ML19350A289
| ML19350A289 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/09/1981 |
| From: | Linder F DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE |
| To: | Eisenhut D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LAC-7400, NUDOCS 8103130413 | |
| Download: ML19350A289 (5) | |
Text
4 O
D DA/RYLAND I
h
[k COOPERAT/VE
- P o DOX 817 t A CROSSE W1SCONSIN 51601
- 2615 EAST AV SOUTH ccos) 78a4000 March 9, 1981 In reply, please refer to LAC-7400 DOCKET -
U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:
Mr. Darrell G.
Eisenhut, Director Z
Division of Licensing k;g j8 ff P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Division of Operating Reactors
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Washington, D. C.
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SUBJECT:
DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE N'
LA' CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR (LACBWR)
PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-45 FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS
REFERENCES:
(1)
DPC Letter LAC-7361, Linder to Eisenhut, dated February 6, 1981.
(2)
NRC ' Letter, Eisenhut to All Power Reactor 4
Licensees with Plants Licensed Prior to January 1, 1979, dated November 24, 1980.
(3)
DPC Letter LAC-7203, Linder to Eisenhut, dated November 3, 1980.
(4)
DPC Letter LAC-6774, Linder to Eisenhut, dated February 6, 1980.
(5)
Amendment No. 17 to License No. DPR-45, forwarded by NRC Letter, Ziemann to Linder, dated July 27, 1979.
Gentlemen:
Our lett'er, Reference (1), provided a status report of fire protection modifications in response to your letter, Reference (2).
I.
As a result of NRC staff review of our latest response, additi'onal j
information has been requested relating to the automation of the sprinkler system now installed on the main and auxiliary power
-transformers.
References (3), (4), and (5) earlier discussed the i
details of fire protection for this equipment.
Enclosed with this letter is a statement concerning our response to Item 3.1.4(5) of-Reference (5).
This information had been telecopied to your office on February 11, 1981.
8108180 %
f &
i Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director LAC-7400 Division of Licensing March 9, 1981 If there are any questions concerning this transmittal, please contact us.
Very truly yours, DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE 1
/
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3
/Frank Linder, Gdneral Manager FL: FAD: abs ENCLOSU RE 1 CC:
J. G.
Keppler, Reg. Dir., NRC-DRO III NRC Eesident Inspectors 2.-
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Y
r IMCLOSURE 1 February 11, 1981 l
Statement Concerning DPC Response to Item 3.1.4. (5) -
FIXED SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS - (Reference DPC Letter, Linder to Eisenhut, LAC-7361, dated February 6, 1981)
Our letter, referenced above, requested an extension of time to convert the manual actuated deluge system for the main and nuxiliary power transformers to automatic actuation.
t' Justification for this extension of time is as follows:
l.
In the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report accompanying the Division of Operating Reactors' letter of July 27, 1979 (Ziemann to Linder), Item 5.10.5 stated that..." Fire protection l
for the transformers adjacent to the Turbine Building has not been shown adequate to preserve the safe shutdown capability of the plant in case of a fire or explosion in this area".
i 6
2.
Notwithstanding conclusions presented in our Fire Hazards l
Analysis submitted by our letter, Madgett to Stello, LAC-4482, dated February 14, 1977, that..."the total design of the area j
is felt to be adequate,and meets requirements of FIA Recorrended j
Good Practices for Transformer and Switchaear Installations, i
the SER, discussed above In paragraph 5.10.6 stated that...
"The licensee will install an automatic water fire suppression system to protect the Turbine Building from transformer fires."
3.
The Commission has not identified specifically how safe shutdown capability of'the plant is impaired as a result of a fire in this area. EIt is worthy of repetition to state that safety related equipment located at the east end of the Turbine Building and is' adequately fire protected.
4.-
The concerns for adequacy.of fire protection for Turbine Building l
Safety-Related Fquipnent identified in the SFR. discussed above (Paragraph 5.1.1) have been alleviated by appropriate modifica-tions as follows:
(
a)
Increased turbine oil reservoir sprinkling b)
Additional turbine oil reservoir curbing c)
Fire hose replacements d)
Addition of sprinklers to power transformers e). Addition of masonry cut-off wall on rezzanine level to protect switchgear and contain turbine oil fire
, F
r ENCLOSURE 1 f)
Extension of sprinklers to cover all' turbine oil piping on north side of pedestal and component coolers g)
Addition of two exterior hose house stations h)
Additional Flame-Mastic cable insulation i)
Improved cable and piping penetration seals j)
Added alarms to fire doors k)
Installation of an Emergency Service Water Supply System which is completely independent of permanent installed water supply systems and ties into the High Pressure Service Water System.
The west wall of the Turbine Building at the grade floor and mezzanine
. floor is made of 10" thick concrete block filled with verm culite and i
covered with 2" thick facing brick.
This construction results in a fire rating of greater than three hours.
The piping penetrations through the wall are sealed with Onse-Foam which also provides a three-hour rating.
A fire door located 11 feet from the main trans-former has a 1 -hour rating.
Starting at the Turbine floor, at elevation 663', approximately 29 feet above-grade level, the West Wall of the Turbine Building is constructed of non-combustible aluminum siding.
The interior siding is constructed.of a double steel envelope containing non-combustible insulation.
There are no combustibles on the Turbine Floor in the vicinity of this wall and there are no combustibles, other than a few cable runs, within 10 feet of the inside wall at the lower levels.
There is'no safety related equipment on the Turbine Floor.
Air
. intake _ louvers on the Turbine Floor are automatically closed lar sroke detectors which alarm in the Control Room.
In the' event of a'significant fire at the Main Transformer or Aux-
~
iliary Transformer of sufficient intensity to cause a sudden trans-former casing pressure, Generator Tripping Relay will activate to came a trip: of _the Generator OCB, Generator Main Field,. turbine trip and closure of-Turbine Building louvers, together with other trips.and. lockouts.
The turbine trip results in a partial scram of the reactor, thus the major steps of a plant shutdown can be accomplished.
Prior to installation of the transformer sprinkler modification, the in-plant 10CFR50.59-review of the Facility Change disclosed concern about the possibility of a malfunction of a'different type than evaluated in the LACBWR Final Safeguards Report.
This consideration addressed the water demand _which might incapacitate the~ Alternate
- Core Spray System- (ACS) because1the water demand of the transformer sprinkling system due to a single electrical. failure- (control solenoid) could' reduce the 900 gpm water supply to the ACS.
.w
EHCLOSURE 1 A second potential problem considered in the in-plant 10CFR50.59 review arose from Combined Water Demand considerations based on an actual fire requiring the use of automatic sprinkler systems, manual hose streams, water. supply to plant systems necessary to maintain hot shutdown, and the assumption that only one of two Diesel Fire Pumps is operable coincident with a pipe rupture in the fire water piping.
The NRC letter of November 24, 1980 stated that the NRC concludes the present supply of fire water is inadequate and that "this deficiency may be worse when the additional sprinkler systems which the licensee is required to install are considered".
DPC intends To compensate for Combined Water Demand considerations, to rely on the Emergency Service Water System which is expected to be capable of providing over 1300 GPM at approximately 100 PSI pressure which exceeds the water demand resulting from any postulated fire.
To accomplish this objective, DPC is considering incorporatien of additional cross-connects and fittings to allow the Frergency Service Water Supply System to pump water into the yard fire loop.
In addition, modifications to the transformer sprinkler systems are
. planned to eliminate the possibility of unnecessary diversion of water from the Alternate Core Spray System in the event of a LOCA.
Until required nodifications can be implemented, DPC intends to maintain the trans"ormer sprinklers in a ranual mode.
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