IR 05000454/1993007
| ML20044G039 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 05/19/1993 |
| From: | Cox C, Jickling R, Mccormickbarge, Reidinger T, Simons H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20044G030 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-454-93-07, 50-454-93-7, 50-455-93-07, 50-455-93-7, NUDOCS 9306010352 | |
| Download: ML20044G039 (25) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j
REGION III
Reports No. 50-454/93007(DRSS); 50-455/93007(DRSS)
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Dockets No. 50-454; 50-455 Licenses No. NPF-37; NPF-66
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Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company Opus West III 1400 Opus Place Downers Grove, IL 60515 Facility Name:
Byron Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Byron Site, Byron, Illinois
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Inspection Conducted: May 11-14, 1993 Inspectors:
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8//f/93 H. Simons Date
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? $3 C. Cox Datef
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n6sh4wW r/ir/95
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T. Re'idinger V
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R. JiMling ()
Date Accompanying Personnel:
H. Peterson i
J. Strasma P. Alloway
Approved By:
J. W. McCormick-Barger, Chief Date Emergency Preparedness and Non-Power Reactor Section
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9306010352 930520 PDR ADOCK 05000454 O
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Inspection Summarv
Inspection on May 11-14. 1993 (Reports No. 50-454/93007(DRSS):
50-455/93007(DRSS))
Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of the Byron Station's emergency preparedness exercise involving a review of the exercise scenario (IP 82302), observations by eight NRC representatives of key functions and
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locations during the exercise (IP 82301), and follow-up on licensee actions on previously identified items (IP 82301).
Results: No violations or deviations were identified. Overall exercise performance to a challenging scenario was very good. The licensee's
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controllers preperly controlled and critiqued the exercise.
No concerns were identified.
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DETAILS
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1, NRC Observers and Areas Observed j
H. Simons, Control Room Simulator (CRS), Operational Support Center
(OSC)
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H. Peterson, CRS T. Reidinger, Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)
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C. Cox, Technical Support Center (TSC)
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J. McCormick-Barger, F0F
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J. Strasma, Joint Pu r e Information Center (JPIC)
P. Alloway, JPIC l
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Persons Contacted K. Graesser, Site Vice President
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G. Schwartz, Station Manager T. Tulon, Operations Manager
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M. Burgess, Technical Superintendent
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D. Brindle, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor S. Barrett, Radiation Protection Supervisor B. McNeill, Emergency Planning (EP) Coordinator
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P. Elkmann, Health Physicist, Corporate Emergency Planning L. Holden, Corporate EP Operations Group Supervisor P. Eage, NRC Coordinator
M. Snow, Services Director
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B. Bielasco, Senior Site Quality Verification (SQV) Inspector l
R. Bastyr, SQV Inspector
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P. Johnson, Maintenance Superintendent
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J. Schrod, Operating Engineer Unit 1 i
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R. Wegner, Shift Operations Supervisor S. Wilson, Shift Supervisor The personnel listed above attended the NRC exit interview on May 14,-
1993.
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The inspectors also contacted other licensee personnel during the
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inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previously identified items (IP 82301)
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(Closed) Inspection Follow Up Item No.'454/92021-01:
During the 1992 exercise, status boards in the Technical Support Center (TSC) were not properly maintained.
During the'1993 exercise, the status boards in the TSC were properly
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used and contained current and accurate information. 'This item is-l closed.
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(Closed) Inspection Follow Up Item No. 454/92021-02: During the 1992 exercise, a weather forecast was not obtained or used in the Emergency
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Operations Facility (EOF).
During the 1993 exercise, the protective measures group in the E0F
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properly obtained a weather forecast and used it appropriately for
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considering offsite releases and protective action recommendations.
This item is closed.
4.
General
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An announced, daytime exercise of the licensee's Generating Stations
Emergency Plan (GSEP) was conducted at Byron Station on May 12, 1993.
- This exercise included full participation with Ogle County and partial participation with the State of Illinois. The exercise tested the
licensee's emergency response organization's capabilities to respond to an accident scenario. Attachment I describes the scope and objectives
of the exercise. Attachment 2 summarizes the exercise scenario.
5.
General Observations The licensee's response was coordinated, orderly and timely.
If scenario events had been real, the actions taken by the licensee would
have been sufficient to mitigate the accident and permit state and local
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authorities to take appropriate actions to protect the public's health
and safety.
6.
Specific Observations (IP 82301)
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a.
Control Room Simulator (CRS)
The operators were very familiar with the plant and the emergency operating procedures. They performed mitigating actions in-
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response to the emergency in an excellent manner. They were-
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adequately aware of plant problems and the required actions to place the plant in a safe and stable condition.
Command and control by the Shift Engineer (SE) was very good. He
provided well thought out crew briefings at an appropriate frequency.
Noise levels in the Control Room Simulator (CRS) were
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minimized while the CRS personnel adequately exchanged technical l
information, concerns, and plant information with the TSC and OSC.
In addition, the SE was quick to call in additional communicators when he realized an Unusual Event (UE) would be declared.
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The crew's ability to recognize, assess, and classify the
emergency conditions was very good. The CRS staff closely monitored the increasing iodine levels in the reactor coolant system and recognized when the UE threshold had been exceeded.
However, it was unclear at what time the SE actually declared the
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UE.
Even though the SE did not specifically announce the UE, the
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notifications to the State and counties were made within 15
minutes of the UE threshold being met.
t The Alert was properly declared when the spent fuel pool level dropped below the Technical Specifications limit. A very minor delay in classification occurred because an operator had to be r
sent out to confirm the spent' fuel pool level.
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Notifications to the NRC were performed in a timely manner;
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however, the CRS communicator was delayed by conducting an extensive review of the Reportability Manual prior to
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communicating with the NRC.
This manual should not need to be referred to for any emergency declaration since a one hour
notification is always required.
The use of the plant paging system was excellent. The need to evacuate the fuel handling building, the emergency classifications and the need to activate the emergency response facilities were all properly announced. The General Emergency announcement was delayed for about 30 minutes because the CRS crew had not been informed that the Corporate Manager of Emergency Operations had made that declaration.
Communications by the CRS crew were very good. However, better organization could have been used in manning the phones at the center desk.
For instance, personnel were picking up phones randomly, which created some confusion around the center desk.
Once command and control was transferred to the Technical Support Center, the communications greatly improved.
No violations or deviations were identified.
b.
Technical Sunoort Center (TSC)
The Technical Support Center (TSC) was staffed and activated in a timely manner. Minimum staffing was achieved in approximately sixteen minutes. Command and control was assumed by the Station Director (SD) after thorough discussions with the Shift Engineer and the TSC staff, and after determining the status of the offsite notifications.
Management and control of the TSC by the SD was excellent. TSC-directors coordinated actions, falling within their areas of responsibility, to mitigate the emergency.
Priorities were set-after thorough discussions with the CRS and the Operational Support Center (OSC).
Priorities were well tracked. The SD directed his staff to keep looking for potential escalating events. Therefore, the Radiation Protection Director and the Technical Director were prepared for the steam generator tube rupture and immediately recognized the event. However, the TSC
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staff were delayed in initiating the termination of the radioactive release because the OSC neglected to promptly inform them that the release was via a stuck open steam generator safety valve.
Accident assessment and classifications were excellent. The emergency action levels (EAls) were properly used to classify the emergency. The technical staff identified all applicable EALs.
Plant status was tracked and trended. Very good coordination was demonstrated between the technical staff and the environmental monitoring staff to provide an explanation for the trend noted from the containment radiation monitor.
The Radiation Protection Director and Environs Director closely coordinated their activities to develop the proper protective action recommendations. Numerous dose projections were made.
Good use of the field teams was demonstrated to detect and characterize the release. Habitability was continually monitored in the TSC. The Radiation Protection Director kept good track of the doses site personnel were receiving.
Notifications to the offsite authorities were timely and accurate.
Good coordination regarding the transfer of command and control was demonstrated when the SD transferred control to the Corporate Emergency Operations Facility (CE0F) but retained responsibility for an on-going notification update. Briefings in the TSC were frequent and informative. All staff members were encouraged to participate and ask questions.
The status boards in the TSC were well maintained and used. The use of a status board for tracking the Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) forms and the times that periodic followup notifications and TSC briefing were due was especially noteworthy.
No violations or deviations were identified.
c.
Operational Support Center (OSC)
The OSC activation process was rapid and efficient; however, security did not arrive until about 25 minutes after the page announcement was made to staff the facility.
The OSC Director demonstrated excellent command and control.
Briefings were frequent and thorough, with the OSC Director providing updates on plant status and the OSC Supervisor providing updates on the radiological conditions. The status boards contained complete information regarding plant and radiological conditions and the emergency response.
All teams requested by the TSC were dispatched in a timely manner.
The average dispatch time for inplant teams was about 10 minutes with no delays encountered. The teams were provided excellent
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briefings with an excellent level of detail for the radiological hazards that existed. The radiation protection technicians properly completed radiolt sical survey maps when appropriate.
Information flow to and from the OSC was generally good.
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one communications flaw was noted. When the OSC personnel identified the release pathway via the steam generator safety
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valve, the OSC personnel did not transmit this information to the other facilities for about 90 minutes.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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d.
Emeroency Operations Facility (E0F)
Security and clerical staff were dispatched to the Emergency Operations facility (EOF) at the Alert declaration. Access to the facility was quickly established. The clerical staff expeditiously set up the facility's status boards and procedures for the EOF staf f to use upon their arrival.
The remaining E0F staff were prestaged at a local motel and were released after the Site Area Emergency (SAE) was declared.
The Manager of Emergency Operations (ME0) arrived about 40 minutes-after the SAE declaration and began obtaining a detailed briefing from his TSC and CE0F ccunterparts.
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Upon arrival at the E0F, the EOF staff referred to their
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procedures, established communications with their counterparts, l
and performed their duties. The staff appeared to work well l
together and rapidly became knowledgeable of the status of the plant and the emergency response efforts.
The ME0 took over command and control after he verified that minimum staffing had been established, the EOF staff had been ~
l briefed, and the E0F staff and management had been asked if any
problems existed that should preclude the transfer of command and
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control.
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Although E0F staffing and activation were acceptable, minor -
problems were identified. A mock NRC site team arrived at the EOF and began interfacing with EOF staff within minutes of EOF staff's arrival.
For example, within 12 minutes of the ME0 arriving at the E0F and immediately after he received a briefing from the TSC
and CE0F, the ME0 briefed the NRC site team on the current plant
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status. The mock NRC site team was also observed spending a significant amount of time with the Protective Measures Director-during the early stages of E0F activation. These activities may
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have delayed activation of the facility. -If an NRC site team
should arrive at the early stages of the EOF activation, it would be appropriate for E0F management to delegate briefing
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responsibilities to knowledgeable subordinates.
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The security officer controlling access required all exercise
participants and controllers to sign in prior to being allowed access. Controllers are considered to be invisible to exercise players and should not have been required to sign in and potentially delay the players.
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Finally, activation was delayed while the ME0 tried to locate the emergency planner on his staff as he was not comfortable assuming command and control without ensuring this person was ready to perform her duties.
Utilization of a prestaged EOF staff and EOF activation timeliness are generic issues that are being tracked as Inspection Follow Up Items No. 454/92014-01 and 455/92014-01. A proposed revision to the Generating Station Emergency Plan, intended to address these concerns, was being reviewed by NRC regional and headquarters staff at the time of this inspection.
Management and control of E0F activities were acceptable.
Regular briefings were conducted, with input form all E0F directors, that discussed current status, issues and high priority tasks.
However, at the time the ME0 took over command and control from the Corporate Manager of Emergency Operations, most significant decisions, such as emergency classifications and protective action recommendations (PARS) had already occurred.
Periodic confirmation of these critical decisions-were observed to have occurred at the EOF.
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Status boards often contained information that was not current and i
did not contain important plant status information which might
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better focus E0F staff activities. The ME0 and his key staff conducted detailed, periodic teleconferences with TSC
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counterparts. These individuals then briefed all E0F staff on the results of the teleconferences.
The EOF protective measures staff performed several dose
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assessments based on offsite monitoring results, estimated releases and plant conditions. These assessments confirmed that existing PARS were appropriate.
They also closely monitored current weather conditions and obtained a weather forecast.
Following the issuance of the General Emergency PAR, the EOF staff
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verified the protective actions chosen by the State and determined that the State was taking more conservative protective actions.
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The E0F staff obtained a draft list of recommended recovery.
actions from the TSC and jointly developed a fairly comprehensive list of onsite and offsite recovery actions. An adequate discussion of the need to quarantine some equipment for later root-i
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cause failure analyses was held. The results of these discussions i
and recovery plans were shared with the mock NRC site team, whose input was sought.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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e.
Joint Public Information Center (JPIC)
Staffing of the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) was adequate with three spokespersons, a center supervisor, a public information staff member, and public information personnel in the
EOF preparing news announcements.
The JPIC was adequately activated and managed.
Security was
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provided at the news media entrance. News media representatives were properly signed in and badged.
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t The licensee staffed the briefing area throughout the exercise.
A public information representative was always available to
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respond to media inquiries.
Prior to activation of the JPIC, the
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licensee's corporate office responded to news inquiries.
r During the initial news briefing, at 11:30 a.m., the licensee's spokespersons were not aware that the event classification had i
recently been upgraded to a General Emergency.
This information was provided to the spokespersons during the briefing and the
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spokesperson appropriately passed the revised information to the news media.
Particularly during changing plant conditions, the licensee should ensure that the spokespersons have the most
current information before beginning a news briefing.
The licensee followed the initial briefing with a more detailed technical briefing on the details of the accident scenario.
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was particularly useful since the initial briefing was more
general in nature.
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conferred prior to each news briefing on the content and i
organization of the briefing. The coordination between the State
and local agencies was effective.
l No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Exercise Obiectives and Scenario Review (IP 82302)
The exercise scope and objectives and the exercise scenario were submitted to NRC within the proper timeframes. The licensee adequately answered the inspectors' questions pertaining to the scenario.
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involving both units, an unmonitored release pathway and multiple
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equipment failures.
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One minor problem was noted in the simulator set up. During the steam generator tube rupture event, an error in the simulator set up caused the release from the faulted steam generator to occur 45 minutes earlier than expected. This was appropriately handled by the controllers.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Exercise Control and Criticues (IP 82301)
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Exercise control was very good. There were adequate controllers to control the exercise. No instances of controllers prompting participants to initiate actions, which they might not otherwise have taken, were observed.
The licensee's controllers held initial critiques in each facility with participants immediately following the exercise. These critiques were well detailed.
The licensee provided a summary of its preliminary strengths and weaknesses prior to the exit interview which were in
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excellent agreement with the inspectors' preliminary findings.
9.
Exit Interview
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The inspectors held an exit interview on May 14, 1993, with the licensee representatives identified in Section 2 to present and discuss the
preliminary inspection findings. The licensee indicated that none of i
the matters discussed were proprietary in nature.
Attachments:
1.
Exercise Scope and Objectives 2.
Exercise Scenario Summary
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BYRON NUCLEAR POWER STATION
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1993 GSEP EXERCISE
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SCOPE OF PARTICIPATION
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May 12, 1993
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IEEE:
Daytime, Partial
0FFSITE AGENCY PARTICIPATION Ogle County, IEHA, IDNS i
PURPOSE:
Test the _ capability of the basic elements within the Commonwealth Edison Company Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP). The
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Exercise will include mobilization of CECO personnel and resources
t adequate to verify their capability to respond to a simulated emergency.
CECO FACILITIES ACTIVATED:
Control Room
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JPIC i
CECO FACILITIES NOT ACTIVATED:
N/A
The " Exercise" Nuclear Duty Otticer wili De riotsiteo or -sisuuiatie cycnts 2: c;pr??tiate on a real-time hac.is.
The " Exercise"-
Nuclear Duty Person and the balance of the offsite Emergency
Response Organization will be prepositioned close to the EOF and
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CEOF. in order to allow personnel from distant CECO facilities to fulfill their biannual participation requirement without impacting
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the Exercise timeline.
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i Commonwealth Edison will demonstrate the capability to make contact with contractors whose assistance would be required by the
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simulated accident situation, but will not-actually incur the expense of using _ contractor services.to simulate _ emergency
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response except as prearranged specifically for the Exercise.
Commonwealth Edison will arrange to provide actual transportation and communication support in accordance with_ existing agreements to the extent specifically prearranged for the Exercise.
Commonwealth Edison will provide unforeseen actual assistance only
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to the extent that the resources are available and do not hinder normal operation of the Company.
ZBYRON/150/1
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BYRON NUCLEAR P0HER STATf0N
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1993 GSEP EXERCISE
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MAY 12, 1993
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STANDARD OBJECTIVES FOR EXERCISES Rev 3 (1/26/93)
PRIMARY OBJECTIVE:
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Commonwealth Edison will demonstrate the ability to
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implement the Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) to provide for protection of the public health
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and safety in the event of a major accident at one of its Nuclear Power Stations.
SUPPORTING OBJECTIVES:
NOTE: An EOF designation includes all EOFs and the CEOF
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if activated as a Backup EOF. A CEOF designation weight Raw weighted is for activation of the CEOF as an initeria EOF ractor score score
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- Denotes critical objectives 1)
Assessment and Classification
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a. Demonstrate the' ability to assess conditions which warrant declaring a GSEP Classification within fifteen (15) minutes.
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i b. Demonstrate the ability to determine the highest
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Emergency Action Level (EAL) applicable for assessed conditions within fifteen (15) minutes.
I c. Demonstrate tiie ab;1ity b detta:U.e the ecct
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anpropriate EAL(s)' for-assessed conditions within
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fifteen (15) minutes.
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Notification and Communications a. Demonstrate the ability to. correctly fill out the NARS form for conditions presented in the
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scenario.
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b. Demonstrate the ability to notify appropriate State and local organizations within fifteen l
(15) minutes of an Emergency classification i
or significant changes in NARS information.
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c. Demonstrate the backup means of offsite
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notifications if the NARS network fails.
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v2iet a:w usieted Factor Sc:re score
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d. Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC immediately after the State notifications and within one (1)' hour of the Emergency classification using the Event Notification Worksheet as appropriate.
e. Demonstrate the ability to provide information updates to the States at least hourly and within thirty (30) minutes of significant changes in conditions reported on the State Agency Update Checklist.
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f. Demonstrate the ability to contact appropriate support organizations such as INPO, ANI, General Electric or Westinghouse, the Fuel Vendor, or Teledyne, for assistance during the Exercise.
g. Demonstrate the ability to maintain an open-line of communication with the NRC on the Emergency Notification System (ENS) upon request.
h. Demonstrate the ability to maintain an open-line of communication with the NRC on the Health i
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Physics Network (HPN) upon request.
1. Demonstrate the ability to provide information updates using the Event Notification Worksheet as appropriate to the NRC within thirty (30)
' minutes of changes in repo(16ble conditions when an open-line of communication (ENS) is not maintained.
j. Demonstrate the ability to provide informational announcements over the plant PA-system in accordance with procedures and policies.
-(CR)
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Radiolooical Assessment and Protective Actions a. Demonstrate the ability to collect, document and use radiological surveys for conditions presented in the scenario.
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ZBYRON/151/2
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b. Demonstrate the ability to evaluate onsite
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radiological information for conditions presented in the scenario.
1 c. Demonstrate the ability to provide appropriate
radiological protection (including clothing and respiratory equipment) for onsite personnel in accordance with procedures and policies.
d. Demonstrate the ability to prepare and brief personnel for entry into a High Radiation Area in accordance with procedures and policies.
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e. Demonstrate the ability to issue and administratively control dosimetry in the OSC in accordance with procedures and policies.
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f. Demonstrate the ability to perform habitability surveys in the Emergency Response Facilities in accordance with procedures and policies.
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g. Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain radiological controls in the Emergency Response Facilities in accordance with procedures and policies.
h. Demonstrate the ability to control personnel exposure per 10CFR20 emergency exposure Ibaits in accordance with proce$ ires and polfcies.
1. Demonstrate the ability to monitor, track and document radiation exposure to inplant operations and maintenance teams in accordance with procedures and policies.
j. Demonstrate the ability to respond to and perform decontamination of radioactively contaminated individual (s) in accordance with procedures and policies.
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ZBYRON/151/3
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score Score l
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k. Demonstrate the ability to identify appropriate
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Protective Action Recomendations (PARS) in accordance with procedures and policies within fifteen (15) minutes.
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i 1. Demonstrate the ability to determine the
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magnitude of the source term of a release.
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m. Demonstrate the ability to calculate Offsite Dose Projections in accordance with emergency
procedures.
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n. Demonstrate the ability to establish the i
relationship between effluent monitor readings and onsite and offsite exposures / contamination
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for given meteorological conditions.
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o. Demonstrate the ability to obtain a meterological
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forecast.
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l p. Demonstrate the ability.to determine the magnitude j
of a. release based on plant system parameters and l
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effluent monitors.
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q. Demonstrate the ability to calculate release
'f rate / projected doses with primary assessment instrementation offscale or inoperable.
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i r. Demonstrate the ability to collect and analyze
RCS and Containment Atmosphere samples using High l
Radiation Sampling System equipment in accordance with HRSS procedures and health
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physics controls.
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s. Demonstrate the ability to estimate core damage in accordance with emergency procedures.
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i t. Demonstrate the ability of the Environs Director to initially brief the Field Teams and keep them
aware of critical. information.
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Uaight Rm w2ighted
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Factor score sesra l
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-.u. Demonstrate the ability to develop effective i
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sampling strategy and effectively direct the Field Teams to assess the components of a radioactive.
release to the environment.
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v. Demonstrate the ability to collect _ and count field
samples in accordance with Environmental Sampling procedures.
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w. Demonstrate the ability to document field samples in accordance with Environmental Sampling
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procedures.
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x. Demonstrate the ability to perform dose rate
measurements in the environment.
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y. Demonstrate the ability to evaluate. field sample
results in accordance with procedures and policies.
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3-z. Demonstrate the ability to dispatch the Field l
Teams within forty-five (45) minutes of determination of the need for field samples.
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aa. Demonstrate the ability to monitor and direct
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Field Team activities in accordance with
procedures and policies.
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bb. Demon:itrats the ability to runiter Field Team activities.
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cc. Demonstrate the ability to transfer control of i
Field Team activities in accordance with procedures and policies.
4.
Emeraency Facilities
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a. Demonstrate the ability to establish minimum
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staffing in the TSC and OSC within thirty (30)
minutes of an Alert or higher Classification
during a daytime event [within sixty (60) minutes
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of an Alert or higher Classification during an off hours event) in'accordance with GSEP Section 4.-
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Fector Scen Scen:
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b. Demonstrate the ability to staff the CEOF within
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sixty (60) minutes of a "Significant Alert" or higher classification.
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c. Demonstrate the ability to staff the EOF within (site specifit) minutes of a SITE EMERGENCY or higher classification.
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d. Demonstrate the ability to augment the Control Room staff within thirty (30) minutes of an Alert or higher Emergency Classification in accordance with GSEP Section 4.
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e. Demonstrate the ability to transfer Command and Control authority from the Control Room to the TSC in accordance with procedures and policies.
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f. Demonstrate the ability to transfer Command and Control authority from the TSC to the EOF /CEOF in accordance with procedures and policies.
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g. Demonstrate the ability to transfer Command and Control authority from the CEOF to the EOF in
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accordance with procedures and policies.
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h. Demonstrate the ability to maintain current and
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accurste ir.fermation on Staties Boards by updating at least every thirty (30) minutes.
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i. Demonstrate the ability to maintain information on the Electronic Status Board in accordance
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with procedures and policies.
j. Demonstrate the ability to exchange data and technical information between the Emergency Response Facilities in accordance with procedures
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and policies.
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- (CR, OSC, TSC, EOF, CEOF, JPIC, OSC/ FIELD TEAMS)
5)
Emeraency Direction and Control a. Demonstrate the ability of the Directors and Managers to provide leadership in their respective
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areas of responsibility as specified in GSEP and position-specific procedures.
(CR, TSC, OSC, EOF, CEOF, JPIC)
i ZBYRON/151/6 j
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b. Demonstrate the ability to prioritize resources
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for Inplant Team activities in accordance with Station procedures.
c. Demonstrate the ability to assemble, dispatch and brief Inplant Teams in accordance with Station procedures.
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d. Demonstrate the ability of in-plant teams to perform their assigned functions.
- (OSC)
e. Demonstrate the ability of the OSC Staff and team members to conduct a thorough debriefing following
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the completion of assigned tasks.
- (OSC)
f. Demonstrate the ability to acquire and transport
Emergency equipment and supplies necessary to mitigate or control unsafe or abnormal plant conditions.
g. Demonstrate the ability of the Acting Station
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Director, Station Director OSC Director and MEO to provide briefings and updates concerning plant status, event classification, and activities in
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progress at least every sixty (60) minutes.
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h. Denonstrate the, ability to provide access for the
NRC Site Team in accordance with Access Control prccedures.
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i. Demonstrate the ability to provide an initial briefing to the NRC Site Team.
- (CR, TSC)
1 j. Demonstrate the ability to provide the NRC Site Team with adequate and timely information pertaining
<
to critical emergency response activities.
j k. Demonstrate the ability of individuals in the
Emergency Response Organization to use position specific procedures.
- (CR, TSC, OSC, EOF, CEOF, JPIC, OSC/ FIELD TEAKS)
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ZBYRON/151/7
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_1. Demonstrate the ability to assemble and account
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for on-site personnel within thirty (30) minutes of announcing the assembly.
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m. Demonstrate the ability to perform search and rescue for personnel not accounted for.
-(TSC)
n. Demonstrate the ability to identify and designate non-essential personnel within thirty (30) minutes i
after completion of Site Accountability.
- (TSC)
o. Demonstrate the ability to staff and setup a Relocation Center within sixty (60) minutes of initiating a Site Evacuation.
p. Demonstrate the ability to explain the evacuation route, brief personnel and arrange for traffic i
control prior to initiating site evacuation.
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6)
Recoverv
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a. Demonstrate the ability to identify the criteria to enter a Recovery classification in accordance
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I with procedures and policies.
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b. Demonstrate the ability to generate a Recovery Plan which will return the plant to normal operations in accordance with procedures unio pol *c W ~
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c. Demonstrate the ability to determine long-term recovery staffing requirements.
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d. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate recovery actions with the State.
7)
SECURITY a. Demonstrate the ability of the Security force to respond to an emergency situation in accordance with procedures and policies.
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ZBYRON/151/8 I
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.b. Demonstrate the ability of the Security Director /
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Safeguards Specialist to coordinate actions per the Nuclear Station Security Plan with the GSEP.
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c. Demonstrate the ability to establish access control to Emergency Response Facilities.
- [(TSC, EOF, JPIC (remote only))
d. Demonstrate the ability of the Safeguards Specialist / Security Director to coordinate emergency response action with appropriate offsite agencies. (e.g., evacuation routes with County Sheriff, NRC Safeguards personnel).
'
8)
PUBLIC INFORMATION i
a. Demonstrate the ability to activate the Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) within sixty (60)
minutes of EOF activation.
- (JPIC)
- b. Demonstrate the ability to respond to Media requests within sixty (60) minutes in accordance r
with policies and procedures.
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c. Demonstrate the ability to prepare accurate Press Releases within ninety (90) minutes of a
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significant event while in a Site or General Emergency.
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d. Dumtrate the.ahility to present accurate-media briefings within ninety (90) minutes of significant events while in a Site or General Emergency.
- (JPIC)
e. Demonstrate the ability to use visual aides to support media briefings in accordance with procedures and policies.
,
- (JPIC)
f. Demonstrate the ability to maintain a CECO representative in the JPIC at all times.
- (JPIC)
g. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate information with Non-CECO JPIC representatives for media briefings in accordance with procedures and
policies.
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i ZBYRON/151/9
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Byron Nuclear Power Station'
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1993 GSEP Exercise
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Hay 12, 1993
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General Information Offsite Conditions:
Spring 1993 has been both cooler and drier than average, and through today the May 1993 rainfall is 0.4" below normal for the month; the last rainfall
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was on May 5, 1993.
P The weathe r in the Byron / Oregon area (0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br />) is mostly sunny with
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some hazy fog in low-lying areas, temperatures are in the lower 50's.
There is a steady light wind from the east, with a steady barometer. This tfternoon is expected to be warm and sunny. Clouds and light rain are expected to be moving into the area by tomorrow (5/13/93) morning. The Rock River is lower
,'
than normal, with a current (0700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br />) level of 668.1'.
l Illinois Highway Department has announced that continued road work (Pot
hole repairs) will be continuing in the following areas:
(1) I-35 between Route 64 and Route 38 (north and southbound),
(2) North Ridge Road, north of Oregon Trail Road,
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(3) Route 72 between Pecatonica Road and the town of Leaf River, and (4) North Tower Road south of Montague Road.
Repairs are also being made to the Route 251 bridge over the Kishwaukee River.
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CECO Conditions:
l Nuclear Unit Status I
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bra 10wooo-nuus Power
.br i a 2. - J001 rower i
.. -
Ryrnn 1 inm; power
"--4P or.-2 npv i of so Dresden-2 Day 6 of 10 Dresden-3 951 Power
LaSalle-1 1001 Power LaSalle-2 801 Power
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Quad Cities-1 87% Power Quad Cities-2 100% Power
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Zion-1 Day 15 of 2 Zion-2 901 Power
'
Fossil Units:
84% available System Capability:
16,312 MWe Load Estimate:
13,600 MWe (0600 hrs)
Power Purchases:
270 MWe
'
Power Sales:
1,020 MWe
[
System Reserves:
1,962 MWe
!
System Status:
Green
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ZBYRON/13/1
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Byron Nuclear Power Station
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1993 GSEP Exercise May 12, 1993
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Narrative Summary l
Initial Conditions
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F Unit One:
Unit One has been operating at 1007. power for the past one-hundred twenty (120) days.
The 18 Safety Injection (SI) pump is out of service (005) due to
repairs necessitated by high vibration readings. Mechanical Maint l
scheduledtomakerepairsandreturnthepumptoserviceonMay12ganceis around 1300.
The Unit has been experiencing Digital Electro-Hydraulic Control (DEHC)
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problems and Operations Analysis Department (OAD) has been notified and are
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scheduled to begin troubleshooting by 1200 today (5/12/93).
Nuclear Fuel
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Services PHR Plant Support Engineers have been working closely with the
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station's Nuclear Group Engineers (NUKES) to resolve recent unexplained Reactor Core Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) problems.
Inco're Flux Haps have l
revealed increased localized axial peaking in quadrant four (4) of g )
!
station's core. Unit One has been experiencing increased Iodine (I levels
in the core for the past eight (8) days and the Shift Engineer has requested i
the Chemistry Department to increase their sampling frequency. Chemistry levels are below the Technical Specification's limit. The Unit 1B Diesel
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Generator monthly surveillance run has been scheduled for today at 0745.
Unit Two:
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Unit Two is in Day One (1) of an expected 59 day refueling outage.
Fuel Handlers are preparing the necessary equipment in the spent fuel pool area for
the upcoming Unit Two refueling activities.
Fuel Handlers are expected to i
test the Fuel Handling Building crane and grappling tools today to ensure-i their operability for the upcoming scheduled outage. The transfer canal is i
dry and has'not Deen flooded for refueling activities.
Unit Zero:
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Commonwealth Edison's Public Affairs Department has scheduled a tour of one of
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its nuclear facilities for the month of May.
Byron Station being among the industry leaders was chosen to host the tour services for a group in order-to
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provide intervenors (10 representatives) with an informed and educational l
background on the operation of a nuclear facility and the need to support
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nuclear energy.
Citizen for Efficient Energy (CEE), Union for the
,
Preservation of the Earth (UPE), and La.syers Aligned with Hind Energy (LAWe)
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are among the expected groups to tour the facility at (1000) today.
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ZBYRON/13/2
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Byron Nuclear Power Station
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1993 GSEP Exercise
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Hay 12, 1993
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Unusual Event (0800 - 0830)
At 0800 an audible alarm is received on the Unit One Control Room RM-ll, (IRT-PR006) Gross Failed Fuel Monitor indicating fuel failure.
Expected Action The Unit One NSO will call up the alarming channel and discover, the IRT-PR006, failed fuel monitor is the problem.
The NSO upon examining the EAls will discover that an Unusual Event should be declared as a result of the alarm.
The Shift Engineer shall declare an Unusual Event per EAL 2b (falled fuel monitor [_REPR005B (RM-ll _PS206)] indicates /.22 microcurielml indicative of 0.1% fuel failure). Chemistry will be notified to sample RCS and perform required Technical Specification Surveillance.
Alert (0830 - 0945)
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At 0815, the Fuel Hand?ers (Response Cell) will call the Control Room to inform them that a tool-box was accidently toppled over into the Transfer
+
Canal gate, severing an Instrument Air line, causing a rapid drop in level within the Spent Fuel Pool. The Fuel Pool will have dropped below the Technical Specification required level by 0830.
The Control Room receives an alarm on panel IPM063 indicating a problem with the Spent Foal Pit level.
The Spent Fuel Fit will continue'to orain untii it is either stoppeu by (ne station or~when tha Transfer Canal voluma levels ont with tbc Spant Foal Pool. At 0930 a fault occurs on the 1A Control Room Chiller. The Control Room Chiller breaker fails open causing an eighty-six (86) lockout and a loss of Bus 141.
Expected Action After being notified by the fuel Handlers of the accident involving the toppled toolbox, the Control Room should dispatch an operator to investigate.
The shift upon hearing the operator's report will then dispatch mechanical maintenance to troubleshoot and make repairs.
The Control Room NSO will investigate the alarm by using the BARS. An Alert will be declared per EAL 99 (Fuel Pool Level with irradiated fuel in the pool decreases below the Technical Specification limit) or EAL Sc (same as previous).
The operator will isolate the instrument air line at the Spent Fuel Pool location and should rttempt to add volume to the Spent Fuel Pool by aligning the RWST, Fire Protection, Primary Water or the Demins System up to pump water via a Fire hose or other means.
Electrical maintenance and an Operator will be dispatcheo to investigate the fault on Bus 141 as well as the Control Room chiller breaker failure. The Corporate Emergency Operations facility (CEOF),
lecated in Downers Grove on the fif th floor, will be activated in a support role at the Alert stage.
ZBYRON/13/3
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Byron Nuclear Power Station
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1993 GSEP Exercise
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May 12, 1993 Site Emergency (0945 - 1100)
The 18 and IC Feedwater pumps trip and the lA Feedwater pump will not start.
The Control Room receives the S/G Low-Low Reactor Trip alarm on panel IPHOSJ.
An Anticipated Transient Without SCRAM (ATHS) occurs and manual attempts by the Control Room crew to trip the reactor will result in failure.
The turbine will also fail to manually trip due to a clogged return line on the EH reservoir caused by an EH reservoir leak.
In response to the increasing pressure in the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), the Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) and IRY8010A, B, and C Safeties will lift in response to the pressure transient.
The resulting transient will cause the Pressurizer Relief Tank (PRT) to rupture and permit a release of radiative steam and fluids to the containment building and containment sump.
The IB Aux-feed pump falls to start due to low suction pressure resulting from a failed pressure transmitter. Two (2) Steam Generator (S/G) Safeties will have stuck open on the ID S/G. At 0948 the IB Chemical Volume (CV) pump will shear its shaft key and degrades below design operation capability.
The Control Room NSO will be able to observe low motor amps on the pump when monitoring the panel. When the Briefing Officers or Corporate Emergency Planner arrives at the EOF and attempts to power up the Emergency Management Center (EMC) visual equipment, the equipment initially starts-up but shortly de-energizes. All attempts to turn the equipment on by the power switch will fall. At 1005 the group of intervenors, scheduled to tour the site, phones the station manager from a gas station in Byron inquiring about the validity of conditions that they have heard via radio news announcements. They will request information about what they should do and the acceptability of going to the EOF for further information.
Expected Actton-An operator will be dispatched to the Reactor Trip Breaker to manually trip the reactor. A Site Emergency will be declared on EAL 3k (Failure of the Reactor Protection System instrumentation to initiate OR complete an automatic trip once a Reactor Protection System setpoint has been exceeded AND a manual trip was NOT successful). An operator will be dispatched to investigate the problem with the Aux-Feed pump. Maintenance will subsequently be called to troubleshoot the pump. An operator will be dispatched to investigate the cause of the low amperage reading on the CV pump and will discover that the pump has sheared its shaft key. Mechanical maintenance should be dispatched
,
to investigate and make repairs. Core Exit Thermocouple will exceed 1200 F.
Bus 141 will be restored allowing the plant to recover.
The IB SI pump will i
be returned to service.
The Briefing Officers / Corporate Emergency Planner should check the unit's fuse located inside of the Main Power Supply and
'
discover that is has blown due to a probable power surge.
The Briefing Officer / Corporate Emergency Planner will have to locate and replace the defective fuse in order to power up the unit.
J Z8YRON/13/4 l
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Byron Nuclear Power Station (
1993 GSEP Exercise
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May 12, 1993 Expected Action The Station Director or designee should inform the group of intervenors that the Station's conditions will not permit the scheduled tour to occur at this time anJ "Je to present conditions he does not have time to discuss alternatives.
The intervenors will contact Public Affairs and finally Communication Services to inquire about plant conditions and request permission to go to the Emergency Operations Facility to become better informed.
i General Emergency (1100- 1300)
The Steam Generator tubes rupture on the ID S/G due to the differential pressure increasing to 2600 psig (1000 psig above the design limit).
This result in an uncontrolled release to the environment through the ruptured S/G tube via the S/G s2feties. At 1130, a fire erupts in the CEOF Protective Measures area as a result of an electrica) fire under a workspace located in the facility.
The fire destroys an outlet and portion of a work desk causing the temporary loss of the area.
Expected Actions
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The Emergency Operations facility (EOF) should declare a General Emergency i
based upon EAL 2m (Challenge to two of the three Fission Product Barriers AND nrobable loss of the third Fission Product Barrier) based upon the Steam Generator tube ruptures. Mechanical Maintenance should be. dispatched to physical,1_y gag the S/G Safeties lh BYder to close the release path. The fire
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ourns tor'less-inan 10'.iiviates, however, i t Dui na q u i t r, iy.
A tire
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avtinguisher can be uscd to extinguich the flanies.
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ZBYRON/13/5
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