ML20003E139
| ML20003E139 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 03/27/1981 |
| From: | William Jones OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | Clark R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20003E141 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8104020320 | |
| Download: ML20003E139 (2) | |
Text
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,-2 Omaha Public Power District i
1623 HARNEY I
Q M A H A, NEBRASKA 68102 TELEPHONE 536 4000 AREA CODE 402 March 27, 1981 fD Q
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Mr. Robert A. Clark, Chief E
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 3
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
,Q*e u* g'h Division of Licensing Operating Reactors Branch No. 3
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Washington, D.C.
20555 y
Reference:
Docket No. 50-285
Dear Mr. Clark:
Omaha Public Power District received the Comission's letters dated February 20, 1981, and March 9,1981, regarding compliance with the fire protection rule. The District's letter to the Commission dated i.tarch 19, 1981, delineated our position regarding compliance with the rule. The attached information supports the position.taken in the District's letter dated March 19, 1981. The attached information also provides the information required by the Comission to complete your reviews of alternate safe shutdown capability, as explained below.
The information requested in Section 8 of Enclosure 1 to t'le 00 b February 20, 1981, letter was provided by the District's letters dated
.s October 12, 1979, and November 15, 1979. Appendix A in both District letters provides a cross-reference between the staff position and the District's report.
mMr N The information requested in Enclosure 2 to the February 20, 1981, M U letter was included in the Comission's March 9,1981, letter. Accord- % J c. M ingly, the District's attached response to the Commission's March 9, ig9) 1981, letter also responds to Enclosure 2 of the February 20, 1981, kM at D.5f
~
The District has evaluated the criteria of 10 CFR 50~, Appendix R,Section III.G against the presently installed fire protection systems at the Fort Calhoun Station. The District believes that the existing systems meet the intent of tho criteria of Section III.G for all credible fires. The District's position above takes exception to the Comission's letter dated November 24, 1980, stating that the three-hour barriers provided for redundant safe shutdowns in several areas were not adequate for protection from exposure fires. For these areas (Fire Areas 6, 20, 32, 34, and 36), the exposure fire is not a credible fire and the District 82 4 p
20'320
Mr. Robert A. Clark March 27, 1981 Page Two maintains that the existing barriers will provide the protection re-quired. Therefore, as stated in the District's letter dated March 19, 1981, no additional modifications to the er. sting fire protection systems are planned for the Fort Calhoun Station.
Sincerely, r
~ W. C. Jones e
Division Manager Production Operations WCJ/KJM/TLP:jmm Enclosure cc: LeBoeuf. Lamb, Leiby & MacRae
'1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036
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n RESP 0 HSE TO URC QUESTIONS POST FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPA3ILITY FORT CAL' IOU'T WCLEAR POWER STATION A.
FINDINGS a
1.
FIUDING: The post fire support runctions ' ve not been shown to be capable of providing the auxil. ry syste=s such as process cooling or lubrication necessary to permit the operation of equip =ent used for shutdown functions. This is shown in the hot shutdown sub=ittal, paragraph h.6 where the licensee ihdicates that the co=ponent ecoling pu=ps vill not be available to provide cooling for the charging pu=ps.
The availability of other support func-tions is not clear.
RESPCUSE: Table
'A' provides a list of equipment and auxiliary sys-tems required for hot shutdown. Where ever required auxi-liary systems such as cooling and lubricatien necessary to permit the operation of equip =ent used for shutdevn functions vill be available.
No attempt was =ade~to save component cooling system for the charging pu=p because the pu=p can cperate for an in-definite period without exceeding the 120cF te=perature li=it set by the pu=p =anufacturer.
2.
FINDING: The heat tracing for the boric acid gravity feed line vill not be available. The licensee stated in the con-ference call of January 30, 1981 that it vould not be needed because the system was all inside at room te=pera-ture. The licensee has not stated at what temperature the boric acid would be at the time of borstion and whether or not the Technical Specifications for boric acid concentration would be =et.
~
RESPONSE: According to the Technical Specification Section 2.2 Sub-ite: 3 of Ite 3 (page 2-18), one channel of the heat
' tracing circuit can be out of service for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. In the event that both channels of heat tracing are lost, the plant is required.to be placed in hot shutdown condi-tion within k hours. During normal plant operation the
-surface te=perature on the boric acid piping is maintain-ed at approximately 1600F, which is at least 200F above the saturatien temperature of the boric acid. The 200F
=argin allows the boric acid to remain above the satu-ration te=perature for at least h hours if heat tracing is completely lost.
In the event of fire in the eshle spreading roc =, the e=ergency baration is done within the first 30 minutes.
Therefore, the Technical Specifiestion vill not be violated.
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3.
FIIIDI: G: The diesel fire pu=p is to be used to provide water to the e=ergency uxiliary feedvater tank one hour after the initial reactor trip.
~
RESPONSE: In accordance with the Technical Specification a =ini=um of 55,000 g dlons of auxiliary feed water supply is required to te =aintained in the auxiliary feed water tank whenever reactor coolant te=perature is above 3000F. This is sufficient to provide decay heat re=cval function for eight (8) hours (refer Technical Specifi-catien Section 2.5, page 2-23. ) No backup will, there-fere, be required for at least eight hours. It is ex-pected that the diesel driven fire pump vill not be required for fire fighting after 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and can +2ere-fore be used for auxiliary feed water make up.
The time period of "1 hour-indefinite" specified in our report entitled, " Alternate Shutdown Capability - Final Design Description", dated 10-1-79 was intended to p ove avail-ability of =an power to perfor= realign =ent cf diesel fire pu=p if required.
h.
FINDING: The post fire shutdown capability.has not been shown to be isolated fro associated circuits so that fire r n-age i
to associated circuits in a fire area =ay prevent the operation of shutdevn equipment.
RESPONSI: Transfer switches and lock out relays provided en the alternate shutdown and auxiliary feed water panels vill allev for isolation of all alternate shutdown cables frc=
the cable spreading roc:i. Dannge to associated circuits vill not prevent proper operation of shutdown equip =ent.
Please see drawing #161-F-561 Sh. 8, 58, and 27 for typi-cal isolation technique. Ihese drawings were sub=itted to the Cor:missien per cur letter dated October 12, 1979 with ' Alternate Shutdown Capability Final Design Des-cript; on" dated October 10, 1979 5
FINDING: The post fire process monitoring function has not been shown to be capable of providing direct readings of the process variables necessary to perfor= and control shut-devn functions. An exa=ple of this is the repair pro-cedure where the licensee proposes to te=porarily connect a '4heatstone bridge.to resistance te=perature detection extension leads in order to deter =ine reactor coolant syste= te=perature. The licensee stated that he did not plSn to use stea= generator status indication, or flov indication.
b
T RESPCNSE: Secticn k.5'of report entitled "Fcrt Calhoun Staticn Alternate Shutdevn Capability - Final Design Oescrip; ion" sub=itted per cur letter dated October 20, 1979, provides a list of direct reading instrumentation which vill be available for het shutdevn.
his lisc. is reproduced be-Icv.
a)
Pri=ary Icep hot leg temperature indicatica b)
Prd-a y locp cold leg te=perature indication c)
Volu=e centrol tank leve'
""'a=** n d)
Pressuri er level indicatica e)
Steam generator ECr2A level indicaticn f)
Stea= generator.3C-23 level indication g)
Pressuricer pressure indicatien Direct reading instr =ents vill be available en the alternate shutdevn panel to =easure reactor coolant syste= te=perature during hot shutdevn phase. Range en these instru=ents is 5150F - 6150F vhich is suf-ficient for het shutdevn phase. Se wheatstone bridge =ethod described in our report vill te used only during cold shutdevn I.tase. (Also see response to Ite= E) 6.
FIIDI5G: The licensee has not as yet de=cnstrated that repair procedures for cold shutdevn syste=s are fully deve-loped and =aterial fer repairs is +tained or, site.
RESPONSE: Repair precedurec have been developed. The =aterial for repairs censists of ju=pers (=ade of vires and ccnnectcrs), fuses, etc. All these =aterials are readily available in the Fort Calhoun storerec=.
Availability of the =aterials is being verified and a confir=aticn to this effect vill be sent_to_the Cc==ission by May 1,-1981.
7 FI:CI3G: The pcst fire shutdevn capability depends en fire protection =easures.in the folleving areas: Fire Area 6 - cable trey and personnel corridor; Fire Area 20 - personnel ccrridor; Fire Area 32 - ce= pressor area; Fire Area 34 -- electrical penetration area; and Fire Area 36 - switchg' ear roc =.- These protec-tion features should =eet the iRC require =ents of Section III G of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.
RESPONSE: Eased en the results of fire hacard analysis and' cable separation analysis, several fire prctection
~ features have been provided at Fort Calheu Station. -The fire protection progrs=, vith the exceptien of the alter-nate shutdown design, vas approved by the Cdssion per letter dated Februar/ 10, 1981. Our review indicates that for the fire areas listed above, ve =eet the intent of 10CFR50 Appendix R, i.e. abilityL to shutdevn the plant with any credible fire.
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Results of cable separatica analysis were reported to the Cc=iasion per our letter dated Septe=ber 29, 1978. Se details of fire barriers were sub=itted to the Cc==ission per our letters dated July 9, 1979, and May 20,'1980.
The folleving is a sum / of cable separation analysis for areas listed above and justificaticn for accept-ability of fire carriers.
FIRE ARF.A 6:
A fire in this area vill not degrade hot shutdown capability. Celd shutdevn capability =ay, however, be degraded because,af unavailability of shutdevn cooling pu=ps.
Lev pressure safety in-jection pu=ps SI-1A and -13 or contain=ent spray pumps SI-3A, -33 and -3C can be used for shutcovn cooling. Cables associated with these pu=ps are routed through Fire Area 6.
A 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire barrier has beca provided to prctect cables associated with SI-3C.
The details for the fire barriers were submitted to the Cc==ission per our letters dated July 9, 1979, and May 20, 1980. As a backup to the fire barrier, the District is developing an Energency Repair Precedure to =eet the require =ents of 10 3 50 Appendix R.
The =aterials required for :aking necessary repairs vill be procured and nnde available at the Fort
)
Calhoun storeroc=.
FIRE A3.EA 20: A fire in this area vill not degrade shutdevn capability.
FIRE ARIA 32: Pcver feeds for redundant =otor control centers MCC 3Al and MCC kC1 have a 4 feet
=ini=us horizontal separation and 3 feet mini =u= vertical separation. 'Three hour fire rated barriers have.been provided to assure availability of one train in the event of cable fire.
Si=ilar barriers have also been provided to separate pcVer feeds for MCC 331 sad 3C1 frc= power feeder for MCC kAl and L31.
This area is provided with an autc=atic fire detection system. Cc=bustibles are limited'to T---
383 qualified cable in-sulatica and 0.75 gallons of lubricating oil. The oil reservoir.is separated fro =
cable trays by about 15'-0" vertical space. Maxi =u= fire severity for this area is 30 minutes. A sprinkler syste has been provided to contain any lubricating oil-fire. It is a security controlled access area. The possibility of an area
-fire or exposure fire is, therefore, very, very limited and a fire barrier should previde sufficient protection.
1.
FIRE rRIA 3LA. Electrical Penetratic: Aree.(2nse=ent Flcer - Feeder cables fer the fel.leving reduadant =ctor centrol centers required for safe shutdevn are routed thrcush this area.
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"' rays containing cables fcr MCC 331, 3C1 cross over at ene point, the trays cen-taining cables fc-MCC LA1, L31 vith a
=ini=us %ertical separation of 2 feet.
~hree hour rated fire barriers have beer.
installed at the cressing point to avoid spr-ad of fire frc= ene tray to ancther.
Cenbustibles are
'4 'ted to :-- -383 qualified cable insulatien.
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- e severity for this area is 19 =inutes. It is a security controlled access area. ~he pessibility of an area fire er exposure fire is, therefsee, very, very 73-4ted and a fire barrier should previde sufficient protection.
FIRI AREA 3h3: Electrical Penetratic: Area (Grcund Flcer) -
Tvc red = dant groupa cf =ctor centrol centers required for safe shutdevn are located in this area. Chese a e:
Grcup 1 - MCC 3A1, 331, 3C1 Grcup 2 - MCC LA1, kB1, LCl A three hour fire rated enc 10sure has been built around Group 1 =cter control centers to provide sufficient separatien. Fee:ier cables for red = dant pressurizer heater groups are aise routed thrcush this area.
Mini== horizontal separation is 9'-C",
which'is censidered as sufficient for this area. Cc=bustibles in this area are li=ited te IIII 333 qualified cable in-sulation, sc=e polystyrede insulatien, and paper.
(See SER Ite= 5 10.2) This area
.is provided with as autc=atic fire de-tection syste=.
The probability of an area fire or expcsure fire is therefore, very,_very limited.
FIRE A~ TEA 36: This area ha s been divided into tvc separate fire areas. Any credible fire in any cne area vill not degrade shut-down capability.
RECC!?E'CATIC'IS A. RICC:WI:DATICH: S e alternate shutdevn capability should be =cdified to =eet the require =ents of Section II! L of Appendix R to 10 CFR Pa-t 50, taking into consideratien the above findings.
g.-.
RESPONAE:
Discussion of the Cc==ission's findings (See re-spense to ite=s 1 - 6) indicates that with exception to -ite= 6 (availability of =aterials) and submittal of information required per enclosure 2 to the Co=-
=ission's generic letter #80-12 dated February 20, 1981, the alternate shutdevn capability provided at Fort Calhoun Station =eets the require =ents of Section III L of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.
Necessary steps are being taken to confir= availability of =aterials. Information required per encicsure 2 is attached.
3.
RECCICnC ATICN: The supporting flactions should be capable of pro-viding the pro' cess ecoling, lubrication, etc. ne-cessary to per=it the operation of the equipment used for safe shutdown by the syste=s identified as part of the alternate shutdown capability. All of the support functions should be available for the equip =ent used in the alternate shutdown cap-ability.
RESP 0 HSE:
Supporting functions required for providing the process cooling, lubrication, etc., vill be avail-able. These are described in detail in the reports previously submitted to the Cc==ission. For example packing coolant pu=p for the charging p'mp will be available. However no atte=pt was cade to save ec=ponent cooling water for the charging pu=p because the pep can operate without exceeding 120cF te=perature limit set by the pu=p =anufacturer.
C.
RECC C'EUDATION: The licensee should verify that the existing Tech-nical Specifications for boric acid concentration are adhered to with the absence of heat tracing.
RESPONSE
It has been verified that the existing Technical Specifications for boric acid concentration are adhered to.
Please see response to Findirg 2.
D.
RECCIOEUDATION: The water requirements for core cooling should be me*: vithout using the diesel fire pu=p or other eq tipment designed for fighting fires. A separate pusp not associated with the fire protection water syste= should be used to produce water for the avxiliary feedvater tank.
RESPONSE
As explained in response to ite= 3, a =im:u= of eight (8) hour supply vill be available in the auxiliary feedvator tank. This should be suf-ficient for hot shutdown. A separate pu=p is, therefore, not required.
-T-E.
RECComOATION: 2e process =cnitoring should be shcvn to be cap-able of providing direct rear'ings of the process rariables necessary te centrol reactivity, reacter coolant =akeup, and reactor heat re=cval.' Per=a-nently installed instru=ents sh.culd be used to provide capability for reading pressuricer pres-sure, te perature and level, reactor coolant Icep te=perature, stem: generator level and pressure, auxiliary feed vater flcw, and ccndensate stcrage tank level and radiation levels.
RESPONSE
Please see respc;:se to Finding 5 Fer=anently in-stalled direct reading instru=ents vill be avail-able to provide capability for reading pressurizer pressure, pressuricer level, reaeter coolant locp temperature, stes: generator level.
Pressuricer te=perature vill not be available; however reactor coolant iccp pressure vill be available to provide indicatien of pressurizer te=perature.
Upper li=it of stes= generator pressure vill te controlled threugh actuatien of safeties. Stes:
generator pressure indicatien is, therefore, not required.
Auxiliary feedvater flev indication is not re-quired since stes= generator level indicativn is available. This is a direct indicatica that suit-able feedvater flov exists-and vill be the criti-cal pars =eter for the operatcr.
Condensate storage tank is not being used for any
'of post fire actions. Se require =ent for conden-I' sate storage tank level and radiation levels is, therefore, not' justified.
y.
RECCMCDATION: All repair procedtres shculd be fully develcped and it should be verified that the =aterials.for the repairs are =aintained en site.
RESPONSE
The repair procedures have been develcped. Avail-ability of =aterials for the repairs is teing verified and a confir=ation to this effect vill be
_sent to the Cc==ission by May 1, 1981.
V
. G.
RECCIC EIDATION:
The canpower for these procedures should be shown to be availab"A on site and the work to
- be performed should be reasonable in light of the manpower available.
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RESPONSE
Manpower equirements for performing hot shutdown procedures are discussed in Section 8.0 of cur report submitted to the NRC in our letter dated October 12, 1979 entitled " Fort Calhoun Station Alternate Shutdown Capability - Final Design Description" dated October 10, 1979, Rev. 1.
Also, as indicated in Section 6.3.2, Alternate Shutdown Oper^ator is required to confirm availability of sufficient =anpower before proceeding with the cold shutdown procedures.
It has been verified that sufficient manpower can be made available for perfor=ing cold shutdown procedure. It should also be noted that the District is currently evaluating the
=anpower requirements for all plant emergencies required in Table 3-1 of NUREC-065h.
H.(1) REC 015ENDATION:
Provide a table that list., all equipment in-cluding instrumentation and support system equipment that are required by the alternate or dedicated method of achieving and maintaining hot shutdown.
RESPONSE
Please see Table
'A'.
H.(2) REC 0!S EIDATION:
For each alternate shutdown equipment listed
-in (1) above, provide a table that lists the essential cable (instrumentation, control, and power) that are located in the fire area.
RESPONSE
Please see Tables
'3' and.'C'.
H.(3) RECCICEIDATICH:
Provide a tabh that lists safety related and non-safety related cables. associated with the.
equipment in cables constituting-the alternate or dedicaMd method of shutdown that are located in the fire area.
RESPONSE
The alternate shutdown capability has been pro-vided for achieving hot shutdown in case of l
fire-in the cable spreading room. Because of
. physical proximity and the cor=non power supply
. sources practically all cables in the cable-spreading room are considered associated cir-cuits. It was, therefore, decided to identify and isolate cables required'for hot shutdown (see Tables
'B' and 'C').
Where required, alternate power sources have been provided.
Please see Drawing ~#161-F-561, Sh. 8, 58,~-and 27 for typical isolation technique. These-drawings were submitted to.the Commission per our letter dated October 12, 1979 with " Alter-
'nate Shutdova Capability - Final Design Des-cription" dated October 10, 1979
.' H.(k) RECCICEIDATION:
Shov that fire induced tailures of the cables listed in (2) and (3) above vill not prevent
- operation or cause malfunction of the alternate or dedicated shutdown methed.
RESFONSE:
Thic !s discussed in Table 'D' H.(5) RICC /:CIDATICIT:
For each cable listed in (2) above provide a detailed alectrical schematic drt.ving that shows hov each cable is isolated from the fire area.
4 RESFCUSE:
The techni.que v ed for isolating cables re-quired for sa:% shutdevn are discussed in Table
'D'.
This table also provides reference to the schematic drawings. Sone of these drawings were submitted to the Cc=nission per our letter dated October 12, 1979 The following is a consolidated list:
A.
Drawings submitted per our letter dated October 12, 1979 Cembustien Enrineering General Electric E23866-210-110 161F561, Sh. 8 F23866-210-120, Sh. 1 161F561, Sh. 19 323866 h13-102 161F561, Sh.
27 323866-413-204 161F561, Sh.
58 10632h31, Sh. 69 Gibbs, Hill, Durham L Richardson Stone L Webster-lik05-M-252 13007.42-EE-k2A 11kOS-M-253 13007.42-ESK-11A Fig. 8.1.1 130C7.42-ESK-11A 11405-E-8 13007,h2-ESK-11F 11kO5-E-27 13007.k2-ESK hA 1140>- e 45 11kO5-E-lh3 11405-E-16 11kO5-E-19 3.
Additional drawings attached with this resnmaa Combustion Engineering 3.-23866-h14-360, Sh. 1,2 3-23866-41k-370, Sh. 2 ~
Gibbs, Hill. Durham i P.ichardson
- nLC5-E-9 nhc5-E-28 SE-likO5-E-25 nkc5-E-29
- ._h05-E-32 11L05-E,42 nh05-E kh 11:,05-I h8 11LOS-E-51 11LO5-E-lS2 nho5-I-lah n:.05-E-186 nh05-E-199 General Electric 13622431,.Sh. 71, 78, 33, 56, 92, 93, 95 13632492, St. 20, 21, 22, 23, 28, 32, no, in 13632k36, Sh. 3, L, 5, 6, 3, 9, 10, 12, 17 1617561, Sh. 21A
,eU m.,U/e=
010SDS67h, Sh. 1, 2, 3 Solid State Centrols, !nc.
235262 C.
' ACD2IONAL RECUIREE;TS The residual heat re= oval system is generally a lov pressure system that interfaces'with the high pressure primary ecolant syste:. To preclude a LOCA thrcush this interface, we require ce=pliance with the rece ~ * *cns of 3rsnch Technical Pcsition 353 5-1.
n:us,
this interface = cst likely censists of two redundant and indepen-dant =ctor operated valves. ~hese two =ctor operated valves and their associated cable =ay be subject to a single fire hazard. It is our concern that this single fire could cause the two valves to open resulting in a fire-initiated LOCA thicugh the subject high-low pressure systen interface. To assure that *.his interface and other high-low pressure interfaces are at*~"mtely protected frem the effects of a single fire, we require the following infor=ation:
I.(1) REQUIRE C T: Identify each high-lev pressure interface that uses redundant electrically centro 11ed devices (such as
~
two series motor cperated valves) to isolate.or pre-clude rupture of any pr4-= y coolant boundary.
RESPONSE: F.C7-3kT and HCV-3k8 provide the only interface aeeting.the above criteria between a low pressure syste= and the high pressure primary coolant syste at the Fort Calhoun Station.
4 I.(2) REQUIRECT: Identify the device's essential cabling (pcVer and control) and describe the cable routing (by fire area) fres scurce to ter=ination.
R.". PONSE: '41 ring diagra=s and schematics for ECV-3kT and HCV-348 are shevn en Gibbs Hill Drawings nkO5-E-29, Sh. k _ and GE Drawing 13632h31, Sh. ~ 65 and 66. Table
'E' provides a list'cf cables and other infor:ation required by the Cc= mission.
m.
I.(3) REQUIREEiT: Identify each location where the identified cables are separated by less than a vall having a three-hcdr fire rating frc= cables for the redundant de-vice.
RESPONSE: Cables for HCV-347 and ECV-3kB are routed in the sane fire area in the cable spreading rec = and the control rocs.
1 i.
I.(h) REQUIRDfENT: For the areas identified in the above paragraph, provide the basis and justification as to the acceptability of the existig design or any proposed modifications.
~
RISPONSE: The only areas-in vhich cables for HCV-3kT and HCV-t 3k3 are routed in the sane fire area are Fire Areas h1 and h2.
(Cable spreading Eccm and Control Roem).
Alternate shutdown procedures provided for fire in these areas requires that the power supply to both these =otor operated valves (EC7-3h7 and ECV-3k8) be i
disconnected within first 10 minutes. "his vill avoid any inadvertent opening of valves due to fire.
No nodification is proposed.
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l TABLE A j
(For raferences see Tacle F)
ITEM FUNCTION EQUI? MENT
~
REMARKS NO.
TAG NO.
DESCRIPTION 1.
. Reactivity Control a) Scram Reactor Control Rod System j
b) Emergt cy Boration CH-11B Boric Acid Tank (See Section 5.1 of CH-167 Check Valve Ref. A-1)
HCV-258 Check Valve CH-155 Check Valve CH-173 Check Valve CH-1B Charging Pump CH-188 Check Valve CH-192 Check Valve CH-198 Check Valve CH-6 Regenerative Heat Exchanger i
HCV-239 Valve CH-204-Check Valve CH-174 Check Valve CH-172 Check L,1ve LCV-218-2 Valve HCV-240 Valve 2.
Reac'.or Ceolant.iakeup CH-1E Charging Pump (See Section 5.2 of
'CH-14 Boric-Acid Volume Ref. A-1)
Control Tank LCV-218-2 Valve CH-173 Check Valve CH-192 Check Valve CH-194 Check Valve CH-172 Check Valve
. CH-174 Check Valve TABLE A (Cont'd)
(For references see Table F)
ITEM FUNCTION EQUIPMENT REMARKS NO.
TAG NO.
DESCRIPTION 3.
Reactor Coolant System TCV-202 Valve Pressure Control PCV-103-1 Valve (See Section 5.3 of PCV-103-2 Valve Ref. A-1)
HCV-240 Valve PCV-1,12-1 Valve PCV-102-2 Valve Pressurizer Heater Groups 10, 11, 12 (Bank 4) 4.
Decay Heat Removal FW-10 Steam Driven Aux.
(See Section 5.4 of Feedwater. Pump Ref. A-2)
YCV-1045A Valve YCV-1045B Valve YCV-1045 Valve HCV-1;07A Valve HCV-1107B Valve HCV-1108A Valve HCV-11088 Valve FCV-1369 Valve 5.
Process Monitoring TI-121C-1 Primary Loop Cold Complete instru-(See Section 4.5 of Leg Temp Indicator ment loop includ-Ref. A-1)
TI-121H-1 Primary Loop Hot ing transmitter, Leg Temp-Indicator power supply, etc.
LIC-219 Volume Control Tank is required.
Level Indicaton LRC-101Y Pressurizer Level Indicator LI-903Y-1 Steam Gen. RC-2A Level Indication LI-906Y-1 Steam Gen. RC-2B Level Indication,,
TABLE A (Cont'd)
(For references see Table F)
Im FLM TION EQUIP E T RF. MARKS NO.
TAG NO.
DESCRIPTION
- 5. (Continue :)
PI-115 Pressurizer Pressure Indicator 6.
Support Systems D2 Diesel Gen #2 (See Section 4.6 of N/A D.C. Bus #2 Ref. A-1) l/A Instrument Inverter "D" 1AD2 Diesel Gen. D2 4.16KV Breaker TIB4A 4.16 KV Breaker TIB4B-4.16 KV Breaker TIB4C 4.16 KV Breaker CH-1B 480 Vac Breaker IB'A 480 Vac Breaker IB4B 480 Vac Breaker IB4C 480 Vac Breaker N/A Load Shed
~7.
. Auxiliaries for Packing coolant pump For charging pump equipment listed D.C. Driven Lube Oil For steam driven in 1-6 above.
Pump Auxiliary Feedwater pump.
-1k-
t TABLE B & C (For references see Table F)
COMPONENT REFERENCE TAG vt DESCRIPTION CABLES IN FIRE AREA WIRING / ELEMENTARY Control Rod System See Note - 1 at the end CH-11B Boric Acid Tank No Cables CH-167 Check Valve No Cab'les HCV-258-Valve (Motor Control)
Power:
None Boric Acid Gravity. FD.
Control: EB3680, EB3681 B-11 Instr:
None
-CH-155 Check Valve No Cables CH-173 Check Valve No Cables CH-188 Check Valve No Cables CH-1B Charging Pump Power:
None B-19 Control:
EB-3744, EB-10458, B-24 EB-3742, EB-3746, B-27 EB-3746A, B-32 Instr:
EB-3743, EB-3745, EB-3749, EB-3753, EB-3753A, 3750 CH-192 Check Valve No Cables CH-198 Check'. Valve No Cables CH-6 Regenerative Heat Exchanger No Cables HCV-239 Valve Charging Power:
None B-13 to LoopL2A-.
Control:
EB-3649 Inste:
None-
+
CH-204 Check' Valve No Cables CH-174-Valve' No' Cables CH-172-Valve No Cables
'LCV-218-2 Valve (Hotor Cont)
Power:
.None'-
B-12 Disch. From VCT.
Control:.
.3623,-3624 Instr:
-None
- HCV-240 Valve' Aux. Press Power:
None-B-13 Spray-Control:
~EA-3650 Instr:
None
'CH-14 Boric Acid Vol.
Control Tank No Cables i
l l
l l
AABLE E & C (Cont'd)
(For references see Table F)
COMPONENT REFEPINCE i
TAG #
DESCRIPTION CABLES IN FlfE AREA WIRING / ELE."NTARY l
CH-194 Check Valve No Cables TCV-202 Valve Power:
None Contro'l:
EA-3603 3-13 Instr:
None PCV-103-1 Valve Power:
C-3461 Control:
C-3461C B,10 Instr:
C-3452 PCV-103-2 Valve Power:
A3462 Control:
A3462C B-10 Instr:
A3468 PCV-102-1 Valve Power:
None Control:
PCV-102-2 Valve Power:
None Control:
EB 3557, EB 3385 B-21 Instr:
EB 3545, EB 11461 E-31 EB-3384 W-10 1.
Steam Driven Aux.
Power:
None Feedwater Pump Control:
EB 5275 B-8 (See FCV-1369)
Instr:
None 2.
Aux. Oil Pump Power:
None l Control:
None B-8 Instr:
4948, 4946 FCV-1369 Valve Power:
None Control:
EB 5340, EB 5275
. E-7 Instr:
None
TABLE B & C (Cont'd)
(For references see Table F)
COMPONEJT REFERENCE TAG #
DESCRIPTION CAELES IN FIRE AREA WIRING / ELE."EhTARY HCV-1107A Valve Power:
None Control:
EA 5253, EA5252, B-lo EA5317 2
Instr:
None HCV-1107B Valve Power:
None Control:
EB 5257, EB 5258 EB 5319, EB 5316 B-16 Instr:
None HCV-1108A Valve Power:
None Control:
EA 5321, EA 5262 B-16 EA 5253 Instr:
None HCV-1108B Valve Power:
None Control:
EB 5267, EB 5323, B-16 EB 5327, EB 5258 Instr:
None YCV-1045A Valve Power:
None Control:
EB 4979, EB 4981 B-23 Instr:
EB 4977, EB 4980 YCV-1045B Valve Power:
None Control:
EB 4984, EB 5258 B-23 Instr:
EB 4982, EB 4985 YCV-1045 Valve Power:
None Control:
4946 B-8 Instr:
None, -. - -
4 TABLE B & C (Cont'd)
(For references see Table F)
~
COMPONENT REFERENCE TAG ft DESCRIPTION CABLES IN FIRE AREA WIRING / ELEMENTARY TI-121C-1 Primary Loop Cold Leg Power:
None Temp Indication Control: None E-26 Instr:
B 11453, 3506W TI-121H Primary Loop Hot Leg Power:
None Temp Indication Control: None E-26 Instr.
B3505, B3505W PI-115 Pressurizer Pressure Power:
None Indicator-Control: None E-27 Instt:
EC 3390 LI-219 Vol. Control Tank Ind.
Power:
None Control: None E-28 Instr:
3627, 3627W Backup Pressurizer Power:
Heaters #10, 11, 12 Control: 33436, B3439, B3442, B-9 (Bank 4)
B3440 Instr:
B3435, B3438, B3441 LI-101Y Pressurizer Level Power:
None Indicator Control: None E-2 Instr:
3473, 3473W LI 903Y-1 Steam Generator Power:
None RC-2A Level Indication Control: None N/A Instr:
None LI 906Y-1 Steam Generator Power:
None RC-2B Level Indication Control: None N/A Instr:
None
'~', - _
TABLE B & C (Cont'd)
(For references see Table F)
COMPONENT REFERENCE TAG e/
DESCRIPTION CABLES IN FIRE AREA WIRIN_C!ELEETARY DC BUS #2 Power:
None Control: EB 980, EB 981, B-1 ED 908 Ins tr.:
B909, B979, B964, B965, B966, B967 Instr. Inverter "D" Power:
ED 1191 Control: None B-2 Instr:
ED 1195, ED 1192, ED 1193, ED 1194 1.
Breaker Controls Power:
None 4.16 KV Control: B1688 1AD2 B-3 TIB4A E-33 TIB4A B1689, B1694, B1699, E-34 TIB4B ED9565, ED9565A, E-35 TIB4C ED9567, ED9567A, ED9627, ED9628, ED9629, ED9632, ED9633, ED9637, ED9640, ED9643, ED9645, ED9646 Inste:
B1688, B1690, B1693, B1695, B1698 B1700 ED 9630, ED 9631, ED 9634, ED 9635, ED 9636, ED 9642, ED 9545, ED 9646, ED 9548, ED 9548A, I
. TABLE B & C (Cont'd)
(?or references see Table F)
COMPONENT
~
TAG #1 DESCRIPTION REFEPINCE CABLES IN FIRE AREA WIRING /EIIMENTARY 2.
480 V Power:
None Control: B1838, EB1841, EB1841A, IB4A B1850, B1852, EB1853, B-4 IB4B EB1853A, B1862, EB1865, B-5 EB1865A B-6 Instr:
B1837, B1839, B1845, B-25 B1846A, B1849, B1851, B-26 B1857, B1858, B1858A, B-27 B1861, B1863, B1869, j
B1870, B1870A Load Shed Power:
None Control: ED2923, ED2923A, B-17 ED2924, ED2924A E-36 Instr:
ED2926 NOTES:
1.
Any shorts or open circuits in cables associated with the control rod system will result in reactor trip. Detailed cable listing is, therefore, not required. Also see Section 7.2 of the Fort Calhoun FSAR.
4
~. _ -
TABLE D (For References Please See Table F)
EQUIP CABLE REFERENCE DESCRIPTION OF ISOLATION METHOD TO VERIFY THAT TAG #
NO. IN DRAWINGS FIRE INDUCED FAILURE IN CABLES WILL NOT PRE-FIRE AREA VENT OR CAUSE MALFUNCTION OF ALTERNATE SHUT-DOWN B
CH-11B No Cable N/A N/A CH-167 No Cable N/A N/A HCV-258 EB-3680 HCV-258 is powered from MCC-4A2. Valve mal-EB-3681 B-11 function due to fire induced failure is pre-vented by opening tile feeder breaker at the MCC and removing the power from the valve.
Without electrical power the failure of con-crol cables in the fire area will have no effect on the valve. HCV-258 is equipped with a handwheel and manual action is used to open or close the valve as required.
CH-155 No Cable N/A N/A CH-173 No Cable N/A N/A CH-188 No Cable N/A N/A CH-192 No Cable N/A N/A CH-198 No Cable N/A N/A i
CH-204 No Cable N/A N/A HCV-239 EB-3649 B-13 Reference Stone & Webster schematics 13007.42-C-2 ESK-11A & C the isolation circuit operates as C-4 follows: Normal DC power for valve operation E-5 originates at DC Bus No. 2 at CB-1 located in the fire area.
In Addition, all normal valve controls and indication are located at CB-1.
To isolate the circuit, transfer Sw. 43 at the alternate shutdown panel is placed in the
" LOCAL" position. This picks up lock out relay (LOR) 43D. Actuation of LOR 43D open circuits, all of the wires in cable EB3649 going to CB-1 and disconcacts the DC power from CB-1 to the valve. At the sats time, the valve is reconnected to a DC pcwer source and s
TABLE D (Cont'd)
EQUIP CABLE REFERENCE DESCRIPTION OF ISOLATION METHOD TO VERIFY THAT TAG #
NO. IN DRAWINGS FIRE INDUCED FAILURE IN' CABLES WILL NOT PRE-FIRE AREA VENT OR 'AUSE MALFUNCTION OF ALTEPSATE SHUT-DOWN HCV-239 control switch located at the alternate shut-(Continued) down panel. Since cable EB3649 is now dis-connected from the valve, a short, open or any other fire induced situation cannot affect valve HCV-239.
HCV-240 EA-3650 B-13 Reference Stone & Webster schematics 13007.42-C-2 ESK-11A, C & D.
Operation is similar to HCV-C-4 239 except HCV-240 must remain closed to allow C-5 full charging flow and prevent inadvertent prer-E-4 surizer spray actuation. To insure the valve remains closed, LOR-43A open circuits the DC Bus 1 power to the valve.
L*- the Bus 2 power from the alternate shutdown panel is provided to a new set of valve limit switches and in-dication lights at the alternate shutdown panel. Since cable EA-3650 is acy disconnect-ed from the valve a short, open or any other fire induced situation cannto affect HCV-240.
LCV-218-2
- 3623, B-12 LCV-218-2 is kept from a malfunction by re-3624 mo ing power from the valve by tripping the feeder breaker at MCC-3A2. The valve is then manually operated in a manner similar to HCV-258.
CH-174 No Cable N/A N/A CH-172 No Cable N/A
_ N/A CH-1B EB-3744 B-19 Reference Stoue and Webster schematics 13007.
EB-10458 C-2 42-ESK-11A & F & Gibbs, Hill, Durham & Richard-EB-3743
( 7 son Dwg. 11405-E-143. The isolation method is EB-3745 similar.to the one used for HCV-239. A trans-BE-3749 fer. switch and lock out relay located on the EB-3753 alternate shutdown panel are utilized to iso-late the control cable for breaker CH-1B from s
TABLE D (Cont'd)
@IP CABLE PIFERENCE DESCRIPTION OF ISOLATION METHOD TO VERIFY THAT TAG #
NO. IN DRAWINGS FIRE INDUCED FAILURE IN CABLES WILL NOT PPI-FIRE AREA VENT OR CAUSE MALFUNCTION OF ALTERNATE SHUT-MW CH-1B EB-3753A the fire area. Alternate controls are located (Continued)
EB-3746 on the panel to provide for Local operation.
EB-3746A The analysis used for each of the cables for EB-3752
, the charging pump is:
EB-3752A Cable EB-3744 is the control cable from breaker CH-1B to the control board in the fire area.
The cable is isolated by a transfer switch in the alternate shutdown panel control and is transferred to a new control switch in the panel for loc $1 operation. EB-10458 - This is the normal feed for CH-1B packing coolant pump. A trans-fer switch in the Alternate shutdown panel iso-lates this cable and transfers the coolant pump to a local power supply at the panel.
EB-3743 - CH-1B ammeter leads EB-3745 - CH-1B alarm No Provision has EB-3749 - CH-1B breaker trip alm been made to isolate EB-3753 Sequencer Display & Alarm cables since CH-1B EB-3753A operation is not EB-3746 affected if they EB-3746A
/
are damaged by 3750 Computer Inputs fire.
CH-6 No Cable N/A N/A CH-14' No Cable N/A N/A CH-194 No Cable N/A N/A TCV-202 EA-3603 B-13 TCV-202 isolation is similar to HCV-240. Cable E-1 EA-3603 is isolated by a transfer switch and open circuited. Since the cable is discon-nected a fire induced short, open or' other condition cannot aff ect TCV-202.
9 %
=...
- - ~
i TABLE D (Cont'd)
EQUIP CABLE REFERENCE DESCRIPTION OF ISOLATION METHOD TO VERIFY THAT TAG #
NO. IN DRAWINGS FIRE INDUCED FAILURE IN' CABLES WILL NCT PRE-FIRE AREA VENT OR CAUSE MALFUNCTION OF ALTERNATE SHUT-DOWN PCV-103-1 C-3461 B-10 PCV-103-1 is maintained in the closed position C-3461C C-2 for alternate shutdown. This is achieved by C-3452 C-3 open cirtuiting the cable to the valve E/P D-5 converter. At the same time this isolates E-8 cable C-3461 from the E/P to ensure that no spurious signals will affect it.
Cable C-3461C has not been modified, it is for valve limit switches and position indicaton. Instead, :e-dundant limit switches are installed on the valve and cabled directly to the alternate shutdown panel. The new cable is outside the fire area. Cable C-3452 has not been modified since its failure has no affect on the valve.
-PCV-103-2 A-3462 B-10 PCV-103-2 has been modified in the same manner 3
A-3462C C-2 as PCV-103-1.
A-3468 C-3 D-5 E-8 PCV-102-1 EC-3556 E-6 PCV-102-is powered from MCC-3C1, and is de-EC-3386 signed to fail closed. The valve is required EC-3544 to maintain a closed position for alternate EC-11462 shutdown. Valve malfunction is prevented of opening the feeder breaker at the MCC a ad re-moving power from the valve. Damage to the cables in the fire area will have no affect on the valve.
i
=
-2E-
s TABLE D (Cont'd)
EQUIP CABLE REFERENCE DESCRIPTION OF ISOLATION METHOD TO VE2IFY THAT TAG #
NO. IN DRAWINGS FIRE INDUCED FAILURE IN' CABLES WILL N01 PRE-FIRE AREA VENT OR CAUSE MALFUNCTION OF ALTERNATE SHUT-DOWN PCV-102-2 EB-3557 C-2 PCV-102-2 is powered from MCC-4B1 and is de-EB-3385 C-5 signed to fait closed. The cables going to EB-3545 C-6 the fire
- area were addressed as follows:
EB-11461 D-6 Cables EB-3557, EB-3385, and EB-3545 u'tilize E-7 a transfer switch for isolation. Cables EB-11461 and 3384 are used for flow indica-tion and annunciation. Their loss does not affect operation of the valve. A new set of indicating lights for position indication are located on the alternate shutdowa panel and these are isolated from inadvertant operation by a transfer switch.
- FW-10 EB-5275 B-8 FW-10 is the steam driven feedwater pump.
Feedsater E-23 Cable EB-5275 utilizes a transfer switch in pump the auxiliary feedwater panel AI-179 for iso-lation.
- Aux. Oil 4948 Cables 4948, and 4946, are used for annuncia-pump 4946 tion in the control room. They are isolated by auxi' 2ry relay contacts in auxiliary feeawater panel AI-179.
i i
TI-121-C B11453 E-26 Reactor Coolant loop 2A cold leg temp indicator 3506W TI-121-C is located on the alternate shutdown panel with its associated power supplies. A t
transfer switch, device 43A disconnects cables B11453 and 3506W from the circuit for the cold leg temp circuit and protects the circuit from j
damage due to fire.
- See Note 1 at the end.
e.
w%s~
~
^
TABLE D (Cont'd)
EQUIP CABLE REFERENCE DESCRIPTION OF ISOLATION METHOD TO VERIFY THAT TAG #
NO. IN DRAWINGS FIRE INDUCED FAILURE IN CABLES WILL NOT PRE-FIRE AREA VENT OR CAUSE MALFUNCTION OF ALTERNATE SHUT-DOWN TI-121-H B3505 E-26 Loop 2 hot leg temp indication is isolated in B3505W the same, manner as TI-121C.
PI-115 EC-3390 E-27 Vide Range Pressurizer pressure indicator PI-115 is located on the auxiliary feedwater panel with its associated power supplies. A transfer switch disconnects cable EC-3390 from the cir-cuit and protects the circuit from damage due to fire.
LI-219 3627 E-28 Isolation is achieved similar to TI-121C & H.
3627W Pressurizer B3436 B-9 Backup pressurizer heater groups 10, 11, and Heaters #10, B3439 12 (Bank 4) are supplied from MCC 4C1 in the 11, 12 (Bank B3442 electrical penetration room adjacent to the 4)
B3440 alternate shutdown panel. The control cables B3435 which are in the fire area could be lost due B3438 to fire. These cables will be locally isolated B3441 at the MCC and the heaters will be operated lo-cally at the MCC if they are required for shut-down.
- FCV-1369 EB-5340 B-7 FCV-1369 is an air operated valve which fails EB-5275 E-14 open. The failure of control cables EB-5340 E-21 EB-5275 in the fire area will have no effect on the valve because of isolation provided by the transfer switch on auxiliary feedwater panel AI-179.
If required, FCV-1369 can be opened manually.
- See Note I at the end.
1 l
TAELE D (Cont'd)
EQUIP CABLE REFERENCE DESCRIPTION OF ISOLATION METHOD TO VERIFY THAT TAG #
NO. IN DRAWINGS FIRE INDUCED FAILURE IN 2 ABLES WILL NOT PRE-FIRE AREA VENT OR CAUSE MALFUNCTION OF AI. TERNATE SHUT-DOWN
- HCV-1107A EA-5253 B-16 Valve HCV-1107A is an air operated valve which EA-5252 E-11 fails open. The failure of the control cables
~
EA-5317 E-18 EA-5252, EA-5253 will have no effset on the valve, because of the isolation previded by the transfer switch on panel AI-179.
- HCV-1107B EB-5319 B-16 Valve HCV-1107B is an air oper.tted valve which EB-5257 E-10 fails open. The failure of cables EB-5257 and EB-5258 E-19 EB-5258 will have no effect on the valve be-EB-5316 cause of isolation provided by the transfer switch on auxiliary feedwate; panel AI-179.
The loss of cables EB-5316 and EB-5319 will have no affect on the operation of the valve because the complete control circuit is iso-lated by the transfer switch. This valve is equipped with handwheels and can be operated manually.
- HCV-1108A EA-5321 B-16 Valve HCV-1108A is an air operated valve which EA-5262 E-11 fails open. The failure of the control cable EA-5253 E-18 EA-5321, EA-5253, and EA-5262 in the fire area will have no effect on the valve because of the isolation provided by the transfer switch on Panel AI-179.
- HCV-1108B EB-5323 B-16 Valve HCV-1108B is an air operated valve which EB-5327 E-12 fails open. The failure of cables EB-5258 and EB-5267 E-20 EB-5267 will have no effect on the valve be-EB-5258 cause of isolation provided by the transfer switch on Auxiliary feedwater panel AI-179.
- 'See Note 1 at the end.
. t
TABLE D (Cont'd)
EQUIP CABLE REFERENCE DESCRIPTION OF ISOLATI0'N METHOD TO VERIFY THAT TAG #
NO. IN DRAWINGS FIRE INDUCED FAILURE IN CABLES WILL NOT PRE-FIRE AREA VENT OR CAUSE MALFUNCTION OF ALTERNATE SHUT-DOWN
- HCV-1108B The loss of cables EB-5323 and EB-5327 will (Continued) have no Affect on the operation of HCV-1108B because the complete control circuit is iso-lated by the transfer switch. This valve is equiped with handwheels and can be operated manually.
- YCV-1045A EB-4979 B-15 Valve YCV-1045A is an air operated valve which EB-4977 E-24 fails open. Upon fire induced failure of cables EB-4980 E-110 EB-4981, EB-4977, EB-4979 and EB-4980 control EB-5258 will be transferred to AI-179 by the transfer switch on AI-179 isolating these cables from the alternate shutdown system.
- YCV-1045B EB-4984 B-17 Valve YCV-1045B is an air operated valve which EB-4985 E-25 fails open. Upon fire induced failure of cables EB-4982 E-111 EB-4984, EB-4985 and EB-4982 control will be transferred to AI-179 by the transfer switch on AI-179 isolating these cables from the alter-nate shutdown system.
- YCV-1045 4946 B-8 YCV-1045 is an air operated valve which fails E-13 closed.
It is provided'with handwheels for man E-22 ual operation. Cable 4946 is isolated from the fire area by the transfer switch and auxiliary relays on auxiliary feedwater panel AI-179.
LI-101Y-3473 E-2 LI-101Y is used for pressurizer level indica-3473W tion and is located on the alternate shutdown
- See Note 1 at the end.
TABLE D (Cont'd)
EQUIP CABLE REFERENCE DESCRIPTION OF ISOLATION METHOD TO VERIFY THAT TAG #
NO. IN DRAWINGS FIRE INDUCED FAILURE IN CABLES WILL NOT PRE-FIRE AREA VENT OR CAUSE MALFLTCTION OF ALTERNATE SHUT-DOWN LI-101Y panel AI-185. Cable 3473 utilizes the trans-(Continued) fer swibch for isolation from the fire area.
Cable 3473w is used for computer input and its loss has no affect on alternate shutdown.
LI-903Y No cables N/A N/A LI-906Y No Cables N/A N/A 125VDC EB-980 B-1 Each cable from 125VDC Bus 2 distribution panel Bus #2 EB-981 that is routed in the fire area is protected by EB-908 a breaker or fused.
If the cables are damaged EB-909 by fire, Bes 2 will not be affected since the EB-979 breakers will open to protect the bus.
In EB-964 addition, the alternate shutdown emergency EB-967 procedure requires the breakers to be opened to ensure the Bus is protected.
Instrument ED-1191 F-1 Instrument inverter 'D' is isolated from the Inverter D ED-1192 fire area by means of the invertor output ED-1193 breaker. The power source for alternate shut-ED-1194 down is tapped off the inverter ahead of the ED-1195 breaker and will be available if the breaker trips as a result of fire damage to cable ED-1191. Cables ED-1192, 3, 4, and 5 are voltmeter, ammeter and annunciator cables going so the control. board. Fire damage to these cables will not affect inverter oper-ation and they have not been modified.
1 TABLE D (Cont'd)
EQUIP CABLE REFERENCEDESCRIPTIONOFISOLATIONMETHOD[0VERIFYTHAT TAG #
NO. IN DRAWINGS FIRE INDUCED FAILURE IN CABLES WILL NOT PRE-t l
FIRE AREA VENT OR CAUSE MALFUNCTION OF ALTERNATE SHUI-DOWN 4160V Breakers 1AD2 ED9545 Isolation for breakers IAD2, TIB-4A, B and C l
ED9548 is achieved by open circuiting the control ED9548A cables running to the fire area. To prevent i
ED9565 inadverten:. -lose or trip, breakers are con-ED9565A trolled using a local control switch mounted ED9567 on the breaker. Ammeter and alarm cables are ED9567A not isolated since they will not affect the ED9627 breaker if fire damage is incurred.
ED9628 ED9629 ED9630 ED9631 ED9632 ED9633 i
i ED9634 ED9635 ED9636 ED9637 ED9640 ED9643 ED9646 t
TIB-4A B-1688 B-3 t
B-1689 B-1690-TIB-4B B-1693 I
B-1694 EB-1695 TIB-4C B-1698 B-1699.
B-1700
i TABLE D (Cont'd)
EQUIP CABLE REFERENCE DESCRIPTION OF ISOLATION METHOD TO VERIFY THAT TAG if NO. IN DRAWINGS FIRE INDUCT.D FAILURE IN CABLES WILL NOT PRE-FIRE AREA VENT OR CAUSE MALFUNCTION OF ALTERNATE SHUT-DOWN 480 Volt Breakers IB4A B-1837 B-17 The isolation scheme for the 480V breakers B-1838 B-4 IB4A, B, and C is similar to 4160V breakers B-1839 TIB-4A, B, and C.
EB-1841 EB-1841A B-1845 B-1846 B-1846A IB4B B-1849 B-5 The isolation scheme for the 480V breaktrs L'-1850 B-17 IB4A, B, and C is similar to 4160V breakers B-1851 TIB-4A, B, and C.
B*1852 EB-1853 EB-1853A B-1857 B-1858 B-1858A IB4C B-1861 B-6 The isolation scheme for the 480V breakers B-1862 B-17 IB4A, B, and C is similar to 4160V breakers B-1863 TIB-4A, B, and C.
E341865 EB-1865A B-1869 B-1870
, B-1870A
TABLE D (Cont'd)
EQUIP CABS.E REFET Ti DESCRIPTION OF ISOLATION METHOD TO VERIFY THAT TAG #
NO. IN DRAWINGS FIRE INDUCED FAILURE IN CABLES WILL NOT PRE-FIRE AREA VENT OR CAUSE MALFUNCTION OF ALTERNATE SHUT-DOWN 480 Volt ED-2923 B-17 Isolation of automatic load shed circuits is Load Shed ED-2923A achieved through use of a transfer switch and Channel B ED-2924 auxiliary relays. The isolation is accomp-ED-2924A lished by disconnecting the wires in the cables ED-2926 to the control room from the circuit. Alarm cables have not been modified as cable damages will not affect the circuit.
Diesel In accordance with the Fort Calhoun FSAR Generator D2 Section 7.6.4.b, a transfer switch (183MES) provided in diesel generater local panel AI-133B will isolate the D) esel generator circuitry from the control room. List of cables is, therefore, not included.
Note 1.
Equipment referenced to in this note is part of the auxiliary feed-water system. Control circuitry for this system is being redesigned in accordance with the requirements of NUREG-737. During this re-design effort ca c has been taken'to ensure cr;aformance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix 'R' als).
t TABLE E CABLES PROVIDING CONTROL AND PWER CONNECTIONS FOR HCV-347 AND HCV-348.
(Reference Drawings B-22, E-29, E-30)
CABLE NO FROM TO ROUTING (BY FIRE AREAS) FUNCTION REMARKS
. B327 MCC4C2 HCV-347 6
Power B3874 MCC4C2 Control Roon.
6.79',41*,42*
Control B3875 Control Room HCV-347 6,29,41*,42*
Control Panel CB-1 r
- Asterisk indi-cates common fire area for 66-redundant cables.
A395 MCC3B1 HCV-348 34A, 30 Power A3877 Control Room Penetration 28, 34A, 36, 41*, 42*
Control Panel CB-1 No. C8 A3876 MCC3B1 Control Room 34A, 36, 41*, 42*
Control Panel CB-1 A3877A-Penetration HCV-348 30 Control No. C8
}
=. -
i
'a TABLE F REFERENCES A.
REPORTS:
A-1 Fort Calhoun Unit #1 Alternate Shutdown Capability - Conceptual Des'gn Description A-2 Fort Calhoun Unit #1 Alternate Shutdown Capability - Final Design Description A-3 Fort Calhoun Unit #1 Alternate Shutdown Cap, ability - Cold Design Phase B.
Gibbs, Hill, Durham and Richardson Drawings:
B-1 11405-E-3 B-2 11405-E-9 B-3 11405-E-16, Sh. 2 B-4 11405-E-19, Sh. 5 B 11405-E-19, Sh. 6 B 11405-E-19, Sh. 7 B-7 11405-E-28, Sh. 5
)
.B-3 SK11405-E-28, Sh. 9 B-9 11405-E-32, Sh. 1 B-10 11405-E-32, Sh. 4 B-11 11405-E-42, Sh. 4 l
'B-12 11405-E-42, Sh. 3 l
B-13 11405-E-42, Sh. 5
.B-14 11405-E-42, Sh. 6 3-15 11405-E-44, Sh. 4 3-16 11405-E-44, Sh. 8 B-17 11405-E-45, Sh. 2
-B-18 11405-E-51, Sh. 4
.B-19:
11405-E-143, Sh. ;
B-20 11405-E-199 B-21 11405-E-30, Sh. 6 7
>B-22 11405-E-29, Sh. 4 B-23 11405-E-45,-Sh. 4 B 11405-E-48, Sh. 4 B-25 11405-E-182 B 11405-E-184 2B 11405-E-186,
-3h-
-.. a -
4 4
C.
Stone and Webster Drawings.
C-1 13007.42-EE-42A C-2 13007.42-ESK-11A C-3 13007.42-ESR-11B C-4 13007.42-ESK-11C C-5 13007.42-ESK-11D B
C-6 13007.42-ESK-11E C-7 13007.42-ESK-11F C-8 13007.42-ESK-4A i
D.
Combustion Engineering i
D-1 E-23866-210-121 D-2 E-23866-210-120, Sh. 1 D-3 B-23866-413-102 D-4 B-23866-414-360, Sh. 1 D-5 B-23866-414-360, Sh. 2 D-6 B-23866-414-370, Sh. 2 E.
General Electric E-1 136B2431, Sh. 69 E-2 136B2431, Sh. 71 e
E-3 136B2431, Sh. 78 E-4 136B2431, Sh. 83 E-5 136B2431, Sh. 86 E-6 136B2431, Sh. 92 E-7 136B2431, Sh. 93 E-8 136B2431, Sh 95 E-9 136B2492, Eh 20 LE-10 136B2492, Sh. 21 E-11 136B2492, Sh. 22 E -136B2492,RSh. 23
t I
.so i
E.
General Electric (Continued)
~
E-13 136B2492, Sh. 28 E-14 136B2492, Sh. 32 5
E-15 136B2492, Sh. 110 E-16 136B2492, Sh. 111 E-17 136B2736, Sh. 3 E-18 136B2736, Sh. 4 E-19 136B2736, Sh. 5 E-20 136B2736, Sh. 6 E-21 136B2736, Sh. 8 i -
E-22 136B2736, Sh. 9 E-23 136B2736, Sh. 10 E-24 136B2736, Sh. 12 E-25 136B2 36, Sh. 13 E-26 161F561, Sh. 8 E-27 161F561, Sh. 21A j
E-23' 161F561, Jh. 58 i
E-29 136B2431, Sh. 65 E-50' 136B2431, Sh. 66 E-31 161F561, Sh.14C E-32 161F561, Sh. 55 E-33 0108D8674, Sh. 1 E-34 0108D8674, Sh. 2 E-35 0108D8674, Sh. 3 E-35 161F565'
' F.
Solid State Controls Inc.
C l
.F-1 2D5262 i
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