ML20035G962
| ML20035G962 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 04/21/1993 |
| From: | Rogge J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20035G959 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-93-05, 50-443-93-5, NUDOCS 9304300231 | |
| Download: ML20035G962 (3) | |
See also: IR 05000443/1993005
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report Number:
93-05
Docket No.:
50-443
License No.:
Licensee:
North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation
Post Office Box 300
Seabrook, New Hampshire 03874
Facility:
Seabrook Station
Inspection Dates:
March 2 - April 5,1993
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Inspectors:
Noel Dudley, Senior Resident Inspector
Richard Laura, Resident Inspector
Fred Paulitz, Electrical Engineer, NRR
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Approved By:
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[' John F. Rogge, Chief
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D' ate
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Reactor Projects Section 4B, DRP
In_spection Summary: This inspection report documents the safety inspections conducted
during day shift and back shift hours. The inspections assessed station performance in the
areas of plant operations, radiological controls, maintenance and surveillance, engineering and
technical support, emergency preparedness, security, and safety assessment and quality
verification.
Results: North Atlantic operated the facility safely. The inspector identified one violation.
The licensee approved a change to the design basis tornado described in the updated final
safety analysis report (UFSAR) without completing a safety evaluation or updating the
UFSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.59. See executive summary for assessment of
performance.
9304300231 930423
ADOCK 05000443
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARl
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SEABROOK STATION
NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-443/93-05
Operations: Operations personnel operated the plant safely by properly responding to minor
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plant transients and by following Technical Specification requirements. The operators made
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correct operability determinations when equipment or component failures occurred.
Inconsistencies in auxiliary operator logging practices indicated a weakness in supervisory
oversight.
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Radioloelcal Controls: Health physics personnel performed routine activities well.
Chemists aggressively worked to identify and reduce the source of dissolved oxygen in the
feedwater and condensate systems.
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Maintenance / Surveillance: Experienced and knowledgeable workers performed r aintenance
activities well. Supervisors, technical support engineers, and quality control insgctors
assured that maintenance workers completed preventive and corrective maintenance in
accordance with the maintenance program. Self-identified problems encountered during the
performance of surveillances were corrected or turned over to engineers for resolution.
Security: The security department responded in an outstanding manner to the challenges
created by the blizzard. Security supervisors sheltered exposed guards, established
compensatory measures, and properly reported the reduced security posture.
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Emereenev Preparedness: North Atlantic's preparations for and response to the blizzard
were excellent. The declaration of an Unusual Event, the staging of personnel, and the
transfer of the service water system to the cooling tower were conservative actions that
enhanced plant safety.
Encineerinn/ Technical Suonort: The engineering department performed well when
resolving the technical issues associated with nonconforming tornado doors. However, North
Atlantic failed to report the nonconforming condition, and engineers failed to formally
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document or report the changes made to the design basis tornado. When North Atlantic
identified these failures, the engineering department did not aggressively pursue the root
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cause for engineers' lack of recognition of regulatory requirements.
The engineering depanment's root cause analysis of the improper installation of non-safety
grade flanges in safety-related systems was adequate, even though the completion of the
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associated corrective actions was not timely. The technical support department's root cause
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analyses of equipment failures were detailed and thorough.
Safety Assessment /Ouality Verification: Licensee event reports were generally well
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written. The technical support department conducted thorough and timely reviews of industry
events.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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EX ECUTIVE S UM MARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
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TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
1.0
OPERATIONS (71707, 92701, 93702) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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1.1
Plant Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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1.2
Routine Plant Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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1.3
Auxiliary Operator Imgs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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2.0
RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS (71707) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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2.1
Routine Tours . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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2.2
Secondary Feedwater Chemistry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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3.0
M AINTENANCE/ SURVEILLANCE (61726, 62703, 92701)
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3.1
Main tenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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3.2
S urveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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3.3
Instrument Calibration
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4.0
S ECURITY (71707, 93702) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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5.0
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (93702)
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6.0
ENGINEERING / TECHNICAL SUPPORT (71707, 37700) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I1
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6.1
Tornado Doors: VIO 93-05-01 (Open); LER 92-13-01 (Closed) . . . . . . . I1
6.2
Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Undervoltage Reactor Trip
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6.3
China Flanges
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6.4
Increased Steam Header Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 15
6.5
Service Water Pump Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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SAFETY ASSESSMENT / QUALITY VERIFICATION (71707,92701)
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7.1
Review of Licensee Event Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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7.2
NRC Region I Technical Issue Summary 93-06
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7.3
NRC Region III Technical Issue Summary 93-03
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8.0
M EETING S (30702) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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Attachment 1 - Documents Reviewed
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Attachment 2 - Tornado Door Time Line
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DETAILS
1.0
OPERATIONS (71707, 92701, 93702)
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1.1
Plant Activities
Throughout the period, North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation (North Atlantic) operated
the reactor at full power. On March 13, the control room operators declared an Unusual
Event based on the severity of the forecasted winter storm. The operators ended the Unusual
Event on March 14.
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1.2
Routine Plant Operations
The inspector conducted daily control room tours, observed shift turnovers, attended the
station manager's morning meeting, and monitored plan-of-the-day meetings. The inspector
reviewed plant staffmg, safety system valve lineups, and compliance with technical
specification requirements. The inspector conducted tours in the primary auxiliary building,
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the emergency diesel generator building, the residual heat removal vaults, the electrical
switchgear rooms, the pipe chases, the emergency feedwater pump area, the service water
and circulating water pumphouse, the service water cooling towers, and the turbine building.
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During the tours and attendance at the meetings, the inspector noted good performance by the
operations staff.
During a tour of the primary auxiliary building, the inspector observed mechanical joint
leakage at flow element CS-FE-7448, located in the chemical and volume control system. A
yellow plastic bag contained the leak. However, the inspector did not observe a deficiency
tag. The inspector discussed the leaking mechanicaljoint with the shift superintendent. The
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shift superintendent searched the computerized work control system and found that the
deficiency was not in it. The inspector assessed that station personnel had not written a work
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request to correct a known deficiency.
In response to the inspector's concern, the work control coordinator prepared a work request
to repair the leak on flow element CS-FE-7448. Operators performed a walkdown of the
plant and identi5ed several other leaks not in the work control system. Operators wrote work
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requests to repair the leaks. At shift briefings, operations management reminded operators to
prepare work requests for identified deficiencies. The inspector assessed that operations
department's corrective actions were prompt and thorough.
The control room operators repositioned the control rods all-rods-out position from 227 steps
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to 226 steps. Technical Specifications 3.1.1.1 " Shutdown Margin" requires rod position to
be greater than or equal to the limit specified in the core operating limit report (COLR). The
inspector reviewed the paged of the COLR Cycle 3 report that were in the control room.
The inspector concluded that repositioning of the control rods met the Technical
Specifications requirements.
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The inspector reviewed the implementation of Technical Specification (TS) 6.2.2e on work
hour limits. TS 6.2.2e refers to generic letter (GL) 82-12, which specifies work hour limits
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for the plant staff who perform safety-related functions. The inspector reviewed the February
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work hours for the following randomly selected personnel: one senior reactor operator, one
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reactor opemtor. two auxiliary operators, two radiation protection technicians, and two
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mechanical mabtenance personnel. The inspector found that the hours worked were less than
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the limits specified by GL 82-12. The inspector assessed that North Atlantic was sensitive to
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meeting the intent of GL 82-12, which showed a proper safety perspective.
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The inspector witnessed the preparations for starting a diesel generator. While using a new
prestart checklist for diesel generator 'A', an auxiliary operator noted that the checklist
contained an incorrect normal reading for the governor speed controller. The checklist
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directed the auxiliary operator not to adjust the controller. The operator notified the senior
control room operator, who wrote a log change request. The inspector considered the
auxiliary operator's questioning attitude and detailed plant knowledge a good example of
operator performance and self-checking.
During a tour of the vital switchgear room, the inspector observed a deficiency tag installed
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on the IE uninterruptible power supply (UPS) inverter. The UPS inverter provides power to
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the 120 volt AC vital instrumentation distribution system. _ The deficiency tag indicated that a
cooling fan inside the UPS machine had failed. The inspector verified that the operators had
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completed the actions in the annunciator response procedure. The inspector discussed with
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the unit shift supervisor and system engineer whether the fan failure affected operability.
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There are five fans inside the UPS inverter cabinet and continued operation with one fan
failure is acceptable. Based on vendor information and previous experience, up to two fans
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could be lost and the UPS machine would not overheat. The inspector assessed that North
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Atlantic personnel identified and properly addressed the fan failure.-
On March 17, the steam supply valves to the moisture separator reheaters (MSRs) began to
close. The reduced steam flow to the MSRs resulted in increasing primary coolant.
temperatures causing pressurizer pressure to increase. The control rods automatically drove
into the core to reduce the primary coolant temperatures and the pressurizer spray valves
opened to reduce pressurizer pressure. Within a minute, the operators verified proper plant
response, opened the steam supply valves to the MSRs, and stabilized plant' conditions. The
shift superintendent contacted the instrumentation and control (I&C) supervisor and technical -
support engineers for assistance.
The inspector observed the subsequent recovery actions. The I&C technicians decided a
problem existed in the new digital valve control system. Since the MSR steam supply valves
continued to drift closed, an auxiliary operator opened the breakers to the motor operated
valves and remained at the electrical panel. The auxiliary operator maintained continuous
communications with the main control room so that he could restore power to the steam
valves if the reactor tripped.
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The I&C technicians and the technical support engineers isolated the problem to a signal
communications controller. The controller sporadically sent zero reactor power signals to the
MSR steam supply valve control circuit. The control circuit sends a close signal to the steam
supply valves on a reactor trip. The I&C technicians replaced the communications controller
and the operators restored the plant systems to normal. The failed controller was installed in
the simulator where it exhibited a similar problem at a different address. North Atlantic
returned the controller to the manufacturer, Fisher-Porter, for repair or replacement. The
operators took conservative actions to stabilize plant conditions and to analyze the cause of
the event. The inspector concluded that the operators' response was excellent.
On April 1, the operators transferred the 'A' train service water system to the cooling tower
to do a quarterly surveillance test. When the operators attempted to transfer the system back
to the ocean, neither of the 'A' train ocean service water pumps started. The operators
started the cooling tower service water pump and investigated the problem. The discharge
valve, SW-V54, for the cooling tower service water pump, had not fully closed. A relay in
the starting circuit for the ocean service water pumps prevents the pumps from starting until
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SW-V54 closes. The shift supervisor entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 3:18 a.m.
based on three inoperable service water pumps in train 'A'.
An auxiliary operator manually
closed SW-V54, and the main control room operators started an ocean service water pump.
The shift superintendent exited TS 3.0.3 at 3:30 a.m. The plant remained in a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />
technical specification action statement until mechanics adjusted the packing on SW-V54 and
electricians completed motor-operated valve testing.
The inspector observed the main control room response to the event. The main control room
operators diagnosed the problem quickly using available prints of electrical pump starting
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circuits. The shift superintendent and unit shift supervisor worked together to direct auxiliary
operators and electricians in the plant. The shift superintendent notified plant management
and evaluated the regulatory significance of the event, while the unit shift supervisor restored
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the service water system. The inspector concluded that operator response was excellent.
In summary, the inspector concluded that operator responses to minor plant transients and
compliance with technical specification requirements were excellent. The operators reviewed
work activities and component failures to ensure equipment operability. Operators promptly
corrected identified work control deficiencies.
1.3
Auxiliary Operator Logs
The inspector accompanied an auxiliary operator (AO) during the performance of the primary
AO rounds. The rounds included checking various operational parameters in the primary
auxiliary building and in the residual heat removal vaults. The AO conducted the rounds
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professionally and was knowledgeable of plant equipment. The AO properly documented the
various checks on the primary log sheets,
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The inspector questioned why the AO marked the steam generator blowdown radiation
monitors (RM) sample flow as unsatisfactory. The AO explained that the sight glass at
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RM 6519 was dirty and a reading could not be taken. Therefore, the AO marked the
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parameter as unsatisfactory, circled the reading, and listed a reason in the remarks section of
the log sheet. The inspector decided that this explanation of the unsatisfactory reading was
valid.
The inspector discussed the implications of the missed sample flow verification check with the
RM system engineer. The system engineer stated that RM 6519 remained operable because
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there is a low flow switch, which operates independently of the sight glass. A deficiency tag
hanging on RM 6519 indicated that cleaning the sight glass was in the work control program.
The inspector reviewed the primary AO logs for the prior week, and identified four instances
where AOs marked the blowdown RM sample flow parameter as satisfactory with a note
indicating that they were unable to read the flow due to the dirty sight glass. The intent of
the primary log instructions i.s that a satisfactory condition exists when flow can be observed
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in all of the RM flow gages. The inspector determined that these four readings should have
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been marked as unsatisfactory, circled, and a note written to explain why the readings were
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unsatisfactory.
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The inspector performed a cursory review of the primary and roving AO logs for
February 1993, to dciermine if the above deficiency was an isolated case. The inspector
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identified four other parameters above the maximum reading specified in the log procedures
that were not circled and explained in the remarks section. The out-of-specification readings
were not required by Technical Specifications.
Although not a safety significant issue, the inspector was concerned that the potential existed
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for missing a technical specification surveillance. The inspector discussed this concern with
the operation department manager who initiated corrective action. At shift turnover, crews
reviewed the requirements for recording out-of-specifications log readings. The inspector
attended one of these meetings and assessed that the briefing properly addressed the
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inspector's concern.
In summary, several out-of-specificatian or unsatisfactory parameters were not properly
documented in the AO log. These deficiencies were of low safety significance, but indicated
that the AO log review process was less than fully effective.
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2.0
RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS (71707)
2.1
Routine Tours
During routine tours of the plant, the inspector observed personnel entering, exiting, and
working in the radiological controlled area. The inspector verified proper posting of
radiation and contaminated area, calibration of radiological monitoring equipment, and
locking of high radiation area doors. The inspector decided that health physics personnel did
routine activities well.
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The inspector observed chemists taking primary and steam generator chemistry samples. The
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chemists clearly marked the sample bottles with the date, source, and purpose of each
sample. The chemists were familiar with the sampling procedures and showed good sampling
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techniques. The chemist, who took the primary samples, reduced the spread of
contamination by changing gloves, wiping sample bottles, and monitoring for contamination.
The chemist was knowledgeable of the use and capabilities of the new software program for
measuring the radioactivity of samples. The inspector concluded that the chemists were
knowledgeable and well trained.
2.2
Secondary Feedwater Chemistry
On March 2,1993, chemists identified that the dissolved oxygen in the discharge of the
condensate pumps increased from 7 to 20 part per billion (ppb). The Station Chemistry
Manual (SCM) defines North Atlantic's chemistry control program for protecting steam
generators tube integrity. The SCM Procedure CP 3.2, " Secondary Chemistry Control
Program," specifies oxygen limits that require corrective actions. The first action level for
dissolved oxygen in the feedwater and condensate systems is 10 ppb. The action level
requires prompt identification of the source of oxygen, and the return of the dissolved oxygen
concentration to below 10 ppb within one week.
North Atlantic identified the source of oxygen as air entering the condensate through the 'B'
condensate pump gland packing. Operators had placed the pump in service following a
motor replacement. Mechanics had repacked the shaft seal with a new type of packing.
Operators stopped the 'B' condensate pump and the oxygen level decreased below 10 ppb
within eleven hours. Mechanics repacked the shaft seal with the original type of packing
material, which reduced the air in-leakage to the condensate.
On March 22,1992, the chemists identified a decrease in condensate dissolved oxygen when
the condenser hot well level decreased to the low level alarm setpoint. The technical support
engineer identified air leakage around the condenser manways, which were exposed to a
vacuum with a low hot well level. The mechanics sealed the manway and operators raised
the hot well level to normal.
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The inspector concluded that chemists aggressively worked to identify and reduce the source
of dissolved oxygen in the feedwater and condensate systems.
3.0
MAINTENANCE / SURVEILLANCE (61726, 62703, 92701)
3.1
Maintenance
The inspector attended morning meetings held by the different maintenance departments. The
meetings were brief, informative, and showed good management of maintenance work.
During routine plant tours, the inspector noted several corrective and preventive maintenance
activities. The mechanics and electricians worked around the clock to replace the 'C'
condensate pump, which had exhibited increased vibration readings. The workers completed
the replacement and operators tested the pump,
Construction workers erected two poles in the offsite transmission yard to provide lightning
protection for the offsite transmission lines. The inspector observed the quality control
testing of concrete for the footings of the poles. The quality control inspectors prompted
construction workers to heat the existing concrete above 40*F before pouring more concrete.
The inspector noted that licensee quality control of the construction workers was effective.
The inspector observed the replacement of heater drain tank level instrument 4508B. During
the installation of a high level switch, instrumentation and control (I&C) technicians
incorrectly wired the control circuit. When the I&C technicians energized the circuit, the 'A'
heater drain tank pump discharge valve closed, causing a minor transient in the feedwater and
condensate systems. The operators immediately took local control of the discharge valve and
stabilized the plant. The I&C supervisor determined that the I&C technicians misunderstood
the control circuit and that the work request did not provide sufficient details. The I&C
supervisor and a technical support engineer corrected the wiring error. The inspector
observed part of the calibration of the level instrument and assessed that the I&C technicians
were experienced and knowledgeable of the calibration process.
The inspector observed electricians do corrective maintenance on the pressurizer backup
heaters 480 volt breaker. The electricians used Piocedure MX0507.02, "480 Volt ITE Power
Circuit Breaker Inspection-Calibration-Test." During the refueling outage, the operator had
noticed that the breaker indication lights did not agree with the breaker's open position. The
electricians found a worn surface within the breaker that caused the improper indication. The
electricians replaced the worn parts and adjusted the contact pressure using a feeler gauge.
The inspector concluded that trained personnel repaired the breaker using approved
procedures.
In summary, the inspector concluded that maintenance workers correctly completed
preventive and corrective maintenance according to program and procedural requirements.
The inspector noted that supervisors, quality control inspections, and technical support
engineers provided effective oversight of maintenance activities.
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3.2
Surveillance
The inspector observed parts of the following surveillance activities:
Turbine Driven Emergency Feed Pump Surveillangs
During the performance of the monthly turbine driven emergency feedwater (EFW) pump
surveillance test, Procedure OX 1436.02, the operators in the EFW pump room had a copy
of the procedure and established good communications with the control room. An operator
locally started the turbine and established rated turbine speed and feedwater flow. All
acceptance criteria were met, and the EFW pump was returned to its normal standby lineup.
The inspector assessed that the operators were experienced in the operation of the EFW pump
and used excellent procedural adherence.
Splid State Protection System
Instrument and control (I&C) personnel conducted the surveillance using Procedure
IX 680.922, " Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Train 'B' Actuation." The I&C
personnel maintained good communications with the main control room operators while
closing and opening the 'B' reactor trip bypass breaker. The auxiliary operator removed the
480 volt power from the motor operators for the refueling water storage tank supply valve
and the volume control tank supply valve to the charging pumps to prevent the valves from
moving. The inspector concluded that the I&C and operations personnel were knowledgeable
and used approved procedures.
Diesel Generator
Operators conducted the surveillance using Procedure OX1426.01, "DG 1 A Monthly
Operability Surveillance." The diesel generator obtained rated speed, voltage, and frequency
in less than 10 seconds. The operators synchronized the generator to the electrical bus and
raised load to 5800 kw. The inspector observed that the kilowatt indicators in the main
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control room and at the local control panel agreed. The inspector concluded that operators
successfully completed the operability surveillance testing of the 'A' emergency diesel
generator.
Diesel Generator Air Comoressor
A newly qualified auxiliary operator conducted the surveillance using Procedure OX 1426.14,
" Diesel Generator Cooling Water and Air Start System Valve Quarterly Surveillance." He
meticulously followed the procedure and checked with another experienced auxiliary operator
before completing unf.'miliar actions. The auxiliary operator properly recorded the required
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information and confirrr.ed the data met acceptance criteria. The inspector assessed that the
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new auxiliary operator professionally conducted the surveillance.
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Engineered Safety Features Actuation System
While installing jumpers for surveillance Procedure OX 1456.60, " Train 'B' ESFAS Slave
Relay K640 Quarterly Go Test," an instrument and controls (I&C) technician inadvertently
blew fuses to two primary coolant sample valves. The inspector reviewed the associated
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operational infcanation report, the surveillance procedure jumper checklist, the self-
verification work sheet, and the main control board terminal stript. An I&C technician and a
control room operator working together incorrectly installed the jumpers. The control room
operator recognized the incorrect placement of the jumpers before staning the test. While
correcting the location of the jumpers, the I&C technician grounded the electrical circuits to
the sample valve solenoids, causing the fuses to blow.
After correcting the placement of the jumpers, the operators successfully completed
Procedure OX 1456.60. The sample valves for reactor coolant loop 1 and loop 2 failed shut
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when the fuses blew. The valves remained shat for several days until I&C technicians
replaced the fuses.
The I&C technicians had previously placed operator aids on the terminal strip locations where
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jumpe ; were normally installed. The operator aids did not prevent the I&C technician or
operator from incorrectly placing thejumpers. The terminal strips inside the control panel
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are difficult to reach and the terminal labeling is difficult to read. North Atlantic. was
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evaluating a plant modification to move selected terminal strip points to an accessible location
in the cor, trol panel.
The inspector concluded that operator aids, procedural signeff steps, and the operations' self-
checking program did not prevent improper placement of the jumpers. The inspector neted
that a control room operator eventually identified the incorrect placement of the jumpers.
Vital Batterv
Electricians condt: tea the surveillance of train 'B' 125 volt battery bank 1B using Procedure
LX 0556.04, Station Battery Service Test." The electricians used a new load discharge test
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set, Alber Engineering Inc., Model BCT-1000, for the first time. Before the test, the
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electricians measured and recorded all battery cells for temperature, specific gravity, voltzge,
and inner cell ' unector resistance. The electricians noted a spot on the connector between
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cells 21 and 22, where the lead coating had corroded away. The electricians prepared a work
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request, WR 92 WOO 798, to repair the connector. The deficiency did not affect the conduct
of the test.
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The inspector observed electriciar,s program the load discharge test set to discharge the
battery at 655 ampere for one minute,475 ampere for 118 minutes, and 524 ampere for the
last minute. The electrical maintenance personnel noted that Procedure LX 0556.04,
figure 10.8, indicated that 475 amperes should be discharged for 58 minutes instead of 118
minutes. The electrical maintenance supervisor made changes to the procedure following
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Station Management Manual, Chapter SM 6.2, " Station Operating Procedures,"
Section 4.4.1, " Pen and Ink Corrections." Although not required by procedure, the
electricians took infrared temperature readings of the inner cell connectors to find any high
resistance points. The battery voltage and the lowest cell voltage at the end of the test met
the acceptance criteria.
After an equalizing charge on the battery, the voltage of one cell did not fully recover. The
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electricians completed a second equalizing charge on the single battery cell, which raised the
cell voltage to 2.1 volts, which was below the desired 2.4 volts. The electricians completed
a third equalizing charge at a higher voltage, which rai'ed the cell voltage to 2.33 volts. The
technical support engineer wrote a request for enginecting service to evaluate the effects of a
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degraded cell.
The inspector concluded that the 'B' battery service test met the technical specification
requirement for proving battery operability. KnowledgeaM: and trained personnel conducted
the battery service test, followed the procedures, and used properly calibrated equipment.
Summary
The inspector concluded that maintenance and operations personnel successfully carried out
the surveillance program. The people were knowledgeable and well trained. Problems
encountered during the performance of surveillances were self-identified and were corrected
or turned over to engineers for evaluation.
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3.3
Instrument Calibration
The inspector reviewed seven safety-related intruments to verify that the calibration
surveillance requirements listed in Technical Specifications were met. The inspector assessed
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that the selected instruments were calibrated within the specified periodicity.
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The inspector reviewed completed calibration procedures for sixteen safety-related process
instruments. The inspector met with an instrument and control (I&C) supervisor to discuss
the "as found" values that were outside the specified tolerance values. The inspector learned
that both the I&C department supervisor and system engineer review the test procedure data
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sheets. Out of tolerance data are evaluated with respect to amou% direction of drift, and
instrument history. The inspector concluded tha' a '
. ments found outside the specified
tolerance are operable and will provide prop-r al
indication.
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4.0
SECURITY (71707, 93702)
The inspector toured the protected area, observed security guards on patrol, and monitored
activities in the central alarm station and secondary alann station. The security force
monitored people and packages entering the protected area and established additional
precautions for land vehicle bombs. The inspector concluded that the security force
performed routine activities well.
During the blizzard, the security shift supervisor sheltered exposed guards, established
compensatory measures, and properly reported the reduced security posture. Security
management directed well planned actions to recover from the blizzard. Three workers were
tested for cause when they arrived at the protected area from a nearby motel where workers
were being housed during the storm. Two of the workers' blood alcohol content exceeded
the fitness-for-duty limits. The two workers were driven back to the motel, suspended for 14
days, and entered the employee assistance program. The inspector assessed that the security
department's response to the challenges created by the blizzard was outstanding.
5.0
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (93702)
On March 13, the shift superintendent declared an unusual event, based on severe weather
conditions, according to the Station Emergency Manual Ghapter ER 1.1, emergency action
level 18a. The inspector was on-site during the event, observed the performance of the initial
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responders, and made periodic tours of the facility.
For convenience and access to weather reports, the initial responders set up an alternate
technical support center in the administration building. North Atlantic communications
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personnel set up the Seabrook Station news services in the general office building. Before
the storm, the initial responders called in other shift and emergency workers and staged them
at nearby hotels. In preparation for the storm, operators transferred service water to the
cooling tower and stopped the ocean service water pumps. During a previous storm, sand in
the ocean water had contributed to the wearing of the service water pump shafts. Site
services personnel ensured temporary trailers were secure.
The snow started to fall at noon on March 13, and continued to fall and drift until about
6:00 a.m., on March 14. One or more NRC inspectors were onsite from 9:00 a.m., on
March 13, to 1:30 p.m., March 14, to observe and evaluate licensee response. The winds
increased to about 40 miles per hour (mph) with gusts to 60 mph. The wind blew out
windows in the southwe< ( mer of the turbine building and blew off a fan housing on the
waste processing building tal. Due to the high winds and heavy snowfall, security reduced
the security perimeter. Security enforced a two man rule for any person going outside a
protected building. North Atlantic ended the unusual event at 1:15 p.m., on March 14.
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The inspector reviewed two emergency preparedness self-assessment reports concerning the
implementation of the Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan (SSREP) and the North
Atlantic Management Manual Procedure 11800, " Hazardous Condition Response Plan." The
reports identified the followm' g areas for improvements:
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The SSREP should provide greater flexibility for relocating the initial responders
during weather related events.
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North Atlantic emergency management personnel should formally notify state and
local officials of station responses to an emergency event instead of relying on
informal corporate communications notifications.
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Logistical arrangements such as food, lodging and transportation should be better
coordinated.
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Facilities and equipment should be improved to enhance command and
communications capabilities.
The inspector concluded that North Atlantic's preparation for and response to the blizzard
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were excellent. The inspector noted that the initial responders reported to the station
promptly and correctly carried out the SSER. The inspector considered the declaration of the
unusual event, the staging of personnel, and the transfer of service water to the cooling tower
to be conservative. The self-assessment was critical and identified areas for program
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enhancements.
6.0
ENGINEERING /TECIINICAL SUPPORT (71707, 37700)
6.1
Tornado Doors: VIO 93-05-01 (Open); LER 92-13-01 (Closed)
In a letter to North Atlantic dated August 24,1992, the NRC requested information
concerning the adequacy of plant doors to withstand the differential pressure of the updated
final safety analysis report (UFSAR) design basis tornado. On August 27,1992, North
Atlantic determined that a reportable condition existed involving the design of six plant doors.
The inspector reviewed the documents listed in Attachment 1. Through discussions with
engineering personnel, the inspector developed a sequence of events provided in
Attachment 2.
The inspector reviewed licensee event report (LER) 92-13 and its supplement. The LES ad
its supplement was well written and met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. This LER is
closed.
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In December 1990, North Atlantic engineers decided that six plant doors did not meet the
design criteria for differential pressure of the design basis tornado described in UFSAR
chapter 2.3.1.2(b)2. Engineering evaluated the nonconforming condition and began
developing a site-specific tornado in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.76. On
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June 26,1991, the engineering manager accepted the site-specific tornado defined by
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Calculation SBC-441 as the design basis tornado for Seabrook. Using industry operability
determination guidelines, the engineering manager decided the six tornado doors were
operable. The engineering manager based his decision on the site specific tornado and other
draft engineering evaluations.
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In October 1992, the engineering department issued engineering evaluations concerning
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tornado barriers and in November 1992, coNpleted a 10 CFR 50.59 review for the site-
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specific tornado. The evaluations concluded that four of the six plant doors and the safety-
related plant equipment behind the other two doors could withstand the depressurization
effects of the site-specific tornado. The 10 CFR 50.59 review concluded that there were no
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unreviewed safety questions concerning the use of the site-specific tornado as the design basis
for Seabrook.
North Atlantic conducted a root cause evaluation as to why the nonconforming condition was
not reported to the NRC and why the UFSAR was not updated. North Atlantic concluded
that engineering personnel did not recognize the reportability of the nonconforming condition
nor the need to update the UFSAR. North Atlantic concluded that the root cause was
engineering's failure to carry out North Atlantic's corrective action process.
The licensee's short term and long term corrective actions were described in LER 92-13-01.
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The inspector reviewed the short term corrective actions and verified that the actions were
complete. The long term corrective actions involved installing a phnt design change and
developing a new procedure. The plant design change involved strengthening the latches for
two doors that could not withstand the differential pressure of the site-specific tornado.
North Atlantic planned to install the design change by May 31,1993. The quality assurance
department was prepanng a new procedure for the corrective action process. The procedure
will integrate and better define the corrective action program, and provide better guidance for
reporting and assessing nonconforming conditions. North Atlantic planned to complete and
approve the procedure by June 1993.
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The inspector interviewed a mndom sample of engineers and designers in the engineering
department. The personnel interviewed had received training on and had done 10 CFR 50.59
reviews when preparing new system designs. However, none of the personnel realized that
the 10 CFR 50.59 review process should be used to evaluate nonconforming conditions for
potential unreviewed safety questions. Some engineers and designers were aware of MtC
reporting requirements, but most relied on their supervisors to decide reportability of
nonconforming conditions.
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In 1990, North Atlantic failed to report the nonconforming condition of tornado doors when
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engineers identified the condition. On August 27,1992, North Atlantic reported the
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condition under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(ii)(B) as a one hour report, after questioning by the NRC.
North Atlantic operated for over sixteen months with an internally approved change to the
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UFSAR design basis tornado without completing a 10 CFR 50.59 review to identify any
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potential unreviewed safety questions. North Atlantic failed to update UFSAR Chapter
2.3.1.2.(b)2 to reflect the approval of the new site-specific design basis tornado. Nonh
Atlantic failed to report the change to the NRC in the subsequent UFSAR annual update.
North Atlantic's failure to formally document and report the change to the design basis
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tornado described in the UFSAR is an violation of 10 CFR 50.59. (VIO 93-05-01)
The inspector concluded that the engineering department properly resolved the technical
issues associated with the nonconforming tornado doors in June 1991. The inspector noted
that the 10 CFR 50.59 review and the update to the UFSAR completed in December 1992,
were detailed and thorough. However, the inspector determined that the engineering
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department did not aggressively pursue the root cause for engineers' lack of recognition of
regulatory requirements. Six months after the weakness had been identified, the engineering
depanment had not trained their personnel in the lessons learned.
6.2
Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Undervoltage Reactor Trip
The inspector reviewed Westinghouse Technical Bulletin NSD-TB-92-03-RO, "Undervoltage
Trip Protection of the Icactor Protection System," dated May 15, 1992. The technical
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bulletin discussed the undervoltage relay time-delay associated with back electro-motive-force
(EMF). When an electrical bus is deenergized, large motors produce a back EMF that delays
)
the bus voltage from dropping. The delayed drop in bus voltages increases the response time
of the reactor coolant pump undervoltage relay. The bus voltage decay time must te
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considered in the total relay response time of 1.5 seconds. NRC Inspection Report No. 50-
443/92-13 noted that North Atlantic planned to change the affected surveillance procedures to
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include the bus voltage decay time in the calculation for the total relay response time.
On September 14, 1992, North Atlantic approved minor modification MMOD 92-549,
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" Reactor Coolant Pump Undervoltage Time Delay Modification." The modification added a
bus voltage decay time to Calculation SBC-128, " Technical Specification - Setpoints and
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Allowable Values." Engineers derived the bus voltage decay time using data from the power
ascension loss of offsite power test and c.a actual loss of offsite power event. In addition,
MMOD 92-549 reduced a relay intentional time delay from 1.0 seconds to 0.8 seconds. The
intentional tirne delay prevented spurious reactor trips due to momentary bus voltage dips.
The reduction of the intentional time delay allowed adEonal margin for the total relay
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response time.
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The inspector reviewed Technical Specification bases 2.2.1, " Reactor Trip System
Instrumentation Setpoints - Undervoltage and Underfrequency - Reactor Coolant Pumps."
The bases state that the time required for a signal to reach the reactor trip breaker following
the simultaneous trip of two or more reactor coolant pumps bus circuit breakers should not
exceed 1.2 seconds. The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Table 7.2-3,
item 12, lists the reactor coolant pump bus undervoltage time response as 1.5 second. The
technical requirements manual, Table 16.3-1, Item 14, also lists the reactor coolant pump
undervoltage time response as 1.5 seconds. Station information report (SIR)92-031
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recommends that the Technical Specification bases be revised to reflect the correct response
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times. North Atlantic ph to submit a technical specification amendment request to change
the technical specification bases.
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The inspector reviewed MMOD 92-549, Calculation SBC-128, and Procedure EX1806.001,
Revision 2, "RPS and ESFAS Response Time Summation Procedure." The inspector
concluded that North Atlantic accountr4 for the time-delay concerns identified in
Westinghouse Technical Bulletin NSD-7B-92-03-RO.
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6.3
China Flanges
NRC Inspection Report No. 50-443/92-25 documented North Atlantic's actions for
identifying flanges made in China. North Atlantic incorrectly ins.alled six of the non-safety-
related flanges in a safety-related system. The inspector discussed North Atlantic's findings
with the administrative services manager, the mechanical engineering manager, the nuclear
quality manager, and their staffs.
North Atlantic identified 239 flanges stamped with the word " CHINA." The flanges ranged
from one inch slip-on flanges to ten inch weld necks. Most of the flanges were in inventory.
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North Atlantic returned 192 flanges to vendors and plans to return or destmy the 28 flanges
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remaining in inventory. Nuclear quality engineers qualified the 13 chin , langes, installed in
non-safety systems, either through hardness testing or engineering analysis.
North Atlantic identified six china flanges in the safety-related control building air ventilation
(CBA) system. The flanges supported radiation monitors in the air supply piping to the CBA
fans. Nuclear quality engineers qualified the six flanges for the safety-related application by
using visual and hardness tests. North Atlantic sent a china flange to an independent
laboratory for destructive testing. The material and chemical tests verified the flange was
made of A105 steel, the type of steel engineers had oniered. North Atlantic found no
substandard china flanges. North Atlantic purchased the china flanges as nonsafety-related
material and the flanges shou'd not have been installed in a safety-related system. The
inspector noted that North Atlantic's efforts to identify test and control china flanges were
thorough and complete.
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The inspector reviewed operational information report (OIR)92-124, that evaluated the use of
nonsafety class material in safety-related systems. The OIR concluded that the installation of
nonsafety-related material in a safety-related application was due to the improper listing of the
safety classification of material in design coordination report (DCR) 90-14. The DCR
controlled the installation of radiation monitors in the CBA and containment area purge
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(COP) systems. The design engineer, who prepared the DCR, improperly listed the
classification of the systems as non-safety. During review of DCR 90-14, the cognizant
instrument and control engineer did not question the non-safety classification of the systems.
The issue ticket for the flanges listed the DCR number instead of the required work request
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number. The work request properly identified the systems as safety-related. The storekeeper
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issued nonsafety-related material based on the incorrect bill of materials. As a result,
workers installed 16 nonsafety grade flanges and weldolets in the CBA and COP systems.
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The 16 nonsafety-related flanges and weldolets included the six china flanges in the CBA
system. The nuclear quality group qualified the 16 flanges for safety-related use based on in
place testing results.
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OIR 92-124 included five recommendations with various completion dates befom
March 1,1992. The inspector reviewed the status of the recommendations. The nuclear
quality group (NQG) reviewed DCRs to determine if similar safety class classification
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problem existed. The NQG engineers identified five DCRs for systems that are similar to the
CBA and COP systems, ANS class 3, non-ASME class. The engineers reviewed the DCR
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bill of materials for about 70 items and concluded the safety class classification problem
identified in OIR 92-124 was not generic. The engineering depanment drafted a revision to
engineering design standard 37165, which revised the DCR bill of material to include a safety
class designation in addition to a construction code designation. The engineering department
conducted triming on the revision on April 7,1992.
The engineering department's corrective actions were not completed promptly, as evidenced
by completing some OIR recommendations after the assigned completion dates. Based on
NQG reviews, the inspector determined that the installation of non-safety grade flanges under
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DCR 90-14 was an isolated event. The unlikely failure of the flanges would not degisde
plant safety since the air supply piping is at or near atmospheric pressure. The inspector
concluded that engineering effons to identify the root cause for installing non-safety grade
material in safety grade systems were adequate.
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6.4
Incretsed Steam IIeader Pressure
Technical support engineers noted an increase in steam header pressure of seven pounds per
square inch gauge since November 1992. The inspector discussed the change with engineers
to determine the potential effects on the primary coolant system or the reactor core.
Technical support engineers trend 180 instruments readings for the primary and secondary
systems. The engineers evaluate the instmment readings for degrading plant conditions or for
failing instruments.
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The engineers decided that the reduction in ocean temperature contributed to the increased
steam header pressure. As ocean temperature decreased, the subcooling in the condenser
increased resulting in a higher condenser v=uum. The higher condenser vacuum increased
turbine efficiency. The increased subcooling reduced the efficiency of the feedwater heaters.
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As a result, plant efficiency remained about the same while turbine efficiency increased.
With a constant plant efficiency the operators maintained a constant electrical output to keep
core thermal power below licensed limits. To maintain electrical output constant, the turbine
generator electro-hydraulic control system shut the main steam control valves causing steam
header pressure to increase. The technical support engineers expected steam header pressure
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to decrease as ocean temperature increases. The engineers noted no changes in primary
instrument readings and continued to evaluate the cause of the higher steam header pressure.
The inspector noted that technical support engineers closely monitor, trend, and evaluate
instrument readings.
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6.5
Service Water Pump Failure
After a winter storm on December 12, 1992, the 'C' and 'D' service water pumps required
replacement. The inspector met with technical support and quality assurance personnel to
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discuss the history and failure of the service water pumps. The pumps were placed in service
in 1985. During the first refueling outage mechanics removed, refurbished, and reinstalled
the 'A' and 'B' service water pumps. During the second refueling outage, mechanics
replaced the 'C' and 'D' pumps with rebuilt pumps.
The inspector examined the 'C' pump impellers, suction bell, suction bowls, columns,
bearings, and shaft. The shaft was worn on one side at the bearing supports. The worst case
of shaft wear was 3/32 of an inch deep. The lower seismic support near the pump bell had
indentation marks that were more pronounced on one side.
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A consultant visited the site on January 11,1993, visually inspected the 'C' service water
pump, and discussed problems with site personnel. North Atlantic sent the impellers to
Johnson Pump Company, Nuclear Service Division, for a dynamic balance check. The
balance check indicated that the impellers were " grossly" out-of-balance. The consultant
wrote report number PV-276, " Investigation of In-Service Failure of Service Water Pump 1-
SW-P-41C at Seabrook Nuclear Plant," dated January 19, 1993, and revised
February 24,1993. The report identified the most probable cause of the pump failure as
abrasive particles in the water caused by a winter storm. Since the pump is lubricated by
ocean water, any abrasive material in the water passes through the bearings. The abrasive
material particles caused accelerated wear of the shaft bearing journals. Additionally, the
pump impellers were " grossly" out-of-balance, which contributed to the failure of the pump.
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On February 9,1993, the 'D' service water pump experienced high vibration. The operators
stopped the pump and declared it inoperable. Details on replacing the pump are discussed in
NRC Inspection Report No. 50-443/93-02. The inspector examined the 'D' pump shaft and
noted that the wear at the bearing support was less than that seen on the 'C' pump. The 'D'
pump impellers were also sent to Johnson Pump Company for a dynamic balance check. The
balance check indicated that the impellers were also out-of-balance.
North Atlantic had Johnson Pump Company check a total of six impellers. Johnson Pump
Company found all impellers out-of-balance, of which five impellers were " grossly" out-of-
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balance. North Atlantic concluded that the unbalanced impellers were a factor in the
accelerated wear of the 'C' and 'D' service water pumps. Although the 'D' }.. up was found
with out-of-balance impellers, the pump had run from 1985 through February 9,1993, with
the same impeller; therefore, the primary root cause of the pump failure was attributed to
abrasive material in the bearing water experienced from the December 12,1992, storm.
North Atlantic concluded, in engineering evaluation number 93-16, that the out-of-balanced
impellers were not reportable under 10 CFR 21. However, North Atlantic plans to submit a
voluntary licensee event report.
The inspector concluded that North Atlantic had identified the root causes of the service water
pump failures.
7.0
SAFETY ASSESSMENT / QUALITY VERIFICATION (71707,92701)
7.1
Review of Licensee Event Reports
Residual Heat Removal Pumo Thrust Bearing Failure. LER 88-09-01 (Closed)
The inspector reviewed supplemental licensee event report (LER) 88-09-01. North Atlantic
submitted the supplemental LER to update site specific information regarding the premature
failure of residual heat removal (RHR) pump bearings. The technical information was
reviewed in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-443/92-80 and discussed in NRC Information Notice 93-08. North Atlantic's supplemental LER provided detailed information concerning
RHR pump testing and modifications. This LER is closed.
Improper Operation of the Control Room Ventilation System. LER 92-10 (Closed)
The inspector documented and assessed this event in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-443/92-
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15. North Atlantic completed an engineering evaluation that determined the control room
ventilation system operated outside its design basis; however, the system still met the
operability requirements. North Atlantic committed to issue a technical classification, which
documented the conclusions of the engineering evaluation, and to revise operating procedures,
which addresses abnormal main control room ventilation system conditions. The inspector
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verified that the issuance of a technical clarification was in progress. The inspector assessed
that this LER provided complete informati9n and reached well-supported conclusions. This
LER is closed.
Inonerable Cooling Tower Fans. LER 92-11 (Closed)
The NRC documented and assessed this issue in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-443/92-80,
which included a Notice of Violation. The licensee's response admitted to the violation. The
inspector closed the violation in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-443/92-24. As part of the
corrective actions, North Atlantic committed to conduct a review of all technical clarifications
to ensure consistency with Technical Specifications. North Atlantic corepleted the review and
identified no other technical clarifications that revised Technical Specificatian requirements.
The inspector assessed that this LER provided complete information and reachd well
supported conclusions. This LER is closed.
Inadvertent Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation. LER 92-12 (Closed)
The inspector reviewed this LER that describes an inadvertent steam generator blowdown
isolation that occurred during surveillance testing. An operator and instrument and control
(I&C) technicians caused the isolation when they failed to complete a prerequisite step in the
surveillance procedure. A contributing factor to the personnel error was the poor human
factors of the surveillance procedural step. North Atlantic committed to modify existing
steam generator blowdown procedures to improve the human factors of the procedural step
and the sign-off sheet used for installing electrical jumpers.
The inspector reviewed station information report (SIR) 92-39 that pertained to the event
reported in LER 92-12. The corrective actions included enhancement of two surveillance
procedures that use jumpers to bypass the steam generator blowdown isolation signals. The
inspector verified diat changes were made to the two procedures mentioned in the LER,
which enhanced the human factors associated with the use ofjumpers. This LER is closed.
Missed Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Test. LER 92-14 (Clozd)
The inspector reviewed this LER that reports a missed seismic monitoring instrumentation
monthly channel check surveillance test. The inspector assessed that the LER was well
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ritten and met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. This LER is closed.
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Blocked Scuppers on the Service Water Pumphouse Roof. LER 92-15 (Clost4)
The inspector documented and assessed this issue in NRC Inspection Report No.
50-443/92-15. The inspector noted that the blocked scuppers were not a reportable condition
because a Nonh Atlantic engineering evaluation concluded that the roof would not have
exceeded its design loading conditions during heavy rain. The inspector concluded that the
LER was of a voluntary nature and was well written. This LER is closed.
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Missed Chemistry Grab Sample. LER 92-20 (Closed)
The inspector reviewed this LER that reports a missed chemistry grab nample that was
required due to an inoperable component cooling water radiation monitor. The missed grab
sample resulted from personnel error. The inspector assessed that the LER provided
complete information and met the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. This LER is
closed.
7.2
NRC Region I Technical Issue Summary 93-06
Technical Issue Summary 93-06 describes an event that occurred at another nuclear power
facility where improper software changes rendered the anticipated transient without scram
mitigation actuation circuitry (AMSAC) system inoperable. The other facility did not test the
AMSAC system end-to-end at the end of each refueling outage as required by the licensing
basis.
The inspector reviewed the potential for a similar problem at Seabrook. The inspector
reviewed the licensing basis, held discussions with the system engineer, and inspected the
AMSAC cabinet installed in the control room. Further, the inspector reviewed the
surveillance tests completed since initial installation.
The AMSAC system was made by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC).
The AMSAC system at the other nuclear power facility was manufactured by a different
company. The design of the Seabrook AMSAC logic sy; tem has no programmable hardware
and no changes can be made to the software. North Atlantic met the licensing basis
commitment to test the AMSAC system every two months for the first six months and during
each refueling outage. The inspector verified surveillance procedures were in place and done
properly. The system engineer indicated that the AMSAC system has performed well.
The inspector determined that the issues discussed in the Technical Issue Summary 93-06 do
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not apply to Seabrook. The surveillance tests meet the licensing basis commitments and have
been completed properly. The system engineer was knowledgeable and reflected a good
safety perspective.
7.3
NRC Region III Technical Issue Summary 93-03
NRC Technical Issue Summary 93-03 and Westinghouse Infogram 93-003 describe a wiring
discrepancy found in the solid state protection system (SSPS) of an operating nuclear power
plant. The wiring configuration created a condition where the containment isolation phase
'B' circuit was not tested. The technical support department contacted a Westinghouse
engineer who had reviewed Seabrook specific SSPS wiring diagram and had found no
discrepancies. A technical support engineer reviewed the SSPS schematics and wire lists, and
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found no discrepancies. Instrumentation and control technicians conducted a visual inspection
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of the wires at two terminal board locations in both trains of SSPS and found no
discrepancies. A technical support engineer concluded that the discrepancy described in the
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Westinghouse Infogram did not exist at Seabrook.
The inspector reviewed the integrated tracking system closure form prepared by the technical
support engineer. The closure form included a clear explanation of the licensee's actions,
simplified diagrams of the wiring discrepancy, a telephone log of conversation with
Westinghouse, and a copy of the Westinghouse Infogram. The inspector concluded tlat the
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technical support department conducted a timely review of an identified industry problem.
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8.0
MEETINGS (30702)
Two resident inspectors and one NRR electrical engineer were assigned to Seabrook Station
throughout the period. The inspectors c)nducted back shift inspections on March 3,9,17,
and 24, and deep back shift inspections on March 7,10,14, 21 and April 1.
The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed with the licensee periodically
throughout the inspection period. No proprietary information was covered within the scope
of the inspection. No written material regarding the inspector's findings was given to the
licensee during the inspection period. The inspector provided an oral summary of the
inspection findings to the station manager and his staff at the conclusion of the inspection
period. The licensee acknowledged the findings of the inspection. The Executive Director-
Engineering and Licensing stated that an engineering action plan had been developed in
response to the engineering issues identified by the inspector and that the implementation of
the plan would be closely followed.
A region-based inspector conducted the following exit meeting during this period.
DATE
S.UIUECT
. REPORT NO.
INSPECTOR
April 2
Radioactive Effluent
93-06
J.Jang
Monitoring
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ATTACHMENT 1
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
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Calculation Number SB6-441, " Tornado Hazard Probability Analyses," July 1,1991
Station Information Report 92-041, " Tornado Doors," initiated August 28,1992; completed
September 24,1992
Licensee Event Repon Number 92-13, " Tornado Design of Plant Doors,"
September 25,1992
Engineering Evaluation 92-29, " Tornado Barrier Evaluation," October 20,1992
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Engineering Evaluation 92-28, " Tornado Barrier Walkdown and Evaluation,"
October 23,1992
Calculation Number SB6-430, " Tornado Winds / Missiles - Days of Equivalent Tornado Risk
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Equal To or Less Than 1.0 E-06," March 21,1991
Yankee Atomic Memorandum, " Evaluation of Tornado Hazard for Repair of Tornado
Pressure Doors C-102 and P-1200," March 26,1991
Yankee Atomic Memorandum to New Hampshire Yankee Engineering Manager, " Program
for Temporary Removal of Tornado Barriers," June 13, 1991
North Atlantic Letter (NYN-92146) to the NRC, " Tornado Design of Plant Doors,"
October 23,1992
10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation for UFSAR Change Request to Include Site Specific Tornado Data,
October 1992
UFSAR Change Request to Include Site Specific Tornado Data, November 30,1992
Station Information Repon 92-041, Revision 1, " Tornado Doors," November 20,1992
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Licensee Event Report Number 92-13-01, " Tornado Design of Plant Doors,"
November 20,1992
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ATI'ACIIMENT 2
TORNADO DOOR TIME LINE
Dec.19,1989
North Atlantic issued LER on missing condensate storage tank
penetration seals. Engineering began developing a design base
document for station barriers.
Aug.30,1990
Engineers completed site barrier drawing.
Dec. 3,1990
Engineers identified six tornado doors that did not meet FSAR design
basis tornado differential pressure.
Jan-Mar 1991
Engineers calculated the venting time of buildings.
Mar 1991
Engineers decided to strengthen the six nonconforming
tornado doors.
Apr 12,1991
The engineering department manager decided to develop a site-specific
tornado.
Jun 4,1991
Engineers developed change authorization to 90MMOD-675 for
strengthening tornado doors during the first refueling outage.
Jun 6,1991
A contractor completed Calculation SBC-441 for site-specific tornado.
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Jun 26,1991
The engineering department manager accepted SBC-441 as the design
basis for Seabrook.
Jun 1991
The engineering manager met with his staff and determined that the
tornado doors were operable according to industry guidelines. The
engineering department failed to initiate an UFSAR update and did not
consider reportability of the doors.
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Summer 1991
Yankee Atomic engineers determined Seabrook met the tornado design
basis as described in the draft safety evaluation reports and concluded
no report was required.
Aug 9,1991
Draft Tornado Evaluation 91-17 concluded that there were no safety
concerns associated with the tornado doors based on Calculation SBC-
441 and SBC-450. SSC-450 determined the maximum negative
pressure in the primary auxiliary building if a tornado door failed.
,
Aug 9,1991
Engineers completed calculations of the capability of tornado doors to
withstand differential pressures.
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Attachment 2
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Aug 12,1991
The station operation review committed approved the change
authorization to 90MMOD-675 to upgrade tornado door latches.
!
Planning assigned low priority to the modification due to the
conclusions of Tornado Evaluation 91-17.
Aug 14,1991
Engineers issued Stone and Webster evaluation of negative pressure
effects on safety equipment, which identified six instruments potentially
affected by negative pressures.
Sep 1991 to
Engineering held tornado door issue open to wrap up issues.
Apr 1992
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Feb 1992
Engineers began evaluating L% venting time of the emergency diesel
building.
Jun 1992
Engineers began evaluating the effect of positive pressures caused by
tornadoes on ventilation systems.
Jul 28,1992
Engineering issued a Yankee report that summarized information in
SBC-441.
Jun 1992
Quality assurance department, in response to a third party audit, began
developing a new procedure to enhance the corrective action program.
Apr-Oct 1992
Engineering resurrected issue of tornado doors while preparing the
Individual Plant Examination for External Events. Engineering initiated
a confirmatory study of tornados.
Aug 24,1992
North Atlantic received NRC letter requesting information on tornado
doors.
Aug 27,1992
North Atlantic reported tornado door nonconforming condition to NRC.
Sep 24,1;92
Licensing issued station information repon (SIR)92-041 with four
corrective actions and a reportability determination.
Sep 25,1992
North Atlantic issued Licensee Event Report (LER) 92-13.
Oct 1992
Engineering reissued barrier drawings with improved readability.
Oct 20,1992
Engineering completed Evaluation 92-29 " Tornado Barrier Evaluation,"
which incorporated information from draft Tornado Evaluation 91-17.
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Attachment 2
3
Oct 23,1992
Engineering completed Evaluation 92-28, " Tornado Barrier Walkdown
and Evaluation," which included evaluation of the effects of a tornado
on plant equipment.
Oct 31,1992
Engineering updated the UFSAR.
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Nov 20,1992
Licensing issued SIR 92-041, Revision 1, with 7 corrective actions.
Nov 20,1992
North Atlantic issued LER 92-13-01.
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Nov 30,1992
Yankee Atomic issued a UFSAR change including a 10 CFR 50.59
evaluation.
4
Persons Interviewed
North Atlantic Employees
J. Vargas
Manager of Engineering
R. Faix
Manager, Mechanical Engineering
I Waters
HVAC System Engineer
G. Myers
Design Basis Document Engineer
W. Dixson
Supervisor of Mechanical Engineering
I
Yankee Atomic Electric Comnany Employees
R. White
Manager
G. Harper
Site-Specific Tornado Study
D. Johnson
Structural Engineer
J. Wojcik
Engineer
B. Bouton
HVAC Structural Engineer
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