ML20002B252

Forwards Fr Notice Re Revision to 10CFR50.48 & New App R to 10CFR50 Re Fire Protection Features at Nuclear Power Plants

ML20002B252
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	11/26/1980
From:	Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Ferguson W VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
References
FRN-45FR76602, RULE-PR-50 NUDOCS 8012110178
Download: ML20002B252 (16)

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COf4 MISSION gQ-gpQ{,[.ij WASHINGTON,0. C. 20%5

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2 ATT;I: !!r. W. L. Ferguson u

f Senior Vice President - fluclear Post Office Box 26666 Richmond, Virginia 23261 4

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Dear ;:

r. Ferguson:

The Cc=.ission published on tiovember 19, 1980 (45 FR 76602) a revised Section.

10 CFR 50.23 and a new Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 regarding fire protection features of nuclear power plants. The revised Section 50.48 and Appendix R i

will become effective on February 17, 1981 which is 90 days after publication.

A copy of the Federal Register !!ctice is enclosed (note that the February 19, 1981 date in the notice is incorrect and should be February 17,1981). Appendix R is applicable to plants licensed prior to Jaruary 1,1979.

With regard to plants licensed after January 1,1979, paragraph 50.48(e) requires all fire protection features needed to satisfy Criterion 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 to be completed in accordance with the provisions of their licenses.

On February 17, 1981, the effective date for this rule, this requirement will supersede the currently effective dates for previously approved fire protection modifications that are given in license conditions (45 FR 71569, October 29,1980).

Sincerely,

.i Mc. Pod t

Robert L. Tedesco, Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing l

Enclosure:

Federal Register Notice l

ces:

see next page i

r i

l 80121 f0 /77 f

Mr. J. H. rerguson Executive Vice President - Power Virginia Electric & Power Company P. O. Box 26666 Richmond, Virginia 23261 ccs:

Mr. Anthony Gambaradella Office of the Attorney General 11 South 12th Street - Room 308 Richmond, Virginia 23219 4

Richard M. Foster, Esq.

t Musick, Williamson, Schwartz Leavenworth & Cope, P. C.

P. O. Box 4579 Boulder, Colorado 80306 Michael W. Maupin, Esq.

Hunton, Williams, Gay & Gibson P. O. Box 1535 i

Richmond, Virginia 23212 Mrs. June Allen, President North Anna Environmental Coalition 1105 - C Olive Street Greensboro, North Carolina 27401 Mrs. Margaret Dietrich Route 2, Box 568 Gordonsville, Virginia 22942 Mr. James C. Dunstan State Corporation Commission Commonwealth of Virginia Blandon Building Richmond, Virginia 23209 Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washingtoa, D. C.

20555 Dr. John H. Buck Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board l

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 Dr. Lawrence R. Quarles Atomic Safety and Licensing Aopeal Board Washington, D. C.

20555 Mr. T. Webster U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 128 Spotsivania, Virginia 22553 nn-,

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ove e 19, 1980 9

Part 11 Nuclear Regulatory

__ Commission Iae.', '!!" " s'.X"" ' '

76602 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19.1960 ! Ruies and Regulations f

NUCLEAR REGULATORY tnat tne comment period snould nave are alrea iv set iortn in Genera; Desig.

COMMISSION been extended C:nenon 3 of Appendix A to 10 CFR The Commission does not agree. The part 50 and in the NRC guidance 10 CFR Part 50 NRC has been developmg fire protection documents These general provisions requirements smce 1975. The NRC gave rise to a number of disputes over Fire Protection Program for Operatin9 published comprehensive fire protection

'whether specific methods adequately Noear Power Plants guidehnes. Branch Technical Position accomplished the intended goal. The AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and its Appendix A in pr posed rule is intended to provide Com.nission.

1976. Licensees have compared their fire sufficient specific guidance to ensure ACTION: Final rule.

protection programs against these satisfa tory resolution of these issues.

guidehnes and have discussed their Thus, reverting to generalized guidance suasesARY:The Nuclear Regulatory deviations from these guidelines with would not accomphsh the intended Commission is amending its regulations the NRC staff for the past four years purpose of the proposed rule.

to require certain provisions for fire during the NRC's fire protection reviews The second issue involved some protection in operating nuclear power of operating reactors. A Safety instances in which the specific wording plants.This action is being taken to Evaluation Report and,in most cases, used resulted in unnecessary and upgrade fire protection at nuclear po er supplements to the Safety Evaluation unintended restrictions. For example.

plants licensed to operate prior to Report, have been issued for each the proposed rule called for a " fresh January 1,1979, by requiring resolution operating reactor. These reports water" supply. For firefightmg purposes, of certain contested generic issues in describe fire protection alternatives that brackish water is satisfactory and a fire protection safety evaluation reports.

have been proposed by the licensee and

" fresh" water supply is unnecessary.

EFFECTIVE DATE: February 19.1981 found acceptable by the staff as well as Similarly, the proposed rule called for Note.-The Nuclear Regulatory unresolved fire protection issues an ' underground" yard fire main loop.

Commission has submitted this rule to remaining between the staff and the Ohen portions of a fire main loop run the Comptroller General for review as licensee. Proposed Appendix R provided abm e ground in and as they enter structures. The Commission had not may be appropriate under the Federal the Commission's requirements for Reports Act, as amended (44 U.S.C.

resolving those issues. Thus, it concerns intended to prohibit running portions of 3512).The date on which the reporting only a limited number of issues derived a fire main loop above ground. Other requirement of this rule becomes from the use of the earlier guides. The similar changes are discussed in Section effective. unless advised to the contrary, Commission believes that a 30-day III. " Specific Requirements." of this reflects inclusion of the 45-day period comment period was adequate under preamble.

that statute allows for such review (44 these circumstances.

The third issue relates to imposition of U.S.C. 3512(c)(2)).

2. Many licensees questioned the need [equirements n pl nts with presently installed or with existing commitments FOR FURTHER INFORsAATION CONTACT:

for backfitting all the requirements of to install fire protection features David P. Notley Office of Standards Appendix R.They commented that they previ usly determined by the staff to Development. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory had previously complied with staff fire satisfy the guidance of Appendix A to Commission. Washington D.C. 20555.

protection recommendations in " good BTP APCSB 9.5-1.The Commission phone 301-443-5921 or Robert L faith" and have committed to or 8'

8 '

Ferguson. Office of Nuclear Reactor completed certain modifications. They thaf illbe ct o f

d' Regulation. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory contend that the staff has properly Appendix R should not be retroactively Commission. Washmgton. D.C. 20555, determined that these modifications applied 'o features that have been phone 301-492-7096.

provide at least the level of fire previously approved by dm NRC staff as corpuesENTARY 100FORedATION:On May protection described by the guidance satisfying the provisions of Appendix A 29,1980. the Nuclear Regulatory contamed m, Appendix A to Branch to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Commission published in the Federal Technical Position BTP APCSB 9 5-1.

The NRC staff had intended in its Register (45 FR 36082) a notice of They also contend that these original proposal for Appendix R. that proposed rulemaking inviting written modifications provide a level of the requirements be epplicable only for suggestions or comments on the protection at least equivalent to that the resolution of unresolved disputed proposed rule by June 30.1980. The contained in the proposed rule. They fire protection features. Thus, the staff notice concerned proposed amendments express the concern that the proposed had not intended the provisions of to 10 CFR Part 50. " Domestic Licensing rule was written in such specific Appendix R to require modification of of Production and Utilization Facilities."

language that fire protection issnes that previously approved features. This was which would require certain minimum were thought closed would be reopened not clearly described in the proposed provisions for fire protection in nuclear and new, but not necessarily better, rule as published for comment. in fact, power plants operating prior to January modifi ations would be required. These the Supplementary Information 1,1979. Fifty.one comment letters were modifications could be accomplished published with the proposed arule received regarding the proposed only by the expenditure of considerable explicitly indicated that "laVI licensees amendments. A number of comments engineering, design, and construction will be expected to meet the 4

pertained to specific requirements in the effort and at great undue expense. The requirements of this rule,in its effective proposed Appendix R. and these will be commenters request that the form including whatever changes result

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dealt with below. Ilowever, there were requirements in the proposed rule be from public comments."

three substantive contentions which rewritten to specify only the general in determining whether the specific i

were raised by many of the commenters. requirements of what needs to be requirements of Appendix R should be These three comments are summarized accomplished.

imposed on licensees with presently as follows:

These comments raise three related installed or existing commitments to

1. Most commenters stated that the 30 issues. The first relates to the need for install fire protection features previously day c6mment period was too short to specific requirements. The general determined to satisfy Appendix A to permit adequate detailed response and requirements relating to fire protection Branch Technical Position BTP APCSB

Federal Registbr / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76605 related issues are invohed here. The hour water supply is considered by a visually indicatmg nr key-operated first is the requirement for dedicated adequate. It should also be noted that (cu*b) vahe." and there was an water storage tanks for fire fightmg this minimum dedicated water volume is opportunity to comment on this purposes. The suggestion that the based on maximum flow rates. Since document.

requirement for dedicated tanks be most fires are controlled and D.Manualfire Suppression Techmcal deleted wan rejected for the reasons extinguished with much smaller flow Basis. Considerable reliance is placed otated in the precedmg Technical Basis.

rates, this requirement realistically on automatic fire suppression systein The other point deals with ensuring represents a dedicated water volume far throughout a nuclear power plant.

.ninimum water storage capacity for fire in excess of two hours.

However, manual fire fightmg activities t uppression activities when storage B. Sectional / solation Valves.

often can control and extinguish slowly tanks are used for combined servae.

C.HydrantIsolation Valves developing fires before an automatic fire water / fire-water uses.The term Technico/ Basis. These two suppression system is actuated. In

" vertical standpipe for other water requirements are similar and can be addition, fires that are controlled or service" simply means that the suction treated together. Proper valving is extinguished by automatic systems for other water uses in common storage required to isolate portions of the water require a certain amount of manual tanks will be located sufficiently high to distribution system for maintenance or response. Also, some areas of the plant ensure the minimum water volume repair without interrupting the water do not warrant the installation of needs for fire suppression activities. If supply to manual or automatic fire automatic fire suppression systems.

the commenters were assuming that suppression systems inside the plant.

Manual response is the only fire

" vertical standpipe" referred only to yalves are similarly required to permit suppression available for these areas; pipes inside the tank, this is not the is lation of outside yard hydrants from thus, it is important that manual fire case. In fact a standpipe exterior to the the water distribution system for fighting capability be present in all storage tank is more desirable since any maintenance or repair without areas of the plant, and that standpipe leakage would be immediately evident.

Interrupting water supply to fire and hose stations be located throughout On an internal standpipe a leak in the suppression systems inside the plant.

the plant. The standpipe and hose pipe could actually allow depletion of yisually indicating valves such as post stations are to be located so that at least the water otherwise to be reserved for indicator valves are preferred so that one effective hose stream can be fire uses. The rule has been clarified to the position of the valve can be readily brought to bear at any location in the allow physical alternatives for water determined. However, key-operated plant containing or presenting a hazard eupply dedication but to preclude valus kommonly known as curb to structures, systems, or components exclusive use of administrative controls valves) are at ceptable for these important to safety. They are to be for this purpose.

purposes where plant. specific supplied from the fire water supply c nditions warrant their use.

Some commenters objected to the system except for those inside containment, which may be connected requirement that other water systerrs

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• • • Y I."8EEI **d to other reliable water supplies if a uced as a backup water supply for fire

'I protection should be permanently separate penetration into containment connected to the fire main system and ca fg' sectional control a

cannot be made for fire water service cuggested that it would be sufficient to

)fn7c'esa needs.

nd not spect with provide a water supply capable of being respect to who should give the approval. Comment Resolution connected to the fire main system within The Commission has accepted this suggestion: the rule now requires that Sevnal commenters suggested adding ten minutes of the loss of normal water cupply or pumps. The rule does not sectional control valves shall be a sentence reading Standpipe and hose address backup water supplies. The provided to isolate portions of the fire stations are not required if sufficient requirement means that,if another main for maintenance or repair without justification can be provided that water system is used as one of the shutting off the entire system. Post adequate fire protection features have redundant water supplies, it must satisfy indicator or key-operated valves are been provided to account for a given fire all of the requirements of the fire mentioned as two examples of area." This suggestion was repcted. The protection water supplies. Additional acceptable valves.

staff has taken the position that the j

backup supplies need not meet these C. Hydrant Block Vo/res-Comment minimum requirements are that at least i

requirements.

Resolution. A number of commenters one effective hose stream that will be One commenter asked why only a made suggestions for rewording this able to reach any location that contains two-hour water supply is required when section. This section has been clarified or could present an exposure fire hazard the Browns Ferry Fire lasted well over to state the requirement for capability to to the safety.related equipment. The l

two hours. All of the investigations of isolate hydrants from the fire main Commission concluded that no analyses l

the Browns Ferry Fire clearly show that without disrupting the water supply to can identify hazards so carefully that I

if water had been used immediately, the automatic or manual fire suppression this minimum requirement can be l

fire would have been extinguished much systems in any area containing or further reduced.

earlier. Indeed once the manual fire presenting a fire hazard to safety-related E. Hydrostatic Hose Test Technica/

fighting activities were started with the or safe shutdown equipment.

Basis. Fire hoses should be use of only one fire hose stream. the fire One commenter suggested that this hydrostatically tested periodically to was extinguished within one half hour.

requirement be dropped in its entirety ensure that they will not rupture during The staff would find unacceptable any since it "is a new requirement which has use. The requirement for a minimum test l

condition in which a postulated fire that not been subjected to the peer review pressure of 300 psi comes from NTPA could threaten safe shutdown capability process." This suggestion was rejected No.196 (National Fire Protection could not be controlled and extinguished on the basis that Appendix A to BTP Association Standard No.196-within two hours with any combination APCSB 9.5-1 contains the following Standard for Fire Hose), a nationally of manual and automatic fire sentence: "The lateral to each hydrant recognized consensus standard. This suppression activities. Therefore, a two-from the yard main should be controlled standard contains other guidance for the i

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Federal Register Vol 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76603

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0 3-1 e a important to recoqmze that arrengements were accepted m some permitted either an od collection system Appenda R addresses onh a portion ef early fire protection reuews As a result or a fire suppression system The staff the specific nems centamed m the more of some separate effects tests. the staff has also accepted an automatic fire comprahenstre document. Branch chanced its position on this suppression system as an acceptable Technica! Pasttion BTP APCSB 9 5-1 configuration. and subsequent plans method of fire protec' ion for this and its Appendix A. Appenda A to BTP have been required to provide application.The Commission has APCSB 9 hl has been the basic fire add:tional pro'ect:on m the fcim of fire concluded that fire suppression systems protection guidance used by the staff m barners or substantial physical do not give adequate protection for fires their fire protection reviews conducted separatica for safe shutdown systeras that may be induced by seism.c esents.

for all eperatmg plants durmg the past No credit for such coatings as fire The Commission therefore beheves that ses eral years. For many plants.

barners is allowed by Section !!!.G of previously approved suppression hcensees pre;,osed systems and features Appendix R. Appenda A to Branch systems should be replaced with oil that satisfactorily achieved the fire Techmcal Position BTP APCSB 9 5d and collection systems that can withstand protection cnterir cet forth in Appenda the ; reposed Appendix R recognized seismic events.

A to BTP APCSB 9.5--I and began to that there were plant-umque '

The technical basis on which rhese promptly implemen'such features and configurations that required fire three sections are based are further s3 stems.

prctection features that are not identical discussed in Section !!I. " Specific Satisfactory features and ss stems are to those hsted in Section III.G of Requirements." of this preamble.

alreads m place and in opera' tion in Appendix R. For these cases. fire

3. Most commenters stated that the many plants. There is a reasonab!e protection features were developed by implementation schedule contained ir.

desree of umfermity amena most of the. hcensee and described in a fire the proposed rule is impossible to meet these approsed features for all facihties hazards analysis. Some of these for any of the operating plants. The smce they were reuewed asunst the arrangements were accepted by the staff commenters further stated that if the see catern of Appenda A to BTp as providma equivalent protect' ion to the implementation schedule in the effective APCSB 9.51. In general. the features requirements of Section III G to rule is the same as that in the proposed preuwiy appros ed by the NRC stall m Appendix R.

rule, the Comiaission must be prepared its res e of f:re protection usma the Requirements that accoimt for all of to either shutdown each operating cnter ' of Ar pendix A to BTP APCSB h pemeters that are important to fire nuclear power plant, or process 9 h1 p., vide an equis aleit lese! of fire protection and consistent with safety exemption requests, The commenters then concluded that protecta. safety to that presided under requirements for all plant unique the spnific provisions of Appendix R.

configurations have not been developed.

the implementation schedule should be rewritten to allow an adequate time Thut the further benefit that might be in hght of the experiens ; gained in fire pri d for compliance. The proposed rule prmded by requirms that previoush protection evaluations over the past four stated that, al1 fire protection and approved features ba modified to '

years. the Commission believes that the m difications identified by the staff as conform to the specific languate set hcensees should reexamine those necessan to sausfy Nnon 3 of forth m Appendix R is outweighed by previously approved configurations of Appendix A to this part, whether the oserall benefit of the early fire protection that do not meet the c ntaired m Appendix R to this part or irrp!emantation of such prevdusiv requirements as specified in Section

• he protec o 8"i approsed faatures. which m many cases Ill.G to Appendix R. Based on this c,pt for I na,e, pdicate are curren*!> being installed.

reexamination the licensee must either shutdown capability) shall be completed Neser'heless, as a result of its meet the requirements of Section III.G of by November 1,1980 unless, for good contmume renew of fire prpection Appendix R or apply for e 1 exemption cause shown, the Commission approves matters. the NRC staff has mdicated to that justifies alternatives by a fire an extension." (proposed paragraph the Commission that there are hazard analysis. llowever, based on 50A81.(c)). The Commission went on to requirements in three sections m which present information, the Commission state its intention in the Statement of the pro'ection afforded by Appendix R does not expect to be able to approve Consideration to the rule that '

.no oser and above that previously exemptions for fire-retardant coatmgs plant would be allowed to continue to accepted may be desirable. The used as fire barriers.

operate after November 1.1980, or Commissmn has decided that these The second relates to emergency beyond an extended date approved by requirements should be retroactively hghting.Section III J of Appendix R calls the Comission, unless all modifications apphed to all facihties This decision is for 8-hour emergency lighting, whereas (except for alternate or dedicated not meant to renect adversely on m some cases less than 8-hour shutdown capability) have been previous hansee or staff evaluations; emergency lighting has been accepted as implemented."

rather its purpose is to take fully into satisf ing Appendix A to BTP APCSB The Commission has reconsidered the 3

ac count the mcreased knowledge and 9.b1 While an adequate level of safety implementation schedule and has experience developed on fire protection may be provided by less than an 8-hour determined that it should be modified ma'ters over the last several years.

supply an 8-hour system would provide for the following reasons:

The first of these sections is related to added protection and would generally

• After reviewing the comments and fire protectwn features for ensuring that mvolve only a small cost. The the information developed as a result of ss stems and associated circuits used to Commission therefore beheves that completion of fire reviews over the past ichmve and maintain safe shutdown are licensees should upgrade the previously 6 months, the staff has informed the free from fire damage Appendix A to approved facihties to satisfy the 8-hour Commission tnat the date of November DTP APCSB 9 51 permits a combmation lighting requirement of Appendix R.

1.1980. is not possible because the of fire-retardant coatmgs and fire The third relates to protection against effective date of the rule will be after detection and supression systems fires in noninerted containments that date.

witbout specifymg a physical separation mvolving reactor coolant pump

• The staff has informed the distance to protection redundant lubricat.an oil (Section 111.0 of Commission that it would expect systems ( Appendix A. D.1(2)). and such Appendix R).The proposed rule virtually alllicensees to request

i 76604 Federal Register / Vol. 45, No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations l

exemptions if the new implementation Section Ill, we proside a summary of the automatic water suppression system 1

dates do not provide an appropriate Technical Basis for each requirement, throughout the plant.

I period of time for complying with the followed by a summary of the public An ensured minimum volume of water requirements of Appendix R. The time comments and a statement of the staff's is set asic'e and dedicated for fire and manpower resources needed by the disposition of those comn.ents.

protection uses to be available at all licensees to prepare such requests and Umes regaps of o6er simuhaneousSection I. Intrecuction and Scepe water uses in the plant. This water by the staff to formulate rec ~amendations on these requests is This section has been revised as a volume is dedicated for fire service by not...rranted Lom the standpoint of result of comments to include a means of separate storage tanks or j

timely fire protection improvement.

discussion of the importance of safe separate pump suctions from a large

• The revised implementation shutdown capability and the distinctic a body of water. When common tankage i

schedule provides a careful balance of between requirements for " safety-is employed for fire service needs and i

these considerations. calling for the related" equipment and equipment other water services, the fire pump remaining fire protection madifications needed for " safe shutdown."

suctions must be at the bottom of the to be implemented and installed on a Section 11. CeneralRequirements tank and other water supply suctions phased schedule that is as prompt as must be located at a higher level to can be reasonably achieved.

This section has been substantially ensure that the minimum dedicated j

The revised schedules distmguish rewritten as a result of comments to water volume is set aside for fire 1

between requirements imposed for the provide a concise summary of general protection needs. Administrative first time on the licensee by Appendix R requirements. The specific requirements controls by themselves. such as locked and those requirements already imposed were consolidated with the appropriate valves to ensure adequate water supply in license conditions or Technical parts of Section III. " Specific for fire fighting needs, are deemed Specifications issued prior to the Requiremen's/* except that the credit unacceptable at nuclear power plants.

a effective date of the rule. For given for 50-foot separation has been Comment Resolution requirements imposed by Appendix R,

dropped, hiany commenters stated that we including the items uakfit" to all Section 1/l. Specific Requirements plants, the schedule provides a were being too restrictive by stipulating ressonable time after publication of the The requirements m, this n21e are an underground yard fire main loop and rule for completion of required based upon principles long accepted fre a wa.,. a miles. Our intent was 4'

modifications. For requirements already within that portion of American industry only that a yard fire main loop be imposed by license conditions providing that has been classified by their furnished. We have deleted the I

for implemention after November 1.

insurance carriers as " Improved Risk" specification for an underground loop 1980, the Commission has reviewed or " Highly Protected Risk". In each of since special conditions may dictate that these schedules and has found that in these cases, the Commission has part of the loop be above ground or some instances the al otted time for decided that the ove-all interest of inside safety.related buildings. Such completion of the required modifications public safety is best served by arrangements are acceptable, may be excessive. Thus, for fire establishing seme conservative level of With regard to the specification for a protection features other than those fire protection and ensuring that level of fresh water supply, the staff was covered by Appendix R.although the compliance exists at all plants. The attempting to avoid potential plant Commission has extended the following is a list of the specific problems that are not associated with compliance dates beyond the November technical bases and resolution of public fire protection. From a fire protection 1,1980, date in the proposed rule, the comments for each of the specific standpoint, salt or brackish water is i

Commission has added a requirement requirements in Appendix R.

acceptable for fire supp.ession provided that limits the compliance schedule in A. WaterSupplies for Fire the fire protection system is designed existing licenses if such schedules SuppressionSystems TechnicoIBosis.

and maintained for salt or brackish I

extend beyond what we now believe One of the basic fire protection water The requirement for fresh water should have been a reasonable e chedule requirements for a modern industrial supplies is therefore dropped. Other l

initially. Relief from such limita' on may site in the United States is a separate operational problems unrelated to fire be granted by the Director of Nuclear water distribution ystem for fire protection that may result from the use Reactor Regulation upon a showmg that protection with dual water supplies.

of talt or brackish water for fire there is good cause kr extending such Duplicate water supplies are required to suppression activities are outside the date and that public health and safety is ensure uninterrupted fire suppression cope of this regulati:,n.

not adversely affected by such capability allowing for single failures Several commenters took issue with extension.

and periodic maintenance and repair of the requirement for two separate i

it should also be noted that for vital portions of the systems. Duplicate redundant suctions, stating that some licensees whose license conditions water supplies may consist of separate plaa's t.se a single large intake structure imposed a schedule with a compliance suctions for fire pumps from a large on a lake or a river for all water date of November 1,1980, or other date body of water such as lake, river, or requiren.ents.The requirement for prior to the effective date of 9 50.48, the pond or from two water storage tanks.

separate intake structures was not Commission has suspended such For nuclear power plants, the intended and the rule has been clarified.

compliance dates by promulgating on distribution system is required to consist Several comments called for deleting October 29,1980, a temporary rule of a loop around the plant with suitable the requirements for dedicated tanks or i 50.48 (45 FR 71509). which will be valves for isolating portions of the use of vertical standpipe for other water superseded by this ule.

system for maintenance or repair services when storage tanks are used for i

To better unde

• and the nature of the without interruptmg the water supply to combined service-water / fire-water uses, public comments tw.eived and the staff's the various fire suppression systems in on the basis that this is overly restrictive resolution of these comments, the the plant.Thus, with dual supplies and a and other ways are available to ensure l

following section will consider each loop concept, an adequate water supply a dedicated supply such as weirs, j

section of Appendix R to this part. In can be ensured to each manual or suction location, etc.Two separate but -

Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19, 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76607 svrc m: NRC used unnecessary detan fire emergeng and operators nsonef moddicatwns tu proude ahernatne m sM:m; eut sp cif.c regatrements for m safe plant snu;down shou.C not also shutdow n e stems are extensise..

c:amor mstruct;on. nre f:ghtmg hase to be concerned with bgntmg in the dedicated sy s:em that is essentian a s

pre : ce and f::e dalk Some area The small cost differential mmtmum capabihty safe shutdown train ccmren rs felt that these requirements between 2-hour supply and the and is mdependent of those already were more detal:ed than anythmg the substantial additional protection existmg may be provided. This mmimum Comm:ss;cn has pubbshed with regard afforded by the 8-hour supply does not capability is requ: red to maintain the to o;erator tram:ng The Commission warrant reducmg this requirement. The process sanables within those sabes here pmnts out that most of the Commission has decided to require an 8-predicted for a loss of offsite power. The mvestgations of the TMI accident hour batter) power supply in all areas case of loss of offsite power is assumed identihed madequately trained needed for operation of safe shutdown because fires m certam circumstances operators as an tmportant facter and equipment and in access and egress (e g, electrical distnbution system 4)

hat work is now bemg done in this routes.

could cause or be related to such a loss.

area. The fact a not that the traming K. AdWnistrative Controls Technical Fire damage to cold shutdown capability requirements spelled out here for the fire Bcsis The fire protection program uses is limited to damage that can be brigade members are excessne when administratn e controls for fire repaired within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to provide a compared to training requirements for prevention and prefire planning The margm in achtes mg cold shutdow n reactor operators but th it fire brigade items hsted in this section are generally conditions. Consideration is given to tramma is further along in development.

accepted within the fire protection associated circuits because most plants and treming parameters that are community as mimmum requirements were not desigaed with this concept m essential to a comprehenMve program for an effective administration of the fire mind. Should either the alternative or have been ident:fied protection program. Controls are placed dedicated capabihty be required to 4 ting rechn.ca!

on the storage and use of combustible function because of a fire. it must not be h

!. F/"eyetvy 1 Bcsw E nergency hghting :s reqmred in aaterials to reduce the fire loadmg in disabled by fire damage to associated all ricar power plants. Battery-safety-related areas and on ignition circuits. Also, this capability does not pcwered hghts with capacities of 1% to sources to avoid careless operations.

have to meet the single failure cnterion 2 heurs is usually sufficient for Procedares are used to control actions because it is only one of severallevels emergency egrr ss. l{ owes er, the postfire to be taken by mdividuals who discover of defense. Seismic Category I critena is emergency hghtng requirements m a a fire and by the fire bngade for the not imposed because fires that would nuclear power 91 ant are of a different deselopment of preplanned fire fightmg require the installation of alternative or kind. The need is for hghting that aids strategies and actual fire fignting dedicated shutdown capabihty are not the access to equipment and techmques.

seismically induced.

opAra Comment Resoludon Comment Resoludon db a t p rs n1o ffect safeg! ant shutdown durmg plant Many commenters stated that this Many of the commenters stated that emerwencies Because such activities requirement was much too detailed for a this requirement exceeded the scope of m.iy extend os er. considerable penod regulation. Some stated that the Appendix R by defming alternative of time both during and after the fire,it requirements should apply only to those shutdown requirements. They stated is prudent to provide 8-hour battery areas having safe shutdown equipment.

that the time requirements are excessive emergency bghting capabdity to allow Other commenters stated that a simple and should be dropped. They also sufficient time for normal hghting to be statement that administrat've contend that this regulation does not restored with a maram fo unanticipated procedures should be established to take into accoc.nt the many plant events.

control the various fire hazards reviews being conducted under the throughout the plant was sufficicnt, and Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP).

Comment Resolun.on that the details could be spelled out in s It is generally understood that cold Many comraenters stated that the regulatory guide or some other similar shutdown is the altimate safe shutdown requirement for emergency lightmg is document.

condition and that. for each fire area.

overly restrictive in three specifics: first.

Minor changes have been made in the different means may be used and may that emergency lighting is unnecessary wording of this requirement for be nacessary to achieve cold shutdown.

in many of the designated areas: second. clarification.

Because a fire in certain areas at some that the requirement for sealel beam or L Alternative and Dedicated p: ants would hase the capability of fluorescent units is overly restrictive:

Shutdown Capabihty.

disabling systems required to achieve third. that the requirement for individual Technical Basis. In some locations both hot and cold shutdown. it is

8. hour battery power supply is (such as the cable spreading room) necessary trs specify the minimum excessive Three commenters within operating nuclear power plants. it capi tility and time requirement for each recommended a dhour battery power is not always possible or practicable to condition necessary to achieve safe supply, five commenters recommended a protect redundant safe shutdown shutdown. We agree that evaluations plant-specific power supply: and one systems against adverse effects of fire or being made under the Systematic commenter recommended that there be fire suppresoon ac'ivities only through Evaluation Program (SEP) may also call no permanent mstallation the use of fire protection features for alternative or dedicated shutdown These suggestions have been accepted because the redundant safe shutdown capabihty for reasons other than fire in part Lighting umts with 8-hour systems in a given fire area are too close protection. For example, seismic.

battery supphes are to be provided m all to ecch other. Alternative shutdown flooding, or emergency cort coohex areas needed for operation of safe capabihty has usually been required to requirements resultmg frorr the SEP may shutdown equipment and m access and be independent of the control room.

require additional modificaticns. Each egress routes thereto.The reasoning cable spreading room, switchgear rooms hcensee should be aware of the status of behmd the requirement for an 8. hour and cable nser areas because redundant the SEP so that the requirements battery power supply is that there can systems in these areas are not resultmg from SEP can be effectively be a great deal of other activity during a adequately separated. When plant mtegrated with those relating to fire

76608 Federal Register. Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. Nmember 19. two / Reles and Regulations protection to the estent possible.

required to ensure safe shutdown the national consensus standard used flowewr. the Commission has decided capability. The use of a 1. hour barner in for testing ar.d rating these cable that the modifications required to conjunc' on with automatic fire penetratioo seals. Smce the cables complete the fire protection program suppress )n and detection capability for conduct the heat through the barner.

should not be deferred until the SEP each re.ndant train of safe shutdown and since the cable insulation is review is completed.

equip *.ient is based on the following combustible. the acceptance criteria of M. Fire Barriers.

cris.derations. Automatic suppression the ASTN1 Standard E-119 relating to TechnicalBasis. The best fire is required to ensure prompt. effective temperature on the unexposed side must protection for redundant trains of safe application of suppressaat to a fire that be appropriately modified.

shutdown systems is separation by could endanger safe shutdown Comment Resolution unpierced fire barriers-walls and capability. The actisation of an ceiling-floor ai.semblies. Because these automatic fire detection or suppression Some commenters si.ggested that this barriers are passive fire protection system does not occur until sufficient entire section be ddeted and replaced features, they are inherently reliable smoke or heat has been developed by with the following two sentences:

provided they are properly installed and the fire. Therefore, the Commission ii

" Penetration seals shall provide the maintained. Fire barriers have been requiring a 1. hour barrier to ensure that equivalent protection which is required used successfully for many years to fire damage will be limited to one train of the fire barrier. Evaluation of the subdivide large potential fire losses into until the fire is extinguished.

penetration seals based upon a design smaller, more acceptable risks. Even fire These requirements have now been review and relevant test data or barriers with openings have successfully incorporated in Section III.G. " Fire qualification tests may be made." The interrupted the progress of many fires Protection of Safety Functions /

commenters felt that sufficient test data provided the openings were properly are available to permit evaluation of protected by fire doors or other Co***"# Re80luh.0" design requirements without full-scale acceptable means.

Several commenters made a number mockup testing and that many of the Fire barriers are " rated" for fire of suggestions of an editorial nature.

items spelled out in the regulation such resistance by being exposed to a One suggestion was to add "or unless as the water hose stream test. were too

" standard test fire". This standard test other fire protection features have been detailed and did not belong in the fire is def' ed by the American Society provided to ensure equivalent regulation. The Commission has m

for Testing and Materials in ASTN E-.

protection"ir. the first paragraph, where reconsidered this issue and revised the 119. "Sta Jard for Fire Resistance of three-hour rated fire barriers were rule to (a) require the use of Budding Materials." Fire barriers are stipulated.mless a lower rating was noncombustible materials only in the commonly rated as having a fire justified by the fire hazards analysis.

construction of fire barrier penetration resistance of from 1 to a hours. Most The Commission feels that this adds seals. (b) require fire barrier penetration

" Improved Risk" or "flighly Protected nothing in the way of clarification and seals to be qualified by test; and (c)

Rish" (as classified by insurance the suggestion was not adopted. The require such tests to satisfy certain carriers) industrial properties in the second paragraph requires that acceptance criteria.

United States require fire barriers to structural steel forming a part of or O. fire Doors.

have a resistance rating of 2 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

supporting any fire barrier have a fire Technica/ Basis. Door openings in fire While a nuclear power plant has a resistance equivalent to that required of walls constitute another breach that low fire load. the potential the barrier. An example was given of must be protected. Fire doors that have consequences of fire are serious.

metal lath and plaster covering as being been tested and rated for certain fire Therefore, the Commission has selected one means of providing equivalent exposures are installed to protect these 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> has been as an acceptable protection. Several commenters stated openings. Fire doors frequently fail to minimum fire resistance rating for fire that they thought this was too narrow protect the openings in which they are barriers separating redundant trains for and would be interpreted by some installed because they are not fully safe shutdown systems. This will give people as the only acceptable method closed. Various methods are available to ample time for automatic and manual permitted. Since the example seemed to licensees to ensure that fire doors are in fire suppression activities to control any be confusing, a decision has been made proper operating condition and that they i

potential fire and for safe shutdown to eliminate it. Other comments tc the will be closed during a fire. These activities to properly control the reactor. effect that the requirement was options are listed in Appendix R.

Many operating plants, or plants that excessivelv restrictive with regard to

~

C####"# A*88I"###"

are already built but that are not yet fire barrier penetrations, including fire operat;ng. have both trains of safe doors and their associated frames and Many commenters stated that this shutdown equipment located in close hardware, and ventilation systems have requirement is too detailed and should proximity and a single fire could been acted upon by the staif and the be deleted. Minor editorial changes have damage or destroy the functional requirement. as it had affected these been made in order to more clearly state capability of both redundant trains. If items, was deleted.

the requirements.

specific plant conditions preclude the N. Fire Barrier Cable Penetration Seal P. Reactor Coolant Pump lubrication installation of a 3. hour fire barrier to Qualification.

System.

separate the redundant trains, a 1. hour TechnicalBasis. Unpierced fire Technica/ Basis. Each reactor coolant fire barrier and automatic fire barriers offer the best protection for pump motor assembly typically contains suppression system for each redundant separating redundant trains of safet -

140 to 220 gallons of lube oil. Oil leaking train will be considered the equivalent related or safe shutdown equipmen from some portions of the lube oil of 3. hour barrier, liowever, these barriers must be pi rced system may come in contact with if the 1-hour fire barrier and automatic for both control and. power cal..

surfaces that are hot enough to ignite the fire suppression for each redundant These penetrations must be sealed to oil. The resulting fire could be large, and train cannot be provided because of achieve a degree of fire resistance access to the fire woun. be delayed plant. specific conditions, alternative or equivalent to that required of the barrier because of the time required to enter the dedicated shutdowns capability will be that is pierced. ASTM Standard E-119 is containment. Containent air temperature

Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 Wednesday. November 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76fiO9 would mcrease. sesere locahzed pump c.; collection system is emered by Capability ' ) In tnr fn horarcs anasis environments would deselop m the area parsgraph C.: becaur,e i*s functmn is fer a pla 11. the eqmprnent re:.ec upon to of the fire, and a large amount of smoke required to protect safety-related perform both funcnons must be would be generated. These conditions systems rather than to perform a safety identified for each fee erea. It fo!!nws could affect operabdity of safety related function. Because the failure of the oil that any associated non-safety circuits equipment inside containment.

collection system for a seismically in the fire area that could aterselv Therefore. an oil collection system is induced oil fire should not prevent a affect the identified shutdowe necessary to confme any oil discharged safety-related system from performinW equipmant by feed:ng back pot'ntial!)

due to leadkage or failure of the its safety function (Regulatory Gaid0 disabhng coriditions (e gm hot sharts or lubrication system and to prever4 it 129. " Seismic Design Classification.'

shorts to ground) to the power supphes from becoming a fire hazard by drainmg paragraph C.2). the eil collection system or control circuits of that equipment it to a safe location.These occurrences should be designed, engineered. and must also be evaluated. Of course such could be random or could be seismically mstalled so that ita failure will not lead disabling conditions must be prevented induced because the esisting lube oil to a fire affecting safety-related system piping and oil collection systems equ.pment as a result of an earthquake.

to provide assurance that the identified may not be designed to withstand a The propo ed rule permitted tw esfe shutdown equipment will function design basis seimic event.

alternatives-an oil collection system or as designed. These re quirements have now be'en incorporati d in Section !!!.L a a ma p

sys e Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 states that for operating plants.

, d

" Alternative and Ded cated Shutdown postulated fires or fire protect on suppression s} stem because Capabihty!

cystem failures need not be cor.sidered unacceptable damage may result to the Comment Resolution concurrent with other plant accidents or safety-related systems from the burning the rlost severe natural phenomena..

f il before the suppression system is Many commenters stated that this The basis for that statement is two fold.

actuated and because the fire water requirement should be de eted because First, nuclear power plants are massive supply system is not designed to many older plant designs aid not withstand seismic events. In addition.

consider associated circuits and thw, is.

struc tures, and essential services are these pumps are located within the therefore. a new design requirement.

designed to withstand earthquakes and biological hield mode containment,

,Ic commenters felt that the analysis cther natural phenomena. Second. the history of many fires associated with therefore, timely fire brigade action that wn. be required to satisfy this recent earthquakes have been w uld be difficult if the suppression requiremem will be both long and system malfunctions. Further. If the complicated ard the requirement should evaluated. These evaluations showed that such fires usually are due to failure suppressi n system becomes inoperable therefore be deleted.

of piping or tanks of fiammable gasses during operation, a fire w3tch or patrol The Commission rejected these carm t enter the area dunng cperation.

suggestions for the following reasons.

or liquids such as municipal natural gas distribution systems or gaso!me storage Comment Resc!ution

1. Virtually all of the fire protection and/or dispensing statiora. Where such A number of commenters suggested modifications made to date have been potential fire hazarde exist in nuclear that this section in too detailed and required to correct deficiencies that power planu. {e.g.. nydrogen for should be substantially modified. This resulted from lack of consideration of generator cooling, or oil fuel for the requirement was chayed to delete the certain specific items during initial emergency diesel generator or station option of protecting the reactor coolant design and construction.

opace heating boilers) they are designed pump lubrication system with an

2. The Browns Ferry fire showed the and installed to withstand the damaging automatic fire suppression system. We necessity of divisional separation of the effects of various natural phenomena.

have modified the rule to indicate that associated ircuit of the control cables and other special fire protection features the requirement that the oil collectan to prevent the disabling of safety are provided as necessary. However.

system be designed to provide systems by a single fire. This has been General Design Criterion 2 Design Bases reasonable assurance that it will discussed with licensees during for Protection Against Natural withstand the Safe Shutdown evaluations of alternative and dedicated Phenc== requires that structures.

Earthquake can be met by satisfying shutdown capability and is necessary to systems and ccmponents important to paragraph C.2. of Regulatory Guide 1.29 ensure that safe shutdown systems will safety be designed to withstand the

" Seismic Design Classification." as be able to function properly in the event effects of earthqi.akes without loss of described above.

of fire.

capabihty to perform their safety Q. Associated Circuits.

function. Regulatory Guide 1.29.

Technica/ Basis. When considering

3. The staff considers incomplete any

" Seismic Design Classification."

the consequences of a fire in a given fire fire hazard analysis that does not descnbes an acceptable method for ares during the evaluation of safe consider the effects of fire damage to ioentifying and classifying those shutdown capabihties of a plant the circuits that are associated with safe features of light-water-cooled nuclear staff must be able to conclude that one shutdown systems.

power plants that should be designed to train of equipment that can be used As indicated above, as a result of the withstand the effects of the Safe immediately to bnng the reactor to a hot comments received on this issue it is Shutdown Earthquake. In this guide, shutdown condition remains unaffected unclear that associated circuits have in paragraph C.1 applies to systems that by that fire. The staff must also be able fact been adequately considered by are required to remain functional to to conclude that damage to one train of licensees in their reviews using the ensure heat removal capability; equipment used for achieving cold guidance of Appendix A to BTP APCSB paragraph C.2 applies to systems that do shutdown will be limited so that the 95-1. To ensure that the associated not have to remain frunctional for that equipment can be returned to an circuits are considered. all operating purpose, but whose failure could reduce operable condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. (See nuclear power plants will be required to the functioning of those systems covered Technical Basis for Section llI.G.

meet the requirements of Section Ill.G of by paragraph C.1. The reactor coolant

" Protection of Safe Shutdown Appendix R.

,y m-

+...y

-a

76610 Federal Register ! Vol 45, No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19.1%0 Rules and Regulations

_ _ _ _ _ _ ~_. _..

G<

d i' - < m R m Vut e shutdenn capabints The Comr ssion nb wcened on the proposed r en-N ura mmnters contended that does not agree. b behew that the rmdens. other commenters C" "

O" b P**

• "" M d " O*U "NUO (i o rn n

e. Ltmns mandate that an ad;uda e a heanne be conducted pr gra ins olvmg euensa e plar t-of N poposed te quirements pnor to a fmideasmn One commenter specihc fire protect n mod 6 cations

!N %d to the Atomic Energy Act of iabeled the resitan an " order" within that are oased on gu mce set fotth m Nu e ao nded. the Energy Branch Technical Po-an flTP APCSB K m ea zation Ac t of 1974. as amended, the mean na of S Admmistratne 1% edure Act p U S C 551(6!f (APA}

9..%1 and its Appendi

.\\ and the anJ % tmns 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the and asserted that 10 CFR 2.204 of the specific requirements if Appends R to I'mted States Code notice is hereby en that the followmg amendments to Comm;ssmn's resulations. " Order for res lve disputed issui i provide p!c to Chapte-r 1. Lode of Federal Modihcation of License? upphes to this dequate fire protection.

Iit One commenter stated that the Ryulanont put 5n are published as a r demAmg procedma The Cornm:sur a disagrees with these mbiguity of the proposed regulation oxum nt sulyett to codification m nts. A ' ru!e" n defmed m the with regard to cnticalitems regarea 1 A new i 50 48 is added to read as that it be renoticed. The commenter fhs "the whole or a part of an APAt>-

4 wm ammt of general or mfuenced three portmns of the mttccLr appbcabihty and future effect proposeo Appendn R as examples of such ambiguitv. Thev were Section 111 G, i m F,ah operatine nuclear power designea to implement.

or 55114n7 aw or pohg,,

{5 U.S C.

Section l!I.N. and Section III Q We have pi,mt shall has e a hre protection plan

~

prescrd !

Nt wishes Cntenon 3 of Appendix A The an ncy action questioned here is acar!y one that treats simdarly in reference to the first eumple the to this part This fire pro *ection plan ue w Mi de ube the us erall fire protectmn sitated brensees equal!y and that paragraph of Section til G identibes praram for the fauhty, identify the prescrd es f uture conduct or reqwments For those hcensees wh alternative shutdown capabihty as n un ms positions withm the licensee s y

ewu or ruzr

,n that are responsibile for the are net already prosided an equisa?ent paragraph !!!.G2c then identifies proc 4 tate the authontres that are (erm of f a protection. certam specific alternative shutdown capabihts as a deleg acu to each of these positions to hrr protectmn features are required' minimum fire protection feature we do implement those responsibihties. and

\\ armus of these requirements would ee with this statement. The first outhne the plans for fire protection. fire appy to approximately 40 facilities The paragraph of Sectic n ll! G identibes detectmn and suppression capabditt commenter s charactenzation of the rule

~

alternative shutdown capabihty as one and limitation of fire damage. The plan as an order. along with the assertion option in a combmation of f:re shall also descnbe specific features that 10 CFR 12m mandates a heanng protection features for a specific f te necessary to implement the program before the rule becomes finalis area. Paragraph III G.3 mdicates w hr r described al>m e. such as administratis e mcorrect. On its face. that regulatwn this option should be used.

contrels and personnel requirements for twhich does grant a hearing right)

In reference to the second example f,re prevention and manual fire apphes only to Commission orders that the commenier stated that Section !!hN suppression activities. automatic and modify a hcense 2 It does not apply t requires a pressure differential acro s manually operated fire detection and requirements rromulgated through the test specimen dunng the testing of

. oppression systems. and the means to ndemaking actmn conducted in fire barrier penetration seals but f:.ils to hmit fire damage to structures. systems.

accordance with the requirements of define the pressure differential. Tais or components important to safety so a pphra b!e law.

comment is incorrect. The press ire that the capabilty to safely shut down Se serai commenters contended that differential called for by the proposed the piant is ensured.'

the environmentalimpact had not been provision was the maximum pressure (b) Appendix R to this part establishes adequately addre= sed. One commenter, differential that the barrier would fire protechon features required to cmng the requirirnents in Section !!!.A expenence in the specific plant s.stisfy Critenca 3 of Appendix A to this of Appenda R for two water supphes installation. In any event. the part with respect to certain genenc and tw o separate redundant sections as requirement for pressure differential asues for nuclear power plants licensed eumples of requirements mvolving durmg such testmg has been deleted to operate pnor to January L 1979 envinmmental issues, contended that since only noncombusnble matena! is Fuept for the requ rements of Sections the Comm:ssion rebed upor its staff's no being used for such seals.

III G 111 J. and 111 O. the provisions of

" unsupported determmation that, in reference to the third example, the Appenh R to th:s p4rt shall not be pursuant to 10 CFR } 51.5f d). an cemmenter stated that Section Ill Q u apWaMe to nuclear power plants environinental impact statement.

totM!y lacking in definition. We do not ik"nsed to cperate pnor to january 1.

app and or nentWe declaration is not agree. Footnote 6 references Regulatory 193 to the extent that fire protection require i ' The Commisuon has Guide 135 and IEEE Std 384-1974 The femures proposed or implemented by considered hectmn ill A and has further

'atter document is a commoniv used conmderM IFe mmaming requirements industry standar i that defmes 3

q., ;

mmr.nm,ts,,ng,,y of Appendit R and remains convinced associated circuits and provides ra a 4

<d m :wo NF c dm umenis-that the reedatwns are not substantive guidance for ensuring that such circo:ts N d temn W P%non AmM Power and are mstgmhcant from the standpomt do not compromise the independence of

('

' " b "4 N ^ 3 GB 9 "

of environmental impact.

the shutdown circuits they are p[ Z d%((j$

"E One commenter suested that all associated with.

n,, a % w,,

plants be required to mstall deditated 13ased on the above examples and our

. Av a A e r Apcsn 9u rawes review of the other provisibns of the D F* Pn m fm wear eow r:am, N""b

' I b i N f" * " ""' "

m. ~ Ja

.% ~ n e.q %, i m a mned m proposed rule, we do not belies e that s%- a d m e a om ; ne w r a sem a the rule as proposed was ambiguous so

'" T a"M 1. Frt dhd Amst 23

' ow r a M er is speufo., b.

• I m t ces mMed t y inc st4ff

• m vrpw rn, wWs by cr*r on s as to reyure renoticing Moreover. it we im.s an m umn m%. sepaea i should be noted that. based on other uu< -

e4

Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225, Wednesday. November 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76611 the hcensee have been accepted by the af ter the effectise date of this section determines upon a showing by the NRC staff as satisfying the provtstons of and Appendis R to this part; licensee. that there is good cause for Appenda A to Branch Technical (1) the first refuehng outage; extendmg s ach date and that the pubhc Position BTP APCSB 9.5-1* reflected in (ii) another planned outage that lasts health and safety is not adversely staff fire protection safety evaluation for at least 60 days; or affected by such extension. Extensions reports issued prior to the effectis e date (iii) an unplanned outage that lasts for of such date shall not exceed the dates of this rule. or to the extent that fire at least 120 days.

determined by paraaraphs (c)(1) through protection features were accepted by (4) Those fire protection features that (c)(4) of this sectron.

the staff in comprehensive fire require prior NRC approval by (1) Those fire protection features that protection safety evaluation reports paragraph (c)(5) of this section shall be involve revisions of administrative issued before Appenda A to Branch implemented within the follow.ag controls. manpow er changes. and Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5-1 schedule: Dedicated shutdown training shall be implemented within 4 was published in August 1976. With syst' 'ns--30 months after NRC months after the date of the NRC staff respect to all other fire protection approval: modifications requinng plant Fire Protection Evaluation Report features covered by Appendix R. all shutdown-before startup after the accepting or requir.ng such features.

nuclear power plants licensed to operate earliest of the events ginn in paragraph (2) Those fire protection features prior to [anuary 1.1979 shall satisfy the (c)(3) commencing 180 das s after NRC involvmg ins'allation of modifications apphcable requirements of Appendix R approval; modifications not requiring not requiring prior approval or plant to this part including specifically the plant shutdown--a months after NRC shutdown shall be implemented within requirements of Sections III.G. III.), and approval.

12 months after the date of the NRC

!!LO.

(5) Licensees shall make any staff Fire Protection Safety Evaluation (c) All fire protection modifications m difications necessary to comply with Report accepting or requiring such these requirements m accordance with features.

require to satisfy the provisions of the above schedule without prior review (3) Those fire protection features, Appendix R to this part or directly and approval by NRC except for including ahernative shutdown affected by such requirements shall be m difications required by Section III.G.3 capabihty, involving installation of completed on the following schedule:

of Appendix R to this part. Licensees modifications requiring plant shutdown (1) Those fire protection features that shall submit plans and schedules for shall be implemented before the startup involve revisions of administrative meeting the provisions of paragraphs after the earliest of the following events controls, manpower changes, and (c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(4) within 30 days commencing 9 months or more after the traimng, shall be implemented within 30 after the effective date of this section date of the NRC staff Fire Protection days after the effective date of this and Append!x R ta this part. Licerisees Safety Evaluation Report accepting or section and Appendix R to this part.

shall submit design descriptions of requiring such features:

[2] Those fire protection features that modifications needed to satisfy Section (i) The first refueling outage:

involve installation of modifications that 111 G.3 of Appendix R to this part within (ii) Another planned outage that lasts do not require prior NRC approval or 30 days after the the effective date of for at least 60 days; or plant shutdown shall be implemented this section and Appendix R to this part.

(iii) An unplanned outage that lasts within 9 months after the effective date (6)In the event that a request for for at least 120 days.

of this section and Appendix R to this exemption from a requirement to comply (4) Those fire protection features part.

with one or more of the provisions of involving dedicated shutdown :apability (3) Those fire protection features.

Appendix R filed within 30 days of the requiring new buildings and systems except for those requiring prior NRC effective date of this rule is based on an shall be implemented within 30 months approval by paragraph (c)(5) of this assertion by the licensee that such of NRC approval. Other modifications section. that involve installation of required modifications would not requiring NRC approval prior to modifications that do require plant enhance fire protection safety in the installation shall be implemented within shutdown. the need for which is justified facility or that such modifications may 6 months after NRC approval, in the plans and schedules required by be detrimental to overall facility safety.

(e) Nuclear power plants licensed to the provisioni; of paragraph (c)(5) of this the schedule requirements of paragraph operate after january 1.1979, shall section, shall be implemented before (c) shall be tolled until final Commission complete all fire protection startup after the earliest of the following action on the exemption request upon a modifications needed to satisfy events commencing 180 days or more determination by the Director of Nuclear Criterion 3 of Appendix A to this part in Reactor Regulation that the licensee has accordance with the provisions of their

.cianric,t,on and guidance mth re pect to provided a sound technical basis for licenses.

permias6ie ehematnes to satisfy Appendix A to such assertion that warrants further

2. A new Appendix R is added to m APcss 9 s-1 has been provided in four other staff review of the request.

10 CFR Part 50 to read as follows:

NRC documents (d) Fire protection features accepted

. ~ Supplementary Guidance on information g}, the NRC staffin Fire Protection Appendix R-Fire Protection Pre en for Nuclear Power Facilities Ope.aung Prior to Needed for Fire Protection Evaluation." dated Ocober n.19 e.

Safety Evaluation Reports referred to in january 1.19*9

. "sampi. Techmcal specificauort" dated May paragraph (b) of this section and it 19--

supplementa to such reports. other than I. Introduction and Scope

• " Nude 4r Plant Fee Protection Functional features cos ered by paragraph (c). shall This Appendix applies to licensed nuclear Responsadmes. Admmistrative Control and be completed as soon 8s practicable but powr electric generstma stations that were Quai 9 Assurance dated lune 14.19'?

no later than the completion date perating prior to january 1.1979. except to

. manpwer pequiremen+ for operatin8 R eaumrs da ed May it.19 a currently specified in license conditions the extent set forth in paragraph 50 48(b) of this part. With respect to certain generic A r ne Pro ection Safety Evaluation Report that or technical specifications for such issues for such facilities it sets forth fire has ',een med for each operatir.s plant states how facility, or the date determined by protection features required to satisfy

'('"jQ","y"*gP[d ',,',*g'$ '"d paragraphs (d)(1) through (d)(4) of this Critenon 3 of Appendix A to this part.'

w hed when the facihty saber.co the appropnate section, whichever is sooner, unless the reg aremerus of Appendis R to this part Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

'see footnote 4

76612 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wdnesday. Nmember 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations Crder.oo 3 ef Appenda A to th:s pnrt program shall estabbsh the f re protect'on D..Uternatae or INgated SLtd m n speofws the - Structures e stems and pohcy for the protectum of structures.

O pebehty components mipertant to safety shall be sy s: ems. and temponents important to safets in areas w here the fire pro'ection features designed aaJ located to m.mmize. consistent at each plant and the procedure

• equipment.

canne' ensure safe shutdown capabilq in with other safety requirements. the and personnel required to impl> ment the the es ent of a fire m that area. alterna:n e or probabaty ard effect of fires and program at the plant site dedicated safe shutdown capabihty s%ll be explcsians '

The fire pretection program shall ne onder pros idad.

When t onsiderms the effects of f:re. those the diret ton of an mdaidual who has been D"*

systems asso< iated wuh ac hievmg and delevated autnority commensurate with the mamiaane safe shutdown constions responsibihttes of the position and w ho has A. Water Supp/ics 6or fire Lpprenw assume major importance to safety because available staff personnel knowledgeable m Systems damage to them can lead to core damage both fire protection and naclear safety Two separate water supplies shall be resulting from lost of coolant through boiloff The fire protection program shall extend prouded to furmsh recessary water solume The phrases "important to safety." or the concept of defense in debth to fire anJ pressure to the fire mam loop-

" safety.related." will be used throughout th:s protection m fire areas important to safety.

Each supply shall consist of a storage tank Appendix R as applymg to all safety with the followmg objectives; pump. piping. and appropnate iso!atmn and functions The phrase " safe shutdown" will

• to prevent fires from startmg.

control valves. Two separate redundant be used throughout this Appenda R as

• to detect rapidly. control, and extmguish suctions in one or e ore intake structures applyira to both hot and cold shutdow n promptly those fires that do occur:

from a large body I w ater (riv er. lake. etc.)

furktions.

• 10 proude protectmn for structures.

will satisfy the re urement for two separated Because fire may affect safe shutdown systems. and components important to safety water storage tan e.These supplies shall be sy stems and because the loss of function of so that a fire that is not promptly separated so that failure of one supply will systems used to mitisate the consequences of extmguished by the f re suppression actmties not result in a faf re of the other supply-design basis accidents under postfire wdl not prevent the safe shutdown of the Each supply of e fire water distnbuten conditions de not per se impact pubhc plant.

system shall be c.pable of providma for a

. o hmtt fire damage to B. Fire Hazenis Analysis penod of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> the maximum expected safety. the ne.

+

systems require to achiese and mamtatn A fire hazards analysis shall be performed water demands as determmed by the fire safe shutdown nditions is greater than the by quahfied fi' protection and reactor hazards analysis for safety-related areas or need to hmit fire c. tage to those systems systems engu u rs to (1) consider potential in other areas that present a fire exposure required to mitigate the consequences of situ and transient fire hazards. (21 determine hazard to safety.related areas.

design basis accidents. Three levels of fire the consequences of fire m any location m When storage tar.ks are used for combmed damage bmits are established accordmg to the plant on the abihty to safely shut down service-water / fire water uses the mmimum the safety functions of the structure. system.

the reactor or on the ability to minimize and volume for fre uses shall be ensured by or component.

control the release of radioactmty to the means of dedicated tanks or by some environment. and (3) specify meuures for physical means such as a vertical standpipe

- - ~

~ - -

r,. o.m.g. wws fire prevention. fire detection. fire for other water service Administrative secy wcion suppression, and fire containtnent and controls mcludmg locks for tank outiet Hm sn uo.a one vac e ememene nee.uny e alternatise shutdown capabihty as required 5alves. are unacceptable as the only means u

• =

'e' **m wa **' ** for ea' 5 fire area contammg structures.

te ensure mmimum water volume.

['_"'Qd%%

systems, and components important to safety Other water systems used as one of the u

,m.g. t,, s.ngi w..

in accordance with NRC guidehnes and two fire water supphes shall be permanently

= cam apowe we '

regulations-connected to the fire main system and shall C"' 6****

8o***"~**"""'"*c'****'a C. Fire Prrvention Features be capable of automatic abgnment to the fire 7 $E 7 Fire protection features shall meet the mam system. Pumps. controls and power an eesse me. tma a.m ga war followmg general requirements for a!! fire supphes in these systems shall satisfy the tw www no mai.: mst ou es*

areas that centain or present a fire hazard to requirements for the mam fire pumps. ' Die

'j*y*[D*

[' **

structures, systems. or components important use of other water systems for fire protection to safety.

shall not be incompatible with their functions Cooga Baws Bom sees or.mmme

• necessay

1. In situ fire hazards shall be identified required for safe plant shutdown. Failure of "C"*""

'"*N**#C"'***"C***

and suitable f ratection provided.

the other system shall not degrade the fire U,$N*,g*"[**,,*o**l

2. Transient fire hazards associated with main system.

we normal operation. maintensnce. repair, or B SectionalIsolation Vc/ves modification actiuties shall be identified and Sectionalisolation valves such as post

' renn *= aa ww. w.. u. a a 9vaa *** eliminated where possible. Those transient mdicator valves or key operated valves shall

.1N.c Nlu7,N.Z.. in.c'"me'**Sen*'i$

• fire hazards that can not be ehmmated shall be installed in the fire main loop to permit o on

.yo m=w e.cs or socn w.

be controlled and saitable protection isolation of portioris of the fire main loop for

$'8. a w*,evo.*'. ",$$t. smaa ***='**"**'.ne*~io" Y provided.

maintenance or repair without mterruptmg 2

,mo wa - wee e 3 Fire detection systems portable the entire water supply.

1.7m*s.'".7.*NtIc~wYo.. mou,t%

estinguishers. and standpipe and hose C. //ydront Isolation ro!ves

.awa stations shall be mstal:ed.

Valves shall be mstaHed to permit isolation c= me.% %.aaet =ae ~v coa,te w m te t.oune at ene eceu e n ame.

4. Fire barriers or automatic suppression of outside bydrants from the fire mam for The most sermgent fire damage bmit shall

5) stems or both shall be installed as maintenance or repair without interruptmg apply for those systems that fall into more necessary to protect redundant systems or the water supply to automatic or manual fire than one category Redundant s5stams used components necessary for safe shutdown.

suppiession systems in any area contaming

~

to mitigate the consequences ofother design

5. A site fire brigade shall be established.

or presentmg a fire hazard to safety-related basis accidents ',t not necessary for safe trained. and equipped and shall be on site at or safe shutdown equipment.

shutdown may be ast to a smgle exposure all ;imes.

D. Manuo/ Fire Suppressmn fire. Howeser. protect.on shall be prov:ded so

6. Fire detection and suppression systems Standpipe and hose systems shall be that a hre within only one such sistem will shall be designed. instaHed, mamtamed. and mstalled so that at least one effective hose g

not damage the reduridant svsiem.

tested by personnel properly qualified by stream will be able to reach any location that esperience and traimng m fire protection contams or presents an exposure fire hazard

//. Genem/ Reqwrements sy ste ms to structures, systems, or components A. Fire Pmtectwn Pragmm

7. Surveillance procedures shall be important to safety.

A fire protection program shall be estabbshed to engure that fire barriers are m Access to permit effective functionmg of estabbshed at each nuclear power plant. The place and that fire suppression systems and the fire brigade shall be provided to all areas compc~: ~a operable.

that contain or present an exposure fire

=

4 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19. 1980 / Rules and Regulations 76613 hazard to structures. sys: ems or components hour ratma in addition fire detectors and an Institute for Occupational Safetv and important to safety.

automat:c fire suppression system shall be Health-approval formerly enen by the llS Standpipe and hose stations shall be inside mstal led in tt:e f.re area; Bureau of Mines) shall be provided for fire PWR containments and BWR containments inside noninerted containments one of the bngade, damage control. and control room tr:at are not inerted. Standpipe and hose fire protection means spectfted above or one personnel. At least to rnasks shall be stations ms:de contamrnent may be of the following fire protection means shall available for fire bngade personnel. Control connected to a high quality water supply of be provided.

room personnel may be furnished breathina

- sufficient quantity and pressure ether than

d. Separation of cables and equipment and air by a manifold system piped from a the fire main loop if plant-spectfic features associated non-safety circuits of redundant storage reservoirif practvsi Serv ce or rated prevent extendtra the fire mam supply inside trains by a honzontal distance of more than operstmg hfe shall be a minimum of one-half 2

containment. For BWR drywells. standpipe 20 feet w:th no intervening cw,bustibles or hour for the self-contained units and hose stations shall be placed outside the fire hazards; At leas

• two exta air bottles shall be dry well with adequate lengths of hose to

e. Installation of fire detectors and an located on site for each self-contained reach any location tnside the dry well with automatic fire suppression system in the fire breathmg unit. In addition, an onsite & hour an effective hose stream.

area; or supply of reserve air shall be provided and E. Hydrostatic Hose Test,

f. Separation of cables and equipment and arranoed to permit quick and complete Fire hose shall be hydrostatically tested at associated non safety circuits of redundant replenishment of exhausted supply air bottles a pressure of 300 psi or 50 psi above trains by a noncombustible radiant energy as they are returned. lf compressors are used t

maximum fire main operstmg pressure, shield.

as a source of breathing air. only units whichever is greater. Hose stored in outside

3. Alternative or dedicated shutdown approved for breathing air shall be used; hose houses shall be tested annually. Intenor capabihty and its associated circuits '

compressors shall be operable assuming a standpipe hose shall be tested every three independent of cables. systems or loss of offsite power. Special care must be

years, components m the area, room or zone under taken to locate the compressor in areas free F. Autoinatic Fire Detect!on consideration, shall be provided:

of dust and contaminants.

Autamatic fire detection systems shall be a.Where the protection of systems whose

1. Fire Brigade Tmining installed in all areas of the plant that contain function is required for hot shutdown does The fire brigade trainina program shall or present an exposure fire hazard to safe not satisfy the requirement of paragraph G.2 ensure that the capability to fight potential shutdown or safe'y-related systems or tf this section;or fires is established and maintained, ne components. These fire detection systems

b. Where redundant trains of systems program shall consist of an initial classmom shall be capable of opercting with or wi:hout required for hot shutdown located in the instruction program followed by penodic offsite power.

same fire area may be subject to damage classroom instruction, fire fightmg practice.

ne suppression activities or from t'se and fire drills:

G. Fire Protection ofSofe Shutdcwn Capabihty rupture or inadvertent operation of fire

1. Instruction I

1. Fire r %tection features shall be provided suppression systems.

a. The initial classroom instmetion shall i

for structt es, systen% and components In addition, fire detection and a fixed fire include:

important.o safe shutdown. These features suppmssion system shall be installed in the (1)Indoctrmation of the plant fire fightmg shall be capable of hmitmg fire damage so ama, roon or zone under consideratfort plan with specific identification of each that:

H. Fire Brigade individual's responsibilities.

a. One train of syste ns necessary to A site fire brigade trained and equipped for (2) Identification of the type and location of achieve and maintain hot shutdown fire fighting shall be estabbshed to ensure fire hazards and associated types of fires that conditions from either the control room or adequate manual fire fighting capability fer could occur in the plant emergency control stationis)is free of fire all areas of the plant containing structures.

(3) TV toxic and corrosive charactenstics damage: and systems. or components important to safety.

of expected products of combustion.

b. Systems necessary t' achieve and The fire brigade shall be at least five (4} ldentification of the location of fire o

maintain cold shuthwn from either the members on each shift. He brigade leader fighting equipment for each fire area and control room or emergency control station (s) and at least two brigade members shall have familiarization with the layout of the plant.

can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

sufficient training in or knowledge of plant including access and egress routes to each

2. Except as provided for paragraph G.3 of 88fety-related systems to understand the area.

this section, where cables or equipment.

effects of fire and fire suppressants on safe (5) The proper use of available fire fighting including assochted non. safety circuits that shutdown capability. The qualificattor, of fire equipment and the correct method of fighting could prevent operation or sause brigade members shallinclude an annual each type of fire.ne types of fires covered maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits, physical examination to determine their should include fires in enentized electrical or shorts to ground. or redundant trains of ability to perform stenuous fire fighting equipment. fires in cables and cable trays, activities. The shift supervisor shall not be a hydrogen fires, fires involving flammable and systems necessary to achicve and maintain hot shutdown conditions are located withii member of the fire brtgede.The brigade combustible liquids or hazardous process leader shall be competent to assess the chemica s. fires resultmg from construction or i

th same f ar a dQg potenti.1 safety consequences of a fire and modifications (weldinal, and record file fires.

a

,g 9

4 advise control room personrel. Such (e) The proper use of communication.

7,jn n[ og rhu

'"s a

d an '

I" I' c mpetence y the brigade leader may be lighting. ventilation, and emergency breathing g

. de !

evidenced by possession of an operator equipment.

a. Separation of cables and equipment and license r equiva ent kn wiedge of plant (7) The proper method for fighting fires associated non-safety ctreuits of redundant safety-related systems.

Inside buildmgs and confined spaces.

trains by a fire barrier havin8 a 3. hour ratin8 The minimum equipment provided for the

- (8) The direction and coordmation of the Structural steel forming a part cf or br gade shall consist of personal protective fire fighting activities (fire brigade leaders suppcrting such fire barriers shall be equipment such as turnout coats. boots, only).

protected to provide fire resistance gloves, hard hats emergency communications (9) Detailed review of fire fighting equivalent to that required of the barner' equipment, portable lights portable strategies and procedures.

b. Separation of cables and e uipment and ventilation equipment. and portable (10) Review of the latest plant associated nen. safety circuits o redundant extinguishers. Self-contained breathina modifications and corresponding changes in trams by a horizonta distance of rr. ore than apparatus using fullJace positive-pressure fire fighting plans.

20 feet with no intervening combustible or masks approved by NIOSH (National fire hazards. In addition. f:re detectors and an Note-Items (9) and (10) may be deleted automatic fire suppression system shall be from the training of no more than two of the

. Al*einstive shutd wn capabihty is provided bF non-operations personnel who may be ir. stalled in the fire area: or reroutwg. relocatma or modificatmg of existma "N"*d I 'h* fire bd8'd'

c. Enclosure of cable and equipment and systems: dedicated shutdown capabihty is provided associated non safety circuits of one by inststhng new structures and systems for the

b. The instruction shall be provided by j

redundant train in a fire barrier having a b function of post fire shutdown.

quahfied individuals who are knowledgeable.

1 m m,s e

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m.-v,wr-a.m m m. w n.w-n,v

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s u 76614 Federal Register / M 45. L 225 / \\\\ ednesday. Nos ember 19.19M Rules and Regubimns 1

<a

'. s ".ened m fetmg brwde. and select.on. placener.t and up of w: ed addm.ma! fa - protet t-on r tFe mpe t ur m the plant eqwpment and f.re f Atmg stra*eres w m.o % ds pro. edure r n p. -

1 ind m t s

, m

't ;

v, wpment.n adable Q As<es<n'ent of eac h bngada n ember s s Gosern the uw of ignen soon es bs use s

• e--

u t am knowlede of h:s or her role a the fire

, t a flame pi rmit sota to (orucci w e Mmg b

cei 'i pr.nided to au hre f:chtmg seategy for the area auumed in Sme<uttmg brarmg. or schierms cd hre bneade !caders re-f am ne fire. Assessment of the bngade

< p. rahens A separa'e permit 55au be issued rst v

w s Fm c p nned mertmes shah be heid member s conforma ne w1th es'ab! shed for, e h stea w here work is to be dov If i

c eu n 3 n'onths for au bnede plant fire hghtmg procedures and use of tire work rentmacs oser more than one shift. the in orr

$+

s!,

o n (Sanges m the hre h e r. na equ:pment. mt!uding se:f-centamed perrmt shah be uhd far not mme than J4 procra n pmgram and other subiects e emergeng breathmg appa atus.

Sours a ben the plant is operarme or !ct the

. ossan communication equ:pment. and sentilahon dratmn of a particular pb dunng p. ant e pened c rcfresher %nmg sess;ons shau eqmpment to the event practicable.

shutdown be held to re; eat the dauroom mstruchen i31 The sirnulated use of fire fshtmg h Ccmtn.1 the remosal from the area of au

, oeram for all bnude members us er a two.

equ:pment required to rope with the situatom waste di bra soap od spd!s. or other s + 2r pt r u: These sessions may be and ty pe of f;re selethd for the drd! 'Ibe timibust: ties resultmg from the w ork acta tts wrcmtrent w nh the regular planned area and tspe of bre c hosen for 'he dnu immedutch fonowmg completmn of the m

• nss should d:!fer from those used m the preuaus aonity er at the end of each wori shih.

/ /7 u

dnu w that bnsade members are tramed m w h'.thes er comes f ast.

Wact te sessmns shM1 he held for each fens fires m unous pl ant areas The i Mamtam the penod:c housekeep ng e ' fee hnmace on the prope.r method of snuatom selected should simulate the uze mspect:or.s to ensure contmurd com;&anc e f.2htmg the s aneus types of fires that could and arrangement of a hre that could with these admmistratne controis os cur m a nur! ear power.Ont These renanably occur m the area se'ected 8 Control the use of specihc wrnbushbles wssmrs shan prcaide bngade membe rs with aSowmg for hre desciopment due to the hme m safetprelated areas M1 wood uwd ;rt ever,ern e m actul fire estmguishrnent and requ: red to respund, to obtam equpment. and safety-related areas durmg mamtenam e.

se of emerenc3 breathmg apparatus organize for the fire assum,ng loss of rnod Erat:on. or refuelir a epi rahons (such as

• r s:renwus conditions encountered m automat:c suppressmn capab,hty lay-dewn blocks or scaffo!dmg) shall be f.re fmhtmg these prattne sessions shil be (41 Assessment of bngade leader's treated with a flame retardant Equipn,ent or p rm:ed or irast once per year for each hre direct an of the fire fightmg effort as to supphe s (such as nesi fue!I sh:pped m bug. & nmber thoroughness. accuracy. and effectneness untreated combust:ble pathmg contamers 3 Dmis t Records may be unpacked m safets related areas if a nre br:ude dnils shaU be performed m Indmdual records of trammg prouded to reqmred for whd opera'mg rea ums e plant so :ha tee fire bngade can pract:ce each hre bngade member. mcludmg dnu flowes er. au combust.ble meenals shan be t

as a team cntiques. shan be mamtamed for at least 3 remosed from the area irnmediate!) follow mg b Uniis shah he performed at regular sears to ensure that each member recenes the unpackmg Such transient tombushble m'ers ab. not to euced 3 months for each tramms in al! parts of the trammg program matenal unless stored in appros ed sh;f t f:re bngade Each f,re bngade member These records of trammg shall be auilable contamers. shall nut be left unattended shou!J partiapate m each dnlL but must for NRC review. Retramma or broadened durmg lunch breaks. shift c hanges or other parnopate m at least two dni!s per year.

trammg for hre fightma withm buddms* shan s:milar periods. lamse combust b!e pakmg i

A sufficmnt number of these dnus. but not be scbeduled for au those hngade rnembers rnatenal such as wood or paper euelsior, or less than one for each sh:ft hre bngade per w hose performance records show po!> ethylene sheetmg shau be placed m s ear. shaU be unannounced to determine the deficiencies.

metal contamers with tight-httm2 self-closmg Ere f.shtmg readmess of the plant fire i Err'eveno I..wbtmg rae+al cos ers.

bngade brigade leader. and fire protection Errentency hghtmg umts with at least an 8-

9. Control actions to be taken by an ss stems and equipment. Persons p'annmg hour battery power supply shall be prouded indmdual discou nng a fire for ewimple, and authorams an unannounted dnll shall m au areas needed for operatmn of safe not:htation of control room, attempt to ensure that the respondmg shift fire bngade shutdown eqmpment and m access and extmguish fire. and actuahon of local bre members are not aware that a drillis bemg egress routes thereto.

suppression sy stems planned u,.nl it is begun. Unannounced dnlls K. Adamstrance Controis

10. Control actmns to be taken by the shan not be scheduled closer than four Admmistratne centrols shall be control room operator to determme the need works established to mimmae fire harards m areas fer bngade assistance upon report of a hre or rec e pt of alarm on control room annundator At Was one drdi per year shall be contamme structures systems and i

e performed on a both shift" for each shif t fire cornponents important to safety These panel for exam;ile. announting Im at.on of bnuade controls shall estabbsh procedu.es to fire over PA s3 stem. soundmg fire a:arrns.

c. The druls shan be preplanned to L Gosern the hand lma and hmitahon of the and nonfymg the shift supervisor and the fee esubhsh the trammg objectnes nf the dnli use of ordmary combushble matenals.

bngade leader of the ty pe. sac. and location

.md shad be cnt;qued to determme how weU combushble and flamma.ie gases and of the bre.

tu trammg obmetn es har been met.

hqui h. h:gh efhaenc> poacu! ate air and IL Control achons to be taken b3 the fire t%nnounred dnlls shall be pla med and charcoal fdters. dry ion euhenge re%ns or bngade after notihcation by the control room rnt.qued by raembers of the management other combushble supphes m safety-related operator of a hre. for example. assemb!mg m staff responsible for plant safety and fire area s a designated location. recen mg deettions pret"thon. Performance dehemncies of a hre

2. Proh:b-t the storage of combustibles m from the fire bngade leadcr. and dischargmg bmde or of mdmdual fire bngade members safe'3-related areas or estabhsh desrated specihc hre fightmg responsitnht:es m(ludmg WM be remedmd by schedubng addit'onal storage areas with appropnMe fee selet tion and transportation of hre hghtmg r w Fa the bnade or member t protectmn.

equipment to f re locahon. sefectwn of t: sat af e tor 3 dnii performam e shan be 3 Gmern the handhng of and hmit protectne equipment. operatmg instructions f, ! awed b3 a r" peat dnll withm 30 days transient fire loads such as tombustible and for use of hre suppression systems, and use d At 3 y ear meersals, a randornly selected flammable hqwds. wood and plashc of preplanned strategies for fightmg fees m unane m ed dnu shall % onhqued b3 prodarts or other combushhle matenals m spenf.c areas at Af rd mdmduk mdependent of the buddmgs contammu safety-related sy s' ems 11 De fme the strategies for fighnng Eres m h4 enser s staff A rep 3 of the wntten report or equ pment dunna all phases of operatma.

a" safety.related areas and areas presentmg from sub mdmduals shaU be asadaMe for and especialh durma mam'enan(c.

a hazard to safet3 -related equipment. These NRL res ww modihcation. or refuehnu operatems.

strateces shall designate:

hre huards m each area covered by the e IMs shau as a cim: mum mdude +

4 Designate the onsi e staff member t

a Www responsible for the mplant hre protettmn speunt. pref re plans.

11t hwssment of bre srm effrctnenest res +w of proposed woik ac imtms to ident f3 h hre "shngashants best suited for hme remi, red to notif3 an.i assembre f,re potere:a! transmnt Ere hazards and speuf3 c.ontrouma the fires associated with the I re

kD) flf0 lhI 1 WG M6MiW )i h Federal Register / Vcl 45. No. 225 / Wednesday. November 19. 1980 / Rules and Rege'e 7ns 76615 v oe

• e neatro meatmr exant leM iom e the m # tt e co~ i -

secara9nn and barners between trass and s

~ ee m.:sran s BW8s and be wah:n the ieselinicano,in condu:ts cor tammst associated circuits of one W: in crah.e c:rection from wFeh 'o the pressunrer for PWRs.

safe shutdown dmston and trays and n

• a f.rr m each area n uew cf tne c Tne reactor heat removal functmn shall conduits contam ng associated circuits or a d.e en acess ha!.wap swrs be upabie at acn.esmg and ma.ntainmg safe shutdown cables from the redundant 4

c _ r a w o e mw Le;> to be :ree of decas he$t remosal dmeten. cr the isolation of these associated and tne best statwn or eles anon for d The process memtonng function shall be circuits from the safe shutdown equipment.

...e

%7 the fee AM acteu and ecess rewes capab;e r'f prmdmg daect readmas of the shall be such that a postvlated fire mvohing y i> + b bd dars @osd u.

procas s arab les necessary to p_rform and associated circuits will not prevent safe mif;O idesfied m the procedure wnh cont *ci the abos e functions.

sh u tdown. "

e w ap;",we precamrs and r ethods for e The supportmg functions shall be M Fire Bamer Cable Pene:rction Seal mass scec fwd capde of prendmg the process cochno Qualificorion d Piant n stems that shwid be r anaged to lubncat:on etc.. necessary to permit the Penetration seal designs shall utihre only rNae &e damose perant.al d.irmg a local operation of the equipment used for safe noncombustiblc matenals and sha!! be a

!:re and the location cf local and remo*e shutdown functions.

quahfied by tests that are comparable to tests corm is fo-such management te g any

3. The shutdown catiabdity for specif.c fire used to rate fire barners.The acceptance hy &dc or e;eoncal ssstems in the tone areas may be unique 'or each such area. or it cntena for the test shallinclude.

coured by the speafic f:re f:ghtmg procedure may be ene unique combination of systems t The cable fire 1, art:er penetration seal tnat coJd mcrease the hazards in the area for all such areas in either case. the has withstood the fire endurance test without because of ourpressunzation or e:cctr: cal alternatne shutdown capabihty shall be passage of flame or ignition of cables on the harmis t independent f the spectftc fire area (s) and unesposed side for a pennd of time e Wal heesensihve system cornponents shall acccrr.nodate postfire cond;tions where equivalent to the fire resistance rating ther read to be kept cool while f:ahtunt a effsate power is as ailable and where offsite required of the barrier; inci f:re. Partica:arly hazardous power :s not available for *2 hours.

2. The temperature levels recorded for the combust.bles that reed cochns shcu:d be Procedures shall be in effect to implement ur.esposed side are analped and des state 1 th:s capabtiity demonstrate that t'ie mastmum temperature f Orgamratan of f.re fahtmg br.gades and 4 If the capabihty to achiese and mamtam is sufficiently below the cable msulation the asser ent of special dut;es accordmg to cold shutdown wd! not be available because ignition temperature. and 10D !Jie so that alli re f;2htmg functions are of fire damage, the equipment and systems

3. The fire barner penetration seal remains emered by any complete shift personnel compnamg the means to achieve and intact and does not allow protection of water wmplement. These duties mclude command maintam the hot tandby or hot shutdown beyond the unesposed surface during the contro! cf tbc bngade, transportmg fire condition shall be capable of mamta: rung hose stream test.

sup-ression and support eqwpment to the fire such conditions until cold shutdown can be N. Fire Doors scer.es. apph ms t$ e eitmpshant to the f:re.

achieved. If such equipment and systems will Fire dor,rs shall be self-closmg or provided i

commumcation with the control room. and not be capable of bemp powered by both with closing mechanisms and shall be cordmanon w:th outs'de f:re departments.

onsite and offsite electnc power systems inspected semiannuall) 'o venfy that a Potential raiolos: cal and touc hazards because nf fire damage. an independent automatic hold-open, release. and closmit m fire vmas onsite power system shall be provided. The mecharusms and latches are operable.

h Venti;atmn system operation that number of operstmg shift personnel.

One of the followmg measures shall be ensures desired plant air distnbution when exclusne of fire bngade members. required provided to ensure they will protect the the sentdation flow is modified for fire to operate such equipment and systems shall opening as required in case of fire:

contamment or smcke clearira operations.

be on site at all times.

L Fire doors shall be kept closed and

i. Operations requiring control room and

5. Equipment and systems comprisi_ng the electncelly supervised at a continuously shdt enameer coordmation or authonzation.

means to achieve and maintain cold manned location; j ins %ctions for plant operators and shutdown conditions shall not be damaged

2. Fire doors shall be locked dosed and general plant personnel dunng fire.

by fire. or the fire damage to such equipment inspected weekly to venfy that the doors are L Alternctne cnd D-dmcted Shutdown and systems shall be hmited so that the in the closed position; Ccpchlity sys' ems can be made operable and cold

3. Fire doors shall be provided with L Alternatne or dedicated shutdown shitdown achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

automatic hold-open and release mecharusms capabihty provided for a specific f:re area Materials for such repairs shall be readily and inspected daily to venfy that doorways shall be able to ach:ese and mamt '.n available on site and procedures shall be in are free of obstructions: or subcnt cal reactmty cend:tions in the effect to implement such repatrs. If such

4. Fire doors shall be kept closed and reactor. rnaintam reactor coolant Even ory equipment and systems used prior to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> inspected daily to venfy that they are m the achieve and maintam hot standb> '

after the fire will not be capable of being ci sed position.

condmens for a PWR (hot shutdown Mar a powered by both onsite and offsite electric The fire brigade leader shall have ready DWR1 and achieve cold shutdown '

power systems because of fire damage, an accus to keys for any locked fire doors.

condit: ens within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and mamtam cold independnet onsite power system shall be Areas protected by automatic total flooding shetdown condit.ons thereafter. Durmg the provided Equipment and systems used after gas suppression systems shall have posti re shutdown the reactor coolant system 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> may be powered by offsite power electncally supervised self.closmg fire doors process vanabies shall be mamtamed withm only.

r shall satisfy option 1 above.

E

1. II"d'## ####"

those predicted for a loss of norma! a c.

6. Shutdown systems installed to ensure power and the hasion product boundary postfire shutdown capability need not be re et coolant pump shall be miemt> shall not be affected; t e, there shall designed to meet seismic Category I cnteria.

be n fuel clad damage, rupture or an) smgle failure critena. or other design basis equipped with an oil collection system if the contamment is not inerted dunns normal pnmary coolant boundary or rupture of the acc*.t entena except where required for centamment boundary.

other seasons. e g, because of interface with operation. The oil col;ection system shall be so designed. engmeered, and installed that 2 The performance goals for the shutdown or impact on existmg safety systems. or failure will not lead to fire during normal or functions shall be-because of adserse valve actions due to fire design basis accident conditions and that a The reactmty control function shall be damage

)

capab,e of achievmg and mamta;nmg cold 7 The safe shutdown equipment and shutdown reactmts cor:dmons ssstems for each fire area shall be known to

• An acceptable niethod of cornplyma with (Me b The reactor co'olani makeup f.metion b'e isolated from associated non-safety

','[",'

,"jd

[c"r s

d shall t e capab6e of mamtamme the reactor circuits m the fire area so that bot shorts.

Std NW'4 Mon a O Mere trays fmen open circaits. or shorts to ground in the redundant safety dmaions are so prowed that As Mred m w Yandd Tedrucai associated circuits will not prevent operation postulated fires affect trays from only one safety Spec.fo cons of the safe shutdown equipment.The dmsion.

76616 Federal Register / Vol. 45. No. 225 / Wednesda3. November la 1980 Rules and Regulation 3 mere is reasenaU.nsuram e that the isste v wi:; e5s'and the Lfe Shutdown E..i n hq u a ke S.ch en: et.on su:<ms 35a!! be ( apa'i.e of couettmg tube ed from 4H potential pressurized and unpressurized leakage sites in the reacter coolant pump lube oil sy stems.

Lc..kage sha'l be collected and drained to a sented closed container that can hold the ent:re tube oil s3 stem insentory A Game arrester is required in the s ent if the Dash po:nt charactenstics of the o;l present the hazard of fire Dashbat k I.eakage points to be protected shan include hit pump and pipmg.

overCow knes. lobe ed cooler, nil fin and drain hncs and p!uss. Canged cennet' ions en oil hnes. and tube a:1 resersairs where such featt.res eust on the reactor coclant pumps The dram hne shall be large enough to accommodate the largest pctential oil leak (Sec.161b. I%b.1.83-703. 68 Stat. 948 sec. 201. Pub. L.93-438. M Stat.1242 (42 U.S C.

2001(b).5841))

Dared at Washington. D C.. this 17th day of November 1980.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Samuel ]. Chi'k.

Secretary af the Commisswn lHI [kx mA 361'5 Fded 1 ~ &-au. 8 0 aml SELLueG CODE Ps9(N11-M I

• See Regulatory Gmde 1 N-%smic Dentgn Claessfu:atum" Paragraph C.2