ML23341A204
| ML23341A204 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch, Vogtle, Farley  |
| Issue date: | 01/12/2024 |
| From: | John Lamb NRC/NRR/DORL/LPL2-1 |
| To: | Coleman J Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| Lamb J, NRR/DORL/LPL2-1 | |
| References | |
| EPID L-2023-LLE-0018, EPID L-2023-LLE-0021 | |
| Download: ML23341A204 (1) | |
Text
January 12, 2024 Ms. Jamie M. Coleman Regulatory Affairs Director Southern Nuclear Operating Co., Inc.
3535 Colonnade Parkway Birmingham, AL 35243
SUBJECT:
EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2, JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2, AND VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1, 2, 3, AND 4 - REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RE: EXEMPTION REQUESTS FOR PHYSICAL BARRIERS (EPID L-2023-LLE-0018 AND L-2023-LLE-0021)
Dear Ms. Coleman:
By letter dated July 7, 2023 (Agencywide Documents and Access Management System Accession No. ML23188A163), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC, the licensee) submitted exemption requests to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regarding the physical barrier definition in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 73.2, Definitions, for Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, and Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1, 2, 3, and 4. The letter is available to the public, and the attachment dated July 7, 2023, is non-publicly available.
The NRC staff reviewed the submittal dated July 7, 2023, and determined that additional information is needed to complete its review.
On October 25, 2023 (ML23298A054), a meeting notice was issued for a closed meeting to discuss security-related information. On November 17, 2023, (ML23311A130), a meeting summary was issued for the closed meeting held on November 6, 2023. On December 11, 2023, the NRC staff provided a draft request for additional information (RAI) questions to SNC to make sure that the RAI is understandable, the regulatory basis is clear, to ensure there is no proprietary information, and to determine if the information was previously docketed. On December 13, 2023, SNC requested a clarifying call on the draft RAIs, and
provided its availability for the clarifying call. On January 12, 2024, a clarifying call was held between the NRC staff and SNC, and SNC stated that it would provide the RAI response within 30 days from the date of this letter.
Enclosed are the RAIs.
If you have any questions, you can contact me at John.Lamb@nrc.gov or 301-415-3100.
Sincerely,
/RA/
John G. Lamb, Senior Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch II-1 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-321, 50-366, 50-348, 50-364, 50-424, 50-425,52-025, and 52-026
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING PHYSICAL BARRIER EXEMPTIONS FOR EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1, 2, 3, AND 4 By letter dated July 7, 2023 (Agencywide Documents and Access Management System Accession No. ML23188A163), Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC, the licensee) submitted exemption requests to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) regarding the physical barrier definition in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 73.2, Definitions, for Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Hatch), Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Farley), and Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1, 2, 3, and 4 (Vogtle). The letter is available to the public, and the attachment dated July 7, 2023, is non-publicly available.
The NRC staff reviewed the submittal dated July 7, 2023, and determined that the below additional information is needed to complete its review.
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (U) RAI-1 (U) Regulatory Basis:
(U) The requirement in 10 CFR 73.2 states, in part, that Physical barrier means: (1) Fences constructed of No. 11 American wire gauge, or heavier wire fabric, topped by three strands or more of barbed wire or similar material on brackets angled inward or outward between 30° and 45° from the vertical, with an overall height of not less than eight feet, including the barbed topping; (U) Issue:
(U) The licensees submittal does not adequately describe the protected area perimeter fence characteristics for each of its three power reactor sites.
(U) In the first basis for its exemption request on page 3 of the submittal, the licensee stated that
[t]he majority of fencing credited as a physical barrier at each of the SNC commercial nuclear sites is explicitly compliant with the language contained in the definition of 10 CFR 73.2 in that it is topped with three strands of barbed wire installed at an inward or outward angle. The number of, and relative length of, those locations currently affected as listed in the Attachment constitute a small portion of the physical barrier as a whole. In the second basis on page 4 of its submittal, the licensee stated, in part, that a vertical configuration of three stands of barbed wire atop fencing utilized as a physical barrier would meet the alternative barrier allowance in that it provides an equal penetration resistance to three strands of barbed wire installed at an angle. Vertical bracket configuration has no impact to adversary or responder timeliness in the protective strategies.
(U) The NRC staff understood the licensees statements to mean that the only difference that exists with the fencing that comprises the protected area perimeter barriers at Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle is that a limited number of locations at all three sites have barbed wire brackets installed at zero degrees from vertical, rather than the 30- to 45-degree angle described in paragraph (1) of the definition for physical barrier in 10 CFR 73.2. The licensees submittal implied that the remaining attributes of the protected area perimeter fencing at all three sites comply with the remaining requirements in paragraph (1), meaning that all the fencing at each site is: constructed with No. 11 American wire gauge or heavier wire fabric; topped with at least three strands of barbed wire or similar material; and at least 8 feet in height, including the fence toppers (i.e., angled brackets or outriggers).
(U) Request:
(U) Describe the protected area perimeter fencing used at Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle in sufficient detail to demonstrate which portion(s) of the protected area perimeter fencing meets each fence attribute required by paragraph (1) of the definition of physical barrier in 10 CFR 73.2.
(U) RAI-2 (U) Regulatory Basis:
(U) The requirement in 10 CFR 73.2 states, in part, that Physical barrier means: (1) Fences constructed of No. 11 American wire gauge, or heavier wire fabric, topped by three strands or more of barbed wire or similar material on brackets angled inward or outward between 30° and 45° from the vertical, with an overall height of not less than eight feet, including the barbed topping; (U) Issue:
(U) The licensees submittal does not clearly describe why it cannot meet the required characteristics for fences required by paragraph (1) of the physical barrier definition in 10 CFR 73.2.
(U) The licensee indicates in the first basis on page 3 that the length of fencing that does not meet the angled bracket (i.e., outrigger) requirement for fences is a relatively small portion of the total length of protected area perimeter fencing at Farley, Hatch, and Vogtle. In the second basis on pages 3 and 4, the licensee asserts that vertical brackets with barbed wire provide equivalent deterrence and penetration time to those provided by angled brackets or outriggers with barbed wire. The licensee indicated that it analyzed penetration times pursuant to Regulatory Issue Summary 2003-06, High Security Protected and Vital Area Barrier/Equipment Penetration Manual, dated March 2003 (not publicly available), and routine force-on-force exercises and determined that the time it takes to penetrate its fencing with vertical brackets did not change the timelines it uses for the design basis threat adversary or armed responders. In the third basis on page 4, the licensee argues that vertical brackets in the existing locations at all three sites enhances their protected area perimeter barriers by enabling greater tension on the strands of barbed wire than what is possible with angled brackets or outriggers.
(U) None of the bases explain why the licensee cannot meet the Commissions requirement that a fence be topped with an angled bracket or outrigger. For example:
The NRC does not require licensees to tension barbed wire to a certain specification (e.g., a specific pound force, kilogram force, or Newton). The Commission has determined that angled brackets with three strands of barbed wire is an adequate characteristic for the top of a fence. Therefore, configuring a fence with hardware that permits tensioning of the barbed wire strands to a greater tautness than they would have with angled brackets does not explain why the licensee cannot meet the Commissions requirement that fences have angled brackets.
The submittal does not explain why gates that comprise a portion of the protected area perimeter barrier were not, for example, configured with inward swinging hinges or installed with sufficient vertical offset that would prevent angled outriggers on the gates from contacting the outriggers on adjacent static fencing. Such a configuration would enable the licensee to maintain the function of those gates and meet the requirements in paragraph (1) of the physical barrier definition.
The submittal does not explain why vertical brackets are installed in specific locations at one site, while angled brackets that comply with the requirement in paragraph (1) of the physical barrier definition in 10 CFR 73.2 are used in similar locations at one or both of the licensees other two sites. For example, it appears as if the licensee has installed vertical brackets on every, or nearly every, corner post and gate support post at Farley.
Yet, the licensee has apparently installed angled brackets on every corner post and gate support post at Hatch and Vogtle because it is not requesting exemptions for those locations at either site.
o Even if the NRC staff were to accept the licensees argument that increasing barb wire tension creates a more effective and consistent barrier, the submittal does not explain why the licensee needs to increase barbed wire tension on the protected area perimeter fencing to a significantly greater extent at Farley than at Hatch or Vogtle.
(U) Request:
(U) For each specific location where a vertical bracket is installed on the protected area perimeter fencing, explain why it is not possible to comply with the angled bracket requirement.
(U) RAI-3 (U) Regulatory Basis:
(U) The requirement in 10 CFR 73.2 states, in part, that Physical barrier means: (3) Any other physical obstruction constructed in a manner and of materials suitable for the purpose for which the obstruction is intended. Section 4.9.3 in Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 5.76, Physical Protection Programs at Nuclear Power Reactors, dated November 2020 (not publicly available), states, (U) Alternative barriers may be used if the penetration resistance of the barrier is equal to or greater than the chain link fencing described in this section.
(U) Issue:
(U) The licensees penetration time analysis is incomplete because it evaluates only the time it takes to penetrate through an alternative barrier and not also over it.
(U) In the second basis on pages 3 and 4, and the in basis for meeting criterion 2 at the bottom of page 4, the submittal declares that the licensee analyzed the penetration times of its alternative barrier configuration with vertical brackets based on the breaching methods described in RIS 2003-06, High Security Protected and Vital Area Barrier/Equipment Penetration Manual, dated March 20, 2003 (not publicly available), and routine force-on-force exercises. The licensee indicates in both instances that the breaching that the licensee analyzed circumvents the barbed wire completely, which leads the NRC staff to conclude that the licensee evaluated only breaching through the fence fabric and not also breaching that occurs when an adversary traverses over the alternative barrier.
(U) The design basis threat adversary described in 10 CFR 73.1(a)(1), Radiological sabotage, may penetrate a protected area perimeter fence by going over it, through it, or under it. The NRC staff expects a licensees evaluation of penetration time to account for two of those three types of penetration: 1) the time it takes to penetrate through the alternative barrier, and 2) the time it takes to traverse over the alternative barrier. The reason both times are important is because either type of penetration represents defeating the barrier.
(U) Because a fence is normally constructed such that the fencing material extends close enough to the ground to prevent circumventing the barrier between the ground and the bottom of the fence (see characteristic 8 in section 4.9.2 of Revision 1 to RG 5.76), penetrating a fence between the fence bottom and the ground or other terrain against which the fence is constructed requires penetrating through the fence. Additionally, the staff does not typically expect a licensee to evaluate tunneling as part of its penetration time evaluation because a fence with the characteristics required by paragraph (1) of the 10 CFR 73.2 definition of physical barrier is the standard for penetration time equivalency. That fence is likely be the thinnest physical barrier a licensee can use, and therefore, it would have the shortest penetration distance and time via tunneling. Stated differently, any alternative barrier would have a penetration time via tunneling that is equal to or greater than a fence with the characteristics that are required by paragraph (1) because the alternative barrier would have more depth, and thus require a longer tunnel to circumvent it.
(U) Request:
(U) For each specific location, provide information regarding the time it takes to climb or otherwise traverse over the fencing that does not meet the characteristics required by paragraph (1) of the definition of physical barrier in 10 CFR 73.2.
ML23341A204 NRR-088 OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL2-1/PM NRR/DORL/LPL3/LA NSIR/DPCP/RSB/BC NAME JLamb ABaxter ABowers (TLeach for)
DATE 12/08/2023 12/08/2023 12/11/2023 OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL2-1/BC NRR/DORL/LPL2-1/PM NAME MMarkley (SWilliams for)
JLamb DATE 12/12/2023 01/12/2024