ML20211N122

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Discusses 971007 Predecisional EC on 971007 in Region IV Office Re Apparent Violations Related to Disabling CCS for Period of About 12.5 Hours on 970821.Agenda,attendance List, Apparent Violations & Licensee Presentation Encl
ML20211N122
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 10/14/1997
From: Gwynn T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To: Gambhir S
OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
Shared Package
ML20211N129 List:
References
EA-97-432, NUDOCS 9710160025
Download: ML20211N122 (107)
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Text

{{#Wiki_filter:e p>R 8'C%g uNifEDSTATES ,7 t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REotoN iv eT- , t %b d 611 RY AN PLAZA drive. SUITE 400 %,"' [ AR LINoToN. T E XAS 76011-8064 OCT I 41997 EA 97-432 S. K. Gambhir, Division Manager Engineering & Opestions Support Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station FC 2-4 Adm. P.O. Box 399 Hwy. 75 North of Fort Calhoun Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023 0399

SUBJECT:

PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE

SUMMARY

Dear Mr. Gambhir:

This refers to the predecisional enforcement conference conducted in the Region IV office on October 7,1997. This conference was convened to discuss apparent violations related to disabling the containment spray system for a period of about 12.5 hours on August 21, 1997, when an operator erroneously placed the control switches for the two containment spray header valves in the " OVERRIDE" position during a surveillance test. This meeting contributed to a better understanding of the events that led to the apparent violations in question and of the corrective actions the Omaha Public Power District has taken and plans to take to prevent recurrence of similar events. During this open meeting, a closed session was held to discuss private plant personnel information. This session lasted approximately 15 minutes, in accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this ictter will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room. Should you have any questions concerning this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you. Sincerely, ( O Thomas P. Gwynn Dir or Division of Reactor je t Docket No.: 50-285 License No.: DPR-40 9710160025 971014 gaa ^=ck **gg5 Illlllll!EIlIlllJillll!Il ]

p Omaha Public Power District

Enclosures:

1. Agenda

-2.- Attendance List -

3. Apparent Violations
4. Licensee Presencation cc w/ enclosures:-

-James W. Tills, Manager Nuclear Licensing Omaha Public Power District Fort Calhoun Station M 2-4 Adm. i P.O. Box 399 Hwy,75 - North of Fort Calhoun Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023-0399 James W. Chase, Manager Fort Calhoun Station P.O. Box 399 Fort Calhoun, Nebraska 68023 Perry D. Robinson, Esq. Winston & Strawn 1400 L. Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20005 3502 Chairman Washington County Board of Supervisors Blair, Nebraska 68008 Cheiyl Rogers, LLRW Program Manager Environmental Protection Section Nebraska Department of Health 301 Centenn!al Mall, South P.O. Box 95007 Lincoln, Nebraska 68509-5007 David P. Schor, MD, MPH, FAAP Low-Level Radioactive Waste Program HHS Regulation and Licensure P.O. Box 95007 Lincoln, Nebraska 68509-5007

4 Omaha Public Power District 3-OCT I 41997 bec to DCD (IE45) bec distrib. by RIV w/ enclosures: DRS-PSB MIS System RIV File Branch Chief (DRP/TSS) Director, WCFO B. Henderson, PAO C. Hackney, RSLO bec distrib. by RIV w/o enclosures: Regional Administrator DRP Director Branch Chief (DRP/B) Project E.1gineer (DRP/B) Resident Inspector G. Sanborn, EO DOCUMENT NAME: R:\\_FCS\\FC10-7MS.DRP To receive copy of document. Indicate ingx: "C" = Copy without enclosures "E" = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy RIV:PE:DRP/B 6fC:DRP/O D:DRP f) l RVAzua;dj/g WDJohnsqn TPGwynn Vff 10/6 /97 / 10/ g/97J 10/ /p/97 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

J Omaha Public Power District 3-OCT I 41997 bec to DCD (IE45) bec distrib. by RIV w/ enclosures: DRS-PSB MIS System RIV File Branch Chief (DRP/TSS) Director, WCFO B. Henderson, PAO C. Hackney, RSLO bec distrib, by RIV w/o enclosures: Regional Administrator DRP Director Branch Chief (DRP/B) Project Engineer (DRP/B) Pesident Inspector G. Sanborn, EO o ~ T DOCUMENT NAME: R:\\_FCS\\FC 10-7 MS.DRP To receive copy of document, indicate ingx: "C" = Copy without enclosures "E" = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy RIV:PE:DRP/B l6fC:DRP/B D:DRP l f) l l RVAzua;d[g WDJohnsqn TPGwynn pTf 10/6 /97 /' 10/ g/971 10/ /v197 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 1O3 cod

il'. I ENFORCEMENT ACTION 97-432 l l l 5y8REGy 0 Ay l h O,g $e-1 O o H E S p* l ~ R G ON V PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE l WITH l OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT i i i OCTOBER 7,1997 I I I

ENCLOSURE 1 PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT. CONFERENCE AGENDA i CONFERENCE WITH OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT OCTOBER 7,1997 NRC REGION IV ARLINGTON, TEXAS 1, INTRODUCTIONS / OPENING REMARKS - ELLIS MERSCHOFF, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR 2. ENFORCEMENT PROCESS - GARY SANBORN, ENFORCEMEta OFFICER 3. APPARENT VIOLATIONS & REGULATORY CONCERNS - PAT GWYNN, DIRECTUR, DIVISION OF REACTOR PROJECTS 4. LICENSEE OPEN PRESENTATION 5. CLOSED SESSION / SELECTED NRC & OPPD MANAGEMENT TO DISCUSS PRIVATE PERSONNEL INFORMATION 6. LICENSEE OPEN PRESENTATION (CONTINUED) 7. NRC CAUCUS (10-MINUTE) 8. RESUMPTION OF CONFERENCE 9. CLOSING REMARKS - LICFNSEE 10. CLOSING REMARKS - ELLIS MERSCHOFF l l ~. <.....n-

ENCLOStJRE 2 MEETING: NRC & OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT IN REGION IV / TCR

SUBJECT:

PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE EA 97-432-1 i DATE: OCTOBER 7. 1997 i ATTENDANCE LIST (PLEASE PRINT CLEARLY) l NAME ORGANIZATION POSITION TITLE My <AMBo!?Al N R C 195 Gt6 M '/ 6NFoncnisyrOR w l C MLY G/979 1 o PP O v P - p< e.searr Jim C h a.s c O PP O P l. o r TYl a v o c <- i m,c us se s.ao t s c.w <> H D t,a r.m a sm a arem ac P> n F>tsssie oreo suwr Tecuawn Aovtua i G A as eNo so../ ar Osuu l 44s L. OfPD smae-A%w&m Aw., i ch -I,A.c.I..- oeeo s x, F + s... c,,.. l FA e n L.A u z nue OPPb uesassu uMooA C H AA TDA l

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j. MEETING: NRC & OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT IN REGION IV / TCR

SUBJECT:

PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT' CONFERENCE EA 97 432 OATE: OCTOBER 7. 1997 ATTENDANCE LIST l (PLEASE PRINT CLEARLY) NAME ORGANIZATION POSITION TITLE Od ddewA D did PC D ED bDfk) Spier-live' c vf 3 L % i\\ch 0I24 WV/ Bas BraAk Cksf / i DanW ( pk) lJ20 dhd d S h u,x SJrw>n~tkn4 satm Au-~2 AWb - Le Lm WrAa ? / / 9 v i 1 1 i u 1 ] 7,%, 2 4 2. >-m 3 -w y w:

i; ENCLOSURE 3 i APPARENT VIOLATIONS

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PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT OCTOBER 7,1997

  • NOTE: THE APPARENT VIOLA TIONS DISCUSSED A T THIS PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE ARE SUBJECT TO FURTHER REVIEW AND MA Y BE

. REVISED PRIOR TO ANY RESULTING ENFORCEMENT ACTION. 1 4 l I 4

i APPARENT VIOLATION i 1. Technical Specification 5.8.1, requires that written procedures and administrative policies be established, implemented and maintained that meet or exceed the minimum requirements of Sections 5.1 and 5.3 of ANSI N18.7-1972 and Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 3.f(4) requires procedures for startup, operation, and shutdown of containment cooling systems. Procedure OP ST-SI 3008, " Safety injection and Containment Spray Pump Inservice Test and Valve Exercise Test," Revision 19, established, in part, written procedures for testing the containment spray system. Step 7.10 required that Containment Spray Valves HCV 344 and HCV-345 be placed in the closed position and that the containment spray valve test switches be placed in the test position. Contrary to the above, Step 7.10 of Procedure OP ST-SI-3008, was not properly implemented in that on August 21,1997, in addition to placing the containment spray valves and the containment spray valve test switches in the required position, the control switches for Containment Spray Valves HCV-344 and HCV-345 were placed in the override position. This would have prevented the automatic actuation of either containment spray header if required. f 't 1 THIS APPARENT VIOLA TION IS SUBJECT TO FURTHER REVIEW AND MA Y BE REVISED 1

APPARENT VIOLATION 2. Technical Specification 2.4, " Containment Cooling " limiting condition for operation requires, in part, that Containment Spray Pumps SI-3A, SI 38, and SI 3C and their associated valves, piping and interlocks be operable during power operation. The modification of minimum requirements for the specification allows for two of these pumps to be inoperable at any one time during power operation. Technical Specification 2.0.1 requires in part that, in the event that the limiting condition for operation cannot be satisfied because of circumstances in excess of those addressed in the specificatio,1, the unit shall be placed in at least hot shutdown within 6 hours, and in at least subcritical and < 300*F within the next 6 hours. Contrary to the above, the unit was not placed in at least hot shutdown within 6 hours and was not in at least subcritical and <300 F within the next 6 hours on August 21,1997, when the containment spray system was rendered inoperable from approximately 8 a.m. CDT to 8:38 p.m. because of the control switches for both containment spray header isolation valves being placed in the override position. THIS APPARENT VIOLA TION IS SUBJECT TO FURTHER REVIEW AND MA Y BE REVISED

APPARENT VIOLATION 3. Technical Specification 5.8.1, requires that written procedures and administrative policies be established, implemented and maintained that meet or exceed the minimum requirements of Sections 5.1 and 5.3 of ANSI N18.7-1972 and Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Regulatory Guide 1,33, Appendix A, Section 1.h requires procedures for shift and relief turnover, Procedure SO 0-1, " Conduct of Operations," Revision 33, provides procedural requirements for the conduct of shift and relief turnover, These requirements include: (1) the oncoming shift shall familiarize themselves with the conditions in areas for which they are responsible; (2) each person will brief his/her relief on the condition and status of that portion of the plant to which he/she is assigned, including abnormal conditions or alignments and inoperable equipment; and (3) prior to assuming the shift, each operator shall personally verify the status of important syster,, operating parameters, especially those relating to safety systems, Contrary to the above, on August 21,1997, the licensee failed to conduct an adequate shif t turnover in that the oncoming shif t did not identify that the control switches for both containment spray valves were in override, rendering the containment spray system inoperable, and that the off-going crew did not brief the oncoming crew about this condition, .THIS APPARENT VIOLA TION IS SUBJECT TO FURTHER REVIEW AND MA Y BE REVISED

APPARENT VIOLATION \\ 4. Technical Specification 5.8.1, requires that written procedures and administrative policies be established, implemented and maintained that meet or exceed the minimum requirements of Sections 5.1 and 5.3 of ANSI N18,71972 and Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Sect on i 1.h requires procedures for log entries. Star. ding Order 50 01, " Conduct of Operations," Revision 33, required that log entries into the official control room log be made when major plant equipment / systems were place in or out of operation, and to document compliance with the requirements of a Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation. Contrary to the above, on August 21,1997, operators f aile1 to log that the containment spray header isolation valves had been rendered inoperable by placing the control switches in override. Operators f ailed to properly log the operability of High Pressure Saft y injection Pemps SI 2A and SI 2C in that they were declared operabie prior to rendering the pumps operable by opening their respective discharge valves, in addition, as of 7 p.m. on August 28, operators had f ailed to log that Containment Spray Pump SI 3C was operable per Technical Specification. 2.4(1)b. The pump had been restored to an operable status on August 21. s THIS APPARENT VIOLA TION IS SUBJECT TO FURTHER REVIEW AND MA Y BE REVISED

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O AGENDA E Ei;~ <s. Gary Gates Opening Remarks Event Review Jim Cook e Thomas Heng Safety Significance Root Cause Analysis Bill Blessie Corrective Actions Chuck Carlson 9

O AGENDA y- \\ [. Human Performance Dr. Jack Stark LTOP Comparison Ron Short i O l Metro Chart / Summary - Jim Chase I Closing Remarks Gary Gates l l l 0

y; Event Revie3v n-i ~ Jim Cook Operations - Shi:S: Supervisor Objective: 9I l l To provide a c escription of the even:s surrounding the c.isabling of Containment Spray i O

1-O Event Review l l g Containmeir: Saray System (Tab No. D m Three CS Pumps m Two Spray Headers l m Hx for Each Header ~ l m Automatic Valve (HCV-342 /325) in Eaca Header - Norma ly c osec. - CSAS Oaens I j - Fails open l m This Event Disablec. Bota CS jO Valves (HCV-32 4/3z 5)

O i Event Review i i 'N 77-n. l Pre-Shi:S: Brief at 0600 on 8/21/97-1 u OP-ST-SI-3008, " Safety Infection and Containment l Spray Pump In-Service Test and l Valve Exercise Test," l Scheduled l m LO assignec. Lead Resaonsibility :o Per:'orm the Test l m Test Woulc. be Coordinated l With PMT for Work on Containment Spray Pump SI-3B g 1

\\. !O i Event Review [$ i~" l M Pre-Job Brief at ~ 07L5 hrs. m LO Conducted Brief With PersonnelInvolved in tae Test O (Tab 2, Original ST Pages) m Run One Pump at a Time Through Minimum Recirculation FlowpatL1 m Main Body Wi:h Indivicual Procedure At:achment for Each Pump lO

O Event Review l NE Se up for Testing Pumps u ~ 0800 - Ecuiament O aerator Reaortec. Loca_ Valve Lineu3 Comp. eted u OP-ST-SI-3008, Step 7.10, stated: Record the "As Found" positions for the Containment Spray control valves and test switches HCV-344 (AI-r, 30A) and HCV-345 (AI-30B), THEN place the valve and test switch in the Required position. As Found Required Valve Yalve Test Switch Valve Test Switch HCV-344 CLOSED TEST HCV-345 CLOSED TEST

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O Event Review ~ H i~i: e Contro: Swi:ches Mispositioned a: ~ 0800 m LO Placed Tes: Switches in O Required TEST Posi: ion m LO Placed Bon Spray Valves in OVERRIDE m LO Announced "My Alarms." m LSO Acknowledgec. Announcement 9

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O Event Review ERII ~ Tes: Delays Encountered a S:li:f: Turnover Comple:ed at ~ : 800 g m Tes:ing of Last 2 Pumps Turnec Over ':0 Night Shift a Last Pum? Test Comp: etec. at 1951 :aours 9

4 O Event Review t, r .a5 1__ Res: oration a Test Switches Returnec to "As-Founc " Position - O:?.? m "Saray Valve HCV-344 (HCV-345) O 0:f:? Normal" Annunciators Did Not Clear at 2038 aours - Discovered both spray valves were in OVERRIDE - LO directed to place the control switches in AUTO u One Hour Report to NRC Oaerations Center Mac.e at 2135 O

e Safety Significance L M I: Thomas Heng Supervisor Reactor Performance Ana:ysis e Objective: To discuss ile low safety significance associa:ed with :he disa aling 0:f containment spray. e'

O Safety Significance Issues

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. I((I a Maximum Containment Pressure m CCW Maximum Temperature ' S ray Pump Opera 3ility in O P Dead Heac.ec. Condition m 3quipment Redunc.ancy a Raciological Consecuences a Containment Air Cooling Coil CCW Voic.ing Susceptibility (GL 96-06) O l

Sa:,ety Significance Maximum Con"ainmen; Pressure ~L E EE5((. '2 m Accic en :s Tha^: CLlallenge Con:ainment Integrity - Yain S:eam Line Brea c (MSL3) Insic e Con 1:ainment 9 - Loss of Coolant Accic ent (LOCA)

6 ~ Safety Significance Maximum Containmen~ ;?ressure ~ II[~I m MSLB Accicent - Maximum Containment Pressure O Reac aec Prior to S aray Initiation - Not Limiting for CCW Temaera~ure O

ee Sa:,ety Significance Maximum Con ~ainmen" Pressure EE(( ^ m LOCA Assumations to Maximize Pea t Con:ainment Pressure - Large Brear (Limiting) - Loss 0: P O:?? site Power Coincident G' wit:1 LOCA (Limiting) - Fai ure of DG-1 (Limiting Sing e Fai:ure) - Loss 0: P::nstrument Air (Diverts Some CCW F:ow) e

9 6 Safety Significance Maximum Containment Pressure 1 L__ m Actual Plant Conc.itions Used - River Water Tempera:ure (74.3F) O - Raw Wa~er Ec ui 3 ment Avai:a3ili::y u Sensitivity :o River Wa:er Tennera nre Evaluatec. l 'I O 4 i ...,,, - _ _ _. _ _. ~. _, - -,. - _ _. -..,.. - - -, - _ _ - - - -. - - - - - - -. -. _ -... -. -.,. ~. -... _ -..,. - - - _.

1 Safety Significance Maximum Corr:ainment Pressure l"~ I m Results 0:f LOCA Case: - Maximum Comainment Pressure 58.25 PSIG O - Containment Suma Temaerature at RAS .2 F e At River Tempera:ure 0:?90 F - Maximum Containment Pressure 58.61 PSIG { 1 O L.

l0 Safety Signi::1cance .~ Maximum CCW Temaera~ure l ^ !.N r l m Assumptions Mac e to l Maximize CCW Temaerature: - Maximum # of CCW Pumas 0 - Failure of One Raw Water Puma - Low RW Puma Per 'ormance - Hig a Fouling on Raw Water Hea" Exc 1 angers lo

Safety Significance Maximum CCW Tempera:ure N 1. m Ac:ual Plant Conditions Used: - Actual River Wa:er Temaerature anc L, eve - Four RW/CCW Heat Exchangers g m Max CCW Temaera nre Case Results: - Pea c CCW Return Tennerature of 29.3 F - We l Be.ow 58 F Ana yzec Limit O

Safe:y Significance Cont. Spray Puma Opera Ji:i~y l(([ ~ m Mini-Recircula': ion Valves Locked Closed - Locked to Limit Loss of Containment S 3 ray F:ow O - Eva.uation Per:Pormed w aic a Permittec Opening t:ae Va ves - Pump Degradation Allowance anc Instrument Uncertainty Prevented Valve O 3ening - Reanalysis With Reducec. F:.ow - Valves Will Be O 3ened ;3y the End 0:'Octo 3er O

Safety Significance Cont. S pray Pum:? 03eraai;i:y E lI" s u Con:ainment S pray Pump O peraaility Issue - Potential Failure o ~ Saray Pumps Due to Deac Heacing 9 - Time Neec ec 'or Oaerator Resaonse - Punns Trinec or Valves Oaened O

O Sa:,ety Significance Cont. Saray :? ump Opera ai:i:y I![I m Results: - Analysis Precicts 30 40 Minutes 0:f Punn 03 era: ion Possible In Deac. Heac ec. Conc ition Prior to O Punn Fai:ure - SFSC Per:Pormed by STA's Veri:ies Spray Every ~ 0 Minutes - Veri:ication 0: P Containment S 3 ray Recuitec in EOP-00 - Punns Remain 0 3erabLe O l

Sa:,ety Significance Equi 3 ment Rec.unc ancy lTi ~ l__. m Equiamerr: Redundancy AvaiLaie: - Containmen" Coolers Provic e Rec unc ant Heat Remova. O - LPSI Punns Coulc. 3e Used to Saray Containment if Requirec - LPSI ?unns Can Recirculate Wa1:er Throug 1 SDHX A: iter RAS to He 3 Coo: Containment - Containment Fi:.tering Units Aie to Remove loc.ine O I

Safety Significance Raciologica Consecuences l_[_. ~ m For the USAR Radiological Consequences Analyses - Con ainment leaxage Assumec at o 60 PSIG Design Pressure - Ioc ine Removal From tLie Containmen~ Atmos 11ere by t:ae Saray System Not Creditec. - Containment Filtering Units Provide Ioc.ine Remova. - No Imaact on Consec uences ,O 1 ~..., - - - - - -,,.. - _. -... - -.

Safety Significance GL 96-06 Vulnerabili:y E l[~ ~ m Containment Air Cooling Coi: CCW Voiding Vulnerability (GL 96-06) - Not A:ffected by the Absence of O Containment Saray System Oaeration - Brief Time Interva. Por Everr:s Enc s Prior to Delivery o:P Saray Flow - No E:?fect on 96-06 Conc _usions O

.o Safety Significance Mb__ m Summary: - Maximum Containment Pressure Less Taan Design Basis 60 PSIG g - CCW Sys1:em Not Overloac ed - S 3 ray :?uma Operability Verifiec - Equi 3 ment Rec.unc ancy Verified - Racio ogical Consequences Ana.yses Unaffectec. - GL 96-06 Conc usions Not Imaactec. - Low Safety Significance

l l l I Root Cause Ana:ysis t :. Bill Blessie Operations - Shift Tec anical l Advisor 1 0 Oyective: To c.iscuss the Roo: Cause 4 Ana.ysis aerformec. as a resttt of this event. i O

j'. l*. lO Root Cause Ana:.ysis 4 [-f i m Human Performance m Acministrative/Programma:ic Issues lO m Management Oversigat/ Supervision m Training anc. Qua.ification m Ecuiament

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e Root Cause Ana~ysis EEbb m Everr: Specific Barriers Ana yzed - Opera':or Ski:l/Knowiec ge - Procec ure Ac ec uacy g - Self-C:aec1ing/Veriication - Communica: ion - Review of Con:rol Boarc s/ Annuncia" ors - Management Supervision and Oversight - Adecuacy o:? Previous Corrective Actions e l

O EVENT CANSES/CONTRIBETORS II'll ~ CAUSES m Cause No.1: Failure to O Recognize CS System Inoceraale - Bot:2 tae Test Oaerator anc Ot:aer 03erators/S:aift Supervisors O

EVENT CANSES/CONTRIBUTC'RS E EUI. CAUSES (Coir:inue8 / m Cause No. 2: Failure to Sef-CLieck O u Cause No. 3: Poor Communica: ion - Acinowlec.ging Annunciators - On-sai:Pt and during sai:'t turnover Too easily accepted that an ST was in progress e us

O EVENT CAUSES/CCNTRIBETORS

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- @gqg ' .s 3 ~ ~ CAUSES i Continuecn m Cause No. L: Ine:?fective Correc:ive Action:from O previous simi.ar even: b O

EVENT l CAL SES/CONTRIBCTORS a=. CONTRIBLTORS m Contri~3utor No.1: OP-ST-SI-3008, Ste a 7.:.0 0 - Containec mul:iple tasks - Open to interaretation m Contri~3utor No. 2: Inadequate Oversight Jy S~1i: P: Supervisor / LSO O

Other Items Consic erec, But Discountec EE$_ m Log Keeping O u Training O

e Human Per'ormance Issue EEEE m Recen: Events Directly Associatet Wit 1 Human ~ Performance - RCS Dilution Waen Rinsing in an g Ion Ex. changer (01/94) - Reactor Trip During DSS Testing (08/95) - Disaring LTOP (03/96) - Disaring Containment Saray (08/97) e

O GENERIC IMPLICATIONS EME m Weaaless in assessment 0:f Corrective Ac: ions E:f:Tectiveness for O Signi ~1 cant Even:s 4 O

9i l Corrective Actions EF-~ sm.. Chuck Car. son Operations - Shift Supervisor Objective: 9 To 3rovide in: Pormation on ':ae co1Tective actions resul~:ing :from the Root Cause Ana..ysis anc the Operations Sel:f-Assessment. 9

O Corrective Actions EE. CauseNo.1: No: Recogni7ing Ino 3erale CS Sys:em O m Crew Stancr owns - Reviewec Event a " Warning" Note Nex: to HCV-32 2 /32 5 Switc 1es ~ a Tes: Monitor Program Innemented (Ta3 3} O

e Corrective Actions (( Cause No. ~ : Not Recognizing Inocerab:e CS System (Cont'd'> m SRO Concurrence Rec uirec. to Disable Safety-Related Equipment 9. m Out-o:?-Norma. Switches / Illumina:ed Annunciators Form l (Taa L) - Discussed at Turnover and Mic-S:aift Brieing u Out-o:P-Normal Switch La ae:/ Col: ar/ Marker (< Tab 5'l q - Brig at Pink Color

l. O l Corrective Actions .IE 1 Cause No. ~ : No: Recognizing Inoneraale CS System (Cont'cn ~ O m Marxing of Expectec. Annunciators for ST's (Tab L & 6)1 m "OI-ES-3" Developed (Ta 3 7) - Key Switch Positions (e.g. ESF, AFW, DSS) Chec1ed Shift:y O i

O Corrective Actions l!!: ~ ~ Cause No. 2 : Failure to Self-Chec1 Waen Encomforta31e m Expanded Peer Check Program (Orange Tape) - HCV-3LL/3L5 Switc aes - ~ 30 other Critical Switcaes u Four Hour Standdowns Up.on Crew Returning from Long Brea1 - Revise 12-hour Shift Scaecule (Long Term Fix) G j

O Corrective Actions HEL. ~ Cause No. 2 : Failure to SeE'- Check When Uncomfortab e (Cont'c3 ~ m Su:?:?or~: Crew Members O Welcomec by SS a': S~1i: Et Turnover m Cognitive / Men:al Skills Assessmen: of O pera: ors li m Ap:? cable, but Previously Discussed - Crew Standdowns Ennhasized DUCS/ STAR Programs O - Test Monitor Program

O Coirective Actions EEET 1 Cause No. 3: Inadecua:e Communica: ion and Ouestioning Attitude m Enhancec.ControlBoarc. O WaLkc. owns During Turnover - Designatec. Boarc s for Detailec. Review - Inc.ivic.ual Wa (downs O

O Corrective Actions F. Cause No. 3: Inadequate Communication and Questioning Attituc.e (Cont'c) O m New Annunciator Standard Initiatec. for Expectec Alarms (Tab 8) Expectec Alarm" not acceptable Unless alarm previously identified by red tape - Read /Paraparase Annunciator & Reason -for Alarm O SS/LSO Acmowlec.gment

l O l C01Tective Actions l e a r l l Cause No. 3: Inadequate 1 l Communication and Oues:ionine Attitude (Cont'd; m pp.icable, but Previously g l Discussec. i - Management Concucted Crew l Standdowns i l - Out-of-Xormal Switch l La3el/ Collar l - OI-ES-3 - Out-of-Normal Swite:a/ Lit i Annunciator Form i e j l

O Corrective Actions Eli Cause No. L: Ineffectiveness of Correc:ive Actions to Preven: Recurrence O m Corrective Actions more Programmatic versus Event Speci:ic (i.e., LTOP) m Corrective Actions Invo:.ve Human Per:formance Enaancemen:s O

O Corrective Actions c E!!;. ~ Cause No. L: Ineffectiveness of Correc:ive Actions to Prevent Recurrence O m New Score Card Observa: ion Program (Tab 9) m Operations Deaartmen: Self-Assessmerr: - Week o:P September 8, ~ 997 g i

O Corrective Actions I5E Corr:ri~xt:or No.1: OP-ST-SI-3008. Step 7.~ 0 Coir:ainec Mu: :ip:e Taso- _no_ Uf S 0][ 345 l[o PSI l ~A_ PUMPS ,k b l g gi LOOP 2+ 84 0" l HOT LEG l f4 L._ x I 4-2 aj. """S i 9 'V g CONT. SUMPS l 2p g w a,. 3 p; R,,A 3, ,= M, 3 ^ /N. b

'l !O i Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1 I I OP ST-SI 3008 SURVEILLANCE TEST

Title:

SAFETY INJECT 10f AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP INSERVICE TEST AND VALVE EXERCISE TEST FC-68 Number: 48597 Reason for Change: Revise to support cancellation of Ops memo 97 02. Contact Person: D. Matthews Documentable Error (a): Page 1 Documentable Error (b): Page 41 ISSUED: 06-10 97 9:30 am R19

FORT CALHOUN STATION SURVEILLANCE TEST OP ST St 3008 PAGE 6 0F $4 i INITIALS /DATE 6.10 . Shift Supervisor authorizes the release of p necessary for the performance of Shift Supv Sig Date 7.0 E@CEDURE NOTE: The used to determine pressurels) pressure gauge (s) ion shall be within for data collect calibrat1on and meet the specifications for test equipment. NOTE: Independent verification m be performed any time during this procedure followin the applicable Step, Test.but must be performed prior t the completion of this NOTE: Steps 7.1 through 7.7 may be performed concurrently. I NOTE: The local puh.p discharge pressure isolationvalvesmayremainopenduringtNu$euration of the Surveillance Test. All gauges must be isolated attheconclusionoftestingthe,lgt, pump. 7.1 OPEN the local pump discharge pressure gauge I isolation valve for the pumps to be tested and !s check OPEN the HPSI pump minimum recirculation valve CThis is N/A for pumps that were not tested?: 4 Room 21 P9 s. ~ Y.1111 m SI-3A SI 228 pressure gauge { isolation valve / SI-1A SI 227 pressure gauge isolation valve / 4 i R19 4 4 v.,.~-e,--+, -.,,.en,m,.e e-.

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FORT CALHOUN STATION SURVEILLANCE TEST OP ST St 3008 PAGE 7 0F $4 INITIAts/DATE 7,1 SI 2A S1 225 pressure gauge isolation valve / S1 118 minimum recirculation valve / SI 2C $1-224 pressure gauge isolation valve / $1 111 minimum recirculation valve / $1 38 S1 22g pressure gauge isolation valve / $1 3C $1 230 pressure gauge isolation valve / S1 1B $1 226 pressure gauge isolation valve / SI 28 51 223 pressure gauge isolation valve / SI 105 minimum recirculation valve / 7.2 If shudown cooling is in operation, close o'r check closed the following LPSI pus) recirculation valves (This step is (/A during poweroperation): P.MIR YAl.H SI 1A SI-132 / $1 18 51 124 / G 9 O R19

({ gg jh ! N OP.ST SI 3008 5 PAGE 8 Of 54 INITIALS /DATE CAUTION Do not perform Step 7.3 when on Shutdown Cooling. If'during power operation che 7.3 followingminimumflowvalves.ck0PENthe N/A when in Cold Shutdown, blMt Y1ht Sl 1A S1 132 / SI 1B SI 124 / 7.4 Verify the safety injection pumps have an adequate oil level in their reservoirs. Room 21 Blut St 3A / SI 1A / SI 2A / 4 51 2C / Room 22 O SI 38 ~ SI 3C / SI 1B / S! 28 ./ O. R19

h 0 1 0 E .INITI AL S/DATE 7.5 Record SIRWT water level. If the computer is unavailable. SIRWT level may be obtained from LIC 381 or LIC 382. If this option is taken, enter a comment in the Comment Sheet ~~ Chronological Log and record the cal bration of the instrument used in Section 4.1. / SIRWT level L 381~ 7.6 Calculate pump suction pressure for the LPSI and Containment Spra pumps. Record the results on the Test uantities and Ran Table on Attachments 1, 2, 6., 7 and 8.ges P, = ( 189 " + ")x(0.036)psig P, = psig / 7.7 Calculate pump suction pressure for the HPSI pumps ~ Record the results on Test Quantities and Rar.ges Table of Attachments 3 through 5. P, = ( 196 " + ')x(0.036)psig P, = psig / O Open or check open LCV 383-1 and LCV 383 2. / 7.8 7.9 Record "As Found" positions of the SIRWT Recirculation Isolation valves, then place these valves in the required position: Valve As Found Reouired ~ HCV-385 OPEN HCV-386 OPEN / 4 emer 4 O R19

FORT CALHOUN STATION SURVEILLANCE TEST OP ST SI 3008 PAGE 10 0F 54 INITIALS /DATE 7.10 Record the "As found" positions for the Containment Spray (Al-30A) and HCV 345 control valves and test i switches HCV 344 (Al 30B). THEN place the valve and test switch in the Required position, j As Found Require'd Valve Valve Test Switch h ly.g Test Switch HCV 344 CLOSED TEST HCV 345 CLOSED TEST / NOTE: Ste)s 7.11 thru 7.19 may be performed in any order at t1e discretion of the Shift Sup3rvisor. 7.11 Test LPSI Pump SI 1A per Attachment 1. / 7.12 Test LPSI Pump SI-1B per Attachment 2. / ) 7.13 Test HPSI pump SI-2A per Attachment 3. / 7.14 Test HPSI pump SI-2B per Attachment 4. / 7.15 Test HPSI pump SI-2C per Attachment 5. / 7.16 Test CS Pump SI-3A per Attachment 6. / ,( 7.17 Test CS Pump SI 3B per Attachment 7. / 7.18 Test CS Pump SI-3C per Attachment 8. / 7.19 Test safety injection tank outlet check Valves SI-207,h Attachment 9.SI-211, 51-215, and Sf 219 in accordance wit This step is N/A if the safety injection tanks are drained. / 4 4 4 1 v R19

FORT CALHOUN STATION op. SURVEILLANCE TEST PAG 5b INITIALS /DATE . NOTE: Independent Verification is N/A if being performed during Mode 4 or Mode 5. 7.20 Place Containment Spray Control Valves AND Test Switches in the As Found" position recorded in' Step 7.10. UD Valve Valve /TestSwitsh HCV-344 / HCV 345 / / Independent Verification / NOTE: Independent Verification is N/A if being performed during Mode 4 and Mode 5. 7.21 Place the SIRfli Recirculation Isolation 7 Valves in the "As Four.d" position recorded in Step 7.9. Valve U) HCV-385 HCV 386 / -t Independent Verification / NOTE: Step 7.2k is N/A for pumps that were not tested. Independent Verification is N/A if being performed during Mode 4 or Mode 5. 7.22 CLOSE the local dit harge pre.ssure gauge isolatian valves: Room 21 Bil!E .Y11Y.1 SI-3A SI-228 pressure gauge isolation valve / Independent Verification / 4 9 w. V R19

FORT CALHOUN STATION SURVEILLANCE TEST OP ST SI 3008 PAGE 12 0F 54 JNITIALS/DATE 7.22 Room 21 h!!!c Valve St.-1A S1-227 pressure gauge isolation valve / Independent Verification / SI-2A SI 225 pressure gauge isolation valve / Independent Verification / SI-2C SI-224 pressure gauge isolation valve / Independent Verification / Room 22 SI 3B SI-229 pressure gauge isolation valve / Independent Verification / SI-3C SI-230 pressure gauge j isolation valve Independent Verification /

O

/ SI-1B SI-226 pressure gauge j isolation valve / 4 l Independent Verification / I SI-2B SI 223 prer,sure gauge isolation valve / Independent Verification / d Completed by / 1 i Signature Date Time a J 4 d R19 .-_,,r e -s,-,r...-m,...._.r~..,---.- e. ,r,. . ~. ~. ~,

I, FORT CALHOUN STATION hijlQ0 SURVEILLANCE TEST 8.0 RESTORATION 8.1 All Independent Verifications have been completed (This step is N/A if being performed during a refueling outage). / 8.2 Th'e Special Services Engineering Check Valve Engineer has been notified that acoustic data taken on the minimum recirc check valves is available for analysis. / ' 8:3 Shift Supervisor has been notified this test hes been completed. Shift Sup Sig / Date Time 8.4 The Surveillance Test Signatura Sheet has been completed in accordance with Standing Order C-23. / 9.0 ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 9.1 Test values )er Tables 1.1, 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, 7.1 and 8.1 are within tie Acceptable Ran actions have been initiated. ges, OR the appropriate required 9.2 Leakag t rates r9 corded in Attachment 9 Steps 5.6, 6.6, 7.6, and 8.6 are less than 1%/ min, f 10.0 TEST RECORD 10.1 This procedure and the completed attachments. 11.0 REVIEW 11.1 The Manager-Operations is responsible for ensuring this completed surveillance is reviewed in a timely manner and forwarded in accordance with 50-G-23. Test data shall be evaluated by the STA and reviewed by'the Shift Supervisor for accentability within 24 hours of the completion of this test. Evaluated by / STA Date Time Reviewed by / Shift Supervisor Date Time i O R19

FORT CALHOUN STATION SURVEILLANCE TEST Op ST SI 3008 PAGE 41 0F 54 ATTACHMENT 7 Page 1 of 4 (SI3B) SAFETY RELATED PROCEDURE INITIALS /DATE 1. Attach acoustic monitoring test equipment by performing the following: 11 Mount the accelerometer on the to) of the cap of the SI valve, pump mini flow recirc chec( 51-301. 1.2 Connect accelerometer to DAT recorder. 1.3 Set amplifier at "lX" and DAT Recorder range on 0.5 volts. / I&C 2. Open or check open the pump suction Isolation Valve HCV-2967. / CAUTION Closing the pump discharge valve or o)ening the minimum recirculation valve renders t1e pump INOPERABLE. The applicable LCO action statements of Technical Specifications 2.1.1, 2.4, and 2.7 must be i Il implemented. Starting SI-3B with the pump discharge L valve closed renders the interlock for HCV 344 inoperable. Tech Spec 2.4(2)d (24 hour LCO) must be implemented for the interlock for HCV 344. / LSO 3. The Licensed Senior Operator has reviewed Technical Specifications 2.1.1, 2.4, and 2.7 and, if applicable, has logged the appropriate LCO into the Control Room Log. 4. Unlock and open SI-146, minimum recirc valve. / 3. Station a dedicated operator at the control switch for 51-38. The operator's function is to place the control switch for SI-38 in PULL-TO LOCK if any Engineered Safeguards actuation occurs. This prevents HCV-344 from opening and protects the remaining CS pumps. N/A if in Mode 4 or 5. Dedicated Operator / 6. Close the Discharge Isolation Valve HCV-2968. / 7. Start acoustic DAT recorder and monitor visual LED display for an indication of a signal being received as check valve opens. / I&C V R19 ., -. ~. _.. ,~,

I0IlTCA[HOUNSTATION SURVEILLANCE TEST OP ST SI 3008 PAGE 42 0F 54 ATTACHMENT 7 Page 2 of 4 (S1 38) q JNITIALS/DATE Q NOTE: Operation of the CS Pumps must-be closely monitored,while on minimum flow. B. Start CS Pump ti-3B and record start time. Start Time / 9. Stop acoustic DAT recorder after SI pump has run for at least 30 seconds and remove accelerometer from the check valve. / I&C NOTE: Satisfactory completion of the following step i fully strokes check Valve SI-301 open and parttally strokes Check Valves SI-140 and 51 153 open to meet requirements of Reference 2.2. 10. Wait at least 2 minutes after system has st;bilized, then record the following: Pump motor current amps. Pump discharge pressure P,, (Record this value on Table 7.1) 11. Measure and record the Pump Inboard -ad Outboard Table 7.g the Micro Log. Bearing Housing peak vibration ve in utilizin Re ord these va es in 1. / O 3 MM/ LNG 12. Stop CS Pump SI-3B and verify pump has stopped. / 13. Verify'SI-3B control switch has returned to the AFTER STOP position. / NOTE: Independent Verification is N/A if being performed during Mode 4 or Mode 5. 14. Open HCV-2968 (remove key). / Independent Verification / 15. Release the dedicated operator from SI-3B control switch and log out of applicable LCOs. N/A if not required. / NOTE: Independent Verification is N/A if being performed during Mode 4 or Mode 5. 16. Close and lock SI-146, minimum recirc valve. / Independent Verification / 17. Calculate the pump differential pressure, AP, on Table 7.1. / 5 Completed by / operations Date Time R19 ,y .m 7 -r. w_.- ,e---}}

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