ML040490212

Handouts from 01/28/04 Management Meeting

ML040490212
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	01/28/2004
From:	Landis K NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5
To:	Byrne S South Carolina Electric & Gas Co
References
Download: ML040490212 (55)

Text

V. C. Summer Nuclear Station SCE&G Attendees

• Steve Byrne - Senior Vice President

• Jeff Archie - Plant Manager

• Dave Lavigne - General Manager Organizational Effectiveness

• Alan Torres - Manager Planning / Outage

• Ron Clary - Manager Nuclear Licensing

• Brad Stokes - Manager Design Engineering

• Larry Bennett - Plant Support Engineering Supervisor

Purpose of Meeting

• Refuel - 14 Results

• Corrective Action Program Update

• Equipment Reliability Program Overview

Refuel -14 General Overview Alan Torres

Refuel-14 Goal Status

• No Significant Safety Events (Actual 0)

• Duration - 36 days (Actual 46 Days)

• Dose Goal -70 REM (Actual 76 REM)

• No Industrial Safety Events (Actual 2)

RF- 14

• Total Work

- MWRs - Scheduled 764 / Emergent 292

- STPs - Scheduled 1174 / Emergent 42

- PMs - Scheduled 2602 / Emergent 8

- ECRs - Scheduled 55 / Emergent 11

• Total of 4948 Documents Worked

• Scope Growth of 7.13%

Major Work Activities

• Reactor Vessel

- Ten Year ISI

- Bare metal visual inspections - Head/BMI

• Main Generator Inspection

• ILRT of the Reactor Building

• A Train Electrical Maintenance

• B CCW Heat Exchanger Repair and Coating

• Repair and Coat all 3 Auxiliary Condensers

• C RCP Motor Replacement and Seal Work

Refuel-14 Modifications

• Modifications

- RHR Pump Seal (Concern for Leakage)

- Complete RHR Miniflow Switch Relocation (EQ)

- RHR Vent Addition (Helps Reduce Dose)

- CW Pump Trip Circuitry (Operator Work Around)

- Feedwater Heater Level Transmitter Logic Change (Operational Challenge)

- Gravity Boration Flow Path (Operator Work Around)

• PRA Review Indicates No Change in CDF

Brief Overview of RHR Project

• A RHR Pump Modification

- Spacer Coupling

- Upper & Lower Hub Assembly

- Dose Estimated 2.75 REM (Actual 0.725 REM)

• A RHR Vent Addition

- Dose Estimated 1.1 REM (Actual 0.590 REM)

Modified 8X20 WD/WDF Bearing Housing 18 by 18 seal opening Support stand with an 18 X 18 opening

The Spacer Coupling Upper (Driver)

Hub Assembly Lower (Pump)

Hub Assembly

Outage Challenges

• Seal Injection Indications

- 40 Hours Additional Work to Critical Path

- Dose of 5.8 REM

• Main Generator Hydrogen Leaks

- 55 Hours Delay to Startup and Critical Path

• Water Clarity Issues Prior to Reload

- 66 Hour Delay for Core Reload to Critical Path

• Main Turbine Vibration During Startup

- 16 Hour Delay to Tie to the Grid

Conclusions

• We Conducted a Safe Outage

- No Safety Significant Events

- Two Minor Personnel Injuries

- No Events During Startup

- Presently No Significant Challenges for Extended Run

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM Dave Lavigne

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP)

• CER Status

• CAP History

• Risk Review

• CAP Changes

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP)

A Look At The Numbers:

CER STATISTICS 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 CERs Initiated 516 1527 1907 2431 3925 4526 Average Per Day: 3.035 4.1836 5.2247 6.6786 10.783 12.434

• CERs Open: 5 27 37 99 389 1378 Percent (%) Open: 0.97% 1.768% 1.94% 4.072% 9.911% 30.45%

• Open CERs have a status of Screened, Unscreened or Ready for Approval.

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP)

CAP History

• NRC PI&R Inspection, March 2001.

• Corrective Action Program Acceptable, however:

• Corrective Actions not well documented or completed in a timely manner.

• Risk insights not used when classifying issues.

• Not effectively using repetitive condition identification.

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP)

CAP HISTORY (continued)

• NRC PI&R Inspection, March 2002

• Improvements noted in corrective action process, however:

• CERs not always generated at threshold expected by management.

• Human performance issues not always addressed.

• Need more management presence at screening committee meetings.

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP)

CAP HISTORY (continued)

• WANO/INPO Peer Review, May 2003

• Station including more lo-level deficient conditions in the CAP.

• Increasing backlogs in CAP.

• Multiple extensions of corrective actions.

• Lack of acceptance of corrective actions.

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP)

CAP HISTORY (continued)

• VCS Internal Assessments

• QA GAP Analysis (August 2003)

VCS Program Meets Industry Stds.

• Root Cause analysis on repeat events (September 2003)

• Management ownership and oversight.

• Need better screening review of identified conditions.

RISK INSIGHTS

• CERs Reviewed by PSA group for Risk Significance

• Results Reported in Quarterly Trend Report

• Presented at VP Performance Indicator Meeting

CAP CHANGES CAP Changes (Contd)

• Established Management Review Team (MRT)

-Composed of GMs and Managers.

• Review Repetitive Events

• Review Immediate Actions

• Establish CER Ownership

• Monitor Due Date Extensions

CAP Changes (Contd)

• MRT to Review Deleted CERs

• Separated Significance Determination from Condition Evaluation

• Established Priority Vehicle for Actions

CAP Changes (Contd)

• Reinforced Expectations

- Unit Evaluators

- Managers

- Corrective Action Group

CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM (CAP)

SUMMARY

• Continue to adjust CAP to meet/exceed industry stds.

• Using Risk Insights to understand plant C/A issues

• Mgmt team committed to self identify and learn from C/A process

V. C. Summer Nuclear Station Equipment Reliability Improvement Overview Larry Bennett

Overview Previous Activity Future plans

Benchmarking NEI Equipment Reliability Benchmarking in 2002 6 Plants Visited for Best Practices

- Prioritization

- Long Range Planning

- Plant Health Committee

Self Assessment

• Gap Analysis to INPO AP-913 Completed in November 2002

• Areas Noted for Improvement:

- System Health Reports do not effectively drive corrective actions and communicate long range plans

- Long term planning for SSCs needs improvement

- Equipment problems are not effectively prioritized

- Critical component classifications not well established

- PM program improvements needed

INPO Equipment Performance Assist Visit

• Conducted in November of 2002

• Validated Self Assessment

• Developed Action Plans for Focus Areas

- Prioritization

- PM Program

- Predictive Maintenance

Plant Health Committee

• PHC Created in November of 2002

• Engineering, Operations, Maintenance, Scheduling, HP, Chemistry

• Prioritization of Equipment Issues Completed January 2003

• PHC Focus List Developed, Communicated to Site

- Initial list had 15 focus issues

- Presently have 10 focus issues

• 8 removed, 3 added

2003 INPO Plant Assessment Areas for Improvement in Equipment Reliability

- Plant trips due to equipment issues

- Unresolved equipment issues

- Some reoccurring equipment issues

Plans for 2004 Equipment Reliability Improvement Project

Equipment Reliability Improvement Project (ERIP) 4 Integrated Phases of Work Aligned with Recognized Industry Standards:

- NEI Standard Nuclear Performance Model

- INPO AP-928, Work Management Process

- INPO AP-913, Equipment Reliability Process

- EPRI PM Basis Documents

Equipment Reliability Improvement Project ERIP Used at:

• Susquehanna

• Calloway

• Columbia

• Farley - in progress

• Hatch - in progress

ERIP Change Goal Desired Outcome:

Lay a solid foundation on which to build a living long-term maintenance strategy where our processes and people are preventing equipment failures.

ERIP Scope of Work Phase 1 Scoping and Identification of Critical Components Phase 2 Preventive Maintenance Implementation and Feedback Improvement Phase 3 Preventive Maintenance Basis and Maintenance Optimization Phase 4 Performance Monitoring and Prioritization Improvement

ERIP - From Project to Process

• Active Craft Feedback and Ownership

• Proactive Engineering

• High Level of Equipment Reliability

• Optimizing Availability of SSCs.

• Optimizing Maintenance Effectiveness.

• Reduced Generation Lost

• Reduced Operation and Maintenance Cost

Conclusions Steve Byrne