ML20079Q260
| ML20079Q260 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 08/23/1991 |
| From: | Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20079Q225 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9111180039 | |
| Download: ML20079Q260 (230) | |
Text
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W o tM 95 o o' SEABROOK NUCLEAR POWER STATION at Seabrook, New llampshire Licensee: Public Service of New llampshiie Date of Exercise: December 13,1990 Ihercise of the Offsite Response Plans ancl Preparedness
Participants:
State of New ilampshire New llampshire Yankee Off;,ite Response Greanization Prepared by FEDERAL EAIERGENCY MANAGEA1ENT AGENCY llegion I
.lohn W. Mccernuck Post Otfice and Courthou .
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i l'n CONTENTS 2
. 4
. . . 4 DUKMARY .. .
. . 7 1 INTRODUCTION . . .
Exercise Background . . .. . . . .
. . . . 0 11 .
Exercise Objectives . ,. . . . 23 12 . . . 26 13 FEMA Evaluators . . f Exercise Scenario . Narrative Summary o . . . . 26 1.4 . . . . 106 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION . . . . ization State of New Hampshire ffsite Response Organ 21 New Hampshire Yankee O 22 TABLES
. 9 15 List . .
of New Hampshire 1 Evaluator AnsignmentMatrix State Yankee . . 17 2 Objective / Location Matrix-New Hampshire . 19 anization . . . 3 Objective /LocationOffsite Btate of NewResponse Hampshire . Org 21 4. Significant Events Log-Now Hampshire Yankee . . 163 Significant Event Logn ization . brook . . . 5 Offsite Response Orga tive Actions for Sea 1990 Exercise) 102 Areas Requiring Correc (December 13,Table, . . 6 Nuclear Power Station tive Action Tracking . . . 205 Areas Requiring Correcr Station of REP . . . 7 . Saabrook Nuclear Poweand Definitions and ACRONYMS
- 8. 01ossary of TermsExtrcise Terminology 1
--~ n ,
e s
SUMMARY
%t for the Seabrook Nuclear PowetOn December 13,19 New Hampshire.
The otation (SNPS). Seabrook Station 1990 The SNPS FEhiA/N is le Offsite Response Or Response Organization RC ocatedin graded (NHplume the Town cf pathw exercise was, a one Seabro d Preparedness,ganization (NH).Y ORO), and the State of ay, New Hexe ampshire Yankee \ Exemise whereas FEMAoffsiteRegion I evaluated NRCRegionIevaluated Report addresses the the O i Off i \ s te Response Plans andam \ ns te Plans and Preparedness This FE FEMA's regulations conce)'rning thThe Seabro . A FEMA's review eand for copin
. exercise approval of ofSpreparedness, State ce and local radiolo in accordance with 44 C.F facilities.g with offsite tateradiological and local radiological emergencies emFEMA's ey and guidance that for regula may occur at commercial nuclea In accordance with exercise was a full participation ex FEMA and NRC wer the graded exercise in suffici ercise:
radiological emergency regulations, ent numbers response to verifypl thatthe the procSeabrookd Station e participated in FEMA's evaluators evaluated the f llans could be effec . State' of New Hampshire: o owing operations: Areas, local EOC's, Reception CEOC, IFO, Accident Assessme NHY ORO: Center, and in the field.EOC, Staging , n the field. Area, Media C Other: er, Reception Center, Congregat NH). e Care Yankee Atomic Mobile II.borato Medical drills: ry (in support of NHY ORO and h t e State of Ambulance Companics ptals. and Hos i 2 i
e . CONTENTS
SUMMARY
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
- 1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1 Exercise Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2 Exercise Objactives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.3 FEMA Evaluators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.4 Narrative Summary of Exercise Scenario . . . . . . 23
- 2. EXERCISE EV.1LUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 2.1 State of New Hampshire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 2.2 New Hampshire-Yankee Offsite Response Organisation 106 TABLES
- 1. Evaluator Assignment List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
- 2. Objective /Lucation Matrix State of New Haay4 4 hire . . . . 15
- 3. Objective / Location Matrix-Neu Hampshire Yankee g Offsite nesponse Crganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
- 4. Significant Events Log-State of New Hampshire . . . . . . 19
- 5. Significant-Event Log-New Hampshire Yankee Offsite Response Org&nization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
- 6. Areas Requiring Corrective Actions for Seabrook Nuclear Power Station (December 13, 1900 Exercise) . . . 163
- 7. Areas Requiring Corrective Action Tracking Table, Seabrook Nuclear Power Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
- 8. Glossary of Terms and Definitions of REP Exercise Terminology and ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 1
. . . . . - - _____ ___ _ __________________A
atmMARY On December 13,1990, FEhiA Region ! evaluated an exercise of off*.: plans and preparednc5s for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station (SNPS). The SNPS is located in the Town of Seabrook, New llampshire. The Seabrook Station 1990 FEMA /NRC graded exercise was a one day, plume pathway demonstration. This exercise was conducted by the New Hampshire Yankee Offsite Response Organization (NHY ORO), and the State of New llampshire Emergency Response _ Organization (NH). FEhiA Region I evaluated the Offsite Response Plans and Preparedness, whereas NRC Region I evaluated the Onsite Plans and Preparedness. This FEhiA Exercise Report addresses offsite response plans and preparedness. The Seabrook Station 1990 FEhiA/NRC graded exercise was conducted in accordance with FEhiA's regulations conecrning the exercise of State and kwal radiological emergency plans and preparedness, 44 C.F.R. 6350.9(a). FEhiA's regulations contain policy and guidance for FEhiA's review and approval of State and Local radiologicai emergency plans and preparedness for coping with offsite radiological emergencies that may accur at commercial nuclear power facilities. In accordance with FEhiA and NRC regulations, the Seabrook Station 1990 FEh! A/NRC graded exercise was a full participation exercise; i.e., emergency response personnel participated in the graded exercise in sufficient numbers to verify that the procedures contained in the various radiological emergency response plans could be effectively implemented. FEhiA's evaluators evaluated the following operations: State' of New Hampshire: EOC, IFO, Accident Assessment, hiedia Center, Staging Areas, kcal EOC's, Reception Center, Congregate Care Centers, and in the field. NHY OAO: EOC, Staging Area, hiedia Center, Reception Center, Congregate Care Center, and in the field. Other: Yankee Atomic hiobile Laboratory (in support of NHY ORO and the State of NH). hiedical drills: Ambulance Companies and Hospitals. 2
~
0 4 I .. In addition to the pre established exercise objectives FEMA evaluated the implementation of the corrective actions identified in previous exercises, e.g., issues identified *hrough . our previous evaluations that the participants were required to resolve. Corrective actions not successfully implemented during this exercise will be reviewed and evaluated in the next scheduled exercise. Following the exercise, an analysis was made by the FEMA evaiuation team and a preliminary briefing for exercise participants v as held in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. A public meeting for the general public was held on December 17,1990, at 1900 in Seabrook, New Hampshire. > d 3 1 - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ .m
A 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EXERCISE llACKGROUND . On December 7,1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency hianagement Agency (FEhf A) to assume lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. FEhiA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following: Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans developed by State and local governments; Determining whether such plans can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans conducted by State and local governments; Responding to requests by the NRC pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between NRC and FEhi A Relating to Radiological Emergency Planning and Preparedness, 50 Fed. Reg.15485 (April 18,1985) (h10U); Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process: U.S. Department of Commer:e (DOC) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comrnission (NRC) U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (El ' ~ U.$. Deputment of Energy (DOE) , U.S. Department of Health and Human Sen s (HilS) U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) U.S. Depanment of Agriculture (USDA) U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI). Representatives of these agencies serve as representatives on the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA. Radiological emergency preparedness plans for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (MA) and MA communities within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) of the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station (SNPS), which is located in the Town of Seabrook, New Hampshire, have not been submitted to FEMA cither by the State of Missachusetts or by affected local Massachusetts jurisdictions. Instead, New Hampshire Yankee (NHY), the holder of an NRC i license to operate SNPS, established its own Offsite Response Organization (NHY ORO) relying on NHY employees, contractors, and private organizations. On September 26, 1987, NH f filed a plan for offsite response with the NRC. 4 l l
t i . 4 I At the request of the NRC, pursuant to the FEMA /NRC Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), FEMA conducted a review of the NHY Offsite Response Plan against the standards ,
- and evaluation criteria in_ NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP 1, Rev.1, Interim Supp.1, dated- ;
November 1987 (Suppleme'nt 1). j The Seabrook Station 1990 FEMA /NRC graded exercise was conducted on December 13, [ 1990 and was the third Seabrook exercise to be evaluated by FEMA Region I for this site. Certain activities w re demonstrated out of sequence on December 12,1990. These werc ! remedial bus runs for runs not completed in die State of NH during the 1988 exercise and ! interviews with Congregate Care Center Managers. On December 14, 1990, remedial bus < , runs for runs not completed on December 13, 1990. Medical Service (MS 1) drills were conducted on August 14 1990 for the SPMC and August 15, 1990 for the State of NH; Objective 34, Shift Change for key personnel in certain NH towns was demonrtrated during i combined functional drills on October 27, 1990 and November 28, 1990. This rep rt includes evaluation of all of the above activities. The previous exercises were conducted in ' February 1986 and June- 1988. It should be noted that the 1986 exercise tested only the preparedness and plans for the New Hampshire portion of the plume exposure EPZ. The ! June 1988 exercise tested the plans and preparedness for the New Hampshire plume exposure , EPZ and Ingestion Pathway and- the Maine Ingestion Pathway. Also in June 1988, the Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities, developed by New llampshire Yankee as 4 noted above, was tested for the Massachusetts plume exposure EPZ and Ingestion Pathway. In the 1990 exercise, the participants exercised their plans of record Following is a list of plans. _ . New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan (NHRERP): As updated in February 1990 - Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities (SPMCM As updated in December _ _ __- 1989 The exercise was conducted in accordance with the exercise scenario and extent of play. The scenario presented a hypothetical accident at SNPS that was to trigger offsite response activities as well as various offsite conditions and contingencies. The extent _ of play constituted the agreements between FEMA and the emergency response organizations " regarding deviations that were to be permitted from the plans and procedures by the players during the exercise. These deviations were necessitated by such. considerations as safety, unreasonable expense, time constraints, legal problems, and the nature of the exercise. as a simulated event. Where no agreement limiting the extent of play existed, FEMA evaluated the observed activities as if the plan and procedures were to be followed in their entirety. The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-I 5 L
i REP 1, Rev. 1 (November 1980), NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP 1, Rev. 1, Supp. 1, (September 1968), and the Exercise Evaluation Methodology (EEM) specified in FEMA memorandum dated June 1988, and those expected actions called for by the participants' plans and procedures. The objectives for the Seabrook Station 1990 FEMA /NRC graded exercise were taken from standards contained in FEMA's 44 C.F.R. 350.5 and the FEMA /NRC document, NUREG-
%54/ FEMA REP-1, Rev.1 and Supp.1. The 37 offsite objective statements were taken from FEMA Guidance Memorandum (GM) EX 3, Managing Pre Exercise Activities and Post Exercise Meetings (February 26,1988) with additional clarification provided in FEMA GM EX 3 Amendments (March 7,1988).
FEMA's EEM provides an objective based method for FEMA to use in evaluating exercises pursuant to 44 C.F.R. 350 and 10 C.F.R. 50 (NRC). The EEM is structured so that any given objective can be addressed for any relevant activity, whether facility or field based. Therefore, the objectives are evaluated based upon an organization of activities regardless of l whether these activities are demonstrated at one level /one location or multiple levels / multiple locations. Two Control Cells were established for this exercise One Control Cell placed and received telephone calls to the various EOC's, Media Center, etc. The NHY Control Cell represented the media, the concerned public, and other response organizations. The response by participants to this Control Cell's telephone calls gave a basis for FEMA's evaluation to determine the adequacy and-preparedness capabilities of offsite preparedness. The other , Control Cell (the FEMA Control Cell) was estr.blished to pmvide FEMA a basis for determining the adequacy and capability of the NHY Offsite Response Organization to - interface with the nonparticipating State and local governments. . The exercise evaluations presented in Sections 2 and 3 of this report are based on the ; applicable objective, me extent of play, and evaluation criteria set forth in the appropriate Exercise Evaluation Form. For the purpose of exercise assessment and evaluation, FEMA > uses the following methodology to classify exercise inadequacies. FEMA classifies extreise it. adequacies u deficiencies or areas requiring corrective hetioas. Deficiencies are , demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that offsite emerp:ney , preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measurer can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a .nu:lcar power facility in the event of radiological emergency. Because of the potential impact of deficiencies on emergency preparedness, tney are required to be promptly corrected.through ' . appropriate _ remedial actions, including remedial exercises, drills, or other actions. Areas Requiring Corrective Action (A.RCA) are demonstrated and observed inadequacies of performance, and although their correction is required, they are not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety, in addition to these exercise inadequacies, FEMA iden6fics Areas Recommended for improvement (ARF 0, which are areas / issues observed during an exercise that are not considered to adversely impact public 6
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f ~ health and safety. While not required, correction or improvement of these areas / issues would enhance an organization's level of emergency preparedness. Sections 2 and 3 of this repon are structured in the following format: The applicable exercise objective: An evaluation of whether the objective was demonstrated; A narrative summary; and, if appropriate, Issues. Issues are items that have been classified as exercise inadequacies, Areas Recommended for Improvement or Other issues. Issues are presented in the following format: Issue #: Followed Fv identi6 cation (exercise inadequacy or Area Recommended for Improvement).
Description:
Statement statir,g the rationale; and Recommendation: Statement expressing the items recommended for implementation of corrective actions. 1.2 EXERCISE 01UECTIVES The objective of this exercise was to demonstrate the offsite response organization's capability to mobilize needed personnel and equipment, to demonstrate the response personnel's fami(.trity with their procedures, and to demonstrate the offsite response organization cap;bility to manage an emergency at SNPS. The exercise was to involve activation and participation of staff and response facilities at SNPS, as well as tim offsite jurisdictions and their facilities. Table 2 indicates the loca' ion (s) where cach objective was to be demonstrated. Federal agencies with radiolegical emergency preparedness responsibility were not to participate actively in the play of the exercise, except for commitments by the U.S. Coast Guard for notincation of waterborne traf6c (simulated) inside the ten (10) mile EPZ. The goal of this exercise was to endeavor to demonstrate by actual performance a number of primary emergency preparedness functions. At no time was the exercise to interfere with safe operation of SNPS, er with State or local government activities. l 7 I i
O 1 1.3 FEMA liVALUATORS The Seabrook Strde,i 1000 FEMA /NRC graded exercise was evaluated by 123 evaluators. Led by the FEM Management Team, these evaluators were drawn from a number of organizations. FEntA staff assigned to FEMA Headquarters (HQ) .md Regions I,11, IV, V, i VI, Vill, and IX, served as evaluators. Among the Federal agencies represented on the l Region I Regional Assistmec Committee, evaluators were provided by the Nuclear l Regulatory Commission (NRC). Department of Transportation (DOT). Department of l Agriculture (USDA), and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). FEMA contractors and subcontractors whose employees served as evaluators include Idaho National Eng'.neering Laboratory (INEL), Argonne National 1.aboratory (ANL), and the Center for Planning and Research (CPR). The American Red Cross provided an evaluator. Tne FEMA Control Cell was staffed by employees of FEMA Headquarters and INEL. Table 1 presents the Evaluator Assignment List, stating the name of each evaluator or FEMA Control Cell member, a location / functional description of their assignment (s), their respective affiliations, and their team assignments. I ! 8 l i
4* TABLE 1 Evaluator List IT3fA I ReclenManagementltam Albert A. Gammal, Jr., Chief, Natural and Technological Hazards John C. Dolan RAC Chairman and Chief, Technological Hazards Branch Locatlan/runctional iksdpilon M cf Evaluators) Namt renluntlan of the New Ilamoshire Radiological Emeretacy_ Response Plan NH State EOC (5) R. Poole, (1) Team leader hi. Gallagher (1) P. Stang (RAC) W. Knocrzer (ANL) S. Grey 01) NH IFO (5) S. Borth, (1) Team Leader D. Catlett (I) P. White 0) W. Serrano (INEL) F. Davis (ANL) NH Field Teams (3) ht. Leal, (FDA) Team 1.cader S. Foster (1) S. Ramsey (Vill) hian nester Reception F. D' Amore, (1) Team Leader Center /EWF (4) G. Ameno (1) N. DiTullo (CPR) K. hierli (I) CCC's (2) S. Curtis (ANL) J. riordy (ARC, VI!!) RC Command Post (1) W. Crcamer, (1) Team Leader (RCDC) (1) K. Franchi (1) 9
TABLE 1 Evaluator Assignment List Brentwood State Tmnsportation Staging W. Weaver (FEMA EMI) Group Leader Area (2) A. Lookabaugh (ANL) Group Ixader Brentwood (2) School Bus T. McCoy (I) Bus Route E. Rosario (I) E. Kingston (2) School Bus C.Reimer (ANL) Bus Route A. Teotia (ANL) Exeter (4) Day Care E. Robinson (ANL) Ambu 1 T. Carroll (ANL) (llospital) W/C Van Sp W. Waddell (ANL) Needs Bus Route C. Polinow (FEMA HQ) . Seabrook (3) School Bus G. Veerman (ANL) Bus Route L. Zander (ANL) Bus Route J. Sutch (ANL) Hampton (2) School Bus W. King (VII) Bus Route R. Neisius (ANL) Hampton Falls Day Care J. Mitrani (ANL) (1) Kingston (3) School Bus K. Kelleher (I) Day Care J. Muzzarelli (ANL) , Bus Route M. Landry (1) Kensington (2) School Bus V. Beverly (II) Bus Route D. Hulet (ANL) Newfields (2) School Bus R. Schwartz (ANL) Bus Route W. Small (CPR) 10
TABLE 1 Evaluator Assigmnent List i 1 Newton (2) Day Carc R. Anthony (CPR) Bus Route H. Fish (ANL) North School Bus J. Moore (ANL) Hampton (1) South School Bus R. Teeri 0) Hampton (2) Bus Route L. Malinowski (ANL) Roekingham Evac Bed Bus R, Trolenberg (CPR) County (1) School Administrative Units and Day Cares (3) N. Gaeta (ANL) R. Sekar (ANL) P. Murphy (1) State Police Traffic D. Piso 0) Troop A, Control Points ACP/TCP (1) LOCAL EOC'S Portsmouth Team Leader M. Goetz 0) Greenland S. Meleski (ANL) New Castle E. Hakala (ANL) Stratham L. Lewis (ANL) Newfields A. Hall (ANL) Seabrook C. Hunkler (ANL) Newton Group Leader R. Rospenda (ANL) East Kingston R. Converse (ANL) Kingston L. Payton (VI) Exeter M. Simonin (ANL) Exeter TSA M. Harvey 0) Brentwood G. Jacobson (ANL) 11
TABLE 1 Evaluator Assignment List Dover ' Group Leader E. Dionne (1) Rochester F. Wilson (ANL) Salem G. Goforth (CPR) Manchester W. Lueders (CPR) Medical Service Transportation S. Bonh 0) (MS1) Drill Wentworth F. Bold (CPR) Aug 15,1990 Douglas Hospital Evnluation of the Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communkics ORO EOC (6) Team Leader J.R. Austin (I) Group Leader D. Petta (DOT) S. Peleschak (INEL) C. Roselli (I) B. Salmonson GNEL) J. Eley (ANL) Field Teams (2) Team Leader J. Cherniack (EPA) J. Staroba (ANL) H a y e r h i11 Team Leader R. Peters (1) Staging Area (5) F. Oleson (CPR) J. Mcdonald (1) M. Brazel 0) V. Wingert (FEMA HQ) ACP/TCPs (2) Team Leader H. Hanning (I) K. Nauman (IX) Rec,ption Team Leader R. Barcelo (1) Center, EWF, E. Boaze (VI) CCC (5) T. Do d (IV) W. McSwain OV) R. Perdue (IV) 12
0 TAHLE 1 Esaluator Assignment List Simulated Bus Team Leader R. Quinlan (1) Yards (2) ht. Hopkinson (Vri) Salisbury (2) Bus Route S. Nelson (ANL) . Bus Route V.C. Stamoudis (ANL) . Newburyport (2) Bus Route L. Hanna (CPR, Bus Route G. Bart>cr (CPR) Amesbug (4) School Bus hi. Vasco (Vill) Day Care bl. Fallon (I) Bus Route A. Donaghue (I) Bus Route S. Curtis (ANL) hierrimae (1) Bus Route B. Young (ANL) W. Newbury (1) Bus Route D. Santini (ANL) Newbury (2) Bus Route K. Flynn (ANL) Bus Route C. Tome (ANL) S h r i n e r 's Evac Bed Bus E. Neterowicz (FEhiA HQ) Auditorium (1) H a v e r h il1 Ambulance S. Rizkalla (1) Staging Area (2) W/C Van J. Gibbons (1) l 13 l
TABLE 1 Evaluator Assignment List VANS (16) . Team Leader - _ D. Swanson 0) J. Gallagher 0) 'i O.C. Payne (FEMA HQ) L.- Kiyabu (I) P. Thacker G) J. Harris (FEMA HQ) .. S. Rizkalla 0) J. Gibbons 0) ' E. Neterowicz (FEMA HQ) - ' C. Tome (ANL) K. Flynn (ANL) - - D.- Santini (ANL) ' B. Young (ANL) G. Barber (CPR) L, Hanna (CPR) ' S. Nelson (ANL) Control Cell - S tate -and M. Lawless (FEMA HQ) Local Liaisons . Medical Service Transportation J. Austin 0) - (MS-1; Drill)- St. Joseph's F, Bold (CPR) Aug 14,1990 Hospital - FEMA Control Cell
. FEMA Control Cell (12) J. Keller, FEMA ' Control Cell Manager M. Hepler L. Deskins M. Stangler -
M. DiGregory S. Wentz - M. Taylor - R. Rowland -
- A, Wildason M. Russo l l
W. Noland . W.Freeby' .. p l 14
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Table 2- . Objective /Locat i on Matri x -State of New Hampshire sP SP. rTELD RCK OTU ' Nil nit COM, TRP-- MDIA . STAG ' FtELD/ ' RAD RCP IIL - DSP IIOST Ot>jective Description NUM EOC IFO ' IllC CIR A CTR ' AREAS OTilER ' MON MON EOC CTR' EOC Implement PA - Special Population is x' x x Implement PA -School Population 19 x ACP and TCP establishment & 20 x x maintencnce Proced ures, equipment, facilities, 21 x x x personnel for reception center Facility, equipment and personnel 22 x for CCCs Vehicles, equipment, procedures, 23 x x and personnel for transportation Medical facilitics. cquipment, proadures 24 x ] personnel Equipment, supplies, procedutes, 25 x personnel for emergency scrker control Request federal /other assistance 26 x x Demonstrate shift change 24 x x : l
-l t
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1
. i I6 f 6
- 4 3.'
Table 3' . Objective /lication Matrix - Preparedness of NHY Offsite Response Organization r Haverhill
. Objective Media: Staging - Ficid/ Field RAD Ro:eption l Objective Description' Number EOC Center Area Other Monitoring Cene JTIC ECL t X X X .X 3X-Alert,' mobilize, activate' - 2 'x x. .x- 'X- X X X -
. Direct, coordinate, control 3 X- x~ X- X-Communications ' 4 X X~ X' X X X. X~
j ' Facilities and displays 5 x xt x .X .x X Emergency worker dose control 4' X X x X y Equipment and procedurcs radiation -7 X monitoring
. Equipment and procedures airborne e X- .
moni<cri::: Samples - particulate activity 9 X ! Dose projection / PAR plume ~ . te X i l pas 11 X Alert and notification 12 X X a, Coordinate information and instructions 13 X' A -X: l Brief media is X ~X Rumor control 15 X X-m 17
, . . -_ _m __ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
q . Table 3 Objective / Location Matrix.- Preparedness of NHY Offsite Response Organization 11averhill . Objective _ Media Staging Field / Field RAD. Reception - i
' objective Description Number :EOC Ccnter - Ares Other Mortitoring ' Center JTTC ;
Emergency workers - KI ' 16' x x. x x
- : Implement PA - Special population is 'x. x Implement PA - school population 19 x x x . i ACP and TCP establishment & 20 . x maintenence l
4 Procedu res, equipment, facilities, 21 x
,[
personnel for reception center 4 Facility, equipment and personnel 22 x - for CCCs t 4 Vehicles, equipment, proced ures and 23 x t personnel for transport i r MedicalServices, facilities 24 x ; f Equipment supplies.procedurer, 25 x x personnel for emergency worker . t control i
< Request federal /other assistance 26 x y r
x Interface with non-participants 37 'x k k i
=
is i
. . e.
Table 4 Significant Event Log - New Hampshire 1 State Itu 24hr 18cid Media Brentweed Fmt Emeter Creettbed K%see FOC W.P. Teams Ceeder EOC Einesen ET)C EOC fX)C SYK Alert 1229 1308 1228 1225 1240 1242 1241 1241 1241 Factilty 1255 1255 1330 1314 1256 1300 1250 1250 A4 tivated FarlHfy 1333 1352 1338 1323 1330 1330 1305 t )peruttanal Sie Ares 1406 (4C3 1405 1405 1421 1419 1415 1416 1420 Emmr :eng - General 1602 1603 1602 1603 1612 1612 1611 1811 1613 Emereng Siren 1500 1500 2 Aeth athm 1635 1635 1803 1803 EBS 1500 1500 hfe w ees 1635 2 1635 1803 1803 i Stwlter 1415 1447 Fveemetion 2 1625 1625 1750 1750 coverner 1417 1417 state et Fsnergency
'l ERMiNNI ION 19.49 194.1 1749 1927 1911 1927 1929
- 1. Mancierer Reu-ption Center was dememstrated out 44-sequence avuf thtas was not included in this timeline. See Oti #2.
- 2. Iirst n.m prerautsmary prosa1ive rec 1Fm deriwm_.
- 3. He Eri s were dabmi at the folkming times: Ah,t
- 222 Site Area Emergency - 1401, General Emergency - 1f42.,
19
E 1-Table 4 LSignificant Event Log- New Hampshire New estle.. Neofleids Neween Portuneeth Seebecet Seeselesen RCDC :SWe- Dewr Mancheter iladrea Rortester i EOC FOC .. EOC: EOC -FOC EOC TSA EOC EOC -EDC EOC ' (Rock Cemety) Alert - 1239 1243 .1243' .'1239 1239 1246. 1233 1405 1245 1350 ; 1350 1410- 1215 '1230 1252 1318 1415 1405 1245 -1351 Feettity 1310-Activated , 1315- 1425- 1430 " 1315 - 1313 1315 1411 1450 1421 1420 1315 1402 Facilley
- Ogwrotlanet ,
1420 1416 - 1414 1416 1412 1415 1406 N/A 1426 1413 1420 1415 Site Ares Emerteney i ll 1613 1612 1610 1612 1609 1611 1604 1605 1907 1606 1904 160E ; General I'mergemy u Siren , Activation t i
~
Ens 91essages 4
$1wlier Erneuatten i
- i
*i r
'I ERMIN ATION 1927 1927 1927. 1927 1930 1927 1927 IM4 m.m [
i 3 . ! I) . !
- ~ *
. e ,, ,
Tahic 5 Significant Event Log - NHY Offsite Response Organization Noeth ORO Staging And er Field Goverwer's MCD4 EOC Area Reception Tennes REF st AreeI ren6ee Framlaghem 1 Alert 1231 1234 1234 1234 1248 1258-Fac11tey 1255 1256 1320 Acet.ated iacilley 1336 1340 1517 Opermilanet Site Area 1412 1413 1415 1423 1415 1415 Fmergency General 1604 1625 1620 1603 1608 1619 : Vmergency Shen 1445 1630 Acitsesi n 1635 Efts 1445 Meweges 1535 Siwiter 9 er==tien 1620 1630 Governer Legal Avthrxity for . Sete of pas - 1620 IJ"er*'nry ; I EitM $ A IION 1934 1935 1935 1930 1930 , I.1he tIYa mere deelered me the fellowing times: Alert . I 222; Site Area Fanergency - 1401; General Fenergency .1681 l 21
1; . Table 5. Significant Event Log - NHY Offsite Response Organization . i Ambery Sa b hery N. - ^. _ ,g . Newbery . Wees Newbery Meerename ..j
&:1 '1250 1305 1300 1256 2 1307 1253-Foriftty
+
Acet ased .
.t
-t,
. Factitty Operatlanal
.i Site Area -1419 1434 1430 1425 146 1425 *
, Emeryncy I ceneral 1619 1625 1623 1622 1*J21 1737 Emergency i i f
' Siren Activellen f
. r EBS
' M%wges
.c 4
- Siniser
! i a 6 t a(Mlleet [ t l 4 j e i . i' i U . 4 i .
)
l
% y e ,. + , , 3 ..vn-
1.4 NARRATIVE
SUMMARY
OF EXERCISE SCENARIO This exercise scenario was based on a large break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) coincident with moderate fuel damage. Containment integrity was breached via a failed penetration assembly resulting in a significant radiological release to the offsite environs. The exercise date was Thursday, December 13, 1990. Initial Conditions establish that the station was operating at 100 percent power with all plant parameters normal.and stable except for an increasing trend in Reactor Coolant System (RCS) activity. Activity values were below Technical Specification limits. The station has been at or above 90 percent power for 180 days and was near the end of cycle 1 core life. Several station components were undergoing maintenance and repair. The initiating ,: vent occurred at 1205 with the partial failure of a weld connecting the Loop B Cold Leg to the reactor vessel. The resulting reactor coolant leak was not of sufficient magnitude to cause a reactor trip; however, a controlled station shutdown commenced. Following the required Alert declaration at 1222, NHY emergency response facilities were activated concurrently with the simulated evacuation of non essential station personnel. The New Hampshire Office of Emergency Mana;;ement (NHOEM) activated the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and mobilized designated personnel including those responding to the Incident Field Office (IFO) at Newington Station. The New Hampshire Department of Public Health Services (NHDPHS) personnel responded to the Radiation Laboratory in Concord and established Field Monitoring Teams. NHDPHS personnel responded to the EOC and set 2p the METPAC computer in preparation for accident assessment. NHOEM and Governor's O'fice Spokespersons were dispatched to the Media Center in Newington. Towns within the Plume Exposure Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) partially activated their EOC's. Additionally, the Rockingham County Sheriff's Department prepared the State Transportation Staging Area in Brentwood for activation. Host Communities were notified and initiated actions to establish reception and deccatamination centers. NHY ORO personnel were mobilized and activated the NHY ORO EOC and Staging Area. Contacts were made with Commonwealth of Massachusetts officials (simulated by the FEMA Control Cell) to coordinate response actions. The Control Room RCS loose parts alarms went off at 1300. Analyses by Chemistry Department personnel revealed significantly higher values of RCS activity. These events did not require 1. change in the emergency classification and the controlled station shutdown continued. 23
At 1315, a geomagnetic disturbance induced by a solar storm caused severe transformer damage to two unit substations, one at Seabrook Station and one at Newington Station. The damage at Newington Station caused a station shutdown and resulted in a loss of power to the EOF /NH IFO/NHY ORO EOC. The unit substation failure at Seabrook Station removed several Waste Processing Building loads from service. As the RCS leak continued, the containment fission product inventory increased. By 1400, containment dose rates exceeded 2,500 Rem per hour and a Site Area Emergency was declared. The NH State EOC, IFO, Media Center, Staging Area and a selected Host Community Reception and Decontamination Center were fully activated. Accident conditions and PARS were assessed and the State ECC authorized public alert and notification system activation as deemed appropriate. Local EOC's were fully staffed and resource requirements were assessed to support an evacuation. Following the notification of a Site Ares Emergency, Reception Centers, the Emergency Worker Facility and Monitoring Tmileis were fully staffed. Evacuation support, traffic control and field monitoring personnel prepared for poter/dal evacuation. NHY ORO management continued coordination efforts with Commonwealth of Massachusetts officials. At 1555, the cold leg weld failed completely and the subsequent large break LOCA caused a reactor trip and safety injection. The rapid RCS depressurization and associated thermal stresses caused significant fuel cladding degradation. During the core reflood phase, hydrodynamic forces drove some of the previously detected loose parts into various fuel assemblies. The resulting severe mechanical cladding damage and fuel pellet erosion distributed alkaline earth and metal fission products into the reactor coolant. Despite the failure of Containment Building Spray (CBS) Pump P-9A, no Critical Safety Function experienced a severe challenge (red path), however active containment heat and iodine removal were lost. Following the LOCA, operators began a plant ctoldown. The increasing inventory of released fission products resulted in containment dose rates to exceed 25,000 Rem / hour and a General Emerg:ncy was declared. 24
LOCA induced pressure and temperature stresses caused a containment penetmtion assembly to lose integrity. The failure and associated pressure differential allowed the venting of the containment atmosphere to the containment enclosure area. Radioactive gases and steam w.te then circulated through the Emergency Exhaust Filter Fan Units and out the plant vent to the environment. As the release progressed, the efficiency of the HEPA and charcoal filters were reduced due to water condensation in the filter banks. Plant vent Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) readings and offsite monitoring revealed significant releases from the station. New Hampshire emergency response personnel continued to assess conditions and implement-d actions to support protective action decisions. Congregate Care Centers were opened to provide temporary shelter for New Hampshire evacuees. The State Field Monitoring and Sampling Teams were in full service to track the radioactive plume. The NHY ORO EOC coordinated the implementation actions necessary to support protective action decisions. Stzging Area personnel coordinated deployment of evacuation support, traffic and field monitoring personnel from the Stagmg Area. Monitoring trailers at the Reception Centers and Emergency Worker Facility provided radiological monitoring and decontamination. Congregate Care Centers were opened i to provide temporary shelter for Massachusetts evacuees. ! CBS Pump P-9A was returned to service at 1800 and resulted in lower containment ! pressure and airborne iodine concentrations. Containment pressure continued to drop l ur,til the pressure differential between containment and the enclosure area was negligible. With the reduction and eventual subsidence of the pressure driving force, plant vent release rates trended lower. ; i Also at 1800, Control Bulloing Emergency Air Intake Fan CBA-FN-16B suffered a i mechanical failure. This failure in conjunction with the tag out of CBA-FN-16A i resulted in a total loss of makeup _ air to the Control Room habitability envelope, l which included the Technical Support Center. Following direction to deactivate emergency response facilities at 1900, exercise play concluded at 1930. I L i t 25 l t r-u 6
. l 2.- EXERCISE EVALUATION 2.1 STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE Objective #1. - EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL. Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and use emergency classification levels (ECL) through the .)
appropriate implementation cf emergency _ functions and activities corresponding to , ECL's as required by-the scenario, ne four ECL's are: Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, D.3, D.4). Evaluation: Met - Narrative Summary: This objective was demonstrated at all New Hampshire locations through the apprc: iate implementation of_ emergency : functions and activities corresp4 ding to ECL's as required by the scenario. These locations meluded the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC), Incident field Office (IFO),
- Rockingham _ County Dispatch - Center, State Transportation Staging Area located in Brentwood .NH, State Police Communications Center, State Police Troop A, Media Center, Joint Telephone Information Center-(JTIC), Plume EPZ Communities EOCs, and Host Community EOCs.
At the State EOC, coordination among staff was consistent and the current emergency classification was posted on status boards and disseminated by hard copy. Updates on the emergency classification were broadcast on the Public Address- (PA) system regularly. There was an. ongoing assessment _ of the situation at each classification level, and appropriate measures were taken. ECL changes were received by all IFO groups over the internal IFO '_PA. Appropriate staff and/or. group leaders in the IFO Operations, Public Health Services and Communications . Rooms - displayed, documented and
' communicated ECL's to staff in a timely manner. However, the Local Liaison Room staff experienced a delay in posting the Alert notification on the status board. The Alert was received at 1308 but.not displayed until 1355_ hours leaving the Notice of Unusual Event (NOUE) on the status board. This delay caused tne Hampton . local liaison to provide incorrect status information to a town, i.e., relayed current ECL was Unusual Event rather than the Alert.
Subsequent ECL's in the Local Liaison Room:were properly displayed in a timely fashion. With this exception, appropriate procedures and/or actions-were demonstrated by all IFO groups following changes in ECL's. 26
The 24 hour warning point (State Police Communication Center), received the initiai notification of the Alert and followed appropriate procedures. After the initial notification, subsequent notifications were made by the Rockingham County Dispatch Center in acwrdance with plans and procedures. The duty supervisor respon:iole for implementing emergency operations at Troop A, NH State Police barracks in Epping was very knowledgeable about the ECL's and posted changes on the status board in a prompt manner. All relevant functions associated with this activity were car i1 out in a timely manner which was consistent with tie cmcriency plan and operational procedures. The Media Center at Newington, NH used the emergency classification levels and posted them in the staff work area. ECLs were also announced to all staff. The Media Center received notification of Site Area Ernergency at 1405 and General Emergency at 1603. The ECL's were displayed on a new status board and posted in a timely fashion in the media work area. ECLs were also explained at each press briefing. At the JTIC, the news releases and EBS messages were reviewed by the Supervisor immediately upon receipt by fax. Information was verified by a telephone call to the media liaison, then authorized for hard copy distribution to the staff. The supervisor then verbally notified staff of update information and wrote the information on the status board. Hard copy of each release was immediately highlighted by staff and inserted into their workbooks for easy reference during calls. All supervisors, NH OEM, and ORO worked very well together. Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) community officials responded to ECLs in a timely manner, providing prompt notification of the ECLs to all members of the emergency management staff and to other local officials, as required by the situation. Local Emergency Management Directors provided this inicrmation promptly. Status boards were kept current in Emergency Operation Centers. ECL changes were announced promptly to all officials and staff. The Host Communities also demonstrated the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through the appropriate implementation of emergency functions as required by the their plans and procedures. i The alert ECL was received at the Rockingham County Dispatch Center at 1233 hours and a return call was made to verify the notification in accordance l with the their plan and procedures. The emergency response organizations and operations within the EPZ were alerted and verifying calls received within 13 l mmutes at the Alert and SAE and within 9 minutes at GE. The ECL's were l I '~ 27 l l
posted and all staff were kept informed of the current status. All actions were consistent with their plans and procedures. The Rockingham County Command Post is located about twenty or thirty feet from the RCDC within the same building. The Command Post controls the State Transportation Staging Area (STSA). They used the ECL's and insured that all subelements were notified of the current ECL. Due to the close proximity of the RCDC to the Command Post, notification of ECL's were almost instantaneous. The Command Post staffing is five and each ECL is simply announced to all, then posted to a board. Field operations at the STSA were activated during the Site Area Emergency. 4 The Rockingham County Command Post informed the field personnel at the STSA by radio of the ECL's during the exercise. At 1605, the Rockingham County Command Post notified the STSA of the General Emergency. IFO: Issue #1: DESCRIPTION: Delay in posting Alert ECL on status board in the IFO ARCA Local Liaison Room resulted in one town getting incorrect ECL information from one of the first Local Liaisons to arrive at the IFO. RECOMMENDATION: The IFO Local Liaisons should receive refresher training so that no information is given to the towns until ECL status has been verified and any action taken is in accordance witn their procedures. A procedure should be established to have the first retuning local liaison staff member verify and post cment ECL status. 28
{ 1 Objective #2. MOBILIZATION OF EMERGENCY PERSONNEL. Demonstrate the 4 ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field based emergency functions. (NUREG-0654/FF3IA REP I, Rev.1, II, E.1, E.2, H.4) Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: The State of New Hampshire demonstrated the ability to alert, mobilize and activate personnel at both facility and field based emergency functions. Full - mobilization and activation occurred, in most eases, in approximately 1 hour. The nonparticipating communities had ' Deputy Sheriffs dispatched from Rockingham County to manage the local staging areas in accordance with their plan. The State Director for New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management (NHOEM) arrived at the State IDO at 1246 and began notifying key personnel of the Alert ECL by telephone. At 1255, the Agency Liaison Officer took over notifying State personnel of the Alert ECL. He utilized the call down list for the Alert ECL of all the agency points of contact and current phone numbers b the NH cmergeng phone list. All agencies ed key personnel were notified by_1333. The State EOC was declared opetational at 1333 hours. - Upon notification of the SAE or GE, the remaining agencies were contacted and their staff were requested to report / deploy. _ The Agency Liaison Officer had each person sign in upon their anival at the State EOC and gave each person a copy of NHUEM procedures with the name of the agency that person represented on it. The relevant functions and activities were implemented in a manner that is consistent with the NHOEM procedures. Activation of the IFO began with the arrival of the first IFO staff member at 1255 hours. The IFO Controller arrived at 1312. Other agency representatives arrived as follows: State Police 1324, Transportation 1337, Civil Air Patrol (CAP) 1348, IFO Commur.icator 1350,o Resources Coordinator _1352, and Department of Resources and Economic Development (DRED) 1410. With the arrival of the IFO Communicator and the Resources Coordinaior, the IFO was declared operational. The IFO was declared fully operational at 1423.
-Various other support staff such as clerks, local liaisons, special needs liaison, and Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES) operators arrived at staggered intervals until 1430.
The 24 hour warning point (State Police Communication Center) located at the-State Police Headquarters in Concord NH received -the -Alert notification at 1228 and promptly mobilized staff for both facility and field based operations. Within five minutes of the Alert notification, emergency response procedures 29
were in place and seniot State Police staff
- vere dispatcherl to the State EOC and personnel from Troop A to the IFO. Staff availability determinations were made in a prompt manner and communicated *o senior State Police staff at the IFO. In anticipation of traffic flow impediments, two designated towing companies were notified to stand by for possible utilization.
Three Field Monitoring Team:, of two persons cach, were dispatched from Concord to the Newington NH Incident Field Office (IFO). The Departraent of Public Health Services (DPHS) IFO Ccordinator and the Field Team Coordinator arrived from Concord together. The staffing was completed with the arrival of the Radiological Herlth Technical Advisor at 1444 and the Radiological Control Cle.k at 144.8. The Media Center is activated by EIY staff. The first responder arrived t 1253. The Center was activated at 13M with telept.ones and Fax machines fully operational. The fzcility was operational at D45. New Hampshire media staff were alerted at their offices via the interecm in the Concord NH Office of Emergency Management. The NII staff arrived at 1408 just in time for the media director to observe the first news briefing. He did not take part in the first briefing f..' the raedia. Suff cient staff was available to have continuous contact with the Public Infor' .ation staff at the State EOC. This corrects a previous ARCA from the 1988 Exercise. Participating communities within the EPZ effectively mobilized emergency personnel within acceptable time limits, with the exception of New Castle. Other ECCs were activated within thirty-five tr.inutes (often in less time) of the initial ale:t notification of key officials, and were operational within an hour's time by 1350 hours. All EOCs were fully staffed by 1430 hours. In New Castle, key personnel were called beginning at 1245 hours and all calls were completed t.t 1253. The facility was operational at 1315 All emergency response personnel reported with the exception of a Selectman, the Health Officer who was available on call, and the Town Clerk / Administrative Assistar.t. The RCDC log indicates a call at 1243 notifying the Newton police officer on duty of the Alert. However, the Newton EMD was not notified of the Alert until he received a backup call from the Control Cell at 1400. This delay in notifying the EMD resulted in a delay in activating the remaining Newton EOC response staff. For the host communities of Manchester, Dover and Salem, the EOCS were alerted, staff were mobilized and reported in a timely manner Contacts to l personnel were accomplished by telephone using current and correct call lists. 1 30
For the Host Town of Rochester, the staffing of the EOC was not in accordance with the emergency plan. Specific staff could not be present due to a "real life" emergency during the early morning hcurs which drained the majority of the emergency response personnel. However, the small staff was able to petform the necessary functions with each member present performing multiple tasks. Due to a pre-exercise agreement related to other real life events at the Manchester High School, the Reception Center demonstrated out of sequence, but without prestaging. The field based personnel Lt the Manchester Reception Center, a monitoring and decontamination facility for the general public, and the emergency worker monitoring and decontamination facility were mobilized and activated in a timely manner by the representative from the DPHS at the Manchester EOC. The facility was established and operational within an hour. The RCDC is a 24-hour operation. Additional personnel were called at 1241. The call-out was completed at 1246 hours. All actions were in accordance with the plans and procedures. The Rockingham County Command Post is not involved in notification of offsite agencies, but is involved in notification cf personnel who will work at the STSA, the Commano Post, and the additional Deputy Sheriffs needed to accomplish those tasks specified in the plan. Call lists were used to alert or activate necessary personnel. The entire Rockingham County Sheriff's Department, other state and county workers, and 29 Hillsboro County Sheriff's Department's Deputies, were called individually. This process took two persons almost 36 minutes to complete. The roster of EPZ communities that elected not to participate was receivea from the IFO at 1437 and the deputies were dispatched from 1459 to 1504 houis. Control of the Sheriff's Deputies dispatched to the nonputicipating communities was then passed to the IFO. The setup crew at the State Transportation Staging Aiea (Rockingham County) which was mobilized at the Alert, began distributing equipment for the bus staging area at 1335. All equipment was deployed to the various stations by 1403. The facility layout was in accordance with the diagram in the STSA procedures. The staff checked in, received their dosimetry kits, and reported to their STSA station. The Bus Coordinator reassigned staff to each station to assure coverage until full STSA staffing was available. Staffing of the various stations occurred between 1440 and 1450 with the bus staging area of the facility operational at 1450. Full staffing was completed at 1525. Personnel present included the Bus Coordinator, Bus Registrar, Bus Dispatcher, Vehicle Arrival / Fuel Checker, and support staff. In addition the buses with their assigned drivers responded to this facility for dispatch to th: local Transportation Staging Areas (TSAs). 31
LOCAL EOCs: Issue #1: DESCRIPTION: In the Town of New Castle, three members of the EOC ARCA staff, including a Selectman, the Health Officer (who was available on call), and the Town Clerk / Administrative Assistant, did not report to the EOC upon mobilization. Their duties were performed by others in the EOC. RECOMMENDATION: Tne absent EOC staff members should be given training to emphasize their responsibilitiepju 0.;;% If other factors r.. event their regular participation, eitner new personnel should be assigned, or the plan revised to accept their partial participation, with consequent reassignment of some or all of their duties. Issue #2: DESCRIFTION: In the Town of Newton, the police officer on duty failed to ARCA notify the Newton EMD of the Alert in a timely manner. RECOMMENDATION: All Newton police officers should be trained to transmit notification messages promptly, 32
<4 ' -Objective #3. DIRECTION AND CONTh0L. Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, A.I.a. A.1.b, A.1.d, A.2.a)
Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: The State of New Hampsh : demonstrated the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities. The Director of the New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management (NHOEM) was in charge of the State EOC in Concord, N.H. State EOC staff briefings were conducted frequently at various time intervals as required. The briefings included all members of the State EOC staff so that all knew the extent of the State's response.' Appropriate suff members were involved in the decision makink process including the State of Emergency declared by the Governor at 1417. Message logs of all incoming and outgoing messages were maintained. With the exception of the initial precautionary action, which was coordinated after the fact with the NHY ORO, all PAR's were coordinated with NHY ORO. The IFO Controller was effectively in charge of the IFO and was ably assisted ; by the Assistant IFO Controller and IFO Resources Coordinator. The Im !- Controller's activities were the following: insuring supporting agen,, . response, communicating with the State EOC, discussions with the EOF Liaison Officer, and keeping the entire staff awar- of developing events by holding frequent briefings. The Resources Coordinator performed admirably; however, because of other duties, he sometimes could not attend the IFO Controller's briefings held in the Operations Room. This caused delay in getting some information to the towns. Although he did attend some briefings in the Operations Room, the Resources Coordinator was sometimes delayed in _ posting information, reviewing messages, and reviewing transportation requests. There was not enough time for him to hold and attend briefings and-keep the local liaisons fully informed. The IFO DPHS Coordinator was in charge of the DPHS activities in the IFO. Reporting to him-were the Field Team Coordinator, the Dose Assessment staff and the Radiological Health- Advisor, He kept the staff advised of weather and plant conditions and discussed Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) promptly with Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) personnel, the EOF Liaison, and the IFO Controller. The IFO Communicator, in charge of radio operations, maintained excellent control. She was obviously well trained and kept in touch with the Resource o l 33 l l t. (
Coordinator and the IFO Controller. The IFO, ARES, and the Sheriff's radio operators were well supervised. The State of NH's Media Relations / Rumor Control Supervisors at the JTIC demonstrated excellent ability to direct, coordinate and control this emergency activity. The State of NH's supervisor interacted and coordinated with both the NHY and the NHY ORO supervisors, as well as with the rumor control and media relations assistants. All supervir, ors provided back-up to each h j cuother's area, demonstrating cross-training and knowledge of the plans. All staff were briefed quickly ar.d accurately, as necessary. In general, all the EPZ communities demorstrated the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities. The activities were controlled by tne Emergency Management Director (EMD) of towns and the cities, operating under the authority of Town Selectmen; or, in the case of the City Of Portsmouth, City Manager. Ah activities were well coordinated with the following exceptions: In the Portsmout EOC, message handling was inconsistent. Two messages (one for a simulated train accident, and one for the notification of j authorization to ingest KI) were delayed in reaching the EMD and the City Manager for approximately 20 minutes. Multiple forms were used for . l l messages, and the system broke down during the distribution of the message form , to appropriate staff locations. The Town Clerk in Newton maintained a log of all EOC messages. The puli ! off carbon copies of messages were routinely distributed after being recorded. Due to the limited number of carbon copies, there were not sufficient copies l-
. available for_ all EOC staff. Appropriate forms were not always used, and l important information was often written on sheets of paper without any
! indication of time, date or the person generating the information. One copy of the current plan (Newton RERP) was available in the EOC, but it was not used by staff members. l l l The Host EOCs demonstrated the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency operations through effective managers. In the towns of Dover and Rochester, the facilities were managed by alternates who were proirrly trained and fully aware of the organization's plans and procedures. All messages l were efficiently received, handled, and relayed to the appropriate staff. Staff l were briefed on current status and involved in decision making. The Manchester Civil Defense Director and ' Reception Center Coordinator were effectively in charge of the operations at the Manchester Reception i Center at Memorial High School. The NH DPHS supervised the monitoring 34 l l
, .- i 1
5 I and decontamination procedures. The Senior Fire Official directed the activities of the site monitors and decontamination teams. NH DPHS.
. cffectively' _ managed the related registration and referral section. - The -
supervisors and staff were knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities. Internal control was maintained by_ close supervision and use of an internal
- radio system. External coordination with the Manchester EOC was maintained through a Fire Depanment radio system and the Civil Defense radio system. ,
At the RCDC the Shift Commander coordinated and directed all emergency activities in precise, clear, and efficient manner. The remaining staff members were well versed in their duties, maintained all required logs and had input into all briefings. There is little or no decision- making at the Rockingham County Command Post. Requests came directly from the IFO for a certain amount of transpon, and this generated transportation orders to the STSA. Message handling in the
~
Ccmmarid Post is exemplary. Good records were maintained and only one minor instance of an error was noted over the entire period, caused by an overload of data being transmitted over the local STSA network, telephones, FAX machines, and the NHOEM radio net. The Bus Coordinator was effectively in charge of operations in the bus staging area. Information was received from the Rockingham County Command Post and verbally relayed to staff. 'No formal staff briefings were conducted and no briefings were given to the bus drivers while in the staging area. No formal
-log of imponant information, such as ECLs, staff KI usage, number of vehicles in the staging area, or emergency status was maintained. However, there were no problems _ noted with the flow -of information to_ the staff.
- Copies of the procedures were available at the various stations and staff input i was solicited for decisions affecting operations.
. The Bus Coordinator 'immediately contacted the Rockingham County Command Post whenever he needed information or clarification of potential
- problems. The Command Post and Coordinators were also pro-active in providing information to the STSA field staff by providing periodic status reports, timely notification of the declaration of a General Emergency, reminders to staff to read-dosimeters, relay of authorization to take KI, and a reminder to staff to wear their night operation reflective safety vests.
4 4
- 35
.- -- - - .~ - -. . . . . - - - . .-- - . - . - - - - -
- e STATE EOC Issue #1: DESCRIPTION: With the exception of the initial precautionary action, which ARCA was coordinated after the fact with NHY ORO, ell PAR's were coordinated with NHY ORO.
RECOMMENDATION: If at all possible, PAR's should be coordinated with neighboring jurisdictions before being issued. ITO: ; Issue #2: DESCRIFFION: Because of the need to allow time for IFO Controller ARCA briefings,the Resource Coordinator did not always have time to review messages, transportation requests, and to keep status boards current. This delayed getting information to the towns through the local liaisons. . RECOMMENDATION: Provide an assistant to allow the Resources ' Coordinator more time for managing resource activities and expediting the information flow to the TowTis. LOCAL EOCs: Issue #3: DESCRIFTION: Message handling broke down at times in Portsmouth EOC, ARCA delaying receipt of information to appropriate staff members. In Newton, appropriate forms were not always used, and important message information was written on sheets of paper without any indication of date, time, or originator. RECOMMENDATION: IN Portsmouth it is recommended that messages be handed directly to the EMD for his action, and further distribution to his staff. In Newton, important information should be announced or enough copies provided to insure each key person prompt receipt. Issue #4: DESCRIFTION: Although a copy of the current plan was available in L ARFI Newton,it was not umi by staff members. Recommendation: EOC staff need access to current plans and implementing - procedures, and should routinely use checklists in their activities. 36
STSA: Issue #5: DESCRWilON: - No general briefings were given to the either bus drivers or ARFI STSA staff while in the staging area. However, there were no problems noted with the flow of information to them.
- RECOMMENDATION: Conduct periodic briefings for STSA staff and bus drivers when they are held in the staging area for extended periods of time.
- Issue #6: - DESCRIPTION: The Bus Coordinator did not maintain a formal log of ARFI - important information, such as ECLs, staff KI usage, number of vehicles in _
the staging area, or emergency status.- RECOMMENDATION: The Bus Coordinator, or designated staff member, should maintain a formal log of relevant information which' can be consulted during the emergency, 9 l 37 l
f Objective #4. COMMUNICATIONS. Demonstrate the ability to communi ate with all appropriate locations. organizations. and field personnel. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, F.1.a. F.1.b, F.1.d, F.1.e, F.2) Evaluation: Met Narrative Sununary: The communication capability was successfully demonstrated by the State of New Hampshire. This included both primary and backup systems which allow the response organizations to communicate with all appropriate locations, ' organizations and field personnel. The Communications Officer at the State EOC was very knowledgeable about the equipment at the NH State EOC. The primary means of communication is the commercial telephone. The Nuclear Alert System (NAS),a dedicated ringdown line, demonstrated its capabilities of receiving and passing on information throughout the exercise. The state radio communications system is utilized as the lead system initially during an emergency until the IFO communications system is operational. The communications room also accommodated an amateur radio operator, who has the responsibility for-assigning radio operators to positions throughout the EPZ. A pager system was used for notification of key State EOC staff personnel. There were three facsimile machines in the State EOC. The outgoing messages were handled by a Civil Air Pat 1 (CAP) radio operator within the communications room. There was a direct telephone line to the EBS radio station (WOKQ) to verify raceipt of EBS messages. The communications room also contained IBM personnel computers, laptop computers and a host of other communications equipment. There was a direct communications link to a weather station, and 14 commercial telephone lines, (one was an 800 number and five lines had conferencing capability). There were two cellular phones also. At the IFO the primary means of communicatica used by the supporting Agency Liaison Officer was the telephone. Communications between the IFO Controller and the State EOC Director were by an additional dedicated tel: phone line. Amateur Radio Emergency Service (ARES) operators and primary radio communicators were located in a separate communications room. Runners were used for message handling between the local liaison, EOF and communications room. Two FAX machines and a copier were available. The IFO had communication links with the State EOC, Local EOC's, Rockingham County Dispatch Center, local law enforcement officials, all Federal, and State support groups such as Civil Air Patrol (CAP), Coast Guard, State Police, and Department of Transportatian. There were no communications breakdown or delays observed in the IFO operations room. L 38 L
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- Minor, sporadic difficulties were observed with phone lines in the Local Liaison Room. Demonstration of the TDD system was delayed due to a faulty connection which war quickly rectified.
The Alert notification was received over the NAS at the 24-hour warning point (State Police Communication Center) at 1228 hours. The State Police immediately began fanout notificatioa to all emergency response organizations, both facility and field based operations, using commercial telephone and telephone pager system. Fanout procedures were completed by 1250 hours. The systems utilized were adequate to meet their designed functions. The primary means of communications from State Police Troop A to mobile State Police units including the Traffic Control Points (TCPs) and Access Control Point (ACPs) is through a low band rP:lio system. All calls were handled in a timely manner and no delays yetc curved. Other means of communication included 4 telephone lines, wi.h unferencing capability, and a FAX machine. All communication with tho State Police Headquarters in Concord and with the Liaison Officers at the iFO were handled promptly and efficiently. Each Field Monitoring Team was issued a hand-held radio at the IFO. As each team prepared to kay the IFO, radio checks were made. Hand-held radios were used for ,,rimary comtrunications throughout the exercise. Team members stated the telephones v auld be used for backup communications. Telephone nurnbern are included .a manuals picked up by the teams at the IFO and are on the back of the ID badges issued to team members. Use of backup communications was not necessary during this exercise and was not demonstrated. A combination of commercial and dedicated phone lines were used to carry out communications activities at the Media Center. One line was used for the Fax machine only, one dedicated line used by the NH rumor control person. Communications were maintained with the NH EOC and the Joint Telephone Information Center (JTIC). There were no undue delays in the communication operation. No breakdowns were noted and no backup systems were demonstrated. All communications worked well at the JTIC. All contacts were accomplished without delay and the quality was exce:ic . The breakout of communications l is as follows: 6 incoming lines to rumo control; 6 incoming lines to media l relations; I commercial line at the fax desk to verify copy; I commercial line l each to ERO supervisor, ORO supervisor and NHOEM supervisor; I direct line each to ERO Media Liaison, ORO Media Liaison and NH OEM Media l l 39 L
i 1 N Liaison; and 9 incoming lines for tape messages, three each ORO, ERO and OEM, for a total of 28 lines. The EOCs of the participating communities communicated effectively with State authorities, the IFO, and other communities as well as their local Police, Fire and other local agencies. Commercial telephones were used with several emergency radio networks, including Police, Fire, Civil Defense and ARES networks. EBS messages could be monitored on both radio and television from the EOC. Back up systems were available, but were not required. In one EOC, two telephone handsets melfunctioned, but were quickly replaced from other equipment available in the fire station. This did not hinder the flow of information. Deputy Sheriffs were available to provided the necessary consmunications for the nonparticipating towns from the local Transportation Staging Areas (TSA's). No problems were noted with either the battery opene.4 hand held radios or the radios mounted in their vehicles. Fresh batt ries were available for the hand-held radios. This correv.s the ARCA fram the 1988 exercise. All Host EOCs demonstrated the abiiity to communicate with all appropriate locations, organiza%nt, and field operations such as NHOEM, IFO, EPZ communities, Receptien Centers, and their respective Fire and Police depanments. Communications systems are similar at all the Host , communities. Ali had multiple commercial telephone lines with conferencing capability. Radio systems consisted of the NHMM (DELTA) Command and Control Net, ARES, and vehicle cellular telephones. Communications were clear and flowed without any problems or delays. At the Manchester Reception Center, i5ur telephone lines were operational in the registntion area and two lines in tne decontamination area. Additional school department lines could be made available, if required by the Manchester EOC. The radio system ha: built in redundancy through the use of multiple channels and radio sets. However, probably because of construction materials in the building, the use of the one watt hand-held radios for internal communications would not operate successfully e' times from all places within the facility. The Rockingham County Dispatch Center has 40 commercial phone lines, available with conferencing capability, and 6 radio systems. Communication links were established with the NH State EOC, IFO, Ixcal Fire and Police, and the Coast Guard. There was no need for demonstrabon of backup systems as the primary system sus able to handle communications flow without undue delay or breakdowns. 40
The Rockingham County communication systems are outstanding and totally supportive of the EOC without reliance on outside help. The number of radios (3 FM,- 1 U'HF), and the number of phones does create some confusion. The staff has developed a fairly simple system to cope with the confusion and manages the flow of data without interruption. The various stations within the STSA communicated with the Rockingham County EOC and each other by radio. Key staff were equipped with portable radios (with headsets and microphones) to facilitate movement within the STSA. Some other staff were equipped with handsets. No communication problems were noted during the exercise. The Portsmouth STSA had been relocated from the Portsmouth Circle Business Center to the NH Port Authority Complex in Portsmouth NH and was not activated for this exercise. The ARCA from the 1988 exercise dealt with communications difficulties with the Portsmouth STSA. Due to the 1990 plan revision, the second STSA has been eliminated. Trairdng associated with the ARCA was completed in August 1989. Therefore, the ARCA is now considered closed. L*aes #1: DESCRWflON:- Probably because of construction materials used in the 4 RFI building, the use of 1-watt hand-held radios would not operate successfully from all places within the facility. RECOMMENDATION: Determine source of the problem and/or consider upgrading to more powerful radios. l 41
Objectise #5, FACILITIES, EQUIPMEN't, AND DISPLAYS. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays , and otber materials to support emergency operatlora (NUREG-0654/ FEMA. REP.1, Rev.1, II,11.3, J.10.s, J.IO b) Evaluationt Met Narrative Summary: There were adequate facilities, equipment, displays and other materials to support emergency operations within the State of New Hampshire. ; Adequate lighting, work areas, and telephones were provided for eacn State l aency responding to the State EOC in Concord NH. Security was established i for the State EOC at the Alert ECL. Within the State EOC Operations Room, a secondary check point had a sign in sheet and provided each terponse agency ; a copy of that agency's section of the NiiOEM procedures. De Emergency Response Planning Area (ERPA) map ns color coded and visible from all
, sections of the rectangalv shaped Operations Room. The statu; board was large, visible and up-dated periodkally. When the status board was full, copies of the computerized statt. board log were distributed to each agency's i
work area. Meteorology data and ECL classifications were posted on separate display boards. Another separate board had the A & B shift (first and second shift) personnel listed for each State agency at the State EOC. The Hevant i functions and activities were implemented in a manner consistent wan the NHOEM procedures. The facility, the layout, and the equipment provided for the IFO were well , thought out and adequate. The telecommunications and office support equipment available was sufficient to provide IFO workers opportunity for timely emergency procedure implementation. There is a concern that the space provided for DPliS is small relative to th? amount of activity and the number of workers located there. A second con. ern is that maps of the EPZ which identify the ERPAs were not located in the DPHS wmk area or the IFO Liaison room of the IFO The ERPA map in the operation room was not large enough to be viewed by all-IFO workers simultaneously. Because the evacuation PA decision was made utilizing the ERPAs, IFO workers had to - consult lists of communities by ERPA, rather than view a map on which ERPAs were posted, to determine which communitics had been directed to-evacuate. The space allocated for emergency operations of Troop A, NH State Police, is [ located on the lower level of the Troop A State Police Barracks. There were no maps which clearly defined evacuation routes, nor plume EPZ populations by planning areas, nor were any recepdon centers identitled on maps. The only map available was the 10 mile EPZ map. 42 - _ _ _ _ .__ _ . _ _ _ . , ~ ~ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . , _
Facilities, equipment, and displays at the Media Center were very pt. Tne facility at the Newington Town Hall is well designed, providing spre 'or news briefings, a working area for the press, an operations ran fs Public Information (PI) staff, and a combined Fax / copying /suoply mo n. The equipment functioned smoothly. There was mox an than adeqt. ate nu.nber of Fax machines. Displays were used for med.a brictings. reporters in the working area, and for staff in the Operations Roo n. Dispus listed the ECl,s and times declared, protective actions, and Other important information, hiaps displaying plume EPZs with ERPAs with populationt, ev cuation routes, reception centers, aad radiological monitoring points we:e : sed effectively during news briefings. This corrects the ARCA from the 1988 exercise. A composite list of towns being sheltered / evacuated was not displayed. The list would have facilitated reporters' understanding of the emergency response. The JTIC is an excellent facility with good aorking area for staff. The closed room eficct for the selephones cuts down on the noise and the " frantic atmosphere" of most callin operations. All status boards were up-dated quickly by supervirors and administrative staff. The staff maintained individual workbooks with all news releases, plans and standard reference information. hiaps and other EPZ planning information were also in each workbook. Each staff member was promptly given copies of all releases which they read, highlighted and put in notebooks for quick reference. local EOCs were usually located in buildings such as Police or Fire stations,
,although in some cases they were located in town or city halls. The EOCs all had locations for ope itions, office space, and equipment; some had limited sleeping areas. The Exeter EOC was fairly noisy during peak activities and the staff experienced difficulties conducting conversations on the telephones.
Maps in the Greenland EOC did not have evacuation routes nor traffic control points identified. The Host EOCs, with the exception of Rochester, have sufficient space, furnishings, and supplies to support emergency operations. The space in the Rochester EOC was very limited but this did not hamper operations. The EOC was reksated in March 1991 to the Fire Department Building which hu sufficient space for all staff functions. All EOCs had sufficient status and map boards containing appropriate information for the operation. These boards were kept current and were easy to view by the staffs witi. the exception of Salem. The map showing the reception centers in the Salem EOC was too small and could not be easily viewed by all the Staff. Access to the Host EOCs were controlled with the exception of Dover. The Manchester Reception Center (RC) yersonnel and vehicle traffic control signs, barriers, cones and taped areas were established according to the plan. C
There was adequate space for vehicle parking. Interior space and lighting was adequate for processing, monitoring and decontamination of evacuees. The relevant functions and activities of the RC were implemented in a manner consistent with their plans and procedures. The RCDC was very functional. The kitchen was nearby and the equipment was modern and well maintained. DN 'ay boards were in place and posted in a timely manner. The siren board is acctrical and lights are used to identify siren status. At the Rockingham County Command Post the facilities, equipment, ano displays were effectively used. Status boards have been developed to opjet th3 activity with a great deal of forethought and the system works very o@. STSA operations were established in the parking areas of the Rockingham County Complex. Tables, chairs, and equipment were provided t each station. T..e Vehicle Dispatch station had cable, chairs, lantern, traffic lights, supply tub, dispatch request forms, exit forms, and maps for the drivers. There were sufficient resources to conduct operations and the facility was functional. Weather conditions during the exercise did not adversely affect operations; however, personnel only spent a limited time outdoors. Since operations are conducted in the open, paper forms and maps would be affected by rain, sleet, and snow. In addition, lighting conditions were marginal for extended night operations. There are buildings and vehicles available for i shelter but they could not be used while conducting operations. IFO AND TROOP A, Nil STATE POLICE: Issue #1: DESCRIIrrION: The DPHS and Local Liaison Rooms in the IFO did not ARCA have EPZ maps with ERPAs identified. The ERPA maps provided in the Operations Room were not large enough to be viewed by all staff member simultaneously. In the operations room of Troop A, Nil State Police there were no maps that clearly defined evtcuation routes and/or plume EPZ population by planning areas, or reception centers. The only map available displayed the 10 mL EPZ. RECOMMENDATION: At the IFO, provide the above referenced maps in the DPHS work area, the Local Liaison Room, and the Operation Room. At Troop A, maps displaying the information cited above are required for this operation. 44
Issue #2: DESCR.llmON: At the IFO, the space provided for DPilS Staff is small ARFI relative to the amount of activity and number of staff located there. RECOhtMENDATION: Consider a redesign cf the IFO to provide more working space especially for IFO DPliS Staff.
-i htEDIA CENTER:
Issue #3: DESCRIFflON: Prior to hard copy of EBS message being available, no ARFI visual display for reference was available when briefings were being held as to what towns were being evacuated / sheltered. RECOhBIENDATION: Utilize a composite list of towns that are being evacuated / sheltered in briefings until receipt of hard copy of EBS, l IDCAL EOCS: Issue #4: DESCRIPTION: Maps in the Greenland EOC did not display TCPs nor ARFI - evacuation routes. , RECOhiMENDATION: Available maps should be enhanced or new maps developed to show TCPs and evacuation routes, or staff trained to be
--knowledgeable of existing map resources.
Issue #5: DESCRIPTION: The lheter EOC during peak activities was fairly noisy and ARFI the staff experienced difficulty conversing on the telephones.- RECOMMENDATION: Investigate means of minimizing noise, e.g., by administrative controls or other suitable means. ; i IIOST COMMUNITIES: Issue #6: DESCRIPTION: There was a lack of security at the Dover EOC, ARFI l-REC 05D1ENDATION: Follow procedures to assign a security individual l entrance to the Dover EOC to prevent intrusion by unnecessary persons who
- i. add confusion to operations, p
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Issue #7: DESCRilvrION: The map showing the reception centers was small and could ARFI not be viewed by all staff members at the Salem EOC, RECOhmiENDATIONS: A larger map showing the location of the reception centers should be utilized for case of viewing by all staff members. STSA: - Issue #8: DESCRIPTION: Severe weather conditions and lack of light for extended ARCA night operations would affect outdoor operations 61 the Brentwood STSA. RECOhiMENDAT10N: Review STSA procedures to determine if indoor facilities or portable shelters, heaters, and temporary lighting would be feasible for some or all of the operations during extreme weather conditions or extended night operations. At a minimum, some protection from the elements is needed for the paper maps and forms, 46
l - Objecthe #6. DIERGENCY WORKER EXPOSURE CONTROL. Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. (NUREG-0654/FDIA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.a. K.3.b, K.4) Evaluattom hiet Narrative Summary: The State of New Hampshire demonstrated the ability to continually monitor and control emergency workers exposure. The State Police Troopers that were dispatched to ACP RY-04 for the Town of Rye and TCP C KE-01 for the Town of Kensington were fully equipped with log sheets, dosimetry with instructions relating to reporting requirements at various levels, dosimetry charger, dosimetry and K1 logs and instructions, Dares, flashlight with extra batteries and the Traffic hianagement hianual. Upon interview, it was learned that if the levels exceed 175mR on the 200mR dosimeter, the Troops were to report it to their supervisor and then start reading from their 0-20R dosimeter. Their ability to monitor emergency worker exposure was very good. DOT personnel that were located at the ACP and TCP had also been issued dosimetry and were knowledgeable in the use of dosimetry and KI. After the equiprnent was checked out and loaded in the vehic!cs, the Field Team hiembers were issued dosimetry at the IFO. Dosimetry is issued by a designated individual who zeroed the pocket dosimeters, recorded dosimeter serial numbers, issued KI and maintained the associated records. Dosimetry issued consisted of two pocket, direct reading dosimeters (0 200mR and 0-20R), and a Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD) which meets FEh1A's minimum acceptable system. All teams were conscientious about readirig their dosimeters and their instruments at designated intervals. At the local EOCs, all emergency workers (EW's) were provided dosimetry, including a TLD, and two pocket dosimeters with ranges of 0-20R and 0-200mR, both of which were zeroed. EW's were provided written instructions with th: dosimetry, but not all were briefed on procedures for its use. Emergency workers from several towns were unsure of acceptable limits of exposure to radiation, and the procedures to follow if the lirnits were reached. This was the case for EW's from Newton, Kingston, East Kingston, Greenland, and Exeter who were dispatched to traf6c control points. This leaves the portion of the ARCA from the 1988 exercise pertaining to Town personnel and local Police incomplete, in Brentwood, a CDV 700 instrutnent without a plastic cover over the instrument probe was used without headphones to monitor potentially contaminated persons ertering the EOC. The 47 I
4 Radiological Officer in Greenland did not know EW's should be pulled from their astignment and sent to an Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility at SR, as specified in the plan. At the RCDC at 1446 hours, dosimetry kits were zeroed .,d issued. , Instructions were given as to the prescribed time for reading the dosimeters and recording of information on the forms issued. ne entire staff was knowledgeable in the use of dosimeters and the record keeping required. Each member of the staff in the Rockingham County Command Post wr.s issued dosimetry, and KL The Radiological Officer and the assistant , Radiological Officer had chargers for direct reading dosimeters, and assured l the Officer in Charge (OIC) that all dosimeters were zeroed. Six sets were left ; on the table at the sign in area and one set was issued to a National Guardswoman. When she initially read the dosimeter it read 115mR. She did nothing to contact the Radiological Officer or to get a zeroed dosimeter; she simply hung it on her uniform. Dosimetry packets contained a set of instructions and a card. No one in the CommauJ Post read the instructions, but all seemed to be very cognizant of the requirement to read the dosimeters at frequent intervals. The staff assigned to the STSA were issued a dosimetry kit when they arrived at the STSA. The dosimetry kit included two self reading dosimeters (0-200mR and 0 20R), a TLD, an instruction card, and an exposure and K1 usage record. They were knowledgeable of the requirement to read the dosimeters at 15 minute intervals and the 175mR reporting limit. In addition, a radio message was broadcast to the staff as a reminder when it was time to check dosimeters. Following one of the early notifications, staff went to each of the bus drivers in the staging area to remind them to read their dosimeters. The staff read their dosimeters at approximately 15 minuAp intervals throughout the exercise. Some problems were noted with respect to the use of dosimetry. One staff member changed the initial dosimeter reading recorded on the exposure record at the time of issuance of the dosimetry kit from 4mR to 10mR after one of the early periodic readings. When questioned about this, she indicated that she believed that her initial reading had been in error. (A review of all of the exposure records by the evaluator just prior to the end of the exercise revealed no other problems of this nature.) While setting up the evacuation bed bus, one staff member lost his TLD. He discovered this later at the Vehicle Dispatch station. He searched the area, found a TLD, and reattached it. A short time thereafter, another staff member noted that his TLD was missing. Upon investigation, it was discovered that the recovered TLD actually belonged to the other staff member. The first staff member then searched the evacuation bed bus and found his TLD. At no time was the Radiological Officer notified of these problems. 48
Duses and miscellaneous vehicles enter the STSA. '! hey are then routed to the dosimetry issue point where cach emergeticy worker (bus driver) is issued a desirnetry kit containing the following; one TI.D, two self reading dosimeters (0 20R and a 0-200mR), a bottle of K1 with an expiration date of 12/93, Kl recording forms, dosimeter forms, and instruction cards. Thu emergency workers are told not to take K1 unless advised, to read and record dosimetets every 15 minutes and to review the instructions in the kit while they were waiting to be dispatched. Procedures were followed at the dosimetry issue po'nt. The time to process each vehicle was from three to four minutes. The schicles leave the dosimetry issue point and proceed to the main bus staging area where they wait until dispatched. Bus driver and special needs vehicle (Ambulance, Wheelchairs Vans, and Evacuation Bus) drivers read their R dosimeters every 15 minutes.' This completes correction of the 1988 exercac ARCA. IDCAL EOCs issue #1: DESCR!lrr!ON: The Greenland Radiological Ofncer did not know that ARCA EW's should be pulled from their assignment and sent to the EWDF at SR, as specified in Section 3.6 of the plan. RECOMMENDATION: Further training should be provided, to insure compliance with the procedures. Issue #2: DESCR!!'ilON: EW's staffing ACPs/TCPs in the Towns of Newton, ARCA Kingston, East Kingston, Greenland, and Exeter were unsure about radiation exposure limits, and reporting procedures if they were exposed. RECOMMENDATION: The Radiological Officers of these towns should themselves be more trained, should insure that workers are trained, and should brief all workers when equipmmt is issued atsout exposure control procedures, pilor to being dispatched to fkld locations. 49 __-__m_______.____.__._________
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- STS A (ROCKINGIIAM COUNTY) COhtht AND POST: [
i ! Issue #3: DESCRIPTION: Within the Conimand Post at the STSA at Rockingham : ARCA County one of the dosimeters issued had not been zeroed and the person to , whom it was issued was unaware that there was a problem with the dosimeter. ; One STSA staff member changed an initial dosimetry reading after a
-subsequent periodic reading. Two staff members lost their TLDs during the !
exercise. 'Ihe Radiological Of6cer was not informed of these occurrences and i no notations were made on the c.xposure re:ord, i RECOhtMENDATION: Dosimeters should be zeroed before issuance, in ! addition personnel who enter the general area of the Command Post who are issued dosin'stry kits should receive a briefing from the Radiological Of6cer to insure they are familiar with the units in use The placir; in the pouches of instructions does not insure they will be followed or read. The Radiological ; Of0cer should be informed immediately of the loss of or eny irregularities during the use of dosimetry. Reemphasize in STSA annual training that r , personnel must report the loss of or any irngularities with the with the use of dosimetry. , Other DESCRil#rlON: A CDV 700 survey tratrurrent was used without a plastic lssue: cover over the probe, and without headphene.1 at the Brentwood EOC to monitor potentially contaminated visitors to the EOC. RECOMMFSDATION: Plans should be changed to renect the need to use headphones and cover the external probe when using 6e CDV 700 survey < instrument. f 50
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e Objective #7, FIELD RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AMBIENT RADIATION MONITORING. Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures foi determining field radiati6n measumnents. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA. REP-1, Rev.1, II, . i 1.8,I.11) Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: The Stat 0 of New Hampshire demonstrated appropdate equipment and procedures for determining field radiation mer.surements. The three Field Monitoring Teams picked up their field monitoring kits and checked the equipment. Since the kits were scaled, an inventory of equipment was not performed. -Operational checks of the instruments were performed I and included testing with check sources and a functional test of the air sampler. In addition to the equipment in the kits, the teams were issued !' respirators. All teams demonstrated the ability to measure ambient radiation and record the information on forms included in the procedures manual. Monitoring locations are assigned as grid map locations which cover approximately 1/10th of a square mile. In some instances, a physical landmark, such as an intersection, is also specified; however, in most cases the field team may locate anywhere within the approximate grid area. Grid Maps are in loose leaf binders and it is sometimes difficult to relate a location on one page to a location on another page. A new fold out map was included in the binder; however, the teams may not have been aware of it. - One team had some difficulty locating their assigned monitoring locations. Another team was sent to a location on a major highway where there was no place to safely pull off the road. FIELD MONITORING TEAMS: P lssue #1: DESCRIITION: Some difficulties were encountered in finding assigned ARCA locations. RECOMMENDATION: Teams should be advised of the availability of the new map and instructed to request assistance from the Team Coordinator if they are not clear on an assigned location.
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Objective #8. FIELD RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AIRHORNE IODINE : MONITORING. Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and proceduits for the , measurement of altborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 10'7 (.0000001) microcurie per cc in the presence of noble gases. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP 1, Rev.1 - II, I.8, I.9) Evaluation: Met Narrative 4 Summary: The State of New Hampshire demonstrated appropriate equipment and procedures for the measurement of airborne radiolodine concentrations. Air sampling equipment was included in the field monitoring kits. Prior to deployment from the IFO, the field teams performed functional tests of the air sampler and loaded the sampler head included in the kit. All field teams demonstrated the ability to collect and count air samples. Samples were handled and identified properly. Issues: -None i 52 l i
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Objective #9. FIELD RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING-PARTICULATE ACTIVITY. Demonstrate the abl!!ty to obtain samples of particulate aethity in the airborne plume and promptly perform laboratory analyses. (NUREG-0654/FESIA REP-1, Rev.1. II, 11.12 I.10) i Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: The State of New llampshire demonstrated the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity, in accordance with a pre-exercisa agreement, the DPilS Laboratory did not participate in the exercise. One of the teams sent an iodine particulate filter to the laboratory at the IFO for analysis. In this case, the field team hand <arried the sample to the laboratory and delivered it in timely manner. This activity was implemented in a manner that is consistent with the organization's plan and procedures. Other DESCRilTION: The field team hand-canied an iodine particulate filter to issue: the laboratory at the IFO for analysis. RECOMMENDATION: The Monitoring Team Coordinator prceedure (Vol. 6, Sect. 9, page 9.05, Step 6) should be clarified to specify that the expedited delivery called for in the procedure should be done by someone other than the field team itself. 53
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N , Objective #10. PLUME DOSE PROJECTION. Demonstrate the ability, within the _ plume expmun pathway, to project dmap to the publ!c via plume exposure, based on plant and Dold data. (NURECrE54/Ft'MA HEP 1, Rev.1, II,1.10) Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: The State of New HampsMic demonsuated the ability to project dosage to the public via p'ume exposure, based upon plant and field data. The DPHS at the IFO has the primary responsibility for making dose , projection calculadons to confkm the validity of the utility's dose projections. ! The DPHS at the IFO had several independent calculational methods. Prior to a release, the stgf made ?what if" u!culations in the event of a release, using the best estiinate of tha source terin along with existing and forecasted weather : conditions. After a release started, the projections were made using noble gas [ release rates identified on the data rhects along with the present and forecasted-weather conditions. The plume locations were plotted in the EOF and a plot ! of the plume was used for EOF briefings. The NH Field Monitoring Teams were positioned by the Field Team Coordinator to be independent and yet work in harmony with the teams from the utility and the New Hampshire Yankee Offsite Response Organization (NHY ORO) teams. The field team data were compared to the dose projections and a back calculation was made , to refine the source term. The field radiolodine measurements were converted : to a thyrold dose rate which was compared to the projected thyroid dose rate. At the State EOC, a steady flow of plant data sheets supplied updated plant information .to de dose projections and to plot plume positions. Accurate ccmparisons beteen the plant's derived METPAC projections and the State's METPAC results were not made during the exercise, apparently due to State . computer operator's inability to accurately interpret the plant data sheets. In- ; addition to the State METPAC projections the State used additional independent calculational methodologies not documented in the plan at the time of tne exercise. While the use of independent calculational methodologies is an approved course of action, sufficient calibration between methodologies must be performed in advance to identify expected discrepancies in comparative retults. Field monitoring team data was received and reviewed by the NH DPHS staff at the IFO.- Besides updating the dose and plume projxtions on the compater (METPAC program), the NH DPIIS computer operator did c: least two METPAC runs using possible variations in' iodine concentrations and- wind directions to anticipate changes effecting the EPZ. The appropriaie plans and procedures were implemented at the NH State EOC. 54
l I ! STATE EOC : hsues #1: DESCRIPTION: The State failed to obtain the same results from the l ARCA METPAC dose projections, apparently because of the inability of the computer operator to accurately interpret the plant data theets used as input data. , RECOMMENDATION: Train the operators t.o that they are familiar with plant data sheets, their use and purpose.
- Other DESCRIITION: The independent calculational methodologies used in the :
hiues exercise were not documented in the plan. Because expected discrepancies in comparative results had not been previously identified, delays occurred in use
- of dose projection data.
RECOMMENDATION: Revise plan to include the identity of alternate methodologies so the preestablished biases between their results will bc l recognized. i i 1 ! 55 i l. l 1
,.<wv==..--,,,,,.,-.,,www , k v. ,,s----,...-.,4r,,,,...-w,,.>.-#,.w,,,.-%,ve.--,,-w-,,-m..,4- r om.,..-~----._....... v.,,r_--- -..rw
a Objective #11. PLUME PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING. Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action decisions, based on projected or actual dosage, EPA PAGS, availability of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates and other relevant factors. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP.1, Rev.1 II, J.9, J.10.m) Evaluation: Met Narrative ' Summary: The ability to make Protective Action Decisions (PADS) was demonstrated by the State of New llampshire. The State of NH selected the conservative end of the EPA PAGs for whole body (1 R) and thyroid (5 R) for action levels to issue protective actions to the affected EPZ populatio,a. The utility's PARS were reviewed, along with verbal discussions with the IFO before the State issued a Protective Action Decision (PAD). Also affecting the State PAD's were evacuation times, shifting wind direction and deteriorating plant conditions. The DP11S IFO Coordinator anived at the IFO at 1419 hours and the it.st member of his staff arrived at 1448, which was after the declaration of the SAE at 1401. Therefore, the initial precautionary shelter in place of the entire N11 portion of the EPZ based on the SAE was initiated at the State EOC. Included in the precautionary sheltering PAD was a five mile safety tone for boaters and access control on the periphery of the entire Nil portion of the FJ'Z. Prior to making any recommendations to either the IFO Controller or the DPilS Director at the State EOC, there were considerable discussions between the IFO DPilS Coordinator and the EOF Liaison. At 1515 discussions were held on the possible evacuation of ERPA A due to high and increasing radiation levels in the reactor containment and degrading plant conditions, it was projected that the GE would occur at 1600 based on the rate of increase on the Post LOCA radiation monitor. These discussions are consistent with the expectations of the plan during a SAE with degrading plant conditions. The discussions were extended to include ERPA C due to a forecasted shift in wind directions. 56 l
Upon reaching the GE at 1602, a PAR at 1606 to evacuate ERPAs A, C, and D and to shelter F and G was recommended to the Director of DPHS at the State EOC. Following this recommendation, a release occurred at 1619 and at 1625 the decision was made to accept the PAR. The PAR to evacuate ERPAs A, C, and D was correct and was in. agreement with the utility PAR at the GE. To assist the DPHS IFO Coordinator in arriving at a protective action recommendation, several evacuation sceriatios have been developed. These scenarios take into consideration the season of the year, whether midweck or weekend, time of day, weather, and population influx such as tourist and beach area transients. Evacuation Scenario 8 in part 6.6 of Volume 8 of the NHRERP was used in the dose calculations to generate " Form 210A' which is used in the decision making process. Scen rin 8 identifies the tourist population at 50% of yearly capacity with no beach area transients. A misint:rpretation occurred v hen the 50% touri:;t population was assurr.e4 to be beach transients which is not consistent with the tirne cf the year or the Scenario 8 definition. At 1745, it wu recommended to the DPHS Director at the State EOC to evacuate ERPAs F and G. The IFO DPHS Coordinator was aware inat the dose projections did not support the recommendation. However, consistent with the degrading plant conditions and possible wind shifts, the precautionary decision would avoid the evacuation through a plume if conditions continued to degrade. At 1750 the decision was made to evacuate ERPA F but not G. IF0: Isme #1: DESCRWFION: Evacuation Scenario 8 was used in the calculation to ARCA generate PARS. Scenario 8 assumes a 50% tourist population and no beach t ansients. The IFO DPHS coordinator assumed the tourist population to be bach transients which could affect the PA implementation process. ! RECOMMENDATION: The IFO DPHS Coordinator should b:: more familiar with the assumptions used in the calculations used to generate PARS. A refresher training session may be ber.eficial. 57 i l
Objective #12. ALERT, NOTIFICATION, AND EMERGENCY INFORMATION- - l INITIAL ALERT AND NOTIFICATION. Demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 1(Lmile EPZ and begla dissemination of an htstiwtlonal message , within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate State and/or local ofncial(s). (NUREG. ; 0654/FEMwREP-1, Rev.1, H, E.5, E.6, E.7, J.10.c) , Evaluation: Met I Narrative . Summary: The State of New Hampshire demonstrated the ability to initially alert the 4 public within the plume EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a Protective Action Decis'on. The NHOEM Director, the Governor's Representative, and the Media Liaison discussed the protective action required once the General Emergency had been declared. A decision was reached at 1625 to mund sirens (simulated) and broadcast an EBS message at 1635. This message was the first with a protective action for the towns of Seabrook, (including the brd), Hampton Falls, Hampton (including the Beach), _ North and South liampton, and Kensington. The decision was for the towns to evacuate to rNeption centers, wh!ch were listed in the message. The activation of the siren and the broadcast of the instructional message was simultaneous. The reason for this . is the State feels that its citizens may be listening to the EBS radio station or will quickly turn to the EBS station and will be anticipating the announcement, so they want the message aired as quickly as possible. The message is then repeated three times, then at 15 minute inte vals for up to two hours unless superseded. The activities implemented by the EOC personnel were done in a manner that's consistent with the organization's emergency plan and procedures.- The initial protective action decision was received by the IFO Controller from the State EOC at 1625. The IFO Controller was directed to instruct the l RCDC to activate sirens at 1635 for the NH EPZ communities. The IFO Controller promptly telephoned the RCDC and received verification from the RCDC at 1640 that all NH EPZ sirens had been activated at 1635. The IFO Resources Coordinator was promptly informed of this protective action so the Local Liaisons could pass the information to the EPZ communities. Actions taken at the IFO were consistent with IFO procedures and the NHRERP. The RCDC was directed to activate (simulated) the sirens for the State of NH three times. They were given the precise time and in each instance the procedure was followed exactly and on time, i Issues: None 58 l l l
t Objective #13. ALERT, NOTIFICATION AND Q1ERGENCY INFORMATION. PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS. Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the forinulation and dissennnation of accurate information and instivetions to the public in a thnely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA. REP 1,11 E.5,E.6,E.7) Evnination: Met Narrative Summary: The State of New Hampshire developed emergency' information and public instructions at the State EOC. The Media Liaison developed and prepared EBS mt.ssages and news releases in coordination with the Governor's Representative, EOC Director, the Department of Public Health Director and other State agency representatives as necessary. The Media Liaison took part in the protective action decisions and drafted messages and/or news releases as needed. An extensive library of prescripted EBS messays and news releases was utillred to issue comprehensive information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion. in the early phases of the exercise, comprehensive and detailed informstion on sheltering as well as advice to boatera was contained in EBS messages. Citizens were urged to contact neighbors with hearing or lanEuage problems to ensure that they were informed of the emergency. News advisories repeatedly identified EBS radio stations and emergency telephone hot lines. An EBS message specifically addressed advice to farmers and food distributors and provided a telephone number for further agricultural information. When the decision was made to evacuate several communities, an EBS message provided timely and comprehensive information on evacuations r procedures. Information on emergency bus routes for transit-dependent T citizens and hotline telephone numbers for others with special needs were also contained in EBS messages. J- While the reliance on prescripted EBS messages and news releases resulted in timely issuance of comprehensive information, there were some instances in which prescripted messages were not modined to meet the exact situation at the time of issuance. For example, due to the precautionary nature of the Grst shelter in place PAD, there was a time interval between the preparation of the message and its airing. During this interval and prior to the message being delivered to the local ofGeials, the school children in the EPZ towns were sent home at their normal dismissal times. The EBS message stated that the school children were being sheltered in their schools. This same failure to modify the prescripted messages recurred with EBS message #3 and to a lesser degree with EBS message #5 where the evacuation information was modified correctly l 59
but the sheltering information for the one ERPA still sheltered was not modified correctly. Also, EBS message #5 states that the release of radiation commenced at 1545, while a utility news release (#5) states the release started at 1619. It was noted that additional information pertaining to hospitals, nuaing homes and special facilities would be helpful in NH EBS messages and news releases. Also, while EBS message #4 advised people who needed bus transportation to check their emergency public information calendars for bus ruute information, pwple were not advised on alternate source of that information, for those without access to a calendar. However, News Releases issued in the same time frame did contain an 800 number where NH residents could call for information. Finally, the EBS messages were -distributed from generb formats which contained headings which were unnecessary and potentially confusing. For example EDS mesuge #1 contained terr.inology in the heading regarding beach closing and evacuations which were not referenced in the body of the instructions. The ARCA from the 1988 exercise remains incomplete. STATE EOC issue #1: DESCRIYrION: EBS messages were not always modified to reGect the exact ARCA situation at the time of their issuance. RECOhih1ENDATION: Train the preparers and reviewers of EBS messages to modify prescripted messages to reflect the situation at the time of their issuance. Issue #2: DESCRIFrlON: ED3 message #5 states that the radiation release began ARCA at 1545 while a utility news release states that the re! ease began at 1619. RECOhih1ENDATION: Measures shculd be taken to ensure that information released to the public has been coordinated and verified for accuracy to avoid connicting statements. 60
l l
- l l
issue #3: DESCRIITION: EBS Message #4 advised people needing bus transportation ARFI _to check their_ emergency public information calendars for bus routes in formation, but did not offer an alternate source of this information for those who may not have access to a calendar. However, News Releases issued in the same time frame did contain an 800 number where NH residents could call for information. RECOhth!ENDATION: Consideration should be given to including in EBS messages, rather than News Releases, an altcmste source of emergency public information for those who may not have access to a public information I calendar. J, Issue #4: DESCRIFTION: EBS Messages contained headings from generic formats j ARFI which were unnecessary and potentially confusing. , RECOhthiENDATION: Prescripted EBS messagt should be reviewed and edited to eliminate generic information which is unnecessary and potentially , J confusing. Other DESCRIPTION: Additional information penaining to hospitals, nursing Issues - homes and special facilities would be helpful in NH EM messages and news - releases, t RECOh1MENDATION: Public information should be broadened to include additional information on hospitals, nursing homes and special facilities. i 1 61
. , = . - , - , . . . .- , - . - - .-.. . - w - . . -
Objective #14. ALERT, NOTIFICATION AND DIERGENCY INFORMATION. MEDIA. Demonstrate the ability to brief the rnedia in an securate, coordinated and timely inanner. (NtJREG-0654/FDf,A REP 1, Rev.1, II, G.3.a. G 4.a, G.4.b) Evaluellon: Met Narrative . Sununary: The ability to brief the media in an accurate, coordinated and timely manner was successfully demonstrated by the State of New Hampshire. No media briefings were conducted at the State EOC. The media was briefed at the hiedia Center in Newington, NH. At the hiedia Center the State PIO and support staff maintained contact with the State EOC for input into the briefings. After the hiedia Center was fully op rational, Utihty, NHY ORO, and NH public information staff provided information 8.o the press through periodic press briefings and the distribution of news releases. The NH spokesmm provided complete information about NH response and demonstrated a knowledge of emergency planning zone issites. This c!oses the ARCA from the 1988 exercise. Hard copics of Ft3S messages were also distributed including messages #1, #3, and #5 which contained information on the status of school children which had not been modified to reficct the rituation at the time of issuance. (See report on Objective #13). Conditions at the plant along with NHY ORO and the State of NH recommendations were fully explained and rep:ated at reasonable intervals. Rumors referred by the Joint Telephone Information Center staff were dispelled through ohcussion at briefings. The NH PIO participated in the second press conference (1505) and all subsequent conferences, providing complete information about NH response and protective action recommendationsc During the 1645 briefing he provided correct information on the status of school children which, however, was not consistent with the EBS hiessage. The mC received, loggtJ or distributed all messages sent from the hiedia Cent:r by fax and telephone contact. The monitoring capabilities of radio and TV broadcats is impressive.- All stations in the area are constantly watc%d. [ At the JTIC, staff listens to three stations at a time. One TV news browicN at the biedia Center was recorded. Radio broadcasts of the exercise we.e heard. One actual EBS test was also monitored. The "Information" voc machines were up dated with each news release. 62
MEDIA CENTER:
- Issue #1: DESCRIPTION: Although the NH PIO correctly characterized the status of ARCA school children at the 1645 briefing, EBS messages containing inaccurate information on the status of school children which did not reflect the situation at the time of their issuance were distributed in the Media Center, RECOMMENDATION: Closer coordination and review of EBS messages !
l should occur to ensure the distribution of information to the news media which reflects the situation at the time of issuance. : [ [ 5 0 b [ f A k i i i I 63
__ _ _. _ . __.__..-_.~._.__.- - _-.._ _..___.- ___ _ j Objective #15. ALERT, NOTIFICATION AND EMERGENCY INFORMATION. RUMOR CONTROL. Demonstrate the ability to estabilsh and operate rumor controlin a coordinated and timely fashion. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP 1, Rev.1, II. G.4.c) Evaluation: Met Narrative . Summary: The State of New Hampshire demonstrated the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion. The New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management activated a rumor control system at the Joint Telephone Information Center. An 800 number was used for rumor control, and three additional numbers for access to l recorded mesuges were available. The phone numbers were publicized in many of the news advisories, j The rumor control person in the Media Center had a dedicated phone line to the JTIC and one commercial line for obtaining additional information. The staff had access to current information, which was obtained from information presented in news briefings, and from material in news advisories and EBS messages. Hard copy of each release was highlighted by the staff and inserted . Into their workbooks to be used as a reference file when answering calls. They were also in contact with the NHEOM via phone. Issues: None b __. _ _... _.~.__ ,_ _ .. _ _ _., _ _ _ .. _
l , t Objective #16. USE OF KI. Demonstrate the ability to make the declsion to recommend the use of K! to emergency worken and institutionallied persont based en predetennined erheria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP 1, Rev. I, II. J.10.e, J.10.f) . Evaluation Not Met i l Narrative Summary: The State of New Hampshire failed to demonstrate the ability to make the , l decision to recommend, distribute, and administer K1 to emergency workers. i The decision was made based on projections from computer models and measurements made by the field monitoring teams, it was determined that the lower dose levels of 1 rem whole body and 5 rem thyroid as stated in the NHRERP could possibly be exceeded by exposure to the plume. The request to take KI was received from the_ field teams, concurred in by the accident assessment staff and approved by the NH DPHS Director after consultation with the Governors Representative. Instructions were given to take one tablet only and then await further advice. , According to the State plan, Volume 8. Rev 3, the Radiological Health Technical Advisor (RHTA) at the IFO is responsible for determining where and when KI should be used and providing that determination to the DPHS IFO Coordinator for transmission to the DPHS Director at the State EOC. The IFO RHTA is supposed to make that determination by calculating the projected thyroid dose using the Potassium Iodide Worksheet in Section 4.2 of the plan. At 1752, the IFO DPHS Coordinator requested that the Acting Director of DPHS at the State EOC authorire K1 for the State field monitoring teams and the emergency workers in the local EOC's. The recommendation was approved and KI was authorized at 1755. . It was not observed that the Potassium Iodide Worksheet was completed and therefore it is not clear what the PAR was ';4 sed on. According to the thyroid dose projections made by the dow anessment staff at the IFO at 1635 and again e* 1722 hours there was no . need for the ingestion of KI. These projections were confirmed by an air sample collected at 1746. This dose projection information was brought to the attention of the IFO DPHS Coordinator after the decision to take K' had been implemented and therefore it was too late to change the PAR. KI along with an information sheet was issued to each Field Monitoring Team member prior to deployment from the IFO. The proper procedures for use of KI were provided by the NH RHTA and reiterated by the Monitoring Team Coordinator. 65 vv = ,m= = -,,-9r -m, - ,A. .m. _ - ,,,.....~c ,,..Er.m ,.,-,U-7%_.--- , _ .. ,,.,%-w -w7-,,r,,,..,-,. . _,,,,.--.,7,
At TCP C KE-01 instructions were issued at approximately 1827 by the State Police Troop A duty supervisor (authorization received from the IFO) recommending the use of KI. Immediately upon receiving this notification the State Police Trooper simulated the ingestion of one tablet of Potassium Iodide. After taking this tablet the Trooper recorded the date, time and dose on a log sheet. Tae. State Trooper who had the only communications, failed to notify the Department of Transportation personnel located at the TCP with him to take Kl. All emergency workers in the cities and towns were provided (simulated) K1 tablets with their dosimetry when they first reported for duty, and they were instructed NOT to ingest these tablets unless directed by competent authority, through their supervisor / dispatcher at the town EOC, At approximately 1830 hours, communities received instructions transmitted by the IFO that the ingestion of KI had been authorized by the Nil Director of Public Health for EW (not for institutionalized persons). EW simulated ingestion of KI, and recorded it on a form held by each recipient, which was later checked by the Radiological Officer. Exceptions to this procedure were: The City of Portsmouth questioned the terminology when ingestion of I'! was
' authorized *: Did this mean that the city could use its discretion? Attempts to clarify this meaning by telephone had not been resolved when the exercise terminated at approximately 1930 hours, so no EW in Portsmouth consumed KI.
The staff assigned to the STSA was issued K! as part of the dosimetry kit they received when they arrived. They had instructions for the use of K1 and knew they should take the KI only when authorized to do so. At 1837, a message was broadcast to all staff at the STSA to take KI. Staff immediately took the appropriate KI dosage (simulated), but did not record K1 ingewon on their exposure record until 1845 following questioning by the evaluator. The reasor, for the delay was concern over simulation; staff was unsure if simulated K1 usage should be logged. They were aware of the need to record actual ingestion of KI. IFO: Issue #1: DESCRIPTION: The Potassium lodide Worksheet which is used to ARCA detetmine the need for the ingestion of K1 was not completed. RECOMMENDATION: The RHTA at the IFO should be trained in the procedures to complete this worksheet and provide the results to the IFO DPHS Coordinator prior to a recommendation to take Kl. 66
TCP C-KE 01: Issue #2: DESCRIPTION: When notification was received that K1 should be taken, ARCA the State Trooper simulated ingestion of a K! tablet; however, he did not advise other emergency workers (DOT personnel) to ingest Kl. RECOhfAIENDATION: Provide training to ensure that notification to take
- 41 is communicated to all emergency workers who enter the EPZ.
LOCAI, EOC: , Issue #3:- DESCRIITION: There was confusion as to the transmission and the meaning ARCA of the message " authorizing' the ingestion of KI by the Nil State DPilS; specifically at Portsmouth. RECOhth!ENDATION: Procedures for the authorization of, and ingestion of, K1 should be reviewed. Since this affects all emergency workers, key - officials- should receive refresher training, clarifying - the meaning of the authorization process. t 67
Objective #18. Ih1PLEh1ENTATION OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS PLUh1E EPZ. , Demonstrate the ability and ersources neceuary to implement appropriate protective actiora for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population (including transit dependent persons, special needs populations, handicapped persons and institutionallred persor:s). (NUREG-0654/FEh1A REP 1, Rev. L,11, J.10.d. J,10.g. J.10.h) Evaluationt Met Narrative Summary: The State of New Hampshire demonstrated the ability and the resources to implement appropriate potective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ populations. The Special Ne.ds Liaisens (SNL) at the IFO checked in, reviewed their procedures, and began making calls to the Exercise Special Needs Lists persons at -1305 hours. - A total of 40 special needs persons simulated _by a NilY Control Cell were contacted, all within the six non-participating,
' compensatory" communities.- The calls were completed by 1450. The SNLs received no incoming calls or calls for special needs assistance from-persons j not previously identified as a part of the exercise play. All four of the SNLs followed procedures in a timely and efficient manner.
There was an approximately a 30-minute delay in the demonstration of the Telecommunicstions Device for the Deaf (TDD). When the TDD was turned on, it was found to 1.e improperly connected to the phone jacks. After approximately 20 minutes of trying to properly connect the system by the SNL staff, a "Logisti:s and Materials
- person from the Utility was summoned and rendered the TDD operational. The SNL staff then demonstrated their ability to send and receive TDD messages.
Once the SNL staff determined the transportation requirements of the special needs population in the 6 nonparticipating towns, those numbers were logged in and relayed to the IFO Resources Coordinator, who posted them on the status boards, The complete information packages (containing name, address, location and required assistance for special needs individuals), for all nonparticipating towns were then forwarded to the radio room to be transmitted to the Deputy Sheriff in place at the communities with the exception of town of Hampton. The Local Liaison for the town of Hampton did not forward the infoiraation to the radio room for transmittal to the Deputy Shetiff at the Hampton, 68 1
At appropriate ti;nes in the exercise, local communities assessed transportation needs to implement protective actions determined to be required for transit dependent and special needs populations. Simulated lists of transportation dependent and special needs persons were used to protect confidentiality. Actual lists are updated annually and availabic for inspection. Requests for . . tansportation were kbmitted from the local Transportation Coordinater to the Local Liaisons at the iFO This information was logged in and forwarded to the IFO Resources Coordinator, who posted the information on the status boards. Ambulances, wheel chair vans, buses (including an evacuation bed bus), cars and pickup trucks which simulated buses, were mobilized as required. They travelled from the STSA to the local TSA where they were briefed by the local Trarnportation Coordinator, issued maps and disratched to accomplish their runs. The IFO Resources Coordinator directed his Resources Clerk to make up dated copies of the Commimity Status Reports and Transportation Resources Chart and far t'+ n every half hour to the STSA and State EOC This information was fwwed up oy confirming the dispatch and arrival of transportation r: sources, and completion of evacuation for both participating and non-participating communitics, in one instance, the town of Exeter requested 220 bed conversion kits for special needs individuals. This request was significantly higher than the need indicated on the town's default requirement sheet. The Exeter Local Liaison made the IFO Resources Coordinator aware of this request. The IFO Resources Coordinator responded that Exeter was unaware that the kits are stored at the special needs facilities within the towns; therefore, the expressed need was incorrect. The Exeter Local Liaison did not contact Exeter with this information for over an hour. The ability to mobilize and deploy resources to provide transportation assistance to special populations and transit-dependent persons was demonstrated by the State of New 11ampshire and the EPZ communities with the exception of Exeter and Newton. In the town of Exeter, the staff member at the local TSA was recalled to the EOC. The individual left the local TSA unattended and did not notify the EOC that there was still one evacuation vehicle enroute from the STSA and no one would be- there to perform the briefing, issue appropriate maps and dispatch the vehicle. When the vehicle arrived, the driver took the only course of action available to him and returned to the STSA. 69
t l \ . In Newton, the initial resource requirement was established by the l Transportation Coordirator at the Newton EOC and forwarded ;o the Local l Liaison at the IFO. A short time later, a decision to increase the requirement was made, but instead of cont cting the Local Liaison, the request was made I to another number, not in accordance with procedures. In general, operations during the exercise were conducted efficiently and effectively at the Rockingham County STSA. The staff at the Vehicle Arrival snd Fuel Check station followed procedures to include observing incoming vehicles, keeping a running total of the vehicles (type, number and arrival l Se), and providing periodic situation updates to the Command Post. Staff c.hccked the fuel level of each vehicle and indicated that those without 3/4 of a tank of gas would be provided with an initialed voucher and instmeted to proceed to a predetermined fueling site. Three coach buses without fuel gages I arrived and were directed to the fueling site to ensure that they had sufficient fuel to conduct operations. Vehicles were held in the sMging area until assigned. Those with sufficient fuel and those returning from the fueling site were directed to the Bus Registration station. This station consisted of table, l i chairs, and supply tub. S tpplies included registration forms, pens, paper, ! clipboards, flashlights, white shoe polish, and procedures. As each vehide arrived, the driver was asked for the inforination needed to complete the registration form (which was retained), a number was assigned to each vehicle, . l j and white shoe polish was used to
- tark the number on the front ' back I
windshields. Vehicles were then diread to the Dosimetry station. I The Vehicle Dispatch station had table, chairs, Iantern, traffie a v .up y tub, dispatch request forms, exit forms, and naps for the drivers. A q st far buses would be relayed frorn & Command Post by radio and loned ,y the staff. Buses would be Assigned by number to each requen and st.d ..uld provide appropriate maps for the drivers. Drive.r and passenger information was recorded on the exit form for each bus. The buses were then dispatched. Tbc exit form information was matched to the request form and the Command Post wa< informed that buses had been dispatched. The exit forms were then filed. There were no detailed briefings conducted for the drivers at the time of dispatch. As a rcsult, some drivers turned the wrong way when they departed the staging area, particularly if the map had been handed to the driver side down, and some drivers had trouble following the route to the local T' i 70
In one instance, two drivers being dispatch (J to South,Hampton local TSA were given maps to the Hampton Falls local TSA instead. The error was discovered when the Bus Coordinator asked for the evaluators to join with the bus drivers, since the evaluator assigned to the Hampton Falls route had already departed. The. Bus Coordinator corrected the maps and correctly dispatched the buses to South Hampton. The Bus Coordinator then reviewed the system to detennine the cause. Hr believed that the maps had either been misfiled or were improperly pulleu form the box. He took immediate corrective action to prevent a recurrence of the problem. He verified the accuracy of the map files. He als.o advised staff to double check maps selected against the request and mark the town on the exit form at the dispatch table and verify it at the vehicle. He also suggested the town names in big letters on the map margin would be easier to read than the information in the legend box. There were no more prnblems with inaccurate dispatch of vehicles. Of twenty-five drivers running routes, three had trouble reading their maps and did not complete their routes. Two of the three uncompleted bus routes (Brentwood and Hampton) were rerun on the day following the exercise, and the Brentwood bus route #1 was successfully completed. However, the driver for the Hampton bus rome #3 still had difficulty in following the map. The Hampton Falls Route #1 was not re-run. Drivers need to study maps prior to departing the staging area rather than waiting until under way. A related ARCA from the 1988 exercise concering the quality of the maps is closed. t/ A 71
- TRANSIT-DEPENDENT ROUTES 1
Vehicle Tvoe Route Description Conuntat.1 Brentwchd . NOTE: The State Transportation Staging- Area is located at the Rockingham C o u n _t y Complex, Brentwood, NH. He Town of - Brentwood- also has a
- local Transportation Staging Area.
Car #1 STSA - to the Brentwood Not Comp 1eted TSA; _ dispatched to run (Driver got lost) Brentwood Bus Route #1; to 'Re-run 12/14/90. the Brentwood TSA; to the Completed Manchester Reception Center. '(
- E. Kingston NOTE: The vehicle dispatched to East _Kingston :
simulated a bus picking up-residents. -requiring transportation to .the~ Hest
- community. The Town of East Kingston makes their
- own arrangements to bring _
residents to the EOC (Local . TSA).
-. Car #3.__ _ STSA - to the East Kingston Completed -
.TSA; to the Manchester Reception Center, i
-72
, y w ,w, ,
P Exeter NOTE: Vehicle simulated picking up_' residents at; a _ preselected pickup point. Bus - -STSA - to the Exeter TSA; Completed to the Park Street Corr. mon (wait 5-10 minutes); to the -
.Exeter TSA;_ to - the Manchester _' _ Reception Center and : back to' the STS A. -
Ambulance STSA to the Exeter TSA; Completed 4 the Exeter Hospital;- to ' the Hampstead Hospital and back to the STSA. ,
.. .W h e elc h air :STSA to the Exeter TSA to Completed Van the Exeter High School-to the Manchester High School and back to the STSA.
i Seabrook
~
1 Bus STSA - to the - Seabroc,k -Completed ; TSA; - dispatched . to run-Seabrook ' Bus _ Route-~#2; to
-the Seabrook TSA;L to the' -
Salem Reception Center and back to the STSA. Car #7 STS A - to the _Seabrook Completed TSA; _ dispatched to run Seabrook Bus Route #4; to the Seabrook TSA; to the Salem Reception Center and back to the STSA. 73
\ i 4 5 l
=
Hamptou , t- ' ! Car #8 _
- t. STSAL- to Hampton TSA; Not Completed
[ dispatched to run Hampton (driver could not t- Bus' Route #3 - ; - to the read map). Re-run Hampton TSA; to the Dover Dec 14, 1990, Not i_ Reception Center and back Completed
?
to the STSA.
- Kingstoo
!' Bus - STSA ; - to the - Kingston- Completed [.- TSA; dispatched - to run
- Kingston Bus Route #3; to *
! lthe _ Kingston TSA; to - the F Salem Reception Center and 1 back to the STSA. Kensington - Car #13 STSA - to the .Kensington ' Completed TSA ; dispatched to irun Kensington Bus Route #2; te
- the.Kensington TSA; to the Manchester Reception
- Center.
Newrields1
- Bus - STSA - ~ to the Newfields Completed -
TSA; dispatched to ' run Newfields Bus Route #1; to the Newfields TSA; 'to the Manchester Reception Center - and back - ' to the STSA'. . 74
t 4 Newton Car #16 STSA - to the Newton TSA; Completed dispatched to run Newton Bus Route #2; to the Newton TSA; to the Salem Reception Center and back to the STSA. S. Hampton Car #19 STSA - to the South Completed Hampton TSA; dispatched to run South Hampton Bus A Route #2; to the South Hampton TSA; to the Salem Reception Center and back to the STSA. Rockingham County Complex Evacuation STSA to the Rockingham Completed Bed Bus County Nursing Home; Where the staff installed bed boards in a satisfactory manner; mannequin loaded and secured in proper fashion; depart for the VA Hospital in Manchester and back to the STSA. 75
Transit-dependent routes noted as "Not Completed" for objective 18 in the 1988 exercise were re-run on December 12, 1990, with the following evaluations. Comment # Route Description Comment per Obj 18 (88 Exercise) 7 South Hampton bus route #2 Comple.ted 20 Hampton bus route (6 Completed 25 North Hampton bus route Completed
#2 39 STSA to Seabrook TSA Completed 45 STSA to Hampton Falls Completed TSA 46 Hampton Falls bus route #1 Not Completed (took wrong turn) 47 Hampton Falls bus route #2 Completed 48 Hampton Falls bus route #3 Completed 55 STSA to Portsmouth TSA Completed 63 STSA to New Castle TSA Completed 64 New Castle bus route #1 Completed
?E
1 IFO: Issue #1: DESCRIPTION: The special needs transportation list was not sent to the IFO ARCA radio room for transmittal to the Hillsborough Deputy Sheriff in the non participating town of Hampton. While the Deputy Sheriff had- the default values, he did not have the up-dated and verified special needs list for Hampton. The IFO Local Liaison for Exeter did not contact Exeter with an explanation provided by the Resource Coordinator of 1) why the town's request for 220 bed bus conversion kits was deemed to be excessive and 2) where the conversion kits to meet this need were stored. RECOMMENDATION: The Hampton and Exeter local Liaisons along with the responsible person in the Exeter EOC need additional training in the overall aspects of special needs response. Issue #2: DESCRIIrrION: The TDD system was improperly connected, resulting in a ARFI delay in the system becoming operational. RECOMMENDATION: Testing of all communication equipment (including TDD) should be part of the procedure for Special Needs Liaison staff upon arrival at the IFO. I OCAL EOCs issue #3: DESCRII" TION: In the Exeter local TSA, the staff member left the local ARCA TSA prior to arrival of last bus from the STSA for use within the Town. RECOMMENDATION: Better communications, understanding, and procedures between the town EOC and local TSA sbuld be established to ensure that all parties are aware of the number of assets being dispatched so that someone is available to give instructions and maps to driver. 77 l
--j
1 i
?
Issue #4: DESCRIPTION: In the Town of Newton a request for additional buse) was ARCA- made to a number other than the IFO Local Liaison as stipulated in the plan and procedures. RECOMMENDATION: More training needs to be provided for the Transportation Coordinator at the Newton EOC to ensure correct actions in requesting transportation assets. STSA issue #5 DESCRIPTION: Three drivers had difficulties following the maps. Two of ARCA the three uncompleted bus routes (Brentwood and Hampton) were rerun on the day following the exercise, and the Brentwood bus' route #1 was successfully completed. This leaves two bus runs uncompleted. RECOMMENDATION: ' Continue to train drivers in following maps. It would also be useful to emphasize that drivers need to study maps in advance
. of departure from the staging area rather than waiting until underway.
o s
- l. =
78
f Objective #19. IMPLGIENTATION OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS EVACUATION OF
- SCHOOIJS. Demonstrate the ability sud resources necessary to knplement appropriate protedive actions for school chiktren within the phune llPZ. (NURIG-0654/FBIA-REP-1, Rev.1, H, J.10.g)
Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: The ability and resourecs necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for school children witidn the plume EPZ was successfully demonstrated. With the etception of Brentwood, the EOCs in the participating towns, contacted their respective schools to obtain the census for that day, determined the required transportation resources :.nd forwarded this information to the local Liaison at the IFO, The local Liaisons then informed the IFO Resources Coordinator of the requirement and they were logged on the transportation defawlt sheets based on the NH Department of Education 1990 census. Communication were established and maintained with all the schools to kmp them up-dated on the situation. This completes the 1988 exercise ARCA. Close to the time of school dismissal, the EMD in the town of Greenland instructed the school officials to keep the students and staff at the school. This was followed up at 1830 with another telephone call to the school instructing them to keep the children sheltered. This was in contradiction to the State's. instructions to release the schools at their normal dismissal and to only cancel after school activities. The IFO Local Liaisons coordinated transportation resources which would have been necessary to assist the non-pa:ticipating towns in providing transportation for schools should an evacuation be ordered. The schools in the NH EPZ communities were dismissed for the day at their regularly scheduled time which was prior to any evacuation muer being given. The IFO Resources Clerk up-dated the transportation resources chart every half hour and faxed copies to the State EOC and the STSA at the Rockingham County Dispatch Center in Brentwood. As mentioned above, schools were dismissed in the towns prior to any protective action. Consequently, the towns called the IFO Local Liaisons and reduced transportation needs. The IFO Local Liaison for Hampton, North Hampton, and Brentwood did not notify the IFO Resources Coordinator of reduced transportation requirements for these 3 towns. 79 l l I
Maps utilized by the bus drivers have been revised. Fifteen out of nineteen - drivers had no difficulty. The remaining four were successfully rerun the day following the exercise. 'Ihe ARCA from the 1988 exercise was corrected. ROCKING 11AM COUNTY SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS During the exercise, the five New Harapsh're School Administrative Units (SAU) identified in the plan panicipated in the exercise. In r.ccordance with the extent of play agreements, the five SAU's would only participate until the close of the school day, with the result they were not available to receive the GE notification. The actisities associated with each of the SAU's are discussed below. All SAU's have been provided with tone-alert radios. According to the extent of play arrangements, these radios were not activated during the exercise. School Administrative Unit #16 The evaluator arrived at SAU #16 in Exeter at 1215 which was prior to the receip: of any ECL notifications. Therefore, due to his arrival time and the length of his visit the evaluator was unable to observe the receipt of any messages from the Department of Education at the State EOC nor the transmittal of any messages to the schools in the SAU There were telephones (dedicaW and speed dialing) and a tone alert device available for communication. They had copies of the SAU's plan and appropriate forms for messages. They also had copies of maps / calendars recently distributed to all parents. Schcol Administrative Unit #17 SAU #17, located in Kingston, did an exceptional job; especially the Assistant Superintendent who was the person in charge. She received, by telephone, information about the Alert from three sources, the Department of Education at the State EOC, the Kingston Police, and the Kingston Health Office, approximately one hour after it was declared. She had copies of the SAU's plan and appropriate forms for messages. She also had copies of maps / calendars recently distributed to all parents. The SAU has dedicated telephones to each school and a speed-dialing system. The Assistant Superintendent was timely in transmitting the Alert information via the speed-dialing system to all of the schools in the Unit. The Assistant Superintendent had current lists of all students. The only protective action, the cancellation of all extracurricular activities, was also transmitt-d to all schools. She contacted her transportation and maintenance coordinators and advised them to be alert to any additional requirements which 80 t
l .- V might be necessary, e.g., requirements for additional buses or sheltering. Names and tejephone numbers of their bus drivers were available. She also asked all of the school principalt to consider what other unmet resources would be requtrx!, e.g., students being kept after school. School Administrat;n Unit #21 The Superintendent of SAU #21, located in Hampton, received the Alert and Site Area Emergency notifications via telephone from the Department of Education at the State EOC and transmitted them to the schools in a timely manner. The Hampton Police also relayed the Site Area Emergency notification. The Superintendent requested and received an up-dated list of students from the schools. The only protective action, to cancel the extracurricular activities, was transmitted to all of the principals. The Unit's fleet of buses would not have been able to transport all of the students at one time, but the Superintendent had knowledge of where to obtain additional buses. He also had information on their bus drivers, copies of the SAU's plan and appropriate forms for messages, and copies of maps / calendars recently distributed to all parents. School Administrative Unit #50 SAU #50, located in Rye, received the Alert and Site Area Emergency notifications by telephone from the Department of Education at the State EOC and transmitted them to all of the schools in the Unit. They had copies of the SAU's plan and appropriate forms for messages. They also had copies of maps / calendars recently distributed to all parents. The SAU had upda+.ed lists of all students. They completed another round of calls to notify the schools of the only protective action, cancellation of all extra-curricular activities and placement of students on the buses as usual. School Administrative Unit #52 SAU #52, located in Portsmouth, was closed by the time the evaluator arrived on the day cf the exercise. On the day following the exercise, the evaluator contacted the Unit by telephone and obtair.ed the following information. The Unit received the Alert notification from the Portsmouth EOC at 1310. The Superintendent departed to set up contact at the Portsmouth EOC. He contacted the Unit staff from the EOC and directed them to contact all of the schools and advise them of the Alert, obtain up-to-date student lists, and to 81 I l
cancel all extra-curricular activities. The State Department of Education at die , State EOC called at 1342 requesting information on buses and student lists. This information was received from the school principals by 1352 and provided to the Deputment of Education. The notification of the Site Area Emergency was received from the Depanment of Education at the Statu EOC at 1419 and transmitted to all of die schools ia the Unit. *Ihe Transportation Coordinator was notified to determine the bus needs and any notification to bus drivers. He has the list of all of the drivers. The Superintendent retumed to the SAU at 1515 after which no funher calls were received. As with the other SAU's, they had col.ies of the SAU's plan and appropriate forms for messages. They also had copies of maps / calendars recently distributed to all parents. VERIFICATION OF SCHOOL NOTIFICATIONS On December 14, 1990, the day after the exercise, FEMA staff telephoned the schools to within the SAU's to verify the contacts which were nutde during the exercise. In accordance with the extent of play agreements, contacts were not made with the SAU's themselves, which were to be visited by FEMA evaluators during the exercise. Based on lists provided by New Hampshire Yankee, there were 40 schools to be contacted. In accordance with pre-exercise agreements, several attempts were made to contact scbools. However, if at least 50% of the total calls attempted made contact, additional attempts to make contact with a particular number were stopped. Due to multiple busy signals or no answers, 3 of the schools were not contacted during tne calling period on Decemler 14 and because of the pre-exercise agreement, additional contacts were not attempted. All of the 37 schools contacted confirmed that they received at least one call from exercise participants, The vast m@rity responded that they would follow instructions issuco by the SAUs. Two schools indicated that they did not have permission to participate in emergency planning at this time. ROCKINGHAM COUNTY DAY CARE CENTERS During the exercise, ten Day Care Centers identified in the plan participated in the exercise. The activities associated with each of the Day Care Centers are discussed below. Virginia Franzoni Family Group Day Care Center (Exeter) The evaluator arrived at the center at 1233. A copy of the Day Care Support Plan was requested and presented immediately. Included in the plan was a 82 l l l
. . .= , xeroxed, highlighted copy of the evacuation route to be followed by the facility staff. The Director stated that a copy of the route is provided to each child's parents upon enrollment, alcng with a briefing of the Director's evacuation procedures, routes, and final destination. This was an addition to the basic Genetic Day Care Center Support Plan. The Director had no special pro-visions for notification cf parents since procedures, as stated above, are provided upon enrollment.
At 1342, the Director received a telephone notification of the Alert from the Director of the Exeter Recreation Department who also serves as the Transponation Coordinator. He advised that no action was required and verified the number of pupils and staff at the center. While the Transportation Coordinator did not request information about the Center's transportation needs, the Director stated that she knew that her plan is to use her own vehicle and, if required, she would contact him for assistance if 1.cr vehicle did not function. The Director promptly completed her notification log. She explained that normally she is tuned to WOKQ on a daily basis. However, upon notification of any kind, she would routinely tune to WOKQ and listen for funher up-dates. She also stated that the tone-alert radio in the facility is sufficiently loud to be heard anywhere in the Center, thus satisfying the constant monitoring requirement in the plan. The Director's comments indicated that she was completely familiar with the p'an and with communications to and from the Transportation Coordinator at the local level. She expressed commitmer.t to the plan and appeared very competent. At 1358, as the evaluator was preparing to leave the facility, the Director received a notification from the State EOC in Concord that a drill is in progress at Seabrook. The evaluator departed at 1359. Exeter Child Care Center (Exeter) The evaluator arrived at the center at 1403 and interviewed the Program Director. Upon request, a copy of the Generic Day Care Center Support Plan was produced for review. The plan wr; immediately accessible to the Program Director. No special procedures had been implemented for parental notification of an evacuation. The Program Director provided the notification log which had been properly completed to indicate that the original notification of the Alert had been received at 1326. The Exeter Transportation Coordinator made the 83
4 notification, confirmed the number of pupils and staff at the center, and ., .
- advised that no further action was required at that time. The Program Dimetor indicated that she was then awaiting funhet instructions or developments. A notification was received from the State EOC in Concord at 1344 indicating that a Seabrook drill was in progress and that she should stand by for other telephone calls. -
In response to the evaluator's questions, the Program Director pointed out the tone-alert radio in the Center's office to satisfy the constant monitoring requirement. The Program Director appeared to be completely familiar with procedures and the plan, and had properly logged pertinent communications to that point. The evaluator departed at 1411. South Road Kindergarten (Kingston) The evaluator arrived at the facility at 1445 and interviewed the Administrative Assistant since the Director had already left the Kindergarten. Upon request, the notification log and Generic Day Care Center Support Plan were provided. The log had been properly completed by the Director and indicated that the State EOC in Concord had provided notification of the Seabrook drill at 1350. The Administrative Assistant stated that she did not know if they had asked for the number of pupils and_ staff present,-but the information was available if needed. The evaluator observed the information taped above the telephone for future use. This indicated familiarity with the plan requirements on the part of the facihty staff. At 1400, the Kingston EOC ptovided the same notification to the Director. In addition to the Generic Day Care Support Plan, this facility has established its own emergency procedures which includes non-nuclear problems as well. This addendum indicates a pro-active approach to potential problems. Copies ere provided to all staff and all parents. Part of these procedures include a notification to parents of an evacuation order. However, since no action was recuired at the Alert level, this was not demonstrated. The toncialert radio, ! the plan, and the attendance roster were centrally located in the office to satisfy the constant monitoring requirement. The staff member interviewed was familiar with the plan and enthusiastic in participating in the scenario. The evaluator departed at 1505. Play and Learn Children's Center (Kingston) The evaluator arrived at the Center at 1530 and interviewed the Assistant Director. Upon request for a copy of the Generic Day Care Center Support Plan, she went to her office and retumed with a copy. She stated that copies 84 3
were provided for all staff for their own use. A cover memo attached to the plan appears to confirm that stamment. The notification log was properly completed. The Center's first notification was received from the Kingston EOC at 1352. The EOC indicated that a drill
' was in progress and requested pupil and staff attendance figures and any special attention requirements for any child. The staff had been briefed legarding the possible sequence of events and were standing by for additional information. A notification had been received from the State EOC in Concord at 1353 advising the Center that a drill was in progress and no action was required. Accordingly, no staff action had been taken except for preparation of the log, provision of attendance figures, and stand by for further information.
The Assistant Director indicated that the center does have a plan to contact parents in the event of an evacua' ion. The plan itself contained no such segment. The Assistant Director stated that she believed the Director has the telephone list in her own possession. The memo which was attached to the plan appears to demonstrate a responsible attitude to the process. The tone-alert radio was in the office to satisfy the constant monitoring requirement. The evaluator departed at 1550. Catherine Cook Day Care (Kensington) Upon crival at the Center at 1625, the evaluator was advised by a guest that the Director had closed for the day as of 1530, but would return in 15 to 30 minutes. The evaluator waited for the Director until 1726 and then departed. Accordingly, the Center was not evaluated on the day of the exercise. The contact log at the State EOC in Concord indicates that four attempts were made to contact the Center, at 1430,1433,1453, and 1459. The telephone line at the Center was busy at ah four calls. (Per the extent of play, no further action was required of the State EOC.) Since notification was not made, FEMA did not make a verification call to this Center on the day following the exercise. Country Kid Day Care Center (Brentwood) The evaluator arrived at the Center at 1300. The Director was knowledgeable about the plan and had a copy readily available. The telephone and tone-alert radio were working. Normally, there are nine or fewer children at the Center , and all of the parents live and work close by the Center. In an emergency, the Director would call the parents and the children would be released to their l 85
custody in less than half an hour. Iag sheets to record r.'.etsages were available. . He evaluator left the Center at 1325 at which time no message had bcen received. A follow-up telephone call at 1630 revealed that two calls we:e received (1341 and 1524). The second call recommended sheltering due to the Site Area Emergency. De Director was aware of the procedure to impleinent sheltering u identified in the plan. Martha's Cart (Stratham) ne evaluator arrived at the Center at 1420 and laterviewed 1e Director until 1440. The Director had a written plan and a list of the parents' telephone numbers readily available. De tone-alert radio was working. Normally, there are 12 or less children at the Center, ne Di:ector showed considerable knowledge as to what to do in case of an emergency. No call had been received at the Center by the time the evaluator departed. During the evaluator's follow-up telephone call at 1620, the Director indicated that an Alert notification was received from the State EOC hi Concord at 1454 The Director was aware that, as identified in the plan, no action was needed. Kids Stop U (Hampton) The evaluator arrived at the Center at 1500. The Center had 25 children and six adults. A working tone-alert radio and a written plan were available, ne log sheet showed that one telephone call had been received by a Co-Director at 1420. The details of the call were not recorded and the recipient was uravailable for interview. The Director exhibited knowledge of what to do in cese of an emergency at Seabrook. The evaluator departed at 1520. Hampton Falls Child Care Center (Hampton Falls) The evaluator arrived at the Center at 1530 and interviewed the Director until 1555. He Dinetor is well trained to handle emergency situations. He had logged two telephone calls from the authorities regarding the status of the Seabrook Station. The first call at 1405 was fmm the Newington IFO informing the center of the Site Area Emergency and requesting the number of children preser.t. The second call at 1425 was from the State EOC in Concord confirming the Site Area Emergency and indicating that no protective action was recommended. The Director had a written plan, a list of parents' telephone numbers, and the number of children readily available, ne 86
Director wre knowledgeable of the sheltering and evacuation procedures identified in the plan. Kathleen Tostenson Day Carr (Portsmouth) This is a small Center with no more than six children at any time. Since the children had been picked up by 1600, the owner had clcsed the facility when the evaluator called ahead at 1615 to advise her that he was coming. She agreed to a telephone interview during which she said that she had received two telephone calls informing her of the Alert at Seabrook. She indicated that a working tone alert radio, written plan, and log sheets are readily available. Due to the small number of children, she said that the parents could pick up the children quickly in case of an emergency. VERIFICATION OF DAY CARE CENTER NOTIFICATIONS On December 14, 1990, the day after the exercise, telephone contacts were rnade with the Day Care Centers to verify the contacts which were made during the exercise. In accordance with the extent of play agreements, contacts were not made with the Day Care Centers which were to be visited by FEMA evaluators during the exercise. New Hampshire Yankee provided lists of Day Care Centers tabulated by town / city. Based on the les provided by the exercise participants, day care centers which were not contacted durig the exercise (no answer, phone disconnected, or several busy signals) or which had been visited by FEMA evaluators on the day of the exercise were climinated from the listings and no attempt was made to contact those centers (2 Day Care Centers were inadvertently omitted from the listings). Of the 77 Day Care Centers shown on the listings,15 were climinated either because they had been visited during the exercise (and no further verification was necessary) no contacts had been made during the exercise. Attempts were made to contact the remaining 62 Centers. During the calling period on December 14th, 8 Centers were not contacted due to multiple busy signals or no answers. In accordance with pre-exercise agreements, several attempts were matie to contact these Centers; however, if at least 50% of the calls attempted resulted in contact, additional attempts to make contact were stopped. Of the remaining 54 Day Care Centers contacted, 48 indicated that they were contacted at hast once by exercise participants. Three of the Centers stated that they were not contacted; one stated that no one was at home during the exercise; and one stated that they were not participating at this time. 87
A review of the information provided during the telephone interviews indicates ., that the Day Care Centers in the towns of Newton and Stratham received only one contact during the exercise. T1ds contact was from the State EOC and, in accordance with the extent of play agreements provided only a notification of the curn:nt ECL. Also in accordance with the extent of play agreements, the State was to make only one call to a given Day Care Center. The town transportation coordinator was also to have contacted the Day Care Centers in their respective towns to ensure that sufficient resources were available, if needed, for evacuation of the Day Care Centers. In the towns of Newton and Stratham, this additional contact path between .the emergency response organization and the Day Care Centers was not demonstrated during the exercise. In addition, in Portsmouth, eight of the Day Care Centers who stated that they were contacted, s*.ated that only the State made contact and that there was no contact made by the local response organization while eight other Day Care Centers stated that they were contacted by both the State and local officials. Several of the Day Care Centers reported that the contacts made by the State EOC were either recorded or sounded like a computer. The concem raised by the Day Care Centers was that the State personnel would not or did not answer questions. 88 l 1 l !
l SCHOOL BUS EVACUATION ROUTES < l During- the exercise, nine' buses (simulated by cars) were dispatched from the State Transportation Staging Area (STSA) in Brentwood to the local Transportation Staging Areas-(TSA) in nine communities to support the evacuation of schools. Following is a list of the evacuation routes demonstrated during the exercise. NUMBER ROUTE CONBENT Town of Brentwood
#2- STSA to the Brentwood Not Completed (took TSA; to the Swasey Central wrong route, got School; to the Manchester lost). Not a map Reception Center, problem. Re-run 12/14/90 Completed Town of East Kingston
#4 STSA to the East Kingston Not Completed TSA; to the East Kingston (wrong map given at ,
Elementary School; to the local TSA) Re-run Manchester Reception 12/14/90 Completed Center. Town of Hampton
; #9 ' STSA to the Hampton TSA; Completed to the Academy Junior-High; to the Dover Reception Center.-
Town of Kensington
#14 STSA to the Kensington Completed TSA; to - the Kensington Elementary School; to the Manchester Reception Center. ,
I 89 f
=, - , - - , - , , , . - . - _ _ , , 4,.w--v ew -- >=- - . - .,w, ~ , , , , - - , ~.v ,e<,-yr-se,.w- , ,, * = +- - e -
e- -vr e v - 5 * - - *
' Town of Kingston ,' -#11 STSA to the Kingston TSA; Completed to - the Sanborn Regional High School; to the Salem Reception Center.-
Town of Newfields
#15 STSA to the Newfields Completed
-TSA; to - the . Newfields Elementary School; to the ,
Manchester Reception . Center. - Town of North Hampton H
#18 STSA to the North Hampton . Completed
.TSA; to the North Hampton Elementary School; to the Dover Reception Center.
Town of Seabrook
#6 STSA to the Seabrook TLA; Completed to the Seabrook Elementary.
School; to ti.e Salem Reception Center. i South Hampton = ;
.#20 STSA to the South Hampton - Completed - ,
l TSA; to the Bernard School; to the Salem Reception - Center. 90 i
L' . DAY CARE CENTER BUS EVACUATION ROUTES During the exercise,_ four. buses (simulated by cars) were dispatched from the STSA in Brentwood to the local TSA in four communities to support the evacuation of day care centers Following is a summary of routes and FEMA's evaluation, NUMBER ROUTE COMMENT
#5- Town of Exeter Not Completed (run from local STSA ,, the Exeter TSA; to the Little_ TSA to Day School Du; Care; to the Manchester Care canceled)
Reception Center. Re-run 12/14/90 Completed
#10- Town of Hampton %11s Completed STSA to the Htmpton Falls TSA; to the Hampton Falls Child Care Center; to the Dover Reception Center,
#12 Town of Kingston Completed STSA to the Kingston TSA; to the Kingston Children's Center; to IM Salem Reception Center.
#17 Town of Newton Not Completed (took' wrong STSA to the Newton TSA; to the Teddy turn) Re-run Bear _ Nursery School; to the Salem 12/14/90 Reception Center. Completed
. 91
School and Day Care facilities routes noted as "Not Completed" for objective 19 in the 1988 . exercise were re-run on December 12,1990 with the following evaluations. Comment # Rente Descriotion Comment per Obj 19 (88 exercise) 64 Newton LSA t0 Newton Completed Memorial School 72 Portsmouth TSA to Completed Sherbourne Elementary School 73 Portsmouth TSA to Dondero Completed Elementary School 74 Portsmouth TSA to Little Completed Harbor Elementary School 75 Portsmouth TSA to New Completed Franklin Elementary School 76 Portsmouth TSA to Completed Wentworth Elementary School STATE EOC (DAY CARE CENTER NOTIrtt.RS) Issue #1: DESCRIPTION: Martha's Care in Stratham was not notified of the Alert ARCA until 1454 which was after the SAE had been declared. RECOMMENDATION: Day care center notifiers at the State EOC should keep the day care centers informed of the situation in a more timely manner. Day care notifiers should receive re :? sher training.
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Issue #2: DESCRUTION: The State day care center notifiers would not or did not ARCA answer questions from the day care center operators. , RECOMMENDATION: Review plan and revise if necessary to provide sufficient personnel so that there will be time to answer legitimate questions. The two staff members making the notifications were clearly rushed to make all necessary calls. IFO: Issue #3: DESCRHTION: The local Liaisons for Hampton, North Hampton, and ARCA Ilrentwood did not revise transportation requirements after school dismissal. Consequently, more resources would have been sent to these towns than required. RECOMMENDATION: The Local Liaisons for Hampton, N. Hampton, and Brentwood need additional training in Local Liaison procedures. LOCAL EOCS Issue #4: DESCRUTION: The EMD in Greenland decided to shelter the school ARCA children and extended this sheltering action beyond normal daily dismissal time, which was not consistent with the State decision. RECOMMFNDATION: Closer coordination is required between the Greenland EOC, the State EOC and the IFO to ensure that the correct PADS are understood and transmitted accurately to all responders. Refresher training should be considered for the Greenland staff. SCHOOL EVACUATION BUS DRIVERS Issue #5: DESCRIPTION: Maps for Hampton and Seabrook need further revision. , ARFI l l RECOMMENDATION: Maps for Hampton should have State route , i designated as 101C changed to State route 111. Map for Seabrook should be i verified for streets that have been changed but not reflected on the map, j i l l f 93 l l
a &
^
Objective #20. TRAFFIC CONTROL. Demonstrate the organizational ability and . resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1,Rev.1, II, J.10.j, J.IO.k) , Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: The State of New Hampshire demonstrated the organizational ability and resources neceuary to control evacuation traffic flow and control access to evacuated and sheltered areas. The State /olice Liaison Officer at the IFO da.xtt:1 the activation of the traffic and access control points and maintained fm t contact with the State EOC and Troop A Headquaners. Four access control points were established around the EPZ and fourteen traffic control points were established, at least one in each EPZ town as required by the extent of play. The Department of Transportation provided barricade material and traffic l cones in support of access / traffic control pcmts established by the State Police and towns in accordance with plant an'! proceduret ) At 1423 the Coast Guard reported that a live-mile exclusion zone was being - established (simulated). At 1610 the Coast Guard implemented the establishment of a ten mile exclusion safety zone (simulated). The State Police Duty Supervisor at Troop A was instructed by the State Police Liaison Officer a the IFO at approximately 1600 hours to dispatch a mobile unit to estabbh an accc:s control point (ACP-RY-04) in the Town of l Rye, NH. This successful deployment was followed by additional request to l dispatch a mobile unit to estaolish a triff. control point (TCP-C-KE-01) in the l Town of Kensington. NH. These operadons demonstrated out of sequence were completed in accordance with the Traffic Management Manual. Deployment was prompt and efficient with no delays noted. At the observed access contrel point (ACP-itY-04) in the Town of Rye NH, one State Police Cruiser and one DOT truck with traffic cones were present. There was also one State Police Cruiser and one DOT truck with traffic control material on board at the traffic control point (TCP-C-II-01) in the Town of Kensington, NH. The troopers end the DOT personnel simulated the establishment of the TCP by arranging traffic control cones in accordance with the TMM. Their action clearly demonstrated that they understood their roles. Discussion concerning traffic direction and flow, protective actions, evacuation routes, and reception center locations revealed they were very knowledgeable 94
. and capable of implementhg all acdons associated with the emergency plans and procedures. All activities complied with the regelrements of the TMM.
All communities established traffic control points (TCPs) successfully with the exception of Greenland and Newton. Some of these were in sequence with the scenario, while others Brentwood, Newfields, Newton, and Portsmouth were established out of sequence. Simulated impediments were successfully dealt with, and traffic rerouted in Brentwood, New Castle, Kingston and East Kingston. In the town of Stratham, a traffic accident (simulated) at the intersection of Bunkerhill Ave , and Rtc 108 was reported and assistance requested. The response consisted of three Police Officers with their vehicles, two firemen with a fire engine, two
.woalances and a tow truck. A plan for rerouting of traffic was developed and fonvarded to the EOC and the impediment was clcared (simulated).
In Greenland, a TCP was established by the local police. The officer staff'mg the point was knowledi;eable in his dut;es but he did not know the designated Reception Center for the population of the towm, The town of Newton, established one TCP w'-h 3 individuals and required equipment including 7 traffic cones. The Town's plans and procedures require that this TCP be staffed by 1 individual and with 12 traffic cones. The , emergency workers that were staffing the TCP were not aware of the designated Reception Center for the citizens of Newton. LOCAL EOCs Issue #1: DESCRIPTION: In the towns of Greenland and Newton the staffing at the ARFI TCP did not know the location of the reception center for Greer. land and Newton residents. RECOMMENDATION: Training should be provided to all individuals who might have TCP responsibilities concerning evacuation routes, reception center location. Issue #2: DESCRIITION: The TCP established in the town of Newton used too many ARFI persons and insufficient equipment was utilized. This was not in accordance with TMM or procedures. RECOMMENDATION: Additional training should be provided to ensure that the correct number of workers and traffic control devices are sent to the TCPs. 95 l ____ _---_________.______m _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Objective #21. RELOCATION CENTERS-REGISTRATION, MONITORING, AND , DECONTAMINATION. Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment and personnel for the registration, radiological monhoring and decontamination of evacuees, (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, H, J.12) Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: The State of New Hampshire demonstrated the adequacy of procedures, equipment, facilities and personnel for the regLtration, radiological monitoring and d-mntamination of evacuees. The DPHS Director,the Radiological Heahh Technical Advisor and Emergency b Response Inifator et the State EOC activated the DPHS Supervisors and support staff fc,r establishment of the Reception Center (RC) at Manchester NH. The Radiological Screening Prognm at the State EOC was revised and the responsible personnel were aware of their duties and responsibilities for administering the program. This corrects an ARCA from the 1988 exercise. Due to 'A commitment of the school for the evening of the exercise The Manchester RC was established out of sequence but, was done in a timely and efficient manner. The assigned supervisors and staff personnel were well , trained and worked in a coordinated manner, Each staif member responsible for monitoring utilized a CDV 700 with headphones, thus correcting ARCA from 1988 exercise. Twenty-six vehicles were monitored and thirty-eight evacuees were repeatedly monitored to maintain a sustained now for a period of one hour and forty-five minutes. The average monitoring time was three minutes. One in five individuals was (simulated) contaminated and seven + vehicles were identified as contaminated (simulated). Controllers dentified contaminated individuds during monitoring and the necessary decontamination - 7 procedures were initiated. Individuals with special needs for sheltering and medication were incorporated into the registration facility, and their needs ]~ attended to by the staff. Transportation to the Congregate Care Centers for those individuals who were transit-dependent was arranged through the Host Community EOC and available. All the above actions were addressed by the staff in a competent manner. The relevant functions and activities of the Manchester RC were implemented in a manner ccmistent with RC Procedures (Section 5, Volume 8, Rev 3 of the NHRERP). Issues: None 96 ( l
',. Objective #22. RELOCATION CENTERS-CONGREGATE CARE. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment and personnel for congregate care of evacuees.
(NUREG-0654/FT31A REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.,10.h) Evaluation: Met Narrative Sutranary: The State of New Hampshire demonstrated that adequacy of facilities, equipment and personnel for congregate care of individuals. The Manchester Chapter of the American Red Cross (ARC) has the responsibility of opemng and maintaining up to thirteen Congregate Care (Mass Care) shelters in the event of an evacuation precipitated by an incident at the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station (SNPS). The Host EOC in Manchester would notify the Chapter's Disaster Director, who would contact the Mass Care Chairperson, who would contact Shelter Managers and staff according to the predesignated staffing assignments and a call-down list. Staft notifications would incluce nursing staff, facility custodians and cafeteria staff. Each facility visited was checked for total capacity, physical accommodations, contact persons and telephone numbers, handicapped accessibility, food and water supplies, and communications. Facility operation included registration of evacuees, feeding operations, nursing capabilities, primary and backup communications systems, additional resources, evacuee orientation information j and Chapter support to shelter operations. Handicapped access in some shelters such as Central High School, Highland /Goffs Falls, was limited by the lack of ramps. The ARC Chapter had written agreements with facilities, additional resource suppli:rs, and other chapters ( for mutual aid), facility floor plans, staffing assignments, notification lists, necessary forms for shelter operation. The Red Cross Disaster Services Regulation and Procedure (ARC 3031) outlines implementing procedures for each function in tr.c centers. Issues: None 97 f l l
.. . - _ - -. .- - -__._ .__. - - -_-.- . - - - .~_ -_- - - ,-
e i Obh<tive #23. MEDICAL SERVICES-TRANSPORTATION. Demonstrate ti.e adequacy of vehicles, equipment, prueedures and personnel for transpor11ag contaminated, ladured 3r exposed ladividuals. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP.1, Rev.1, II, K.3.a. K 5.a. L.4) Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: On August 15, 1990, the State of New Hampshire demonstrated that arrangements have been made to provide adequate vehicles, equipment, procedures, and personnel for transporting an ill or injured patient 1 contaminated with radioactive material.
'!he Lift. Star Ambulance Service Company dernonstrated that its vehicle, equipment, procedures, and perwnnel were ahquate to transpon an ill or injured patient contaminated with radioactive material.
1 The ambulance was proce2 sed through each i,tation at the Newington Staging Area-(a location that simulat?d both the Eocidngham County and the local 1 (Rye NH) Staging Areas). As the ambulance attendants checked in at the staging area, they teceived an ambulance identification number and then proceeded to the dosime'.ry station. The attendants were each issued two direct readir.g dosimeters (0 200mR and 0 20R), a thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) card with a uri .'e T identification number, a dosimeter log sheet, emergency worker instructions F.itten and verbal) for proper use of direct. reading dosimeters K1 tkhlets, and a KI instructions form which was signed by each attendant. Additio: 41 verbal instructions were given regarding the K1 othorization procedure. The ambulance crew received a contamination control kit. While waiting for dispatch, the crew draped the interior of their ambulance and their gurney (stretcher) with the plastic shecting and donned prote tive clothing. Tne crew was briefed as to the set.nario situation, which had the Seabrook station in a GE with a PAD of evaw> for ERPAs A, C D, and G with ER9A F sheltering. All available b" s hao %n assigned to the evacuating communities and imbulances were being um to evacuate nursing / medical facilities. The plume was approximately 8 ml es NE of the station in the vicinity of Rye. Unknown to the patient or stilf of the Webster Health and Retirement Home or the ambulance crew, southwesterly winds had transported a radioactive plume through the area. The ambulance attendants were told to proceed to the Rye, NH Staging Area for further assignment and issued a map for this portion of the trip. Travel time was simulated with the ambulance being held for actual travel time. 98
l ,- At 0805, the Special Vehicle Coordinator informed the Life Star ambulance crew that they were to pick up an elderly woman froni the Webster Health an1 Retirement Home in Rye, NH and transport her to the Dover IVe Mn'4 Facility, a host facility, and issued route maps to Foth facilities aEg oth a l map showing all hospitals within 30 miles of Seabrook station (iri the event the l patient required immediate hospital attention). This reconfirmed the adequate demonstration in this area in se 1989 MS 1 drill, which cleared a related ARCA from the 1988 exercise. The ambulance was then dispatched to the Webster Health and Retirement Home (simulated at the NH IFO). Upon arrival, the ambulance crew escorted the patient to the ambulance and proceeded to the Dover House Health Facility. Upon arrival at the Dover House Health Facility, the patient was being escorted into the building where she fell and injuied herself (simulated). While the ambulance crew was attending to the medical needs of the patient, a monitoring team from the host facility began monitoring the patient and found i her to be contaminated. At this point, the ambulance was also declared to be contaminated and a back up unit was called for (simulated). Once the backup unit arrived (thralated) the decision was made to transport the patient to the Wentworth Douglas Hospital for treatment. The patient was placed upon the gurney and covered (packaged) with a blanket and plastic sheet to confine contamination while transporting the individual to the Hosphal. This completes the ARCA from the 1988 exercise and the 1989 MS 1 drill. The transport to the Hospital and transfer of the patient to the Hosp!tal staff was accomplished satisfactorily. An ARCA from the 1989 MS 1 drill was corrected when the attendant was observed removing shoc covers and gloves in accordance with the ambulance procedures found in Volume 8. Section 9, page 9.0 3 of the NHRERP. hsues: None 99
7 Objective #24. MEDICAL SERVICES-FACILITIES. Demonstrate the adequacy of medical facility's equipment, procedures and personnel for handling contaminated, injured or expowd individaats. (NUREG-084/ FEMA FEP 1, Rev.1,11 L.1) Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: The Wentworth Douglas Hosp!tal participated in a medical service (MS 1) Drill held on August 15, 1990. Wentworth Douglas Itospital located in Dover, New Ilampshire, has facilities in their Emergency Dep.atment (ED) which can be isolated and used to treat and decontaminate an injured patient contaminated with radioactive material and still allow access to and simultaneous use of the ED facility for other tyys of emergencies. The hospital has in place a plan, ' Wentworth Douglas Radiological Emergency Response Plan
- sad implementing procedures for handling an ill or injured patient contamina'.ed with radioactive material. The plan and procedures are reviewed annually and up-dated as required by the Hospital Disaster Committee. The plan and procedures were last reviewed by the committee in .
July 1990. A copy of the plan and procedures were available in the ED. ' There is a required annual review of the Plan and Procedure by the ED staff which allows their input into any plan update. The Hospital Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), a Medical Doctor, and three (3) Nuclear Medicine Technologists were available to the ED to provide contamination monitoring and to make and interpret dose rate measurement. q During the exercise, they performed the monitoring functions ir, a manner that demonstrated knowledge and understanding of radiation terminology and biological effects of radiation. This re-confirms the adequate performance in this area demonstrated in the 1989 MS 1 drill, which cleared a related ARCA from the 1988 exercise. The hospital staff successfully demonstrated their ability to perform proper monitoring techniques. This completes the second ARCA from the 1989 MS-1 drill concerning the ability of the hospital staff to perform the monitoring function. Training is provided by New Ilampshire Yanke,:. Attendance at the in service training was documented by NHY and the hospital. The most recent training session was held in August 1990. Sufficient medical staff members have been trained to provide at least one (1) trained staff member on each shift. 100
Supplies and equipment were in order. Anti-contamination clothing was i available in several sizes and was marked for culck selection. Two (2) GM pancake detectors for monitoring and two (2) compensated GM detectors for dose rate measurements were available. All instruments were operational and calibrated. The supplies and equipment are inventoried and documented on a quarterly schedule by NHY. The latest documented inventory had tan conducted on May 17, 1990. Wentworth Douglas Hospital has telephone communication (land line) capability with four (4) lines through the hospital swi'4. board and one (1) direct line into the ED. Tney are on the llospital Emergency Action Radio (HEAR) net for radio communications with emergency backup power. They can communicate with the ambulance by radio or mobile telephone backup. They also have a facsimile capat lity. Contamination control during the exercise was noteworthy. There was excellent interplay and discussion between the participants. The participknt's professionalism was noteworthy and commendable. Issues: None 101
Objective #25. EMERGENCY WORKER DECONTAh11 NATION. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, procedures and penonnel for decontamination of emergency worken, equipment and vehicles and for waste disposal. (NUREG-0654/FEh1A REF.1, Rev. I, II, K.5.a. K.5.b) Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: The equipment truck arrived at the EWDF (Hillside Junior liigh School) at 1455 hours and the facility was fully setup and operational at 1615 hours. Minor adjustments had to be made to the decontamination layout because the gymnasium was being used that evening at 1800 hours for a school concert. Except for this modification, the layout was as shown in the approved plan. Separate parking areas were designated for contaminated and uncontaminated vehicles. A total of 12 vehicles (5 clean and 7 listed as contaminated) and 12 EW's (4 clean and 8 designated as contaminated) were processed through the facility during the exercise. Proper monitoring techniques for both vehicles and personnel were demonstrated. The lapse time to monitor a vehicle varied from about 3 to 5 minutes and the monitoring time for EW's was about the same. The vehicle monitors located outside the EWDF could not communicate with those inside the EWF with the assigned hand held radios. Fire Department portable radios were subst i tuted satisfactorily. The remainder of the communications including three unlisted commercial telephones functioned properly. The monitoring techniques for both vehicles and EW perwnnel and subsequent decantamination procedures observed were in accordance with the approved plan and procedures. Issues #1: DESCRIPTION: The hand held radios assigned to the vehicle monitors ARFI did not function properly. RECOhiMENDATION: Obtain radios which are powerful enough to provide proper communications capability between staff inside and outside the E%DF. P 102
O Objective #26. SUPPLEMENTARY ASSISTANCE (FEDERAIJOTIIER). Demonstrate the ability to identify the need for and call upon Federal and other outside support agencies' assistance. (NUREG-0654/I'EMA. REP 1, Rev.1,11, A.3, C.I.a. C.1.b, C.1.e, C.4) Evaluation: Met Narrative Sununary: The ability to identify the need for and call upon Federal and other outside support agencies assistance was demonstrated adequately at the NH State EOC. In accordance.with the NHOEM procedures of the NHRERP the order to request assistance was: First to the New England Compact, and, second to Federal agencies, i.e. DOE. Twenty sampling teams, radiation physicists tad clerical staff were requested from the Compact. Federal assistance requested from DOE included field teams, clerical personnel, mobile laboratory and aerial monitoring. The earliest arrival (simulated) of assistance was 2000 on Dec 13,1990 from the New England Compact and extended into the afternoon of the next day for a fixed wing aircraft from DOE. Actions and resources requested to support the assistance organizations were not discussed. Issues: None 4 103
Objective #34. MOBILIZATION OF EMERGENCY PERSONNEL (24 IIOUR, I. CONTINUOUS BASIS). Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing on a continuous 24 hour basis by an actual, shift change. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP 1 Rev.1, II, A.4) Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: Demonstrations related to this objective were conducted out of sequence during 2 Combined Functional Drills (10/27/90 East Kingston, Kingston, Stratham; 11/28/90 Dover, Manchester, Brentwood, and Salem), and during the exercise (12/13/90 New Castle, Rochester, Newton, Portsmouth, Seabrook, Newfields, Exeter, and Greenland). The EPZ communities with the exception of New Castle, Exeter,and Greenland demonstrated the ability to maintain staffing on a continuous 24-hour staffing basis by an actual shift change. When the second shift staff reported in, adequate briefings were conducted. Second shift persor.nel demonstrated adequate knowledge and capability. In accordance with the agreed upon extent of play, the Towns of Exeter and Greenland demonstrated this objective by means of a roster for the second shift key positions. In New Castle, the second shift was staffed with the exception of the position ( of a Selectman, who was identified as a key individual. The decision making responsibilities were assumed by the EMD. The second' shift was properly briefed and demonstrated good knowledge and capability. A shift change was successfully demonstrated in the Host Communities of Dover, Manchester, and Salem. Key incoming personnel were completely briefed by the respective outgoing staff member. Both shifts demonstrated appropriate capability and knowledge of their response roles and functions. A shift chuige was not physic:.lly demonstrated in Rochester due to a "real life" emergency that occurred during the moming regul'ing the commitment of a majority of the emergency response personnel within the town. The shift . change was demonstrated by use of a roster. The small staff was able to perform the EOC operations with each member present performing multiple tasks. However, an actual shift change should be demonstrated at the next exercise. The 1988 exercise ARCA has been cleared for the communities of Brentwood, East Kingston, Kingston, Newton, Newfields, Portsmouth, Seabrook, Stratham and Salem. 104 l. l
.- The 1988 exercise ARCA for the community of New Castle remains incomplete ar.d should be demonstrated during the next exercise. LOCAL EOCs Issue #1: DESCRIPTION: In New Castle, one key staff position (Selectman) was not ARCA filled, as designated by the plan. RECOMMENDATION: The Selectman should be given refresher training to reemphasize his responsibilities in the continuity of emergency operations. 105
_. .. _.__ _ _ . _ _ . _ ___.__-m._ _. _ _ __ _ . _ . . .._.._. .
. l
. I OTHER ISSUES: STATE OF NEW HAMPSIIIRE. .
- Objective 6. Emergency Worker Exposure Control (K.3.a. K.3.b, K.4)
Issue - DESCRIPTION: A CDV-700 survey instrument was used without a plastic cover over the probe, and without headphones at the Brentwood EOC to monitor potentially contaminated visitors to the EOC. RECOMMENDATION: Plans should be changed to reflect the need to use
' headphones and cover the external probe when using the CDV.700 sun'ey instrdment, j Objective 9. Held Radiological Monitoring (H.12, L.10) i i
luue: DESCRIFilON: The field team hand-carried an iodine particulate filter to the laboratory at the IFO for analysis. , RECOMMENDATION: The Monitoring Team Coordinator procedure (Vol. 6, Sect. 9, page 9.05, Step 6) should be clarified to specify that the expedited delivery called for in the procedure should be done by someone other than the field team itself. - 4 Objective 10. Plume Dose Projection (1.10) L Issue: DESCRIPTION: The independent calculational methodologies used in the !- exercise were not documented in the plan. Because expected discrepancies in i comparative results had not been previously identified, delays occurred in use of dose projection data.
- RECOMMENDATION: Revise plan to include' the identity of alternate methodologies so the preestablished biases between their results will be recognized. ;
Objective 13. Alert, Notification and Emergency Information (E.5, E.6, E.7) - Issue: DESCRIPTION: Additional information pertaining to hospitals, nursing homes and special facilities would be helpful in NH EBS messages and news releases. - RECOMMENDATION: Public information should be broadened to include additional information on hospitals, nursing homes and special facilities. 106
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1 O _ , 2.2 NEW ilAhtPS!! IRE YANKEE OITSITE RESPONSE ORGANIZATION ~ Objective #1. E5fERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL. Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and use emergency classification levels (ECL) through the appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to
- ECL's as required by the scenario. 'the four ECLs are: Notification of Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP 1, Rev.1, Supp. I, II, D.3, D.4)
- Evaluation: hiet Narrative Summary: The New Hampshire Yankee Offsite Response Organization (NHY ORO) demonstrated the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs, The ability to
- monitor, receive, understand and use the ECLs was effectively demonstrated throughout the NHY ORO.
)
The ECL status board wu prominently displayed at the ORO EOC for easy t viewing by all members within the operations center. The Offsite Emergency Response Director announced the ECL status at each hourly briefing and upon ' each change over the internal PA syst:m. The understanding and use of ECLs by ORO and New Hampshire Yankee personnel at the Media Center was very 2ood. Notifications of the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency ECLs were promptly received at the ' Media Center via the dedicated telephone link with technical staff at the EOF. ; The ECLs were verified by the ORO Public Information Coordinator with the ORO EOC and by the New Hampshire Yankee Emergency News Manager with the utility's emergency communications center at the EOF. After the ECLs were verified, - they were .promptly posted on the Media Center operations room status board and staff were briefed about the reasons for escalation of the emergency classification. The ECLs were also posted in the
- media working area in a timely manner and they were promptly announced in the media briefingsi The utility's Technical Advisor and supporting staff diligently requested information and followed tip with the EOF to obtain the necessary understanding of plant conditions and rationale behind the escalation of ECLs.
- At %e Joint Telephone Information Center-(JTIC) the news releases and EBS--
messages were reviewed by the Supervisor immediately upon receipt by fat Information was verified by a telephone call- to the media liaison, then 107 u-- 4% - q ,,wm,q-,.* ,g,,-.g,-. ..,.,p.-w,--. -,-y4y.rp g-gy,,,y-,ggr.gw, wy-,,,.,m,y. -- e
authorized for hard copy distribution to the staff. The supervisor then verbally . notified staff of update information and wrote the information on the status board. Hard copy of each release was immediately highlighted by staff and inserted into their workbooks for easy reference during calls. All supervisors, NH OEM, and ORO worked very well together, ne Haverhill Staging Area demonstrated the ability to monitor, understand and use the ECLs to implement the appropriate emergency functions. The Staging Arca leader (SAL) and his staff assistant kept the personnel aware of the ECLs and all changes which occurred. This was done by posting the information on status boards and by frequent briefings. The SAL maintained contact with the Evacuation Support Coordinator at the ORO EOC and was able to keep emergency personnel who had been dispatched to field locations informed of ECLs by radio. Status boards were maintained in the Staging Area Leader's room, main hallway, the liaison room, special vehicle room and the breakdown rooms. Due to the number of boards to be up-dated, the update of these ECL status boards was not always done in a timely manner. Since new staff was constantly entering the Staging Area for assignment, it is important to ensure that current status is posted. However, the Staging Area functioned according to the plan and implementing procedures. De North Andover Reception Center staff showed a clear understanding of the ECLs. The Reception Center Leader promptly announced each ECL as the Reception Center received the information. He also gave the reason why plant conditions caused the movement from one ECL to another. The ECLs were displayed on the status board. The announcement of each ECL was followed by appropriate actions. Such actions included mobilization of the reception center staff, full activation of the center, setting up of monitoring and decontamination stations and registering incoming evacuees, The reception center staff ran a professional operation and fully understood the ECL's. IIAVERIIILL STAGING AREAt issue #1t DESCRII*TIONt ECL's were not always posted in a timely manner. The ARTI Staging Area has several ECL status boards, which must be up-dated. Emergency personnel arrive at the facility throughout the emergency and need current information. However, the staging area functioned according to the plan and implementing procedures. RECOhiMENDATION: The task of posting ECLs should be delegated to more than one staff member and given a high priority. This posting, accompanied by frequent briefmgs, will keep all personnel informed. 108
', Objective #2. MOBILIZATION OF DIERGENCY PERSONNEL. Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility and field based ernergency functions. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP 1, Rev.1, Supp.1, II, E.1, E.2,11.4)
Evaluation: Met . Narrative i Sununary: At 1231, EOC Contact #1 (Security Guard) at the EOC in Newington was !, informed by the Seabrook Station Control Room via the Nuclear Alert System , (NAS) phone, that an ALERT was declared at 1222. Per procedures, at 1234, . the EOC Contact #2 (a second Security Guard) activated the Vehicular Alert Communication System (VACS) to alert and deploy the 16 Vehicular Alert and Notification System (VANS) vehicles. All units responded and were enroute ; to their respective fi^l locations by 1239. EOC Contact #1 loaded and activated the Melita Emergency Telenotification System (METS) at 1234. l
- Responses to Melita paging started within one minute of METS activation.
The NIIY Offsite Response Director called the Melita operator to confirm notification and receive a telephone briefing at 1237. At 1249. EOC Contact
#1 initiated telephone notifications to the 24 hour warning points of the six ,
EPZ towns (FEMA Control Cell). The last return confirmation call was received at 1308. All VANS vehicles reported to acoustical sites and were ' operational within 15 minutes with the exception of SA 3-VL 12 which was operational within 16 minutes. This time is not inconsistent with the times discussed and accepted in ALAB 935. EOC staff personne'. began arriving approximately 30 to 40-minutes after METS activation. The NHY Offsite 3 Response Director arrived at 1255. All key staff leadership were present " before the first EOC staff briefing at 1330. The EOC was activated at 1255 and declared operational at 1336. Activation of the EOC was orderly throughout and in accordance with procedures. Initial notification of the Alert ECL was received by the New Hampshire Yankee Emergency News Manager, via pager, at approximately 1234 The ORO Public Information Coordinator also received his pager notification of the Alert ECL at approximately 1234 The remainder of the staff were notified by either METS personally at or by telephone at their work stations and told to report for duty to the Media Cer.ter. The first responder arrived at the Media Center at approximately 1253. Key utility personnel had arrive ( at the facility by approximately 1317 (i.e., within 47 minutes of the initial notification). The Media Center was activated s.t approximately 1330 with telephones, facsimile and copying machines tested and fully operational. The facility was operational at approximately 1345 with the briefing room and work area set up to accommodate reporters and conduct briefings. A full complement of ORO support staff was available when the ORO Public Information Coordinator and Rumor Control Liaison arrived at about 1348.- 109 3
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The mobiliution of a pert nnel ' call-down' system at the TTIC worked well. . All staff received their notlee within a ten minute period. The plant siren system notified site workers. The Melita system was also available. The telephone call-down used was timely and the telephone numbers were accurate. All workers used Melita System to log their receipt of notification. Upon the Alert ECL being declared by NIIY at 1222, emergency staff were notified to report to the IIaverhill Staging Area OISA) by two methods: (1) individual staff with pagers were notified by pager codes and (2) individuals in utility offices and organizations were contacted by commercial telephone. The HSA was declared operational at 1340. Emergency staff began reporting for duty at 1256. There was a constant influx of staff persons throughout the exercise. Over 200 emergency staff were deployed tc neld and facility assignments from 1405 to 1935 after the declaration of Site Area Emergency at 1401. Emergency staff were still being dispatched from the HSA at the time of exercise termination (i.e.,1935 at liSA). The activation, mobilizations and deployment of emergency staff for the HSA was implemented in a timely, organized and efficient manner that supported the full functioning of the facility in accordance with SPMC and procedures. Notification of offsite response personnel began at 1234. Members of Field Monitoring Team #1 artived at the Haverhill staging facility at 1325. The two team members promptly signed in, obtained their personal dosimeters and checked out their radio and monitoring equipment. By 1340 the team had begun their operational checks on the radio and monitoring equipment. At 1400, the checks were completed, equipment inventoried and the vehicle loaded. The team was then briefed, given monitoring locations and dispatched at 1425. ORO Field Monitoring Team #2 demonstrated the ability to fully alert, mobilize and actiute its members. Both members arrived promptly, received their dosimetry, field monitoring kits and radios and conducted an equipment operational check and supply inventory. The field team was completely operational at 1420 and departed the staging area for their assigned field position at 1425 after a briefing by the dispatcher. In accordance with extent of play agreements, five simulatt.d bus companies were established at the Massachusetts Electric Company propeny in Ikverly, MA. The initial notification came from the ORO Lead Dispatcher to the five dispatch points (simulated bus ya.ds) which were 4taffed with Dispatchers, Dosimetry Record Keepers (DRK), Bus Drivers and Route Guides from the Haverhill Staging Area. I10
. l North Andover Reception Center response personnel were alerted and notified by telephone and pager/bcepers at 1234 and reported to the facility in a timely manner. The facility was activated at 1320 and became operational at 1517.
All relevant functions were implemented in a manner that was consistent with the organization's plans and procedures. Issues: None ! 111 l l l
Objective #3. DIRECTION AND CONTROL. Demonstrate the ability to dirret, ., coordinate and control emergency activities. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP 1, Rev.1, Supp.1, II, A.1.a. A.1.b, A.I.d, A.2.a) Evaluation: Met Narrative i Summary: The NHY Offsite Response Director at the New Hampshire Yankee Offsite j Response Organization EOC demonstrated the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency response activities. The NHY ORO provided notification, mformation and protective action recommendations to the FEMA Control Cell, which simulated the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and local governments within the plume EPZ. All actions requiring govemmental approval were discussed and approval requested from the Oovernor's Representative l (simulated) at the FEMA Control Cell. Only when approval was granted was j the action implemented. Exchange of information and coordination of effort l occurred through regular staff briefings which included participation from the staging area through a telephone conference system. Protective action i decisions were well coordinated with Massachusetts (FEMA Control Cell) and the New Hampshire State EOC. In accordance with the SPMC, the New Hampshire Yankee Emergency News - Manager had administrative responsibility for the Seabrook Media Center. The Emergency News Manager demonstrated excellent direction and coordination of this facility. He coordinated detailed briefings in the operations room prior to the conduct of media briefings. During these discussions, the ORO and New Hampshire spokespersons reviewed information distributed to the public in news releases, which included recommendations that had been issued via EBS messages and actions that were being taken by their organizations. These briefings were well managed and, in a number of cases this - coordination uncovered the need for additional clarifying information which was then requested and obtained from the ORO and New Hampshire State EOCs before media briefings were conducted. The Emergency News Manager also provided excellent management and coordination of the media briefings, assigning the order of presentations and directing questions to the appropriate spokespersons. The emergency information, including message handling within the Media Center, was in accordance with the SPMC, a copy of which was available for reference. The coordination and delivery of emergency information to the media was exceptional, 112
The ORO Media Relations / Rumor Control Supervisor at the JTIC l
- I demonstrated excellent ability to direct, coordinate and control this emergency activity, ne ORO supervisor interacted and coordinated with both the NilY and State of New Hampshire Supervisors, as well as with the rutaor control and media relations assistants. All the supervisors provided backup to each others' area, demonstrating cross training and knowledge of the plans. All staff were briefed quickly and accurately, as necessary, ne Haverhill Staging Area adequately demonstrated the ability to direct,
, coordinate and control emergency activities. The Staging Area I.cader (SAL) coordinated the activities of the NHY ORO einergency management operations i
for Massachusetts communities. De SAL coordinated the activities of over 200 persons who were special vehicle drivers, local EOC liaisons, route guides ) and dispatchers, dosimetry record keepers, traffic support guides and equipment room personnel. As the emergency response personnel signed in, they received dosimetry and moved to their ass!gned location where they received assignments and equipment for their missions. The SAL and his staff dispatched field monitoring teams, traffic guides, route guides and dosimetry record keepers. This was done with a minimum of confusion. The SAL was aware of current personnel levels by checking the sign in sheets periodically. The SAL was in frequent communication with the evacuation support coordinator who was located at the EOC. The SAL and his staff responded well to a traffic impediment which occurred during the exercise, thus correcting une ARCA from the 1988 Exercise. The SAL delegated much of the responsibility of dealing with the traffic impediment to his assistant, but remained involved to the extent that he was temporarily distracted from his primary function of directing the staging area activities. During the exercise the EOC sent a 38 page fax regarding hearing impaired persons. This tied up the only hard copy device in the SAL's administrative area thus preventing access to other hard copy information. Personnel assigned to the staging area continued to sign in even as the exercise terminated at 1935. The command and control of this facility was demonstrated in accordance with the SPMC and procedures. The overall leadership demonstrated by the North a Jover Reception Center Manager and Assistant Manager was outstanding. The Reception Center Managers were very knowledgeable and professional in carrying out their assigned duties. Detailed plans, procedures and checklists were available and utilized. Hourly briefings by the Reception Center Manager kept the staff informed of changes in the ECLs and other appropriate information. A message c;t.ter was effectively staffed and all incoming and outgoing messages were recorded and distributed as required. Evacuees arriving at the Reception Center were kept informed by an intemal message board displaying family information. The organization and detailed procedures resulted in efficient 113
activation, staffing and execution of responsibilities at the Reception Center at - North Andover. i HAVERHILL STAGING AREA: . Issue #1: DESCRIITION: 'lhe Staging Area Leader did not utihre his assistant as ! ARF 1 effectively as he could have. He neglected to delegate some tasks which should be handled by his &asistant. RECOhBfENDATION: _ Procedures should be developed to outline specific tasks which should be assigned to the Staging Area Leader assistant. Coping ' with the traffic impediment is an example of a task which could have been performed by his assistant. Issue #2: DESCRIITION: The receipt of a lengthy fax (38 pages), denied the use of l ARFI the only machine in the Staging Area Leader's administrative area at the HSA. l RECOhnfENDATION: Install a second machine for the Staging Area Leader's administrative area. 5 i i 114
<=r-- t p r .s -eree,- +s,
,. Objective #4 COMMUNICATIONS. Demonstrate ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and Geld personnel. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP 1, Rev.1, Supp.1 II, F.1.a. F.1.b F.1.d, F.1.e, F.2) i Evaluation: Met Narrative Sununaryt Communications at the ORO EOC were under the very capable direction of the Communications Officer. Systems available were adequate for the requirements and traffic load. All systems were tetted upon EOC activation including a silent test of Vehicular Alert and Notification System (VANS) sirens which were determined operable. The type of systems available for use l within the ORO EOC included: 39 commercial telephones, the NAS, ' dedicated ring < lown telephones to the Media Center and to the EBS station, the VANS, McTS, the Massachusetts Governmental Interface Communicator (MAGI), Emergency Radic Network (ERN), ARES, 2 and 6 meter systems, and facsimile transmit / receive machines. The ORO EOC was in contact with Senbrook Station, pr'ncipal Massachusetts State officials and the six EPZ , com'nunities simulated by the FEMA Control Cell, and all principal support staging locations and organizations. Also, communication links for coordination of interstate issues were available between the ORO EOC and the NH EOC. No delays in the ability to communicate were observed. Facsimile machine #3 in the EOC communications room became inoperative and, after attempts at repair failed, was removed without adverse effect on o;wrations. From the time of facility activation, facsimile messages were transmitted and received without difficulty. Throughout, the communications room functioned in an outstanding manner. Each of the approximately 15 communications staff were proficient in their duties. Procedura and checklists were followed by p!L Periodic and comprehensive briefings were held. Of particular note were the exceptional jobs done by the EOC contacts (security guards). They were on duty when the ALERT notification was received and between them expeditiously activated the VANS, METS and other telephonic notifications to the ORO EOC staff and offsite locations. Their responses were efficient and in accordance with prescribed procedures. The communications systems used by the ORO Media Center and New Hampshire Yankee emergency organization were very good. Dedicated ring-down telephones were assigned and used as follows: 1) ORO Public Information Coordinator for communications with the ORO EOC; 2) ORO Rumor Control Liaison for communications with the JTIC; and 3) New Hampshire Yankee Emergency News Manager for communications with the Emergency Communications Center at the EOF. In addition to these primary communications systems, four commercial telephone lines with separate instruments were available as backup in the event that the primary systems 115
,. and resources functioned properly in accordance with the SPMC and procedures. Since there were no obsened breakdowns with the communications resources, there was rio need to use back up systems and resources. The ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel was very capably demonsttuted by ORO Field Teams, ne primary communication method was the portable converticom radio system issued from the Staging Area supply room. In the event of a problem with the radio, the field monitoring kit contains a bag of quarters and the team would then use public pay telephones to communicate. Extremely good radio protocol was followed for all transmissions and all messages received were clear and fully understood. No operational problerrs or ' dead rreas* were encountered at any time. All directives to both teams were received clearly. All Traffic Guides (TG) who were staffing the TCPs had been well briefed, understood what they had to communicate, and how to use their radios. The radios worked well throughout the exercise. All TGs carried telephone numbers to use when calling the Stssing Area in case commercial telephones had to be used as backup. This did not happen, since all radios worked well. All TGs performed communications checks before leaving the Staging Area. Reliable communications between the Haverhill Staging Area and each of the simulated bus company's dispatch points was satisfactorily demonstrated. At the North Andover Reception Center, the primary means of communication was commercial telephone. Radio was utilized as the backup method. Ibth systems were used during the course of the exercise and both functioned properly. Eight telephone lines were available and all were operable. There were no delays or failures observed. The primary point of contact for the Reception Center was the Reception Center Coordinator and/or his Assistant at the ORO EOC at Newington. All messages were sequentially numbered for control purposes and promptly delivered to the appropriate party. Copies of all messages were retained ty the Communications Officer and the Reception Center Manager. The preprinted message forms contained appropriate information as per procedure. Throughout the ORO network all communication systems worked xtreme'y well and no problems were experienced with transmission between fixed facilities and field operations. A backup system has been installed for the EMS radio net and was available. This corrects the 1988 Exercisc ARCA. Juues: None 117
e machines, copiers and an extensive equipment room to support over 200 field personnel. All access to and egress from the HSA was monitored and controlled by security personnel. Each work area was well equipped with a variety of status boards containing ECLs, meteorology, protective actions and information tailored to each major functional area. General maps of plume and ingestion pathway EPZ's, population data and roads were available along with hundreds of specific function maps to support field personnel such as route and traffic guides. The facility and the variety of resources proviM were fully adequate to support all the emergency functions of the IISA, both within the facility and the extensive field anignments. The only observed problem with facility operations was that due to the number of status boards, i they were often not up<iated with ECL changes in a timely manner. The facility and its varied resources were set up and functionai in accordance with j the SPMC plan and procedures. He facilities, equipment and displays at the North Andover Reception Center were adequate for the accomplishment of their mission, i.e., processing , evacuees through registration, monitoring, decontamination, and transportation , to congregate care centers. The layout and flow of evacuee traffic through the facility was excellent and extremely efficient. The areas in whicii evacuees
- waited for transportation accommodated about 320 persons. They would be picked up by buses for transport to a congregate care center. Lighting was adequate for the performance of all assigned responsibilities and a backup power generator was available in the event of a main power loss. Two trailers were custom configured for monitoring and decontamination. One trailer contained 6 monitoring stations and no showers. If a person was found to be contaminated, they were directed to the other trailer, which contained 14 monitoring stations, a sink and showers for both male and female evacuees. '
After being determined to be uncontaminated, evacuees were registered and either continued in their own transportation or waited for buses to be taken to a congregate care center. Status boards were promptly up-dated by the Reception Center Manager as updated information was received. There were status boards showing the event s'atus, school registration, special population registration and an evacuee message board. All components of objective #5 were adequately and properly demonstrated at the facility. 119
1 l l i . I
', Objective #2. MOBILIZATION OF EMERGENCY PERSONNEL. Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobillze and activate persormel for both facility and field based emergency functions. (NUREG 0654/FEhiA. REP 1, Rev.1, Supp.1, II, E.1. E.2, H.4)
Evaluation: Met Narrative I Sununary: At 1231 EOC Contact #1 (Security Guard) at the EOC in Newington was i informed by the Seabrook Station Control Room, via the Nuclear Alen System !! h (NAS) phone, that an ALERT was declared at 1222. Per procedures, at 1234, i' the EOC Contact #2 (a second Security Guard) activated the Vehicular Alert
- Communication System (VACS) to alert and deploy the 16 Vehicular Alert and
[, Notification System (VANS) vehicles. All units responded and were enroute , to their respective field lo:ations by_1239. EOC Contact #1 loaded and i C activated the Melita Emergency Telenotification System (METS) at 1234. Responses to Melita paging started within one minute of METS activation. 4 The 'NHY Offstte Response- Director called the- M@4 operator to confirm notification and receive a telephone briefing at 1137. At 1247, EOC Contact
#1 initiated telephone nodfications to the 24 hour wamtr;g pd.ats of the six EPZ towns -(FEMA Control Cell). The last retm senfirmation call-was received at 1308. All _ VANS vehicles reported to acoustical sites and were operational within 15 minutes with the exception of SA 3-VL 12 which was _
operational witnin 16 minutes. This time is not inconsistent with the times discussed and accepted in ALAB-935. EOC staff personnel began arriving approximately 30 to 40-minutes after METS activation. The NHY Offsite Response Director arrived at 1255. All key staff leadership were present before the first EOC staff briefing at 1330. The EOC was activated at 1255 and declared operational at 1336. Activation of the EOC was orderly throughout and in accordance with procedures. Initial notification of the Alert ECL was received by the New Hampshire Yankee Emergency News Manager, via pager, at approximately 1234 The . ORO Public Information Coordinator also received his pager notification of the Alert ECL at approximately 1234. The reinainder of the staff were riotified by either METS personally at or by telephone at their work stations and told to report for duty to the Media Center. The first responder arrived at the Media
- Center at approximately 1253. Key utility personnel had arrived at the facility by approximately 1317 (i.e., within 47 minutes of the initial notification). The Media Center was activated at approximately 1330 with telephones, facsimile and copying machines tested and fully operational. The facility was operational at approximately 1345 with the briefing room and work area set up
-to accommodate reporters and conduct briefings. A full complement of ORO support staff was available when the ORO Public Information Coordinator and Rumor Control Liaison arrived at about 1348.
i l 109 l
The mobilization of a personnel
- call down' system at the TriC worked well. .
All staff received their notice within a ten minute period. The plant siren system notified site workers. De Melita system was also available. The telephone call down used was timely and the telephone numbers were accurate. All workers used Melita System to log their receipt of notification. Upon the Alert ECL being declared by NHY at 1222, ernergency staff were notified to report to the Haverhill Staging Area (HSA) by two methods: (1) individual staff with pagers were notified by pager codes and (2) indhiduals in utility offices and organizations were contacted by commercial telephone. The HFA was declared operational at 1340. Emergency staff began reporting for duty at 1256. There was a constant influx of staff persons throughout the exercise. Over 200 emergency staff were deployed to field and facility assignments from 1405 to 1935 after the declaration of Site Area Emergency at 1401. Emergency s:-Jf were still being dispatched from the HSA at die dme of exercise termination (i.e.,1935 at HSA). The activation, mobilizations and deployment of emergency staff for the HSA was implemented in a timely, organized and efficient manner that supported the full functioning of the facility in accordance with SPMC and procedures. Notification of offsite response personnel began at 1234. Members of Field Monitoring Team #1 arrived at the Haverhill staging facility at 1325. The two team members promptly signed in, obtained their personal dosimeters and checked out their radio and n:onitoring equipment. By 1340 die team had begun their operational checks on the radio and monitoring equipment. At 1400, the checks were completed, equipment inventoried and the vehicle loaded. The team was then briefed, given monitoring locations and dispatched at 1425. ORO Field Monitoring Team #2 demonstrated the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate its members. Both members arrived promptly, received their dosimetry, field monitoring kits and radios and conducted an equipment operational check and supply inventory, ne field team was completely opentional at 1420 and departed the staging area for their assigned field position at 1425 after a briefing by the dispatcher. In accordance with extent of play agreements, five simulated bus companies were established at the Massachusetts Electric Company property in Beverly, MA. The initial notification came from the ORO Lead Dispatcher to the five dispatch points (simulated bus yards) which were staffed with Dispatchers, Dosimetry Record Keepers (DRK), Bus Drivers and Route Guides from the Haverhill Staging Area. I10
. . _.~...--_. - _ _ - _ . . . _ . _
0 North Andover Reception Center response personnel were alerted and notified by telephone and pager/ beepers at 1234 and reported to the facility in a timely manner. The facility was activated at 1220 and became operational at 1517. ' All relevant functions were implemented in a manner that was consistent with the orgardzation's plans and procedures. Issues: None I 111
Objeese #3. DIRECTION AND CONTROL. Demonstrate the ability to dirret. , coordinate and control emergency activities. (NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP.1, Rev.1 Supp.1, H A.1.a. A.1.b, A.I.d, A.2.a) Evaluati mt Met Narrative Summary: The NHY Offsite Response Director at the New Hampshire Yankee Offsite Response Organization EOC demonstrated the ability to direc', coordinate and cortrol emergency response ketivities. The NHY ORO provided notification, information and protective action recommendations to the FEMA Control Cell, which simulated the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and local gosernment-within the plume EPZ. All actions requiring governmental approval were
)
discussed and approval requested from the Oovemor's Representative (simulated) at the FEMA Control Cell. Only when approval was granted was - the aedon implemented. Dchange of information and coordination of effort k occurred through regular staff briefings which included participation from the staging area through a telephone conference system. Protective action decisions were well coordlaated with Massachusetts (FEMA Contrc1 Cell) and the New Hampshire State EOC. In accordance with the SPMC, the New Hampshim Yankee Emergency News - Manager had administative responsibility for the Seabrook Media Center. The Emergency News Manager demonstrated excellent direction end coordination of this facility. He coordinated detailed briefings in the operations room prior to the conduct of media briefings. During these discussions, the ORO and New Hampshire spokespersons reviewed information di:.tributed to the public in news releases, which included recommendations that had been issued via EBS messages and actions that were being taken by their organizations. These briefings were well managed and, in a number of cases this coordination uncovered the need for additional clarifying information which was then requested and obtained from the CRO and New Hampshire State EOCs before media briefings were conducted. The Emergency News Manager also provided excellent manat,ement and coordination of the media briefings, assigning the order of presentations and directing questions to the appropriate spokespersons. The emergency information, including message handling within the Media Center, was in accordance with the SPMC, a copy of which was available for reference. The coordination and delivery of emergency information to the media was exceptional, 112 i
4 De ORO Media Relations / Rumor Control Supervisor at the JTIC demonstrated excellent ability to direct, coordinate and control this emerg,ency retivity. The ORO supervisor interacted and coordinated with both the NHY and State of New Hampshire Supervisors, as well as with the rumor control and media relations assistants. All the supervisors provided backup to each ' others' area, demonstrating cross training and knowledge of the plans. All staff were briefed quickly and accurately, as necasary. The Haverhill Staging Area adequately demonstrated the ability to direct, coordinate and control emergency activities. The Staging Area leader (3AL) coordinated the activities of the NHY ORO emergency management operations for Massachusetts communities. The SAL coordinated the activities of over 200 persons who were special vehicle drivers, local EOC liaisons, route guides and dispatchers, dosimetry record keepers, trafnc support guides and equipment .oom personnel. As the emergency response personnel signed in, they received dosimetry and moved to their assigned location where they received assignments and equipment for their missions. The SAL and his staff dispatched field monitoring teams, trafnc guides, route guidw and dosimetry record keepers. This was done with a minimum of confusion. The SAL was aware of current personnel levels by checking the sign in sheets periodically, he SAL was in frequent communication with the evacuation support coordinator who was located at the EOC. The SAL and his staff responded well to a traffic impediment which occurred during the exercise, thus correcting the ARCA from the 1988 Exercise. The SAL delegated much of the responsibility of dealing with the traffic impediment to his assistant, but remained involved to the extent that he was temporarily distracted from his primary function of directing the staging area activities. Dunng the exercise the EOC wnt a 38 page fax regarding hearing impaired persons. This tied up the only hard copy device in the SAL's administrative area thus preventing access to other hard copy information. Personnel assigned to the staging area continued to sign in even as the exercise terminated at 1935. The command and control of this facility was demonstrated in accordance with the SPMC and procedures. The overall leadcrship demonstrated by the North Andover Reception Center Manager and Assistant Manager was outstanding. The Reception Center Managers were very knowledgeable and professional in carrying out their assigned duties. Detailed plans, procedures and checklists were available and utilized. Hourly briefings by the Reception Center Manager kept the staff informed of changes in the ECLs and other appropdate information. A message center was effectively staffed and all incoming and outgoing messages were recorded and distributed as required. Evacuees arriving at the Reception Center were kept informed by an internal message board displaying family information. The organization and detailed procedures resulted in efficient 113
activation, staffing and execution of responsibilities at the Reception Center at - l North Andover. HAVERHILL STAGING AREA: , Issue #1: DESCRIMION: '!he Staging Area 1cader did not utilize his assistant as ARFI effectively as he could have. He neglected to delegate some tasks which - should be handled by his assistant. ; RECOhthfENDATION: Procedures should be developed to outline specific tasks which should be assigned to the Staging Area I.cader assistant. Coping with the traffic impediment is an example of a task which could have been performed by his assistant. t Issue #2: DESCRINION: The receip: of a lengthy fax (38 pages), denied the use of ARFI the only machine in the Staging Area 1.cader's administrative area at the 11SA. Install a second machine for the Staging Area RECOhBIENDATION: Leader's administrative area. , t i I ii . . t i 114 f
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,. Objective #4. COhiMUNICATIONS. Demonstrate sbility to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP.1, Rev.1, Supp.1, II, F.1.a. F.1.b, F.1.d F.1.e, F.2) 3 Evaluation Met i Narrative Summary: Communications at the ORO EOC were under the very capable direction of ,
the Communications Officer. Systems available were adequate for the , requirements and traffic load. All systems were tested upon EOC activation including a silent test of Vehicular Alert _and Notification System (VANS) sirens which were determined operable. The type of systems available for use within the ORO EOC included: 39 commercial telephones, the NAS, dedicated ring down telephones to the Media Center and to the EBS station, the VANS, METS, the Massachusetts Governmental Interface Communicator (MAGI), Emergency Radio Network (ERN', ARES, 2 and 6 meter systems, and facsimile transmit / receive machines. The ORO EOC was in contact with Seabrook Station, principal Massachusetts State officials and the six EPZ communities simulated by the FEMA Control Cell, and all principal support staging locations and organizations. Also, communication links for coordination of interstate issues were available between the ORO EOC and the NH EOC. No delays in the ability to c. umunicate were observed. Facsimile machine #3 in the EOC communications room became inoperative and, after attempts at repair failed, was removed without adverse effect on operations. From the time of facility activation, facsimile messages were transmitted and received without difficulty. Throughout, the communications room functioned in an outstanding manner. Each of the approximately 15 communications staff were proficient in their duties. Procedures and checklists were followed by all. Periodic and comprehensive briefings were held. Of particular note were the exceptional jobs done by the EOC contacts (security guards). They were on . duty when the ALERT notification was received and between them l expeditiously activated the VANt,, METS and other telephonic notifications to the ORO EOC staff and offsite locations. Their responses were efficient and
!n accordance with prescribed procedures.
The communications systems used by the ORO Media Center and New Hampshire Yankee emergency organization were very good. Dedicated ring-down telephones were assigned and used as follows: 1) ORO Public Inlarmation Coordinator for communications with the ORO EOC; 2) ORO Rumor Control Liaison for communica'kns with the JTIC; and 3) New Hampshire Yankee Emergency News Manager for communications with the Emergency Communications Center at the EOF In addition to these primary i communications systems, four commercial alephone lines with separate instruments were available as backup in the event that the primary systems 115 4
bmke down. No failure of the primary ringdown telephones occurred during , , the exercise and these commercial lines were used as needed to contact locations other than those on primary systems or when the ringdown telephones were in use. A separate room is provided for an extensive array of administrative support equipment and supplies, including five facsimile rnachines and two copiers. In addition, a dedicated facsimile machine was provided for the ORO spokespersons in the Public Information working areas. A facsimile machine was assigned and used as a hard copy link between the ORO EOC and the Media Center. A personal computer equipped with a modem and the necessary communications software was available and demonstrated for communications with the utility's emergency communications system. It is used as backup for the receipt of EBS messages and news releases in the event that direct facsimile communications are lost with the EOC. Communications between the Media Center and the ORO EOC and the EOF were very good. On one occasion information was needed by the ORO Public Inforrnation Coordinator regarding protective actions taken for special facilities. Once the need for this information was identified rd requeswd by the ORO Public Information Coordinator, the information was communicated back to the Media Center within 5-minutes. The timely communication of requests for and response with !.. formation from both the ORO EOC and the EOF were demonstrated in re:.p'ase to a number of requests for information. All of this equipment functioned efficiently and no breakduns were observed. All communications systems worked well at the JTIC. All contacts were accomplished without del.v and the quality was excellent. The breakout of communications for the JRO is as follows: 2 incoming lines to rumor contiol; 2 incoming lines to media relations; I commercial line at the fax desk to verify copy; I commercial line for the ORO supervisor; I direct line to ORO Media Liaison; and 3 incoming lines for the dissemination of recorded messages. The Haverhill Staging Area facility was equipped with a variety of communications resources to support its many emergency functions. These communications systems included the following: 1) commercial telephone with Mple lines; 2) Emergency Radio System (ERS) with 10 channels for umunication with all field units; 3) Emergency Medical Systems (EMS) for communication with ambulances and hospitals; 4) individual pagers with the ability to receive coded messages from NHY ORO; 5) tone alert radio to monitor EBS broadcasts; 6) facsimile machines for receiving and uansmining fax messaSes; and 7) a Telecommunication Device for the Deaf (TDD). These communications systems enabled the HSA staff to communicate with the NHY ORO EOC, ORO 1.ocal EOC Liaisons (at the FEMA Contrul Cell), transportation providers and over 200 personne deployed to a variety of field assignments such as route and traffic guides. These communications systems 116
,. cnd resources functioned properly in accordance with the SPMC and procedures. Since there were no observed breakdowns with the communications resources, there was no need to use back up systems and resources. The ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, orgarilzations and field personnel was very capably demonstrated by ORO Field Teams. The primary communication method was the portable converticom radio system issued from the Staging Area supply room. In the event of a problem with the radio, the field monitonng kit contains o bag of quarters and the team would then use public pay telephones to communicate. Extremely good radio protocol was followed for all transminions and all messages received were clear knd fully understood. No operadonal problems or
- dead areas" were encountered at any time, All directives to both teams were received clearly.
All Traffic Guides (TG) who were staffing the TCPs had been well briefed, understood what they had to communicate, and how to use their radios. The rrdios worked well throughout the exercise. All TGs carried telephone numbers to use when calling the Staging Area in case commercial telephones had to be used as backup. This did not happen, since all radios worked well. All TGs performed communications checks before leaving the Staging Area. Reliable communications between the Haverhill Staging Area and each of the simulated bus company's dispatch points was satisfactorily demonstrated. At the North Andover Reception Center, the primary means of communication was commercial telephone. Radio was utilized as the backup method. Both systems were used during the course of the exercise and both functioned properly. Eight telephone lines were available and all were operable. There were no delays or failures observed. The primary point of contact for the Reception Center was the Reception Center Coordinator and/or his Assistant at the ORO EOC at Newington. All messages were sequentially numberut for control purposes and promptly delivered to the appropris.te party. Copies of all messages were retained by the Communications Officer and the Reception Center Manager. The preprinted message forms contained appropriate infor nation as per procedure. Throughout the ORO network all communication systems worked extremely well and no problems were experienced with transmission between fixed facilities and field operations. A backup system has been installed for the EMS radio net v4 was available. This corrects the 1988 Exercise ARCA. Issues: None 117
)
Objective #5. FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT AND DISPLAYS. Demonstrate the - i adequacy of facilities, equipment, disphys and other materials to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, Supp.1, II, H.3) i Evaluation: Met NarMive Summary: Facilit.a mipment and displays were more than adequhte at the NHY ORO EOC. Toe physical surroundings provided ample space, lighting and furnishings for the EOC staff to perform their duties. Access to the facility was controlled by security guards posted at the entrance to the building. Guards used an access list to control access to the facility. Maps and status boards identified plume EPZ, evacuation routes, EPZ populations, reception centers, radiological monitoring points, ingettion pathway EPZ, ECLs, PARS and weather data. The displays were located in strategic locations and of ample size for viewing by the EOC staff. The ORO Media Center at ic Newington Town Hall is an excellent facility providing adequate space for briefings and separate working areas for PIO's and news media representatives. The facility was access controlled. The Media Centra was also equipped with an elaborate array of charts, maps, displays an6 status boards which were effectively posted and utilized in the . briefing room and in the working areas for the news media and PIO's. This corrects an ARCA from the 1988 exercise. The status boards were up-dated in a timely fashion. Separate maps depicting the EPZ communities and the reception centers were utilized during biiefings. This presented an awkward situation for the briefer who was required to constantly point from one map to the other in demonstrating the respective receptim centers for the evacuated communities. The JTIC is an excellent facility with good working area for staff. High space dividers, utilized in the telephone area for a closed room effect for the telephones, cut down on the noise and the " frantic atmospherc" of most call-in operations. All status boards were up-dated quickly by supervisor, and administrative staff. The staff maintained individual workbooks with all news releases, plans and standard reference information. Maps and other EPZ planning information were also in each workbook. Each staff member was promptly given copies of all releases which they read, highlighted and put in notebooks for quick reference. The Haverhill Staging Area contained extensive resources to fully support the emergency functions of the facility including the following: space, breakout rooms for each major emergency function, emergency worker monitoring and decontamination trailer, lighting, ventilation, rest rooms, typewriters, fax 118
. . - - , , , ~ _
,,. , , . - - ~ ,- - ,
,. machines, copiers and an extensive equipment room to support over 200 tield personnel. All access to and egress from the HSA was monitored and controlled by security personnel. Each work area was well equipped with a variety of status boards containing ECIA, meteorology, protective actions and information tailored to each major functional area. General maps of plume and ingestion pathway EPZ's, population data and roads were available along with hundreds of specific function maps to support field personnel such as route and traffic guides. The facility and the variety of resources provided were fully adequate to support all the emergency functions of the HSA, both
- within the facility and the extensive field assignments. The only observed problem with facility operations was that due to the number of status boards, they were often not up-dated with ECL changes in a timely manner. The s facility and its varied resources were set up and functional in accordance with the SPMC plan and procedures.
The facilities, equipment and displays at the North Andover Reception Center were adequate for the accomplishment of their mission, i.e., processing evacuees through registration, monitoring, decontamination, and transportation to congregate care centers. The layout and flow of evacuee traffic through the i facility was excellent and extremely efficient. The areas ir, which evacuees waited for transportation accommodated about 320 persons. They would be picked up by buses for transport to a congregate care center. Lighting was adequate for the performance of all assigned responsibilities and a backup power generator was available in the event of a main power loss. Two trailers were custom configured for monitoring and decontamination. One trailer contained 6 monitoring stations and no showers. If a person was found to be contaminated, they were directed to the other trailer, which contained 14 monitoring stations, a sink and showers for both male and female evacuees. After being determined to be uncontaminated, evacuees were registered and either continued in their own tr:nsportation or waited for buses to be taken to a congregate care center. Status boards were promptly up-datea by the Reception Center Manager as updated information was received. There were status boards showing the event status, school registration, special population registration -d an evacuee message board. All coinponents of objective #5 were ade u *e. snd properly demonstrated at the facility. 119 I
MEDIA CENT'R ORO: Issue #12- DESCRIFFION: - Separate maps depicting EPZ communities and ARFI reception center locations citated an awkward situation for briefers to demonstrate the appropriate reception centers for evacuated communities. RECOMMENDATION: Provide a single composite map -- of EPZ communities and reception centers, perhaps copying the colored coded maps currently utilized in the emergency informadon calendars. 120
0 ,- Objective #6. EMERGENCY WORKER-EXPOSURE CONTROL. Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. (NUREG-0654/1%1A-REP-1, Rev.1, Supp.1, D, K.3.a. K.3.b, K.4) Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: The ability to continuously monitor _ and control emergency worker exposure was demonstrated at the ORO EOC by the Radiological Health Advisor and the Accident Assessment Coordinator. Dosimetry readings from the ORO field monitoring teams were reported to the Accident Assessment Coordinator in the ORO dose assessment area. The Radiological Health Advisor, in accordance with his procedures, maintained contact with the Exposure Control Coordinator and evaluated the reported emergency worker exposures. The IR exposure limit, which requires authorization to be exceeded, was not reached by emergency workers (EW). The Radiological Health Advisor monitored the need to tuthorize exposures in excess of SR and no emergency worker exposures approached this SR limit. Emergency worker dosimetry is not issued at the ORO EOC. Each Vehicular Alert and Notification Systems (VANS) driver had one TLD and two direct reading dosimeters, one 0-200mR and one 0-20R, All knew the TLD must be turned in as the Haverhill Staging Area upon their_ arrival there, at the end of their shift or when they reached their mission level, to be read professionally. Each. VANS Staging Area had a charger for zeroing and charging the self-reading dosimeters. Each is zeroed at tne beginn'ng of every shift change. Exposure record sheets were kept by each driver and they were aware of the need to read and record levels every 15-minutes. The VANS drivers have their dosimeny in their possession at all times, not just in-the event of an accident at the plant. Each driver is familiar with its use. Each of the 16 drivers knew they must report dosimeter readings of 175mR on their 0-200mR and/or 1R on their 0-20R dosimeter, to the ORO EOC as soon as they - are reached. VANS drivers were aware this was their authorized mission level. - Two dosimeters at VANS SA6 could not be zeroed. All emergency workers reporting to the Haverhill Staging Area received dosimetry and (simulated) KI immediately after signing in. The dosimetry consisted of a TLD and two direct reading dosimeters (DRD). One was for 0-
~
20R and one for 0-200mR. Ten record keepers zeroed the DRD's and distributed instruction sheets explaining their use and mission check points. Female responders were given, or briefed on, Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Regulatory Guide 8.13 which explains risk to unborn children. Females known to be pregnant were assigned tasks not involving potential exposure to radiation. The EWs were also issued an exposure record sheet on 121
which readings could be recorded. It was the responsibility of each EW to . track his or her exposure and record any readings on this form. The 0-20R dosimeter and TLD meet FEMA minimum recommendation for dosimetry. As indicated above, they also had an appropriate instruction sheet on the use of dosimeters, frequency of readings and requirement for reporting of any readings. The dosimeters were also read and any exposure recorded by Dosimetry Record Keepers (DRK) at the EWF when the emergency workers returned from their assignments. Whenever the 0200mR dosimeter reached 175mR the EW reported to his supervisor and received authorization to proceed or await instnictions. When the dosimeter reached a 1R reading EWs required permission to continue the mission not to exceed SR and so forth at SR intervals not to exceed 25R. In lifesaving missions the RHA at the ORO EOC could authorize up to 75R in accordance with EPA criteria. The EWs had this information on their instruction sheets and had been trained to observe these regulations for emergency worker exposure control and to contact their supervisor by radio if higher exposures were experienced. All relevant functions and activities were conducted in accordance with the Staging Area IP 2.8. The ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure control was demonstrated by the two ORO Field Teams. The teams were issued their complete dosimetry kits and instructions at the Staging Area. The kits contained 2 dosimeters (0 200mR and 0 20R), TLD, plastic neck chain
)
and record keeping forms (containing instructions and limits). Team #2 members knew authorized exposure limits, who to contact and what to do in the event this exposure limit was exceeded. Team #1 members did not know what exposure was authorized for the mission, but stated that the coordinators at the EOF were responsible for the control of exposure. All team members read their dosimeters every 15 minutes and reported information as necessary to the Offsite Radiological Assessment Room at the ORO EOC. Instructions - posted at the Staging Area, and reiteratu! in the briefing, required teams to report in when their dosimeters approached 175mR (on the 0-200mR dosimeter) and 1R (on the 0-20R dosimeter). Additional instructions contained on Field Monitoring Team badges required team members to call in at SR and 10R. Workers were very knowledgeable about exposure control procedures and pmetices. All fifty-one Traffic Guides (TG) reflected 'a good working knowledge of dosimetry procedures and followed guidelines for 15-minute readings. One TG did not know correct radiation reporting limitations and another did not know of the requirement to note on the log the ingestion of 13. 122
l 3 j- The ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker (EW)
- exposure was _ demonstrated at the simulated bus yards. Dosimetry consisting _
of one TLD and two: DRDs (0-200mR- & 0 20R), were issued by trained personnel to all bus drivers, route guides, dispatchers and exposure control
- technicians. The EW dose record form was filled out by each- EW with instructions from the technician. A copy of the dosimetry instructions from -
the implementing procedures was used as a check list and given to each EW. All: ne-ry radiation health and dosimetry information, including KI procedures, was communicated to EWs. One DRD issued could not be zerced. It was replaced and the off scale dosimeter _was processed using the
" lost, damaged, off-scalc dosimeter. report" by the Dosimetry Technician. All bus drivers and route guides read their dosimeters and recorded readings every 15-minutes. This corrects the ARCA from the 1988 exercise.
The Emergt .cy LWorker Facility (EWF) at North Andover was ccmpletely_ staffed in an organized and efficient -manner. Th- + cnce of personal
' dosimetry to the - individuals responsible for i monitoring and decontamination was done by the DRKs- acci.1 we implementing procedures. Each worker was issued a TLD and a y > with a range of 0-200 mR which had been zeroed. Oral instructions were given to place the TLD crystal side out and adjacent to the DRD. In addition to oral instructions, each -
worker received three pages of dosimetry instructions. Female workers were questioned about their pregnancy status and given the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
- Commission Regulatory Guide 8.13 concerning prenatal exposure, Females known to be pregnant were assigned tasks not involving potential exposure to radiation.-~ All EW monitoring and decontamination workers had group leaders that continuously called for the reading of DRD's at fifteen minute intervals.
VEIIICULAR ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEAIS (VANS): Issue #1: DISCRIITION: _ Record keeping was somewhat lax in one VANS Staging
~ ARFI Area. Two dosimeters could not be zeroed and no entry was made showing
- the initial reading.
RECOMMENDATION: When dosimetry- cannot be zeroed, the initial readings should be recorded. This should be emphasized in training sessions. 123
FIELD MONITORING TEAMS: Issue #2:- DESCRIPTION: One Team did not know tF- authorized exposure for the ARFI mission, although it is included on an instruction sheet prosided to the team. RECOMMENDATION: 24riefingt conducted by the Field Team Coordinator should emphasize mir-it 3 *irc's. prior to FMT dispatch. TCP TRAFFi Issue #3: DESCRP' f' .< . ft. "' tides were weak or unsure of the ARFI procedurt -r.
.adings and the acceptable radiation limits fo. ....,, .
RECOhiM . I- 0 Tut. .,- . . .etraining should emphasize acceptable mdiation o q.- ,s 4 . ., Lt.g procedures. l l i 124 l l
c Objective #7: FIELD RADIOLOGICAL h10NITORING-Ah1BIENT RADIATION MONITORING. Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for determining field radiation measurements. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1, Supp.1, II, I.8, I.11) , Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: Field Monitoring team #1 was equipped with a beta / gamma survey instrument and a high range gamma instrument. The meters and probes used by the team were the ones called for by the plan. The team received a scaled monitoring kit at the Haverhill Staging Area and checked the equipment's operation and batteries before being dispatched. If equipment did not respond properly spares were available at the Staging Area. While performing the operation. checks, the team checked calibration stickers in order to be sure the equipment was within the calibration period. The team was knowledgeable about survey procedures and demonstrated adequate training when taking waist and ground level readings with the beta / gamma survey instrument. The team was able to arrive at all their monitonng locations promptly, take measurements and transmit the data in a timely, concise manner. The Field Team did not enclose their meters or probes in plastic bags as required by Section 4, page 420, FEMA REP-2, Rev. 2, June 1990. When asked about this, the team stated that the enclosure in plastic was not a part of the plan, and they could decontaminate the instruments if they did become contaminated. ORO Field Team #2, after arrival at the Staging Area, also received their scaled field kits containing their supplies, radios and instruments. The two survey instruments (RO-2A and E-140N) and air sampler were all operationally checked quickly outside at the rear supply room door. All instrurnents had been recently calibrated and bore a sticker with dates of calibration. After receiving their map book, briefing and completing a radio check, the team embarked (1425) for their assigned field location and began their traverse for plume location. This ORO Field Monitoring Team displayed all correct measurement techniques and radioed their field readings frequently, as required. This field team was very knowledgeable about all aspects of field radiation measurement and instrument handling. Other DESCRIPTION: Field Teams did not enclose the monitoring probes in Issue: plastic as required by FEMA REP 2, Rev. 2, dated June 12, 1990. RECOMMENDATION: IP 2.3 of the SPMC should be changed to instruct field team members to enclose the monitoring probe in plastic. 125
4
. 1 Objective #8. FIELD RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AIRBORNE IODINE .
MONITORING. Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for the measurement of airborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 10^7 (.0000001) microcuries per cc in the presence of noble gases. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev.1, Supp.1, II, I.8, I.9) Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: ORO Field Team #1 was equipped with a low volume air sampler which was powered from their vehicle's 12-volt electrical system. The air samplers were recently calibrated and the team demonstrated the ability to calcula*e the proper sampling time to draw the 20 cu. ft. air sample required by the plan. The monitoring equipment kit contained two sealed bags, each containing 12 silver zeolite cartridges, During the exercise charcoal canisters were used. The team members demonstrated their ability to properly load the particulate filter and cartridge and to draw an air sample. After collection of the sample, the team demonstrated their ability to field count both the filter and cartridge with fixed geometry using the calibrated E-140N with HP-210 probe. The team was aware of the necessity of leaving the plume area in order to count the samples. Once the samples were counted, they were placed in plastic bags, scaled and the bags were identified per instructions in the plan. When this process was completed the team radioed the results to the EOF promptly and asked for further instructions. ORO Field Team #2 demonstrated their ability to obtain airtome iodine samples. At the Staging Area, the Field Team received and checked out on their vedcle's 12-volt electrical system, a recently calibrated air sampling unit. Silver zeolite cartridges were available in the kit but charcoal canisters were used for the exercise. The team members demonstrated the ability to properly load the particulate filter and cartridge and draw an air sample. The field team counted the filter and cartridge using a fitxed geometry with the E-140N and HP 210 probe. This was counted in a low background area and no counts above background were obtained. After counting, the samples were placed in a plastic bag, sealed and marked as required. The results then were radioed to the EOF. This field team was very proficient in all aspects of airborne iodine collection procedures and techniques. Issues: None l l l 126 . I l
.- Objective #9. FIELD RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING-PAltTICULATE ACTIVITY.
s Demonstrate the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity in the airborne plume and promptly perform laboratory analyses. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, Supp. 1, 11, 11.12, I.10) Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: ORO Field Team #1, after drawing an air sample, was requested to meet with a runner who would bring the samples to the mobile laboratory located at the EOF in Newington, NH. Arrangements were made by the Field Team Coordinator at the EOF to have a runner leave from the Haverhill Staging Area and pick up the sample at a rendezvous point in Amesbury, MA. The Field Team arrived first and waited about 24-minutes for the runner. The runner arrived and was given the sample to transport to Newington. The total clapsed time from the collection of the sample until pickup was 40-minutes. ORO Field Team #2 demonstrated the ability to collect samples of particulate activity. The Field Team took one air sample as directed by the Field Team Coordinator. According to extent of play only one sample (field team 1) was raken back to the laboratory. Therefore, no sample was sent via runner to the lai> oratory for analysis. The acquired sample was bagged and tagged properly as if an actual transfer would be made. The Field Team was very capable and knowledgeable about proper field collection techniques and procedures. The sample was taken to Yankee Atomic Mobile Laboratory at the EOF. The sample was logged into the receiving area, surveyed, and taken to the counting area. Procedures and equipment were available for counting the sample media, lssues: None 127
Objective #10. PLUME DOSE ASSESSMENT. Demonstrate the ability, within the - plume exposure pathway, to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data. (NUREG-0654/FEhiA REP-1, Rev.1, Supp.1, II, I.10) Evaluation: - hiet Narrative Summary: The ability to project dosage to the public via the plume exposure pathway was demonstrated by the ORO EOC dose assessment group, All members of the dose assessment group, i.e., Radiological Health Advisor, Accident Assessment Coordinator, Field Team Coordinator and Dose Assessment Technician, were extremely well' trained and did not deviate from their procedures. The primary dose projection system is the NHY METPAC dose projection system. The Utility (NHY) was very responsive to the ORO dose assessment requests for specific "what if" calculations. Dose projecdons were made t,oth predictively (prior to any release) and after a release occurred. METPAC results were promptly shared with New Hampshire and ORO personnel. The ORO backup dose projection system is an HP-41CX programmable calculator. This backup system was available and was demonstrated. The METPAC dose projections were updated at 15-minute intervals, or at each change in plant conditions or when meteorolopeal
- conditions changed. Responders were aware of, and considered predicted wind shifts. When field monitoring data became available, the field measurements were compared to the METPAC exposure rate projections. Air sample data was also input into METPAC and the dose projections were compared to dose projections which were based on in-plant monitor data.
The ORO Field Team Coordinator gave an excellent demonstration of managing the ORO Field Monitoring Teams to define the plume boundaries and to obtain field measurements which could be used to verify the METPAC dose projections. Field Monitoring Teams were dispatched and in place well before a release occurred. When the release occurred the teams were quickly able to identify and define the plume. The Field Team Coordinator was well informed on traffic impediments and determined appropriate routes to be used by the sample couriers which would keep them from being exposed to the plume. Issues: None l 128 i
. Objective k'1. PLUhiE ROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION hiAKING. Demonstrate the ability b mnke apprey< tate protective action decisions, based on projected or actual dMagt, EPA PAG's; sva" ability of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates and other relevant facton. (NLREG-0654/FEh1A REP-1, Rev.1, Supp.1, II, J.9, J.10.m)
Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: The NHY ORO demor.stmted the ability to make appropriate protective action decisioas. The ORO Offsite Response Director, making use of his advisors, the Radiological Health Advisor, the Accident Assessment Coordinator, the Technical Advisor and the Assistant Offsite Response Director for Response Implementation, demonstrated the ability to make appropriate protective action decisions. The protective actions were based upon ORO Procedure IP 2.5, which incorporates the correct EPA PAGs which were compared to projected doses. The ORO decision group worked closely with the utility and considered the utility PAR's during the decision making process. Preplanned PARS such as a marine control zone, 5 miles and later 10-miles were implemented by the U.S. Coast Guard (simulated). Due to accident timing, preplanned PARS for populations, such as schools, were limited to prohibiting after =chool activities. The decision to evacuate the six EPZ towns was made at 1620 (Governor's Representative concurrence) and the associated emergency broadcast of the protective action decision was made at 1635. All protective action decisions were made in accordance with the ORO plan and procedures. All NHY ORO recommendations' were coordinated with State officials (simulated by the FEMA Control Cell) and were not considered decisions until receiving approval. Issues: None 129
Objective #12. ALERT, NOTIFICATION AND EMERGENCY INFORMATION - INITIAL ALERT AND NOTIFICATION. Demonstrate the ability to initially aled the public within the 10 mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instivctional message within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate State and/or local offletal(s). (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev.1, Supp.1, II, E.3, E.4, E.5, E.8, J.10.e) Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: The initial alert and notification within the 10-mile EPZ was accomplished by NHY ORO using VANS and EBS. The siren sounding and EBS broadcasts were simulated. The VANS drivers were notified and dispatched at 1234. All VANS drivers were at their locations within 15 minutes with one exception, as discussed under Objective 2. The VACS alarms sounded in the six VANS Staging Areas and were heard by each driver and evaluator. All VANS routes were completed accurately. All but four trucks stopped exactly on their acoustical location. In each of those four instances, the drivers knew where their exact location was and pointed it out to their evaluator. By pre-exercise agreement, a spot within 125 feet to 150 feet of the acoustical location was satisfactory at those four places since it was difficult to get to the exact location due to a temporary traffic obstruction. The initial siren sounding occurred at 1445, coincident with the initial EBS broadcast. The Governor's Representative and the Offsite Response Director authorized the initial alert and notification of the public at l_436. Upon approval of the EBS message, the Public Notification Coordinator-(PNC) directed the Communication Coordinator to sound the sirens at the time of the EBS broadcast. The PNC then faxed me EBS message to the EBS radio station, and called the EBS ndio station on the dedicated line to provide instructions on when to broadcast the EBS message. The EBS message was then distributed to the ORO staff. The PNC did not contact the New Hampshire State EOC Operations Office to inform them that preparations were underway to activate public notification and did not coordinate the Public Alert Notification System activation. '1his is contrary to the IP 2.13 Section 5.1.9.C. Arrangements were made with the EBS radio station to rebroadcast the message three times consecutively and then every 15 minutes. Telephones were used to contact special needs individuals beginning at about 1500 along with TDDs for the hearing-impaired. During the exercise 2 Route Guides were dispatched to implement their procedures by locating the homes of two hearing impaired individuals. The Route Guides were to ensure that the individuals were aware of the situation and verified the transportation assistance required if any was necessary. Upon retuming to the transportation 130
room after clearing through the EWF, the Route Guides were debriefed by the dispatcher and awaited release or reassignment. Issue #1: DISCRII' TION: The ORO PNC did not coordinate with the New llampshire ARCA State EOC Operations Office in accordance with their procedures. RECOMMENDATION: Provide further training to TNC on proper coordination with NH EOC prior to public alert and notifications. 131
. 1 Ob.lective #13: ALERT, NOTIFICATION AND - EMERGENCY _ INFOR51ATION PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the fonnulation and dissemination of accurate infonnation and instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the inillal ale 1 and notification has occurred. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Supp.
1, II, E.3, E.5, E.8,) Evaluation: Met Narrative - i Summary: The New Hampshire Yankee Offsite Response Organization in the EOC distributed a total of ten news releases, of which five were EBS messages. The Public Notification-Coordinator (PNC) was' responsible for drafting and disseminating EBS messages. News releases which were not part of an EBS message were drafted and disseminated by the Public Information Advisor (PIA). Current information used in the releases was obtained from the EOC staff, the EOF and the IFO. The PNC and PIA used prescripted messages , wnich they tailored to meet the specific needs of the scenario. - The Offsite Response Director approved all EBS messages and news releases. Copies of all releases were given to the EOC staff. EBS Message #2-was drafted but
'was. superseded by _ events and never issued. Since EBS messages were reproduced as news releases, there was minor confusion in the EOC because .
EBS Message #3 was only the second EBS message to be issued. Even so, the information which was- provided to the public was accurate and timely. Protective actions were described in terms of familiar landmarks. Prior te ,ny news release, the PIA used a direct ringdown phone line to inform the Media Certer of the forthcoming news release. Public instructions for-the ORO communities in Massachusetts were
-formulated at the ORO EOC. then relayed to the media center via telephone andl:elefacsimile machme. The ORO spokesperson shared this information r
with the media center staff, including the spokesperson for New Hampshire, and then disseminated .the information to the news media during media briefings and through the distribution of hard-copy EBS messages-and news releases. For the most part, the information conveyed was comprehensive, accurate and timely, ~ and included appropriate information on sheltering, evacuation,~ the school population and advice-for farmers. A related ARCA from - the 1988- exercise has been corrected. It was noted that additional information for special facilities such as hospitals and nursing homes would be helpfulin NHY ORO EBS messages. EBS message #5 indicated that residents in all special facilities within the EPZ were being evacuated to the Shriners' facility in Wilmington, MA. Directions to that facility were then issued with instructions indicating that family members _ were to _ pick up their patients / relatives at that location. It would be helpful to note more specifically the disposition of intensive care patients. 132
_ .. . _- _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ . _ __ __ All public instructions were availabic to the JTIC staff within an average of 10 minutes, from authorization to release, at the Media Center. A rekk-d ARCA from the 1988- exercise has been corrected. There were no repolis of confusion at the . Media Center in' distinguishing- news releases from EBS .
- messages. _ _Some minor confusion -in maintaining the JTIC log could be-addressed by closer attention to- the logging procedure. _ All standard information is already la the staff notebooks and familiar to the staff.- A related ARCA from the 1988 exercise has been corrected.
MEDIA CENTER ORO: Issue #1: DESCRIPTION: Some minor confusion in maintaining the JTIC log could be
~ ~ARFI addressed by closer attention to the logging procedure.
- RECOMMENDATION: Training for JTIC staff should_ focus on giving close attention to:the numerical labelling for both EPS messages and news relenses when the documents are received at the JTIC.
Other- DESCRIPTION: Additional information on residents of soccial facilities Issue: including hospitals and nursing homes would be helpful in NHY ORO EBS messages and news releases. RECOMMENDATION: More detailed information penaining -to rpecial_ _
- facilities should be included in EBS messages.
133 _- _ .~ --
Objective #14: ALERT, NOTIFICATION AND EMERGENCY INFORMATION MEDIA. Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in an accurate, coordinated and - timely manner. -(NUREG-0654/ FEMA. REP-1, Rev.1. Supp.1, II, G.3, G.4.a. G 4.b) Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: The Media Center at the Newington Town Hall served as the principal location for conveying information to the public via the news media. Representatives and spokespersons represcating the utility, the State of New Hampshire and the ORO gathered information via telephone and telefacsimile machines from their respective information sources at the EOF and EOCs. This information was shared and coordinated among the spokespersons and support staff, and then conveyed to the. news media during five formal briefings. Timely, accurate and comprehensive information was presented by the spokespersons regarding plant-- conditions and offsite emergency response actions. On numerous occasions, rumors were addressed and dispelled during the briefmgs based on close coordination with the JTIC. The ORO spokesperson presented current information regarding protective actions for the hiassachusetts communities and provided responsive answers to questions posed by the role-playing reporters. Two technical experts from the utility provided clear and understandable presentations on plant conditions and radiation health issues. In each briefing, the spokespersons effectively utilized a wide array of maps, chans and displays depicting the EPZ, reception centers and the power plant. In between the formal briefings, hiedia Liaison staff from the utility provided up-dated information to the role playing reporters in the media work area.
.The JTIC demonstrated this objective by receipt and logging or distribution of all messages sent from the hiedia Center by fax and telephone contact. The monitoring capabilities of radio and TV broadcasts is impressive. All stations in the area are constantly watched.- At the JTIC, staff listens to three stations at a time. One TV news broadcast at the hiedia Center was recorded. Radio broadcasts of the exercise were heard. One actual EBS test was also monitored. The "Information" tape machines were up-dated (simulated) with each news release.
Issues: None - I34
e Objective #15: ALERT, NOTIFICATION AND EA!ERGENCY INFORh!ATION
~ RUh!OR CONTROL. Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor controlin
.a coordinated and timely fashion. (NUREG-0654/FEA1A REP-1, Rev.1, Supp.1. II, G.4.c)
Evaluation: Met Narrative Sununary: The demonstration of Media Center coordination with rumor control operations located at the mC was exceptional. In accorduce with the ORO plan, the news releases' informed the public to direct rumors and questions to the 800 telephone number for the mC. This rumor control telephone number war also mentioned at the press briefings during follow up to news releases. The ORO Rumor Control Liaison frequently contacted his counterpart at the mC via- the ring-down telephone dedicated for that purpose. Rumor trends received at the mC were discussed, logged, tracked and verbally summarized in the staff briefings that were conducted prior to the media briefings. In turn, the ORO and utility rumor control liaisons communicated the information available. in the Media Center (e.g., EBS messages, news releases and information on plant status) to the mC. The mC operation was excellent. Staff are well trained and demonstrated knowledge of all aspects of rumor control / media relations. Their response to questions was brief, exact and well documented. The recognition of rumor trends was quick and followed up to ensure immediate resolutions by the supervisor. All emergency. information released to the public was put on the status boards. Administrative staff provided copies to each staff person and updated status boards immediately after authorization by the supen>isor. Issues: None l l 135 l' i I . - , - ,- - --
Objective #16: USE OF KI. Demonstrate the ability to make .the decision- to recommend the use of KI to emergency workers and institutionallred persons based on predetennined criteria, as_ well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev.1, Supp.1, II, J.10.e, J.10.f) Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: In the ORO, the decision to recommend use of KI is based on advice from the Radiological Health Advisor at the ORO EOC. He is responsible _ for authorizing exposures greater than SR for EWs and KI tablet usage based on thyroid dose projections during an emergency. The ORO Radiological Health Advisor demonstrated the ability to evrJuate the projected emergency worker thyroid dose and to determine whether KI would be necessary for- ORO emergency workers. The Radiological Health Advisor utilized METPAC dose projections and Attachment 1 to IP 2.8, Potassium Iodide Worksheet, for evaluating the need for KI. Each new field air sample measurement was evaluated and in every case ~ the correct decision was made that KI was not warranted for the ORO emergency _ workers. Procedure IP 2.8, incorporates the FDA PAGs (25 rem) for determining when to use KI for emergency workers. VANS drivers were questioned by evaluators to determine. if they were knowledgeable in the use of KI, possible side effects and dosage. All sixteen drivers were aware that there was a supply of KI in their trucks. They knew that instructions to take KI would come through the ORO EOC. All had been advised of proper dosage and possible side effects. At the Haverhill Staging Area, the Exposure Control Coordinator at the SA is-responsible for implementing this procedure for the EWs dispatched from the SA through their organizational supervisors. Although supplies of KI would have been available to EWs in the EPZ, no advice was issued from the ORO EOC to EWs or institutionalized populations to take KI. At 1825 a Route Guide picked up a dosimetry kit which included KI and delivered it to the Amesbury. Hospital (simulated delivery) in response to a request -from the hospital. Likewise, the local EOCs (simulated by the FEMA Control Cell) were supplied with 50 sets of dosimetry, KI and other equipment, by six EOC dosimetry record keepers (DRK). Staging areas or assembly points for buses, ambulances, etc. were supplied by designated DRKs who assisted- at those locations. Approximately 22 DRKs were used '~ supplying dosimetry and KI-to assembly points, local EOCs, institutionalized populations and emergency workers. - i I , 136 i L 1
The distribution of KI tablets to all 51 traffic guides was simulated as they reported for duty to the ORO Haverhill Staging Area. Each worker was given a simulated container of KI and told to retain it until he received further instructions on when to consume KI. All ACP/TCP personnel were familiar with procedures for the issuance of KI. All had simulated KI on hand. Most knew the reason for taking KI. Two of the TGs did not recall they had been given " simulated
- KI when questioned at their TCP.
KI was included in ORO Field Team #1's monitoring kit, When the members of the Field Team picked up their dosimeters and dosimetry records at the Staging, Area, they were instructed in the use of KI and possible adverse effects from its use. The Team was also instruct:d to enter the time of ingestion on their dosimetry records, if told to take KI. During the exercise they were not directed to take KI. Field Team #2 had KI in their issued field kits but no instructions to take KI were ever received. Both Team members knew and understood the reason for K1 issuance and use. They were fully prepared to ingest the KI and record the date, time and dose if the order had been issued. EWs were briefed at the five simulated bus dispatch areas at Beverly. Each briefing consisted of notice that the distribution of KI was simulated as well as k.struction on the use of KI. Instructions to administer KI would be given by radio, if required, once routes were initiated. Also, referenced and available were the "EW Dose Record Form" and " Potassium Iodine, K1, Record". KI issuance was discussed at the TSA and distribution was simulated. EWs were familiar with the use of KI, its issuance, record keeping and possible side effects. At the North Andover Reception Center, KI tablets in vials were available to the DRK but were not issued to the emergency workers with their dosimetry. Instructions for KI use were included in the emergency worker dosimetry instructions that each worker received. The previous ARCA concerning the emergency workers' knowledge of the side effects of KI has been corrected, as shown through the previous discassion. 137 l 1 I
9 4 NIIY ORO TCP/ACP: Issue #1: DESCRIFr10N: Two of Si TGs did not recall the simulated distribution of ARFI K1 tablets or how and when to tecord ingestion of KI. RECOMMENDATIONt Follow-up training for TGs should reemphasize KI
. procedures, i.e., when it is provided; when it should be ingested; and how this should be recorded.
r 5-g 138
9 w 4 Objective #18.- -IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS-PLUME EPZ, Demonstrate the ability and resounes necessary to knplement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population (including transit-dependent - penons, special needs populations, handicapped penons and institutionalized persons).- (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, Supp.1, II, J.10 d. J.10.g, J.10.h) - Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: The NHY ORO demonstrated the ability and resources necessary to implement protective actions for impacted EPZ populations, The _ORO arranged transportation for transportation-dependent, handicapped and the institutionalized persons by contacting special facilities, such as hospitals, on their needs and capabilities; coordinating with the Congregate
- Care Center managers;. and _ directing the activities _ of Special Population Liaisons. The ORO adequately assessed the transportation needs of the impacted plume EPZ permanent and transient population.
In accordance with the extent of play the NHY ORO made initial notification to each of the transportation providers identified in the plan and estimated the resources available to meet the requirement. - Arrangements were made for the use during the exercise of a limited number of buses. Automobiles and pickup trucks -simulated the remaining buses which would be used during an emergency. All predesignated routes in the Massachusetts plume EPZ communities designed to pick up rer' dents and transients who were unable to evacuate on their own were run during the exercise, although.not all were - evaluated by FEMA. Also provided were a bed bus, van, ambulance, and wheelchair van for institutionalized and non-institutionalized individuals with special needs. The Bus Coordinator did an excellent job on the dispatch of buses. Plan i procedures were followed in _ contacting host facilities for special populations. L The Special Population Coordinator did a good job in providing information ll and direction to the Special Population Liaisons. All actions required to provide evacuation assistance to special populations were carried : out effectively. L The Special Vehicle Dispatch staff located in the Haverhill Staging Area is l responsible for implementing protective actions impacting special needs,
- i. handicapped and institutionalized populations along with the hearing-impaired.
The process of notification and special needs identification was demonstrated by Special Populations Liaisons by placing telephone calls to the NHY Control 139
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1 Cell which simulated - special needs individuals. Lists of addresses and telephone numbers of individuals with special needs and the hearing impaired were current. In accordance with the extent of play, 2 Route Guides were dispatched to locate the homes of four hearing-impaired individuals. The Route Guides were to ensure that the individuals were aware of the situation and to verify transportation assistance requested was correct. There was no report of any problems with the maps issued to these Route Guides. Route Guides were debriefed by the dispatcher upon return and awaited release or reassignment. FEMA evaluated the dispatch of buses from the five simulated bus yards
- located at the Massachusetts Electric Company in Beverly, MA, through transfer points, to designated transient routes, to the reception center. The evacuation bed bus, ambulance and vans ran their routes successfully. The evacuation bed bt.s drove to the designated Nursing Home, then to the assigned reception center. The ambulance drove from the risk hospital to the host hospital. The wheelchair van drove to a special facility for the elderly and then to the reception center in Beverly. The wheelchair van driver became confused when attempting to locate the assigned facility in Newbury.
However, the facility was successfully located. The van was driven to the North Andover reception center where it was used to shuttle individuals from monitoring points to the congregate care center located within the same comclex. FEMA evaluated the following routes run for the transit-dependent: (For School Routes and Day Care Routes, refer to Objective 19.) ROUTE COMMENT Amesbury Bus Route #1 Completed Amesbury Bus Route #2 Completed Merrimac Bus Route #2 Completed Newbury Bus Route #1 Not Completed
- Remedial Run 12/14/90 Completed Newbury Bus Route #2 Completed Newburyport Bus Route #1 Not Completed
- Remedial Run 12/14/90 Completed 140
Newburyport Bus Route #2 Not Completed
- Remedial Run 12/14/90 Completed 9
S lisbury Bus Route #1 Completed Salisbun Bus Rot:te #2 Completed West Newbury Bus Route #3 Completed Institutionalized /Non-Institutionalized Special Needs Populations VEHICLE ROITTE COMMENT Eyaeuation Shriner's Auditorium (dispatch point) where the Completed Bed Bus - Evacuation Bed Bus equipment was stored and set up; to the Maplewood Manor Nursing Home in Amesbury, MA; to the North Andover, MA Reception Center for monitoring; back to the Shriner's Auditorium. Ambulance Dispatched from the Special Vehicle Dispatch Area Completed at the Staging Area in Haverhill, MA; to the Anna Jaques Hospital in Newburyport, MA; to the St. Joseph's Hospital (MSI) in Lowell, MA, WheeIchair Dispatched from the Special Vehicle Dispatch Area Completed Van at the Staging Area in- Haverhill, MA; to the Newbury Village Elderly Housing Facility in Newbury, MA; to the_ Beverly Reception Center (drive by) for individual monitoring; back to the Staging Area in Haverhill, MA.
-Van Disp tched from the Special Vehicle -Area at the Completed Staging Area in Haverhill, MA; to the North Andover Reception . Center for use in shuttling individuals from monitoring points to the congregate care center located within the same complex,
- NOTE: Prior to the exercise all evaluators were notified by the RAC Chair not to ride in vehicles with limited seating capacity, Vehicles of adequate size were not available until the following day, at which time the routes were completed.
141
Issue #1: DESCRIITION: The wheelchair van driver became confused when ARFI attempting to locate the assigned facility in Newbury. ,
- RECOMMENDATION: Provide tmining on how to interpret maps.
l l l l l l 142 l
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i l
.. i Objective #19. IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS-EVACUATION OF SCIIOOLS. Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective. actions for school children within the plume EPZ. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP.1, Rev.1, Supp.1, II, J.10.g)
Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: The NHY ORO successfully demonstrated the ability and resources necessary to ' implement appropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EPZ. The NHY ORO provided special consideration to school districts and day care centers and nurseries by designating School Liaisons for each community. Schools and Day Care Centers, both participating and simulated in the IGY Control Cell, received the initial notification of the emergency situation at the Seabrook Station from the School Liaison. Since the evacuation order was not issued until late in the day, the decision was made to allow schools to effect their normal dismissal time. A recommendation was made to the Governor's Representative to cancel all after school activities. Approval was received at the ORO EOC at 1458 and immediately retransmitted to the schools through the Liaisons. One_ private school was in session when the general population evacuation order was given. The school requested seven buses. The transportation room dispatcher assembled the Route Guides, who then secured their map books. The dispatcher then briefed the Route Guides and they proceeded to the simulated bus yards-in Beverly, where they were provided with maps of evacuation routes and were assigned to vehicles. The evacuation (simulated) of twc schools and tnree day care centers was done out of- sequence and _ in accordance with the extent of play. This was demonstrated by the aciual dispatch of two buses. One bus was dispatched for two schools and one bus was dispatched to three day care centers and then to the reception center in North Andover. The school bus was assigned two Route Guides .so that a- different Guide had responsibility for locating a designated facility and then guiding the driver to the Reception Center. The three day care center and one school route were run successfully without any deviation from assigned routes utilizing maps that were of sufficient detail and quality. This corrects the ARCA from the 1988 exercise involving maps for day care center routes. On one of the school bus routes the bus lost its way for 25 minutes before finding the prescribed school. The Route Guide had difficulty reading the route map. l 143 L
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Listed below is a summary of the routes actually pavelled: i VEHICLE ROUTE COMMENT Bus Simulated Bus Yard ai Mass. Electric Company Completed > (MECO) in Beverly, MA; to Amer ,ory High - School; to the North Andover, h%, Reception Center. Change Route Guides. Bus New Route Guide leave North Andover; to. Completed Amesbury Elementary School; to North Andover Reception Cemer; to simulated bus ya-d, MECO, Beverly, MA. Bus Simulated Bus Yard MECO, Beverly, MA; Comoleted (Amesbury Day Cares); to Donna Blades Day Care; to Vickie Cook Day Care; to 1.ouise Stilphen Day Care; to North Andover Reception Center; to (simulated) bus yard, MECO, Beverly MA. ISSUE #1: DESCRIPTION: Although the map was of good quality, the Route Guide on ARFI second route shown above had difficulty interpreting the map. RECOMMENDATION: Refresher training should be provided to the Route Guides. b , 144
Objectire #20. TRAFFIC CONTROL. Demonstrate the organiza;lonal abliity and resources necessary to control evacuation tra91c flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas in the EPZ. , (NUREG-0654/IDIA. REP-1.Rev.1, Supp.1,11. J.10.j, J.10.k) - Evaluation: Met Narrative Summary: The Haverhill Staging Araa staff demonstrated the organi.utional ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access.- Fifty one emergency workers were deployd to 19 pre-determined traffic control / access points in a timely manner. They Ne accurately briefed on their role in the exercise play. They were knowledgeable in protective actions, planning areas and special facilities evacuated, evacuation routes, location of reception centers, and access control. Traffic Guides had radio contact with the Haverhill SA and were capable of receiving instructions. This objective was also evaluated in the field. All assignments were carried out .in an effective and timely manner accc,rding to their emergency operation plan. A high degree of professionalism was demonstrated by the staff at the Haverhill Staging Area. All Traffic Guides were well versed in all procedures and could discern ACP vs TCP duties. Roughly two thirds _ chose not to check their equipment bags before dcparture. None wore their safety vests, creating a safety problem for exercise participants (dark narrow streets, little good parking). Overall, this was an excellent, professional performwice. The Traffic Guides at TCP B SA 06 (Salisbury, MA) handled a (simulated) accident creating an obstacle blocking all traffic. Tney recommended a viable Sternate route which was relayed back to the HSA and when instructed, simulated directing traffic to the this alternate route. A tow truck was dispatched by the HSA and arrived at the scene of the accident in a timely manner and (simulated) cleared the impediment. Overall, this was an exce!!cnt, professional performance.- l p y 145
-am-
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i NilY ORO TCP/ACP: j 1 Issue #1: DESCRIITION: Due to the practice of considering equipment bags issued to l AFFI be " sealedd , taffic guides did not check all their equipment before leaving the ! Staging Area. Also while at their TCP, they did not wear luminescent safety vests issued to them. RECOhih1ENDATION: Equipment bags should be checked before leaving the Staging Area and all equipment verified to be present and oixradng. Safety vests should be worn while on position at all times, day or night, t i 146 l i n
t Objective #21. RELOCATION CENTERS REGISTRATION, MONITORING, AND ! DECONTAMINATION. Demomstrate the adequacy cf procedures, facilities, equipment and personnel for the reglstration, radiological monitoring and decontamination of ' evacues. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP 1, Rev.1, Supp.1, II, J.12) Evaluation: Met i Narrative Sununary: Fifty two ORO members demonstrated the adequacy of the Reception Center I and its plan and implementing procedures. The entire staff demonstrated that they were well trained and highly qualified. The Reception Center was activated at 1320 and fully operational at 1517. Forty five cars, two buses and , sixty three evacuees passed through the Reception Center between 1700 hours and 1815 hours. All vehic!cs were monitored for radiological contamination. Six contaminated vehicles were identified and processed in accordance with the implementing procedures. Contaminated vehicles wre tagged and moved to a- ; decontamination area. _ All vehicles that could not be decontaminated quickly ; were placed in a contaminated vehicle parking area to be decontaminated later. Clean 'vehic!cs were directed to the clean vehicle parking area. Male and j female monitors provided assistance to the contaminated evacuees during the decontamination process which included showers when required. 1< Contaminated clothing and personal items were taFged, bagged and processed ; in accordance with procedure.i. In the event of more serious tadiological/ medical emergencies, knowledge of MS 1 hospitals and their i locations was described. All personnel were aware of the need to control the ; I spread of contamination on the site, Once an individual entered the site he/she was always under the observation of a staff person and being guided to the . next processing station. During the exercise all radiological monitoring checla and procedures were performed in accordance with appropriate implementing , procedures.- In accordance with the extent of play, personnel monitoring was
' timed for thirty minutes using five monitors. One hundred and forty evacuees '
passed through the monitoring trailer. Twenty-five evacuees were contaminated (simulated with the use of Coleman lantern mantels). Twenty-four individuals were identified as contaminated. The one individual not .
-identified had inserted a mantle into his high top sneaker, making it difficult to
- locate. The computed time per individual surveyed averaged 64 seconds per individual. While the average time required to monitor individual evacuees during the demonstration was slightly longer than the approved 60-second planning basis, the staffing pattern is such that the 12 hour requirement could .
still be met with the observed monitoring time. The Reception Center was staffed by very concerned, highly qual!Ged personnel. The registration staff was outstanding. All relevant functions and activities were implemented in a manner that was consistent with the reception centers emergency plans and procedures. , 147 5 l I. i --
l Since the congregate care center utillred for this exercise was in the same complex as the reception center, no maps were issued to eve:uees. However, FEMA reviewed the revised maps from reception' centers to the CCCs and found them to t>e clear and concise, with adequate instructions and easily identified route and road signs. This closes the ARCA from the 1988 exercise. i l Issuet None l 148 I l'
e Objective #22. RELOCATION CENTERS-CONGREGATE CARE. Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment and persom.el for congregate care of evacuees. ) (NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, Supp.1 II, J.10.h) Evaluation: Met Narrative . l Summary: The Congregate Care Building Manager conducted a thorough walk through of ! the North Andover Congregate Care Center. He had a clear diagram showing where all of the stations and offices would be located dunng an actual emergency operation. The Congregate Care Center receives evacuecs after they are processed through the Recep,lon Center. The Congregate Care Center has adequate feeding, s!ceping, toilets, showers, nursing, and pa king facilities. Ample provisions have been made for the handicapped and special needs populations. For the handicapped, there are special entrance ramps and , toilet facilities. The Congregate Care Center has contracts with two vendors ,l to provide food during emergency operations. The Congregate Care Building Manager was knowledgeable about the capacity and functions. The building is , fully equipped to be used as a Congregate Care Center. j-l
- Upon review .of the revised Appendix M (Rev 1.C 10/3/90) of the SPMC, ;
-congregate care centers with and without access for handicapped have been identified. Attachment 1, IP 1.6 (Rev 1,12/1/89) now contains information ,
about specific congregate care centers that do and do not have handicapped l! access. Staff training was conducted September 1989. This corrected the l ' t ARCA from the 1988 exercise. Issues: None ; l 149 l + l-l
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l ' Objective #23. htEDICAL SERVICES TRANSPORTATION. Demonstrate the adequacy of vehicles, equipment, p,ocedures and personnel for transporting contaminated, ladured or exposed Individuals. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev.1 Supp.1, II, K.3.a. K.5.a. L.4) Evaluation: Met Narrative . Summaryt On August 14, 1990,- the NHY ORO demonstrated that arrangements have been mtoe to provide adequate vehicles, equipment, and personnel for transporting hhred individuals contaminated or exposed to radiation. The Shanahan Ambulance Company demonstrated that vehicles, equipment, procedures, and personnel were adequate to transport an injured patient contaminated with radioactive material. The Shanahan Ambulance with its two (2) Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) arrived at the Haverhill Staging Area around 0630. Upon arrival, the EMTs received a briefing from the Special Vehicles Dispatcher on an P.ccident at Seabrook Station. A second ambulance from the Frontline Amt utance Company, also with two (2) EMTs, was notified to serve as a backup. A kit containing the SPMC Implementing Procedure 2.10, two (2) direct reading dosimeters, (0-200'nR and 0-20R), a thermoluminiscent dosimeter (TLD), an emergency worker exposure record card, and a contamination control kit for each ambulance was issued to the EMTs. The Special Vehicle Dispatcher instructed the EMTs to prepare their respective ambulances in the event that they had to transport a contaminated, injured victim. -The ambulance crews began the draping process at 0720 and finished at 0754. Both crews also draped the gurneys with plastic. The ambulance crews performed radio checks and then returned to the Special Vehicle Dispatching Area to don protective clothing. Both crews dressed out in protective clothing in accordance with their procedures. After completing this process, the Special Vehicle Dispatcher briefed the EMTs on proper use of dosimetry, the location of MS 1 hospitals, appropriate routes to the hospital, a map that indicated the locations within 30 miles of the Seabrook site (in the event the patient required immediate medical attention). This reconfirmed the adequate demonstration in this area in the 1989 MS-1 drill, which cleared a related ARCA from the 1988 exercire. He further instructed them of the necessity of contacting him should they have to deviate from a prescribed route. 150
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At 0828 the Special Vehicle Dispatcher received a call from the Emergency Worker Facility Leader informing him that a Field atenitoring Team member had been injured in an automobile accident (simulated) at the Emergency Worker Facility adjacent to the Haverhill Staging Area. The Special Vehicle Dispatcher dispatched the Shanahan Ambulance to the EWF at 0830. The EWF monitoring personnel took appropriate actions in monitoring the injured Field Monitoring Team member, as required by the SpMC procedures. The injured Field Monitoring Team member was found to be contaminated and the survey meter readings were recorded on a Personal Contamination Report Form. The ambulance arrived at the accident scene at 0832. The Shanahan EMTs then treated the victim's injuries. The EWF Leader informed the EMTs that the victim was contaminated. The victim was removed from the vehicle and placed on a backboard. During treatment of the victim, the EWF leader called St. Joseph's Hospital in Lowell, Massachusetts at 0835 to inform them that a contaminated, injured victim would be transported there. The patient's contaminated outer clothing was cut off and discarded. The patient was then monitored, placed on the ambulance gurney, and wrapped in plastic to prevent the spread of contamination. The patient was placed M the ambulance for transport to the hospital. The EMTs did not remove their outer shoe coverings prior to entering the ambulance, thus contaminating the plastic on the floor of the ambulance leaving the ARCA from the 1988 exercise open. The EWF monitoring staff gave a carbon copy of the Personnel Contamination Form to the EMTs. The ambulance departed for the hospital at 0850. While enroute to the hospital, the EMTs were monitoring the patient's medical condition and vital signs. The driver contacted the MS 1 Hospital through the CMED radio network to relay medical condition, ETA, and the fact that the patient was contaminated, though the extent and type of contamination was not relayed as required by their procedure. Though the ambulance arTived at the hospital without incident, the driver deviated from the prescribed route and did not inform the Special Vehicles Dispatcher of the change in route. Upon arrival at St. Joseph's Hospital at 0920, the patient was transferred to the hospital staff. The EMTs provided the hospital staff with the copy of the Personnel Contamination Form and an assessment of the patient's medical condition. The outside of the ambulance was properly monitored, with special attention devoted to the wheel wells and grill. The ambulance crew was also properly 151
-monitored and went through an approprirte process of removing their contaminated clothing. After the hospital monitoring staff declared the two (2)
EMTs free of contamination, the inside of the ambulance was monitored. The hospital's monitor inadvertently contaminated the inside of the ambulance by , entering the ambulance without removing her outer booting. -After consulting with the hospital Radiological Safety Officer (RSO), the RSO then demonstrated an appropriate procedure to decontaminate the small " Hot Spot." ; AMBULANCE CREW Issue #1: DESCRIPTION: The Am'sulance crew failed to remove shoe coverings prior l ARCA to entering the ambulance. : Also, they failed to relay the extent and type of !
' contamination to the hospital, as required in their procedure. The Special :
Vehicle Dispatcher was not advised of a deviation in the prescribed route. ; RECOMMENDATION: Ambulance crew should receive refresher training in their procedures. P t t l 1 [ t 152 l g ,, m. .-,g-,. --a, ,-.,- ,- v-r g r< w y,-w. r,y - g- m----g- a m -,u p ,+w,-,e- --
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Objective #24. MEDICAL SERVICES FACILITIES. Demonstratt the adequacy of medical facilities equipment, procedures and personnel for handling contaminated, injured er exposed Individuals. (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP 1, Rev.1. Supp.1. II, L.1) Evaluation: Met Narrative - Summary: On August 14, 1990, the NHY ORO demonstrated that arrangements had been made to provide adequate medical facilities, equipment, procedures and personnel for handling contaminated, injured or exposed individuals. St. Joseph's Hospital, a MS-1 facility located at 220 Pawtucket St., Lowell Massachusetts, has facilities in their Emergency Department (ED) which can be isolated and used to treat and decontaminate an injured patient contaminated with radioactive material and still allow access to, and simultaneous use of, the remainder of ED facility. The hospital staff demonstrated the ability to receive, treat and decontamiaate an injured patient contaminated with radioactive material. The hospital Disaster Plan contains a section with implementing procedures for handling ill or injured patients contaminated with radioactive material. The Disaster Plan and procedure are reviewed aanually and updated as required by tne Hospital Disaster Ccmmittee. The plan and procedure was last reviewed in May 1990 by the committee. A copy of the plan and procedure is available in the ED. There is a required annual review of the plan by the ED staff; however, th: annual ED review is not documented. The hospital RSO, a medical doctor, and a Nuclear Medicine Technologist are available to the ED to provide contamination monitonng and to make and interpret dose rate measurements. During the exercise, their performance of this mandatory function was noteworthy. No outside assistance was required. Training is provided by NHY. Attendance at the in services training is documented by NHY and the hospital. The three and one half (31/2) hour video tape of the Oak Ridge Associated Universities seminar which includes
" Hospital Handling of Radiation Accident Victims", and video tapes made during previous exercises, slides and lectures are used in the training program.
According to the training records the most recent training session was held in June 1990. Sufficient medical staff members have been trained to provide at least one trained staff member on each shift. 153
I l I s i Necessa2y supplies and equipment were available. Anti-contamination clothing ! ' is packaged in plastic bags. Two GM pancake detectors for monitoring, and a compensated GM detector and an ion chamber for dose rate measurements are , available. All instruments were operational and calibrated. St. Joseph's Hospital has telephone communications, with six lines available . I through the hosp!tal switchboard. They are on the CMED net for communications by . radio, with emergency power backup. They can
- communicate with an ambulance by radio or mobile telephone. T. key have a '
facsimile capability. Contamination control during the exercise was noteworthy. The hospital staff demonstrated their knowledge of the significance and difference between counts per minute and mR per hour (dose rate). This reconfirms the adequate performance in this area demonstrated in the 1989 MS-l_ drill, which cleared a related ARCA- from the 1988 exercisei There was excellent interplay and t
- discussion between the participants. .
Issues: : None k 9 P 154 _ , -- ___...__.,_._.____.._._.._.__________m... _ _. _ . _
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Objective #25. DECONTAh11 NATION. Demonstrate the adequacy of faellities, equipraent, supplies, procedures and personnel for decontamination of emergency worken, equipment and vehletes for waste disposal (NUREG-0654/IDIA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Supp.1, II, K.5.a K.5.b) Evaluationt hiet Narrativt Summary: The NHY ORO demonstrated the adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, procedures and personnel for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles for waste disposal. The monitoring and decontamination facility for emergency workers at the Haverhill Staging Area was a full size trailer, custom designed for the purpose. Half of the trailer was used to monitor returning emergency workers. Six stations utilizing AIYTEC-FT-126B probes were staffed by well trained monitors. The other half of the trailer was to facilitate the decontamination of workers with some degree of contamination.
~1here were adequate Nrking spaces for both contaminated and clean vehicles and these were capabic of expansion, if necessary. A special area for the decontamination of approximately six vehicles at a time was roped off for this purpose as a " dirty" area. In this area, vehicles were to be decontaminated by use of maslin cloths by workers in protective clothing and plastic foot covers.
When such vehicles had been decontaminated, they could be removed to designated clean parking spaces. The system was in place to keep contaminated personnel and equipment separate from " clean". The monitoring stations in the trailer provided the r.eans to screen returning EWs and insure their being uncontaminated before admission to the Staging Area building. Their equipment (note books, cones, radios, etc.) was separately monitored outside, but adjacent to, the trailer before it was returned to the SA storage shelves inside. Only two instruraents were available for this monitoring of equipment and a backlog developed which demonstrated the need for more temporary storage and plastic covers in case of inclement weather. Personnel operating the facility knew that the permissible limit for contamination was less than 100 epm above background. The monitoring instruments used were the FT-126B large area Ght Probes, Bicron rate meters, Rht-14's with HP-210 probes. These were properly used in accordance with the plan. Three of the Bieron instrumen,s failed during the demonstration, causing concern by the Monitoring and Decontamination Leaders. 155 i
i 1 The monitoring process for both personnel and vehicles was demonstrated at a carefully slow pace (2 inches per second) for scanning personnel and at about the right distance (less than 1 inch). The screening of vehicles was being done in the open with the wide area probes uncovered. During inclement weather or dusty / windy days this would result in contaminated probes and/or a possible shortage of probes. A record was made when the vehicles, equipment or personnel exceeded permissible or detectable levels of contamination. Vehicles and articles exceeding 100 to 200 cpm in any location were tagEcd and held for decontamination. The sequentially numbered tags indicated where the vehicle or article was contaminated, maximum epm, survey meter used, name of monitor, date/ time and owner. Space for the name of the person completing the form and final disposition was also provided. Clean articles and vehicles were given green tags. The decontamination procedure for personnel (EWs) was carefully demonstrated in strict accordance with the SPhiC f1P 2.9). The procedure is very detailed and covers what is done at the decontamm;. tion side of the trailer by a minimum of two monitors ( one male and one female). If only clothing is contaminated the decontamination process involves removing and bagging the contaminated articles. These can be washed and returned to the owner later, if the contamination is successfully removed. Hands, face and other lightly contaminated skin areas can be decontaminated by the decontamination monitors using a sink and soap and water or other cleaning agents. In any event, a special form is used to record the information and readings involved during the decontamination process. When " clean", the EW may proceed to the Staging Area. If showering is required, paper jumpsuits are provided until a change of clothing is available inside the SA. The decon form provides for medical follow up if necessary. An EW with (simulated) internal contamination in the neck and face area was encountered during the demonstration. The hionitoring and Decontamination Leader knew that this person should be referred to an hts 1 Hospital (St. Joseph's) for medical treatment and/or further observation. Arrangements for this were coordinated with the Radiological Health Advisor in accordance with the plan SPhtC (IP 2.9). In all cases, the relevant functions and activities of the monitoring and decontamination operation for EW's were being
.nplemented in a manner that was consistent with the ORO Staging Area plan and procedures.
156 i
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I EW DECON: Issue #1: DESCRIITION: A shortage of one type of monitoring instrument (Bierons) ARFI developed in the monitoring and decontamination trailer because three (3) of these instruments failed. RECOhiMENDATION: Develop a r.ystem to ensure prompt availability of the .djitional supply of these instruments to avoid possible delays in processing contaminated EW's. Issue #2: DESCRIITION: Due to the lack of instruments, there was a backlog of ARFI potentially contaminated articles or equipment outside the decontamination trailer for various reasons. RECOMMENDATION: Review pla7s and procedures to determine the proper number of instruments required to reduce or eliminate time delays which may result from this equipment being out of service. Other DESCRIITION: Under adverse weather conditions the wide area probes issue: used outside by vehicle monitors could have become contaminated and/or inoperative. RECOMMENDATION: Provide a thin plastic cover such as Saran Wrap for the wide area probes used for monitoring vehicles and personnel, e 1 157
i t 1 Objective #26. SUPPLDIENTARY ASSISTANCE (FEDERAUOTi!ER). Demonstrate the ability to identify the need for and call upon Federal and other outride suppon s< agencies' assistance. (NUREG-0654/FDIA. REP 1, Rev.1, Supp.1 II, A.3, C.1.a. : C.1.b, C.1.c, C.4)
..aluation: Met - i Narrative !
Summary: The NHY ORO EOC demonstrated the ability to identify the need for, and to request assistance from the Federal government. The Offsite Response Director recognized the need for the assistance from the Federal agencies that are available to assist states in a nuclear power' station accident. - He directed the Assistant Offsite Response Director, Support Liaison, to initiate the request for assistance from the Federal government and other agencies. Assistance was pledged from the New England Compact, odier utilities, the Department of Energy Brookhaven National Laboratory and FEMA. Contact with the Federal and other agencies was simulated through the FEMA' Control Cell. A portion of the assistance requested consisting of Field Teams with _a- Team 1.cader and Dose Assessment Specialist and Monitoring Helicopter, were due to arrive between 2000 and 2400 hours on , December 13, 1990, at Pease Air Force Base, Newington, NH. A mobile laboratory was scheduled to arrive during the morning of December 14, 1990. , Issues: Nonc
?
158
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f Objective #37. UTILITY OFI51TE RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS, Demonstrate the capability of utility offsite response organization penonnel to interface with nonparticipating State and local governments through their mobilization and provision of advice and assistance. (NUREG-0654/IBIA REP 1, Rev.1, Supp.1, II, C.S. N.I.b) Evaluation: hiet . . Narrative . Summary: The NHY ORO demonstrated the capability to interface with nonparticipating State and local governments by dispatching liaisons to the EOC's of the 6 Massachusetts communities in the EPZ, hiassachusetts Department of Public Health, the MCDA in Framingham and the MCDA Area 1 EOC in Tewksbury. All of these nonparticipating organizations were simulated by the FEMA Control Cell. The State and local community of0cials informed the ORO liaisons that they would not respond to emergency c-)nditions. Tht's, the ORO functioned in Mode 2 according to the Seabrook Plan for hws.uhusetts Communities.
- Officials provided no State or local resources or personnel to assht in the ORO emergency response. 1.cgal authority was requested of the Governor's representative, and granted, using the Legal Authority Checklist in the ORO plan (IP 2.14, Rev.1, Att. 7) for appropriate response activities. These authorities were communicated to the local officials via the local Liaisons as changes occurred.
All liaisons requested permission of the nonparticipating organizations to go to their response locations. The local Liaisons went to the Staging Area to pick up kits containing necessary supplies, then after receiving permission, reported to the local EOCs (simulated by the FEMA Control Cell). Each local Liaison brotght with them a fax machine, cellular telephone, copy of the SPMC plan, public information calendar, maps, and other supplies to assist the local officials. A DRK also arrived with each local liaison, to explain and provide emergency worker dosimetry to local emergency workers. That individual had a kit containing 50 sets of dosime'ry, as specified in the plan, (TLD, 0-20 R and 0-200 mR dosimeters, KI) and a dosimeter charger. Local Liaisons briefed the (simulated) local officials on the appropriate ORO plans, locations of ACP/TCPs, relevant reception centers and congregate care centers associated with their communities. State Liaisons also engaged in continuous efforts to update the (simulated) officials they were assisting and to obtain and provide information requested by the officials. I 159
t The Local Liaison Coordinator was the single source of information for the local liaisons. This ensured consistency of information, liowever, the inicemation could be delivered more efficiently by a conference call capability. litro copy backup of verbal notifications of EBS mesuges and news releases was not provided in a consistently timely manner in accordance with the praedures. On one occasion, the Salisbury Liaison was questioned about.not getting hard copy and an adequate response was not provided. In a real event, the local officials would hear EBS messages as they are broadcast. All Traffic Guides at N11Y ORO TCPs were asked by the FEMA evaluators what actions they would take if their positions were taken over by local police or town offic!als. All provided correct descriptions of what actions they should take, ir.cluding reporting these events to their supervisor / dispatcher at the NHY ORO Staging Area. Two of the fifty one traffic guides interviewed failed to report that they also should provide dosimetry readings to police or local officials, if these persons did not possess their own dosimetry. One problem occurred in coordination between the NIIY ORO EOC and the Massachusetts Governor's representative. The draft of EDS #3, faxed to the Governor's representative and approved for release, was based on a different prescripted message than the EBS message released to the public. There was no substantive difference between the two versions of the messages and the - version of the message released to the public clearly conveyed the protective action recommendation and all other approved information. Issue #1: DESCRU" TION: There were fifty-one Traffic Guides interviewed. Two did ARFI not know that they should pmvide dosimetry readings to police or local officials who rasumed control of their assigned TCP if these persons did not possess their own dosimetry. RECOMMENDATION: Radiological training for Traffic Guides should emphasize the requirement to provide dosimetry infonnation to police or local officials who assume control of their TCP, i 160
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Issue #2: DESCRIITION: One problem occurred in coordination between the NHY ARFI ORO EOC and the Massachus:tts Governor's representative. The draft of EBS #3 faxed to the Governor's representative and approved for release, was based on a different prescripted message than the EBS message released to the pt.olic. There was no substantive difference between the two versions of the messages and the version of the message released to the public clearly conveyed the protective action recommendation and all other approved information. RECOhlh!ENDATION: Review procedures and training to assure tFat such , errors in mer. sage handling do r.ot recur. Issue #3: DESCRIITION: Hard copy backup of verbal notifications of EBS messages ARFI and news releases was not provided in a corsistently timely manner in accordance with procedures. On one occasion, the Salisbury Liaison was questioned about not getting hard copy and an adequate response war not provided. RECOh!h!ENDATION: Although in a real event the EBS information would have been heard over the radio, timely delivery of hard copy is desirabir,. This should be emphasized in training, l l 161
t OTilER ISSUES: NilY ORO Objective #13: Alert, Notification and Emergency Infonnation. (E.3, E.5, E.8.). Issue: DESCRIPTION: Additional information on residents of special facilities including hospitals and nursing homes would be helpful in NIIY ORO EBS messages and news releases. RECOSIAIENDATION: More detailed information pertaining to special facilities should be included in EBS messages. Objective 25. Decontamination, (EW) (K.5.a. K.5.b) Issue: DESCRIPTION: Unoer adverse weather conditions the wide area probes used outside by vehicle monitors could have become contaminated and/or j inoperative. RECOh!AIENDATION: Provide a thin plastic cover such as Saran Wrap for the wide area probes used for monitoring vehicles and personnel. 162 w
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4 ( t j TAllif 6 Areas Requiring Corrective Actions for Seabrook Nuclear Power Station (Decemi;*r 13,1090 Exercisd Page 1 of 19 j i 1% % kwks/Areng hp6 ting Cermtive 'FITIA-RE1'-1 State (S) anJ Leal IL) - Prnpmd Actual AdLm an! R wmnytmlaters W ~ Rev 1, Prep ==ed Cerredsve Actxms Completam FEMA Eweimt.* of C.,,,, iA- - , Cmrecture Adam Liement er Comments Date State ar=1 tocat Roperee Dat- [' i 6 i Areas !tcquirinic Corrective Arthm: , State of New Itampshire
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Ub,intire t l l i IKh L j- i
'n1 Ikurig tkm: iklay in prairy; .Alest DA N1IOEM wi!! prwvsle tram- Traerwg - Reaparme is edepsate.1131A hs. Tian )
D4 reviewel t!e plan reviske ==I his it U pfaer 4 FCI. =m status luard in tie 110 t ocal iry; b local lia% 110 12/91 1 l ishm hwn emehl in one town Controller ar=1 Emerdee Plan to 1* adc7mk_ FEM A will ev haste 2/wt
- gettmg iro
- orent I CI. ardormatum fmm Cordrol Personnel on the re- Revidan tfws in the 1?C esmiw. j me of tie f n-t laal Liwers to arrive satnw of ECL stattsn leerds 2/91 .
armt im erstres.ted a ddferert '5
- l. attle !! O.
s' was;c peredure int ECL f hwnmendation:. The iTU local magretx latels. : y I inw.cr. slumtJ reive refeier '{r , w trsniry. m tfut ev snformatum k given The Rev. 4 Uplak of tFe ta tie tewis unbl ECL state hw le NIIKERP (2/11/91) added a f
- verifed avst any a<%m tan en is in step to tie liU Contro3fc(s !
5' am r.laew with tlwir procedura A - medtere (Vol 5. Sec 12 0, [ 4 procaturc dwm.* te ntaluted to pg.12 0-3, step M Werwure f I are 11. fsrst r pwnng kval liaism tW all status !=wrds are , stati nwmber verify e d p4 oernmt iruhally clearnt of at y { ' irt st.,rm. er*rc< 2/91 Plan l'pdate. } (Compktd f t l 1 , i i E i- ! ! l i
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- TAlitif 6 (Cont'd). Page 2 of 19 ,
i I 5 iwirmw/Areme R. pariry, Ca.rrective ITM A. REP 4, State (5) arul Lorel (f.) Pro p =ed , Ackel [ j Acts.m aal Fenm>mentaSww for Rev.1 Pregwmf Carrective Actams C,1 :i,. FEMA Evakaten ef C- . .,1 L,. $ I C wrntive Ac&n Ik ment or Commere. Date State and local Rew Date [ l
- Ohjn f nv 2 f i .
j i oral l'OCs: , I
- m2 Deweis tiem
- In rk Tmen of New E1 Ik sunahl EOC Statt in 12/91 Reyne is ad-guate. IBtA will ;
j- . Casic, thrw memlers of t!w EOC staff. El emh c nenuruty are c4fered ersbate tfw portsption I y New ; i in loderg; a Selectman, the I fealth I!4 annual refreskr trammg. ' Castle effwiels in the IW2 cumse_ l Of f.cer twin was avaelal4e on ca!!). anl his i sue will le ensewed tie Town Clerk /AJministrative . . with New Castle offwisi, as A utant,dLi ru t repnt 63 tie EOC put of 11wie enmiel refredn upm nuel 2raten. Deir dutwo were trainrr% > p rtamed ty otkr5 in t1.e IDC. .. , I l Rmmwwwndation- %e abweit LOC e {- t fi penh-rs 4=m1J tw given trairung !
, g . f+. empto we tN,r reywmibletees to [ }- O tNm if ottwr fxtors pretect their - t 1 .D.
foytd.et partwap.etert, either pew , p rumnet simut.1 te wis:rw d, <w tk j l pLm wrref to accept t!wir partial ! j partspat -n with rcre<,pr nt ~ f } ret uhenment of same or all of thir f l J utW. t j ML4 Demi eim: T In sie Town cf Newt m. E.1 TWgnated EOC Staff in 12 /01 Reyme in ade9 sate FD,fA wd1 [ l tie rike offierren duty failed to El caci. commumty are offemi evshsaec tfw enoNTuatwm/rmttficatman ! { imhty the NewtemINI)of tlw* Alert in iI 4 amsal s freder tremmg cf Newt m ceticists in t1= t*C enercise. [
} m timely marwn. Ihm imue *-i!I tw. reviewed with Newtem Polsce with j Resommendatiem: A!! Newtim p.1xe - emM en tlw i,.,,,^ u l af ficers dwml.1 te trained to trarrmat of the tenet.r seitifwat'am of ,
j n.+tific.vi.m ewwp p>rnptly, the12,1D_ i 8 - I. s I [ i f k 4- 2 5 I 1., . e
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, .t , , ' TAlltI 6 (Cont'd) I' age 3 of 19 !
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I kfkk rd.s/ Aeess Roperity, Corm ti<e ID 1A-RIT 1 State (S) ers! t ccal (IJ Prop *wd Actual [ A4ti.m erst Renmwnendatiors for rev.1, PrapM Corrixtive Actiews Compkbon FDtA Evalustwm es C*,mg4etwm I , Correchve A<tum flement er Commeres Date State erst Local Resgwwe Date ; i . ? Objntire .1 ; I
$ tate T( K: .
L i %* Demiptiem: With tk e=ceptum of the A 1 d, We agree with IBt A 12M1 Repovec is ad<wprate. IDT A will y
- m. tut gnav.iutenwry artiert. wisch wm Ala, commerds and efkwt* mil be crainste thie henctum in the 1*82 [
' o*wdieuted af to the t xt with NifY A.1 a, made to deicums IBf A's cierswa i ORO, all PA R's were coordinated mth A.1 b - semmmeestatums as part of i NilY ORO, refrehre tramieg fx PAR .l dechinn makers. [ Remmew ndati.m: . If at all p.ast lc. , j PAR's sis.uld N <corJinated wdh t r rwir,IJw.rmgp rWidkssw Id re l= ing - i i m ied.
- - i O !
t U' 11 0 : 6 t i ! 9M Demig tion: ihanw of tk em .1 to A 1 J. AJJ a step to the tiO e/41 FBf A well evolunte the plan reemim 1 attaw time f..r I:0 C..ntroller briefem A.2.a, Newurce CoordinatVs wlms it is submetted mes! wi11 evaluate fg j the Revurse Coordin.ent dki r=.t A 1 m, Pmcedure (Vol 5, Sec. 24 to tfws may.ct ed 110 ogerabre in the j ] always have teme to revie.w w, A. I .l* Retret the ITU Coveroller 1**2 enestiw. i 1 traie.pwtdwm re guests and to kap to desis:nete en tiU admist l l t tm Nards current Thi. Jet.ywi staff memI= r as the ITU peng informati m to tie tnwww [ j' Pe==rce Coordinalds t thnmgh tie kwat har.o.-w Ani< tant armi accign f
- epwwibibbes as the rimi j i Remenmendatierr
- Provib ar. m<i-tant arms. 9/91 Plan Up1 ate. , j to all..w tt.e Ec mne C wdin t.w F t
pure time far rnarup.ing ve=eurw l
.wtivstW assi cupdatmg ik [
inf *rm tu.n flow to tric Toww 4 i r I e
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k ( I l j TAHII 6 (Conrd) Page 4 of 19 - 4 i\ j' i Ytikme / Arm koperirg Corecctive IL%1A Ett'-1, State (S) and Iscal (O Pror=wd ' Acttral
- At..e .mf Reo.cmwn.lat.nv. for Rev.1, Propwd Cerew+rve Adiums Cornplet=m MAT A Evaluatwm of Comr4rtum Corratrre Acts.m Herm na or Corwnents Date State an! Local Re<pnwe Date l 1ocalt M x uit g. pcy,;pe;on
- Measce lumit.m; twake A 1 J. N1 K)EM will efter beinina; 12 # 1 Ryme is adepete. ITM A will g
down at sn .es in hutsnmuth EXX', Ala, k h-% Portannuth ans evalisate tw enemage lumlimg functium l Jclayinc eccep of inwirmatian b A.? , New+m on the saw of sw f%etnnoteth an! Newton in the l appn pnat taff memte In Newton, A.1 b nwwere W +=f EOC 19N t emerme i approgmat_ fomw were sw3t always rnretaac dhtnbuion as part o el. anl in.p.etant emw . . tk anmial uplate ., icf.w..atsm was written en sie af trasmew. ! 39 at tydivut any sedkatkm ad date. !- t,m.. .c anrjnator NI!OEM will rn*w
- IT\1 A's <,- -c.a .L with
- Reromw.*nJatkm: ' in Ibrtsmouth et is leth Portwnouth ami evo mmes64 risat mesup k lunh4 . New tme of fkiels.
- dmxtly h. (% 111D br Wacten, an!
j g hertlwe dwtrd tion to tus staff. In i G Newton, imp =rtant insormatwn sJemkl 4 Ch , te anew.unm! or erw ugh copics { prmud to ime exh key ger*.m prnmpt mipt. E 1. e J 1 1 I a 1 4 1
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4 i' 1 i - TAI 11.l! 6 (Conrd): Pagc5 cfl9 1 t A tmwwks/Arem Ryernu; C.Mve . FIA1 A-E1.P-1, Stste 03 armt Local flJ PrW Acttel Actum ard Em>mmm.tatwnw for Rev.1, Prop. ed Correctwe Ah Completum . FEMA Evahneemmet Canylet-m j Carmtree Actam Uewumt er Comrneres Date State ami Lccal Repmve Date Obyrctwe 5 f f 0 and Tewy A, Nil State radice: 4 M7 thweirtkm: De l'r115 am! I ccal Ii 3, . 3rdorraatum (ERPAs crac 1281 Reywwe is adequate FDJA wit! ) I iamm Rm.ms in tf e !TO dal nnt lure i 10 a. rr ukw etc) will tw prownled evaluate the irdormetra whm it is 1.W mayw with LTPAs idenhrmf. The 1.10 1 en maps in the argwpiate avadat le.
- . LEl*A ma;w posiint in the Op ratmos - format.12F1
]. Ihm+ wew emt lars;e emegh to tw . s ecucJ tv all statt ew wdn umuitmwrJy In tfw cpvaters eman ef l emy A, Nil Stufe Poke thew m marx that clearly def'end evacuatem 4 n.utes ant /or plume !1'l pp2 tats n 4 by platwng areas, w mer*xm centers.
%e <mly map avstaI4e dreplayed the a
=J 10-mA i PL R .s datiece- Insvile sm-h wp
- in the D41tS mwk awa a-mf tiw liU .
j i in- rwm. At i n-ep A. magw , I dspt , rug tk irdarmata., cieed eNve . aw eymi kw tim egmt>m 4 i 4 I i t 1 i i. i y g- w -rsr-g'.. ei-y ,a 4----.~%,, ,. $- . = . er w _+e = r,w- -us=, , ,-v%am:--w-- m- M .iw-w_ e- e- - ----- -
m t t i $ -- [ ! TA!!LE 6 (Omrd) ' Page 6 d 19 7 4 I 1 -' ; 1 Wiwks / Area 4 Repdring Correctwc IUt A-REP-1/ State (St ani I.ccal (U - Pregw.wd ' Actual f a Ad*m en! Reo.mmentatuma h R. v. L Prepmed Cerratwe Assrve Ceayhtum ITM A Enluetum of Completwm ; C rrective Actam Dement er Comer-* ' Date ' Stew an! Local Fw Date j i f ST S A: $ I W Dewrig tkm: % vere westkr meshteen 11 3 STSA gwcedum kve twn 2/Y1 ' flan reviden is ade;.aee. ITM A w,T! 2M1 j
, atd 1xk of bght for otensel rugid rev.W to inlicate enresises evoluste the ST5A fetum en the sw=t } ! cp vatrwe would affat cutJmw to te taken iv.co aamned 6or '
eterrwe. l J. osvrat- at tie tiredwwwi 5!5A. . rugfd epsters at ek ' i } Recv*womi 515A_ NilRIS.P 'f wh.me 7,Saten 242. . !
- p.14.2-4. j i [
j -: 2/91 Plan Update _ i (Complete) [ j Rn e..*ation: Review STSA t
- promtores e d+-mire if irmloor !
I- g t cihtks or I"t234 $kket km8"S. Ci auf sm.gwary hghtmg would k . icadk t..e m av att et f s
..,,,a, .r. #ir.. .r.,r.e w am conht=wn at otenled rugid
,I-opnatum At a redmmum, some { j gwoentmi from the elements is emeted [ f.w h pgw map enifw m j t
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e I' age 7 of 19 T A111 f! 6 (Om t'd) Prop-icJ Actual Iww2.~ / Ar m re.piiring Cmmine I P f A-FIT-1, stas (si mi t erai tIJ C- * :.m 1:ev.1, l' rop = J Cnemine A&ms Comg4-tu m 5-UtA Frahsatum cf As t.no aewt Wo.mm.,.tatwww f., St* aesi i cral Fe qn.me=- Da tr LFenmt or C mmmt< . Ihw Cover < teve Ad m t't.srs Irt-r 6 levasI Ofi: K 3 a. NIOf At wi!! ctfer 12/M Revyerre is mierute. IUt A wd1
'81 9 11cuript4<m: Tb Gremt.wi entuale th krumkJ.y cf CemlaM K3*, *Li, Sorel Wrwr.n: tor b I Or yl Ottm dit tv.t &rw.w th,t FadL4ywat 0t% m the tw2 i We amt i 15 pdkJ frv m tl ir A4 Greerd.rst t'adk4mimi e,ertw.
.womved mi vr:t to 11 r LWI?I: at licaith Pc ennel R x <pr.h. d in w%n 3 e. of tb-pLm Rcrommcmiat FW9: E'OrtOwT tTW4DC
~Iwys!-j te prov ed.d, to srv4rre mmpi.a,-w e w dh th. pr ud ure-h 1.n, I mpimh wd1 tw phi ett 12/91 h* gem k a le pute. IIATA w,il p e H Dewig ei.m: LW~< -f ath g ACPJiCPS eval.iate t!w a<gn:t of LW Linwl -f ry ,
L3 t., irmerwy Woeker o m ?! Inwrw os News m. heree.m I's t oc tfw i$P22 esenvie. ) o Leic tun, t , rend.ml, ar=1 1 meter her.: b1 K*is.orwm Empwwe hmsts as l on .rre al..ut t. Ibram np-trre 6mits gwrt of the sewmal rhier traimer for 1. cal emng . g ar ! rs p etum gw. _f me a if they w. re wne kers v . p -< t Urg eweestocr*d At h,we- U. Fad.nh,sw 4! ( Heu cru esf thew b>was dvmkl t1w =<!vc= Iw rrw re tr am.d, +h.ull n,-urv t6t wort m rv trawwd, a,*1 Ju *ut i Swt.4 all w. rkers w? wet
.-;..tynwr* n w .d ebaut c.pmere
,4 nemt gw<stims, pet. t<*tv,rm de pit.1.d t-.16 td Ex :stvie
Y I e t-TAllLli 6 (Omt'd) Page 8 of 19 1 i (ktkwesecs/ Areas Req.Aring Corrective FD TA-REP-L State (5) mesi Lccal (I) Propmed . Actual { A t**n mi hcemrmedstaw im Rev.1, Pmp sed Cormtive Actwms . Completen m1A Evaluation of Comy4cten l Comsteve A<bn Ekw9ent er Comments Date State ard I ocat Re=poree Date STSA 4Ihtiingham County) 1- Command Post: 4: l K3 a. TW i=um wiiile 12 /91 Regwre is as quate Of A will j^
- ell t)cmiption: Within tie Command K3b cmr4 mired in refredwe eva!, rate this e of EW kr=>wkdga i Pet at ttee STSA at Rodmgham trammg for aff emogeng in tlw 1*r2 escroce County orw of tir dmimeters Wted wee kers.
twf twt te rer wd ani tir pwr4 in - I w1wi it wa< iated was unaware Itut I tiwwe was a proldem with tie j demwtx Orw StSA stati memiwr
- j. dunge.1 an i.wtial dmimetry readmg 4
ato ra Sul .opumt p-riodic readinr 4 I wo y,tMf memim kwt drir 11 th
. durice, the nercia. Tie Eadw4 gical
- Oit cer wn ent infon wd of ts u e i meurtnwa aM re rm.tatuwts were -
f $ O' weh em the opxun rixard. l , Remmmendaa km: Ikimeters dwmki i Iw revoed t.-*m %,ance in adJitw n } pwmert wie e,A.e sfr gerwral area of i the Commmi Pmt wfu are esta d - Jownctry 1it< shwM meive a 1*fmg j from tiv Rafinbgical(Mfacer to irw.u c l tfwt are f.sm hat wdh the uruts in see. TIE placing. in tfr pwxlw-s of , erv tn.ctions d.c ret isvure they will ! Iw to!!ewed .or read Ihr Radi-k rical Othrer (J=.uld le informed imewdsately of t!r km a f..r any imguimrtis
- during t 5e u.* af Jamemetry i W.wnplucire in STSA antnul training
! that p rwnwl rme:t regvrt tie km et ! r any irregAmtes with tfe v ed ,. J. ~ mw+sy. 1 I I i i 1 1 s *
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c - 1' i t i i TAllt.fi N jCont'd) Page 9 of 19 1' !' {' 1 E4%ww / Areas L gwrirg Ccerectne - e131 A-RD'-1, State (9 mal I ocal (U Frugww d . Actual ; j /htem ant I:w mre cniathms fer Rev.1, Pragwed Carectwe Actiesw Cerapietam . f EMA Evateatum of C**rirtmi ,; Cormt+e Actim Fiement or Commer*s Date Sta+e oral Local Rc5wum- Date- j l.- i l Ohrr? rec ? i i i iield M<mit% i' cam =: l 1- i
- . 'n12 lb Mpthm
- Smw diffemities were 18 - Fevicw la armual &ki 6 /91 ~ ' e' is ade psate. IBf A will 6/91 l emmmt**d in 6niew; o+igmi 1.11 l - mrmrtrmns tram trarwng tte evaluste the ap of fV.d morwhwmg bwtvem ' avastakh*y 4 tlw p;ril map team foncture ir, the IW2 e=cecue 3
in ik froca of the wep Em-+e ., c.,!stiem T43ms +1cul.1 t=- ' t==*As arid mm,44 that , admed af tlw avaAit=1.tv of the erw - - if ar:y p*oblem= are !
- ,.sp armt irwin=1.s! to request enmtin*eved *he Morwtormg (t
- aue-t.mm in.m tk leam Cettmotor if Team Coordiretor sha.JJ be l' tiny a c mt (kar on an ergwd ' contacted for dirntir et -
- 6/91 Trair.ing ar=1 hi f
l .l h A men. j Marms.ori v; Drdi (Compira r) : i .. g ) j -4 Ohr. #mr 10 e w ( { NateTOG
- t't Dmriptiom 11r State inled en nt<.n* IJ Anemal redreder traineep; %n Fey eve is mJerpeste. TB! A will tfw same emelts fnnn tk MDPAC wiB be 3workled he cwelvate this hmetum in the FM2
, dw genkt**es twaue **f ik mal My METTAC operah emenwo. , 't of tk c.,mpreer operasor ta accuratdy mtergm4 the pLmt data sheets as iryat Time trar w g wm s r:A ! data the plant data sleet inrmat to inwre tiet METTAC - himmendati m: Tram the egetats r* pns are faminar with r . that tiev mee famitsar wwh pt.ar t data st. Alwrts tier +r me anj g=,ry-w r i b !: i i , f l 4 !
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Page 10 of 19 TAIll.fi 6 Omrd) I'rnpel Actus! ihirex es/ Arr,v bpirir.g G tre tae fUt A M1t 1, Sbte tS) sal I oral (1) Rev.1. Prepae1 Caerntrve Acterts Comg+ ten ITMA Fvaluatw iof Gwricenn Attum mi Recumnwmiat me wr State r=1 Lacsi I4 parve Dak LL meret or Comments D.ste Correcke Atten Obirrtere 11 11 0 : Arwel refrmhet trsirurgr, 12/*'1 Resporee is adepwte. FEM A wD
'N
- 14 Ikuviptimv: 1 v.xuatims Sceturkp 8 l 10 m evaluew thus aspect of I'AR geners'.km we trel in the cal utitxm en sym-rate m'Jbe renvahl.
in the IW2 c=h-FARs Scenavn 8 awum.- a 501;, t.-,rst pp btenn arvf sv. lub This traimeg mE irable an
*r a rweenes lie 110 DI1IS cnorJmatar aw rtment .-f y=mt4e m<unm3 t!=r tmet p pulaten in le ct m* vruters el awumptm>rn in h trarm of, wMh omkl af fat the whwh are ered m the calcubenms to gererate
(*A empbenwntatum pn cra PARI lie imp rtacre of
- f. Ikming the we urw.s w di it es ommemiatio.-: 1)*.11 0 itrlis Cmed,nator cl.mki i= ew re famitive lac stsessal with t}w a-wumphom trA in fle U calidatrim t%d to pyrweate l'ARs A
'> r+ in~!vr trainery. wim may l e 1*-nefwe. I Ob,rn twe 13
%te TOC:
E S, Nif00M wit 1 provide 12/91 Resp 3 rec is miepate ITM A will
'*Lii Des <T'ptiem: Lini mes.ges were r .t es aluate I HS sew-sace preperaten in always v.wi&f e i refht the cuact !7 traioiry to pmnven-r6pwible for p eparm5=== the 1732 esercee.
ubratam at fle tm.e of the er buare c. of the tits mewges ard Rcrommemlation: Train ?!w preperers will r.-riew IBtCs a,*1 rewm et LI6 n,wce< to comments with t*rm_ nn-bfy gw.-cirtal fr=wres t . retint ti. w stum at th. tmw of fl=-ir iaummc e
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L 1 Mit E 6 (Cont'd); Page 11 of 19 '-
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' FEMA RET-1, State (S) arm! tocal (t) Prop.med Actual ..;
IMicicaies/ Areas Rojiiiring Corrective Comg4etkm We 1, Propsed Corrective Actiom Completi<m Fa.1 A Evaluation of i Action and Recommenf atiom for er Co nnw nts ' Date . State armi Lu .4 Regervie Date i ' . Correctiv-c Action Elen ent e M 14.
Description:
Ells ryssage #5 ,tates E.
- C4medination asui ' 12/ 91 Resperse is ade piate. fBf A will l evahsate UlS memage/swws release ;
tIut tN radi.: tion release coe.mencal at ve<ification will le cmducted in the future to awardi.iathm in tk IW2 ewerciac. -[* ISIS while a Utility swws se e.+r states i tiot tie rdcase Ngan at 1(19 asmare the avoidame of mnflicting s*:.tements - , Itecommendation: Meases es sta ulJ t=- l taen tiensure tlut inforn athm . T his wiH te emphasized a released to the gml4ic has L vn during annual training. ctw*reinuted avul verified for ecurAy to - avoid conflictmg statenwntA ' Ubjective Et Media Center: L M17 Demiption: ' Alt!wugh tN NIi PIO G5a, Coordinathm and verifka- Q/91 Respm is adeguate. FEM A will l' G.4 a, tion will be conducted in the evaluate Uls rnewage/ news reicaae
- -j corrutly duracterized the status of ta' simwl children al the 1615 twiefing, G.4 b fu'ure to assure the coordinatkm in the 1M esercise. ;
I avokiance of conflicting ;
- 1. tis awmages omtaining inuccurate j statements.
infarnution on tN status of whwl
. chadren whVh J d not reflect tk This will te emphasized situathm at the time of their issuance were distributed in the Media Center. : during arwmal training L
j Itcrommendation: Closer amrdination .. an! review of FilS neges shrsuki r%ur to enam tb dktributton of f mf..tnutum to tiv- rwws media wtw_-b reflects lle utuathm at. the time of .I .t
. t%U3 tic, e
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t j: TA111.li 6 (ContW . Page 12'of 19 IMkkwh/ Areas Re.ghiring Corrective ' - IliMA-REP-1, State (S) aM tecal (L) Propneed .
; Actual
. AtGn aid Recommerdations for Rev.1, Propwed Correctwe Actions - Completion 1 FEMA Evaluation of Completen Corwtive Action - IJement or Comments - Date . State an! Local Rc=porse Date Objective
- 16
. ITU-
*e-19 Dewriptiom 11w Potas4um lodide .
- J.10.f N11 me;rees that furtin . ' Training Re=porne is adequate. IBtA wili f Worksleet wl&h is ened to deterrnire trainirg and crienta&n 12/ 91 evaluate tk process for ik the sw. J (or tiw inr,esWn of KI was amt sindd be offered to the Plan cutle ization of KI in the 1992 exercise.
completed. Drils RitrA .and Darator Update of DrilS. 9/91 . Recommend eion: Tiw Elif A at tiw 110 Alnuld be traises in tfe procedures ' Confusion arnse when the ta o.mplete tins workslet and pravide '!!C Coordinator requested . tk result.; to IN 110 DPIIS preautlerization for KI Coordinator prior to a recommerdation a t:ninistrahn from the ! to take KI. DPI15 Dir stor should action ~ kweis te exceeded The
- U
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Director mistook tir request as a request for .
- 4 autlerization and prematurely autierized ik i use of KI by emergency workers. In additiers the i 110 Coordinator sinuld fax a copy of the K1 worbNet !
. to tie DPl!S Director to; i provide projected thyroid ;
- dose docuneentatwn, lhe ;
DPIIS Dirator skuld tkn complete and sign tie j-Emergency Eupsure
- Authorint'x l'erm. l t
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- Taut.E 6 (Cont'd)l Page 13 of 19.
1M.cierwies/Arex; Ecquiring Co n ctive 1:EMA-REP-1; State (S) 2nd Iocal (t ) l'roposed Actual Actum assi Recen. men.iatims for lhv.1, I'royused Corrwtive Actions Cem;& ten . FIMA Evalua an of Completxm Corrwtive Acten' Llement - or Comments Date State arsi t_ocal Respowe Date
' TC P-CM-01:
v14. Desnripti.m: Whrn notificarian was . J to.e, NilOEM will emphasize fis - .12/91' Respome is adequate; int A will . rneivat tiot K1 a.lvmkl be taken tiu J.10.f . issue in tiw refresher . evaluate EWs 11wwledge of the
$t ite 'In grr eimutated inge*t6n of a training procedures for tie use of KI in tlw .
. K! tat 4ct, fewme, Iw <!kt set advise - 1W2 exercise.
etire enwrgency wmkers (IUT
; g.muuwl) ta ingest KL Recommendation: Pnivide train'ng to '
cnsure ttut ru>tifwation to take K! is
, toenmunicatal ta all enwegency-workers wie enter tir 17Z.
I ocal FOO
. w j *C1 Duription: 11wre was omfusion as to J 10 e, ' N110EM will review t!ss 12 / 91 Respmwe is ; 3 equate. IB1A will tie transmieson tral tie meaning of J.10.f process with DPflS to seek evaluate EWs knnwiedge of the i . tiw mewage "autnorizinpf the ingestkm further clarification and will procedures for the use of KI in the
.4 Ki ly tiu- Nil Shte DPIISi Alude this information in 1W2 exercise.
exi6cally at fartsmoutit - sut sequent training for emergerry workers. Recommendation: [*rmedures for 18 e auti..rinten of, and ingestion of, K! sb. uki tv revi. wed. Siro- t145 af6t; ail emergency workers key officiak ., i sinuu recesve seinstwr trainiry,, 4 darifying tie nw.nsng of the l aut! .rintbn proem i i t
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~ TAlit.E 6 (Cont'd) Page 14 of 19 l>cli& wies / Arras Rapiiring Corrective ITM A-REP-L State (S) and local (1) ~ Propsed ~ Actual . I Atum ani Rwommersiawm for . - a<cv,1 Propmed Corrective Adirms . Compic&n FEMA Evaluation of . .Completon !
Corrective Action Element or Comments Date State arsi local Resprwe Date .. Otijectin .019 + II0:
%21 Desniption:' IN spsial seeds Anrr. sat trainirg for tecal - RcSerse is adequate. FE!M A will J 10 d, 12/91 trareport.ithm ist was not sent to the J.-4 g Town 1rarvprtahn .
evaluate tids marct of sp cial rude IFO radio raom for trammittal to tie Coordinators will empbmire . respwee in the 1992 ewrense I hilsbomugh 11rputy Sherif f in the run- reg =nsiNbties/ duties of participating town of I tampton. ' Wisle special rweds respwne, tk ikputy Sheriff lud tk defudt ' . including trarsportaten. r vahws, le did rut have the uplatn! rejuirerrent uplates. 1991 and veritial pial reeds list for Ilampton 1N 110 localI iaiam for - IFO Liaiess will te Euta did rut contact E=eter with an prewntni with specific j , cylanathm provi. led by tie Nautree situa%rs during drills to j Cmerdicator of !) why the tawn's. provide trainity and 1 [ r. pst for 220 ini temversion nits evaluaMn on sycial reeds o was deermst ta le e=cessive ani re<pirsiNiities. 1991 .;
- 2) wb-re +'w mnverskm kits ta nwet !
tids need were stowd.
- V j
Recommemlatsorr TN Ilampt.m ant E cter Local I iaiw>m along with tk n prviNe person in tN E=cter LOC ; need additiovul trah&g in tir overall aspst.4 e f sgvcial tw& reporse. P SMA: i t
%22 Dewription:-Two drivers lud J10g We will omtinue to train 12/91 Reg = wee is adequete. FEMA will ditfwultws 64 towing the nup. drivers in map reading ord evaluate bus dnvers* aNlity to have drivers familiante cinnplete ruutes in the 1902 czercise.
Recommendatiom Centinue to train- timmelves r>ith maps prior , iirivers in followmg nsp. It would in beginnmg their routes. -! a!u te uwful to emplusire that drivres -
. rn-I to shufy mapa in adverw of !
- departore from tlw starnng area ratkr
! tion waiting until underway. '
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_I TAHW 6 (Cont'd). Page 15 of 19 i a f , Odkiencies/ Areas Requiring Corrective ' FEM A RIT 1, . . State (S) and local (l.) I'mpw.ed Actual
. Action an! Remmnmdatiors for Rev.1, . Progwed Corrective Actions -- Completion FEMA Evaluation of - Completion - .;
- Cerrective Actinn - Element . or Comments Date State ord Iscal Re= pome Date ~
t Imal IOCm . [
%21 Desniption: In the Exeter local TSA. ~ J 10 d, Annual trainirg (local EOC 12/91 Reapome is adequate. ITM A wi!!
tlw staff nwmter left the local TSA J 10 g . Trampertation evaluate tMs in the IW2 e=cecise. i prior to arrival of ist tus frem the Cwedinators) will g i SISA for uw within the Towrs emphasire tie {
. mmmunication cluin of . t Recommendation: lletter communica- commarsi t*cen town tium. unterst.udieg, arsl procedurce LOC and LTSA regarding .
between the town EOC an? Incal TSA resources and securing -r shout.1 tv estat li_.!wl to emure tlut all operations. 1991 - purties are aware of tk ruimkr of , asets teing disgutclad so t'ut ; someone is available to give f in,trutt om ani rnap to driver - U 'G2 4 Desairtiom in the 'Iown of Newton a J 10J Feview in annual trening 12/91 kmnee is adequate. FU1 A will 4 nspet for additiosulImses was made J 10 g with the local Town evaluate this in the 1'F2 exerci=e. to a numkr other ttun tie 11U Incal - Tramwrtation Coordinators I laien as stinstated in tfw plan ami the procedures for-panlures. requesting trareportation resources. 1U91 Recommendation: More training needs to tw provid<d for tie Transportatic,n Coordinator at the Newton EOC to ' enmere wrrect actions in regetirig s trairp rtatim mts ; A
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Page 16 of 19 TAlltli 6 (Contd) - IUf A REP-1, , State (S) ar=1 local (IJ Proposed - Actual INikierwies/ Ar as Neigtdrisw Corrective O*mpletw>rt Rev.1, . Propied Corredive Actions Completk n . FEMA EvaluaSon of Action ani Recomnwwiatienu for . State ard Local Repree Date llenwnt or Comments Date G+rrective A&m .. Ohfrrf 6e 19 State I:OC (Day Care Notifiers):
- Day Care retification by 9/91 FEMA will evaluate the plan updates 9k25
Description:
Martha's Care in ) Ser;*ttum u tv>t'rvtined of tle Alert " DPilS persorew4 is a tertiary whm tfwy are submitted anf will , emtil 1451 w!,ich was af ter tie SAE Int baskupsystem. Sirert tone . evaluate tis furwtion in the 1992 alert radio, anf local EOCs - ~exerc M twn declased. pro 1 ride primary rm.tificatiott Reco:omendation: Day Care Notifwra at the State EOC sleul.1 kap the day NilOEM wit! review this-care centers informs of t!w situation in issue with DPllS ard a more tim !y nurwer. Day care clanges as app.u,riate will notifwes ilmuhl rewire tresher training. le inchded in sutwepent plan uplates, FEM A will evaluate the plan updates s , J.10 g NilOEM will review tis 9/91
-J 'abre Descriptioru lhe sta+e day care center wtwn tfwy are subnutted cad win
- notirwes would not or did mt answer issue with UPils ard clons;es as appropriate wiU evaluate t!s function in the 1e02 quntem from tir day care center enerme.
operators. be included in sul=cguent plan sbarges. Recommendation: Revicw plan and resise if t*xesury to provide sufficient perwrtw! so tfut tlwee will be time to arwwer hy,itim*te tyhorn 11w two
*taf f nwml=-rs mumg ite switibcation were clearly nolel to make att nects sary ' calk 4
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Page 17 of 19 T.\ ll! I: 6 (Cont'd) Prop M Actual t M a L-rrL- / treas Re gerriry; Corrw fue F I Af A-R!-'Itl, State (S) and local (U Compkten TEM A EvalueSan of Compktkm 1 t on arw! Kecommowiatmew fu. Erv. I, Propvd Correctise Actnrs Date or Comments Date State and I ocal Recpors; ( o rei fit e Ai tion Iknw.t 1I O-
]FO I saiwtw wit] lie 12/H Ecep.vese ig adepaste. FEMA will '*! 27 Dmription: 1Iwr I oc.il I ianens for ' j 10 g pre-entni with vific evaluate th's hrnction in the 1992 i fam;4an, N..rth f lampton a,w! caern e.
kotwo.wl dal mt to i .e trarwp>r-situatiore during drib to penvile training and fatwn ve.}useems nts af ter =.clumi Coimpwaitly, more evaluaten on trarwpirtation
.f e. m r~.a!
r~. ora 4 wout.1 luve != en wot to a.inastments- IW1 f f ~ towns flun rnpiired Ret ommen d ation: llu I ocal I i,uums f ar llampton, N. l f ampt..n. afst liresitwo..d n v,1 a.ldetkinal tru:Wne in 1 o. al i i.u+n gyncnj ure<. g I ocal i OCs: a 12/"I Reportse is adeepsete IEM A will
- j ltig Tiw PAR proceM ar f
*t2% Dr u rips:on: 'il=r LMI)in Gree-nbtul evaluate tins s<prct of PAR impt.-men-dn of nf to .-f = (1-r tir % f uel du!Jren nu rdirutson with tbc !!U ws:1 te reviewed with tie tatmn in tie 1W2 ewrriac arwi est nh,i the s1* hering a tion Grecrele.d LOC staff dunng beyorni n..tnnt dady .6nu, sal tmw.
armual taining. IW1 whicii was mt rewdstent with five
- ta :
det sw m Rcromm-ndation: Ctm coord!.ution i- requirni 14 tween the Greenlatwi
! t K. the 5 tate 1 OC arwf the !!O to en-cre t!ut t!w .orrwt P Alk are m>Ierst ml and frard.mitmj ucurately
+o sti n--p.n si. rs Refre her training dv utt le iomidee.sj for fle- Gewnfarst
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a P TAIll.E 6 '(Cont'd) Page 18 of 19 - ; IWienM/ Arem Requinng Corrective - FEM A-RIT-1, . State (S) and local (O . Prapwed ' . Actual Actum and Recomnmlatiorn for Rev.1, Propel Corrective Actiers Corrpletion , IBiA Evaluation of Completion ; Corrective Actim - . Elenwnt or Comments Date ~ State armi 1.ocal Response ' Date : l Objectare ,1s
. Loca1 FOCs: . ;
i i OC 29
Description:
In New Ca tie, ore key A4 lbip ated EOC Staff in 12/91 Rep is a'dequate. Int A will ; staff psition(Seintman) was rmt filhl, each community are offered . evaluate tk participatio. of New I
.v. .te.igeutul by sk plan - aramal refresher trainir g. Castle of ficials in tk 1992 caercise. .
- his iwue willle reviewed l Itecommendation: "Ihe Selectman with New Castle Mfkials as i slamid le gisen refresher training to part of their annual refrester I
. reempfmire his spmsibihties in the training.
contumity of cenergrney ogerations ; Obiatet-e 22 . g NIIY-ORO: l (D t O
~
W M Demiption: 1he ORO PNC did set E.8 Coordination of tk public Plan Peep >ree is adequate. IBTA will .v c.erdirute e,ith the New llamgwldre alnt and rmtificat:on proces Update evaluate the plan update wkn it is - ~f willle reviewed with tk submitted and wi!! evaluate ' Stat LOC Operations Office in 9/91 accordarw with their prmwf ures. OI?O PNC during armuel Transng coordination of the public notification , training in 1991. 12/91 proces with Nil in the IW2 ewertne ; Itecomrnemiation: Provide fisrtier tramine, to l'ubbe Information stalf on 1%e pro <wf ure (IP 2.13) will 4 pop-r coordinatum with Nil EOC _ be revised to clarify an ! g rior to pulmc lert and entifica%rw attempt at mordination with tiv N1I EOC prior to public , alert and ratificatiort 9/91 ; Plan Update. i i P i
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- TAllt.E 6 (Cont'd) Page 19 of 19 1
1Muen&E/ Arc.u Reipsting Corrective Int A-RLP-l State (S) and tecal (L) Prop w d Actual . Actum aest Rnommmiatims for Rev.I,Supp.1 ~ l'ropv.ed Cerrative Actions - Completion ' FEMA Evaluation of Completion Corrective Actum Elernent ' or Commerits Data State arul Local Resp >rse Date , Obin tire D Ambulanc: Crew:
- I l
1 W-31
Description:
Ile Amlmtancecrew KSb, Amlu;ance crew pmcedures Plan ' Resparw is adequate. IDTA will fastni to renere shoc coverings prior to L4 will tw revbed ta irdicate Upfate " evaluate the procedural _revisien when .j entering tie amtmlarv - Alm,they' tlut corbmirutbn mntrol 9/91 et is sulmutted and will evaluate t)w failot to relay the estent armi tygv of practices will be Training implementation of tlwse functbru in 'r o.nt., min.itom to the hi-y4tal as implement.4 at the MS.1 - 12/91 t!w IW2 esercee. required in thor prawf ure. Ile hm.pital. 9/91 Plan Update.
- Sprial Vehick Dkpatelwr won not I miciwd of a deviatum in the precib!' Arnbulance crew trairurg I ro u te, will irtiode a review of tlwir p ocedures during tie next f Rwnnmendation: Amtmlarwe crew annual training in 1991.
- l v
p sivmki receive refreslwr training in -,
$ tivir pnicedurn Spdal veldde dispatcher anmaal training will
[ emplusire iterrs t!ut rJouki . y ' tw covered in ambulance crew briciings,irwitaling . advicing the dicpatclwr of , any deviatiors from premibed ruutes ard ; contarnitution control .., l memures. 1W1. , i i b 1 h l I i
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4 TAllt.fi 7.. Areas Requiring Corrective Action Tracking Table, Seabrook Nuclear Power Station Page 1 of 23 Obyctive NURFGD64 - Sul sequently IT MARIT 1 Tested Corredive Excrase FEMA 'Rev.1 (Faerme Action Venfied Curtent Ivo, i kwnytion ' D.ste Obyn tsve Refceence ju dsdsction Action Taken thee) fi.e, Results) Satos M 24' One bus route stnp map 2/29 % - 110 g New lbs route strip maps wig .6/28/8A In 1990 whue 2 out of 25 C . had a mnfu-mg area whhh f lampshire be upgraded to support 12/13/93 driven reung mutes wtil regmre snap to be resolution of this comment, had difficultwo following madd -J . their reaps, th poblem s
- 6/89, snaps revised and did not appear to be with !
inaued. the quality of the snape. . See M 22. '! M1 The sp. kewnan for NiloE~M 2/26/M - G4a New Additional training wiD be 6/28/ftA The N!! I10 provided C .f at wtical time
- did not flamphire provided during the next 12/13/90 cornp4cte informatien !
appar fully knowledgeable anttual cycle to ensure the about New IlampshiWe or,important asprets of the spokeernan for Nil OfM is renponse and pretertive , emerrcewy rian thoroughly knowledgeable adian during the 2 on the NilRFRP. Ihrember 13,19% ' enerdee.
- PD Trairdag was H cornpleted in August.
r3 10/19/89 letter. i Et i lhe 1% faercise twue #49 2/26/M - F 1 b, New Coordination between the 12/13/90 Da-ing this emerrine the C refers in an operational J 10 g liamphire State Staging Area and the Rockingham County "[ need for prdinatu.c htwood IUC will be Command Poet did notify [ between Ihntwood and the addressed during annual and mordinate with the F<*1ingham County traimng for the Brentwood RX . t ornrb Alihough the Rork.ingham Cownty , 9aec Transportation 94ging Staging Area and Area 1%:coures have been firentwned FOC Staff.
- o. 'AnprJ with mrwidera- i tme for traffy v ken.. the
- Training was conduded gm bra thewche. *ie for Staging A en staff in not rew% the < ae August and for IWntwend RE s+aff in January,10/891ctecr. .,
- l br, Tradsn< 'IaMe this only thow items frorn the 19% New liarophire emerer,e which were shown as remaimng open in the " Report on the States of Corredive Adians, Fires l'aerciw and Drill e y ir.1 ** to Ims, r.t the heatch of M. sine and New Ifaraphire, and New it.rmphire Yankee s Offsite Responw Organiration, for the Seat >mok 9ation, Janumey twW
'l
. oe Page 2 of 23 TAllt.l? 7 (Cont'd)
Obpri tive NURT G164 Sutwapently Tested Corrective liA1A El P'1 Corrent
%crise Action Vmfied
! arreise !111A Rev.I A< ton Taken ILtc) G c Results) Status Iwuc ! h s ripeton DATf Obrtve Reference jurisdichen 12/11/'*) Th. addition of a perwn C 6/N/** A1d New The 6/M Revision to the M- 1 lbc N11110 at Meda .
to work more clowly llarnphire NiIRf RI'rontains an addi-t ' enter w.n obwrvni on a wdh the PlO was tiottal staff rnernber for emmber cf m ramms having benefnial and enade for a Media I;aison datics at trooHe tv.s. brng his room effi4 vet operation. Nil State F1)C This
< u+it, f part at the $* ate j person Mll s;vnd enere I4 M' 141 di l brw in contatt with the PnO.
The irnportance of constant Ill.)(Drstm1 will be rnnform! with training
- IT training menpicted in August,10/19/PJ letter w
(D LJ J
TAIII.E 7 (Cont'a) Page3 of 23 Objective NUREGWA4 Subsequently 11 M A-RFP-1 Tested Corrective , th:dw - ITMA Rev I (berrise Action Vmfied ' Current [ Olyctive Action Taken Detc) (i.e., Feoults) Status Iwoe Ibirtwn I1ste Reference Jurisdictwn H2 Notifkation and 6/28/M 4 F New The fan machine was 12/13/'s The Ibrtrmouth S15/. C rommunicatmn with tbc 1larnpehire irutially reywrted to be was ederated froen the Ibresmnath Cirric Tkssiness broken, he.vever, fu 1her Portsmcuth Onie Cer.ter %ging Area was to evalustron indicates that l'usiness Center to the le masle by tag. lhe fau this was due to operator's New flarnpshire Port rnathine dad not work. (I') errer, not to the mm+ine . Authoney Cemr4ew in st*1f. Training will be Portsmouth, Nil but was provided to ensure not activated for this op stars know how to use exercise, The ARCA imm equipment. 1W enerdse dealt with cernmurutabors ddficul-
- Training module reviwd tie
- with the Portsmouth ;
in July and Staging Area ST5A. In addition, doe to j staff tramed in August, the IW1 plan revision, 10/19/M letter. the sawnd $15A has been ebminated Therefore, ! pa U' the ARCA is now conn-da dewd ckwd.
** 3 Same of the radios leg 6/29/M 4 F New An instrumon sheet for 17/13/5U De f>puty Sheriffs C uwd by staff in non- ' flarppshire batty rotation, and assigned to a!! non-prti-parti.ipating mmmunities quarterly ir spwtion has cipating communities' cup-ncrmi paar .creption been developed. local 15As had both goality due to weak radio Additional batteries base operational battery-t aterrin. (l') been provided. operated portable radwo end radios in their
- 9/M,Ibiteries provided, vehirice which had the ingtraten sheet capabil'+y of operating in provided. 2/M, the local area and quarterly inspn1 son throughout the Courey.
etartal. No problem were neted with either the battery-oprated handheid radios or the radios rnovnte f in the*r vehicles. Frc=h barteries were availabic for the handh 4d radias. o O O% g
a .
+ ,
o e, a Page 4 of 23 TA11117 (Cont'd) ObMve NURI t MwN Subnepently lested Correstve i I .M A 1(I l'-1 Cure t (fierrw A< tan Verihed I .cr.iw I1MA Lv.1 Status Refer.we ).msfution Actmn Taken Ibte) (i e . Results) fs oc i b n pez..n i b:c Otyei tac All Media Center day 4ays 12/11/'O tbplays bswl the TGs C 6/28, F8 5 Gia New
**4 % do '.-nter - Ibere were will be upgreded to and tunes dec lared, ru, map., avaitat le int news itemphire incarporete three prot-ttve seemne. and t n.-no,cs tut 4 pixecay comments. Maps of i w other important depn tc4 cve. u.enon mut.s, information. Mape g4urne Empsore &
plume t l'/ p pol wr. , Ingestion F= mere d**F4 87 i "8Ih** FI7 reart..m 4 voter > leations, with FEPAs with rathway FI'I wdt be c.ce,n3 ste e are ..rnter populatsuns, evacuation corppiled & pbced in the 1.., + e m thenc we no routes, rneption tynters Meda Center. The man
..tu .n t . ard prc<rt in the will inctede mapr evacua- and radmiogical 3t .fi wora ny, an . (G .1,i tian mutes, acms & trafhe morntonng prnes were !
I control pints, ppulsbon need elfeetvel y dunng data & the l<w stans of the news briefings ernergency factities A status board will te made available in the work.ing
.rca.
(D La
- f./P9, Medi.a Center displays upgraded and are in place, 10/19/889
!cttee.
TAllif.7 (Cont'd) '
. Page 5 of 23 -
W"
; NtJREGM54 Subsequent?y ITMA RII*.I . Tested Comrtive I:metciw ITMA Rev,1 !
(Eacense Action Verrfd Current l2ve ibwwrtan . Date Otp:t> ve Fr!cs. nm Jurtsdirtum I Attum Taken Date) (ie., Results) - Status
' RA % - Moe but drivers, ' '6/2R/Nt 6' . K.3 m, K.3 b New Additional trairting on - 12/13/W) ' Bus and eri*I ***ds C-amt ulance driver +, town !!arnNire desimetry equipment ard . vehide drivere read their gyrsoon.4 and a few Int evrnsure contral une witi dosimeters every 15 y+hcc did rwe roomerir- be provided to all '_ mir***.
curesure via the use et emergemy werkers.
' d,.m wtry ajuipment and exposure centrd letruction cards willbe '
procedures (k3 a and b) provided to eII Ecid workers These will be - stored and distributed with the doeirnetry
* .1999 (Training)
Training module 2 & 19 were revised Tra.irar g g w.s .emp4eted es p.-t co of anceal training cyrie. c1 4
+ 6/89 0nstruchen 'entd) 6/89, Instncten card -
develeted and distributed.10/19/09 letter. t I e g g MS
. . . , .~
*. -*.. :\
TA11I li 7 iCont'd) .. Page 6 of 23 9 Obyrrtise
- NURTG 4 E*,4 Sub equeutty llM4-RIT-1 Tested Cerrestve -
l'acrase f1MA Rev 1 . (Denise Action Venfied Cervent - f 3ue IWT:ption - thee t % tne Referennr - ' Jurisfiction Action Taken ' thte) Ge Resalts) Statue i N- %me New R&aws 6/2*/e n 3i . .J. 5, G 4 b New Set. of draft news releases 12/13/W ' In somein.tane i coerained Need to b r=w" llamphire ano (E messages sviH be . premipted enessages informat.on and v.houhl c= pended, f.hpartment of were me always medafici , have more poivrly been Eclocatsen Premfure wi9 to ref!nt the casd inori n lIN mmiges or a a be empended to situatien at the time of reviwd iIti me. sages iw!ade steps ter providing thest imacre. Gnverurtend %me IIM .. xhool related ETE menage , I mmares im Led impartant 'nput.. ir forn.abon. (I3 ar J G 4 b)
- 12/819,11an revisci j E
1 4 Preperces will be trained t on dew @g apprornate . .j' I1H message and cews relcaws. w m
- Trainir6g medule 21 was
'J reviwd.110 training was conduded in .[
August,10/19/99 letter.- M7 New Ifam phne 6/2*/M 14 G4a New The 6/48 Revision to the 12/13/W ihe N!!110 pertirspa'ed C spAc m n, mhite gen.raMy llamphire NilRIRP adds a tevimeral in ptees conferenews at prof 4.vnt, dmonstrated an asetact to the Media the Media Center and , apparer.t ask of knowbfge Center Repe$cntative. provided co nplete. [ regard: cit emergency informatien abou the Nil plannng zone bucs (G 4 m) Both gwrsoncel will be mpense and poetectswe l trained thoroughly in the actions Ile deoc4 rated RI~RP. a kneewledge of
**"R*7 PbieS
- 8/?8. Plan reviwd inswes. l l
- 8/M, Training was cornpleted as part of 4 annual training cyde.
'I v
I 6 i 4
. - , a
1 i Page 7 of 23 TAlti.I! 7 (C<mt'd) l oby.+ ,e NURT G 068 Subsequently Teored Cervective iTAfA-RfT*1 Corwnt Rev 1 (!;.e m e Acber. Verified I =cr4.c fTMA (i.e. Ire, arts) srae Refe rern lors*.fic son A< ton Taken Dete) Iwie Ikeng4mn liste Otyvbse 12/13/93 in r+0 while 2 out f 25 C iM J10J Ne.i Maps w U be reciec ed to
**4 % int dnvers had &!6culty 6/28/M ddvere run#ng route liarnyc hire snake them ricarer &
in resfing or (oflowmg the hed drffindties following concise.14us route ot-ip rn a,% Map larked de' ail their mare, the poblern mape wiB be reviewed and arn! necur*y ti 10 di revised to enau e maps are d.d not appear to be with clearer, conn e and ensure the custery of the mape toutes are corred., Map %e 9122. will inckde reregniraHe landmarke, key ycints & Ley inserw*doce as pas.ible. Additional traineg for dnvers will be provided in ncitannualcyde.
- 6/84(Map )
p W 6/% mere revised and imed.
- 1*7 (Trairung)
Modul4. 19 was revi ee i . 7/N Trairnng we, orng4eted as part of annual training tyde Addibenal treining el! be 12/13/m The deossen reada et the C 1, therewo.tf att.-r the 6/ = m 14 J 10 g Ther t wand 9e State RK was for erbnols et d provided to staff rnernbert t,s d to du !ter w.r1 to be released at the end v.ce:wd, the w Irceman m Ibrtsn euth, on ,wotettre att.* ens. o8 the normal event day-
. Saree afled the $wawy N.I
- Traimng module 4C The onwes of Nntwcod
*a ud to te ll tf<rn to 1.t the med Pot smmth (RK cpe-ations) was cb4drentJetbsrnormat irnr4 wnted tN, revised. Bren wood was t.os rn an h mie. In trained in January, dens'w e Ibitanurith, t*>e m Amis 1%rtsmouth was trained were en!J en ef fet rady in Jone, N/19/M le+ter.
dami-u! and to buf.1 opfy f anh kry rhtdren by the tut. ...th I i n' :l 10 g i
e c'.... 4 TAHl.E 7 (Cont'd) Page 8 of 23 Nt1RFG 4V54 ' Sut,equeertly IFMA Fir-1 Tested ' Correr1tve :7 I merrb I f'M A Rev.1 (bs - ' Actsen Veribd Curwnt f 1%ue I.Wrir eion IWe Ohrstire Refernwe ' ' jurisdiction ' Action Tshe ' Thee) G e. Re,afts Statua
?x 10 In wver.1 cae, the m4p . 6/2R/M 14 J 10 g New fkee Route strip mapc w:B 17/13/93 ~ Mape utdised by the bus . .C' h4J woocg intem+m or Iimphire be reviewed and eevimt se driver, fee the day are tud we.mg aJJem whk h emove inser=< tion /ed- center, have beca reewed ;
c ntel prehles for thw dresses are wrrert and to show cormt addrewes , dnwes , y 10 g) ' anrise. mad 4. .. L Fifteen E of the !? drivers had no Drivers wdl be presided diffruity. The reweining , training en foCoweg route 4 re:rtes were meetmfatly ? instructiers m ma en ee icDowmg day. ;
- 6/*9 (M.p ) l .
6/P9,ineps revised and I imuci . , i
+ 1*9(Training) [
Tramieg nodule 19 was ; p revised to irdade y foDowing route instruc-tien. Traini"6 was. , memy4eed as part of the i annual tratemg cyne. ' t t I
~
t
, , ,m.. .~. ._ . _ . . ~ . . -
i Pag,e 9 of 23 TAllt.fi 7 (Cotit'd) l
<w-l Ntmf Gac4 Subwpently Temed Corrective 1 !MA-RlY 1 Actma Verif,cd Curwnt l Rev 3 (LW rwnsw iTTfA t htet (ie. Fepults) Statias R.4crem e Jurid.cten A+n Taben 1-ne t ts npren tue obet w 12/11/90 All reecito,s at the C l12 New Emh CIN 7m (or 8
- 11 Wmtors de.1 no? 6/2*/*4 21 Mandwater Re}h mee stm+f y uw bee f <e-ts lismphire egoicalent) imed by the State for radiobryral Center and the m NL geformm ;
momering parnws is Emergency Weder r,onermg () 12) Center used headwis am.mpanied by a headwt. l The 9mte ha, e t Hished e iweed with the CIW N0 l sets. quarterly enaintenem
-g,ar. b a-da-with Vel 1, Set 2.43 This l pgram eneuws that all f
radiobgical equipment is in e constant remte of l readmess. Trmnmg for l rnon: tors w,Il address the l need for monitemng l I persortnel te omtral l p background r==re ami l C indode ;-actical sesmons O wha strew rnemtrenng in a omsy enwrnmnent.
- IW(Training)
Training was mmpleted as part of the animal tratnma cyde. g &4
c .: .'.. i-i TAHIE 7 (Cont'd)- Paca 10 of 23 5 i Mve ; NURI'G&54 Sub=equently , it MA RIP-1 Teated ' Corrective ! Ihr<6e : . Action Verdwd Corrent
-ITMA Rev.I (Emeedse bue IWri;&n .,1 hrte OEyctne Rderence Jurisdirtron Action Taken ' Date) - 6.e. Results) I Sta+ws . f 4
1'
* * - 12 W F +diological Srcening 6/28/PA 21 J 12 New W preredure win be - 12/13/90 W Radiologir31 C i l'n.gnm at the State IW- Itamphire . reviewed and redsed for . Sacecmg Program is -
DI1 t9 levd was m.t wen lan9 uplate. Duties and snenitored and directed ! developd rdatae to wtm re pensibilities of openfic by the UtilS the
- has spede Jotic and IN1tS personnel wiD be , Asses = ment pervennd et engnutshties for n. ore e=plidtly described. the State IOC under the .E in picmentaten of tbc dirntion of the IArener prarem. 4 T2)- ' Training of these personnel of Public Ifeelth. The wiB ectur during nemt duties and ec=pensibilite annual cyde. of sy-rific IM'Its personnel are more
,i
- 1989 Gian) emp4witly describnf in the'
- 12/M Plan reve.ed. revised premieres. i
'?
- W4 firminingt g 141Piletter. 2/29/819 _l c , details changes made to H tratrung matenals.
Training was cendvocJ l in May,10/19/Filetter. + I M li Ambulanse attendants need 6/218/ M 23 .L4 New Map to identify au lon/m9 m Ambulance L C to be padded with a ht of , llamphire heepta's and those whia Pwvdc res Valerne 8. - , It/15 '30 Part 912 provides for hti hmpitAb and endp5 tG afe EI will be I where they enay transport developed. Ambulance drivers to be evntammatal patwnts or a prov-ded with a be and Ati ho>ptal JNg,ahd at Ambulance procedure will map-identdying all ; the time of the swignemt be reviewed and revid hoor tais along the route, {
'Ibe praenjure emis to be se rmessary, for the 1989 to t. s designated M41 [
ebnged to mver trampre update. hoept.l. Ihn was L eerrwted in twt 9 MSI i of a p.itierst with Ide-l thecirmag inpnes to
- 6f 89(Mape) driE ami sucevenfuUy ' j spec .rany rt to the ' Map develaped and redernerwirated during nears a bmpt41. ' (1.,4) imsed,10/ft9 tetact. the MS1 drin cor ducted ,
A aguet 15. TW1 [
. two u1an.) - !
12/% lbn revised, . T F k 1 i b
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't ip a gw t s
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ma c a k na nd w 4 C b e g P ( t c tpf i i tr n on t u md W v. rm d tpw l u b e n e c e r m mf a 7 h b i on A me n Iw kt wo A na i E H L 3 H A T M 14 L 1 A 2
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.a ,
TAlllE 7 (Coned) Page 12 of 23 i Obpective
' NURf'GtW4 Stwquently intA-RIT' 1 Teated Cermtive I =crdw FIA1A .Rev.1 (E=cedw Action Verifted Current
, Inue I beription Ihte O!ptsw .- Reference jarisdiction ~ Action Taken theel' G e. Results) - Seto, - A la Medu!al & Norwing staff I 6/24)v 24 ? 1,1 New _ Module " Managernent of 10/3/R9 The lloopital Radiation C , memben & penonswt . Ilarnphire Contarr.easted Ingumf . 8/15/uo . Sofety OfGrrr (RSO), e
, perherm.ng radotion Patients, will be revised to Medical th1ce and three [
me; sori *g d:d met iutly erry+mize rad 6 tion Nucicar Medicine Terh-i endrr'.tmJ the biological . termimslogy & biological . nelogists were otzlized to p a fic<te of rwhatian, the eifats. Interpret dew rate , mgndicaruc of ~rounts per . . , measuremerits. During minov 0 ontaminatwn) and
- T% was venford in the MSI DnB en August ' 't "Mthrem per hour"(dow . 10/*7 dral. 15, IPA), they performed satc) and the m nitors <*td momtericg fonctiece in a l 1
not fully understand how to Training was provided to 'enannerthat . ;
, make and interpret MSI Medical & Nursing demcastrated knowledge - !
contamina*on and du rate - Staff. em! understanding of 5 mes*u remem. (L D radiation. T% , reconfirmed the adequate 'f 1 povformance in the 1989 ! P M51 drill. to . w . . MP Sup;wre staff did not 10/3/*9 24 . 1.1 New Train staff, B/15/% Staff performed . C t dernenstrate proper llamphire enert:tericg tedw= ques in I men.coneg techniques a proper and professional ; rnancer during the ; August 15,199 MS 1 . thi1L . !
.I
%oc
- M wa an Area Itcouiring Conective A tion observed doricg the 10/3/es itS1 dn11 for New 11ampshire.
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d i v d oor a a i ini t areu dd e md s mo%ci o a r ar me 4n/1 1 a0 Nn/ o0 c1 Apmpgrdwt r ed e S pt pt h * + n e' o r it n wa N d e p i a r Nma J u l f MI vB c ht R .n1 UA- ve re e ! J RM U' l RfR e Nf e A iv l Metry 7 7'
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a TA111.E 7 (Cont'd) Page 14 of 23 Chtive ! NURFG N4 subpent!y 11 MA Ril' l Tested Conwtive , l' o cnw II M A Rev 1 itierose A< tion Verified Cunect tv oe ibs.tirtion I hte Otyrtue Ndetence farishction A4 ten Taken Lhte) (ie. Result-) 9stus i M i/ 1.hdr , hange fo, Ley staff M 2*/R8 34 A4 N11 local and Ayeopnate local and hast 10/27/W CThe commaaitie, of See Cer-prdtmn, wn no e Ibt IXKs will demonstrate tail 11/2A/W ikwet, Macc% ster ene dem<m*trated fo, 'vabro.L Coraswunitics .Nft change at a d-ci, er 12/13/90 Salem, Brentwd, het Actmen and bngstrin. l'a rti41 shif t during the peut Graded Megston, Megeten. Verifwd t hwge WAS demoM4trated beftite. Newton, NewfieIdS, COI. . for tweserouth. Newfields. Portwnouth SrabM lirmt wood, St utha m, E and Stretbane so xrefu!Iy lunpenn. Not,: m ar,o
- d. ;..-a..;W e eluft Newcastic. (A 4) change and cornpletet thee ARCA. Some.f tw demonetentie w took pla<v et ownbined fonctional dnD, MThe Town of Raieter did not h
Ut mepie a shift chacge due to e "seel life' emergeracy which requirw! the commitment of a matonty of the Town's emergency reopense pnenencl. Shoekt t- deonstrated , ee nest dnit or esercise. [De Tcwn of Newen*tle mndweted a sortvwful ee uft chacge eg fer the & cy p sition of Wtman, Should be y demonstrated at nemt drdi or e=crcree t 4-
TAHI.E 7 (Contd) - Page 15 o' 23
.1 NURf'G4h4 Obt edive II:MA-R LI*-1 Submpetly
. Rev. Ii Tested Cerredive l Enerci.e ' 11MA fiupp.1 - (Escrdee Action Verifwd Current . ,
I.we Ibcriptic,n ' I L*c . . Mrneve Refererwe hertedichen - ' Action Taken ~ Ihee) G e, Rewits) Sta+ve ' fn 18 Bere wn a delay at the 6/28/M 3- A.1 d NIfY4)RO;- To msvre that the %ging 12/13/90; ne Staging Area trader C l
!bgme, Area in eponding Ares leadre snaintains and Ids Ase stant to an impedienent to " wmmand la twneral, the responded to a tr/
esweatu n traHic (A.1 J) ficuibinty to assign an ' impediment in au . assistant has been added to appspriate enanner. . IP 3.2 in Amendment 6. As nerveury, dutw, msy be delegated to ensure rarnediate resperse to tituations which ruay arise , j in an evacuabort ie., traffie - impedimant. - Training wi!I be pmvided ' in annual cycle h CD
- 8/PA (lian) 8/88, tien resised.
I a 1989(Training) 6/S9. Training modules ; revised,6/21/N letter.' Traimng was <wmpleted . , as port of the manual Traming cyde.
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Page M of 23 TAHI E 7 (Cont'd) NURFGAM (%twe iI M A FtJ"-1 Nbsequent!y Tc=ted Cerrereve Rev f. Ostwnt Npp 1 (E=c m e Art n Vmfied 1.cn N IEM\ Satus Wyt te Refereny furi dvtoc Atton Taken Ihte) G e. Rewis) i e t k wry tWm I bec Amendment 6 ed IP 2.8 12/Dral Drewghout the ORO C ex H e r.c arcitives to fieLf 6 /28 /M 4 F NI!Y OFO d.rects the Ibn Compacy network, a3 wmire wev m.t in nved Umewn, Evnanac o.mynaniotions eystems en the f < fd, <!; worked entremely weU
$4pprt & 4 penal Vehkk In*psh ben to repeat the and no pwbterne were direrbro to field wodem capmenM wnth Ilcavy radio traffic is to be ersmmianon F< tween cepeted dodng fi ed fanhei., and f. eld emergence,. eperatres A backer ,
system has been insen!'+1
- 9/P4 (IM) far the E Sti radie net and 9/M lbn reused was avsJahle.
E Nti radio will14 b=ed
- 6/9 (kad M 6/N, TMS Radio fe=ed m p
bac kop rad,o ba, bmi (D instaned. 6/14/N icteer. The ceremoary traimng weil i be provided in ont trainmm gde.
*1M (Training 1 1/Ro,1rammg endule revised,6/71/89 letter.
TAHLE 7 . (Cont'd) a Page 17.oi 23 NNRit$eht. i
' %tive ILMA-Ef;f' l - Subsequertly ,
Rev,L. Tuted 1 Corrective Twsme 11.MA ' Supp 1 . . Geriae Action Verfwd Curwnt. Iswe ibrnp;nm . Ible fre ptse . : Rdeera kansdictaan ' . Actise Taken Dete) G e, Resala) Status MM Na map mth d<taded 6/29/M S .G3.- NIIYORO l . Au Malsa Center disr4ay, ' 12/13/M N MWin Center was C j . evneten routes, rekatmn win N epgraded ts . . mise equipped with an 1 ienter !m at nw me- eeptort metation of t% eteorste arrey of darts. - F*rutaun by planning covenwnt. ' ensp. dist(sys and statue dfC3% Weff utef itt bfkiing NFdS Whid were er dwet pd at the Medi.e .. Training en the aw of ef!<rtively posted and Center Meteoroiccical dist 4avs ic,e tiw staff will ~ otsized in the knefang , ron.firions were su.t h provkfed during the . roern and in the workiar, emmtent'y displayed amt red tramieg cyde. atees for the tww, media runtamed 0;3 A '
.e d PD's, De status e f./89(14rtay4 brards wereupdated in a 6/P9. Media Center tirneiy th dissisys have tv vi op -
4 graded and ave irt riace.
. It'/19/89 Ir+ter.. .
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Page 19 of 23 TABl.!! 7 (Comt'd) NURf GM - Objective 11 MA.RfP.1 Sebserpently Rev t, Tested Corrntive D'aerdse A< tion Verified Ces est berdse FTMA Npp, ! Acrien Taken twe) . (Le, Results) , Senus imee tW i itica t rate Ur,wt.ve Refemre )cedetton 12/13/91 A3 rwbBe enetractone C MM 116rrnnt,esandpme 6/?H/M Il 13 G 4 L N!TY4)RO _ . Amendraent 6 of IP117
, presideo a pere!!al were available to the JTIC
' rdews were ecmnin.cs - e:sff within an average of distnbution pramme for withktd frc n s%tritmeien 10 minuws, from authori-
; to the media relaterms and snessagee & press releswa to the Media Center & ration as retener, at the rumo rentrol riaff at the Media Center. AU TilC, ence approved.
ITP ' reang n .5pt o of Standa rd information is append copy as news . altrody in the reaff rdca,.c from the Media Training wiB be pmvided , in next cyde. notebooks and faenGlar to l Cevat-r. (f'A G 4 b) . the ntaff. I = 8/e8 (Thn) i F/M, flan reviwd. I e 19Pl9 (Trasmng)
- 9/89, Training was endutted as fait of the anneal training cyde.
y
.O Staff will be trained to w 12/13/91 There were no reports af C
' At the Mafia Center and at 6/28/M 13 ILS NIfY4)RC M 74 reedussce at the Media the flK~. it was not alwge avrrect let'rrhead for M avssages. Censer in diet *6*i*hia8 casy so tdt whab releases news relews from i15 were it'S mes:uges and mesnges. Some n6por e 9/1I9 Taeinmg was which weren't (f.5} <wnfesion in swaintrining
- renducted a, part of the anwel training cyde. the T!1C log could be addressed by deoer attention to the legg eg procedt ae.
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.' TABLE 8 GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS OF REP EXERCISE TERMINOLOGY AND ACRONYh!S GLOSSARY OF TERhtS
, and DEFINITIONS OF REP EXERCISE TERhilNOLOGY ACCESS CONTROL: The prevention of unauthorire4 entry into a spedne area. Road barriers and trafnc control are used to assist access control. The access controlled area may include all or part of the Plume Exposure EPZ, or may be established to control and monitor a Restricted Area (s) which may have been radiologically contaminated.
ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT: The evaluation of the actual and potential consequences of a ; radiological incident. ACTIVATION: The process by which an emergency facility, such as an EOC, becomes available for operations. AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL: Any radioactive material disperted in the air in the form of dust, fumes, mists, vapors, or gases. ALERT SYSTEht: The hardware system (s) used to get the attention of the public within the plume EPZ. Examples of an Alert system are: sirens; tone activated radios; and vehicles (including boats and airplanes) that utilize loud speakers / sirens, etc., to perform public alerting. AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT (ARFI): Aren/ issues observed during an exercise that are not considered to adversely impact public health and safety. While not required, correction or improvement of these areas / issues would enhance an organization's level of emergency preparedness. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION (ARCA): Demonstrated and observed inadequacies of performance and although their correction is required, they are not 9nsidered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety. CONGREGATE CARE: The supportive action that entails the provision of food, shelter, routine medical services, and other essentir! provisions or services for evacuees. CONTAMINATION (RADIOACTIVE): Deposition of unwanted radioactive material on the surface of structures, areas, objects, or personnel, l 205 r s, ----ep---- ,-- - -
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TABLE 8 (CONT'D) CURIE: The basic unit used to describe the intensity of radioactivity in a sample of material. The curie is equal to 37 billion nuclear transformations per second. Several fractions of a curie are in common usage. Millicurie: One thousandth of a curie, abbreviated mci Micorocurie: One millionth of a curie, abbreviated uCi Picoeurie: One trillionth of a curie, abbreviated pCi DECONTAMINATION: The reduction or removal of contaminating radioact se material from a structure, area, object, or person. DEFICIENCIES: Demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that off site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of radiological emergency. DOSE: The quantity of energy absorbed from lonization per unit mass of tissue. The rad is the unit of absorbed dose. DOSE RATE: Absorbed dose delivered per unit time, as rads per seconds or rads per hour. DOSIMETER: A portable device such as a thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) film badge or direct reading ionization chamber for measuring and registering the total accumulated exposure to ionizing radiation. DOSIMETRY: The theo.. tnd application of the principles and techniques involved in the measurement and recording of radiation doses. Its practical aspect is concerned with the use of various types of radiation instruments with which measurements are made. EMERGENCY BROADCAST SYSTEM (EBS): The radio stations which provides a direct link > between responsible authorities and the public. Emergency Broadcast System stauons broadcast instructions about what emergency steps the public should take. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTERS (EOCs): Locations designated by the State, local, and Utility sponsored Emergency Response Organizations as the central command and control points for their respective staffs. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF): A facilit) operated by the licensee for evaluating and controlling emergency situations and coordinating the utility's emergency responte. The EOF for Seabrook Station is located in Newington, New Hampshire. 206 , 1 l
. TABLE 8 (CONT'D) EhlERGENCY PLANNING ZONE (EPZ): The area surrounding the nuclear plant site for which planning has been done to ensure that prompt and effective actions ca:. be taken to protect the public in the event of a radiological incident. EhiERGENCY WORKER DECONTAMINATION FACILITY (EWF or EWDF): A facility used to monitor (for radiological contamination) and decontaminate emergency workers. The facility in this plan is a mobile trailer located at the Staging Area. EXPOSURE: The absorption of radiation or ingestion of a radionuclide. FULLY OPERATIONAL: The EOC/ EOF / Media Center / Reception Center / Emergency Worker Facility /l2boratories, etc., are fully staffed and capable of performing all emergency functions assigned to that facility. INGESTION PATIIWAY EPZ (50 mile EPZ): For planning purposes, the area within approximately a 50-mile radius of a nuclear plant site. The principal exposure from this pathway would be from the ingestion of contaminated water or foods. K1 - POTASSIUM IODIDE: A stable form of iodine taken orally to prevent the uptake of radioactive iodine by the thyroid. htEDIA CENTER: A facility operated by the licensee for the coordinated release of information to the public via the news media by utility and offsite authorit) spokespersons. The Media Center is located at the Newington, New Hampshire Town 11all. MICROCURIE: See Curie. MILLICURIE: See Curie. MILLIREM: See Rem. MILLIROENTGEN: Sec Roentgen. MONITORING, RADIOLOGICAL: locating and measuring radioactive contamination on individuals or in an area. MS-1 HOSPITAL: liospitals trained and capable of treating members of the general public who may be injured and/or considered to have substantial radiation related injuries, or who may have been exposed to and contaminated by radioactive materials, 207 1
I-
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TABLE 8 (CONT'D) ) NHY OFFSITE RESPONSE ORGANIZATION (NHY ORO) The New Itampshire Yankee Offsite Response Organization has been developed in recognition of, and to compensate for, the fact that the Commonwealth of hiassachusetts and the local biassachusetts municipalities i located within the Plume Exposure Emergency Planning 2xnc for Snabrook Station are not currently participating in radiological emergency planning. NOTIFICATION SYSTEht: The hardware and software system used to deliver a warning message (public instruction) to the public within the plume EPZ. Examples are: EBS radio station; NOAA radio; sirens /public address system that allows voice transmission; and vehicles with public address capabilities (i.e., message and means of delivery). OPERATIONAL: The EOC/ EOF / Assistance Center /htedia Center / Emergency Worker Center /I.aboratory, etc., should be considered operational when the emergency facility is minimally staffed (essential portions) and capable of performing the critical emergency functions assigned to that facility. PLUhfE EXPOSURE EPZ (10-hilLE LPZ): For planning purposes, the area within approximately a 10-mile radius of a nuclear plant site. The principal exposure sources from . this pathway are: (a) whole body exposure to gamma radiation from the plume and from ceposited radioactive material, and (b) inhalation exposure from the pasOng radioactive plume. PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDE (PAG): The projected radiological dose, or dose commitment levels at which protective actions should be initiated. PROTECTIVE ACTIONS (pas): hicasures taken in anticipation of, or in response to, a release of radioactive material to the environment. The purpose of pas is to provide dose savings by avoiding or minimizing the radiation exposure received by individuals, thereby minimizing the health risks resulting from radiation exposure. Sheltering and evacuation are the two pas which are relied upon for limiting the direct exposure of the general public within the plume exposure EPZ. Preventative and emergency pas are two categories of pas which are relied upon for limiting exposures from contaminated food and water in the ingestion exposure EPZ. PUBLIC INSTRUCTION: Instructions (warning messages) that are Protective Action-Recommendations for the public. Instructions should be given by a public official and , delivered directly to the public via the notification system (ie., EBS radio). hiessage content l and timeliness are very important, hiessage should be repeated by the Notification System at l least every 15 minutes until updated by public authorities. If applicable, public instructions l should be coordinated with other at.thorities. 208
- i i TABLE 8 (CONT'D)
PUBLIC INFORMATION: Information delivered to the media via press conference, interviews, technical briefings, printed media releases, and telephonic distribution of printed releases. Information should be current, accurate, and timely. All printed releases should be coordinated with other authorities before distribution to the media, ideally, information released in news conferences, briefings, and interviews should be coordinated before release. If pre coordination does not occur, then post notification to other authorities of critical points diecussed in interviews, conferences, should occur. RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSJ PLAN: A detailed plan which coordinates and describes the emergency response organizations, responsibilities, and capabilities of l utilities, local or state gwernments, and private organizations to ensure public health and ; safety during an emergency situatiori in which there is a potential for radiological release. RECEPTION CENTER: A predesignated facility outside the Plume Exposure EPZ at which the evacuated public can register; receive assistance in contacting others; be radiologically monitored and, if necessary decontaminated; rec,ive directions to congregate care centers; reunite with others ; and receive general information. RECOVERY: The actions taken to restore the affected areas as nearly as possible to its pre-emergency conditions. REENTRY: The provisions for the return of the public after evacuation, when the radiation risk has been reduced to acceptable levels. RELEASE: Escape of radioactive materials into the environment. REM: Acronym for Roentgen equivalent man. The unit of dose of any ionizing radiation that produces the same biological effective as a unit of absorbed dose of ordinary x rays. Millirem: One thousandth (1/1000) of a Rem. , RESTRICTED AREA: Any area to which access is controlled for the protection of individuals from exposure to radiation and radioactive material. SCENARIO: Time based simulations of emergency events postulated to allow the demonstration of response capabilities. SPECIAL FACILITY: Institution or location normally occupied by a population that may require specia consideration con.ernirig the implementation of protective action recommendations (e.g., hospitals, schools, nursing homes), SURVEY METER: A portable instrument used in radiological monitoring to detect and measure f
- ionitmg radiation.
l 209 l _ _ _ _ . ~ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,
TABLE 8 (CONT'D) THERMOLUMINESCENT DOSIMETER (TLD): A dosimetry badge used to measure exposure to ionizing radiation. It is characteristic of thermoluminescent material that radiation produces internal cleanges which cause the material, when subsequently heated, to give off a measurable amount of light directly proportional to the radiation dose. , THYROID EXPOSURE: Exposure of the thyroid gland to radiation from radioactive isotopes of iodine which have been either inhaled or ingested. TRAFFIC CONTROL: 'Ihe directing of traffic from a specific area to primary evacuation routes. Road barriers and cones are used to assist traffic control. The traffic-controlled area may include all or part of the Plume Exposure EPZ, or may be established to control and monitor a restricted area. TRANSIENT POPULATION: Individuals who do not permanently reside in the Plume Exposure EPZ but may be present during an emergency. VERIFICATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTION: Evaluation of the redemonstration of a function concerning exercise inadequacies which were identlfled in previous exe:ises/ drills and to which the organizations have agreed to implement corrective actions. WilOLE BODY EXPOSURE: Exposure of an individual to radiation, in which the entire body rather than an isolated pan is irradiated. t l i 210
O =$ TABLE 8 (CONT'D) - ACRONYMS ACF Access Control Point ,. ANL Argonne National Laboratory ANS Alert and Notification System ARC American Red Cross ARES Amateur Radio Emergency Services BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory CAP Civil Air Patrol CBS Containment Building Spray CCC Congregate Care Center CDC Center for Disease Control CMED County Medical Emergency Dispatch CPCS-1 Common Program Control Station 1 CPR Center for Planning and Research DELTA N.H. Civil Defense Command and Control Network DHE Division of Health Engineering DHS Division of Human Services DOC U.S. Department of Commerce DOD . U.S. Department of Defense DOE U.S. Department of Energy 211
TABLE 8 (CONT'D) - DOI U.S. Department of Interior DOT U.S. Departinent c,f Transportation DPHS New Hampshire Division of Public Health Services DRD Direct Reading Dosimeter DRED New Hampshire Department of Resources and Economic Development DRF Dose Reduction Factor DRK Dosimetry Record Keeper EAL Emergency Action Level EBS Emergency Broadcast System ECL Emergency Classification Level EEh! Exercise Evaluation Methodology EFW Emergency Feedwater EhiD Emergency hianagement Director EMS New Hampshire Bureau of Emergency hiedical Services of the i Division of Public Health Services l EMT Emcrgency Medical Technician i EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPA U.S. Enviromental Protection Agency i EPZ Emergency Planning Zone 212
o
.t TABLE 8 (CONT'D)
ERN Emergency Radio Network System ERPA Emergency Response Planning Area ETA Est: nated Time of Arrival ETE Evacuation Time Estimate EWDF (or EWF) Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility EW Emergency Worker (s) FAA Federal Aviation Administration FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration FEhfA Federal Emergency hianagement Agency FEhiA Ght Guidance hiemorandum FEhfA RAC Regional Assistance Committee FRC Federal Response Center GE General Emergency Ghi Geiger-hiueller HEPA High Efnciency Particulate Activity HEAR Hospital Emergency Action Radio Network HHS U.S. Depanment of Health and Human Services (Formerly Health, Education and Welfare) HSA Haverhill Staging Area
' IFO Incident Field OfDee L Idaho National Engineering Laboratory INEL 213 1 . _
t TABLE 8 (CONT *D) IP Implementing Procedure JCAH Joint Committee on Accreditation of HospitrJs JTIC Joint Telephone Information Center IU Potassium Iodide LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident , MAGI Massachusetts Governmental Intnface MC Media Center MCDA/OEP Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency / Office of Emergency Preparedness MDPH Massachusetts Department of Public Health MECO Massachusetts Electric Company METS Melita Emergency Telenotification System MOU Memorandum of Understanding MS Medical Services NAS Nuclear Alert System NAWAS National Warning System NCS National Communications System
'I NHOEM . New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management NHRERP New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan NHSPCC New Hampshire State Police Communication Center 214
n I j TABLE 8 (CONT'D) NiiY New llampshire Yankee NHY ORO New Hampshire Yankee Offsite Response Organization NIAT Nuclear Incident Advisory Team NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the U.S. Department of Commerce NOUE Notice of Unusual Event NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NWS National Weather Service OEM Office of Emergency Management PA Protective Action PAD Protective Action Decision PAO Protective Action Guide PANS Public Alert and Notification System PAR Protective Action Recommendation PEAS Public Emergency Alerting System PIA Public Information Advisor PINS Public Information and Notincation System PIO Public Information OfGcer PNC Public Noti 6 cation Coordinator PRNWR Parker River National Wildlife Reserve 215
t TABLE 8 (CONT'D) PSNH Public Service of New Hampshire RACES Radio Amateur Communications Emergency Services RC Reception Centers RCDC Rockingham County Dispatch Center RCS Reactor Coolant System RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan RHA Radiological Health Advisor RHTA Radiological Health Technical Advisor RSP R?diological Screening Program SA Staging Area SAE Site Area Emergency SAL Staging Area Leader SAU School Administrative Unit SNL Special Needs Liaison SNPS (SS) Seabrook Nuclear Power Station SPMC Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities 'STSA State Transportation Staging Area TCP Traffic Control l'oint TDD Telecommunications Device for the Deaf TG Traffic Guide 216
1 ,
.D TABLE 8 (CONT'D)
TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter TMM Traffic Management Manual , TSA Transponation Staging Area
'ISC Technical Support Center USCG U.S. Coast Guard USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture VACS Vehicular Alert Communications System . VANS Vehicular Alert and Notification System o
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