ML20237G606
| ML20237G606 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 08/26/1987 |
| From: | Phillips H, Warnick R NRC OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237G582 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-445-87-14, 50-446-87-11, NUDOCS 8709020328 | |
| Download: ML20237G606 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000445/1987014
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U.
S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
NRC Inspection Report:
50-445/87-14
Permits:
CPPR-126
50-446/87-11
CPPR-127
Dockets:
50-445
Category:
A2
50-446
Construction Permit
Expiration Dates:
Unit 1:
August 1, 1988
Unit 2:
Extension request
submitted
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Applicant:
TU Electric
Skyway Tower
400 North Olive Street
Lock Box 81
Dallas, Texas
75201
Facility Name:
Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES)
Units 1 and 2
Inspection At:
Comanche Peak Site, Glen Rose, Texas
Inspection Conducted:
July 8 through August 4, 1987
Inspector:
. /
d*
d[8'7
l
H'.
$. Phillips,' Senior Resident Reactor
Date
Inspector, Construction
Reviewed by:
R F u)aamIcA
F- 2 t.- F7
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R.
F. Warnick, Assistant Director
Date
for Inspection Programs
Comanche Peak Project Division
Office of Special Projects
8709020328 870826
ADOCK 05000445
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Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted:
July 8 through August 4,
1987 (Report
Nos.
50-445/87-14; 50-446/87-11)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced safety inspection including
(1) followup on previous inspection findings; (2) followup on
applicant identified construction deficiencies; (3) general plant
inspections; (4) storage / handling of safety-related components;
(5) penetrations; (6) piping and supports; and (7) electrical work
activities.
Results:
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations
were identified.
A meeting was held on July 22, 1987, to resolve
the NRC's concern with the TUE response to NRC Inspection Report
50-445/84-32; 50-446/84-11 (paragraph 2).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
- R.
P. Baker, Regulatory Compliance Manager, TU Electric
(TUE)
- J.
L. Barker, Engineering Assurance Manager, TUE
- M.
Blevins, Technical Support Manager, TUE
- W.
G.
Counsil, Executive VP, Nuclear Engineering &
Operations, TUE
- R.
D. Delano, Licensing Engineer, TUE
- D.
E. Deviney, Operations Quality Assurance (QA) Manager,
TUE
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- T.
L. Heatherly, Regulatory Compliance Engineer, TUE
- J.
Hicks, Licensing, TUE
- J.
J. Kelley, Plant Operations Manager, TUE
- 0.
Lowe, Engineering Director, TUE
- L.
D. Nace, VP, Engineering and Construction, TUE
- D.
Noss, QA, TUE
- D.
M. Reynerson, Director of Construction, TUE
- A.
B. Scott, VP, Nuclear Operations, TUE
,
- C.
E.
Scott, Startup Manager, TUE
- J.
C.
Smith, Plant Operations Staff, TUE
- P.
B. Stevens, Electrical Engineering Manager, TUE
- J.
F.
Streeter, Director of QA, TUE
- T.
G. Tyler, Projects Director, TUE
The NRC inspector also interviewed other applicant employees
during this inspection period.
- Denotes personnel present at the August 4, 1987 exit
interview.
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2.
Management Meetings (30702)
a.
On July 22, 1987, R. F. Warnick, H. S. Phillips, and C.
Hale of the NRC met with TUE staff members J. F.
Streeter, R. Spangler, and D. Noss to discuss the TUE
response to NRC Inspection Report 50-445/84-32;
50-446/84-11.
The NRC requested clarification and
additional information. That is, the response reflected a
more positive view of the TUE QA and audit program when
compared to the Comanche Peak Response Team results
reports for Issue-Specific Action Plans (ISAPs) VII.a.4
and VII.a.5.
Also the response did not factor in the
generic findings and corrective action discussed in the
ISAPs.
b.
Three representatives from the Texas Department of Labor
and Standards were onsite the week of July 13-17, 1987.
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The purpose of their visit was to inspect applicant
compliance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
as required by Texas law.
A representative from the NRC
onsite staff attended their entrance and exit meetings.
In addition,
P.
F. McKee, R.
F. Warnick, and H.
S.
Phillips (J.
G. Keppler and C.
I. Grimes were in
attendance part of the time) met with Steven M. Matthews,
Director and Chief Inspector, Boiler Division; George
Bynog, Assistant Director, Boiler Division; and Ricky
Bryan, Lead Inspector for Comanche Peak, Boiler Division
on July 14, 1987, to discuss their responsibilities and
authority, under Texas law, and items of mutual interest
relating to the applicant's compliance with the ASME
Code.
3.
Followup On Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
a.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8214-01):
Region IV (RIV)
planned to do additional inspection of vendor shop
performed welding (including NPSI) during a subsequent
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inspection.
This item was opened during a RIV followup inspection in
response to a visit by an alleger at RIV.
The original
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concerns dealt with American Welding Society (AWS)
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Structural Welding Code, D.1.1, welds that were not in
accordance with this code.
The RIV inspector inspected
five girder welds and a box structure on main
steam /feedwater pipe whip restraints, addressing the
alleger's concerns in NRC Inspection Report 50-445/82-14.
Although the concerns were addressed, the NRC inspector
chose to perform additional inspection of similar vendor
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welds including Nuclear Power Services, Inc. (NPSI)
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during a future inspection and left the item open.
]
The currently assigned NRC inspector found that
additional inspections were performed and documented in
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50-445/82-22; 50-445/84-29, 50-446/84-10; 50-445/83-24,
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50-446/83-15; 50-445/82-25, 50-446/82-13; 50-445/80-22,
50-446/80-22; and the special NRC Technical Review Team
inspection documented in NUREG 0797 Supplement 10
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(AQW-22, AW-39, AW-57, AQW-75, and AQW-76).
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b.
(Closed) Violation (445/8507-V-06; 446/8505-V-04):
Failure to document on a Deficiency and Disposition
Report (DDR) a 24-48 pound deviation on cement scale MTE
779 frcm required accuracy.
The NRC inspector reviewed the corrective action file and
found that the violation was caused by a lack of
procedures.
Nonconformance reports (NCR)-C-85-101882,
Revision 1, and NCR-C-85-201617, Revision 1, were issued
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to require an evaluation of two concrete placements while
the scales were in this condition and it was found that
specified design strengths were attained.
This resolves
this issue.
c.
(Closed) violation (445/8507-V-02): Failure to use Class
"E" concrete as specified.
The NRC inspector reviewed a TUE file on this item.
The original response (TXX-4727) from TUE was inadequate;
however, the supplemental response (TXX-6211) provided
the necessary information and action.
As a result of the
NRC inquiry, two deficiency reports were issued to ensure
appropriate drawing changes, document the design change,
and identify causes.
The applicant also found that this
grout substitution for Class E cencrete occurred in seven
Unit 1 and eight Unit 2 installations not previously
identified in response TXX-4727.
The NRC inspector found that the use of commercial
non-shrink grout with an average compressive strength of
8450 psi is an acceptable substitute even though it's use
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was unauthorized at the time.
This strength exceeds the
Class
"E" concrete minimum strength of 4000 psi.
The
inspector observed a typical baseplate (TBX-RCPCG-01)
that was grouted.
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The applicant's file showed that a project directive
(CPPA-56,467) was issued to emphasize the precedence of
design documents over vendor documents.
Stone & Webster
Procedure PP-053, TUE Procedure ECE-DC-5 (used by
Ebasco), and Impell Procedure IMP-FP-19 have either been
revised or emphasized to assure that conflicts between
vendor drawings and design drawings are resolved and that
design takes precedence.
d.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (446/8511-U-03):
The issuance
of drawing packages from satellites to the field and the
logging of the status of design change authorizations
(DCAs) and component modification cards (CMCs) into the
computer were not in controlled procedure DCP-3 but were
covered in uncontrolled guidelines.
The NRC inspector reviewed a TUE package which showed
that the uncontrolled guidelines were incorporated into
controlled procedures.
Paragraph 3.1.2.3 of DCP-3,
Revision 19, dated March 31, 1986, described the issuance
of drawings to the field.
Paragraph 2.1.5 of ECE-DC-7,
Revision 19, dated October 31, 1986, described the
tracking of DCAs and CMCs.
This resolves this issue.
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e.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8601-0-01; 446/8601-0-01):
Ultrasonic testing procedures were not onsite.
The NRC inspector reviewed copies of the CB&I procedures
UTP-18B and UTP-25B that are now in the records vault.
TUE reviewed CB&I records that were removed and returned
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to site and found that they have essential records.
This
resolves this issue.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Followup On Applicant Identified Construction Deficiencies
(92700)
The NRC inspector reviewed construction deficiency reports
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CP-87-13 through CP-87-54 which had been identified as
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potentially reportable construction deficiencies in accordance
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with 10 CFR Part 50.55(e).
Each report was reviewed to assure
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that the deficiency was fully identified, described,
evaluated, and that the NRC was notified in accordance with
TUE Procedure NEO-CS-1, Revision 1 and 10 CFR 50.55(e).
The following potentially reportable items were inspected in
the field to observe the deficient conditions and any
corrective actions in process.
Location
Number
Deficient Condition
1
RCB 1&2,
Polar Crane not installed
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el 905'
properly
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RCB 1&2
Steam generator lateral
el 905'
support restraint bolts
shortened
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AB 2
Gould battery racks
el 792'
improperly spaced
EC 1
Butt splice CPI-ECPRC-13
el 830'
improperly made
EC 1&2
Seismic supports for CR
el 840'
ceiling improperly
installed
AB 1&2
CCW pump impellers cracked
el 810'
AB 1&2
CCW heat exchangers have
el 790'
deficient seismic
qualifications
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Location
Number
Deficient Condition
SGB 1
Air accumulators improperly
el 790'
stored
SGB 1
6.9kV transformer porcelain
el 810'
bus cracked
DGB 2
DG piston skirt had linear
el 810'
indication
SGB 2
Bunker-Ramo penetration
el 852'
assemblies removed
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
General Plant Inspections
At various times during the inspection period, the NRC
inspector conducted general inspections of the Unit 1 and 2
reactor containment (RCB), safeguards (SGB), auxiliary (AB),
electrical control (ECB), and diesel generator (DGB)
buildings.
All accessible rooms in these buildings were
inspected to observe current work activities with respect to
major safety-related equipment, electrical cable / trays,
mechanical components, piping, welding, coatings, Hilti bolts,
and removal of debris from the seismic gap between the
buildings.
The housekeeping, storage and handling conditions
inside these buildings and various outside storage areas were
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also inspected (paragraph 6). Four backshift and two weekend
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inspections were performed during this inspection period.
Work activities that were selected for more detailed
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inspections are described in paragraphe 7, 8 and 9.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Identification and Storage of Site Materials, Parts, and
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Components (50073, 50090, 50095, 51053, 51063, 53053)
a.
Identification
The NRC inspector verified that equipment, components,
parts, and materials used in civil, electrical, and
mechanical activities were positively identified during
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receiving, storage, and installation.-
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b.
Warehouses /Laydown Yards
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The NRC inspector observed all materials, parts, and
components stored in all warehouses (A, B,
C, D,
and
Electrical) and all laydown yards to determine if storage
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met the equivalent measures of Regulatory Guide 1.38 and
American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
N45.2.2-1972.
These measures were implemented to prevent
damage, deterioration, or contamination.
Equipment such as instrumentation, tubing, Conax
electrical penetrations, cable, Barton/Rosemount pressure
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transmitters, ASCO Solenoids, pressure indicator
switches, thermowells/ thermocouple, Magnetrol level
indicators, Namco switches, bulk hardware, and shelf life
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material were stored to Level A and B requirements in
Warehouse
"B".
The humidity was being recorded on a
circular chart which measured temperature / humidity and
which was calibrated February 23, 1987 and due for
calibration again August 24, 1987.
Materials such as
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"0"
ring seals, spacers, piston kits, gaskets, and
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diaphragms for valves were monitored by date of
expiration of shelf life. Other equipment such as pumps,
valves, thermal insulation, abrasives, adhesives,
grouting, and chemical materials were stored to Level "C"
requirements in Warehouses A,
C,
and D.
Bulk electrical
hardware was stored in the Electrical Warehouse.
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The NRC inspector inspected nine outside storage areas.
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Electrical cable, trays, and miscellaneous hardware were
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stored in the cable reel yard and an adjacent yard for
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hardware.
Piping supports, reinforcing / structural steel,
fuel racks, and other miscellaneous material were stored
to Level "D"
storage requirements;
i.e.,
up on wood
dunnage and covered where necessary.
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c.
In Place Storage
The NRC inspector observed all accessible equipment in
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Unit 1 and 2 to determine that equipment moved into
buildings and temporarily or permanently stored in place
continues to be appropriately stored and is afforded
special protection where necessary to protect it from
ongoing construction activities.
d.
Quality Control
The NRC jnspector found that quality controls (QC) for
receiving and storage were implemented.
In Warehouse
"B"
a QC inspector was stationed to perform receipt
inspections and there was evidence that a number of items
had been inspected, rejected, tagged, and segregated to
preclude inadvertent use.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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7.
RCB Penetrations and Fire Barriers (53053)
The NRC inspector observed in process or completed work
relative to Unit 1 and 2 electrical and mechanical
All mechanical penetrations have been
installed.
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In SGB 1, el 832', room 88, the NRC inspector observed the
physical appearance of the following previously installed
mechanical penetrations as:
MI-09, 10, 11 & 12
Steam generator blowdown
piping
MIII-20
Demineralized H O to RCB
2
MV-3 & 4
CCW from letdown heat exchanger
(Hx) and reactor containment
drain tank Ex
MV-5
Service air to RCB
MV-6
CCW drain tank pump discharge line
The NRC inspector observed the quality of fire barrier seals
installed in SGB 1, el 832', Room 89.
One volume control tank
(TBX-LSATVC-01) and the associated piping which penetrates two
walls is located in this room.
Completed fire barriers
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6026183101 2003 6 89, 6026183100 2002 6 89, and 60260831 2001
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6 89 were installed around the piping.
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The NRC inspector observed AB 1 and 2 penetrations MV-14 and
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MIII-18, RCB pressure relief and hydrogen purge supply exhaust
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system located on the 832' el.
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Electrical penetrations in SGB 1 and 2 were observed to be in
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various stages of construction; however, no in process work
was observed.
The installation of Bisco seal material Release No.
SG-2-790-RM64-5001 was observed while work was in progress for
Machine 9876-1 System 95.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Piping and Piping Supports (50090, 55053)
The NRC inspector previously identified planned work
modifications in SGB 1, room 88, that resulted from DCA 24676,
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Revision 0.
During this inspection period the inspector
observed that the modifications were in progress to relocate
valves IMS-149, 151, 153, and 155.
Unit 2 valves were to be
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transferred to Unit 1 and be renumbered.
The reason for the
change was the existing steam generator blowdown valves did
not meet operability requirements.
The applicant considered
this to be a significant deficiency (CP-86-035).
The piping
was described on drawings BRP MS-1-SB-003 through 006.
The
NRC inspector found that the valve being removed from the
piping going into penetration MI-12 was partially resting on
another pipe.
This was pointed out to the applicant who
immediately corrected the problem.
The NRC inspector observed welding activities that were in
progress in the Brown & Root Fabrication Shop.
The
documentation for support CC1 066 077 S33K, Revision 0,
appeared to conflict with the safety class stamped on the name
plate.
The paperwork indicated it was American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Class 3 while snubber 15090 was
marked ASME Class 2.
The inspector found that there was no
conflict because Section III of the ASME Code allows the
downgrading of components to a lower class.
The material for
transition kit 16524-1720 was traceable using receiving
inspection report 20536 and material report 418991.
The work
was being accomplished to drawing Revision CP-2.
The NRC inspector observed work in progress in RCB 2 at the
885' el.
Feedwater (FW) support FW2-018-444-C72K was being
checked for concrete attachment (embeds) separation
violations.
Discussions with the responsible personnel
revealed that multiple separation violations had been
identified when compared to the new specification (SS-30)
criteria.
More violations were expected in Unit 2 than Unit 1
because 15,000 embeds were built into Unit 2 versus 3,000 in
Unit 1.
The NRC inspector found that corrective action report
(CAR) 86 plus 50.55(e) reports CP 86-04 and 86-59 had
identified these deficiencies to the NRC.
The NRC inspector observed work in progress in RCB 1 at
el 905'.
Containment spray piping support CT-2-044-015-C92R
was being reworked, that is, washers were inserted and the
angle of the snubber was checked.
The construction foreman
had signed off the completed work.
The NRC inspector observed a CCW pipe support in room 205 of
the AB 1.
The installation of support CC-1-043-010-A43K had
been completed but had not been painted.
The NRC inspector observed that several restraints / supports in
the hallway of the AB 2 (elevation 810') had paint removed to
determine the number vibroetched onto this component. They
were located near valve LCV-0112E at centerline GA 8'-0" 0/S
N.6-A.
TUE answered an inquiry as to whether this was an
identification (10 CFR Appendix B,
Criterion VIII) deficiency
that violated the ASME Section III, Division 1, Code.
At a
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meeting the TUE representative stated that there was no code
violation and presented an ASME procedure which controls such
activities and allows the observed practice.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Electrical Work Activities (51053, 51063)
The NRC inspector preselected electrical work activities to
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observe.
(The storage and handling of electrical materials is
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described in paragraph 6 and includes all that is presently
stored on site.)
The NRC inspector observed a cable tray walkdown in progress
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in Unit 2 cable spread room.
The walkdown was a quality
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control training exercise.
In ECB 1 cable spread room, the
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NRC inspector observed in-process work activities at different
times during the inspection period.
The activities included a
TUE audit that was in process, conduit walkdowns, and an
electrical modification which resulted from DCA 31278R1 (which
was nonsafety related).
In AB 1, a power distribution panel CPX-EPDPNB-26 and
electronic control panel XAT-10B were inspected.
A bolt was
found to be missing from a bolt hole in the base support that
secures these cabinets to the floor.
These cabinets were
later identified as nonsafety related.
The NRC inspector observed in SGB 1, room 83, the replacement
of 6.9 kv transformer porcelain buses that had been
overtorqued and cracked.
The NRC inspector observed various work activities in and
around cable trays.
Two adverse conditions were referred to
the applicant.
First, workers expressed a concern about the
installation of fire protection / detector conduit because
procedure ECP-19A only allowed workers to go one size larger
on conduit elbows.
It was stated that this sharp bend radii
will cause problems later when wirdng is run.
This
nonsafety-related activity was referred to the applicant for
resolution. Secondly, the NRC inspector observed cable tray
T13GSN83 in AB 1, room 88, which had cable spilling over the
tray.
The applicant determined that cable SP1197679 was a
spare which was coiled in the tray and the coil went over the
edge of the tray.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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10.
Exit Interview (30703)
An exit interview was conducted on August 4, 1987, with the
applicant's representatives identified in paragraph 1 of this
report.
During this exit interview, the scope and findings of
the inspection were summarized.
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DISTRIBUTION:
4 Docket 1 Files:z(50-445/446)([NRCiPDRik
Local PDR
.
CPPD Reading (HQ)
Site Reading
- CPRT Group
- SRI-OPS
- SRI-CONST
- MIS System
- RSTS Operator
RPB
RIV File
- DWeiss, RM/ALF
JKeppler/JAxelrad
CIGrimes
PFMcKee
HSchierling
JLyons
LChandler, OGC
CPPD-LA, OSP
- w/766
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