IR 05000334/1989014
| ML20247K325 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 09/08/1989 |
| From: | Craig Gordon, Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20247K308 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-334-89-14, 50-412-89-15, NUDOCS 8909210132 | |
| Download: ML20247K325 (5) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGUIA'IORY CIPMISSICH
REGION I
Report Nos. 50-334/89-14 & 50-412/89-15 Docket Hos. 50-334 & 50-412 License Nos. NPF-66 & NPF-73 Priority Category C
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Licensee: Demane Light Canpany Ptrst Office Box 4 Shippingport, Pennsylvania 15077 Facility Name: Beaver Valley Atcanic Iower Station, Units 1 & 2 Inspection At: Shippingport, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: - A'xjust 1-3, 1989
4 NRC Team Namham:
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T 39 W
C. Z. @rdon, Regional Team Isader idate E. Fox, Region I I
J. Beall, SRI R. Van Niel, NRR Oh 4 /n ee ey:
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W. J. Iatarus, Chief, E2ergency date Preparedness Section Inspection Sumary: Inspection on August 1-3, 1989 (Report Nos. 50-334/89-14 & 50-412/89-15)
observation of the licensee's partial g preparedness inspection and Areas Inspected: Routine announced en participation annual emergency preparedness exercise conducted on August 2, 1989. The inspection was performed by a team of four NRC Region I ard Marters personnel.
Results: No violations were identified. 'Ibe licensee's response actions for this exercise were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the public.
6909210132 690912
PDR ADOCK 05000334
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Q PDC
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DETAIIS
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1.0 Persons contacted
'Ibe followirq licensee representatives atterded the exit meetiry held on August 3, 1989.
J. O. Crockett, General Manager, Cbrporate Nuclear Services N. S. DiPietro Security Prooechtres & Training Coordimtor g
C. R. Haney, Director, Technical and Crafts Trainirg H. L. Harper, Director, Security T. E. Heid, Instrument and (bntrol Foreman M. R. Johnson, Supervisor, Security Operations D. R. Kline, Administrator Nuclear Security J. A. Kosmal, Manager, Radblogical Controls W. S. Iaoey, General Manager, Ibclear Operations Services F. J. Lipchick, Senior Licensing Supervisor F. P. Liptak, Count Rocan Coordinator W. R. Mahan, Senior Planner J. R. Marietta, Operations Maintemnoe Instructor J. E. Matsko, Plant Operations Maintenance Manager W. J. Mercer, 'Ibsting Supervisor T. P. Noonan, General Manager, Nuclear Operations Unit F. L. Pavlechko, Director, Ema_rgency Plannirg J. M. Salasa, Director, Ibclear Ctrmunications G. S. Sovick, Senior Licensing Supervisor J. E. Starr, Supervisor, D4S H. I. Szklinski, Health Ihysics Syblint N. R. 'Ibnet, Manager, Ibclear Engineering Durity the ccMuct of the inspection, other licensee emergency response per-sonnel were interviewed and observed.
2.0 Emergency Exercise
'Ihe Beaver Valley partial-participation exercise was conducted on August 2, 1989, from 8:00 a.m. until 3:00 p.m.
2.1 Pre-exercise Activities
'Ihe exercise objectives, subnitted to the NRC Region I on April 20, 1989 were reviewed and, following revision, determined to adequately test the licensee's Emergency Plan. On May 24, 1989 the licensee sohnitted the ccxuplete reenario package for NRC review and evaluation. Region I representatives had telephone conversations with the licensee's emergency preparedness staff to discuss the scope and content of the scenario. As a result, minor revisions were made to the scenario and supporting data provided by the licensee. It was determined that the revised scenario would provide for the adequate testing of major portions of the Emergency Plan Inplementirg Procedures (EPIP) and also provide the prtunity for licensee personnel to duaachute those areas previously
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identified by the NRC as in need of corrective action.
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NRC observers atterded a licensee briefing on August 1,1989 and participated in the Mmancion of =mrtvuncy response actions expected durirg the scenario.
Stggested NRC changes to the scenario were made by the licensee and were also di m meai during the briefing. 'Ihe licensee stated that certain era:.tysucy re=,riase activities would be sinulated ard indicated in the scenario that
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ua Lwllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scenario deviations or disruption of normal plant operations.
'Ibe exercise scenario inclwiui the following events:
Maiimi respcas:,e and trai9ttation to hospital of
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ua Lsminated/ injured individual; Civil disturbance at site boundary;
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Increasing in-plant radiation levels;
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Unanticipated explosion within protected area;
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Steam generator tube rupture;
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Offsite release of radioactivity to the environment;
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Declaration of Unusual Event, Alert, and Site Area Emergency
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classifications; and Management of recovery operations.
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'Ihe above events caused the activation of the licensee's onsite and offsite emergency response facilities.
2.2 Activities Observed Durity the conduct of the licensee's exercise, NRC team members made detailed observations of the activation and augmentation of the emergency organization, activation of emergency response facilities, and actions of emergency respcirse personnel during the operation of the emergency response facilities. 'Ihe following activities were observed:
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Detection, classification, and anment of the scenario events; 2.
Direction and coordination of the energenry re=,panse; 3.
Notification of licensee personnel and offsite acyencies; 4.
Ocununications/information flow, and record keeping; 5.
An s ~m ut and projection of radiological dose and consideration of protective actions;
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Provisions for in-plant radiation protection;
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Performance of offsite ard in-plant radiological surveys; 8.
Maintenance of site security and access control; 9.
Performance of technical support, repair and corrective actions; I
10. Performance of first aid and rescue; 11. Assembly ard accmntability of personnel; 12. Provisions for oorm2nicating information to the public; and 13. Management of recovery operations.
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3.0 Exercise Observations
'1he NRC team noted that the licensee's activation and airpita:Lation of the espcy organization, activations of the empcy response facilities, and use of the facilities were generally consistent with their emergency resFsmie plan and implementing ptwdares.
3.1 Exercise SkeuwUis
'Ihe team also noted the following actions that provided strraq positive indi-cation of the licensee's ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions:
Ormmwiications and information flow within each wapcy response
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facility were effective; Good demonstration of scenario Im34am by use of actual protesters to
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initiate the Unusual Event classification via civil distudxua s;
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Classification of events were timely and in accordance with newly
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established w m p cy action levels; and Briefings of response p=uY:unal regarding plant status were conducted
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on a regular basis in the Control Room, Emtu.Wcf Operations Facility, Technical Support Center.
3.2 Exercise Weaknesses An exercise weakness is a finding that the licensee's desu= Lated level of preparedness could have preclnriari effective implementation of the ww@cy plan in the event of an actual w m p q in the area being observed.
No exercise weaknesses were identified.
3.3 Areas for Inprovenent An area for improvement is a finding that did not have a significant negative the licensee for corrective action.g the exercise, but should be evaluated by inpact on overall performance durir
'Ihe licensee conducted an adequate self-crtitique of the exercise which also identified scue of these areas.
- Ambic)uity exists in the Secatrity Cupwdse emergency action level in that the indicators described in EAL section 3 a. through 3 c. do not relate directly to the criterion for a potential degradation in plant safety.
Several concerns were identified during the reponse to a reverely injured
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and wiumminated irdividual. 'Ihese were: errwaive response time of over one hour by the local ambulance; poor planning in transporting the victim to the designated location prior to meeting the ambulance; portable radio transmission problem; and instances of cross contamination while treating the victim.
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'Ibe accountability process for all personnel is inefficient since it is
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r-cary for the licensee to activate several cmputer based designated key card stations before initiation of accountability.
Attachment 2 to EPP-IP 3.2 identifies a list for all personnel who may be l
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exmpted from accountability. Licensee representatives stated that the list is used primarily durirg drills ard exercises. However, the licensee must ensure that during any emergency all site personnel are accounted for
and no individuals are exenpted.
'Ihe exercise m:enario escalated to an Alert classification due to a
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Security Cuupunaise EAL and then to a Site Area Emergency classification due to an operational event EAL. Discussions during the recovery phase included riaccMation to an Alert carrlition based upon inproving plant conditions. 'Ihis provided no benefit to the overall response since the emergency was already urder control.
In the oricJ nal scenario subnittal, the media ard public information section i
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contained information which was identical to that in the 1988 subnittal.
Although this section was revised, the licensee should ensure that such information is changed frcan year to year.
4.0 Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items Based upon Memecians with licensee representatives, examination of procedures ard records, arrl observations rade by the NRC team during the exercise, the iterts identified durity the previous emergency exercise were not repeated.
5.0 Exit Meetirn ard NRC Critictue Following the licensee's self-critique, the NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1 of this report. Team observations made during the exercise were summarized.
'Ihe licensee was informed that previously identified items were adequately i
ackiressed and that no violations were observed. Although there were areas identified for corrective action, the NRC team determined that within the scope ard limitations of the scenario, the licensee's performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan ard Emergency Plan Implementing
Procedures in a manner that would provide adequate protective neasures for the l
health ard safety of the public.
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Licensee management acknowledged the finding ard irdicated that they would evaluate and take appropriate action regarthng the items identified for corrective action.
At no time durirq this inspection did the inspectors provide any written information to the licensee.
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