IR 05000324/1986006
| ML20138C314 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 03/24/1986 |
| From: | Fredrickson P, Garner L, Ruland W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20138C302 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-324-86-06, 50-324-86-6, 50-325-86-05, 50-325-86-5, NUDOCS 8604020453 | |
| Download: ML20138C314 (8) | |
Text
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p E Ecgfg UNITED STATES
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D NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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REGION 18
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'.j 101 MARtETTA STREET.N.W.
ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
8 gy.....f Report Nos. 50-325/86-05 and 50-324/86-06 L'censee: Carolina Power and Light Company P. O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket Nos. 50-325 and 50-324 License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 Facility Name: Brunswick 1 and 2 Inspection Conducted:
February 1 - 28, 1986 Inspectors:
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P. E. Fredrickson, Section Chief ate Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: -This routine safety inspection involved.151 inspector-hours on site in
the. areas of maintenance observation, surveillance observation, operational safety verification, onsite followup of unusual event, ' plant modifications, and refueling activities.
Results: One Unresolved Item was identified - Post-Modification Testing of Valve Operators.
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REPORT DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees P. Howe, Vice President - Brunswick Nuclear Project C. Dietz, General Manager'- Brunswick Nuclear Project T. Wyllie, Manager - Engineering and Construction E. Bishop, Manager - Operatior.s L. Jones, Director - QA/QC R. Helme, Director - Onsite Nuclear Safety - BSEP J. Chase, Assistant to General Manager J. O'Sullivan, Manager - Maintenance G. Cheatham, Manager - Environmental & Radiation Control K. Enzor, Director - Regulatory Compliance B. Hinkley, Manager - Technical Support V. Wagoner, Director - IPBS/Long Range Planning J. Wilcox, Principal Engineer - Operations W. Hogle, Engineering Supervisor L. Tripp, Radiation Control Supervisor W. Tucker, Engineering Supervisor B. Wilson, Engineering Supervisor R. Creech, I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)
R. Warden, I&C/ Electrical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)
W. Dorman, Supervisor - QA W. Hatcher, Supervisor - Security R. Kitchen, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 2)
C. Tr'eubel, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor (Unit 1)
R. Poulk, Senior NRC Regulatory Specialist D. Novotny, Senior Regulatory Specialist Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, office personnel, and security force members.
2.
Exit Interview (30703)
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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 28, 1986 with the general manager.
The licensee acknowledged the findings without exception. One Unresolved Item * was identified:
Post-Modification Testing of. Valve Operators (paragraph 9). The item was discussed in detail and the licensee agreed to verify that Emergency Core Cooling System response times have been properly demonstrated.
The licens'ee did not identify as proprietary any of.the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.
- An Unresolved Item is a matter about'which more information is required to j
determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.
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Followup on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
Not inspected.
4.
Maintenance Observation (62703)
The inspectors observed maintenance activities and reviewed records to
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verify that work was conducted in accordance wii.h approved procedures, Technical Specifications, and applicable industry codes and standards. The inspectors also verified that:
redundant components were operable; administrative controls were followed; tagouts were adequate; personnel were qualified; correct replacement parts were used; radiological controls were proper; fire protection was adequate; quality control hold points were acWquate and observed; adequate post-maintenance testing was performed; and independent verification requirements were implemented.
The inspectors independently verified that selected equipment was properly returned to service.
Outstanding work requests and authorizations (WR&A) were reviewed to ensure that the licensee gave priority to safety-related maintenance.
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During a work request review, the inspectors fcund that several Unit 2 hydraulic snubbers had failed functional testing performed in accordance with Technical Specification 4.7.5.e.
The licensee reported that the number of failures (35) had forced them into 100 testing of all Unit 2 snubbers (over 600 snubbers).
The licensee is using a new computer controlled machine to test the snubbers.
All snubbers at Brunswick are made by Bergen-Patterson, Model 77 or manifold type. The licensee has re-examined their snubber maintenance and surveillance procedures and found them technically satisfactory.
Disassembly of failed snubbers started on February 27, 1986.
The licensee will continue to investigate the cause of the failures.
All Unit 1 snubbers were replaced with new or repaired snubbers last octage as prrt of the snubber seal replacement program. Unit 2 remains defueled. Thus, no immediate safety problem exists at Brunswick.
The inspectors will continue to follow the licensee's actions.
The inspectors observed / reviewed portions of the following maintenance activities:
86-AETM1 Containment Atmospheric Control Radiation Monitor 1260 Chart Recorder Preventive Maintenance.
86-AGHE1 Repair of Drifting SRM C.
85-ADIY1 Inspection and Functional Test of Molded Case Breaker on Diesel Generator Motor Control Center.
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86-AGPUI Rebuild Spare Snubber BSEP-0472.
MI-10-2K GE 480 VAC Molded Case Circuit Breaker Functional Test.
MI-03-3L10, Rev. 2 RCIC Steam Leak Detection Ambient Instrumentation Calibration.
OP-39, Section 8.3 Oil Addition to Diesel Generator No. 1.
86-AGAW1 RCIC Turbine Speed Contro! System Signal Converter Calibration.
PM-85-063 Service Water Piping Inspection.
86-AHZB1 Disassembly of Hydraulic Snubber E21-40SS107.
86-AIEP1 Disassembly of Hydraulic Snubber E21-58SS514.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Surveillance Observation (61726)
The -inspectors observed surveillance testing required.by Technical Specifications.
Through observation and record review, the inspectors verified that:
tests conformed to Technical Specification requirements; administrative controls were followed; personnel were qualified; instrumentation was calibrated; and ' data was accurate and. complete. The inspectors independently verified selected test'results and proper return to service of equipment.
The inspectors witnessed / reviewed portions of the following test activities:
PT-34.31.1.1 Portable Fire Extinguisher Inspection Administration Bldg., Old Training Bldg., Document Contr;l Bldg., New Training Bldg., etc.
2-MST-BATT11M Batteries, 125 VDC Monthly Operability Test.
PT-17.5 Carbon Dioxide Fire Extinguishing System Standby Batterfes.
PT-1.9 LPRM Calibration.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Operational Safety Verification (71707) (71710)
The inspectors verified conformance with regulatory requirements by direct observations of activities, facility tours, discussions with personnel, reviewing of records and independent verification of safety system status.
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- The inspectors verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 and the technical specifications were met.
Control room, shift supervisor, clearance and jumper / bypass logs were reviewed to obtain information concerning operating trends and out of service. safety systems to ensure that there were no conflicts with Technical Specifications Limiting Conditions for Operations.
Direct observations were conducted of control room panels, instrumentation and recorder traces important to safety to verify operability and that parameters were within Technical Specification limits.
The inspectors observ Q a shift turnover to verify that continuity of system status was maintained.
The inspectors verified the status of selected control room annunciators.
Operability of a selected Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) train was verified by insuring that: each accessible valve in the flow path was in its correct position; each power supply and breaker, including control room fuses, were aligned for components that must activate upon initiat'on signal; removal of
. power from those ESF motor-operated valves, so identified by Technical Specifications, was completed; there was no leakage of major components; there was proper lubrication and cooling water available; and a condition did.not exist which might prevent fulfillment of the system's functional requirements.
Instrumentation essential to system actuation or performance was verified ope ~rable by observing on-scale indication and proper instrument valve lineup, if accessible.
The inspectors verified that the licensee's health physics policies / procedures were followed. This included a review of area surveys, radiation work permits, posting, and instrument calibration.
The inspectors verified that: the security organization was properly manned and security personnel were capable of performing their assigned functions; persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the protected area (PA); vehicles were properly authorized, searched and escorted within the PA; persons within the PA displayed photo identification badges; personnel in vital areas w' re authorized; and effective compensatory measures were e
employed when required.
The inspectors - questioned the randomness of the licensee's system for selecting certain individuals to be searched at the PA entrance.
The licensee immediately changed' to 100% searches while they evaluated the inspectors' concerns.
The licensee changed their selection method to prevent compromise of the random selection process. The inspectors had no further questions in this area.
The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping controls, verified position of certain containment _ isolation valves, and verified the operability of onsite and offsite emergency power sources.
The inspectors briefly reviewed the service water system line-up for compliance with Technic'l Specification 3.7.1.2.
This specification a
requires that "The service water system nuclear header shall be OPERABLE with at least three OPERABLE service water pumps." The nuclear header has
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. only two pumps that will auto-start as a LOCA signal.
FSAR analysis requires only one pump to operate to supply ccoling water to the diesel generators during the first ten minutes.of. a loss-of-off site power /LOCA.
Three conventional service water pumps can be manually. aligned to the nuclear header.
The licensee has been working on a license amendment request for the service water system.
This issue -has been discussed with NRR and Region II before but with no resolution.
The inspectors will. continue to pursue this' issue during future inspections.
This is an Inspector Followup Item:
Service Water System Technical Specification Discrepancy (325/86-05-02 and 324/86-06-02).
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Onsite Followup of Unusual Event (UE) (93702)
The licensee declared an Unusual Event at 1:00 a.m. on February 24, 1986,-
when a contaminated injured worker was taken offsite to a local hospital.
The contract construction worker lost his footing in the Unit 2 drywell and
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fell against a support. He received a minor back laceration and complained of lost. feeling in his legs. He was placed in a Kendricks Extriction Devise (KED) to prevent any spinal cord damage. The licensee transported the man to the. hospital in anti-contamination clothing. A complete survey of the man was not performed since the KED prevented adequate frisking.
The licensee knew that some contamination existed on the man but could not determine the levels.
The licensee found, at the hospital, that the worker's anti-contamination clothing had one spot with 2500 counts per minute measured with an RM-14 frisker.
The licensee also found 270 disintegrations per minute on the plant stretcher used to transport the man.
The anti-C's and the stretcher were returned to the site.
The UE was
cancelled at 3:10 a.m. on February 24.
The inspector reviewed survey information, emergency plan implementation documentation and interviewed personnel to verify that the licensee carried
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out the actions required by the emergency plan, including notification of
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appropriate offsite agencies within the required time. The licensee did not declare the UE until after the man left the site.
The plant manager reported that the UE determination was made' after the Shift Operating j
Supervisor (SOS) called him. The SOS hesitated on declaring a UE since he thought it was necessary for the man's body (skin or internal organs) to be contaminated and not just his clothes for a UE to be declared.
The inspector discussed this interpretation with the licensee and stated that a i
man was contaminated if he or his clothes were contaminated and transported
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offsite. The inspector had no further questions.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Plant Modifications (37700)
On February 24, 1986, the inspector reviewed modification packages81-309, MOV Actuator Change for 2E21-F005A, and ~ 81-310, MOV Actuator Change for 2E21-F005B. These modifications replace the actuators and reset the circuit breaker trip setting for the inboard core spray injection valves on division I and.II respectively. Step 35.0 of the acceptance test requires the valves to be timed in the closed direction with the following note: " Max. closing time 27 sec. as per Tech. Spec."
Inspector review of Technical Specifications (TS) revealed that 27 seconds is the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) response time shown in Table 3.3.3-3.
Thus, the 27 seconds is the total allowable time for. actuation of the core spray system, i.e.,
logic response time plus diesel generator loading time plus core ~ spray pump starting time as well as the time for the 2E21-F005 valves to open and other components to actuate to their required positions. Modification 81-309 had been completed and full operability had been declared on January 26, 1986.
The other modification package acceptance test had not been perforraed.
Unit 2.was defueled; thus, the core spray systems were not required to be operable.
Review of the ISI data on the operable valve indicated that the valve performed af'.er the modification much as it had prior to the modification.
However, similar modifications of Unit I were performed during the last outage.
These modifications included the Low Pressure Cocling Injection System valves of the Residual Heat Removal System (IE11-F015A and B), and the core spray valves on Unit 1 (1E21-F005A and B).
The licensee has committed to complete a review to verify.that Units 1 and 2 ECCS response times have been properly demonstrated on operable systems.
Inspection report No. 84-31 issued a Notice of Violation for inadequate acceptance test in PM 83-262 in that the steam jet air-ejector radiation monitor was found inoperable after the modification had been declared operable.
Since the report No. 84-31 violation was issued within the preceding two years, the inspectors are evaluating the corrective actions associated with the violation to determine if the above identified problem should have been prevented.
This issue remains unresolved pending completion of the licensee's review and the inspectors' evaluations.
This is an Unresolved Item:
Post-Modi fication Testing of Valve Operators (325/86-05-01 and 324/86-06-01).
One unresolved item was identified.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Refueling Activities (60705)
The inspector audit'ed the licensee's training session for fuel receipt inspection certification. The presentation was by General Electric training personnel. The material was appropriate, easily understandable and included a video tape of an inspection on an actual fuel assembly.
The inspector also reviewed ENP-27, New Fuel, Channels, and Channel Fasteners Inspection, revision 2, January 24, 1985. The inspector compared ENP-27 with the presentation and found:
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Allowable adjustments were not addressed in the procedure.
These adjustments included adjusting the spacer to water rod tab clearance,.
. bending locking tabs on tie plate nuts to within specifications and adjusting expansion spring lengths and finger spring minimum gaps
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The procedure lacked a caution to not twist the bundle by more than 10 degrees to adjust the rod-to-rod spacing.
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ENP-27 did not specifically address applying lubricant to the channel fasteners prior.to assembling the fuel assembly.
- The licensee knew these items were not in ENP-27 and was in the process of revising the procedure. The nuclear engineering supervisor said that they had not typically - performed such adjustments themselves but r'elied upon General Electric personnel to perform these for them. (The General Electric fuel manufacturing facility is within 30 miles of the site.) They.do intend to incorporate some of the adjustments into ENP-27.
ENP-27 does list
"Neolube" lubricant 'in section 4.0, Special Equipment.
ENF-27 will be revised to require its use. The inspector had no further questions in the area.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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