC Prepared by DRC person notified e
Emil (2) copies to:
Director Office of Management Information and Program Control U. S. 1Euclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 8008080448 l
4 REPORT ON PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAK DETECTIO*ASYSTD_f This report is separated into two parts; Part I provides a description of the system and Part II'provides a chronology of events surrounding the violation of Technical Specification identified on July 16, 1980.
I.
Pressure Boundary Leak Detection System (C-19)
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The Reactor Pressure Boundary Leak Detection Monitor combines particulate monitoring, iodine monitoring, and gas monitoring into a single three chamael series system.
It is designed to measure and record Beta-plus-Gamma activity detectable in the particulata sample, radioactivity from iodine vapor present in the semple after filtration, and Beta-Gamma activity residual in the sample gas af ter particulate and iodine filtering.
The particulate monitor detects, measures, records, and provides an alam from the radioactivity collected from the sample on filter paper.
The filter paper may be moved at a continuous rate, or stopped and used as a fixed filter.
The iodine monitor makes use of an activated charcoal cartridge for concentrating the iodine, with a spectrometer grade scintillation detector measuring the build-up of iodine activity.
After the particulate and iodine filters, the residual gas is passed through a heavily shielded one liter chamber where it is presented to a GM cube which measures both Beta and Gamma activity from the sample within the chamber.
The detectors feed into a counting ratameter and a three channel graphic recorder.
Independent alarm signals are provided for each channel.
The C-19 portabis cart assembly contains a top mountad amber lamp for low level alarm (indicating a level less than normal background and possible instrument malfunction), and a top mounted red lamp in con, junction with a bell for high radiation warning.
Tim blower-regulator assembly is equipped with a small red light at the outlet end of the cart (near the magnehelic gage) which indicates low sample flow when continuously illuminated (possible clogged filter paper), and a ses11 saber lamp in the same area which indicatas high sample flow when continuously illuminated (possible ruptura of the filter paper).
All four of the above alarms are annunciated on C-903 at a common alarm (Rascror Boundary Leak Detection).
In addition, the C-903 common alam is picked up by a loss of C-19 power.
Tge sample flow to C-19 passes through one of seen sample lines which feed the 0 Analyzer (C-41), The tap off this line is down stream of the solenoid operatedcontrolvalveswhichareapargofthePrimaryContainmentIsolation Logic. The seven sample linas to the 0 analyzer are shown on P6ID M-227, and the intertie to C-19 is illustrated on M-239 (see attached diagram for clarificaeion).
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II. Chronolony rf Evente July 1,1980; 12:00 a.m. - 0800 a.m.
2 Surve811 =+e testing was conducted to verify operability of 0 3,,g,,,
y isolation valves.
SV-5065-23 failed to meet the acceptance criteria for closing time. A Failure and Malfunction Report (FEM 80-80) and a Maintenance Enguest (!ct 80-572) was issued to investigate and correct malfunction. The control switches on Fanel C-904 were positioned to close all 02 Analysar Isolation Valves and cautioned tagged by the Watch Engineer.
The Caution Tag noted that SV-5065-23 was INOP and that valves should remain closed except during daily sampling of Containment 02 concentration per 0?tR-09.
Jt:17 1, 1980; 0800 a.m. - 1600 p.m.
Watch Engineer recognized fact that the 4th of July weekend was coming up and designated 19L 80-572 as an 'A' priority requiring immediats repairs. He contacted the Chief Technical Engineer and requested wires lif ted on solenoids for 57-5065-16 and 23. This allowed him to meet the requirements of Technical specification 3.7 D.1 and 2 and continue ope 3ation of the 0 analyser in the 2
normal menner. The wires were lifted, the 0 analyzer returned to service and investigation begun.
Concurrent with the actions beins taken for the 02 Analyser, it was discovered that the MYIAL window on C-19 was ruptured. Penel C-19 was removed from service and MR 80-570 issued to repair the instrument.
I&C's investigation determined the problem to be electrical in nature so the Watch Engineer contacted the Acting Nef Maintenance Engineer and requested electrical maintenance to investigatit SV-2065-23.
At_ approximately 1500 p.m., the electrical engineer requested the wires be returned to normal on SV-5065-16 and 23 so that they could stroke the valves during their investigation. The wires were replaced and subsequent investigation revealed the position indication was misaligned.
He informed the fiarch Engineer of his findings and told him that repairs would be started in the morning (7-2-80).
It was at this point that the system broke down for the following thras ramsons.
(1) The maintenanca request to repair Sv-5065-23 was down graded to a *B' priority because of overtime involved and the fact that it was an indication problem only.
(2) The power to SV-5065-16 and 23 was not removed to return these valves to the conditions established earlier in the day.
Again the problem was indication not operability.
(3) No one recognized impact on operability of C-19.
July 2 through 7, 1980 The repairs to SV-5065-23 were not initiated on July 2,1980 as planned, However, there was not immediate need, since the established conditions satisfied the requirements for containment isolation.
Duringtgisperiodoftime,the0..arationsGroupopenedthesevensamplelines to the 0 analyser daily and obtained containment oxygen values as required by OPER-09. After approxinately five minutes, the sample lines were again closed.
There was no Technical Specification violation in funcrdoning this way because SV-5065-23 operated properly, it just did not indicats that fact, and oxygen samples are only required twice a week.
e 1
It vna also known that C-19 was INOP b:causa thera was a troublo n,nnciatcr on Panel C-903 in the Control Room. However, C-19 was INOP for repaira cf its 2 taalyzer on C-19.
own and no one had yet related tha offect of is>1ating the 0 July 7, 1980; 0800 a.m. - 1600 p.m.
During the 0830 a.m. meeting, C-19 was discussed with regard to the MYLAR window problem and it was noted that if repairs were not cer= plated by the and of the day, station shutdown would be required.
The repairs were completed, calibration and source checks were conducted and thn systen declared operable.
Ecan C-19 was declared operable and returned to service (power turned on),
the annunciator on Panel C-903 in the Control Room cleared. The operator a:
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Panal C-19 observed that chara were no malfunction alarms illuminated on the panel, there was flow, and the radiation monitors were indicating radiation.
July 15, 1960; 1600 p.m. - 2400 p.m.
After drawing the weekly Iodins ss=ple at C-19 and analyzing the results, it was notad that the rasults vara significantly lower than nor=al (E-13 vica E-9).
The Senior Chemical Engineer checked the valve line up and noted that C-19 was isolated because the valvas to the 02 Analyzer were all closed. The same lines
!and both analyzers.
- heSeniorChemicaljngineerimnediacalywenttotheControlRoomand questioned why the 0 analyzerwasigolated.
It was at this time that it m d that isolation of the 0 analyzar on July 1,1980 hd also was rea e
isolated C-19.
Discussion Discussions with the Watch Engineer, who was on days July 1st and the Senior Chemical Enginaar, vara conducted by the Methods, Compliance and Training roup Leader on July 15, 1980. These discussions pps o'eservations by the Methods, Compliance and Training Group Leader identified the following conditiom which contributed to this event.
2 1.
Station personnel did not consider the isolation of the 0 Analyzar systes to effect any other system.
2.
Repairs to SV-5065-23 were not complaced as planned.
3.
Failure of the MMR window at approximately the same cima confused the issue since the C-19 panel was inoperable and clearly annunciated on Panel C-903 in the Cor. trol Reem.
4 When Panel C-19 was repaired on 7-7-80 and returned to service, the failure annunciator cleared on Panel C-903 in the Control Roon giving a falso indication of operability.
5.
The conditions for operability of Panel C-19 as stated on OPER 09 test
- 21 were verified to be acceptable daily as required.
6.
ylow was indicated on the conitor at all times indicating in leakage into l
the systam.
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7.
on July 15, 1580 the monitor was isolated with the hand valve and e.o low flow condition was alarmed in the Control Room. This is contrary to the dasign of the system.
Corrective Actions 1.
Raview set points for all alarm devices on Panel C-19 and verification of alara capability.
2 2.
Caution tagged 0 analyzer valve control switches in control Room to prohibit closing for other than testing purposes.
3.
Review requirements for containment atmospherie sampling and practicability of current Technical Specifications, 2
4.
?roposal of new atmospharie monitoring system complete separated from 0 i
analyzar isolation scheme pending resolution of Item 3.
5.
Accommendation to station Manager that status Soard be installed in his office which will clearly identify all Technical Specification related systens which are inoperable or are having maintenanca performed on them.
This statua board will be reviewed at tha morning neeting.
5.
Identify source of in Ieakage.
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Drywell Sample To C-41 l
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'14 To C-19 Drywell Sanplc To C-41
- Terus Samp1c toc-4N 23 16 Terus Sample To C-M DC AC
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NOTES:
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1 Seven sample lince to C-41 (O Analyzer)
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All seven DC Solcoofds conts'clied by one switch f rom Cont.rol Room Fanel C-904
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All seven AC Solenoids tatstrotted by one editch fwm Control
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e Room Pnnel C-904.
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4.
Three Drykc11 Sampic I.ines vltle tapa to C-19 from CV-5065-12, 13,
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amt 14.
5.
C-19 t ied to line f roen CV-5065-12.
6 Turun.cnnple volve 5065-23 won valve vt:Ich failed tlening,
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