IR 05000247/1986032
| ML20207P964 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/13/1987 |
| From: | Norrholm L, Roxanne Summers NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207P959 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-247-86-32, NUDOCS 8701200485 | |
| Download: ML20207P964 (8) | |
Text
i
.
.
.
.
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION DCS 50247-861216
REGION I
Report N /86-32 Docket N License N DPR-26 Licensee: Consolidated Edison Company of New York, In Irving Place New York, New York 10003 Facility Name: Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 Inspection at: Buchanan, New York Inspection conducted: November 22, 1986 - January 5, 1986 Inspectors: L. Rossbach, Senior Resident Inspector P. Kelley, Resident Inspector q uscitto, License Examiner Reviewed by: [A " / /3 R.(jumme~rs,Proje'ctEngineer Aate/
J Reacppr ects Section 28, DRP Approved by: / w ____ //
Lei hate /
Rea'f/Norrholm, ctor Projects Chief Section 28, DRP Inspection Summary: Inspection on November 22, 1986 - January 5, 1987 (Report No. 50-247/86-32)
Areas Inspected: This inspection report includes routine daily inspections, as well as unscheduled backshift inspections of onsite activities, and includes the following areas: licensee actions on previously identified inspection findings; operations; maintenance; surveillance, and review of periodic and special reports. The inspection involved 64 hours7.407407e-4 days <br />0.0178 hours <br />1.058201e-4 weeks <br />2.4352e-5 months <br /> by the resident inspector Results: There were no significant findings during this inspection perio One event is discussed in Section 3 of this report; a dropped rod during the performance of a surveillance tes %.47 PDR ADOCK 05000 .-
_
G PDR
[
m i .
.-
.
DETAILS
. 1. Persons Contacted Within this report period, interviews and discussions were conducted with members of the licensee management and staff to obtain the necessary information pertinent to the subjects being inspecte . Licensee Actions on Previously Identified Inspection Findings (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI 247/80-06-07) Plant specific engineering data for LOCA guidelines. This item identified plant specific engineering data to be reviewed as part of inspection of the licensee's implementation of the Westinghouse Owner's Group (WOG) LOCA Guidelines. This inspection was performed prior to the development of WOG Generic Emergency Response Guidelines. The licensee submitted a Procedures Generation Package (PGP) to NRR for review in June 1984. NRR review is currently underway and does not affect the implementation schedule for the E0Ps which are currently in use and have been subject to observation by NRC operator licensing examiners in the pas Since the development of the new E0Ps supercedes the original short term lessons learned, the substance of this item is no longer relevant and is, therefore, close . Operational Safety Verification 3.1 The inspectors conducted routine entries into the protected area of the plant, including the control room and auxiliary buildin During the inspection activities, discussions were held with operators, technicians (HP & I&C), mechanics, foremen, supervisors, and plant management. The purpose of the inspection was to affirm the licensee's commitments and compliance with 10 CFR, Technical Specifications, and Administrative Procedure On a daily basis, particular attention was directed in the following areas:
-
Instrumentation and recorder traces for abnormalities;
-
Adherence to LC0's directly observable from the control room;
-
Proper control room and shift manning and access control;
-
Verification of the status of control room annunciators that are in alarm;
-
Proper use of procedures;
_ _ _ . .- .
_ _ _ _ _ _ - . __
.
.
..
"
-
Review of logs to obtain plant conditions; and,
-
Verification of surveillance testing for timely completio On a biweekly basis, the inspectors:
-
Verified the correct application of a tagout to a safety-related system;
-
Observed a shift turnover;
-
Reviewed the sampling program including the liquid and gaseous effluents;
-
Verified that radiation protection and controls were properly established;
-
Verified that the physical security plan was being implemented; and,
-
Reviewed licensee-identified problem area In completing the above inspections, the inspectors reviewed the following documents:
-
Selected Operators' Logs
-
Senior Watch Supervisors (SWS) Log
-
Jumper Log
-
Radioactive Waste Release Permits (liquid & gaseous)
-
Selected Radiation Work Permits (RWPs)
-
Selected Chemistry Logs
-
Selected Tagouts The inspectors verified that the licensee's overtime usage by staff members performing safety-related functions were within the limits of Generic Letter 82-12. There were rare instances where these limits were exceeded. Proper authorization was received when the limits were exceede .2 pRA Based System Walkdowns As discussed in Inspection Report 247/86-25, the inspectors are using probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) based inspection guidance in performing system walkdowns. This guidance helps to focus NRC inspection resources toward risk significant item _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -
.
.
.
~
During this inspection period, walkdowns were performed on the auxiliary feedwater, containment fan cooling, and pressurizer relief systems. The systems were found to be properly lined up and operabl .3 Operational Events At the beginning of this inspection period, the unit was operating at 95%
power. The unit is limited by electrical generator end turns vibration. The vibration is dependent on electrical output of the generator and increases with increased power. At the beginning of the inspection period, the vibration limit was administratively set at 1 mils. The operators would manually adjust power to stay below 16.0 mil On December 18, the limit was raised to 18.0 mils peak, 17.5 mils average vibration. The unit achieved 100% power on several occasions with the new limit. At the end of the inspection period, the unit was operating between 96% and 100% powe The licensee has plans to shut down the unit in early February,1987 for four to seven days to inspect the electrical generator. The licensee has a new General Electric electrical generator on site, which is being prepared to install either in a mid-cycle outage in April or in the refueling outage in November, 1987. Currently, a Westinghouse generator is installe On December 16, 1986, at 10:30 a.m., while performing PT-BWI, Biweekly Rod Exercise Test, shutdown rod M-12 dropped when its associated bank was being inserted. By design, when a rou tottom bistable is energized, the turbine began to runback to approximatcly 80% power. The dropped rod caused the Technical Specification quadrant power tilt ratio (QPTR) iimit of 1.02 to be exceeded. The quadrant power tilt was recorded to be 1.1 This caused the plant to enter a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)
per Technical Specification 3.10.3.2. The licensee was unable to latch rod M-12 in order to realign the rod with its bank. I&C began trouble-shooting and power was reduced to less than 50%. The power range high flux trip setpoint was adjusted to 53% per Technical Specification 3.10. At 1:00 p.m., power was reduced to 39% for preparation for a Vapor Con-tainment (VC) entry to continue troubleshooting the dropped rod. An open connection inside the VC on the control rod drive mechanism stationary gripper coil was found and repaired at approximately 4:30 p.m. At 5:00 p.m.,
rod M-12 was realigned with its group, determined to be operable, and the LC0 was terminated. The highest quadrant power tilt recorded during this time period was 1.23, just prior to realigning rod M-12. After realignment, the QPTR was reduced to 1.1 PT-BW1 was completed at 5:20 The QPT began to cycle, due to the Xenon oscillation, because of the power reductio The QPTR was reduced to less than 1.02 on December 18, at 6:25 By Technical Specification 3.10.3.3, the rod position indicators shall be monitored and logged once per shift. The licensee performs this action twice during a 24-hour period, due to the operators being on 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> shifts. The Technical Specifications define " shift" as twice per
_ _
, _ - - - .
%'
.
.
~
calendar day. The rod positions were monitored and logged on December 16, at 12:44 a.m. and 9:44 a.m. by using a computer printout. On December 17, the rod positions were recorded at 3:44 a.m. and 5:44 p.m. During the 3:44 a.m. reading, it was noted that rod B-6 was recorded by the computer printout as being inserted 22 steps further than its bank demand positio At 9:45 a.m., on December 17, an incore flux map was made and verified that rod B-6 was misaligned. Rod B-6 was realigned with its bank at 10:20 The operators reported that the misalignment could not be readily seen on the individual rod position indicator for B- The licensee was able to retrieve historical data from the plant computer, and track the B-6 individual rod position indication and its bank demand position, for a period of time at 5 minute interval It was determined that between 11:30 a.m. and 11:35 a.m. on December 16, rod B-6 dropped approximately 22 steps from its bank demand position. During this same time period, on December 16, the licensee was reducing power, due to dropped rod M-12. The plant has installed a combined rod deviation and flux tilt annunciator which would alarm if one or more rod is greater than 12 steps away from its bank demand position or if the QPTR is greater than 1.0 This annunciator was in the alarmed condition after rod M-12 dropped. The ;
condition for the rod deviation alarm to annunciate is generated by the '
plant computer scanning the individual rod positions. The operators are able to delete rods from the computer scan to eliminate alarms from those rods. This would be done to remove inputs to the computer from rods with faulty individual rod position indicators or with inoperable rods to prevent erroneous alarms. After rod M-12 dropped on December 16, the operators attempted to remove rod M-12 from the computer input. This operation is performed fror the Central Control Room through the plant computer via a keyboar The operator inadvertently deleted all the rods from being scanned, thus disabling that portion of the alar The licensee has stated that the operators will receive more in depth knowledge on the use of the plant computer. Since the deletion of rod positions from the computer disables a portion of an alarm, this is considered a jumper. The licensee will upgrade Station Administrative Order (SAO) 206, Jumper Log, to reflect the fact that a jumper could be electronically installed via the plant computer. These two issues are an open item (86-32-01).
Rod B-6 was actually misaligned from 11:30 a.m., December 16 until 10:20 a.m., December 17. By Technical Specification 3.10.5.3, if a ,od is mis-aligned greater than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, then the rod is considered inoperable. By Technical Specification 3.10.7.2, only one rod is allowed to be inoperable while the plant is critica Rod E-9 has been inoperable since September 22, 1986. Although rod B-6 was misaligned for approximately 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br />, it was not considered inoperable, since it was not discovered misaligned until 6:45 a.m. on December 17, a period of approximately 3.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> ..
.
.
'
The licensee has had a history of problems with dropped rods, especially during the performance of PT-BW Some examples are as follows:
-
September 16, 1986 - During PT-BW 1, the plant was manually tripped, after dropping three rod September 1,1986 - During PT-BW 1, rod E-9 was dropped, causing a turbine runback. Rod E-9 has since been declared inoperabl August 21, 1985 - During PT-BW 1, rod M-4 was dropped, causing a turbine runbac April 22, 1985 - Rod B-6 dropped, while reducing power, causing turbine runbac December 2, 1984 - Rod B-6 was found on botto August 21,1g81-RodG-3 droppe May 28, 1981 - Rod B-6 droppe May 26,1977 - Rod F-2 droppe Upon investigation of the dropped rods, the licensee could not determine the root cause for many of these instance The licensee has a Technical Specification amendment awaiting approval to change the rod exercise surveillance test time interval. The amendment would allow a monthly time interval instead of biweekly. The licensee is continuing to look for the causes of the dropped rods and plans to perform inspections of the control rod drive coils, during the next refueling outag . Maintenance The inspector observed maintenance in progress and reviewed completed and ongoing work packages. The inspector verified that proper administrative approval was received, equipment was properly tagged out, prpcedures used were adequate, proper radiological precautions were taken, QA/QC holdpoints were established and observed, and equipment was properly tested before returning to servic The following maintenance items were observed or reviewed:
-
86-29902, Investigate Why Rod M12 Dropped During PT-BW1 on December 16, 1986. It was determined that an electrical open existed on the stationary gripper coil in the containment. A male / female type connector was disconnected and reconnected and the circuit was close The post maintenance test consisted of moving the rod and verifying rod movement by incore flux ma .
-
.
a
~
-
86-29803, Repair PCV 1310 PCV 1310B was discovered stuck shut December PCV 13108 is in the main steam piping leading to #22 Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. The valve closes on a high ambient temperature signal from the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room in response to a high energy steam line break. A 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LC0 was entered. Upon disassembly of the valve, a bent shaft and a worn disc were found. These items were replaced. PT-Q13, Valve Stroke Test, was performed satisfactorily on December 1 , Repair PCV 1190. PCV 1190 was determined to be stuck open on December 2 PCV 1190 is a containment pressure relief valve. A 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> LCO was entered until the relief path could be isolated. A faulty air control valve was replaced. PTQ13, Valve Stroke Test, was performed satisfactoril , Clean / Inspect / Repair /0verhaul #22 Coolant Charging Pump 480 Volt Breake No violations were identifie . Surveillance The inspector observed surveillance tests in progress and reviewed completed surveillance tests. The inspector verified the test results satisfied Technical Specification requirements, proper administrative approval was received, procedures were adequate, and systems were properly restored at the end of the tet PT-W1, Emergency Diesel Generator Weekly Check, Revision 8, performed December 8, 198 PT-W5, Diesel Fire Pump Starting Batteries Check, Revision 3, performed December 1, 198 PT-M14A, Reactor Protection Logic Test, performed December 22, 198 No violations were identifie . Review of periodic and Special Reports The Monthly Reports for September, October, and November,1986 were reviewed. The review included an examination of significant occurence reports to ascertain that the summary of operating experience was properly documented. The reports were also reviewed to determine that they included the information required by Technical Specification 6.9. and 8. The inspector had no further questions relating to the report No violations were identifie .
.,
.
,.
- ,.
7. Exit Interview At periodic intervals'during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope ano findings. An exit interview was held with licensee management at the end of the reporting period. The licensee did not identify any 10 CFR 2.790 material.