NOC-AE-02001377, Technical Specification Bases Changes
| ML022240471 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 08/06/2002 |
| From: | Head S South Texas |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NOC-AE-02001377, STI: 31478260 | |
| Download: ML022240471 (5) | |
Text
Nuclear Operating Company Souh6 Te Prolcd Ekct Gen walh'g Station PG. Box 289 Hwtdsorth, Tes 77483 ws A g s 6,2 0 August 6, 2002 NOC-AE-02001377 File No.: G25 STI: 31478260 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 South Texas Project Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 Technical Specification Bases Changes South Texas Project Technical Specification Bases pages B 3/4 9-1a and B 3/4 9-2 are attached for your information and for updating the NRC copy of the Technical Specifications.
Changes on the attached pages reflect information allowing the containment equipment hatch to be open during core alterations and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies inside containment.
If there are any questions regarding these changes, please contact me at (361) 972-7136.
Scott M. Head Manager, Licensing mkj
Attachment:
Revised Technical Specification Bases Pages O%\QUALTYANDLICENSING\TSB\AMENDMENTO2\NOC-AE-02001377 (TSC-280)
NOC-AE-02001377 Page 2 of 2 cc:
(paper copy) (electronic copy)
Ellis W. Merschoff A. H. Gutterman, Esquire Regional Administrator, Region IV Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400 M. T. Hardt/W. C. Gunst Arlington, Texas 76011-8064 City Public Service U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mohan C. Thadani Attention: Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike R. L. Balcom Rockville, MD 20852 Reliant Energy, Inc.
Richard A. Ratliff A. Ramirez Bureau of Radiation Control City of Austin Texas Department of Health 1100 West 49th Street C. A. Johnson Austin, TX 78756-3189 AEP - Central Power and Light Company Cornelius F. O'Keefe Jon C. Wood U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Matthews & Branscomb P. 0. Box 289, Mail Code: MN116 Wadsworth, TX 77483 C. M. Canady City of Austin Electric Utility Department 721 Barton Springs Road Austin, TX 78704
ATTACHMENT REVISED BASES PAGES
REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses for the rapid refueling design.
3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS The requirements on containment building penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment. The containment personnel airlock and auxiliary airlock, which are part of the containment pressure boundary, provide a means for personnel access during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 operation. The equipment hatch is required to be closed and sealed during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. During periods of shutdown, when containment closure is not required, the equipment hatch may be opened to allow passage of material needed to support activities in the containment building. The personnel and auxiliary airlock door interlock mechanisms may be disabled during shutdown, allowing both airlock doors to remain open for extended periods when frequent containment entry is necessary. Both containment personnel airlock doors may be open during CORE ALTERATIONS when specific limitations are satisfied. The specification requires: (1) there is 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange, (2) the reactor has been subcritical for >95 hours, (3) one airlock door is OPERABLE and, (4) an individual is available to close one personnel airlock door (if open) following a fuel handling accident inside containment.
The requirement to have 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange is consistent with the fuel handling accident analysis assumptions, Regulatory Guide 1.25, and Technical Specification 3.9.10, Water Level - Refueling Cavity.
Operability of a containment personnel airlock door requires that the door is capable of being closed, i.e., that the door is unblocked, no cables or hoses run through the personnel airlock, and at least one door seal is capable of being inflated. Containment personnel airlock door closure is required to take place within 30 minutes of initiation of a fuel handling accident inside containment if the reactor has been subcritical for less than 165 hours0.00191 days <br />0.0458 hours <br />2.728175e-4 weeks <br />6.27825e-5 months <br />. Fuel movement is not permitted with personnel airlock doors open, if the reactor has not been subcritical for >95 hours. If the reactor has been subcritical for 165 hours0.00191 days <br />0.0458 hours <br />2.728175e-4 weeks <br />6.27825e-5 months <br /> or more, containment personnel airlock door closure is to occur as soon as practicable, but is assumed to occur within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to be consistent with the accident analysis.
The equipment hatch may also be open during CORE ALTERATIONS when specific limitations are satisfied. The specification requires: (1) the reactor has been subcritical for >165 hours and, (2) the equipment hatch (if open) is capable of being closed following a fuel handling accident inside containment. The following administrative requirements will apply whenever the equipment hatch is open during core alterations or the movement of irradiated fuel in containment:
- 1. Appropriate personnel are aware of the open status of the containment during movement of irradiated fuel or CORE ALTERATIONS
- 2. Specified individuals are designated and readily available to close the equipment hatch following an evacuation that would occur in the event of a fuel handling accident
- 3. Obstructions (e.g., cables, hoses, and runway) that would prevent closure of the equipment hatch can be quickly removed.
SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 9-1 a Unit 1 - Amendment No.
Unit 2 - Amendment No.
02-10903
REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATION (Continued)
The containment equipment hatch closure is required to take place upon the occurrence of a fuel handling accident inside containment if the hatch is open. Fuel movement is not permitted with equipment hatch open, if the reactor has not been subcritical for >165 hours. Equipment hatch closure should occur as soon as practicable, and is normally assumed to occur in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Unlike the airlock, the equipment hatch may be blocked by an obstruction (e.g. the removable equipment hatch runway). Fuel movement is not allowed with the runway installed unless the capability to remove all obstructions and close the hatch within the required time is maintained.
A surveillance requirement verifies that the proper tools are staged at the equipment hatch location and qualified personnel assigned to close the equipment hatch on a seven-day frequency.
These requirements assure that the associated doses are limited to within acceptable levels.
3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity conditions during CORE ALTERATIONS.
3/4.9.6 (NOT USED) 3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - FUEL HANDLING BUILDING The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel and control rod assembly and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool, unless handled by the single-failure-proof main hoist of the FHB 15-ton crane, ensures that in the event this load is dropped: (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the safety analyses.
SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 9-2 Unit 1 - Amendment No.
Unit 2 - Amendment No.
02-10903