ML20024B945
| ML20024B945 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1983 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-0881, NUREG-0881-S02, NUREG-881, NUREG-881-S2, NUDOCS 8307120036 | |
| Download: ML20024B945 (41) | |
Text
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NUREG-0881 Supplement No. 2 Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of i
Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No.1 Docket No. STN 50-482
-Kansas Gas and Electric Company, et al.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation June 1983
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NOTICE Avaiiability of Reference Materials Cited in NRC Publications Most documents cited in NHC publications wiil be nailable from one of the following sources:
- 1. The NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N.W.
Washingtori, DC 20555
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~. The National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161 Although the listing that fo! lows represents the majority of documents cited in NRC publications, it is not intended to be exhaustive.
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GPO Printed copy price: _$4.00
NUREG-0881 Supplement No. 2 Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No.1 Dccket No. STN 50-482 Kansas Gas and Electric Company, et al.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation June 1983 p s ~a.9,
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Table of Contents Paste 1
INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DISCUSSION.........................
1-1 s
1.1 Intraduction...........................................
1-1 C
1.7 Summa ry of Outstandi ng Items...........................
1-1 1.8 Confirmatory Items.....................................
1-2 1.9 License Conditions.....................................
1-3 3
DESIGN CRITERIA FOR STRUCTUREf, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS.....
3-1 3.9 Mechanical Systems and Components......................
3-1 3.9.6 Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves...........
3-1 References..............................
3-1 4
REACT 0R....................................................
4-1 4.2 Fuel Design............................................
4-1 4.2.3.1(10) Control Material Leaching..................
4-1 4.2.3.3(4) Structural Damage From External Forces.....
4-1 References....
4-2 5
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM......................................
5-1 5.3 Reactor Vessel.........................................
5-1 5.3.1 Reactor Vessel Materials and Compliance with Appendices G and H, 10 CFR 50...................
5-1 5.3.2 Pressure-Temperature Limits.....................
5-1 References..................
5-1 7
. INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL................................
7-1 7.5 Information Systems Important to Safety................
7-1 7.5.2.3 Post-Accident Monitoring.....................
7-1 References...........................
7-1 13 CONDUCTION OF 0PERATIONS....................................
13-1 13.3 Emergency Preparedness Evaluation.....................
13-1 13.3.1 Introduction...................................
13-1 13.3.2 Evaluation of Emergency Plan..................
13-2
. Wolf. Creek SSER 2 jjj
Table of Contents (Continued)
Page 13.3.2.1 Assignment of Responsibilities (Organizational Control Standard).......
13-1 13.3.2.2 Onsite Emergency Organization...........
13-2 13.3.2.3 Emergency Response Support ar.d Resources......................
13-4 13.3.2.4 Emergency Classification System.........
13-4 13.1.2.5 Notification Methods and Procedures.....
13-5 13.3.2.6 Emergency Communications................
13-7 13.3.2.7 Public Information......................
13-7 13.3.2.8 Emergency Facilities and Equipment......
13-8 13.3.2.9 Accident Assessment.....................
13-11 13.3.2.10 Protective Response.....................
13-12 13.3.2.11 Radiological Exposure Control...........
13-13 13.3.2.12 Medical and Public Health Support.......
13-14 13.3.2.13 Recovery and Reentry Planning and Post Accident Operations................
13-14 13.3.2.14 Exercises and Drills....................
13-15 13.3.2.15 Radiological Emergency Response Training...............................
13-16 13.3.2.16 Responsibility for the Planning Effort:
Development, Periodic Review, and Distribution of Emergency Plans.....
13-17 13.3.3 Conclusion.....................................
13-18 References.....................................
13-19 16 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS....................................
16-1 17 QUALITY ASSURANCE...........................................
17-1 17.1 Introduction..........................................
17-1 17.2 Staff Evaluation.............................
17-1 References............................................
17-1 22 IMI REQUIREMENTS............................................
22-1 II.B.2 Plant Shielding to Provide Access to Vital Areas for Post Accident 0perations........................
22-1 II.F.1 Additional Accident Monitoring Instrumentation......
22-1 II.K.2.13 Thermal Mechanical Report--Effect of High Pressure Injection on Vessel Integrity for Small Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident With No Auxiliary Feedwater...........................
22-2 II.K.3.2 Report on Overall Safety Effect of Power Operated Relief Valve Isolation System............
22-2 Wolf Creek SSER 2 jy
v.
Table of Contents (Continued) fag 4
APPENDICES t
Appendix A Chronology of NRC Staff Radiological Safety Review
[
of Wo'f Creek........................................
A-1 Appendix D NRC Staff Contributors and Consultants...............
D-1 p
t I
-Wolf Creek SSER 2.
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1 INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DISCUSSION 1.1 Introduction The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) (NUREG-0881) for the application filed by Kansas Gas and Electric Company (KG&E), as appli-p cant and agent for the owners, for a 11 cense to operate the Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) (Docket No. STN 50-482), was issued in April 1982 and the first supplement.(SSER #1) was published in August 1982.
In these documents, the staff identified a number of items that were not resolved with the applicant.
These items were categorized as:
1.
Outstanding items which needed resolution prior to the issuance of an operating license.
2.
Items for which the staff had completed its review and had determined positions for which.there appeared to be no significant disagreement between the applicant and the staff.
Further information was needed, however, to confirm these positions.
3.
Items for which the staff had taken positions and would require implementation and/or documentation after the issuance of the operating license.
These would be conditions to the operating license.
The purpose of this supplement is to provide the staff evaluation of the open items that have been resolved and to address changes to the SER which resulted from the receipt of additional information.
Copies of this SER supplement are available for inspection at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW, Washington, D.C. and at the William Allen White Library, t'mporia State University,1200 Commercial Street, Emporia, Kansas. Single copies may be purchased from sources indicated on the inside front cover.
The NRC Project Manager assigned to the Operating License application for,,olf Creek is Joseph J. Holonich.
Mr. Holonich may be contacted by calling (301) 492-7793 cr writing:
Joseph J. Holonich U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Division of Licensing Washington, DC 20555 1.7 Summary of Outstanding Items The resolution of Item II.B.2 of Outstanding Issue B(4) is described in this supplement. As a result of the staff review of KG&E's Emergency Preparedness Plan, there is a new outstanding item.
Prior to issuance of the operating license, the staff will resolve all of the outstanding items listed below.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 1-1
Part A*
A(1) Seismic and dynamic qualification of seismic Category I mechanical and electrical equipment (Section 3.10)
A(2) Environmental qualification of safety-related electrical equipment (Section 3.11)
A(3) TMI Action Plan (Section 22.0)
I. A.1.1 Shift Technical Advisor I.D.1 Control room design review III.A.1.2 Upgrade emergency support facilities A(4) Onsite Emergency Preparedness (Section 13.3)
Part B*
B(1) High energy pipe break hazards analysis (closed SSER #1)
B(2) Pump and valve operability assurance program (Section 3.6.1)
B(3) Fire protection program alternate shutdown panel (Section 9.5.1.5)
B(4) TMI Action Plan (Section 22.0)
I.C.1 Guidance for evaluation and development of procedures for transients and accidents I.C.8 Pilot Monitoring of selected emergency procedures for near-term operating license applicants II.B.2 Plant shielding tc provide access to vital areas and protect safety equipment for post accident operation (closed SSER #2).
- 1. 8 Confirmatory Items The following is an update of each of those confirmatory items in Section 1.8 of the SER which has been completed.
In addition, License Condition B(11) has been removed and made Confirmatory Item B(32).
Closed Confirmatory Items Part A*
A(4) Identification of base metal and heat-affected zone surveillance material (Section 5.3.1).
A(5) Pressure-temperature limits (Section 5.3.2).
- Part A lists the site-specific items while Part B contains the SNUPPS items which are common to both Wolf Creek and its sister plant, Callaway.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 1-2
Part B*
B(3) Testing of pressure isolation valves (Section 3.9.6).
B(4) Fuel assembly structural response to seismic and loss-of-coolant accident (Section 4.2.3.3(d)).
B(28)II.F.1, Attachment 3 Additional Accident Monitoring Instrumentation II.K.2.13 Thermal Mechar.ical Report - Effect of High-Pressure Injection on Vessel Integrity for Smell Break LOCA With No Auxiliary Feedwater (Section 22).
II.K.3.2 Report on overall safety effect of PORV isolation system.
B(32) Post Accident Monitoring 1.9 License Conditions The following is an update of two license conditions in Section 1.9 of the SER which are no longer required.
B(1) Surveillance of hafnium control rods.
B(11) Post accident monitoring.
- Part A lists the site-specific items while Part B contains the SNUPPS items which are common to both Wolf Creek and its sister plant, Callaway.
Wolf Creek SSER.2 1-3
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3 DESIGN CRITERIA FOR STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS 3.9 Mechanical Systems and Comp,nents 3.9.6 Inser'iice Testing of Pumps and Valves 4
In Section 1.8 of the Wolf Creek SER (NUREG-0881), the staff identified Confirmatory Item 6.3 regarding the testing of pressure isolation val /es. In Section 3.9.6 of the SER, the staff stated that the applicants have addressed the leak testing of only those check valves with an Event V configuration which form an interface between RCS pressure and the Low Pressure Coolant Injection System.
The applicant's response for the Event V configuration is documented in a letter from N. Petrick to H. Denton dated September 11, 1981.
However, the SER alsc stated that other low pressure interfacing systems exist with valve configurations whose failure could lead to an intersystem LOCA.
These other systems include the accumulator discharge check valves, the boron injection system pressure isolation valves, and the motor operated valves in the RHR system.
The SER stated, as a confirmatory item, that the staff will require that the leaktight integrity of the pressure isolation valves in the above systems be verified by testing.
The applicant has responded to our concern regarding the pressure isolation valves in systems with other than Event V configurations and has documented all pressure isolation valves that will be included in their leak test program (Petrick; July 14, 1982).
The applicants have also submitted the required Piping and Instrumentation Drawings (P&ID) for each system containing the pressure isolation valves to be tested.
After reviewing the list of pressure isolation valves, we find it acceptably complete and consider the confirmatory item completed.
The valves listed in the above response will be included in the Wolf Creek Technical Specifications.
It should be noted that the Applicant proposed a maximum allowable leakage limit of greater than 1.0 gpm in the Wolf Creek Technical Specifications, as stated in the Wolf Creek SER this is not acceptable to the staff.
The Wolf Creek Technical Specifications are presently being formulated and will address the allowable leakage of pressure isolation valves.
Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) will be added to the Technical Specific-ations which will require corrective action i.e., shutdown or system isolation when the acceptance criteria are not met.
Also, surveillance requirement;s, which state the acceptable testing frequency, will be provided in the technical specifications.
References NUREG-0881, " Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No. 1," April 1982.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 3-1
Nickolas A. Petrick (SNUPP3) Letter to H.R. Denton (NRC)
Subject:
" Event V Program," September 11. 1981..
Nickolas A. Petrick (SNUPPS) Letter to H.R. Denton (NRC)
Subject:
" Testing of Pressure Isolation Valves," July 14, 1982.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 3-2
4 REACTOR 4.2 Fuel Design 4.2.3.1(10) Control Material Leaching 4
Control material leaching will not be a problem at Callaway or Wolf Creek because the control material will be in the form of solid hafnium rods, not boron carbide particles or pellets.
However, hafnium control rods (of the design configuration to be used at Callaway and Wolf Creek have not been used before in commercial PWPs, so the NRC staff believes that a minimal surveillance program consisting of a visual inspection of representative rods should be carried out at the first two plants to have the new hafnium control rods.
Those two plants are expected to be Comanche Peak and Callaway Unit 1.
With a letter (Schnell; dated June 2, 1982), Union Electric Company has agreed to perform a visual inspection of " select" (i.e., representative) control rods during one of the first five refueling outages at Callaway and to perform a second visual inspection between the 10th and 15th refueling outages, inclusive.
These inspections are intended to detect evidence of control rod degradation, such as deformation or cladding defects.
Union Electric Company will also review the results of the control rod visual surveillance program performed at the Comanche Peak plant. We conclude that this is an acceptable surveillance program for Callaway, in view of the fact that it complements the program at Comanche Peak, at which visual examinations will be performed at the end of the first, third, fifth and ninth cycles of operation.
Since this license condition is applicable to the first two Westinghouse plants using hafnium control rods and because the first two plants are expected to be Comanche Peak and Callaway, this license condition is not expected to be required for Wolf Creek.
However, if either Callaway or Comanche Peak delay startup such that Wolf Creek is one of the first two plant; to begin operation, this license condition will apply to Wolf Creek. Therefore, License Condition B.1 will be retained until the startup of Comanche Peak and Callaway.
4.2.3.3(4) Structural Damage From External Forces Confirmatory Item B.4 required that the applicant demonstrate that the maximum forces due to Seismic-and-LOCA-loading on fuel assembly components (guide tubes, fuel rods, etc.) other than grids be shown to be within allowable limits.
The applicant has made a submittal (Petrick; December 23, 1981) in which it has provided the calculated fuel assembly component stresses due to combined effect of Seismic-and-LOCA loading in Table 490.1-1.
A finite element model of the fuel assembly equivalent to the Seismic model described in Westinghouse's NRC-approved reports, WCAP-8236 and WCAP 9401, was used to assess the fuel assembly deflections, and impact forces.
The calculated fuel assembly component stresses Table 490.1-1 of the December 23, 1981 submittal, are only a fraction of the allowable stresses; therefore, this item is resolved.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 4-1
References WCAP-8236, " Safety Analysis of the 17 x 17 Fuel Assembly for Combined Seismic and Loss-of-Coolant Accident," Westinghouse Electric Corporation, December 1973.
WCAP-9401-A, " Verification Testing and Analysis of the 17 x 17 Optimized Fuel Assembly," Westinghouse Electric Corporation, August 1981.
Nickolas A. Petrick (SNUPPS), letter to H.R. Denton (NRC),
Subject:
"CPB Review, December 23, 1981.
D.N. Schnell (Union Electric) letter to H.R. Denton (NRC),
Subject:
Hafnium Control Rod Surveillance, June 2, 1962.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 4-2
l 5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 5.3 Reactor Vessel 5.3.1 Reactor Vessel Materials and Con.pliance with Appendices G and H,10 CFR 50 5.3.1.3 Compliance with Appendix H, 10 CFR Pa'rt 50 g
In the Wolf Creek safety evaluation report the staff concluded that the appli-cant had met all the requirements of Appendix H, 10 CFR Part 50 with the exception of Paragraph II.B.
Paragraph II.B of Appendix H requires that the surveillance program comply with ASTM E-185-73.
The applicant has identified in Westinghouse topical report WCAP-10015 the Wolf Creek Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program.
Our review of this document indicates that the Wolf Creek Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program is in compliance with all the requirements of Appendix H,10 CFR Part 50 and ASTM E-185-73.
Therefore, Confirmatory Item A.4 is resolved.
5.3.2 Pressure-Temperature Limits In the Wolf Creek safety evaluation report (NUREG-0881) the staff could not confirm that the applicant's pressure-temperature limit curves comply with Appendix G, 10 CFR Part 50 and ASME Code-Section III, Appendix G, " Protection Against Nonductile Failure, because the applicant had not provided pressure-temperature limit curves for Wolf Creek.
The applicant has recently provided pressure-temperature limit curves for the Wolf Creek reactor vessel (Koester; January 26, 1983 and March 4, 1983) which it indicates are applicable for 16 effective full power years (EFPY).
The staff has reviewed these curves in accordance with Standard Review Plan (SRP)
(NUREG-0803) Section 5.3.2 and have concluded that the pressure-temperature limit curves meet the safety margins of Appendix G, 10 CFR Part 50 and ASME Code Section III, Appendix G for 16 EFPY.
The Wolf Creek Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program will provide material properties for the Wolf Creek beltline materials which will be utilized to provide end of life (32 EFPY) pressure-temperature limits for Wolf Creek.
Based on our review and findings of the pressure-temperature limit curves, Confirmatory Item A.5 is resolved.
References NUREG-0800, " Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants, LWR Edition," July 1981.
NUREG-0881, "fafety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No.
1," April 1982.
Glenn Koester (KG&E) letter to H.R. Denton (NRC)
Subject:
" Draft Technical Specifications," January 26, 1983.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 5-1
Glenn Koester (KG&E) letter to H.R. Denton (NRC)
Subject:
" Draft Technical Specifications," March 4, 1983.
I Wolf Creek SSER 2 5-2
7 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL 7.5 Information Systems Important to Safety 7.5.2.3 Post-Accident Monitoring
'g In the staff's SER for Callaway Unit 1 (NUREG-0830), it is stated that the operating license will be conditioned to require compliance of the SNUPPS design with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide (R.G.) 1.97, Revision 2, including justification for any alternatives, by June 1983, License Condition 11 for Callaway and B.11 for Wolf Creek.
Subsequently, Generic Letter 82-33 (Eisenhut; December 17, 1982) was forwarded from the.NRC to applicants giving clarification regarding the subject regulatory guide.
The enclosure (Supple-ment 1 to NUREG-0737) to this letter requires that conformance to the provisions of R.G. 1.97, Revision 2 be addressed in the broader context of the requirements for emergency response capability.
Therefore, this item will not be included as a separate license condition and License Condition B.11 will be removed.
A schedule for implementation of R.G. 1.97, Revision 2 will be established for SNUPPS consistent with the December 17, 1982, letter.
Until the staff completes its review of the SNUPPS submittal on R.G. 1.97, Rev. 2, we will retain this as Confirmatory Item B(32).
References NUREG-0830, " Safety Evaluation Report related to the Operation of Callaway Plant Unit 1," October 1981.
Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2, " Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident."
D.G. Eisenhut (NRC) Letter to All Licensees of Operating Licenses, Applicants for Operating Licenses, and Holders of Construction Permits, Subject.
" Supplement I to NUREG-0737 - Requirements for Emergency Response Capability (Generic Letter No. 82-33)," December 17, 1982.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 7-1 i
13 CONDUCT OF OPERATION 9 13.3 Emergency Preparedness Evaluation 3
13.3.1 Introduction 3
As reported in the SER, (NUREG-0881), an emergency preparedness evaluation was conducted for the Wolf Creek Generating Station.
This evaluation dealt with Revision 2, dated April 7, 1981, of the emergency plan.
Since that time sub-stantial modifications to the plan have occurred: the result being Revision 9 dated July 1982.
Revision 9 of the plan was reviewed with respect to the same criteria described in SER Section 13.3, " Emergency Planning." The staff sub-mitted comments on the plan to the applicant (Youngblood; December 6, 1982, and KG&E provided responses to these comments (Koester; January 12, January 21, and April 8, 1983).
The responses not only provided additional information for plan evaluation purposes, but also included commitments on the part of KG&E to incorporate this information into the next revision of the plan.
The evaluation presented in this report addresses Revision 9 of the plan and the KG&E responses to the. staff's request for additional information.
A future supplement to this evaluation will verify that the applicant's commitments have been incorporated into the plan.
The findings and determina-tions of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on the adequacy of the State and local emergency response plans and the NRC staff's overall conclusions on the status of emergency preparedness associated with the Wolf Creek site will also be reported in a future supplement.
Section 13.3.2 of this report lists each standard followed by a summary of applicable portions of the plan as they apply to the standard.
Section 13.3.3 of the report provides the staff's conclusions.
13.3.2 Evaluation of the Einerger.cy Plan 13.3.2.1 Assignment of Responsibility (Organizational Control)
Standard l
i Primary responsibilities for emergency responte by the nuclear facility licensee, and by State and local organizations within the Emergency Planning Zones have l
been assigned, the emergency responsibilities of the various supporting organi-l zations have been specifically established, and each principal response organi-l zation has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous l
basis.
Emergency Plan Evaluation In the event of a radiological emergency at WCGS, the Kansas Gas and Electric staff is responsible for classifying the incident, activating the onsite emer-gency organization and notifying offsite authorities.
The Shift Supervisor is initially designated as the Duty Emergency Director until properly relieved by Wolf Creek SSER 2 13-1
the Plant Superintendent or one of his Call Superintendents.
Initial notifi-cation of the onsite and offsite emergency response elements is the Shift Supervisor's responsibility.
Twenty-four-hour per-day communication capability is maintained between the site and the offsite organizations.
The Governor is ultimately responsible for directing and coordinating the State emergency response.
The primary state organization, acting order the Governor, responsible for implementation of the Kansas State Disaster Emergency Plan is the Division of Emergency Preparedness, Radiological Systems Management (RADIAC).
RADIAC will notify other key state agencies and will activate the Emergency Broadcast System Network in the affected area (s) of the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).
The Kansas Department of Health and Environment acts as the lead state agency for operational response; they will dispatch radiation control teams, coordinate emergency medical support, and estimate offsite doses.
Evacuation will be aided by the Kansas Highway Patrol; they will secure areas and establish evacuation routes.
The Coffey County Board of Commissioners has the authcrity and responsibility for planning and coordination of county emergency response.
County emergency preparedness is described in the Coffey County Contingency Plan for Incidents Involving Commercial Nuclear Power.
Initial notification from the site will be directed to the Coffey County Sheriff's Office.
The sheriff's office will act as the main point of contact between the site and the county agencies.
Alerting members of the general public and aiding in evacuation are two of the prime responsibilities of the sheriff's office.
Contractual arrangements have been made with the City of Burlington Fire Company for fire fighting support.
Emergency arrangements with support organizations are described in the plan.
These arrangements include, in addition to fire protection, medical assistance and ambulance service support.
Arrangements have been made for engineering, technical, and administrative support with the following organizations; (1) Westinghouse; (2) Bechtel; and (3) Union Electric via the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO).
Agreements for support with state or county agencies reflect statutory obligations and are approved by the Governor or county commissioners, respectively.
However, specific written agreements for all of the support organizations still need to be develored and these letters of agreement need to be provided as part of the emergency plan.
The following item requires resolution:
(1) Provide all of the necessary written agreements that describe the scope of support and role within the emergency response for each relied on support organization.
13.3.2.2 Onsite Emergency Organization Standard On-shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency response are unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmenta-tion or response capabilities is available, and the interfaces among various onsite response activities and offsite support and response activities are specified.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 13-2 i
1
Emergencv Plan Evaluation An onshift emergency organization has been established and station personnel emergency assignments have been made for all shifts.
The relationship between the emergency organization and the normal shift complement is described in the plan.
For each functional area of emergency activity, the positions and/or
{
titles and major tasks to be performed by key shift personnel and plant personnel
(
assigned to emergency duties are specified.
The plan specifies that the minimum number of personnel on shift at all times
'(
will be ten: the same minimum shift staffing guidance given in Table B-1 of NUREG-0654 and Table 2 of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.
The applicant's minimum shift staff will. consist of two senior reactor operators, two reactor operators, four nuclear station operators, one health physics staff member and one chemistry staff member.
The plan indicates that the onshift staff can perform several functions, depending on the emergency needs, until augmentation personnel arrive.
The aoplicant's concept of shift augmentation, as presented in Revision 9 of the plan, does not adhere to the guidance as described in Table 2 of Supplement 1 of NUREG-0737.
Instead of using the 30-minute and 60-minute shift augmentation guidance of Table 2 as staffing goals the KG&E, staffing concept calls for 60-minute and 120-minute augmentation objectives.
Adequate justification for the exception to tre staffing goals of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 have not been provided by the applicant.
At the onset of an emergency, the Shift Supervisor is designated as the Duty Emergency Director (DED).
He has the responsibility and authority to implement the emergency plan and to initiate emergency actions which includes notifica-tion and protectiva ac, ion recommendations to offsite authorities.
The Shift Supervisor will be relieved upon atrival of the Plant Superintendent (or the Call Superintendent).
Before the transfer is effected the Plant Superintendent will review appropriate logs, records, and other documents related to the emergency situation.
After transfer, the DED will proceed to the Technical Support Center (TSC).
Should the event continue to escalate beyond the i
Notification of Unusual Event Emergency class, the DED transfers the overall l
management responsibility for emergency response to the Duty Emergency Manager (DEM) upon his arrival.
The DErl, who is the Director Nuclear Operations or his designated alternate, will operate from the Emergency Operations Facility (E0F); the DED will continue his role of directing in plant activities from the TSC and reports to the DEM.
The interfaces among the functional areas of the onsite emergency organization, and between the onsite organization and offsite support organizations are illustrated in block diagrams in the plan.
A block diagram in the plan also illustrates the interface of the onsite emergency organization with key support groups which will provide services such as ambulance response, medical aid, and fire fighting support.-
The following item requires resolution (1) Justification for reasonable exception to the goals for-the number of additional staff personnel and the respnose times for their arrival Table 2 of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 13-3
13.3.2.3 Emergency Response Support and Resources Standard Arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified.
Emergency Plan Evaluation Request for Federal assistance, under the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan, are made by the DEM through the State in accordance with the Kansas Disaster Emergency Plan.
A specific request for Department of Energy (DOE) assistance, through their Radiological Assistance Plan, may be made using the same method as above (i.e., DEM to State officials).
Provisions have been made to accommodate representatives from Federal, State, and local government crganizations at the F0F.
It will be the central location for coller. ting and providing information and making recommendations for offsite protective actions.
The plan provides information concerning specific appli-cant resources available to support Federal response and the expected arrival times of Federal assistance at the site.
The plan indicates that the DEM will dispatch KG&E personnel to State and local emergency operations centers at their request.
In addition to the Wolf Creek laboratory facilities, the plan identifies that analytical support will be available from various sources: (1) Westinghouse; (2) Bechtel; (3) Union Electric Callaway Plant as part of INP0; and (4) INP0.
Additionally, the State of Kansas maintains a laboratory for the implementation and administration of the State Radiological Program.
This laboratory which is located in Topeka, Kansas and has a GeLi detector and gas flow proportional counters, is available for use by the applicant during an emergency.
13.3.2.4 Emergency Classification System Standard A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on in-formation provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures.
Emergency Plan Evaluation The event classification scheme presented in the Wolf Creek plan is consistent with the class descriptions for each event as described in NUREG-0654.
Event classification is based upon anticipated or projected loss of fission product barriers.
The event classification model proposed for WCGS consists of two phases.
Phase 1 addresses the immediate conditions present and yields a
" snapshot" description of the pl. ant condition as it exists at a given point in time.
Phase 2 considers the future condition of the plant; using continual Wolf Creek SSER 2 13-4
assessment, projections may be made which allow initiation of protective s
measures while time remains to complete their implementation.
Phase 1 is predicaten en the challenge or breach of three fission product barriers: (1) fuel cladding; (2) reactor coolant system; and (3) containment.
The challenge or breach of a single barrier corresponds to the Alert classifi-cation; challenge or breach of any two barriers yields a Site Area Emergency classification; and challenge or breach of all three barriers leads to a General Emergency classification.
4 Phase 1 is based on a symptomatic as opposed to an event specific approach.
This is accomplished through the use of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees (Trees).
The Trees, somewhat analogous to " fault trees," are patterned after those found in WASH 1400. The three fission product barriers represent a total of six Trees: (1) maintenance of subcriticality; (2) control of reactor coolant inventory; (3) maintenance of reactor cooling; (4) maintenance of heat sink; (5) maintenance of reactor coolant system integrity; and (6) maintenance of containment integrity.
Utilizing plant specific parameters, the endpoints of each Tree provides reference to a response (functional restorative) proce-dure and a color code that defines the magnitude of potential barrier breach.
The color code endpoints provide the data input for initial emergency classification.
Two objectives are achieved in Phase 1:
event classification and plant condition diagnosis for purposes of corrective measures implementation. Phase 2 is designed to maintain the effectiveness of these objectives and expand on them.
By continually assessing the plant's conditions (using the safety tree analysis system), Phase 2 is used to anticipate subsequent barrier failures.
Such trend analysis will allow the WCGS emergency staff to predict the approxi-mate amount of time until breach of an additional barrier.
Subtracting such time factors as evacuation time from the estimated safety time margin calcu-i lated, the emergency staff will be able to advise the DED or DEM as to how
)
much time is available to effect protective actions before escalation of emergency class is necessary.
The Phase 2 functions are to be the responsibility of the Technical Support Center (TSC) staff.
Their recommendations will be the major data input into the issuance of protective action recommendations by the DED (or DEM later in an emergency).
The following item requires resolution (1) The Wolf Creek Emergency Classification System concept is being reviewed by the staff.
The results of this evaluation will be reported in a later supplement.
13.3.2.5 Notification Methods and Procedures Standard Procedures have been established for notification, by the licensee of State and local response organizations and for notification of emergency personnel by all response organizations; the content of initial and followup messages to Wolf Creek SSER 2 13-5
response organizations and the public has been established; and means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone have been established.
Emergency Plan Evaluation Procedures have been established for notifying onsite and offsite emergency personnel and Federal, State, and local response organizations.
These notifi-cation procedures are consiste.t with the emergency action level scheme set forth in Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654.
Initial notification to offsite authorities will provide sufficient information on plant status and offsite dose projec-ticas/ mea:Jrements, and will issue recommendations for offsite protective actions, if appropriata.
Message fonas, both initial and followup, have been developed to augment the notification method.
The contents of initial emergency messages include information about class of emergency, whether a release is taking place, recommendations for protective measures, and if offsite assistance is required (i.e., ambulance, fire department, or police).
Followup message forms also include information about meteorological conditions, dose projections / measure-ments, release data, sample data, response actions in progress, and accident prognosis.
Both message forms include information concerning verification.
Supplement EE of the plan describes a conceptual design of an alerting /notifi-cation system for the 10 mile plume exposure EPZ.
Presently, this portion of the plan is under revision; the revision will be reflected in the next update of the plan.
The latest concept calls for seven sirens, located near high population areas, and approximately 700 tone alert radios to be used in low population zones.
The Cof fey County sheriff will activate the system fol?owing consultation with KG&E and State personnel.
Negotiations with county and city officials indicate that maintenance and administrative control of the notifi-cation system components will be the responsibility of the county and/or a governmental entity in which the siren is located.
Complete cycle tests will be performed annually during the exercise; however, siren function verification may occur more frequently because the sirens are to be used also for fire and weather alerts.
Standardized written messages for the public, consistent with the applicant's classification scheme, have not yet been developed.
Meetings between the applicant, and State and county public information personnel have been held to develop the messages.
Proposed messages are to be developed for the following areas: announcement of Site Area and General emergencies, shelter advisories, respiratory protectior., evacuation of pregnant women and preschoolers, the use of radioprotective drugs, and evacuation information and routes.
KG&E, county and State public information personnel plan to release these messages jointly The following item requires resolution (1) Provide a commitment to have a prompt alert and notification system, which is in accordance with the guidance of NUREG-0654, Appendix 3, installed and operational by fuel load or develop interim compensatory measures to provide emeraency instructions to the public within the plume exposure EPZ.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 13-6
13.3.2.6 Emergency Communications Standard Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public.
(
Emergency Plan Evaluation The plan describes the communication systems available for use in emergency situations.
Diverse and redundant communications exist between all essential onsite and offsite emergency response centers except that the plan does not indicate backup communications capabilities for the State EOC.
The principal communication systems consist of a telephone system, several radio systems, and a microwave system.
A public address system and an internal telephone intercom system are also available for use on site.
Commt.nication contacts, by title, and their alternates are indicated in the plan for the primary onsite emergency support groups and for the primary off-site state and local organizations.
Twenty-four-hour per-day notification capability exists becween the site and Federal, State, and local authorities.
Dedicated telephone communications are maintained between the site and NRC headquarters; numerous extensions are located throughout the site (e.g., E0F and TSC).
Provisions for communication between the site and fixed or mobile medical support personnel are also described in the plan.
Radiological Moni-toring Teams are outfitted with portable radios which permit communication with the site and the EOF from any point within the plume exposure EPZ.
The various communication links will be tested monthly, quarterly, or yearly (depending on equipment type) and drills will be conducted quarterly to assure proper function of communications systems.
13.3.2.7 Public Information Standard Information is made available to the public on a periodic basis on how they will be notified and what their initial actions should be in an emergency (e.g., listening to a local broadcast station and remaining indoors), the principal points of contact with the news media for dissemination of informa-tion during an emergency (including the physical location or locations) are established in advance, and procedures for coordinated dissemination of infor-mation to the public are established.
2mergency Plan Evaluation The applicant has participated in meetings with county and State public information personnel in an effort to develop the mechanism for disseminating information to the public.
Present plans call for education information on radiation, protective measures, information contacts, and special needs of the handicappet to appear annually as an attachment to the county's telephone directories. Additionally, a leaflet expanding upon this information will be sent out annually as an enclosure to each resident's county tax packet.
The public recreational areas of John Redmond Reservoir and Kansas Wildlife Refuge Wolf Creek SSER 2 33-7
dill be provided with information displays which will make available the same information to the transient population.
Periodic meetings will be scheduled to cover the information needs of special interest groups.
The text of emergency information to be contained in the leatlet has not yet been developed; however, the source of this information is expected to come from established industry sources such as Atomic industrial Forum (AIF)
Public information brochures (i.e., leaflets) have not yet been submitted to the NRC for NRC/ FEMA review.
The staff will require that draft brochures be submitted for review and comment before fuel loading and that the brochures be distributed to the public before plant operation above 5% of rated power.
The Manager - Information Services (MIS) has been designated as the principal spokesperson for KG&E public information purposes.
During an emergency the MIS will take direction from the Vice President - Nuclear and the DEM.
The MIS has the responsibility to coordinate the efforts of all KG&E communications personnel at the EOF, and at the corporate offices.
The MIS will report to the General Office Emergency Center (G0EC) or the EOF as appropriate.
Although the public education program is designed to reduce the possibility of rumors, the county E0C will serve as a central location for public inquiries.
Identified rumors will be forwarded to the E0F where media releases are jointly issued by a team composed of the applicant, county, and State media information personnel.
Office space for a limited number of news media persennel has been established at the E0F.
The plan states that additional space for news media personnel will be provided at a Media Information Facility (MIF).
This backup facility is to be located in Topeka, Kansas and will be established on an as-needed basis from a predesignated list of available facilities such as the National Guard Armory, Exposition Center, public schools, etc.
However, the plan does not indicate whether arrangements will be made in advance for expanded communi-cation capability and the timeliness of activating these facilities.
Training for news media personnel will be offered at least once a year; the training will acquaint these individuals with the emergency plan, information concerning radiation, and points of contact for the release of public information in an emergency.
The following item requires resolution (1) Submit draft public information brochures for NRC ar.d FEMA review before fuel loading and commit to distribute the brochures to the public before operation above 5% of rated power.
Also, assure that public information to transients will be available within the same time period.
(2) Provide a more detailed description of the arrangements made to establish a Media Information Facility and to accommodate media personnel.
13.3.2.8 Emergency Facilities and Equipment Standard Adaquate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response are provided and maintained.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 13-8
Emergency Plan Evaluation (1) Technical Support Center (TSC) - The TSC is the emergency operations work area for designated technical, engineering, and senior management person-nel.
The TSC provides plant management and technical support to plant operations personnel during emergencies.
The TSC is located on the north side of the WCGS Administration Building, approximately 2 minutes walking i
time from the WCGS control room. Working space for twenty-five persons (five from NRC) is provided for at the TSC.
The TSC has the same radio-logical habitability as the control room (includes HEPA filters, charcoal filters, and radiciodine monitoring).
Should an emergency situation f
require activation of the TSC during normal work hours it will achieve l
full functional operation within 30 minutes; however, during the back-shift full functional operation would not be achieved until approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> post activation.
Communication links have been provided with all onsite and offsite emergency response centers including the NRC.
The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) is provided for through the Emer-gency Response Facility Information System (ERFIS), and a data display console is located at the TSC.
(2) Operations Support Center (OSC) - The OSC serves as an assembly area for all operations personnel not immediately serving in an emergency capacity, but who are available for assignment of duties to support emergency operations.
The OSC is located in the main locker area of the shop building.
Available facilities and supplies include protective clothing, breathing apparatus, personnel dosimetry, and showers.
Alternate OSC locations (i.e., the Administration building and the warehouse) have been designated in the event the primary OCS becomes uninhabitable.
Dedicated voice links with the TSC, the EOF, and the Control Room are available at the primary OSC.
(3) Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) - The E0F provides an area for the overall management of emergency response activities, including the coor-dination of radiological and environmental assessment, determination of recommended public protective actions, and coordination of emergency i
response activities with Federal, State, and local organizations.
The EOF is located in the Education Center approximately 2.8 miles north-oorthwest of the reactor.
The EOF is large enough to accomodate at least 35 persons (including nine from NRC and one from FEMA) and has been engineered to provide a protection factor of J 5 (based on 0.7 MeV ganma radiation).
Habitability equipment include a HEPA system and radioiodine monitors.
Primary and backup communications systems are provided between the EOF and other onsite and offsite emergency response centers.
Displays and data summaries generated by the ERFIS are provided in the EOF. Arrange-
[
ments have been made to utilize the Beto Inn as the backup EOF. This facility is located approximately 13 air miles north of the plant at the I
junction of Highway 75 and I-35.
Several telephones are available at this location to insure the provision for continuity in decision-making functions.
Separate telephones are available for supporting dose projections.
The onsite monitoring systems and equipment used to initiate emergency measures and assess emergency conditions include radiological monitors, process moni-tors, remotely interrogated meteorological instrumentation and seismic monitors, l
Wolf Creek SSER 2 13-9
and fire detection devices.
The offsite environmental radiological monitoring program includes thermoluminescent dosimeters for direct radiation measurement, air sampling capability for particulate, noble gas and radioiodine measurement.
Field teams will augment the fixed monitoring equipment by providing direct radiation pluca exposure measurements.
The environmental radiological program is designed to provide, among other things, prajected radiation contamination levels and estimated population exposure.
Laboratory capabilities, for chemical and radiological sample analysis, are present at the Auxiliary Building Radiochemistry Laboratory and Counting Room; laboratory facilities for cold chemistry, human bioassays, and environmental analysis are also available in the Turbine and Shop building.
Provisions have been made to transfer necessary equipment from these laboratories to the E0F should their respective areas experience elevated background radiation levels or physical damage. WCGS has installed an in-line Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) that can provide for remate analysis of primary loop chemical and radiological parameters; the Auxiliary Building laboratory will support the analysis of grab samples from the PASS if necessary.
Should additional laboratory support become necessary the applicant may utilize State laboratory facilities in Topeka, Kansas, or laboratory facilities of private contractors or neighboring utilities.
Portable radiologcal and air sampling equipment, protective clothing, personnel dosimeters, respiratory protection equipment, and administrative supplies are some of the typical equipment placed in emergency kits.
These kits are located in the control room, TSC, and EOF.
Emergency kits will be inventoried and the contents inspected quarterly and after use.
For those iteras removed from the kits for repair or calibration an equivalent operable item (or instrument) will be placed in the kit.
The Meterological Monitoring System includ_3 a 90 meter instrument tower with its associated equipment housed in a temperature controlled shelter located at the base of the tower.
Wind speed and direction sensors are located at the 10 and 60 meter levels and proside continuous readout to the RRIS computer (dose assessment interface) and the control room.
Resistance Temperature Detectors (RTD's) are located at the 10 and 60 meter levels; they provide information for establishing thermal inversion characteristics of the area.
The TSC and E0F also have access, through printouts and data displays, to the meteorological information generated from the tower.
However, the applicant does not indicate whether provisions have been made with the National Weather Service to obtain information on meteorological conditions for the region in which the WCGS is located, in accordance with Supplement 1 of NUREG-0737.
The following items require resolution:
(1) Provide a commitment that the permanent emergency response facilities and equipment will be operational prior to fuel loading or that adequate interim facilities and capabilities will be in place.
(2) Describe the provisions made to obtain information from the National Weather Service on meteorological conditions for the region in which the WCGS is located.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 13-10
13.3.2.9 Accident Assessment Standard Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequencas of a radiological emergency condition are in use.
\\
Emergency Plan Evaluation The plan identifies instrument readings and other observable and measurable parameters that, if exceeded, will initiate an emergency in accordance with the applicant's standard emergency classification and action level scheme as discussed in Section 13.3.2.4.
Effluent and containment radiation monitoring systems provide information that is used to determine tia magnitude of release and the source term of an unplanned radioactive release.
Two methods for assessing the potential and actual radiological consequences of a release are being developed for use.
These consist of a manual calculational method and a computerized dose assessment model, which is included in the Radioactive Release Information System (RRIS).
Currently, two different procedures are being considered for use as the manual dose assessment method.
These involve a nomogram method and a hand calcu-j lational method; both methods are also being considered for use as alternates to each other.
Each method is to be designed to combine conservative assump-tions with limited data (e.g., meteorological data such as wind speed or effluent release data such as radioactivity concentration and stack flow rate) in order to determine projected dose estimates within the plume exposure EPZ.
Both methods are to be designed to provide identical dose estimates when using the same input data.
Further, should the instrumentation to be used in esti-mating release rates be inoperable or offscale these methods will be augmented with predetermined data generated for accident analysis purposes as found in the FSAR.
Because these methods are still under development their final evaluation will be reserved until they are completed, and the technical bases and supporting information are submitted for review to the staff.
The applicant's capability to perform radiological consequence analysis will be greatly enhanced when the RRIS computer system is placed into operation sometime after fuel load.
The computer models used in the system have been designed to meet or exceed the requirements of the Class A model as described in Appendix 2 of NUREG-0654. The RRIS will have the flexibility to analyze various actual and postulated accident conditions using actual (measured) source term data, plant process data, and radiation monitor readings.
Real-time meteorological information from the onsite meteorological measuremerat system will be used in a site-specific 'model within the RRIS to provide at.nospheric dispersion data for the radiological calculations.
The applicant will have postaccident sampling and analytical systems, radiation and effluent monitors, inplant iodine instrumentation, and containment radiation monitoring to provide initial estimates of unplanned releases of radioactive materials and continued assessment throughout the course of an accident. These systems and equipment will be installed in accordance with the requirements of NUREG-0737, " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements." These items are reviewed in Section 22.2 of the SER and its supplements.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 13-11
l The applicant has established the capaaility and resources for field monitoring within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.
Specific procedures are being developed for activating, equipping, transporting, and communicating with the radiological emergency field teams.
Instrumentation available for the field teams indicates that they will have the capability to detect and measure radiciodine concentra-tion in air in the plume exposure pathway EPZ as low as 10-7 mci /cc under field conditions.
The following item requires resolution:
(1) Provide the technical bases and supporting information for the primary and backup dose calculation methods.
Revise the emergency plan and develop emergency plan implementing procedures to reflect the dose assessment methodology.
13.3.2.10 Protective Response A range of protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public.
Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed.
Emergency Plan Evaluation The protective response actions for onsite personnel including employees, visitors, and contractor personnel are described in the plan.
Audible alarms and public address announcements will serve as the primary means of notifying onsite individuals; telephone notification to specific onsite locations may also be used.
Three levels of evacuation are identified in the WCGS emergency plan:
(1) local area evacuation (i.e., move to unaffected area); station evacuation (i.e., evacuation of all non-essential personnel from the Power Block structures); and (3) exclusion area evacuation (i.e., site evacuation).
Specific procedures have been developed to accomplish the various levels of evacuation; these procedures identify onsite and offsite assembly areas.
During a station evacuation, non plant :.taff personnel and visitort will report to, or be escorted to the main gate security guard; all remaining plant personnel will report to the Shop Building Assembly Point (i.e., OSC).
Upon announcement of a site evacuation, all non-essential persons will evacuate to the Education Center, (i.e., the E0F located approximately 3 miles offsite).
Provisions have been made to monitor and, if necessary, decontaminate personnel and vehicles at the offsite center.
A procedure has been developed to accomplish accountability (within 30 minutes) of all individuals onsite at the cime of the emergency.
Additional onsite protective measures for individual emergency workers include the use of respiratory protection equipment, dosimetry, protective clothing, and radioprotective drugs.
The plan does oct adequately describe the protective action decisionmaking process nor the bases for recommending protective actions to state and local authorities.
The regulatory requirements for the prompt notification of off-site authorities have the capability to alert and provide prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure EP7 are contained in 10 CFR 50, Wolf Creek SSER 2 13-12
Appendix E, Guiaance on the protective actions to be recommended to offsite authorities for serious accident situations with potentially severe consequences is given in Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654.
Evacuation time estimates for the piume exposure pathway EPZ are contained as Appendix DD to the emergency plan.
This study adequately addresses the guidance
+
found in Appendix 4 of NUREG-0654.
The study includes information on the plume exposure pathway EPZ, resident and transient population distribution, evacuation routes, and road characteristics and capacity.
Evacuation time estimates are developed for sub-areas within the EPZ and for the entire EPZ for both normal and adverse weather situations.
The following items require resolution (1) Develop predetermined protective action recommendations in accordance with the guidance of Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654 and incorporate these recommendations into the emergency plan and a specific procedure.
(2) Coordinate planning efforts with offsite authorities to ensure the administrative and physical means will exist to alert and provide prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.
13.3.2.11 Radiological Exposure Control Standard Means for controlling radiological exposures, in an emergency, are established for emergency workers.
The means for controlling radiological exposures shal6 include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Action Guides.
Emergency Plan Evaluation The applicant has established a radiation protection program for controlling radiological exposures in the event of an emergency.
Emergency radiation exposure guidelines have been provided for the emergency workers which are consistent with the EPA Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Action Guides.
The plan specifies that the DED will initially assume the responsibility for authorizing emergency workers to receive doses in excess of 10 CFR 20 limits.
This responsibility will pass to the DEM ultimately.
In either case, authori-zation of excess exposure will be done after consultation with the Radiological Emergency Coordinator (REC).
Proposed emergency procedure, ADM 12-13.0, describes the means for personnel exposure control and includes provisions for 24-hour per-day dose determination for emergency personnel and for maintenance of dose records to ensure that exposure history is current.
Onsite contamination control measures for personnel and equipment are provided; release levels and protective action guidelines for contaminated personnel and equipment have been established.
The criteria and procedures for determining whether personnel are contaminated are established and this infonnation will be contained in a procedure.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 13-13
13.3.2.12 Medical and Public Health Support Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated injured individuals.
i Emergency Plan Evaluation The applicant has made arrangements, confirmed in letters of agreement, with Ransom Memorial Hospital and the University of Kansas Medical Center (KUMC) to provide medical assistance for injured personnel, including individuals contam-inated or overexposed to radiation.
Ransom Memorial Hospital is located in Ottawa, Kansas, approximately 40 miles from the WCGS site; KUMC is located in Kansas City, Kansas, approximately 100 miles from the site.
Periodically, the applicant will review with these medical personnel the WCGS emergency plan and the necessary concepts of radiation protection related to their support function during an emergency.
Arrangements have also been made to transport injured and/or contaminated personnel to medical treatment facilities.
This service will be provided by the Coffey County Ambulance Service; a letter agreement is included in the plan.
The WCGS emergency plan indicates that tr4ined station p rsonnel will be available on a 24-hour per-day basis to render first aid.
These personnel i
will receive, as a minimum, first aid instruction at least equivalent to the Red Cross Multi-Media training.
The first aid room is located in the health physics area of the plant.
13.3.2.13 Recovery and Reentry Plannino and Post Accident Operations Standard General plans for recovery and reentry are developed.
Emergency Plan Evaluation The emergency plan describes the general plans for recovery and reentry following a significant emergency even'..
The specific means by which decisions to relax protective measures are reached will be described in the emergency plan imple-I menting procedures.
This process will consider both existing and potential conditions.
Transition from an emergency situation to one of recovery will be declared by
{
the OED, or DEM if present, and will be based on the recommendation of his advisors and the Vice President-Nuclear.
Upon this declaration, control of l
the emergency response will be transferred to the Recovery Manager (RM) who will be responsible for implementing the recovery plan.
The emergency plan describes, by title, the authorities and responsibilities of key individuals in the recovery organization.
The racovery organization includes both techni-cal and administrative personnel.
The Radioactive Release Information System (RRIS) provides the means for periodically astimating total population exposure.
i Wolf Creek SSER 2 13-14 1'!-
13.3.2.14 Exercises and Drills Standard Periodic exercises are (will be) conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, periodic drills are (will be) conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies identified as a result of exercises or drills are (will be) corrected.
Emergency Plan Evaluation An annual exercise will be conducted which simulates an emergency that results in cffsite radiological releases and involves the participation of State and local response personnel and organizations.
The exercise scenario will be varied from year to year so that over a 5 year period all major elements of the emergency preparedness plan and organization will be tested.
The exercises will be initiated at different times of the day and night and conducted under various weather conditions.
As a minimum, the following drills will be conducted:
(1) Communication Drills -
Communications with state and local governments within the plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) will be tested monthly..Communicai. ions with Federal and state emergency response organizations (within tne ingestion pathway EPZ) will be tested quarterly.
Communications between WCGS, State and local Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), and field assessment teams will be tested annually.
The drills will also include the aspect of understanding the content of messages.
(2) Fire Drills -
Fire drills will be conducted in accordance with the plant technical specifications and administrative procedures.
(3) Medical Emergency Drills -
Once a year medical care personnel will be requested to participate in drills on transporation and treatment of contaminated individuals.
The drill scenario will include a simulated contaminated individual and provisions for participation by the local support service agencies (i.e.,
ambulance and offsite medical treatment facilities).
The offsite portions of the medical drill may be performed as part of the required annual exercise.
(4) Radiological Monitoring and Health Physics Drills -
Inplant, onsite, and offsite radiological monitoring drills will be conducted annually.
These drills will include collection and analysis of sample media,- field activities and provisions for communications, and record keeping.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 13-15,
Health Physics drills which involve response to, and analysis of, simulated elevated airborne and liquid samples and direct radiation measurements inplant, will be conducted semi-annually.
Analysis of inplant liquid samples with actual elevated radiation levels will be included in Health Physics drills.
The plan provides for the development of drill ar.d exercise scenarios that include the basic objectives and evalutions criteria, dates, places, and participating organization; the simulated events; a time schedule of the events; a narrative summary; and assignments for controllers, evaluators, and observers.
Designated observers from Federal, State, and local government organizations will also observe the required exercises.
At the completion of every exercise, a formal critique will be scheduled to appraise the effective-ness of the exercise; the results of the critique will be used in the annual review of the plan and implementing procedures.
The Emergency Planning Coordinator is responsible for developing and implementing the program and for ensuring that corrective actions are implemented for areas identified as needing improvement.
13.3.2.15 Radiological Emergency Response Training Standard Radiological emergency response training is provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency.
Emergency Plan Evaluation Specific training is provided for KG&E plant and General Office staff who assume key emergency response or planning roles as specified in the plan and the EPIP's.
Training programs are developed by the responsible organizations and reviewed by the Manager Nuclear Training and the Emergency Planning Coordinator.
General training is provided to all plant and general office staff and is included as part of their annual plant indoctrination program.
Each offsite response organization will participate in and receive training associated with their emergency support role approximately once per year.
The training will be coordinated with training received by the Kansas Division of Emergency Preparedness, Radiological Systems Management and will include an orientation to the plant's, operations, site specific emergency response activ-ities, and an overview of the plant's emergency response organization. Where matual aid agreements exist between local support groups and the applicant (such as fire, police, and ambulance / rescue), these personnel will also be offered training.
Training programs for hospital personnel, ambulance / rescue, and fire depa?tments include review of the procedures for notification, basic radiation protection, and of their expected roles during an emergency.
For local services and support organizations who will enter the site, training programs also include review of site access procedures and identification of the individual within the onsite emergency organization who will coordinate the organizations' support activities.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 13-16
Drills that are supervised and evaluated by a qualified instructor are a major component of the training program.
Training programs for onsite emergency organization members include practical drills in which each person demonstrates the ability to perform his assigned tasks in an emergency situation.
The training programs are structured around detailed lesson plans.
Testing will be utilized to demonstrate a satisfactory understanding of emergency responsi-bilities.
Those people assigned to first aid teams will complete and pass a first aid course, at least equivalent to the Red Cross Multi-Media training.
Personnel who implement radiological facets of the emergency response plans will particiapte in a training program that will instruct and qualify them to function appropriately in an emergency.
Training and annual ret. raining programs will be provided for emergency response personnel in the following categcries:
I Directors or Coordinators of the emergency response organizations; Personnel responsible for accident analysis, post-accident sampling, and dose assessment; Radiological analysis personnel and inplant, onsite, and offsite monitoring teams; Security, fire fighting, and local law enforcement personnel; Personnel responsible for transmission of emergency information and instructions; Onsite repair and damage control teams; First aid, rescue, and medical support personnel;
)
KG&E general office support personnel; Local emergency preparedness personnel; and Media personnel.
In addition, a public information program is being developed by KG&E, Features of this program include distribution of an annual information brochure and a public information meeting.
I 13.3.2.16 Responsibility for the Planning Effort:
Development, Periodic l
Review, and Distribution of Emergency Plans Standard l
Responsibilities for plan development and review and for distribution of emergency plans are established, and planners are properly trained.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 13-17
l Emergency Plan Evaluation KG&E will arrange for an independent review of its emergency preparedness program at least once every year.
This review will be conducted under the auspices of the Nuclear Safety Review Committee (NSRC), as required by the WCGS technical specifications.
The NSRC has no direct responsibility for the plan's implementation.
The NSRC is responsible for reviewing the emergency plan, emergency action levels, implementing procedures, training, readiness, testing of human factors aspects, interfaces with state and local organizations, letters of agreement, equipment, and criteria for drills and exercises. Manage-ment controls will be implemented for evaluation and correction of review findings through the Vice President-Nuclear who retains the overall authority and responsibility for radiological emergency response planning. The result of the review will be documented, reported to the involved Federal, State, and local organizations, and retained for a period of five years.
KG&E has designated an Emergency Planning Coordinator (EPC) who is responsible for coordination and documentation of plan review and revision.
The EPC will update the plan and EPIP's as needed and certify them to be current on an annual basis.
The update will take into account changes identified during drills, exercises, and the NSRC review.
KG&E will also make provisions for updating telephone numbers in the emergency procedures at least quarterly.
The emergency plan and approved changes will be distributed in a controlled manner to all organizations and individuals with responsibility for implemen-tation of the plan.
Revised pages will be dated and marked to show where changes have been made.
Each section of the emergency plan corresponds to a planning standard of NUREG-0654.
The plan contains a table of contents and an appendix listing, by number and title, the procedures required to implement the plan.
The plan identifies the supporting plans and their sources that augment the applicant's emergency plan.
13.3.3 Conclusion On the basis of its review of the Wolf Creek Generatir.g Station Radiological Emergency Response Plan for conformance with the specific criteria in NUREG-0654/
FEMA-REP-1, which addresses each of the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b),
and with the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, the staff concludes that the Wolf Creek emergency plan, on satisfactory correction cf those items requiring resolution and those items requiring a commitment as identified in Section 13.3.2 of this report, will provide an adequate planning basis for an acceptable state of emergency preparedness.
After a review of the findings and determinations made by FEMA on the adequacy of State and local emergency response plans and of the revisions to the appli-cant's emergency plan, a supplement to the SER will provide the staff's overall conclusions as to whether the state of onsite and offsite emergency preparedness provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 13-18
References Glenn L. Koester (KG&E) letter to H.R. Denton (NRC)
Subject:
" Additional Information for the Review of the 1,olf Creek Emergency Plan," January 12, 1983.
Glenn L. Koester (KG&E) letter to H.R. Denton (NRC)
Subject:
" Additional Information for the Review of the Wolf Creek Emergency Plan," April 8, 1983.
Glenn L. Koester (KG&E) letter to H.R. Denton (NRC)
Subject:
" Additional Information for the Review of the Wolf Creek Emergency Plan," April 15, 1983.
B. J. Youngblood (NRC) letter to Glenn L. Koester (KG&E),
Subject:
Request for Additional Information for the Review of the Wolf Creek Generating Station Emergency Plan," December 6, 1982.
l 1
Wolf Creek SSER 2 13-19
16 Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications of a license define certain features, characteristics, and conditions governing operation of the facility that cannot be changed without prior approval of the staff.
During its review of the Wolf Creek application, the staff identified certain issues which must be included in the Technical Specifications as a condition of staff acceptance.
These issues are delineated in the SER.
As a result of the staff's review of additional information received after the SER, there is a new issue that must be inciuded in the Technical Specifications.
This issue is listed below and discussed further in the indicated section of this supplement (SSER #2).
(18) Allowable leakage of pressure isolation values (Section 3.9.6).
.?-
7 I
Wolf Creek SSER 2 16-1
17 QUALITY ASSURANCE 17.1 Introduction By letter dated February 17, 1983, the applicant reported a potential 10 CFR 50.55(e) concern on the Borated Refueling Water Storage Tank (BN01) System.
The concern resulted from a number of discrepancies discovered in the BN01 system by the KG&E Surveillance Audit Organization.
This surveillance identi-fied some discrepancies in the documentation and hardware of the system after it had been received by KG&E startup personnel for pre-operational testing.
As a result of this concern, a meeting was held with KG&E and the staff to discuss the discrepancies reported for the BN01 system.
Based on these discussions, KG&E issued a self-imposed stop work order on February 21, 1983 for the turnover of safety-related systems at WCGS.
Subsequently, in a March 2, 1983 letter, the applicant provided its proposed corrective actions I
and the criteria used to determine when the stop-work order could be lifted.
I 17.2 Staff Evaluation The staff has reviewed the information submitted in the March 2, 1983 letter (Harpster; March 16, 1983) and has concluded that the letter recognizes the necessary elements for a proper turnover process as described in Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 50.
In addition, the staff plans to take appropriate actions to ensure resolution and elimination of this problem.
Therefore, we find the KG&E program proposed in the March 2, 1983 letter acceptable.
References Terry L. Harpster memorandum to B.J. Youngblood,
Subject:
"SNUPPS QA Program for Design and Construction-Acceptance," March 7, 1983.
Terry L. Harpster memorandum to B.J. Youngblood,
Subject:
"QA Branch Review of Proposed KG&E Program to Correct QA Problems in the System Turnover Process,"
March 16, 1983.
Glenn Koester (KG&E) letter to W.C. Seidle.(NRC),
Subject:
" Potential 10 CFR 50.55(e) Report - Discrepancies in the BN system," February 17, 1983.
Glenn Koester (KG&E) letter to John T. Collins (NRC),
Subject:
" Wolf Creek Generating Station System Turnover Quality Action Plan," March 2, 1983.
Nickolas A. Petrick (SNUPPS) letter to H.R. Denton (NRC),
Subject:
"SNUPPS QA Program for Design and Construction," December 22, 1982.
Wolf-Creek SSER 2 17-1 l
~
I TMI-2 REQUIREMENTS II.B.2 Plant Shielding to Provide Access to Vital Areas for Past I
Accident Operations The applicant reviewed its shielding design to evaluate its ability to access vital areas necessary to operate essential systems required i'
after a LOCA with significant core damage.
The systems analyzed as sources of radiation that would be designed to function after an accident included:
reactor containment, the emergency core cooling system, the contair. ment spray system, the sampling system, the residual heat removal system, the chemical and volume control system, and the hydrogen analysis system among other vital areas and equipment.
Dose rate calculations were performed for the areas of these systems using the postulated post accident 6
assumptions and source terms consistent with Regulatory Guides 1.4 and 1.7, and TID-14844, and computer codes such as QAD-CG that calculate dose rates from these source terms and respective geometries.
Dose rate zone maps, as a function of time following an accident, were provided by detailed layout drawings for each of the areas of interest.
Post accident radiation levels in the Control Room Complex and the Technical support Center, which are vital areas, are accept-able for continuous occupancy in accordance with NUREG-0737 and the requirenients of GDC-19.
Access to some vital areas that only require infrequent cccupancy was verified to be less than 5 R/hr, based on a time and motion study.
For post accident sampling, an inline monitoring system will provide the required data witnout direct operator access.
In addition, although areas to the sample stations will be limited, a back-up system will be available so that samples will be able to be taken within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
On the basis cf its review, the stcff has concluded that the applicant has performed a radiation and shielding design review for vital. area access in accordance with item II.B.2 of NUREG-0737 and consider this open item resolved.
II.F.1 Additional Accident Monitoring Instrumentation The Radiological Assessment Branch has reviewed Revision 11 to the SNUPPS FSAR, which provides a drawing showing the exact location of
[
the high range cor,tainment area monitors.
The location of these monitors meets the position of item II.F.1 Attachment 3 of NUREG-0737.
i Therefore, this portion of Confirmatory Issue B.28 is closed.
-(
dP s
Wolf Creek SSER 2 22-1
II.K.2.13 Thermal Mechanical Report--Effect of High Pressure Injection on Vessel Integrity for Small Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident With No Auxiliary Feedwater The applicant has committed to implement the Westinghouse owners group resolution which is subject to NRC review and approval.
Furthermore, the final resoluticn of this issue may be affected by the resolution of the Unresolved Safety Issues USI-45, " Shutdown Decay Heat Removal Systems", and USI-49, " Pressurized Thermal Shoc k. " The staff accepts the applicant's commitment to meet the NRC requirements which will envelop II.K.2.13, USI-45 and USI-49 and is therefore removing this item as confirmatory.
II.K.3.2 Report on Overall Safety Effect of Power Operated Relief Valve Isolation System As stated in the SER, the applicant has complied with the staff position on this item by referencing WCAP-9804.
In addition, the applicant has included an automatic PORV isolation feature specified in Task Action Plan Item II.K.3.1 in his design.
Because the appli-cant has complied with the staff position and basad on the informa-tion above, the staff believes the applicant has satisfied the Action Plan guidelines.
Therefore the staff is removing this item as confirmatory.
However, if the staff deems it necessary upon comple-tion of its review of the topical report WCAP-9804 the applicant may be required to provide additional analyses, test results, or modifi-cations to its P09V isclation system.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 22-2
APPENDIX A CHRONOLOGY OF NRC STAFF RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY REVIEW 0F WOLF CREEK The following is an update of the chronology through April 15, 1983.
August 4, 1982 Letter from SNUPPS concerning control of heavy loads.
August 8, 1982 Letter from applicant transmitting draft Technical Specifications which are not common SNUPPS items.
August 11, 1982 Letter from applicant transmitting WCAP-10015, " Kansas, Gas and Electric Company, Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No. 1, Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program."
August 24, 1982 Letter from applicant revising the construction completion date.
August 27, 1982 Letter from SNUPPS transmitting NUREG-0737, Item II.B.2 information.
September 17, 1982 Letter from applicant transmitting revised response to NRC Question 241.15WC.
September 30, 1982 Letter from SNUPPS transmitting Revision 10 to SNUPPS FSAR.
September 30, 1982 Representatives from NRC, UE, KG&E, SNUPPS, and Bechtal Corporation met in Gaithersburg, Maryland to discuss matters related to the electric power systems of the Callaway and Wolf Creek Plants.
(Summary issued October 12, 1982).
October 6, 1982 Letter from applicant concerning new KG&E Management Organization.
October 18, 1982 Letter from SNUPPS transmitting a revised seismic analysis.
October 70, 1982 Representatives from NRC, UE, KG&E, SNUPPS, and Bechtel Corporation met to discuss matters related to fire protection for Callaway and Wolf Creek.
(Summary issued October 29, 1982).
October 20, 1982 Letter from SNUPPS concerning NUREG-0737 Item II.D.1.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 A-1
l November 2, 1982 Letter from SNUPPS transmitting the test plan for hydraulic model testing in lieu of containment recir-culation sump site testing.
November 3, 198?
Letter to applicant concerning clarification of SRP Section 7.4 and requesting information on fire protection.
November 15, 1982 Letter frem SNUPPS transmitting "SNUPPS Control Room Fire Hazards Analysis Report."
November 24, 1982 Letter from applicant requesting an extension in the construction completica date for Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No. 1.
November 24, 1982 Letter to the applicant requesting additional informa-tion on interim security plan.
November 29, 1982 Representatives from NRC, UE, KG&E, and SNUPPS met in Bethesda, Maryland to discuss the proposed snubber Technical Specifications (Summary issued March 2, 1983).
g Dete...se-3, 1982 Letter from SNUPPS transmitting WCAP-10043, " Steam Generator Tube Plugging Analysis" (Proprietary),
WCAP-10195 (Non-Proprietary), and application for withholding proprietary information from public disclosure.
December 6, 1982 Letter to applicant requesting additional information, on the Wolf Creek Generating Station Emergency Plan.
December 7, 1982 Letter from applicant transmitting Revision 4 to Wolf Creek Environmental Report.
December 10, 1982 Letter from applicant transmitting further revision to the KG&E management organization.
December 14, 1982 Representatives from NRC, UE, KG&E, SNUPPS, Nutech, Westinghouse, and Bechtel met in Bethesda, Maryland to discuss matters related to equipment qualification of pumps and valves.
December 15, 1982 Letter from SNUPPS transmitting revised submittal of the snubber Technical Specification.
December 22, 1982 Letter from SNUPPS transmitting Revision 5 to the SNUPPS QA Program for Design and Construction.
December 23, 1982 Letter from SNUPPS transmitting information on SRP Section 7.4, Remote Shutdown Capability.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 A-2
January 5, 1983 Letter from SNUPPS providing comments on EGG-EA-6109 report.
January 7,1983 Letter from SNUPPS on NUREG-0737 Item II.D.1.
January 11, 1983 Letter to applicant extending the latest construction completion date for the Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No. 1.
January 12, n83 Letter from KG&E transmitting additional information on the Wolf Creek Emergency Plan.
January 17, 1983 Letter from applicant transmitting revised response to Question 8 concerning the interim security plan.
January 19, 1983 Representatives from NRC, UE, KG&E, KCPL, SNUPPS, and Westinghouse met in Bethesda, Maryland to gather information on the performance of Westinghouse RCP seals.
(Summary issued January 21, 1983).
January 21, 1983 Letter from applicant transmitting responses to questions concerning the Special Nuclear Materials License Application and informing the NRC of a change in the fuel delivery date to April 1, 1984 January 25, 1983 Letter to applicant concerning the Wolf Creek Generating Station Interim Security Plan for the Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Low Strateg!c Significance.
January 26, 1983 Letter from applicant transmitting pressure-temperature limits for the Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No. 1.
February 2,1983 Letter from SNUPPS concerning the ICSB review.
February 2,1983 Letter from SNUPPS concerning the Power Systems Branch Review.
February 4,1983 Letter from SNUPPS concerning NUREG-0737 Item II.B.3,
" Post Accident Sampling Capability."
February 16, 1983 Letter to applicant notifying applicant of the results of the Reactor Trip Breaker Test Appeal Meeting.
February 22, 1983 Representatives from NRC, UE, KGE, SNUPPS, Westinghouse, and Bechtel met in Bethesda, Maryland to discuss matters regarding equipment qualification.
March 2, 1983 Letter from SNUPPS requesting a simultaneous review of the Callaway and Wolf Creek Technical Specification.
l Wolf Creek SSER 2 A-3
March 4, 1983 Letter from the applicant transmitting revised pressure-temperature limits.
March 10, 1983 Letter from SNUPPS transmitting Revision Eleven to the SNUPPS FSAR.
March 10, 1983 Letter from SNUPPS concerning the environmental qualifications of safety-related electrical equipment.
March 10, 1983 A prehearing conference was held in Burlington, Kansas to discuss the date and place of the hearing.
March 23, 1983 Letter from SNUPPS transmitting Revision 6 to the Quality Assurance Program for Design and Construction.
March 24, 1983 Letter to KG&E and UE discussing the revised snubber Technical Specifications.
March 28, 1983 Letter from KG&E stating its intention not to apply for an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24.
April 8, 1983 Letter from KG&E containing additional information for the review of the Wolf Creek Emergency Plan.
April 15, 1983 Letter from SNUPPS in response to Generic Letter 82-33.
April 15, 1983 Letter from KG&E in response to Generic Letter 82-33 referencing SNUPPS letter.
April 15, 1983 Letter from KG&E containing additional information for the review of the Wolf Creek Emergency Plan.
Wolf Creek SSER 2 A-4
i APPENDIX D NRC STAFF CONTRIBUTION AND CONSULTANTS This Supplement No. 2 to the SER is a product of the NRC staff.
The following NRC staff members were principal contributors +n this report.
NAME Title Review Branch R. Stevens Reactor Engineer Instrumentation and Systems Control, B. J. Elliot Materials Engineer Materials Engineering J. Spraul Sr. Quality Assurance Engineer Quality Assurance P. Robinson Emergency Specialist Emergency Preparedness D. Terao Mechanical Engineer Mechanical Engr.
S. Block Sr. Health Physicist Radiological Assess.
M. Tokar Sr. Nuclear Engineer Core Performance S. Diab Reactor Engineer Reactor Systems t
L Wolf Creek SSER 2 D-1
NRC FonM 335
- 1. REPORT NUMBER Mssiasseby DOC /
U.S. NUCLEAD REGULATORY COMMISSION
,7 77, NUREG-0881 BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET Supplement No. 2
- 4. TITLE AN D SUBTITLE (Add Volume No., sf oprmerate)
- 2. (Leave bla1kl Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation
- 3. RECIPIENT S ACCESSION NO.
of Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No.1
- 7. AUTHOR (Si
- 5. DATE REPORT COMPLE TED M ON TH l YEAR June 1983
- 9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION N AME AND MAILING ADDRESS (taciude 2,p Code /
DATE REPORT ISSUED Division of Licensing MONTH l M AR Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation June 1983 U.S. Nuclear Requlatory Comriission r
Washington, DC 20555
,,t,,,,,,,,,
- 12. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION N AME AND M AILING A003ESS (include 2,p Codel
- 10. PROJECT /T AiK/ WORK UNIT NO.
Same as 9. above
". CONT R ACT NO.
- 13. TYPE OF REPORT PE RIOD COVE RE D (/nclussve astes)
Technical - Safety Evaluation Report September 1982 - June 1983
- 15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
- 14. (Leave clai41 Docket No. STN 50-482
- 16. ABSTR ACT 000 words or less)
Supplement No. 2 to the Safety Evaluation Report Related to operation of the Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No.1 updates the information contained in the Safety Evaluation Report, dated April 1982 and Supplement No.1, dated August 1982.
l The Safety Evaluation Report and its supplements pertain to the application I
for a license to operate the Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No.1 filed by Kansas Gas and f.lectric Company on February 19, 1980. The Construction Permit, CPPR-147 was issued on May 17, 1977.
The facility is located in Coffey County, Kansas.
- 18. AV AILABILITY STATEMENT
- 19. SE CURITY CLASS (TA.s reporr) 21 NO. OF PAGES UNLIMITED U" CLASSIFIED
- 20. SE CU RITY CL ASS (This pavel 22 PRICE UNCLASSIFIED S
NRC FORM 335 17 77)
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