ML20199G904
| ML20199G904 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1999 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20199G898 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9901250059 | |
| Download: ML20199G904 (4) | |
Text
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wAsmwoTou, o.c. sossweet SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RFI ATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 250 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-59 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A, FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-333
1.0 INTRODUCTION
i On March 22,1996, the Power Authority of the State of New York (the licensee, also known as the New York Power Authority) proposed changes to the Technical Specification (TS) for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The licensee proposed changes to TS Table 3.2-2,
" Core and Containment Cooling System initiation and Control Instrumentation Operability Requirements," and to TS Table 4.2-2, " Core and Containment Cooling System Instrumentation Test and Calibration Requirements." The proposed changes also clarified the operability j
requirements for 4-kV emergency bus undervoltage trip functions. The licensee revised and supplemented the proposed changes on February 6,1998, and provided nupplemental i
information on April 17,1998 and October 30,1998. The revisions and supplemental information do not affect the NRC staff's proposed finding of no significanz hazards considerations.
2.0 EVALUATION The proposed changes to Fitzpatrick TS Table 3.2-2 and TS Table 4.2-2 are:
- 1) replace the generic actions for inoperable instrument channels with function-specific
- actions,
- 3) relocate selected trip functions from the TS to a licensee-controlled document.
The revised actions and AOTs simplify the use of the TS by providing trip function-specific requirements and by ensuring consistency with the Standard Technical Specifications (STS),
NUREG-1433, " Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric Plants, GWR/4,"
Revision 1, dated April 1995. Table 3.2-2 presently provides a generic actiors statement and generic allowed outage times for testing for various trip functions. The proposed revision provides function-specific actions for these items based upon the STS requirements.
For high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) or reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC), initiation instrumentation involves a total of four instruments, two in each of two trip systems. The associated logic is arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic. The STS provide a 24-hour repair AOT for these trip functions, regardless of the number of inoperable instrument channels, provided that system initiation capability is maintained. The staff finds that the proposed AOT 9901250059 990112 PDR ADOCK 05000333 P
. ensures affected instrumentation will be promptly repaired, that appropriate initiation capability is maintained, or proper corrective actions are required. Therefore, the staff considers these changes acceptable.
Similarly, with one or more channels inoperable for core spray, low pressure coolant injection (LPCI), automatic depressurization system (ADS), or containment spray initiation instrumentation, the rpvised actions permit full use of the AOT for repair when multiple instrument channels are inoperable, provided that system initiation capability is maintained.
The staff finds that the proposed AOT ensures affec'ed instrumentation will be promptly repaired, that appropriate initiation capability is maintained, or proper corrective actions are required. Therefore, the staff finds these changes acceptable.
The licensee's October 30,1998, letter provides a discussion of the application of notes associated with TS Tables 3.2-2 and 4.2-2. The licensee provided a detailed discussion of the application of Table 3.2-2 Note 1, which applies to the HPCI, RCIC, and standby gas treatment system functions. The discussion describes various scenarios where one or more instrumentation channel is inoperable, and how the notes are applied for these scenarios. The notes are applied in a different manner, dependent on whether or not system initiation capability is lost. This capability is lost when two instrument channels are inoperable in one trip system, but not when two channels are inoperable in separate trip systems. The NRC staff has reviewed this discussion, and concludes that the licensee intends to interpret these notes appropriately. Therefore, these proposed changes are acceptable.
The licensee also deleted the LPCI, core spray, ADS, HPCl, and RCIC trip system bus power monitors; core-spray-sparger-to-reactor vessel d/p; and LPCI cross-connect valve position indication from TS Table 3.2 2 because these functions do not satisfy the criteria of 10 CFR 50.36 for inclusion in the TS. Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act (the "Act")
requires applicants for nuclear power plant operating licenses to state the TSs to be included as part of the license. The Commission's regulatory requirements related to the content of the TSs are set forth in 10 CFR 50.36. That regulation requires that the TS include iterns in five specific categories, including (1) safety limits, limiting safety system settings and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions for operation; (3) surveillance requirements, (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls. However, the regulation does not specify the particular requirements to be included in a plant's TSs.
The criteria for inclusion of a requirement as a limiting condition for operation in the TSs are set forth in 10 CFR 50.36. The criteria are as follows:
(1) installed instrumentation that is used to detect, and indicate in the control room a significant abnormal degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; (2) a process variable, design feature, or operatirig restriction that is an initial condition of a design basis accident or transient analysis that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier; (3) a structure, system, or component that is part of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure of or presents a challenge to the integrity of a fission product barrier; and
. (4) a structure, s/ stem, or component which operating experience or probabilistic safety assessment has shown to be significant to public health and safety.
As a result, existing TS requirements that fall within or satisfy any of the criteria of 10 CFR 50.36 must be retained in the TSs, while those TSs requirements that do not fall within or satisfy these criteria may be relocated to other licensee-controlled documents.
The functions to be relocated only produce control room alarms, which are not relied upon for the detection of any transient or degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary. The operability requirements for these functions will be relocated to a licensee-controlled document.
The revised actions for inoperable instrument channels require the associated parameter to be monitored at least every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The licensee committed that any future change to the design, surveillance or operability requirements of these trip functions will be controlled under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. The NRC staff finds that these proposed changes to be acceptable, since they are consistent with the standard established by NUREG-1433 and are not otherwise required by 10 CFR 50.36. The licensee's commitment to control these functions under 10 CFR M.59 will be reflected by a license condition.
In addition, the licensee deleted surveillance of the trip system bus power monitors, core spray sparger d/p sensor, and LPCI cross-connect valve position indication. This deletion of surveillance requirements reflects the removal of the associated trip functions from Table 3.2-2, and are, therefore, acceptable.
In the original TS amendment submittal dated March 22,1996, the limiting csndition for operation (LCO) for core spray and residual heat removal (RHR) pumps required racking out the breaker of the affected pumps. The licensee,in a later submittal dated February 6,1998, stated that an engineering evaluation and review of past performance records have determined that the simultaneous start of two of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pumps on the same emergency bus would not affect the availability of the emergency buses. Therefore, the required actions were revised to remove the requirement to rack out the affected ECCS pump breakers. The staff finds this later change consistent with the plant design and, therefore, acceptable, in addition, the March 22,1996, submittal requested that the containment high pressure trip function that prevents inadvertent operation of containment spray during accident conditions be moved from the TS to a licensee-controlled procedure. The basis for removing the trip function was that it did not meet the criteria stated in 10 CFR 50.36. for items to be included in TS. The licensee, in a later submittal, dated February 6,1998, chose to retain the trip function in the TS on the basis of information in GE topical report, NEDO-31466, Supplement 1, " Technical Specification Screening Criteria Application and Risk Assessment," dated February 1990. The staff finds this acceptable.
With regard to the 4-kV emergency bus undervoltage trip function, the proposed TS amendment states that with one or more channels inoperable for the 4-kV emergency bus undervoltage trip functions, place the channelin trip within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. If the required action and associated completion time are not met, immediately declare the affected emergency diesel generator system inoperable. This is consistent with STS Section 3.3.8.1; therefore, the staff finds this acceptable.
3.0 CONCLUSION
1 l
Based on the above, the staff concludes that the proposed Fitzpatrick TS changes for core and containment cooling system initiation instrumentation are consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36 for items to be included in TS, the provisions of the STS, NUREG-1433, Revision 1, and the plant design, and are, therefore, acceptable.
4.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the l
proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.
5.0 i3NVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes j
surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (61 FR 20855). Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
i l
6.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by j
operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the I
common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
l Principal Contributo s: F. Gee and J. Williams l
l Date:
January 12, 1999 i
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