ML20069C103
| ML20069C103 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 02/22/1982 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-82 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8203080249 | |
| Download: ML20069C103 (2) | |
Text
4.7 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 4
CH ATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 m
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-m 400 Chestnut Street Tower II 30 T
February 22, 1982
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn:
Mr. James P. O'Ruilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - BABC0CK & WILCOX'S NONCONSERVATIVE ANALYSIS OF NEUTRON FLUX - NCR BLN NEB 8007 - FOURTH INTERIM REPORT On November 5,1980, R. W. Wright, NRC-0IE Region II, was informed that the subject nonconformance was determined to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). This was followed by our interim reports dated December 3,1980 and March 30 and September 21, 1981. Enclosed is our fourth interim report. We consider 10 CFR Part 21 to be applicable to this deficiency. We expect to submit our next report by April 27, 1982.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
. Mills, & nager Nuclear Regulatia and Safety Enclosure g
oc:
Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
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y Office of Inspection and Enforcement D
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission g
Washington, DC 20555 ItEC,F.lVED g7 MAR O E,1982> $
Mr. James McFarland (Enclosure) i Senior Project Manager simu mg 18 Babcock & Wilcox Company e'-
noc P.O. Box 1260 Lynchburg, Virginia 24505 Q4
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OWICUJ2N 8203000249 820222 An Equal Opportunity Employer
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ENCLOSURE BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 BABCOCK AND WILCOX'S (B&W) NONCONSERVATIVE ANALYSIS OF NEUTRON FLUX NCR BLN NEB 8007 10 CFR 50.55(e)
FOURTH INTERIM REPORT Description of Deficiency B&W's measurement errors assumed in determining Reactor Protection System (RPS) setpoints may be nonconservative under specific plant conditions. These errors may Lllow operation outside the established safety limits in certain design basis events.
The events of concern are:
small overcooling and small steam line break; large steam line break in containment; and the rod ejection accident.
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Interim Progress B&W has proposed both a hardware resolution and a software resolution to the subject deficiency. TVA is reviewing the two options.
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