ML20129C814

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Notice of Violation from Insp on 850506-0617
ML20129C814
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs, 05000506  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 07/08/1985
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20129C797 List:
References
50-317-85-13, 50-318-85-11, NUDOCS 8507160337
Download: ML20129C814 (1)


See also: IR 05000506/2006017

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APPENDIX A

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Docket / License: 50-317; DPR-53

Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 50-318; DPR-69

As a result of the inspection conducted on May 6 - June 17,1985, and in accordance

with the NRC Enforcement Policy (10 CFR 2 Appendix C) the following violation was

identified:

Technical Specification 6.8.la requires that procedures be established, im-

plemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures referenced in

Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Appendix A

of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, 1978 requires plant procedures for

changing operating modes from Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby and performing

surveillance tests.

Calvert Cliffs Operating Procedure OP-1, Revision 26, " Plant Startup from Cold

Shutdown" requires (General Precaution I.E. and Initial Condition II.A.4) that i

whenever the shutdown cooling system is in operation, Reactor Coolant System

(RCS) pressure shall not exceed 270 psia.

Contrary to the above, at 10:45 a.m. on June 2,1985, Unit 1 shutdown cooling

flow was lost when RCS pressure was allowed to increase above 284 psia which,

as designed, caused automatic closure of a shutdown cooling return isolation

valve.

Section V of Calvert Cliffs Surveillance Test Procedure STP M-220-2, Revision

10, "ESFAS (Engineered Safety Features Actuation System) Functional Test",

' requires removal of each Refueling Water Tank (RWT) level switch channel, one

at a time, for testing. General Precaution 8 of the STP emphasizes that only

one channel is to be affected by the test ("be in a test mode") at any one

time.

Contrary to the above on May 23, 1985, STP M-220-2 was conducted on Unit 2

in such a manner that two of four RWT level switch channels were affected

(tripped) at one time. With one channel under test and in a tripped condi-

tion, the cover was removed from a second channel's level switch. That action

caused the second channel to trip and generated a Recirculation Actuation

Signal (RAS).

This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR2.201, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company is

hereby required to submit to this office within thirty days of the date of this

Notice, a written statement or explanation in reply, including: (1) the corrective

steps which have been taken and the results achieved; (2) corrective steps which

will be taken to avoid further violations; and (3) the date when full compliance

will be achieved. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to ex-

tending the response time.

0507160337 050700

PDR ADOCK 05000317

G PDR

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