ML20148C871
| ML20148C871 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 03/18/1988 |
| From: | Shawn Smith TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| 88-01, 88-1, NUDOCS 8803230152 | |
| Download: ML20148C871 (2) | |
Text
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 2000 Soddy-Dalsy, Tennessee 37379 C
March 18, 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commlssion Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Gentlemen:
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND~-328 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 AND DPR SPECIAL REPORT 88-01 REVISION 1 The enclosed special report is being revised to provide clearlfication to the description and analysis of events concerning two doors which were breached greater than 7 days. This event was previously reported in accordance with action statement (a) of Limiting Conditions for Operation 3.7.12, on January 29, 1988.-
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
.t. C k
Smith Plant Manager Enclosure cc (Enclosure):
J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Sulte 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339 NRC Inspector, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant h/
8803230152 880319 i L PDR ADOCK 0500032f '
An Equal Opportunity Employer S
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 2 SPECIAL REPORT 88-01 This report is being revised to provide clearlfication to the description and analysis of events.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On January 4, 1988, with unit 2 in mode 5 (0 percent power, 140 psig, 128 degree F), fire beach permits issued on December 28, 1987, for fire door A-71 (permit No. 5689) (to 2A containment spray and residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger room, Elevation 690, Auxillary Building) and for fire door A-72 (permit No. 5590) (to 2B containment spray and RHR heat exchanger room, Elevation 66 Aux 111ary Building) exceeded the seven-day limit allowed by Technic' Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.12.
Temporary hoses for service air and a 480V power supply for welding equipment were required to be connected to the permanent connections located outside the rooms, in order to modify the lower support structures of the containment spray heat exchangers.
The fire breach permits were issued to maintain the fire doors open so that temporary hoses and the power supply for the welding equipment could be taken through the door openings.
CAUSE OF EVENT The modification to the lower support structures of 2A and 2B containment spray heat exchangers was not completed within the seven-day period due to the extent of the work involved.
A management decision was made to maintain the breaches for the duration of the modification activities to permit the timely completion of the modifications. As a result, the fire breaches exceeded the seven-day limit of action statement A of LCO 3.7.12.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT The above described event is being reported in accordance with the requirements of action statoment A of LCO 3.7.12.
A roving fire watch was established to inspect the heat exchanger rooms 2A
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and 2B on an hourly basis as required by the action statement of LCO 3.7.12.
The existing fire detection systems for the heat exchanger rooms I
were operable and would have actuated in the event of a fire. Therefore, there was no danger to redundant safety related equipment, g
CORRECTIVE ACTION A roving fire watch at a regular interval of one hour was established for both 2A and 2B heat exchanger rooms immediately and maintained until the modification activities were completed, and the fire doors A-71 and A-72 were returned to functional status on January 22, 1988.
No further corrective actions are required.
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