ML20199C198
| ML20199C198 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1997 |
| From: | Stolz J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Public Service Electric & Gas Co, Atlantic City Electric Co |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20199C202 | List: |
| References | |
| NPF-57-A-109 NUDOCS 9711190258 | |
| Download: ML20199C198 (6) | |
Text
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4 UNITED STATES y-s j
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-354 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.109 License No. NPF-57 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment filed by the Public Service Electric
& Gas Company (PSE&G) dated Se)tember 24, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of t.1e Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.
There is reasonable assurance:
(1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities vill be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Conaission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendraent, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-57 is hereby amended to read as follows:
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9711190258 971106 PDR ADOCK 05000354 P
(2) Technical Soecifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.109, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into the license.
PSE&G shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
3.
The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 60 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION d$]Ul DNQ N
John F. Stolz, irector Project Directorate I-2 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: November 6, 1997
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 1no FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-57 DOCKET NO. 50-354 Replace the following > ages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. T1e revisea pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.
Remon Insert 3/4 5-4 3/4 5-4 B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-1 B 3/4 5-la l
i l
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1-The emergency core evoling systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE bya
- a. At least;once per 31 days I
1.
For the cort spray system, the LPCI system, and the HPCI system:
a) Verifying by venting at the high point vents that the system piping from the pump discharge valve to the system isolation valve is filled with water.
b) Verifying that each valve, manual, power operated or automatic, in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct
- position.
c) Verify the RHR System cross tie valves on the discharge side of the pumps are closed and power, if any, is removed from the valve operators.
2.
For the HPCI system, verifying that the HPCI pump flow controller is in the correct position.
b.
Verifying that, when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:
1.
The two core spray system pumps in each subsystem together develop a flow of at least 6350 gpm against a test line pressure corresponding to a reactor vessel pressure of a105 psi above supprestion pool pressure.
2.
Each LPCI pump in each subsystem develops a flow of at least 10,000 gpm against a test line pressure corresponding to a reactor vessel to primary containment differential pressure of =20 paid.
3.
The HPCI pump develops a flow of at least 5600 gpm acainst a test line pressure corresponding to a reactor vessel pressure of 1000 psig when steam is being supplied to the turbine at 1000,
+20,
-80 psig.**
c.
At least once per 18 months:
- 1. For the core spray system, the LPCI system, and the HPCI system, performing a system functional test which includes simulated
' automatic actuation of the system throughout its emergency operating sequence and verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position. Actual injection of coolant into the reactor vassel may be excluded from this test.
- Except that an automatic valve capable of automatic return to its ECCS position when an ECCS signal.is present may be in-position for another mode of operation.
- The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable provided the surveillance is performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after reactor steam pressure is adequate to perform the test.
. HOPE CREEK 3/4 5-4 Amendment No.109
2/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM
+
PASES
..........................c.......................,......................
3/4.5.1 and 3/4.5.2 ECCE - OPERATING and EHUTDOWN The core spray system (CSS), together with the LPCI mode of the RHR system, is provided to assure that the core is adequately cooled following a lops of-coolant accident and provides adequate core cooling capacity for all break sites up to and including the double-ended reactor recirculation line break, and for smaller breaks following depressurization by the ADS.
The CSS is a primary source of emergency core cooling after the teactor vessel is depressurized and a tource for flooding of the core in case of accidental draining, The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the CS3 will be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop during reactor operation, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage to piping and te start cooling at the earliest moment.
The low pressure coolant injection (LPCI) mode of the RHR system is provided to assura that the ccre is adequately cooled following a loss of-c oolant accident. Four subsystems, each with one pump, provide adequate core flooding for all break sites up to and including the double erded reactor recirculation line break, and for small breaks following depressvrization by the ADS.
The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the LPCI system will be OPERABLE when required. Although all active comporants are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop during reactor rmeration, a complete functional test requires reactor shutdown. The pump t,.scharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage to piping and to start cooling at the earliest moment.
Verification every 31 days that each RHR System cross tie valve on the discharge side of the RHR pumps is closed and power to its operator, if any, is disconnected ensures that each LPCI subsystem remains independent and a failure in the flow path in one subsystem will not affect the flow path of the other LPCI subsystem. Acceptable methods of removing power to the operator include de-energizing breaker control power or racking out or removing the breake.
For s'e valves in high radiation areas, verification may consist of e
verifying that no work activity was performed in the area of the valve since the last verification was performed.
If one of the RHR System cross tie valves is open or power has not been removed from the valve operator, both associated LPCI subsystems must ba considered inoperable.
The 31 day frequency is acceptable, considering that there valves are under strict ada.inistrative controls that will ensure that the valves continue to remain closed with either control or motive power removed.
The high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) cystem is provided to assure that the reactor core is adequately cooled to limit fuel clad temperature in the event of a small break in the reactor coolarit system and loss of coolant which does not rsault in rapid depressurization of the reactor vessel. The HPCI system permits the reactor to be shut doen while maintaining sufficient reactor vessel water level inventory until the vessel is depressurized. The HPCI system continues to operate until reactor vessel pressure is below the pressure at which CSS operation or LPCI mode of the RHR system operation maintains core cooling.
HOPE CREEK B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 109
jf4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM BASES L
3/4.5.1 and 3 /4. 5. 2 ECCS - OPERATING and CHUTDOWN (Continued)
The capacity of the system is selected to provide the required core cooling. The }lPCI pump is designed to deliver greater than or equal to 5600 gpm at reactor pressures between 1120 and 200 psig; Initially, water from the condensate storage tank is used instead of injecting water from the suppreesion pool into the reactor, but no credit is taken in the safety analyses for the condensate storage tank water.
t HOPE CREEK B 3/4 5-la Amendment No.109 l
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