IR 05000334/1993026
| ML20058M793 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 12/08/1993 |
| From: | Lazarus W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20058M787 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-334-93-26, 50-412-93-28, NUDOCS 9312210110 | |
| Download: ML20058M793 (68) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
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Report No Docket No License No DPR-66 NPF-73 Licensee: Duquesne Light Company One Oxford Center ,
301 Grant Street Pittsburgh, PA 15279 Facility: Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Shippingport, Pennsylvania inspection Period: October 26 - November 27, 1993 Inspectors: Lawrence W. Rossbach, Senior Resident Inspector Peter P. Sena, Resident Inspector Scot A. Greenlee, Resident Inspector ,
Approved by: V /Nf WMuartdief, Reactor Projects Section 3B Date jnjpection Summary This inspection report documents the safety inspections conducted during day and backshift hours of station activities in the areas of: plant operations; maintenance and surveillance; engineering; plant support; and safety assessment / quality veri 6 catio PDR ADDCK 05000334 :
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- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Beaver Valley Power Station Report Nos. 50-334/93-26 & 50-412/93-28 Plant Operations .
Several control room annunciators were found not to have alarm response procedures (ARPs)
despite previous identification by the licensee. The licensee developed ARPs for all that j
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were missing and plans to do additional reviews of procedure requests. This violation is not being cited because of the minor safety signincance and the adequacy of the licensee's j
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corrective actions. The reactivity curves for the estimated critical position calculation were i found by the inspectors to be of the wrong core cycle. The safety significance is minor, as 'l these curves had not been used by the licensee. However, a previous violation for the use of j incorrect pressure / temperature limitation curve remains open as the licensee's corrective :
actions were not demonstrated as being effectiv )
i Several occurrences of operators failing to properly use procedures were identified by the l licensee, and one example was identi6ed by the inspectors. Individually, each occurrence I was of minor safety significance. Collectively, however, these multiple instances indicate a lack of self-checking by the operators and a failure to demonstrate proper procedural usage and adherence. This was a violatio I The Unit 1 plant startup and Unit 2 plant heatup were both completed safely and without ;
significant complications. The continuous management oversight of the Unit 1 plant startup -
was a strength. The licensee's management of shutdown safety was very good, although some areas for improvement were noted by the inspector Maintenance Job preplanning for a reactor vessel head vent isolation valve repair was poor, as ,
inadequacies in the work package were identiGed. A surveillance procedure for cleaning the i containment sump screens did not provide adequate acceptance criteria for cleanliness. The l inspectors found the bottom 1 foot the Unit 2 sump screen to be partially obstructed with fine j fibrous material after involvement by several work groups, including a multidiscipline l inspection team. The safety significance of this plugging is currently under evaluatio l Engineering i The licensee has determined that the failure of a reactor coolant system resistance temperature detector (RTD) was due to a lack of thermal insulation. This condition occurred in spite of an environmental qualification report on the affects of ambient temperature on temperature inside the RTD head. The report concluded that the maximum ambient ii i
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Executive Summary
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temperature for full qualification was 120oF. The actual in-plant conditions were determined to have exceeded 200oF inside the head of three RTDs. This was a violation of design j control requirement ,
Licensee actions and engineering evaluations of an inoperable containment seismic monitor and recirculation spray pump suction valve failures were found to be appropriate and technically sound. The licensee is considering a 16 CFR 21 report on the valve failures, as each valve was supplied by the vendor with oversized adapter and bonnet plate holes. This allowed the valve operators to decouple from the valve ste Two event reports were closed based on satisfactory completion of the corrective action .
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Plant Support A previously cited violation for failing to follow a resin flush procedure remains ope During a resin flush this inspection period, operators adhered to the procedure but failed to thoroughly investigate an incorrect valve lineup despite questioning from the inspector Surveillances completed by the Quality Services organization on operational activities were found to focus on routine evolutions. Although management oversight was good, surveillances of non-routine evolutions, such as plant startups, were not eviden >
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SUMMARY SLIDES
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- Duquesne Light Company Attendees
- J.D. Sieber
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Senior Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer
- D.E. Spoerry
- Vice President, Nuclear Operations
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T.P. Noonan General Manager, Nuclear Engineering & Safety N.R. Tonet I
Manager, Nuclear Safety R.W. Fedin
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Supervisor, ISEG jy S.F. LaVie vga Senior Health Physics Specialist 8093NRC1 TMP
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i Agenda
. Introduction Penetration Description
' Sequence of Events
- Release Analysis Root Causes . Corrective Actions Review of Previous Event
- Summary / Conclusions svs
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NRC Enforcement Conference King of Prussia PA November 19,1993
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Introduction i
i J.D. Sieber gk' 4 7T Ab BO93NRC1.TMP
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'I NRC Enforcement Conference King of Prussia PA l November 19,1993 i
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Penetration Description L
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Penetration Description, con i 2RCP-08D Enc-View Sketches ;
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Outside Containment View:
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N $ 1-3/16"
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. Inside Containment View
. Penetration Inner Diameter = 113/8"
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Penetration Description, con RCP-08 J Sice Sketch l
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Tem aorary
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Containment Containment
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Penetration Description, con tC3 08J Plan View
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A apro K Cable Trays 4 Feet
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Railing !* 718' elevation'
A3 aro Approx. 20' dro a 4 Feet
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NRC Enforcement Conference King of Prussia PA November 19,1993 Sequence of Events N.R. Tonet dvs
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Sequence of Events 2/11 MWR 016735 written for cable pulling & penetration sealing per 1/2 CMP-PENETRATION-1ME 9/15 MWR 016735 wor < initiated; Working under cable construction specialist criteria; Preparations for pulling cables from trailer to cable vault 9/17 Plant shutdown for 2RO4 outage 9/22 MWR sent to seal construction specialist for inclusion of penetration sealing criteria 9/23 Electrical penetration (2RCP-08D) opened to run eddy current cables; Attachment to MWR on seal installation criteria completed; Seal work package information given to Bechtel 9/24 Final edcy current cable pullec and in place; Opened electrical penetration 2RCP-11E for seal installation hoses: Installed temporary seal dam &
foam in penetration 2RCP-08D
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Sequence of Events, continued 9/25 Final inspection completed on 2RCP-08D by PLC QC; 1/2 CMP-PENETRATION-1ME comp ete 9/26 Penetration 2RCP-11E Type B leak tested 9/30 QC reinspected 2RCP-08D per Administrative Procedure NPDAP 7.10 - weekly inspection 10/1 2BVT 1.47.7 test log indicates 2RCP-08D sealed per 1/2 CMP-PENETRATION-1ME 10/2 2BVT 1.47.7 "Cnmt. Isolation Valve Leakage Test
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Connection Verification" - complete 10/3 2OST-47.3 "Cnmt. Intergity Checklist" - complete
. 10/4 Receive spurious spikes on RQl-104B causing autoclosures of containment purge ex7aust damper; Commence fuel movement to spent fuel pool 10/5 Receive spikes on RQl-104B; Numerous openings &
closings of containment purge & exhaust dampers
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Sequence of Events, continued 10/6 0528 Containment purge & exhaust dampers left closed; 0935 2RCP-08D penetration leak identified; Fuel movement stopped; Containment purge & exhaust dam aers opened 1045 Penetration 2RCP -11E opened for seal installation hoses; Repairs to penetration 2RCP-08D started 1215 10 CFR 50.72 four-7our report made 1545 Repairs to penetration 2RCP-08D comalete 1558 Penetration 2RCP-11E resealed & Type B tested 1635 Containment purge & exhaust dampers closed 1750 Penetration 2RCP-08D leak tested
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NRC Enforcement Conference King of Prussia PA November 19,1993 Release Analysis
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S.E LaVie
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Contiguous Area Ventilation
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9660 cfm to SLCRS A k RMR-RQ301 g g Purge Duct Area 1175 cfm 773' el Personnel Hatch Area 575 cfm 767' el Cable Vault 360 cfm *
755' el West Cable Vault 440 cfm 735'el
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man East Cable Vault 310 cfm 735' el t
Cable Vault 6800 cfm 718'el
7T AF-PR21853 TMP
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REFUELING
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Containment l RuR-RQ-301
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Contiguous
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Contiguous l
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l RMR-RQ301 Alarm
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OBasis:-1.0 MPC @ Monitor / 0.5 MPC at Site Bdry l CSetpoint: 3.11 E-6 / 3.3E-5 gCi/cc
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OPostulated CNMT FHA Activity: 1.4E-2 Ci/cc (1.2E-3 diluted)
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- CALERT and HIGH Alarms in Control Room
- CHIGH Alarm initiates Diversion to SLCRS
OResponse Procedures in Place
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CSurveillances Performed on Monitor
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CCalibrated on 2/4/93 s%.
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- OAreas into which penetration leakage occurred have l monitored exhaust ventilation system ,
ONormally unfiltered release; RMR-RQ301 alarm would cause automatic diversion or filtered release pat .
l 0 Airborne activity in containment below maximum ,
permissible concentration A BO93NRC1.TMP
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Radioactivity Release .
OVentilation exhausts to environment (filtered and
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unfiltered) were covered by discharge permit, .
! incorporating effluent radiation monitor alarm l setpoints, pursuant to the Offsite Dose Calcu!ation l
Manual (ODCM) and the Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications (RETS)
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. ONo alarms occurred on effluent radiation monitors, .
nor were any increases noted in monitor readings, ,
indicating negligible releas svs .
7YAb BO93NRC) TMP
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FHA Analysis Assumptions
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CBased on RG 1.25, SRP 15. cfm Release Rate (exc l-131 Gap Fraction is 12% Vice 10%) (Based on CNMT Pressure Differential)
014 Day Decay Period CNo Control Room isolation CFiltered/ Unfiltered Release Cases OAccident X/Qs 095% Filter Efficiency
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FHA Radiological Consequences (rem)
Beta Photon Thyroid % Limit FILTERED RELEASE ,
0-2 hr EAB 0.001 <0.001 <1 %
30 Day LPZ <0.001 <0.001 <1 %
30 day <0.001 <0.001 .3%
UNFILTERED RELEASE 0-2 hr EAB 0.003 0.005 1 %
30 Day LPZ <0.001 0.002 %
30 Day .002 <0.001 %
10 CFR 100 25 25 300 SRP 15. '
GDC 19 5 5 30
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Ref: ERS-SFL-93-045
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-PR21853 TMP
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k Consequence Summary
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I oNo detectable releases identified during even I
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cif a FHA had occurred in containment, releases would have caused exhaust diversion to the filter
banks, thus mitigating the consequences of the
accident.
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Consequence Summary
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0 Filtered FHA release doses would have been <1% of the SRP 15.7.4 guidelines, and would have been less than the licensing basis FH ,
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OUnfiltered FHA release doses would have been about
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16% of the SRP 15.7.4 guidelines, and would have l been less than the licensing basis FH .
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Analysis Conservatisms 8 i
oContainment Mixing Assumption oNo Credit for Plateout Within Containment
, OLow Pool Scrubbing Credit 095% Assumed Filter Efficiency versus 99% T/S 4 testing ONo Operator Action for 30 days l OFlow Rate Estimate
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d Safety Significance .
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oConclusion: Minor Safety Significance oNo Detectable Release Identified ;
oPostulated FHA Doses are SmaII Percentage of Licensing Basis Dose Criteria ;
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I l NRC Enforcement Conference l King of Prussia PA l
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Root Causes ,
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Root Cause Methodologies
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(NPDAP 5.2)
. Change Analysis
- . Barrier Analysis
. Event & Causal Factor Charting
. ISEG (Fault Tree) Analysis .
. Human Perforrnance Evaluation System
. Kepner Tregoe
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. Inadequate Installation
. Inadequate Independent Verification Human Factors Environment
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Human Factors Environment
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. Minc set of t1ree chambers -
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- - Construction Specia ist/ Foreman
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- Instal er
- QC Inspector
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. Environment
! - Lighting
- Open area in front o" work
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- Limited visibility
- 92 cables
- Cable sleeving
- Focusing inside. penetration
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1 NRC Enforcement Conference King of Prussia PA November 19,1993 l
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i t Corrective Actions D.E. Spoerry
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Immediate Corrective Actions
. Fuel movement was immediately lalted
. T1e event was reported to the NRC per a 10 CFR 50.72 four hour notification
. . The leaking penetration was inspected, sealed, and tested -
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Follow-up Corrective Actions
. The seal insta er's certi ica: ion was susaencec aending re': raining for unique penetration designs
. A reinsaection o 2 RO4 sea s installed by the involved seal installer was aer ormed wi:h no de iciencies notec
. Al' pene': ration seal installers & supervisors were a ertec to the potential for unicue 3enetration cesigns that may inc uce sma l unused spaces
. Any urther tem 3orary containment 3enetration sea ing was suspendec for 2RO4
~
. Insta lation personnel & the QC inspector invo ved in the incident were discialined
- - - - - _ - --- - - -
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. .
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i Follow-up Corrective Actions, con .
. Improve t7e QC inspection process by:
- Strengthening the QC checklist for
.
penetration sea' inspections
- Evaluating changes to QC training moc u e on all types of penetration & fire seals
- Performing an assessment of occasionally ,
performed inspections to determine if more
. detailed inspection procedures are required
!
[
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d a
Follow-up Corrective Actions, con '
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l OTest temporary containment penetration seals to l
'
verify proper installation before beginning core ,
alterations or fuel movement 3 O Develo o a specific work package for temporary
,
containment oenetration seals having unique designs
'
O Retrain penetration seal installers & supervisors j on unique penetration designs that may include ;
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small unused spaces i
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . . _ . _ -
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l . .
l NRC Enforcement Conference King of Prussia PA November 19,1993 l
l l
l
.
Review of Previous Event i
.i T.R Noonan dvs '
'Af BO93NR' : TMP
. _ _ . _ - - , _ . . . . - . _ . . - .- _ . , _ . . - . - - , . . . - - . . . . . . ... .~-..--.-. .. ,-.
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_ __
t Summary
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a. Identification b. Corrective Action c. Licensee Performance c Prior Opportunity to Identify e. Multiple Occurrences During T1is Event - None i
i; f. Duration I
_.,..-._-.-...m__
_ - . . _ _ _ . . . _ _ . - . . _ , _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . - - - - . _
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f-Conclusions
'
J
l a. Licensee identified .
l b. Since the previous. event lad a different root cause, the previous event's corrective action could not have reasonably prevented this event
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c. Immediate corrective action was taken &
actions to1 prevent recurrence are
- comprehensive.
- d. This violation .was not willful
. - _ _ _
_ . - _ . . . _ . _ _ . . . _ . _ . . _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ . _ - - _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ . _ . . _ . _ _ _ . _ . . . . . . . . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . .