IR 05000321/1988005
| ML20148H711 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 03/07/1988 |
| From: | Holmesray P, Menning J, Sinkule M NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148H683 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-321-88-05, 50-321-88-5, 50-366-88-05, 50-366-88-5, NUDOCS 8803300068 | |
| Download: ML20148H711 (11) | |
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UNITED STATES
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- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION il
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Report Numbers: 50-321/88-05 and 50-366/88-05 Licensee: Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, GA 30302 Docket Numbers: 50-321 and 50-366 License Numbers: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Facility Name: Hatch 1 and 2 Inspection Dates: January 23 - February 19, 1988 Inspectors: D )[ adv [m Peter Holmes 'Ra , Senior Resi/ent Inspector
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Date Signed
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JohnE.Menning,ResidentIn@ector Date Sitned AccompanyingPersgnel:/RanallA.Mussr Approved by: !Muk/ / WWV1 d--
Marvin \f/. Sinkule, Chief, Project Section 3B
$/7!W Date Signed Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope: This routine inspection was conducted at the site in the areas of Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters, Operational Safety Verification, Maintenance Observation, Plant Modification, Surveillance Observation, Radiological Protection, Physical Security, Reportable Occurrences, and Reactor Operating Event Results: Two violations were identifie o068 8s0310 PDR ADOCK 0500o321 Q DCD t_
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REPORT DETAILS Persons Contacted Licensee. Employees T. Beckham, Vice President-Plant Hatch
- C. Coggin, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager D. Davis, Manager General Support
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J. - Fitzsimmons, Nuclear Security Manager
- P. Fornel, Maintenance Manager
- 0. Fraser, Site Quality Assurance (QA) Manager
- M. Googe, Outages and Planning Manager
- H. Nix, Plant Manager
- T. Powers, Engineering Manager
- D. Read, Plant Support Manager
- H. Sumner, Operations Manager
- S. Tipps, Nuclear Safety and Compliance Manager
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R.-Zavadoski, Health Physics and Chemistry Manager Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members and office personne NRC Resident Inspectors
- P. Holmes-Ray
- J. Menning
- R. Musser NRC management on site during inspection period:
M. Sinkule, Chief, Project Section 38, Region II
- Attended exit interview Exit Interview (30703)
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 19, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. The licensee acknowledged the findings and took no exceptio Item Number Status Description / Reference Paragraph 321/88-05-01 Open VIOLATION - Bypassing of APRM Downscale Scram Inputs (paragraph 5)
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Item Number Status Description / Reference Paragraph cont'd VIOLATION - Inadequate MWO for
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4 321/88-05-04 Open Vacuum Breaker Maintenance (paragraph 8)
321,366/86-41-01' Closed VIOLATION - Failure to follow plant procedures which resulted in partial loss of water from the fuel pools (paragraph 3) '
321,366/88-05-02 Open URI - Leak Testing of Test Solenoid Valves (paragraph 5)
321/88-05-03 Open URI - Inadequate APRM Surveillance (paragraph 8) Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
(Closed) Violation 321,366/86-41-01, Failure to follow plant procedures
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which resulted in a partial loss of water from the fuel pool The GPC i letter of response dated May 8,1987, was reviewed. Licensee corrective action involved replacement of the transfer canal inflatable seal assembly, an enhancement of the leak detection system (implemented by DCR 87-99),
the addition of redundant air supplies to the inflatable seal assembly and annunciation in the control rocin for loss of seal air pressure (implemented by DCR 87-100), and specific training for operations personnel on the spill even The inspector reviewed the GPC corrective action package, 4 DCR's 87-99 and 87-100 (and associated MW0s), toured the new seal air ,
i supply system with the system engineer and determined that the required f corrective actions had been performed. Since the actions to correct the j specifics of this violation have been completed, this item is close ; Unresolved Item (URI)*
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(0 pen) URI 321,366/88-05-02, Leak Testing of Test Solenoid Valve ,
i (0 pen) URI 321/88-05-03, Inadequate APRM Surveillanc (Closed) URI 321,366/87-02-03, Method to Ensure Qualified Personnel are i Available to Fill Emergency Organization Position In Inspection Report 321,366/87-18 the Emergency Preparedness Section .
' opened IFI 87-18-04, Veri fy Shift Augmentation Times and Violation ;
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87-18-05, Failure to Maintain a Trained and Qualified Emergency Response i Staff. These two items cover the same concern as 87-02-03. URI 87-02-03 is closed to remove the redundancy.
l "An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviatio I i
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3 Operational Safety Verification (71707) Units 1 and 2 The inspectors kept themselves informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations. Daily discussions were held with plant management and various members of the plant operating staff. The inspectors made frequent visits to the control room. Observations included instrument readings, setpoints and recordings, status of operating systems, tags and clearances on equipment, controls and switches, annunciator alarms, adherence to limiting conditions for operation, temporary alterations in effect, daily journals and data sheet entries, control room manning, and access controls. This inspection activity included numerous informal discussions with operators and their supervisors. Weekly, when on site, selected Engineering Safety Feature (ESF) systems were confirmed operable. The confirmation was made by verifying the following: accessible valve flow path alignment, power supply breaker and fuse status, instrumentation, major component leakage, lubrication, cooling, and general conditio General plant tours were conducted on at least a weekly basis. Portions of the control building, turbine building, reactor building, and outside areas were visite Observations included general plant / equipment conditions, safety related tagout verifications, shif t turnover, sampling program, housekeeping and general plant conditions, fire protection equipment, control of activities in progress, radiation protection controls, physical security, problem identification systems, missile hazards, instrumentation and alarms in the control room, and containment isolatio On January 28, 1988, the inspector observed tools and other materials in the Unit 1 reactor building in the vicinity of Core Spray System Outboard Injection Valve 1E21-F004 These items had apparently not been removed following the completion of maintenance work. This matter was brought to the attention of the Unit 1 Shift Superviso On February 9, 1988, while administering an NRC operator licensing examination, the examiner noted that Unit I was potentially operating with less than the minimum number of operable Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Downscale scram inputs required by the Technical Specifications (TS). At the time of this observation (approximately 0840) Unit I was operating in the RUN mode at approximately 100 percent of rated powe The examiner noted that APRM channel A and Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) channel C were both in the bypassed condition. A review of a f acility print (H-17789) confirmed that the bypassing of IRM channel C in effect bypassed the Downscale scram input of APRM channel Since APRM channels A, C and E provide input to Reactor Protection system (RPS)
channel A, only APRM channel E remained available to provide Downscale scram input to this RPS Channel. During power operations Table 3.1-1 of the TS requires a minimum of two operable channel inputs per RPS channel for the APRM Downscale scram function. If the min' um number of operable inputs cannot be met for an RPS channel, the affected RPS channel must be trippe The examiner observed that RPS channel A was not tripped. The i
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i examiner discussed his concerns with the Unit 1 Shift Supervisor and noted that IRM channel C was subsequently unbypasse The resident inspector attempted to determine how long APRM channel A and IRM channel C had been simultaneously bypassed in following up on this matter. This could not be determined from a review of control room log books. However, on duty operations personnel indicated that the condition had existed since at least the start of their shift. This event is considered a violation of TS Table 3.1-1 in that only one APRM channel was available to provide APRM Downscale scram input to RPS channel A and the RPS channel was untripped. This matter will be tracked as Violation 321/88-05-01 - Bypassing of APRM Downscale Scram Input At approximately 1500 on February 9, 1988, while conducting an NRC licensed one"/.or examination, the examiner noticed that halon tanks serv 4 *., the Unit 2 Remote Shutdown Panel were discharge Discussions wi .n operations personnel revealed that the tanks discharged at 2237 on February 8, 1988. Operations personnel also indicated that no action had
,een taken to replenish the halon. Since Unit 2 was in cold shutdown during this time period, halon protection was not required for the Remote Shutdown Panel. However, the examiner and the resident inspectors were concerned that the licensee had taken no action to replenish the halon almost 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br /> af ter the discharge had taken place. The licensee is currently reviewing this matter. Region II NRC personnel will also review this matter during a future inspectio At 1920 on February 12, 1988, with Unit 1 operating at 100 percent of
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rated power, the licensee declared a loss of primary containment integrity
- and entered a 12-hour hot shutdown LC Proper NRC notifications were made at that time. These actions were precipitated by the results of local leak rate testing (LLRT) in Unit 2 which is currently in an outage.
- The licensee had previously been conducting LLRTs on vacuum breaker test solenoid valves 2T48-F342A - L. These test solenoid valves are in lines
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that supply air to the air operators of torus to drywell vacuum breakers 2T48-F323A - These vacuum breakers normally operate in the
, self-actuated mode. The air operators exist for the purpose on demonstrating opening capability on a monthly basis. For containment isolation purposes, the licensee considers the air operators to be primary
- barriers. Test solenoid valves 2T48-F342A - L are considered outboard i isolation valves, and are identified as containment isolation valves in
- the licensee's Pump and Valve Program. Until the current Unit 2 outage,
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LLRT's on these valves had been performed with pressure applied on the
! side of the F342 valves away from accident pressure. When recently tested i on the accident side, the valves failed to hold pressur As a result of the Unit 2 test failures and the similarity of equipment in i Unit 1, the licensee promptly declared a loss of primary containment 1 integrity in Unit The licensee subsequently restored primary containment l integrity in Unit 1 by disconnecting and capping the air lines at test
- solenoid valves 1T48-F343A - L. This avoided shutdown of Unit 1 and was accomplished within the LCO time allowed. The licensee it currently
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investigating this matter and exploring options for corrective action.
, Pending completion of the licensee's investigation and -NRC review, the
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matter will be identified as Unresolved Item 321,366/88-05-02 - Leak Testing of Test Solenoid Valve One violation was identifie l Maintenance Observation (62703) Units 1 and 2 ,
During the report period, the inspectors observed selected maintenance .
activities. The observations included a review of the work documents for adequacy, adherence to procedure, proper tagouts, adherence to technical specifications, radiological controls, observation of all or part of the actual work and/or retesting in progress, specified retest requirements,
- and adherence to the appropriate quality control The primary maintenance observations during this month are summarized below
Maintenance Activity Date
l Preventive maintenance on Limitorque operator 1/26/88 on valve 2E32-F001P per procedure i 52PM-MNT-005-0S (Unit 2) Plant service water pump "2A" sequencing 1/28/88 timer evaluation per procedure 42SP-011188-0J-1-2 (Unit 2) Inspection of "2C" diesel generator per 2/3/88 ;
procedure 52SV-R43-001-05 (Unit 2) [
j Inspection of Allis Chalmers Motor 2/8/88 j Control Center 2R24-5012 per procedure 52PM-R24-001-05 (Unit 2)
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' Removal of Valve 2E11-F005B per 2/9/88 l Maintenance Work Order 2-87-3462 for j Inservice Inspection (Unit 2)
No violations or deviations were identified.
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- Plant Modification (37700) Unit 2 l The inspectors observed the performance of selected plant modification Design Change Requests (DCRs). The observation included a review of the DCR for technical adequacy, conformance to Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal from service and return to service of T
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. 6 the system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteri The primary DCR observations are summarized below:
DCR Date .86-235 2/2/88 81-008 2/8/88 No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance Testing Observations (61726) Units 1 and 2 The inspectors observed the performance of selected surveillances. The observation included a review of the procedure for technical adequacy, conformance to Technical Specifications, verification of test instrument calibration, observation of all or part of the actual surveillances, removal from service and return to service of the system or components affected, and review of the data for acceptability based upon the acceptance criteria. The primary surveillance testing observations during this month are summarized below:
Surevillance Testing Activity Date Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System 2/2/88 Pump Rated Flow Testing per procedure 345V-E51-002-1S (Unit 1) Functional Testing of Offgas Vent Pipe 2/4/88 Radiation Monitor per procedure 575V-011-010-1 (Unit 1) Post Maintenance Functional Testing of 2/11/88
"2" Diesel Generator per procedure 52SV-R43-001-05 (Unit 2) Functional Testing and Calibration of APRMs 2/15/88 345V-C51-002-15 (Unit 1)
On February 15, 1988, at 1720, the licensee discovered that the surveillance for Average Power Range Monitors (APRM) did not test all contacts in the trip logic. The downscale and the flow biased high flux trip contacts had not been included in the surveillance procedure and therefore had not been tested weekly as required by Technical Specifications).
The APRMs were declared inoperable at 1720, 2-15-88 and the LC0 atiion required by TS 3.1, Table 3.1-1, Scram Number 8 was entered. This required action was to reduce power to the IRM range and to have the Mode Switch in Hot Standby within eight hours. The licensee requested that the NRC grant discretionary enforcement to extend the LCO time for about eleven hours (until 12:00 noon, 2-16-88) to allow time for procedure development and testing of the APRM trips. The request was processed through proper channels and discussed. Since the LC0 time limit of eight hours was rot exceeded, the discretionary enforcement was not utilized due to clearing
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of the LC The Senior Resident Inspector reviewed the procedure and witnessed the testing of one of the APRMs. All APRMs were tested
satisfactorily and the LCO cleared .by 2302, 2-15-8 This item, Inadequate APRM Surveillance, will be tracked as URI 321/88-05-03. As discussed in Region II Reports 321,366/87-29 and 321,366/87-33, several Unit 1 torus to drywell vacuum breakers failed to test satisfactorily during recent monthly operability testin More specifically, vacuum breakers 1T48-F323 C and F did not test properly on November 11, 1987, and vacuum breaker 1T48-F323E stuck open during testing on December 11, 198 ,
Vacuum breaker li:.e-F323E eventually did close when the test switch at the local panel for vacuum breaker IT48-F323F was depressed. The licensee subsequently initiated a program to identify and correct wiring problems in the test circuitry for these vacuum breaker Required corrective actions were taken under Maintenance Work Orders (MW0s) 1-87-8123, 1-87-7516, 1-87-7517 and 1-87-7950 during the month of January 1988. In essence, the licensee found that solenoid valves in the air test lines for IT48-F323C, E and F had been incorrectly wired and that individual wire conductor labels for these solenoid valves were incorrect. The solenoid valves (designated IT48-F342 C, E and F) are two-way valves that remain open after the test button is released to assure that all air is relieved
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The licensee conducted a broader investigation af the vacuum breaker testing problems to determine the root cause and identify any additional needed corrective actions. The resident inspectors reviewed the report of
this investigation dated February 5,1988. It was determined that the !
i wiring discrepancies causing the testing problems were introduced in
, October of 1987 during the performance of MWO 1-86-7823. This MWO was I
generated primarily to mark and stow a spare cable and verify the wiring I of a new cable. Personnel performing this work noticed and documented i
improper conductor termination at test solenoid valves 1T48-F342C, E and
, F. Unfortunately, MWO instructions to correct the observed wiring discrepa-i ncies were inadequate, and subsequent corrective maintenance actually introduced [
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wiring errors into the test circuitr The operability testing difficulties of vacuum breakers IT48-F323C, E, and F were subsequently experienced in j November and December of 198 Technical Specification 6.8. requires that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering the activities recommended ,
in Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 197 ,
Appendix "A" recommends that maintenance that can af fect the performance l of safety-related equipment be properly preplanned and performed in ;
accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings
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appropriate to the circumstance The rewiring of solenoid valves l IT48-F342C,E and F in October 1987 is considered to be a violation of TS ;
6.8.1.a. in that the instructions of MWO 1-86-7823 were inadequate and l
resulted in improper wiring of the three vacuum breaker test soler.oid valve This matter will be tracked as Violation 321/88-05-04 -
Inadequate MWO for Vacuum Breaker Maintenanc In reviewing this matter the inspectors noted that the incorrect wiring of the test solenoid valves did not impair the ability of the torus to drywell vacuum breakers to function in the normal, self-actuated mode, One violation was identified.
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8 . .ESF System Walkdown (71710)
The inspectors routinely conducted partial walkdowns of ESF systems. Valve and breaker / switch lineups and equipment conditions were randomly verified both locally- and in the control room to ensure that . lineups were i accordance with operability requirements and that equipment material conditions were satisfactory. The Unit 1 Residual Heat Removal system "A" loop was walked down in detai Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
a 1 Radiological Protection (71709) Units 1 and 2
The resident inspectors reviewed aspects of the licensee's radiological protection program in the course of the monthly activitie The performance of health physics and other personnel was observed on various shifts to include: involvement of health physics supervision, use of radiation work permits, use of personnel monitoring equipment, control of high radiation areas, use of friskers and personal contamination monitors, and posting and labelin No violations or deviations were noted.
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1 Physical Security (71881) Units 1 and 2
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In the course of the monthly activities, the resident inspectors included a review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance of
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various shifts of the security force was observed in the conduct of daily
! activities to include: availability of supervision, availability of armed
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response personnel, protected soc vital access controls, searching of personnel, packages and vehit 'es, badge issuance and retrieval, escorting 1 of visitors, patrols and compensatory pests.
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On February 18, 1988, the resident inspectors toure, the new security j building and observed operations in progress.
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No violations or deviations were note l 1 Reportable Occurrences (90712 & 92700) Unit 1 and 2 A number of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) were reviewed for potential generic impact, to detect trends, and to determine whether corrective actions appeared appropriate. Events which were reported immediately were also reviewed as they occurred to determine that Technical Specifications were being met and the public health and safety were of utmost consideratio Unit 1: 86-11, Personnel Error Causes ESF Actuatio The events of this LER were cited as Violation 86-03-03. The licensee's corrective action was raviewed and the violation closed in Inspection Report 86-2 This LER is close _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ .
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87-01, Spurious Ground Fault Trips Turbine Overspeed Device Causing Reactor SCRAM. The licensee's response to to this event was reviewed and appeared adaquate. No fault was located in the turbine overspeed device and the device has operated properly during Unit 1 power operations. This LER is close , Ground Condition Trips Main Generator and Turbine Resulting in Reactor SCRAM. A loose wire was located and repaired. Checks were made for other loose components or ground conditions with none found. A review for possible additional preventative measures is continuin This LER is close . Blocked Air Port Prevents Damper Closure Resulting in Improper ESF Actuation. This event was caused by a missing locknut on the damper control valve bleed off port adjusting screw. The nut was replaced, the screw properly adjusted and locked and the other dampers inr.oected for loose or missing locknuts. This LER is close Unit 2: 86-20, Primary Containment Penetrations Failed LLRT. All failed penetrations were repaired and retested prior to Unit 2 startu This LER is close , Leaking Valves Cause RWCU Isolation (Group 5). The leaking valves were located and isolated and the Group 5 isolation signal rese There is a continuing RWCU upgrade in progress to which this problem has been added. This LER is close . Operating Reactor Events (93702) Unit 2 As discussed in Report 321,366/88-01, the maximum reactor coolant system cooldown rate of 100 degrees F per hour specified in Technical Specification 3.4.6.1 was exceeded during the shutdown of Unit 2 on January 13, 1988. The licensee determined that a cooldown from about 520 to 375 degrees F occurred in one hour. The associated technical specification Action Statement required the licensee to perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the fracture toughness properties of the r6 actor coolant system and to determine that the reactor coolant system remains acceptable for continued operatio An engineering evaluation, performed by General Electric Company for the licensee, addressed the potential cor.cerns of brittle fracture, allowable stress and f atigu The evaluation concluded that brittle fracture was not a concern, and that the impact of the transient on maximum stress and fatigue were less severe than those evaluated for the design basis single relief valve blowdown event. In summary, it was concluded that there were no structural integrity concerns with continued operation of Unit _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
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The resident inspectors reviewed the General Electric engineering evaluation dated January 18, 198 Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identifie . Information Meeting with Local Officials, (94600)
On February 2,1988, the Chief of Region II Projects Section 3B and the resident inspectors held an information meeting with the Appling County Board of Commissioners. The NRC representatives provided the Board with a description of the NRC organization and responsibilities, a summary of plant status and the business telephone numbers of appropriate NRC contacts. Additionally, the Hatch resident inspectors were introduced and the inspection program was briefly described. Information available in the local Public Document Rnom was also discussed. The NRC representatives responded to questions posed by the Board at the conclusien of this information meeting.
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