IR 05000416/2001007

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IR 05000416/2001-007, Entergy Operations, Inc., Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Integrated Resident & Regional Inspection on 12/30/2001-03/30/2002 Re ALARA Planning and Controls; Biennial Emergency Preparedness Exercise
ML021090107
Person / Time
Site: Grand Gulf Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 04/18/2002
From: Johnson W
NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-A
To: Eaton W
Entergy Operations
References
IR-01-007
Download: ML021090107 (20)
v • d • e


Text

ril 18, 2002

SUBJECT:

GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-416/01-07

Dear Mr. Eaton:

On March 30, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on April 2, 2002, with Jerry Roberts and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely, Ken E. Brockman for William D. Johnson, Chief Project Branch A Division of Reactor Projects Docket: 50-416 License: NPF-29

Entergy Operations, Inc. -2-

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 50-416/01-07

REGION IV==

Docket: 50-416 License: NPF-29 Report No: 50-416/01-07 Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Location: Waterloo Road Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150 Dates: December 30, 2001 through March 30, 2002 Inspectors: T. L. Hoeg, Senior Resident Inspector R. W. Deese, Resident Inspector P. J. Elkmann, Emergency Preparedness Inspector R. E. Lantz, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector J. B. Nicholas, Senior Health Physicist Approved By: W. D. Johnson, Chief, Project Branch A Division of Reactor Projects ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000416-01-07, on 12/30/01- 03/30/02; Entergy Operations, Inc., Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. Integrated resident & regional inspection report; ALARA Planning and Controls; Biennial Emergency Preparedness Exercise.

The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors and regional reactor inspectors. The inspectors identified no findings. The significance of any findings are indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red) using IMC 0609 "Significance Determination Process." Findings for which the Significant Determination Process does not apply are indicated by No Color or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html.

A. Inspector Identified Findings None B. Licensee Identified Violations None

Report Details Summary of Plant Status: During this inspection period, the plant operated at or near 100 percent rated thermal power except for periodic planned power reductions for monthly control rod exercising and periodic rod pattern adjustments.

1. REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness 1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Quarterly Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed partial system walkdown inspections and reviews of systems important to reactor safety in order to verify the operability of the systems. The inspectors reviewed system operating instructions, system valve and breaker lineups, operator logs, system control room indications. The inspectors also verified valves, breakers, and control circuits were in their required positions for operability. The following systems were inspected:

  • Standby service water system Train B b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Semi-Annual Equipment Alignment (71111.04S)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a complete walkdown of the engineered safety feature Division I AC and DC Electrical system to determine if there were any discrepancies between the actual equipment lineups versus what was procedurally required. During the walkdown, System Operating Instructions 04-1-01-L11-1, "Plant DC System,"

Revision 114, and 04-1-01-R21-15, "ESF Bus 15AA," Revision 12, applicable annunciator response procedures, and Drawings E-1023, "One Line Meter and Relay Diagram - 125V DC Buses 11DA, 11DB, and 11DC," Revision 31 and E-1008, "One LIne Meter and Relay Diagram - 4.16 KV ESF System Buses 15AA and 16AB, Unit 1,"

Revision 12, were used by the inspectors to verify major system components were correctly labeled, cooled, and ventilated. The inspectors also reviewed open condition reports on the system for any deficiencies that could affect the ability of the system to perform its design function. Documentation associated with control room deficiencies, temporary modifications, operator workarounds, and items tracked by plant engineering were also reviewed to assess their collective impact on system operation.

-2-b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection Quarterly Fire Protection Area Walkdowns (71111.05Q)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed area fire plans and performed walkdowns of plant areas to assess the material condition and operational status of fire detection, suppression systems and equipment; the materiel condition of fire barriers; and control of transient combustibles. Specific risk-significant plant areas included:

  • Division I switchgear room, 1C202
  • Division I battery room, 1C207
  • Division I switchgear room, 1A219
  • Division II switchgear room, 1A221
  • Standby gas treatment Room A, 1A323
  • Standby gas treatment Room B, 1A326
  • 119' Auxiliary building perimeter hallway, 1A202 b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11)

a. Inspection Scope On March 26, 2002, the inspectors observed operator requalification training activities in the simulator to assess the licensee's effectiveness in evaluating the requalification program and to ensure that licensed individuals received the appropriate level of training required to maintain their licenses. The observed training consisted of a simulated loss of feedwater flow followed by the loss of the reactor core isolation cooling pump in accordance with Grand Gulf Nuclear Station's licensed operator training scenario Procedure GSMS-LOR-00198, Revision 0, "Loss of Feedwater Flow."

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

-3-1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12Q)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed performance-based problems involving selected in-scope structures, systems, or components (SSCs) to assess the effectiveness of the Maintenance Rule program. Reviews focused on: (1) proper Maintenance Rule scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65; (2) characterization of failed SSCs; (3) safety significance classifications; (4) 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) and (a)(2) classifications; and, (5) the appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2), and goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1). The inspectors reviewed the most recent system health reports and system functional failures for the last 2 years. The following SSCs were reviewed:

  • Engineered safety features switchgear ventilation system
  • Containment isolation system
  • Condensate system
  • Diesel generator building ventilation system
  • Nuclear boiler system controls
  • Atmospheric dump system b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed weekly and daily work schedules to determine when risk-significant activities were scheduled. The inspectors discussed selected activities with operations and work control personnel regarding risk evaluations and overall plant configuration control. The inspectors discussed emergent work issues with work control center personnel and reviewed the prioritization of scheduled activities. The inspectors verified the performance of plant risk assessments related to planned and emergent maintenance activities as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and plant Procedure 01-S-18-6, "Risk Assessment of Maintenance Activities," Revision 1.

Specific maintenance items reviewed during this period included:

  • MAI 302446, Train B suppression pool makeup system

-4-b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed selected operability evaluations affecting risk-significant mitigating systems to assess: (1) technical adequacy of the evaluations; (2) whether continued system operability was warranted; (3) whether other existing degraded conditions were appropriately addressed with respect to their collective impact on continued safe plant operation; and (4) where compensatory measures were involved, whether the measures were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled. The following evaluations were reviewed:

  • CR-GGN-2002-0313, Control room fire door b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds (71111.16)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated an operator workaround associated with the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station's main generator dc powered hydrogen seal oil pump. The licensee previously determined that on a loss of offsite power, the seal oil pump would not provide proper flow to the hydrogen seals on the main generator to prevent hydrogen leakage resulting in a fire hazard. As a result, operations personnel would have to isolate the hydrogen supply to the main generator and purge excess hydrogen from the generator following a loss of offsite power. The inspectors also evaluated the effect of this operator workaround on the operators' abilities to implement applicable abnormal and emergency operating procedures.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed Engineering Request No. ER-2001-285, Channel A End of

-5-Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip Bypass Time Delay and Logic Modification," Revision 0.

The inspectors verified that: (1) the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the component had not been degraded as a result of the modification; (2)

the modification did not place the reactor plant in any unsafe conditions; and, (3)

adequate postinstallation testing was performed to verify the modification functioned as expected.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Postmaintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed postmaintenance test procedures and associated testing activities for selected risk-significant mitigating systems to assess whether: (1) the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and engineering personnel; (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3) acceptance criteria was clear and would adequately demonstrate operational readiness, consistent with design and licensing-basis documents; (4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, ranges, and accuracy for the application; (5) tests were performed, as written, with applicable prerequisites satisfied; and, (6) equipment was returned to the status required to perform its safety function. The following activities were reviewed:

C MAI 308880, Division II hydrogen igniters C MAI 309293, Standby service water, Train B C MAI 310586, Standby liquid control system, Train A C MAI 303899, Containment temperature transmitter, Train A C MAI 276151, Control room ventilation, Train A C MAI 310110, 1P41FO61, Drywell purge compressor cooler relief valve b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed performance of surveillance test procedures and reviewed test data of selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether the SSCs satisfied the Technical Specifications, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, the Technical Requirements Manual, and licensee procedural requirements; and, to determine if the testing appropriately demonstrated that the SSCs were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions. The following tests were inspected:

-6-

  • 06-OP-1C11-R-013, "Control Rod Drive Hydraulics Valve Test," Revision 101
  • 06-OP-1P41-Q-005, "Standby Service Water Loop B Valve and Pump Operability Test," Revision 114
  • 06-IC-1M71-R-004, "Containment Temperature Transmitter Calibration,"

Revision 3

  • 06-CH-1P81-1P81-Q-057, "Standby Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Tank A001 Sampling and Chemical Testing," Revision 103 b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the temporary alterations listed below to assess the following attributes: (1) the adequacy of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation; (2) the consistency of the installation with the modification documentation; (3) the updating of drawings and procedures, as applicable; and, (4) the adequacy of the postinstallation testing.

  • No. 2001-0025, Temporary installation of vibration monitoring instrumentation on the recirculation flow control valves b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1EP1 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation (71114.01)

a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the objectives and scenario for the 2002 exercise to determine if the exercise would acceptably test major elements of the emergency plan. This exercise had been postponed from September 2001 because of the events of September 11, 2001. The scenario included equipment and electrical power failures, an unisolable steam leak direct to atmosphere, core damage, and a radiological release to

-7-demonstrate the licensees capabilities to implement the emergency plan.

The inspectors evaluated exercise performance by focusing on the risk-significant activities of classification, notification, protective action recommendations, and assessment of offsite dose consequences in the following emergency response facilities:

  • Simulator control room
  • Operations support center
  • Emergency operations facility The inspectors also assessed personnel recognition of abnormal plant conditions, the transfer of emergency responsibilities between facilities, communications, protection of emergency workers, emergency repair capabilities, and the overall implementation of the emergency plan to verify compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b),

10 CFR 50.54(q) and Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.

The inspectors attended the postexercise critiques in each of the above facilities to evaluate the initial licensee self-assessment of exercise performance. The inspectors also attended a subsequent presentation of critique items to plant management.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Observation (71114.06)

a. Inspection Scope On February 6, 2002, the inspectors observed a planned licensee emergency preparedness quarterly drill. The inspectors reviewed the drill scenario to determine if it reflected realistic plant configurations. The inspectors observed licensee personnel at various locations during the exercise including the control room simulator, the technical support center, the emergency operations facility, and the emergency news and media center. The inspectors primarily focused on the ability of the emergency response organization to properly classify the simulated emergency through recognition of emergency action levels, their ability to activate the station emergency plan and procedures, and their ability to make proper and timely notifications as appropriate.

b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

-8-2. RADIATION SAFETY Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety 2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02)

a. Inspection Scope The inspector interviewed radiation workers and radiation protection personnel throughout the controlled access area and conducted independent radiation surveys of selected work areas. The inspector attended the prejob as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) briefing and observed the potentially high exposure job which involved the transfer of a high integrity container filled with radioactive resin to a shielded transport shipping cask during the inspection. The following items were reviewed and compared with regulatory requirements to determine whether the licensee had an adequate program to maintain occupational exposures ALARA:

  • Three radiation protection department self-assessments (dosimetry program performed June 25-28, 2001; hot spot tracking program performed November 1-15, 2001; and ALARA planning and controls performed January 9-18, 2002)
  • Processes used to estimate and track exposures
  • Plant collective exposure history for the past 3 years, current exposure trends, and 3-year rolling average dose information
  • Five radiation work permit (RWP) packages for work activities which resulted in some of the highest personnel collective exposures during the inspection period and Refueling Outage RF11 (RWP 2001-1082, Repair of Valve 1N11F052A; RWP 2001-1501, MSRV Work; RWP 2001-1514, LLRT, Pressure Test, and Drywell Bypass Test Work; RWP 2001-1517, Flow Control Valve B33F060A/B Work; and RWP 2001 1613; G33F039 Valve Replacement
  • Individual exposures of selected work groups (health physics, operations, mechanical maintenance, and instruments and controls)
  • Hot spot tracking and reduction program
  • Radiological work planning
  • ALARA Committee meeting minutes (6/21/01, 6/22/01, 6/28/01, 7/9/01, 7/18/01, 7/30/01, 8/16/01, 8/23/01, 8/24/01, 8/28/01, 9/26/01, 10/02/01, 11/26/01, 11/29/01, 11/30/01, 12/12/01, and 12/13/01)
  • A summary of radiological worker performance and ALARA related condition reports

-9-written since June 1, 2001, was reviewed (10 of these documents were reviewed in detail: CR-GGN-2001-1141, -1219, -1237, -1274, -1340, -1433, -1499, -1518, -1982, and -1988)

  • Job site inspection and ALARA controls. Prejob briefing and work activities for the transfer of a high integrity container filled with radioactive resin to a shielded transport shipping cask which was controlled by RWP 2002-1006, Task 1 b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Reactor Safety Cornerstone Performance Indicators a. Inspection Scope The inspectors verified the accuracy and completeness of the data used to calculate and report performance indicator information from the second calendar quarter 2000 through the fourth calendar quarter 2001. The inspectors used Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02,

"Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 1, as guidance and interviewed licensee personnel responsible for compiling the information.

The inspectors verified the licensees reported results for the emergency preparedness drill and exercise performance indicator by reviewing a sample of records for exercises, actual declared emergencies, drills, and simulator training scenarios. The inspectors verified the licensees reported results for the emergency response organization drill participation performance indicator by reviewing drill participation attendance records for a sample of 10 key emergency responders. The inspectors verified the licensees reported results for the alert and notification system reliability performance indicator by reviewing a sample of offsite siren test results. The following performance indicators were reviewed:

  • Unplanned scrams per 7,000 critical hours
  • Scrams with a loss of normal heat removal
  • Emergency response organization drill/exercise performance
  • Emergency response organization drill participation
  • Alert and notification system reliability b. Findings No findings of significance were identified

-10-4OA3 Event Followup (71153)

.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-416/01-004, "Violation of Operating License Condition 2.C (1) Maximum Power Level," Revision 0 and Revision 1 On October 3, 2001, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station received new information relating to moisture carryover calculation methodology from General Electric and determined that their existing calorimetric calculations may be in error. The licensee had been previously using a General Electric generic value of 0.1 percent for the moisture carryover fraction when General Electric most recently recommended a value of 0.0 percent to be used for the type of steam dryers used at Grand Gulf. Grand Gulf discovered that changing the carry over fraction in their core thermal power calculation from 0.1 percent to 0.0 percent resulted in a 3.1 megawatt increase which exceeded their maximum allowed power level of 3833 megawatts during past operating history. In December of 2001, the licensee through discussions with General Electric determined that the enthalpy values used in their calorimetric calculations had been less conservative as a result of using older steam table data vice newer data. Using the newer enthalpy data resulted in an increase of 5.5 megawatts at full power. This conservatism addressed in LER 2001-004, Revision 1, combined with the moisture carryover error, produced a total thermal power increase of 8.6 megawatts or 0.224 percent. As a result, the licensee violated their operating License Condition 2.F. The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program by initiating Condition Reports CR-GGN-2001-1645 and CR-GGN-2001-1899.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees apparent cause, corrective actions, safety assessment, and reporting requirements associated with these LERs and found no findings of significance. These licensee event reports are closed.

.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 50-416/01-005-00, "Loose-Parts Report as Required By NRC Regulatory Guide 1.133, Revision 1 and Jet Pump Nozzle Flow Restriction" On November 27, 2001, during the performance of the daily jet pump surveillance, the licensee noted indications of reduced flow through reactor recirculation system jet Pump 13. The licensee assessed available indications and concluded that an unknown particle was restricting flow through the jet pump. In accordance with their Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Table 4.4-11, Item 6 addressing their position on Section C.6 of Regulatory Guide 1.133, "Loose Part Detection Program for the Primary System of Light Water Cooled Reactors," Revision 1, the licensee submitted Licensee Event Report 2001-05 to notify the NRC of a loose part in their reactor coolant system. The licensee entered this into their corrective action program by initiating Condition Report CR-GGN-2001-1871.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees apparent cause, corrective actions, safety assessment, and reporting requirements associated with this licensee event report and identified no findings of significance. This licensee event report is closed.

-11-

.3 (Open) Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) from Technical Specification 3.8.1 Required Action B.4 for Division II Emergency Diesel Generator On March 26, 2002, at 4:02 a.m., the licensee entered a 72-hour required action statement per Technical Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources Operating," for a planned Division II emergency diesel generator maintenance outage. The outage time was scheduled to last approximately 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> under the licensees Limiting Condition of Operation Number 02-0208. Following the maintenance, the licensee experienced several equipment failures associated with newly installed pressure and temperature switches during postmaintenance testing which required extensive troubleshooting and retesting. The licensee determined that the apparent cause for the failure of the switches was due to venting, and subsequent repressurization, of the system resulting in air leaks rendering the pneumatic engine control circuit inoperable. Due to the amount of time spent resolving postmaintenance test problems, the licensee was likely to exceed their allowed outage time and initiated discussions with the NRC. At 12:00 a.m., on March 29, 2002, the licensee requested and received 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of enforcement discretion from the NRC while in violation of their operating license, specifically Technical Specification 3.8.1 required Action B.4. On March 29, 2002, at 1:36 p.m., the licensee declared the Division II emergency diesel generator operable and exited the limiting condition of operation after 81.52 hours6.018519e-4 days <br />0.0144 hours <br />8.597884e-5 weeks <br />1.9786e-5 months <br />. The licensee initiated Condition Report 2002-0555 to document their noncompliance with their operating license. At the close of this inspection period the inspectors had not yet completed all inspection activities associated with this NOED and considered this item as an unresolved item (URI) (URI 05000416/2001-007-01).

4OA6 Meetings, including Exit On April 2, 2002, the resident inspectors presented their inspection results to Mr. J. Roberts, Director of Nuclear Safety and Assurance, and his staff.

The results of the ALARA Planning and Controls inspection were presented on January 24, 2002, to Mr. J. Roberts, Director of Nuclear Safety Assurance, and other members of licensee management.

The results of the emergency preparedness inspection were presented on March 8, 2002, to Mr. W. Eaton, Vice President of Operations, and other members of licensee management.

The inspectors also asked if any materials examined during the inspections should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified by the licensee.

ATTACHMENT PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee D. Barfield, Manager, Design Engineering R. Barnes, Manager, Training and Development R. Benson, Supervisor, Radiation Protection C. Bottemiller, Manager, Plant Licensing K. Christian, Superintendent, Mechanical Maintenance G. Coker, Quality Assurance Specialist D. Cotton, Supervisor, Radiation Protection W. Deck, Security Superintendent L. Eaton, Maintenance Rule Coordinator W. Eaton, Vice President, Operations N. Edney, Supervisor, Radiation Protection J. Edwards, General Manager, Plant Operations C. Ellsaesser, Manager, Corrective Action and Assessment A. Goel, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Safety Assurance G. Green, Senior Emergency Planner M. Guynn, Manager, Emergency Preparedness C. Hayes, Emergency Preparedness Project Manager, Nuclear Support C. Holifield, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Safety Assurance R. Jackson, Senior Licensing Specialist, Nuclear Safety Assurance C. Lambert, Director, Engineering M. Larson, Senior Licensing Specialist, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs R. Moomaw, Manager, Outage Planning and Scheduling M. Renfroe, Manager, Engineering Programs & Components J. Roberts, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance J. Robertson, Manager, Quality Assurance F. Rosser, Supervisor, Radiation Protection G. Sparks, Manager, Operations R. Sumrall, Emergency Planner D. Townsend, Senior Emergency Planner W. Trichell, Supervisor, Radiation Protection R. VanDenAkker, Senior Emergency Planner D. Wiles, Acting Director, Engineering R. Wilson, Superintendent, Radiation Protection E. Wright, Specialist, Radiation Protection H. Yeldell, Manager, System Engineering NRC W. Johnson, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Projects G. Good, Branch Chief, Division of Reactor Safety T. Pruett, Senior Risk Analyst P. Sekerak, Project Manager, NRR

-2-Other R. Fuller, Manager, Emergency Preparedness, Arkansas Nuclear One J. Lewis, Emergency Planning Manager, Waterford - 3 F. Puleo, Plant Protection Coordinator, South Texas Project ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 05000416/2001-007-01 URI Notice of Enforcement Discretion from Technical Specification 3.8.1 Required Action B.4 (Section 4OA3.3)

Closed 50-416/01-004-00 and LER Violation of Operating License Condition 2.C(1)

50-416/01-004-01 Maximum Power Level (Section 4OA3.1)

50-416/01-005-00 LER Loose-Parts Report as Required By NRC Regulatory Guide 1.133, Revision 1 and Jet Pump Nozzle Flow Restriction (Section 4OA3.2)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Procedures:

10-S-01-1 Activation of Emergency Plan (EPP-1) Revision 108 10-S-01-6 Notification of Offsite Agencies and Plant On-Call Revision 36 Emergency Personnel (EPP-6)

10-S-01-11 Evacuation of Onsite Personnel (EPP-11) Revision 16 10-S-01-12 Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Revision 29 Recommendations (EPP-12)

10-S-01-29 Operations Support Center (OSC) Operations Revision 17 (EPP-29)

10-S-01-30 Technical Support Center (TSC) Operations Revision 11 (EPP-30)

10-S-01-33 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Operation Revision 11 (EPP-33)

01-S-10-4 Emergency Preparedness Drills and Exercises Revision 9 01-S-10-6 Emergency Response Organization Revision 15

-3-10-S-04-4 Performance Indicators Revision 2 06-CH-1P75-Q-0056 Fuel Oil Tank A003B Sampling Surveillance Test Revision 103 06-CH-1P75-Q-0055 Fuel Oil Tank A003A Sampling Surveillance Test Revision 103 Condition Reports:

2000-0358 2002-0480 2002-0486 2002-0496 2002-0500 2001-1052 2002-0482 2002-0487 2002-0497 2002-0505 2002-0473 2002-0483 2002-0489 2002-0498 2002-0367 2002-0476 2002-0484 2002-0490 2002-0499 2002-0376 2002-0479 2002-0485 2002-0493 2002-0499 Maintenance Action Items:

284093 313246 313304 313309 313315 313520 302347 313276 313307 313310 313318 313526 312115 313277 313308 313314 313322 312731 Other Miscellaneous Documents:

Engineering Request 2001-285-000, Revision 0 Control Room Standing Order 00-004 Miscellaneous Drill and Exercise Reports from April 2000 through February 2001 Grand Gulf Emergency Plan, Revision 46 GG-1-SMS-LOR-00178, Revision 4, "EOP Execution Practice Scenarios"

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