ML21033B008
| ML21033B008 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/22/2021 |
| From: | NRC/NRR/DORL/LPL3 |
| To: | |
| Robert kuntz-NRR/DORL 301-415-3753 | |
| References | |
| NRC-1328 | |
| Download: ML21033B008 (57) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
10 CFR 2.206 Petition Review Board RE Charpy Testing for PRWs Docket Number:
(n/a)
Location:
teleconference Date:
Friday, January 22, 2021 Work Order No.:
NRC-1328 Pages 1-56 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2
+ + + + +
3 10 CFR 2.206 PETITION REVIEW BOARD (PRB) 4 CONFERENCE CALL 5
RE 6
CHARPY TESTING FOR PWRs 7
+ + + + +
8 FRIDAY 9
JANUARY 22, 2021 10
+ + + + +
11 The conference call convened at 10:30 12 a.m. EST, Gregory Bowman, Chairperson of the 13 Petition Review Board, presiding.
14 15 PETITIONER: THOMAS SAPORITO 16 17 PETITION REVIEW BOARD MEMBERS 18 GREGORY BOWMAN, Deputy Director 19 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 20 ROBERT KUNTZ, Petition Manager for 2.206 21 petition 22 ROBERT CARPENTER, Senior Attorney, Office of 23 General Counsel 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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2 NRC HEADQUARTERS STAFF 1
PERRY BUCKBERG, Petition Coordinator, 2
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 3
HIPO GONZALEZ, Chief of the Vessels &
4 Internals Branch, Office of Nuclear 5
Reactor Regulation 6
ALLEN HISER, Ph.D., Senior Technical Advisor 7
for License Renewal Aging Management, 8
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 9
NATE JORDAN, Backup Petition Coordinator, 10 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 11 JENNY TOBIN, Project Manager, Office of 12 Nuclear Reactor Regulation 13 ON YEE, Materials Engineer, Office of Nuclear 14 Reactor Regulation 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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3 T-A-B-L-E O-F C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S 1
Welcome and Introductions 2
Rob Kuntz 4
3 Introductory Remarks 4
Gregory Bowman................. 11 5
Presentation by the Petitioner 6
Thomas Saporito
................ 14 7
Opportunity for Questions and Answers...... 54 8
Adjournment................... 56 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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4 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 1
10:31 a.m.
2 MR. KUNTZ: The meeting is being recorded 3
by the NRC Ops Center and will be transcribed by a 4
court reporter and the transcripts will become a 5
supplement to the petitions. The transcript will also 6
be made publicly available.
7 Before we start I'd like to thank everyone 8
for attending this meeting. The purpose of today's 9
meeting is to provide the Petitioner, Nuclear Energy 10 Oversight Project, an opportunity to address the 11 Petition Review Board regarding the petitions related 12 to Charpy testing for all pressurized water reactors 13 and at -- specifically at the Beaver Valley Power 14 Station Unit 2.
15 My name is Rob Kuntz and I'm a senior 16 project manager in the Division of Operating Reactor 17 Licensing in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
18 I'm also a petition manager for these petitions.
19 The PRB typically consists a chairman, 20 who's usually a manager at the senior executive 21 service level at the NRC. It has a petition manager 22 and includes a petition coordinator. Other members of 23 the Board are determined by the NRC staff based on the 24 concept of the information in the petition request.
25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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5 The PRB chairman is Gregory Bowman, Deputy 1
Director in the Division of Risk Assessment in the 2
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
3 This is a Category 1 meeting. The public 4
is invited to observe this meeting and will have an 5
opportunity to communicate with the NRC after the 6
business portion, but before the meeting is adjourned.
7 This does not preclude the Licensee from responding to 8
questions if they choose to do so.
9 There are three categories of NRC public 10 meetings. More detailed information of these meetings 11 can be found on the NRC public website, www.nrc.gov.
12 As a public meeting, there will be no 13 safeguards or official use-only information discussed.
14 As part of the PRB's review of these petitions, 15 Nuclear Energy Oversight Project has requested this 16 opportunity to address the PRB.
17 This meeting is scheduled to begin at 18 10:30 and end at 11:30 Eastern. After introductory 19 remarks, we will allow Nuclear Energy Oversight 20 Project to address the Board followed by a brief 21 question and answer phase.
22 I'd like to open this meeting with 23 introductions. To better facilitate introductions 24 over the phone of the list of people registered for 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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6 today's meeting, I will read each person's name on the 1
list. When you hear your name, please acknowledge you 2
are on the phone and clearly state your name, your 3
position, and the office or organization you work for 4
so we have the information for the record.
5 Again my name is Rob Kuntz and I am a 6
senior project manager in the Division of Operating 7
Reactor Licensing.
8 So let me start with the NRC staff.
10 MR. BOWMAN: Yes, this is Greg Bowman.
11 I'm the Deputy Director of the Division of Risk 12 Assessment and the PRB Chair.
14 MR. YEE: This is On Yee, materials 15 engineer, Division of New and Renewed Licenses.
16 MR. KUNTZ: Allen Hiser?
17 DR. HISER: Allen Hiser, Senior Technical 18 Advisor in the Division of New and Renewed Licenses.
19 MR. KUNTZ: Hipo Gonzalez?
20 MR. GONZALEZ: Hipo Gonzalez, and I'm the 21 Chief for the Vessels and Internals Branch in NRR.
22 MR. KUNTZ: Robert Carpenter?
23 MR. CARPENTER: Yes, Robert Carpenter, 24 Office of the General Counsel, NRC.
25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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7 MR. KUNTZ: Perry Buckberger -- Buckberg?
1 MR. BUCKBERG: Hi, this is Perry Buckberg 2
and I'm a senior project manager in Nuclear Reactor 3
Regulation and I'm the Agency 2.206 petition 4
coordinator. Thanks.
5 MR. KUNTZ: Jenny Tobin?
6 MS. TOBIN: Jenny Tobin, also DORL project 7
manager specifically for Beaver Valley.
8 MR. KUNTZ: Okay. Is there any other 9
members of the NRC staff on the line that would like 10 to introduce themselves?
11 MR. JORDAN: Yes, this is Nate Jordan, 12 project manager, Division of Operating Reactor 13 Licensing and I also serve as the Agency's backup 14 2.206 petition coordinator.
15 MR. KUNTZ: Thanks, Nate, anyone else?
16 Okay. Hearing none, at this point I'll 17 turn it over to the Petitioner, Mr. Thomas Saporito.
18 MR. SAPORITO: Good afternoon. This is 19 Thomas Saporito. I'm the Executive Director for the 20 Nuclear Energy Oversight Project. We're a licensed 21 corporation based in the State of Florida.
22 On this date, January 22nd, 2021, the 23 Nuclear Energy Oversight Project filed a January 22nd, 24 2021 supplement to its 10 CFR 2.206 petitions dated 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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8 October 31st, 2020 and November 6th, 2020 for Charpy 1
testing.
2 MR. KUNTZ: Mr. Saporito --
3 MR. SAPORITO: You have a copy -- yes, 4
sir?
5 MR. KUNTZ: Mr. Saporito, we're just going 6
through introductions now. We'll come back to your 7
presentation.
8 MR. SAPORITO: Oh, okay.
9 MR. KUNTZ: Yeah, can we finish the --
10 we'll finish the introductions.
11 Was there anyone else from Nuclear Energy 12 Oversight Project that you'd like to introduce today?
13 MR. SAPORITO: No, sir.
14 MR. KUNTZ: Okay. Thank you; next 15 Licensee Energy Harbor. Is Phil Lashley on the phone?
16 MR. LASHLEY: Phil Lashley is on the call.
17 MR. KUNTZ: Okay. Matthew Snyder?
18 (No audible response.)
19 MR. KUNTZ: Okay. Eric Perez?
20 (No audible response.)
21 MR. KUNTZ: Was there anyone else from 22 Energy Harbor on that would like to introduce 23 themselves?
24 MR. McMULLEN: Yes, Ken McMullen, nuclear 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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9 engineer with Energy Harbor's Fleet Licensing Group.
1 MR. KUNTZ: Thank you, anyone else from 2
Energy Harbor?
3 Okay.
Hearing
- none, State of 4
Pennsylvania, Lawrence Winker, are you on?
5 MR. WINKER: Yes, I'm on. Yes, I'm with 6
the State of Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation 7
Protection, and I'm assigned to the Beaver Valley 8
Plant.
9 MR. KUNTZ: Thank you, Mr. Winker.
10 Members of EPRI; I'm sorry, is there 11 anyone else from the State of Pennsylvania on that 12 would like to introduce themselves?
13 Okay, hearing none, EPRI. Is Steven 14 Williams on?
15 MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, I'm Steven Williams 16 from Electric Power Research Institute. I'm a 17 principal lead, technical lead in the Boiling Water 18 Reactor Vessels and Internals Program.
19 MR. KUNTZ: Thank you. Nathan Palm?
20 (No audible response.)
21 MR. KUNTZ: Okay. Bob Carpenter, are you 22 on, or Carter, I'm sorry, Bob Carter?
23 (No audible response.)
24 MR. KUNTZ: Okay. Was there any members 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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10 of the public --
1 PARTICIPANT: Neither of those will be on 2
the call.
3 MR. KUNTZ: Okay, great, is there any 4
other members of the public on the line that would 5
like to introduce themselves at this time?
6 Okay. Hearing none, I'd like to emphasize 7
that we each need to speak clearly and loudly to make 8
sure that the court reporter can accurately transcribe 9
this meeting. If you do have something that you would 10 like to say, please first state your name for the 11 record.
12 For those dialing into the meeting, please 13 remember to mute your phones to minimize any 14 background noise or distractions. If you do not have 15 a mute button, this can be done by pressing *6. To 16 un-mute, press *6 again. Thank you.
17 The agenda for today's meeting after this 18 introduction is for the Petitioner, Mr. Saporito, to 19 provide new information to the PRB for the PRB to 20 consider in the petition's acceptability for review or 21 final assessment. After the Petitioner's presentation 22 we will enter a brief question and answer phase.
23 At this time I'll turn the meeting over 24 the PRB Chair, Mr. Greg Bowman.
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11 MR. BOWMAN: Thanks, Rob.
1 I'd like to welcome everyone to this 2
meeting, which as Rob mentioned, is regarding 2.206 3
petitions submitted by Nuclear Energy Oversight 4
Project. I'd like to share first some background on 5
our process.
6 So Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code 7
of Federal Regulations describes the petition process.
8 It's the primary mechanism for the public to request 9
enforcement action by the NRC related to NRC licensees 10 or licensed activities. Depending on the results of 11 our evaluation of a petition, the NRC could modify, 12 suspend, or revoke an NRC-issued license or take any 13 other enforcement action.
14 The guidance that we use to disposition 15 2.206 petition requests is found in Management 16 Directive 8.11, which is publicly available and can be 17 found on our website.
18 For the purpose of today's meeting, as Rob 19 discussed, is to give the Petitioner an opportunity to 20 provide any relevant additional information on the 21 petitions after having received the PRB's initial 22 assessment back in December.
23 Just a couple of kind of ground rules:
24 the meeting is not a hearing, nor is it an opportunity 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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12 for the Petitioner or members of the public to 1
question or examine the PRB on the merits or the 2
issues presented in the Petitioner's request. It's 3
really focused on obtaining information from the 4
Petitioner to help us make a decision.
5 During the question and answer phase of 6
the meeting, the NRC staff may ask clarifying 7
questions of the Petitioner or the Licensee, and the 8
Petitioner or Licensee can ask the PRB questions about 9
the 2.206 process in general.
10 We will not be making any decisions 11 regarding the merits of the petition at this meeting.
12 Following the meeting we'll conduct internal 13 deliberations, and the outcome of those deliberations 14 will be provided to the Petitioner in a letter.
15 I'd like to summarize the scope of the 16 petitions under consideration and our activity to 17 date. The Nuclear Energy Oversight Project submitted 18 petitions to the NRC on October 31st and November 8th, 19 2020. The October 31st petition requested that the 20 NRC take action under 10 CFR 2.206 to issue an 21 immediate shutdown order to pressurized water reactor 22 licensees until those licensees provide first an 23 updated safety analysis of the degree of reactor 24 pressure vessel embrittlement; second a detailed 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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13 description of the methodology used to provide the 1
updated safety analysis; and third, a statement of 2
full compliance with NRC regulations.
3 The November 8th petition requested that 4
the NRC take action under 10 CFR 2.206 to deny and 5
refuse the assertions made by Energy Harbor Nuclear 6
Corporation in its letter dated October 28th, 2020 7
related to the testing of capsule Y at Beaver Valley.
8 The petition also requested that the NRC issue a 9
confirmatory order requiring the use of a specific 10 impact test machine, issue an order to require the 11 identification of the striker used by Energy Harbor to 12 test capsule Y, and issue an order requiring Energy 13 Harbor to identify any outside contractor used to 14 perform Charpy testing on capsule Y.
15 On December 21st, the petition manager, 16 Rob, contacted the Petitioner to provide the PRB's 17 initial assessment, which is that the petitions don't 18 meet the criteria in Management Directive 8.11 for 19 evaluation. At that time, the petition manager also 20 offered the Petitioner the opportunity to address the 21 PRB to clarify or supplement the petition in response 22 to our initial assessment. As I mentioned earlier, 23 that's why we're here today.
24 Rob mentioned this, but I'll reinforce.
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14 When you speak -- if anybody needs to speak up during 1
the meeting, please make sure you identify yourself 2
and your organization if you make any remarks to help 3
us with the transcript.
4 With that, I'll turn things over to Mr.
5 Saporito to provide any information you believe the 6
PRB should consider as part of the petition. Mr.
7 Saporito, we ask you to try to limit your presentation 8
to about 30 minutes if possible, just so that we have 9
plenty of time to ask questions or get any additional 10 information we need to support our deliberations. So 11 with that, I'll turn things over to you, Mr. Saporito.
12 MR. SAPORITO: Well, just for the record 13 I did ask -- request for one hour to make my 14 presentation.
15 Nonetheless, January 22nd, 2021, this 16 date, today I filed a supplement to the January 22nd, 17 2021 -- or excuse me, to the 10 CFR 2.206 petitions 18 dated October 31st, 2020 and November 8th, 2020 19 regarding the Charpy testing. In that supplemental 20 petition I indicated a date of November 6th. It 21 should have been November 8th, so you could correct 22 that when you read your copy.
23 Okay.
So the supplement petition 24 requested the following enforcement action:
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15 For the NRC to issue a confirmatory order 1
requiring licensees to state and affirm under oath how 2
the general public could realistically evacuate during 3
a declared emergency, loss of coolant accident, or 4
LOCA, stemming from a fractured nuclear reactor vessel 5
melted reactor core as a direct or indirect result of 6
a pressurized thermal shock event or from degradation 7
from damage of the nuclear reactor vessel from the 8
effects on neutron fluence.
9 And that the NRC issue a confirmatory 10 order requiring licensees to perform a one-time 11 inspection of the continuous circumferential 12 transition cone closure weld on each steam generator, 13 essential 100 percent examination coverage of each 14 weld, employing non-destructive radiographic testing.
15 And that the NRC issue a classified 16 information requiring the licensees to perform a one-17 time inspection of the reactor vessel extended 18 beltline region of the reactor vessel's shell material 19 including welds, heat-affected zones, and plate or 20 forgings adjacent to the beltline region employing 21 non-destructive radiographic testing.
22 And that the NRC issue a confirmatory 23 order requiring the licensees to modify and reduce 24 nuclear reactor's pressure temperature limits within 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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16 the licensee's respective plant technical 1
specification to limit full power operation of their 2
nuclear reactors to no more than 80 percent, to limit 3
the amount of reactor vessel damage, due to neutron 4
fluence during the period of extended operation.
5 And that the NRC issue a confirmatory 6
order to licensees that submit Charpy testing data to 7
the NRC obtained from another nuclear reactor vessel 8
surveillance capsule as part of the NRC Participant 9
Program, as representative of data showing the degree 10 of neutron fluence damage, or embrittlement, to the 11 licensee's plant-specific reactor vessel, to affirm 12 under oath that the capsule data fully complies with 13 Section I.3 limitations, Subsections 1-3 of NRC 14 Regulatory Guide dated May
- 1988, Revision 2,
15 accordingly.
16 And the basis and justification for these 17 requests:
18 In a 10 CFR 2.206 petition dated October 19 31st, 2020, Petitioners contended that the current 20 methodology used by NRC licensees to determine the 21 degree of embrittlement of pressurized nuclear reactor 22 vessels is not sufficient to protect the health and 23 safety of the public and the environment.
24 And that the current Licensee Participant 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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17 Program utilized by NRC licensees in sharing 1
pressurized nuclear reactor vessel capsule sample data 2
does not provide sufficient and reliable data to 3
determine the degree of embrittlement of the 4
licensees' pressurized nuclear reactor vessel.
5 And that the current pressurized nuclear 6
reactor vessel surveillance programs utilized by NRC 7
licensees does not provide sufficient and reliable 8
data to the NRC in determining the degree of 9
embrittlement of a licensee's pressurized nuclear 10 reactor vessel.
11 And that PWROG-18068, use of direct 12 fracture toughness for evaluation of reactor pressure 13 vessel integrity, is a more accurate methodology to 14 determine the degradation and degree of embrittlement 15 of a pressurized nuclear reactor vessel.
16 In a 10 CFR 2.206 petition dated November 17 8th, 2020, petitioners averred that:
18 The NRC cannot accept or rely on the data 19 provided by the licensee regarding reactor vessel 20 capsule Y analysis report WCAP-18558-NP because the 21 licensee failed to identify the model number of the 22 Instron Impulse system which the Charpy machine 23 striker was instrumented with.
24 And the NRC cannot accept or rely on the 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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18 data provided by the licensee regarding the reactor 1
vessel capsule Y analysis report WCAP-18558-NP because 2
the licensee obtained data on the Beaver Valley Power 3
Station Unit No. 2, BVPS-2, reactor vessel capsule Y 4
using an outdated Charpy test machine which is 5
apparently no longer manufactured and has been since 6
replaced by the vendor with more accurate Charpy test 7
machines which do not involve interpretation of an 8
analog gauge by a human, and which newer machines 9
employ a digital display that can be directly linked 10 to a personal computer and connected to a Tinius 11 Olsen's Horizon software.
12 On December 21st, 2020 the NRC Petition 13 Review Board provided an initial assessment of the 14 October 31st, 2020 and November 8th, 2020 petitions.
15 With respect to the October 31st, 2020 petition, the 16 Petition Review Board stated that:
17 Instrument Charpy testing is not necessary 18 to demonstrate compliance with regulations or to 19 assessment embrittlement of the reactor pressure 20 vessel consistent with guidance in Regulatory Guide 21 1099, Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel 22 Materials, Revision 2,
ADAMS Accession No.
23 ML031430205.
24 The NRC staff reviews and approves the use 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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19 of integrated surveillance programs in lieu of plant-1 specific surveillance programs and ensures that the 2
representative materials chosen for the surveillance 3
for an reactor pressure vessel are irradiated in one 4
or more other reactors that have similar design and 5
operating features to permit accurate comparisons of 6
the predicted amount of radiation damage. Other 7
factors such as transient behavior during reactor 8
trips raised in the petition have no discernible 9
impact on the ability of surveillance specimens from 10 one plant to provide relevant data to assess radiation 11 embrittlement of another plant, since the elastic 12 deformation of the reactor pressure vessel steel due 13 to such evolutions does not affect the degree of 14 embrittlement.
15 And it went onto to say that since reactor 16 pressure vessel fluence calculations explicitly 17 consider the actual plant operating history, the 18 additional neutron fluence from a power uprate or 19 license renewal is incorporated in the plant-specific 20 calculations.
21 The PRB stated with respect to direct 22 fracture toughness measurements as referenced in 23 PWROG-18068 -- the NRC PRB stated that the addition of 24 these requirements would not have a corresponding 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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20 benefit to public health and safety.
1 With respect to the November 8th, 2020 2
petition the PRB stated in part that:
3 The use of manual reading of data provides 4
sufficiently accurate readings of the absorbed energy 5
to fracture the surveillance specimens consistent with 6
the pertinent consensus codes and standards to 7
adequately assess the condition of the reactor 8
pressure vessel.
9 And that the use of instrumented Charpy 10 testing apparatuses are capable of providing the data 11 necessary to adequately assess reactor pressure vessel 12 embrittlement; however, the mandatory use of these 13 apparatuses is beyond the current regulations.
14 And that given that the NRC's regulatory 15 framework relies on consensus codes and standards, it 16 is not necessary for the staff to require the use of 17 the most up-to-date apparatus to perform instrumented 18 Charpy testing.
19 On this
- date, January
- 22nd, 2021, 20 Petitioners state in further support of the requested 21 NRC enforcement action that:
22 The NRC Petition Review Board's initial 23 response dated December
- 21st, 2020 to the 24 aforementioned petitions appears to be:
25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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21 (1) A fraud on the American people with 1
respect to the NRC's acceptance of the licensees' 2
submittal of data purported to represent the degree of 3
embrittlement of pressurized reactor vessels due to 4
damage caused by neutron fluence.
5 (2) A waste of taxpayer funds appropriated 6
by the United States Congress to the Nuclear 7
Regulatory Commission with respect to the expenditure 8
of NRC resources in rubber stamping license extensions 9
of nuclear reactors up to 80 years and 40 years beyond 10 their original safety design basis and apparently in 11 collusion with its licensees to continue the operation 12 of the NRC and its federal employees as an ongoing 13 federal agency to regulate the nuclear power industry:
14 (3) a gross abuse of authority and power 15 by the NRC in granting license extensions up to 80 16 years in direct violation of the NRC's congressional 17 mandate to protect the health and safety of the public 18 and to protect the environment from the catastrophic 19 effects from a serious nuclear loss of coolant 20 accident caused by a cracked reactor vessel damaged 21 and embrittled by neutron fluence during extended 22 power operations beyond the reactor vessel's original 23 40-year safety design basis.
24 United States government agencies have 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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22 colluded with private sector industries in the past, 1
and have mislead the public regarding safety, which 2
resulted in deaths.
3 The United States Federal Aviation 4
Administration colluded with Boeing.
5 On September 16th, 2020 the chair of the 6
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 7
Peter DeFazio, and chair of the Subcommittee on 8
Aviation Rick Larsen released the Committee's final 9
report on the Boeing 737 MAX. This report prepared by 10 majority staff lays out the serious flaws and missteps 11 in the design, development, and certification of the 12 aircraft, which entered commercial service in 2017 13 before suffering two deadly crashes within five months 14 of each other that killed a total of 346 people, 15 including eight Americans. The Committee's 238-page 16 report, which points to repeated and serious failures 17 by both the Boeing Company and the Federal Aviation 18 Administration, contains five central themes and 19 includes more than six dozen investigative findings.
20 These themes include:
21 Production pressures that jeopardized the 22 safety of the flying public. There was tremendous 23 financial pressure on Boeing and the 737 MAX Program 24 to compete with Airbus' new A320neo aircraft. Among 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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23 other things this pressure resulted in extensive 1
efforts to cut costs, maintain the 737 MAX Program 2
schedule, and avoid slowing the 737 MAX production 3
line.
4 Second, the faulty design and performance 5
assumptions. Boeing made fundamentally faulty 6
assumptions about critical technologies on the 737 7
MAX, and most notably the MCAS system, the software 8
designed to automatically push the airplane's nose 9
down in certain conditions. Boeing also expected that 10 pilots, who were largely unaware MCAS existed, would 11 be able to mitigate any potential malfunction.
12 And third, culture of concealment. Boeing 13 withheld crucial information from the FAA, its 14 customers, and 737 MAX pilots, including internal test 15 data that revealed it took a Boeing test pilot more 16 than 10 second to diagnose and respond to un-commanded 17 MCAS activation in a flight simulator, a condition the 18 pilot described as catastrophic. Federal guidelines 19 assume pilots will respond to this condition within 20 four seconds.
21 In another town the National Highway 22 Traffic Safety Administration colluded with the auto 23 industry.
24 On June 2nd, 2005, the National Highway 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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24 Traffic Administration, NHTSA, estimates that airbags 1
installed in automobiles have saved some 10,000 lives 2
as of January 2004. A just-released study by a 3
statistician at the University of Georgia however 4
casts doubt on that assertion. In fact, said UGA 5
statistics professor Mary C. Meyer, a new analysis of 6
existing data indicates that, controlling for other 7
factors, airbags are actually associated with slightly 8
increased probability of death in accidents.
9 NHTSA recorded 238 deaths due to airbags 10 between 1990 and 2002 according to information about 11 these deaths on their website, said Meyer. They all 12 occurred at very low speeds with injuries that could 13 not have been caused by anything else. But is it 14 reasonable to conclude that airbags cause death only 15 at very low speeds? It seems more likely that they 16 also cause deaths at high speeds, but these are 17 attributed to the crash.
18 The National Highway Traffic Safety 19 Administration estimates that airbags installed in 20 automobiles have saved some 10,000 lives as of January 21 2004. A just -- excuse me.
22 When we -- that was an unintended repeat 23 of the same verbiage.
24 When we look at the random sample of all 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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25 accidents we find that airbags are associated with 1
increased risk of death, she said, and this increase 2
is due to more deaths with airbags in low-speed 3
crashes and no seat belts. However, if we limit the 4
data set to include only collisions in which a 5
fatality occurred, we get a significantly reduced risk 6
of death due to airbags.
7 By way of analogy Meyer explained it this 8
way: If you look at people who have some types of 9
cancer, you will see that those who get radiation 10 treatment have a better chance of surviving than those 11 who don't. However, radiation is inherently dangerous 12 and could actually cause cancer. If you give everyone 13 radiation treatments, whether they have cancer or not, 14 you will probably find an increased risk of death in 15 the general population.
16 Making everyone have airbags and then 17 verifying the effectiveness of using only fatal 18 crashes is like making everyone get radiation and then 19 estimating the lives saved by looking only at people 20 who have cancer. Overall, there will be more deaths 21 if everyone is given radiation, but in the cancer 22 subset, radiation will be effective.
23 The new study directly contradicts 24 assertions about airbag safety on the NHTSA website, 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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26 said Meyer. The correct analysis is important to 1
obtain now because in only a few years there will be 2
virtually no cars on the road without airbags. We are 3
confident that our analysis better reflect the actual 4
effectiveness of airbags in general than earlier 5
studies. The evidence shows that airbags do more harm 6
than good.
7 And thirdly, the United States Atomic 8
Energy Commission colluded with the General Electric 9
Company and the nuclear industry.
10 In a March 26th, 2013 publication, Arnie 11 Gundersen, a former nuclear engineer, stated that, 12 dismissing pleas from citizen groups in local United 13 States communities where General Electric's Fukushima-14 style reactors operate and ignoring expert testimony 15 from independent nuclear engineers, the NRC voted 16 earlier this month against a plan to require utility 17 owners to upgrade nuclear plant filtering systems with 18 vents, or radiation scrubbers, intended to reduce but 19 not eliminate radiation levels when the vents are 20 opened in a severe accident.
21 The nuclear industry's congressional 22 allies fought the proposal. Safety gains should be 23 significant enough to outweigh the additional costs to 24 be paid by the industry, said Representative John 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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27
- Shimkus, chairman of the Energy and Commerce 1
Subcommittee. While Senator Barbara Boxer, in a 2
letter sent to the NRC last month, wrote, the tens of 3
millions of Americans who live near the affected 4
reactors located in 15 states could not face 5
additional delays.
6 This is not just a Fukushima-Daiichi 7
issue. The issues in the United States are in some 8
ways much worse, warned Arnie Gundersen, a week before 9
the vote was taken in the kickoff presentation at a 10 symposium on the Fukushima disaster held in mid-March 11 at the New York Academy of Sciences in New York City.
12 It was sponsored by the Helen Caldicott Foundation and 13 Physicians for Social Responsibility.
14 Gundersen is a former nuclear industry 15 engineer turned whistleblower and his ongoing reports 16 over the last two years on the Fukushima-Daiichi in 17 Japan repeatedly raise warnings about the GE reactors 18 and their vulnerability to accidents. The main 19 difference between the United States and Japan -- and 20 the Japanese GE plants is the extreme amount of 21 highly-radioactive spent fuel stored in reactor spent 22 fuel pools which are located five stories above the 23 reactors. The U.S. spent fuel pools in the GE's 24 Fukushima-style reactors each contain more irradiated 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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28 fuel than the total in all four reactor pools at the 1
Fukushima plant.
2 Following the initial news reports of 3
explosions at the Fukushima plant inside the GE 4
reactor containment buildings, stories quickly 5
appeared reporting that the federal nuclear safety 6
regulators who licensed the reactors knew about their 7
design flaws but did not stop GE from selling them.
8 Scientists in the United States recognized in 1965 9
that this Mark 1 had design flaws, Gundersen said, but 10 GE threatened to pull out of the commercial reactor 11 business if forced to make costly design changes.
12 Gundersen recalled a comment by Glenn Seaborg, 13 chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission from 1961 to 14 1971, who said in an interview years later, I didn't 15 think that we had the power to stop them. Think about 16 that, said Gundersen. This is the United States 17 government. It didn't have the power to stop General 18 Electric's faulty design in 1966.
19 At the time GE and Westinghouse were in 20 fierce competition for top place in the new commercial 21 reactor industry. GE was willing to take a loss on 22 sales of its Mark 1 boiling water reactor, and it did.
23 GE lost millions, Gundersen said. Our people 24 understood this was a game with massive stakes, and 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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29 that if we didn't force the utility industry to put 1
these stations on line, we'd end up with nothing, a GE 2
VP told Fortune Magazine in an interview in 1970.
3 Atomic Energy Commission documents reveal 4
that federal safety experts recommended banning the 5
Mark 1's pressure suppression containment system and 6
cited its vulnerability to an explosion that would 7
follow a loss of coolant accident. The concerns were 8
dismissed by Joseph Hendrie, then the AEC's top safety 9
regulator, who was later appointed NRC chairman. In 10 a 1972 memo Hendrie thought such an action could well 11 be the end of nuclear power and would create more 12 turmoil than I can stand thinking about. So the 13 turmoil that Hendrie chose to avoid in 1972 became the 14 turmoil that Japan suffered 40 years later, Gundersen 15 said.
16 Now, today, the NRC amends the reactor 17 Vessel Material Surveillance Program requirements for 18 commercial light water reactors.
19 On December 29th, 2020 the NRC finalized 20 and amended the Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance 21 Program requirements for commercial light water 22 reactor. See Federal Register Volume 85, Issue 249.
23 In so doing the NRC appears to have significantly 24 increased the risk to public health and safety by:
25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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30 (1) Eliminating the testing of certain 1
specimen materials inside capsules placed within the 2
pressurized nuclear reactor vessels by licensees.
3 (2) By extending the reporting time 4
requirements for the test results of the specimen 5
material of the capsules by licensees.
6 (3) By eliminating the requirement for 7
licensees to include or test heat-affected zone 8
specimens as part of the Reactor Vessel Material 9
Surveillance Program.
10 (4) By revising Appendix H to 10 CFR, Part 11 50 to make optional the requirement to include or 12 evaluate temperature monitors as part of the Reactor 13 Vessel Material Surveillance Program.
14 Petitioners note here that the NRC's new 15 rules apply to extended operation of pressurized 16 nuclear reactors for up to 80 years, and that the NRC 17 is actively working with the nuclear industry to 18 extend operations to 100 years.
19 Petitioners challenged these rule changes 20 by submitting comments to the NRC via the NRC website 21 for such public participation. However, the NRC never 22 contacted Petitioners regarding their opposition 23 views, but instead simply ignored Petitioner's safety 24 concerns related to the NRC's rule changes, and 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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31 adopted the changes nonetheless.
1 Petitioners aver here that the NRC, acting 2
in concert with the nuclear industry, finalized the 3
Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program 4
requirements for pressurized nuclear reactor vessels 5
to:
6 (1) Allow the nuclear industry to continue 7
to operate old nuclear reactors which were originally 8
constructed with only a 40-year safety design basis.
9 (2) To protect and ensure numerous NRC 10 jobs that depend on the nuclear industry's continued 11 operation of old pressurized nuclear reactors.
12 Petitioners contend that the NRC's actions in 13 finalizing the new rule for the Reactor Vessel 14 Material Surveillance Program requirements jeopardize 15 public health and safety, and that the NRC appears to 16 have colluded with the nuclear industry for the 17 economic benefit of its licensees and for the 18 longevity benefit of NRC jobs and the NRC's existence 19 as a federal agency.
20 To the extent that the NRC appears to have 21 engaged in misconduct in violation of its own policies 22 and mission statement and congressional mandate as 23 described immediately above, Petitioners request that 24 the NRC Petition Review Board provide the NRC Office 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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32 of the Inspector General with a copy of the record 1
transcript of this teleconference call and any and all 2
other documents,
- notes, emails and other 3
communications and correspondence by the NRC related 4
to this matter, in accordance with NRC policy at MD 5
7.4, Reporting Suspected Wrongdoing and Processing OIG 6
Referrals. See Appendix B - Guide for Processing 10 7
CFR 2.206 Petition, at page 1,Section I.B.3.
8 Petitioners note here for the public 9
record that the NRC Office of the Inspector General 10 has opened up an allegation under A 21 08848 with 11 respect to the subject matter of 2.206, Pressurized 12 Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Issue. Therefore, any 13 assistance on the part of the NRC in assisting the 14 Office of the Inspector General in its open 15 investigation in this matter will serve to further 16 protect the health and safety of the public and to 17 protect the environment and is appreciated.
18 At this time I'm going to provide 19 clarification and further basis and justification for 20 these petitions, including the supplement.
21 As a threshold matter, the Atomic Energy 22 Act of 1954, as amended, authorizes the NRC to issue 23 operating licenses to nuclear plant operators and also 24 authorizes renewal of expired operating licenses and 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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33 states in relevant part that: Each such license shall 1
be issued for a specific period as determined by the 2
Commission, depending on the type of activity to be 3
licensed, but not exceeding 40 years from the 4
authorization to commence operations, and may be 5
renewed upon the expiration of such period. See 42 6
United States Code at Part 2133(c).
7 Petitioners contend here that the NRC 8
appears to have violated the Atomic Energy Act in 9
renewing operating licenses for extended power 10 operations of its licensees before the expiration of 11 the prior period. To the extent that the NRC's 12 actions in granting its licensees extended power 13 operational licenses before the expiration of the 14 prior period, the extended power operational licenses 15 are not valid. Therefore, Petitioners request that 16 the NRC issue a confirmatory order requiring all 17 licensees who were granted extended power operational 18 licenses by the NRC before the expiration of the prior 19 period to immediately shut down their respective 20 nuclear reactors.
21 Common sense shows that NRC regulations 22 relied upon by the NRC licensees such as the Florida 23 Power & Light Company in the early 1970s, who were 24 granted operating licenses for the Turkey Point 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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34 Nuclear Plant Units 3 and 4, employed highly-1 qualified, degreed nuclear engineers who complied with 2
the NRC Regulatory Guides at that time with respect to 3
estimating or guesstimating the expected amount of 4
damage to the nuclear reactor vessel due to neutron 5
fluence for the original 40-year safety design basis 6
of the reactor vessel.
7 Subsequently, NRC nuclear engineers 8
reviewed FPL's license amendment requests and 9
estimated neutron fluence damage to the reactor 10 vessel, or embrittlement, and issued two operating 11 licensees for a 40-year period of operation. As the 12 years passed, the American people through innovation 13 discovered and developed other means to generate 14 electric power, and generally opposed nuclear power 15 operation. Petitioners aver here that the NRC and the 16 nuclear industry feared the end of the nuclear power 17 in the United States was at hand and therefore the 18 NRC, in concert with the nuclear industry, made a 19 decision to grant operating license extensions up to 20 80 years and 40 years beyond the original safety 21 design basis for nuclear reactors.
22 To the extent that both the licensee's 23 nuclear engineers and those of the NRC who originally 24 justified operations of pressurized reactor vessels 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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35 for only 40 years due to concerns of the degree of 1
embrittlement of reactor vessel from neutron fluence 2
can now somehow contend via estimates and guesstimates 3
using vague formulas with assumptions about the amount 4
of error in the calculations of neutron fluence in the 5
NRC regulations strains all reasonable thinking.
6 Rather, it appears that the NRC, in concert with the 7
nuclear industry, are working together to extend 8
operations of pressurized reactor vessels up to 80 9
years and possibly 100 years in the United States at 10 the expense of public health and safety.
11 This becomes even more evident in 12 reviewing numerous licensee applications for extended 13 operations where it appears that the NRC accepts a 14 cookie cutter generic type of application requiring 15 both pressurized reactor vessels and boiling water 16 reactor to respond to various technical questions 17 using the very same application instead of the NRC 18 having two separate applications. To the extent that 19 the NRC and its licensees can somehow look an 20 additional 40 years into the future and issue an 21 Environmental Impact Statement as part of a licensee's 22 application for extended power operations is well 23 beyond belief and absolutely not realistic. It 24 appears to be fraud.
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36 Petitioners further contend here that the 1
licensed operations of a pressurized reactor vessel 2
with 200 miles or less of Washington, D.C. in extended 3
power operations beyond the pressurized reactor 4
vessel's original 40-year safety design represents an 5
unwarranted and unacceptable risk to the national 6
security and common defense of the United States of 7
America. For this reason standing alone, the NRC 8
should issue a classified information requiring 9
licensees of such located pressurized reactor vessels 10 to immediately shut down.
11 Licensee emergency plans are not 12 sufficient to protect the health and safety of the 13 public during a declared general emergency due to a 14 loss of coolant accident, or LOCA, stemming from a 15 fractured nuclear reactor vessel and resulting core 16 meltdown caused by a damaged reactor vessel from the 17 effects of neutron fluence which caused the reactor 18 vessel to fracture during a reactor trip and 19 subsequent pressurized thermal shock event. Indeed, 20 the Fukushima nuclear disaster and reactor core 21 meltdowns resulted in massive evacuations, and the 22 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 23 recommended that the public in Japan be evacuated in 24 a 100-mile radius of the damaged nuclear reactors and 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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37 not the 50-mile radius currently embraced in licensee 1
evacuation plans in the United States.
2 The NRC must require its licensees to 3
perform a one-time inspection of the continuous 4
circumstantial -- circumferential transition cone 5
closure weld on each steam generator, essential 100 6
percent examination covers of each weld, employing 7
radiographic testing, and this is required to protect 8
the health and safety of the public during a 60-year 9
or 80-year period extended power operations of 10 pressurized reactor vessels.
11 The failure of this weld would absolutely 12 result in a major nuclear loss of coolant accident 13 which would kill and harm millions of Americans in the 14 United States. Radiographic testing is the only 15 reliable method of testing and examination to ensure 16 that no cracks or voids exist in the weld.
17 Radiographic testing (1) provides an extremely 18 accurate permanent record; and (2) is very sensitive 19 and can expose cracks and voids where other testing 20 methods cannot.
21 Therefore it is imperative that licensees 22 perform radiographic testing on these areas of their 23 respective reactor vessels to protect the health and 24 safety of the public during extended power operations.
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38 The failure of licensees to conduct such radiographic 1
testing is not a sufficient reason to justify extended 2
power operations for 60 years or 80 years, because 3
Charpy testing of reactor vessel capsule materials is 4
not sufficient or reliable in determining the degree 5
of neutron damage to the reactor vessel over a 60-year 6
or 80-year period of extended power operations.
7 The NRC must require licensees to perform 8
a one-time inspection of the reactor vessel extended 9
beltline region of the reactor vessel shell material 10 including welds, heat-affected, and plate or forgings 11 adjacent to the beltline region employing non-12 destructive radiographic testing. The failure of this 13 weld would absolutely result in a major loss of 14 coolant accident which would kill and harm millions of 15 Americans in the United States. Radiographic testing 16 is the only reliable method of testing and examination 17 to ensure that no cracks or voids exist in the weld.
18 Therefore, it is imperative that licensees 19 perform radiographic testing on these areas of their 20 respective reactor vessels to protect the health and 21 safety of the public. Failure of the licensees to 22 conduct such testing is not sufficient reason to 23 justify power operations for 60 years or 80 years, 24 because Charpy testing of reactor vessel capsule 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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39 materials is not sufficient nor reliable in 1
determining the degree of neutron damage to the 2
reactor vessel over a 60-year or 80-year period of 3
extended power operations.
4 Moreover, the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, 5
Revision 2, May 1988, at paragraph B.3 states that:
6 The definition of reactor vessel beltline 7
given in Paragraph II.F of the Appendix G requires 8
identification of the region of the reactor vessel 9
that are predicted to experience sufficient neutron 10 radiation embrittlement to be considered in the 11 selection of the most limiting material. Paragraphs 12 III.A and IV.A.1 specify the additional test 13 requirements for beltline materials that supplement 14 the requirements for reactor vessel materials 15 generally.
16 Thus, it is imperative that licensees 17 perform a one-time inspection of the reactor vessel 18 extended beltline region of the reactor vessel shell 19 material including welds, heat-affected, and plate 20 forgings adjacent to the beltline region employing 21 non-destructive radiographic testing.
22 In addition, a modification to each 23 licensee's nuclear reactor pressure-temperature limits 24 within the licensee's respective plant technical 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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40 specifications to limit full-power operation of their 1
nuclear reactors to no more than 80 percent is 2
required to limit the amount of reactor vessel damage 3
due to neutron fluence during the period of extended 4
operations. This is true because both the licensees 5
and the NRC are simply guessing about the amount of 6
damage or embrittlement to the reactor vessel -- will 7
be sustained due to neutron fluence during the period 8
of extended power operations. Thus, the described 9
operational modifications will serve to protect the 10 public -- the health and safety of the public.
11 One characteristic of the reactor vessel 12 steels is that their material properties change as a 13 function of temperature and neutron irradiation. The 14 primary property of interest for the purposes of 15 reactor vessel integrity is the fracture toughness of 16 the reactor vessel material. Extensive experimental 17 work determined that Charpy impact tests, which 18 measure the amount of energy required to fail a small 19 material specimen, can be correlated to changes in 20 fracture toughness of the material. Thus, the Charpy 21 impact specimens from the beltline materials; i.e.,
22 base metal, weld metal, and heated-affected zone, 23 became the standard to assess the change in fracture 24 toughness in ferric steels. The fracture toughness of 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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41 reactor vessel materials decreases with decreasing 1
temperature and with increasing irradiation from the 2
reactor. See Federal Register Volume 85, No, 192, 3
Friday, October 2nd, 2020.
4 Petitioners aver here that while Charpy 5
impact testing was used on pressurized reactor vessel 6
capsule samples for up to a 40-year period of 7
operation, Charpy impact testing is not sufficient to 8
ascertain the amount of damage or embrittlement 9
sustained by a pressurized reactor vessel from neutron 10 fluence over a 60 or 80-year or 100-year period of 11 extended power operations.
12 The Army Materials and Mechanics Research 13 Center, or AMMRC, managed a program for many years on 14 the certification of Charpy impact machines. What is 15 evident is that each model machine possesses its own 16 characteristic weaknesses which, unless controlled, 17 can easily result in erroneously high test values. It 18 is estimated that approximately half of the machines 19 in use today are producing values well in excess of 20 the limits set in Army specifications; that is, plus 21 or minus five percent or one foot-pound, whichever is 22 greater.
23 Since most discrepancies either slow down 24 the pendulum or result in absorptional losses, the 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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42 value recorded includes energy not expended in 1
fracturing the specimen, thus creating a false sense 2
of security for the investigator or design engineer.
3 See N. Fahey, F-A-H-E-Y, The Charpy Impact Test - Its 4
Accuracy and Factors Affecting Test Results, in Impact 5
Testing Metals, ed. D. Driscoll, in parentheses, (West 6
Conshohocken -- it's spelled C-O-N-S-H-O-H-O-C-K-E-N 7
-- PA; ASTM International, 1970), close parentheses, 8
76-92.
9 Petitioner further aver that while Charpy 10 impact tests are useful in the analysis and prediction 11 of the behaviors of different materials under impact 12 stresses or dynamic loading, such tests cannot 13 directly predict the reaction of a material to real 14 life loading. Instead, results can only be used for 15 comparison purposes. Like hardness tests, impact 16 tests do not result in a number that definitively 17 describes the material's toughness. Instead, impact 18 tests yield comparative data which is interpreted in 19 combination with an analysis of the broken surfaces of 20 the test specimens themselves. The performance of a 21 specimen in a Charpy impact test is however influenced 22 by many factors beyond material composition and 23 temperature such as yield strength and ductility and 24 placement and size and shape of the notches and strain 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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43 rate and a fracture mechanism. All affect the 1
performance of a sample.
2 When as many of the factors are held 3
constant as possible, the results of the impact test 4
reflect the toughness of the material, although even 5
then, values found are useful only to compare to other 6
results and not as a simply defined property that can 7
be stated universally as a single value. See E59 8
Laboratory Report, submitted October 21, 2008, 9
Department of Engineering, Swarthmore College.
10 Moreover, dynamic tests such as the Charpy 11 impact test yield information regarding energy 12 absorbed in breaking the test piece. This approach is 13 useful in comparing materials but gives virtually no 14 information regarding intrinsic properties of the 15 material such as fracture toughness. See January 16 14th, 1977, Department of Defense, Australian Defense 17 Scientific Service Materials Research Laboratories, 18 Maribyrnong, spelled M-A-R-I-B-Y-R-N-O-N-G, Victoria.
19 Thus, Petitioners aver here that Charpy 20 impact testing is not sufficient, it is not 21 dispositive, and cannot be relied upon by licensees or 22 the NRC to determine the neutron damage or 23 embrittlement to a pressurized reactor vessel due to 24 neutron fluence. Moreover, as referenced in the 2.206 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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44 petitions plant-specific loading, i.e. reactor trips, 1
directly challenge the integrity of the pressurized 2
reactor vessel and should be considered by licensees 3
in assessing the degree of pressurized reactor vessel 4
embrittlement, especially when licensees engage in the 5
NRC Reactor Capsule Surveillance Data Sharing Program.
6 This is true because every time that a 7
nuclear reactor vessel trips off-line, a pressurized 8
thermal shock event occurs where safety injection 9
pumps induce -- introduce cool water directly into the 10 extremely hot reactor vessel. During the pressurized 11 thermal shock event, the integrity of the reactor 12 vessel is challenged. Each time that the integrity of 13 the reactor vessel is challenged by a pressurized 14 thermal shock event, the reactor vessel material 15 contracts due to the introduction of the cool water.
16 Thus, the integrity of a reactor vessel may fail 17 during a pressurized thermal shock event, depending on 18 how embrittled the reactor vessel has become due to 19 neutron fluence during extended power operations.
20 As stated earlier, both licensee nuclear 21 engineers and NRC nuclear engineers originally 22 believed that the integrity of a reactor vessel could 23 only be maintained over the reactor vessel's original 24 40-year safety design basis. Thus, the NRC and its 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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45 licensees are engaged in an experiment, at the expense 1
of public health and safety, to see just how long the 2
integrity of a reactor vessel can be maintained during 3
extended power operations up to 80 years.
4 Petitioners further contend that the test 5
capsule data provided to the NRC by licensees who are 6
part of the Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program where 7
capsule Charpy test data are taken from one nuclear 8
reactor vessel is submitted to the NRC as 9
representative of the amount of neutron damage to the 10 reactor vessel of another reactor vessel is not 11 sufficient to accurately determine the amount of 12 neutron damage or embrittlement of the latter reactor 13 vessel.
14 First, there is no single test location 15 authorized by the NRC or utilized by licensees where 16 Charpy impact testing is performed. Therefore, the 17 testing performed by one vendor can widely vary in 18 accuracy from another vendor depending on the testing 19 facility's equipment, testing procedures, 20 qualifications of employees conducting the tests, 21 human interpretation of the test results, gravity 22 effects on the testing machine, the vintage of the 23 testing machine, the placement of the specimen in the 24 testing machine, the machining of the v-notch in the 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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46 test specimen, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.
1 Second, as stated earlier, Charpy testing 2
should only be used for comparative analysis and 3
cannot be relied upon by licensees to represent the 4
degree of embrittlement of their respective reactor 5
vessels. This is true regardless of the tolerance 6
allowed in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, May 7
1988.
8 To the extent that licensees submit Charpy 9
tests results to the NRC for test results of capsule 10 test samples taken from another reactor vessel and not 11 their plant-specific reactor
- vessel, the data 12 submitted to the NRC is further erroneous and not 13 representative of the degree of embrittlement of the 14 licensee's plant-specific reactor vessel. This is 15 true because the placement of the test capsule inside 16 the reactor vessel, the distance that the capsule is 17 placed from the reactor vessel wall, the height of 18 placement, the operational history of the reactor 19 vessel, the exact properties of the reactor vessel 20 material, et cetera, results in different neutron 21 fluence data obtained from one reactor vessel to 22 another.
23 Third, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 24 2, May 1988, states in part that:
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47 The calculative procedures given in 1
Regulatory Position 1.1 of this guide are not the same 2
as those given in the Pressurized Thermal Shock rule 3
at Part 50.61, Fracture Toughness Requirements for 4
Protection Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events, 5
of 10 CFR Part 50, for calculating RT, subset PTS, the 6
reference temperature that is to be compared to the 7
screening criteria given in the rule. The information 8
on which this Revision 2 is based may also affect the 9
basis for the Pressurized Thermal Shock rule. The 10 staff is presently considering whether to propose a 11 change to Part 50.61.
12 Petitioners contend here that licensees 13 who are operating pressurized reactor vessels, nuclear 14 reactors, in extended power operations beyond the 15 pressurized reactor vessel's original 40-year safety 16 design basis and who justified in their respective 17 license amendment requests for extended power 18 operations by referencing and relying on and using the 19 NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, May 1988, are 20 conducting licensed operations of nuclear reactors in 21 violation of NRC regulations and requirements in 10 22 CFR Part 50 and Part 50.61. This is true because NRC 23 Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, May 1988 contains 24 information on which Revision 2 is based that may also 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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48 affect the basis for the Pressurized Thermal Shock 1
rule.
2 Therefore, pressurized reactor vessels 3
that are operating in extended power operations may 4
experience a pressurized thermal shock event that 5
causes the reactor vessel to crack. Such an event 6
would result in a loss of coolant accident causing the 7
affected licensee to declare a general emergency 8
nuclear accident. To the extent that licensees are 9
only required to evacuate a 10-mile area around the 10 nuclear facility, the loss of coolant accident would 11 kill thousands of people.
12 Furthermore, such a nuclear accident would 13 result in a complete core meltdown and a resultant 14 explosion destroying the containment building due to 15 a buildup of hydrogen released into the containment 16 building. The plume of radioactive particles released 17 into the environment would travel with the prevailing 18 winds and would permanently contaminate areas, for 19 example, Washington, D.C., causing the permanent 20 evacuation in the nation's capital.
21 Petitioners contend that extended power 22 operations of existing pressurized reactor vessels 23 represent an unwarranted risk to the national security 24 and common defense of the United States and to the 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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49 health and safety of the public, and that the NRC 1
should issue a confirmatory order requiring the 2
immediate shut down of all pressurized reactor vessels 3
currently operating in extended power operations.
4 Fourth, for the reasons stated above, 5
Charpy testing is not sufficient to justify extended 6
power operations for 60 years or 80 years or 100 years 7
to ascertain the degree of embrittlement of each 8
licensee's plant-specific reactor vessel as required 9
in the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, May 10 1988, and that Revision 2 cannot be relied upon by 11 licensees to justify extended power operations of 12 pressurized reactor vessels for the reasons previously 13 stated above.
14 Fifth, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 15 2, May 1988 at page 2, Surveillance Data Available, 16 states in part that:
17 When two or more credible surveillance 18 data sets, as defined in the discussion, become 19 available from the reactor in question, they may be 20 used to determine the adjusted reference temperature 21 and the Charpy upper-shelf energy of the beltline 22 materials as described in Regulatory Position 2.1 and 23 2.2, respectively.
24 Thus, Petitioners aver here that the NRC 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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50 Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, May 1988 requires 1
NRC licensees to submit Charpy test data from 2
pressurized reactor vessel capsule samples taken from 3
their plant-specific pressurized reactor vessels and 4
that licensees are not authorized to submit Charpy 5
data from another pressurized reactor vessel employed 6
in the NRC Participant Reactor Vessel Surveillance 7
Program.
8 Sixth, Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, 9
May 1988, Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel 10 Materials, provides for the use of two substantially 11 different methods for determining through-wall fluence 12 in nuclear reactor pressure vessels. One method is a 13 generic attenuation curve based on a simplistic 14 exponential decay equation. Partly due to the 15 simplicity of its application, the generic attenuation 16 method is predominantly used for licensing 17 calculation. However, it has a limitation in that at 18
-- in increasing distance away from the core beltline, 19 it becomes increasing less accurate, because it cannot 20 account for neutron streaming effects in the cavity 21 region surrounding the pressure vessel.
22 The other attenuation method is based on 23 a displacement per atom, or dpa, calculation specific 24 to the reactor vessel structure. The dpa method 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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51 provides a more accurate representation of fluence 1
attenuation through the reactor vessel, PRV, wall at 2
all elevations of the pressurized reactor vessel 3
because it does account for neutron streaming in the 4
cavity region. A requirement for using the dpa 5
method, however, is an accurate flux solution through 6
the reactor pressure vessel wall. This requirement 7
has limited the use of traditional transport methods 8
such as discrete ordinates and that are limited by 9
their treatment of cavity regions; i.e., air, outside 10 the pressure vessel wall.
11 TransWare Enterprises, under the 12 sponsorship of EPRI and BWRVIP, has developed an 13 advanced three-dimensional transport methodology 14 capable of producing fully converged flux solutions 15 throughout the entire reactor system, including the 16 cavity region and primary shield structures. This 17 methodology provides an accurate and reliable 18 determination of through-wall fluence in boiling water 19 reactors and pressurized water reactor pressure 20 vessels, thus allowing the dpa method to become -- to 21 be implemented with high reliability. Using this 22 advanced 3-D methodology, this paper presents 23 comparisons of the generic and dpa attenuation methods 24 at critical locations in both BWR and PWR pressure 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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52 vessel walls. See Comparison of Regulatory Guide 1
1.99, Fluence Attenuation Methods, April 2012, Journal 2
of ASTM International, 9(4):104028.
3 Thus Petitioners aver here that the NRC 4
should require its licensees to use the above 5
described dpa method to more accurately represent the 6
fluence attenuation through the reactor pressure 7
vessel wall at all elevations of the pressurized 8
reactor vessel because it accounts for neutron 9
streaming in the cavity region and therefore provides 10 more accurate and more meaningful data to the NRC 11 about the degree of reactor vessel embrittlement due 12 to the damage sustained from neutron fluence.
13 Conclusion. For all the above-stated 14 reasons the NRC should take the requested enforcement 15 action against its licensees as requested above and as 16 requested in the earlier 2.206 petitions to protect 17 the health and safety of the public and to protect the 18 environment. Petitioners once again urge the NRC to 19 issue a confirmatory order to all PRV licensees 20 requiring the immediate shut down of all pressurized 21 nuclear reactors which are currently operating in 22 extended power operation in America.
23 That completes my dissertation. I'll be 24 open to any questions that anyone might have.
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53 MR. BOWMAN: Okay. Yeah, this is Greg 1
Bowman, the PRB Chair. I would ask -- we're hearing 2
a lot of background noise, and so if you're on the 3
line and not speaking, if you'd please mute yourself, 4
that would help cut down some of the distraction.
5 So, thank you, Mr. Saporito, for your 6
presentation. I know it's been a little bit over on 7
time, but we definitely appreciate hearing your 8
perspectives. I'll note -- you went through the 9
supplement, but I'll note that we just kind of 10 received it this morning. I don't believe any of us 11 had a chance to really kind of review and digest it, 12 but we will certainly do so as part of our 13 deliberations. I'll also offer that we'll share the 14 information related to the petition, including the 15 transcript of this meeting when it's ready, to the 16 Inspector General as you requested. So thank you 17 again.
18 And with that, I'll turn things back over 19 to Rob, our petition manager, to get into the Q&A.
20 MR. KUNTZ: Great. Thanks, Greg.
21 This is Rob Kuntz with the Nuclear 22 Regulatory Commission. And as we stated at the 23 opening we will now enter the question and answer 24 phase of the meeting.
25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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54 So at this time does anyone on the PRB 1
have any questions for Mr. Saporito?
2 Okay. Hearing none, I'll ask now if 3
anyone from the Licensee, Energy Harbor, has any 4
questions for the PRB related to the issues raised in 5
the petition?
6 Okay. Hearing none, I'll ask the 7
Petitioner or the Licensee if they have any questions 8
for the NRC staff about the 2.206 petition process.
9 Okay. So before I conclude the meeting, 10 at this time, any members of the public may provide 11 feedback regarding the 2.206 petition process.
12 However, as stated at the opening, the purpose of this 13 meeting is not to provide an opportunity for the 14 Petitioner or public to question or examine the PRB 15 regarding the merits of the petition request.
16 So at this point are there any members of 17 the public that would like to ask any questions of the 18 NRC staff related to the 2.206 process?
19 Okay. Hearing none, before we complete 20 does the court reporter need any additional 21 information for the meeting transcript?
22 Okay. I don't hear anything.
23 (Simultaneous speaking.)
24 MR. KUNTZ: Yes, go ahead.
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55 COURT REPORTER: Yes. I'm sorry, sir. I 1
needed to get off mute. I was hoping you could spell 2
On Yee, Mr. Hipo Gonzalez, and Jenny Tobin's names.
3 MR. YEE: This is On Yee. The first name 4
is spelled O-N. Last name is spelled Y-E-E.
5 And for Hipo Gonzalez, his first name is 6
spelled H-I-P-O. And last name is spelled G-O-N-Z-A-7 L-E-Z.
8 MR. KUNTZ: Jenny, can you provide --
9 MR. YEE: And Jenny Tobin is Jenny, and 10 the last name is spelled T-O-B-I-N.
11 COURT REPORTER: Okay. Thank you very 12 much.
13 MR. KUNTZ: Okay. Was that all you 14 needed?
15 COURT REPORTER: Yes, sir. That is all 16 the questions I could think of.
17 MR. KUNTZ: Great. Thank you.
18 So the NRC, we want to encourage the 19 participants outside the NRC to provide public meeting 20 feedback to the NRC via the NRC public meeting website 21 or you could provide it to me. My name is Robert 22 Kuntz.
And you can provide that at 23 robert.kuntz@nrc.gov.
24 Okay. So with that, this meeting is 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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56 concluded and we'll be terminating the phone 1
connection. Thank you.
2 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 3
off the record at 11:39 a.m.)
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