ML20148M611

From kanterella
Revision as of 11:01, 11 December 2024 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot change)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Suppl Testimony of NRC Staff in Response to Intervenor Citizens to Preserve the Hudson Valleys Stipulated Contention I.B.5. Re Systems Separation
ML20148M611
Person / Time
Site: Green County Power Authority of the State of New York icon.png
Issue date: 11/07/1978
From: Burwell S, Joyce J
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20148M544 List:
References
NUDOCS 7811220082
Download: ML20148M611 (13)


Text

.

i.

O UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION J

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of

)

)

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE

)

0F NEW YORK

)

Docket No. 50-549

)

(Greene County Nuclear Power

)

Plant)

)

4 SUPPLEMENTAL TESTIMONY OF NRC STAFF IN RESPONSE TO CITIZENS TO PRESERVE THE HUDSON VALLF.Y, STIPULATED CONTENTION I.B.5 (SYSTEMS SEPARATION) i by Spottswood B. Burwell Joseph P. Joyce i

781122 Oon J

~

~

4 Spottswood B. Burwell Joseph P. Joyce 1

This testimony is offered in response to Contention I.B(5) of 2

Citizens to Preserve the Hudson Valley.

The contention reads as 3

follows:

4 I.

The preliminary Safety Analysis Report'("PSAR") prepared 5

by the Applicant does not provide reasonable assurance, as 6

required by 10 CFR 650.46 and 650.40 that (a) the health and 7

safety of the public will not be endangered, and (b) the Applicant 8,

is financially qualified to engage in the propose 6 activities in 9

accordance with the Commission's regulations in the following 10 respects...

11 B.

The PSAR is deficient with regard to its description 12 and analysis of the following design features or principal safety 13 considerations as required by 10 CFR 550.34.

.14 5.

The adequacy of the physical separation of rodundant 15

. safety systems, especially electrical systems, will not be 16 sufficient to insure the " single failure criterion" (i.e., that 17 a failure in one part of a safety system will not affect its ~ ~ - ~

l 18 (redundant counterpart]).

19 Spottswood 8. Burwell. The Staff assumed that this contention relates to 20 the physical separation of the electrical system. Therefore, we have not 21 specifically addressed the physical separation of other redundant safety systems.

22 However, the Staff has considered separation criteria (e.g., missile protection 23 and flooding) for all safety systems and concludes that the design description 24 meets the Staff's criteria for separation and protection of safety systems.

1

~

w n

~

-.n

.c

-,ww.,-

-w

Spottswood B. Burwell Joseph P. Joyce 1

Joseoh P. Jovce.

The independence of redundant safety related 2

systems for class 1E circuits is addressed in the Greene County SER 3

at section 7.1.2.

This testimony is supplemental to the SER.

4 The Applicant has identified the following design criteria in 5

PSAR sections 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 0.3.1 and 8.3.2 for assuring adequate 6

physical separation of redundant safety related electrical systems, 7

1.e., class 1E systems.

8 GDC-17

" Electric Power Systems" 9

Regulatory Guide 1.6

" Independence Between Redundant i

10 Standby (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution 11 Systems" 12_

Regulatory Guide 1.32

" Criteria for Safety Related 13 Electric Power Systems for Nuclear Power Rlants" 14 Regulatory Guide 1.75

" Physical Independence of Electric 15 Systems" 16 IEEE Std. 308

" Standard Criteria for Class 1E Power 17 Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" 18 IEEE Std. 384

" Standard Criteria for Separation of Class 19 1E Equipment and Circuits" 20 The above criteria establish the minimum recuirements for preserving 21 the independence of redundant class 1E electrica's

.tems through 22 physical arrangement and separation and for assuring the minimum 23 required equipment availability during any design basis events.

The 24 Applicant has adopted a design, as described below, wherein class-1E 2

l l

Spottswood B. Burwell Joseph P. Joyce 1

electrical equipment is physically separated from its redundant counter-2 part or mechanically protected as required to prevent loss of redundant 3

features for single events and accidents. The Applicant has indicated a

that separate redundant electric tunnels are provided for class lE 5

electric cables routed in ladder-type trays from the control area to 6

the penetrations and engineered safety features area.

These tunnels 7

provide protection against external fires, floods, missiles and effects 8

of high energy pipes.

In other plant areas where these hazards exist, 9

the minimum separation distance between redundant cable trays is 3 feet 10 between horizontal trays and 5 feet between vertical trays.

In the 11 cable spreading area the minimum distance between redundant class 1E 12 cable trays is 1 foot between horizontal trays and 3 feet between trays 13 separated vertically. Where termination arrangements preclude maintain-14 ing the minimum separation distance, the redundant circuits are run in 15 solid enclosed raceways that qualify as barriers or barriers are pro-16 vided between redundant circuits.

The minimum distance between these 17 redundant solid enclosed raceways and between barriers and raceways is 18 1 inch.

Essential power system cables, trays and raceways have unique 19 colors to identify their safety related systems divisional assignments.

20 The physical arrangement of the electrical equipment is as shown in 21 Figure 8.3-2 (sheets 1-8) of the PSAR.

22 For isolation devices in instrumentation and control circuits, 23 the Applicant has proposed to use fiber optic cables, photocoupled 24 isolators and isolation amplifiers. These devices will be qualified 3

Spottswood B. Burwell Joseph P. Joyce 1

to withstand shorts, opens, grounds and the application of maximum 2

credible AC and DC faults.

3 Based on the above stated design information provided in the 4

PSAR we fird that the Applicant has committed to sufficient design 5

criteria for physical separation of redundant safety related electrical 6

systems to assure that design can satisfy the single failure criterion 7

(i.e., that a failure in one part of the system will not affect its 8

redundant counterpart).

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 4

  • wesque*~ '

a- %ea-,,.=w>

..+m.

.m.

P t

i SPOTTSWOOD B. BURWELL PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS LIGHT WATER REACTORS BRANCH NO. 2 DIVISION OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I am a Senior Project Manager on the staff of the Light Water Reactors Branch No. 2, Division of Project Management. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission. As a member of this staff, I manage the safety review of applications for construction permits and operating licenses.

I manage and coordinate the review and evaluation efforts of each of the participating, specialized safety review branches to achieve a complete and balanced evaluation of safety matters with respect to siting, design construction, testing and operation of the facility.

I prepare the staff's safety evaluation report and its supplements using inputs prepared by

~

the participating review branches.

I serve as the principal staff spokesman to the applicant for the safety review.

I organize and present the staff's technical case before the Advi'sory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, sponsor the site suitability report before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board at the environmental hearings, and sponsor the safety evaluation report and supplements thereto before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board at the radiological safety hearings.

. ;.- -.. - l

1

.'t 1

i s

$pottswood B. Burwell.

i I joined the Nuclear Regulatory Comission in June 1969.

In this l

position'I have served as Licensing Project' Manager for the safety.

f l

\\'

reviews of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Cooper Nuclear Station, Mendocino Power Plant, Hatch Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1, Skagit Nuclear J

Power Plant, Clinton Power Station, Browns Ferry Unit 3, and the Greene County Nuclear Power Plant.

i I graduated from' North Carolina State College with a Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering degree.in 1948 and received a Master of Science in Mechanical Engineering degree from the same school in 1949. Following college I accepted employment with the Newports News Shipbufiding and

~

Drydock Company and worked on piping analysis and process system design for two years.

In 1951, I joined the David Taylor Model Basis (currently U. S. Naval Ship Research and Developtrent Center) where I performed j

vibration tests on ships and shipboard machinery.

In November 1952, I i'

joined John I. Thompson and Company, consulting engineers, where I was responsible for the preparation of instructions for the acceptance

. inspection and field assembly of naval ordnance.

In 1956, I joined the Nuclear Energy ' Products Division of ACF Industries, Incorporated.

In May 1959 this office was sold to Allis-Chalmer:;.

I remained with the Atomic Energy Division of Allis-Chalmers, until 1967. While employed by ACF Industries and Allis-Chalmers, I served as project engineer, project manager and section leader for a series of design studies on' research, military and commercial power reactors.

In 1967, I joined NUS Corporation where I worked on safety reviews of commercial power plants and equipment standards.

(

B t

i 3..

i Since joining the Commission I have attended short courses on Nuclear Power Reactor Safety, Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants and, PWR Systems.

I am a member of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, and a i

Registered Professional Engineer (1963, No. 4936) in the District of Columbia.

e l

t q

l e

JOSEPH P. JOYCE

?ROFESSIONAL OUALIFICATIONS INSTRUMENTATION & CONTROL SYSTEMS BPANCH DIVISION OF SYSTEMS SAFETY I am a Reactor Engineer, Sectior 8, of the Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch, Office of the Assistant Director for Plant Systems, Division of Systems Safety.

My primary responsibility is to review instrumentation and control sys-tems for Nuclear Power Plants.

The ICSB perfor-

  • c" hnical review of the design, fabrication and
wer plant, reactor protection and safety in-operation of r ir strumentation, control instrumentation and radiation monitoring systems; reviews the control systems for all power reactors for adherence to appropriate codes and standards; and performs a review of reactor control systems with; respect to systems reliability, stability, and transient characteristics. This review encompasses evaluation of applicants' safety analysis reports, generic reports and other related information on the instrumentation and control designs. Further, the Branch develops the bases for _ Regulatory acceptance criteria for instrume'ntation systems designs; evaluates the experience obtained during the construction and operation of nuclear' power plants and relates this information to future

?

i '

1 I

f evaluations and acceptance criteria; and participates in the development of Regulatory Guides and regulations pertaining to instrumentation and ccntrol sjstens.

I have beer, with the Nuclear Regula ory Cc7?ission since Sepcember 1974.

~

During this period I have participated in the review of instrumentation.

control and electrical systems of nuclear power stations and standard plant designs and in the formulation of related standards and regulatory guides.

4 Education I graduated from Capital Institute of Technology with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electronic Engineering. Other educational backgrocnd includes:

1.

Fiber Optic Communication Systems Course - Integrated Computer Systems (1 week) 1978, 4

b

]

2.

U.S. Navy Electronic School - 1 year, 3.

Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants - NRC sponsored (2 weeks)

1977, 4.

Boiling Water Reactor Simulator School - NRC sponsored (2 weeks) i

1976, 4

5.

Fiber Optics & Optical Isolators Course, Don White Consultants -

Training Institute (1 week), 1975, e

,-n.m

--,e--

--rq, e

~

m ym so m m

e--

y-y w

+,9c p

' 6.

System Design Course Using MICR0/ MINICOMPUTERS - National EngineeringConsortium(1 week),1976.

I Experience NUS Ccrpo-ation,1974 Hydrospace-Challenger, Inc., 197C-1974 Capitol Radio Engineering Institute, 1967-1970 Page Communication, Inc., 1966-1967 Western Electric, 1965-1966 Gar-Let Manufacturers, Inc., 1964-1965 U.S. Navy, 1960-1964 NUS - Systems design and analysis of the er.vironmental monitoring sys tems.

Cevelopment and preparatier. of the electrical site drawings required for the meteorological and air quality systems.

Involved in the design of underwater' systems used by nuclear power plants to measures and monite-all hydrology parameters.

ace l

Hydrospace-Challenger, Inc. - Reviewed the design of PM/FL (pe monitoring and fault locatior.) subsystem of the AN/BQ0-5 sonor sptem.

This effort required a familiarity with many analog and digital SHP (standard hardware program) modules to analyze the software and hardware circuitry of the PM/FL.

Performed analysis on the Spherical Array Sonar PFEC (preamplifier filter equalizer and clipper) subsystem, using ECAP prcgraming to simulate the electrical models developed during the analysis.

. Responsible for the design, analysis and preparation of electrical and wiring diagrams for the Sicnal Converter and Switchine Cao' net, which is the interface between the Simulation Ccrputer AN/UYK-7 and the Central Computer Ccmoiex.

Development and preparation of AN/BQQ-2 sonar system and MK113 MOD 6 fire control system interface drawings. An analysis was performed to determine the adequacy of the documentatior relating to the interface between sonar and fire control systems as installed onboard the SSN-667 submarine.

Ceveloped many werking models using FORTRAN IV to analyze preamplifiers, filter equalizer and active filters.

Capitol Radio Engineering Institute - Part-tine instructor grading

^

correspondence lessons in digital computers, mathematics and the 1

electronics series.

Page Communication, Inc. - Collected data in Germany pertaining to the reliability of the Pershing Missile System.

Western Electric - Installatior and test of peripheral telephone equip-ment.

Gar-Let Manufacturers, Inc. - Responsible for quality control of elec-trical ard electronic devices.

L o

. U.S. flavy - Supervisor of a 300 line dial telephone exchange, radio and amplifier shop.

l Me.-tershics Insti%:e of Electrical anc Ele: ronics Engineers l

l I