ML042310014
| ML042310014 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 08/18/2004 |
| From: | Nerses V NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD1 |
| To: | Clifford J NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD1 |
| Nerses V, NRR//DLPM, 415-1484 | |
| References | |
| TAC MC1284 | |
| Download: ML042310014 (3) | |
Text
August 18, 2004 MEMORANDUM TO: James W. Clifford, Chief, Section 2 Project Directorate I Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Victor Nerses, Sr. Project Manager /RA/
Project Directorate I, Section 2 Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
MILLSTONE POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION, DRAFT REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (RAI) TO BE DISCUSSED IN AN UPCOMING CONFERENCE CALL (TAC NO. MC1284)
The attached draft RAI was transmitted by facsimile on August 18, 2004, to Mr. Paul Willoughby, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC). This draft RAI was transmitted to facilitate the technical review being conducted by the staff and to support a conference call with DNC in order to clarify certain items in the licensees submittal. The draft RAI is related to DNCs submittal dated November 10, 2003, regarding the implementation of a risk-informed inservice inspection program plan. Review of the RAI would allow DNC to determine and agree upon a schedule to respond to the RAI. This memorandum and the attachment do not convey a formal request for information or represent an NRC staff position.
Docket No. 50-336
Enclosure:
Draft Request for Additional Information
August 18, 2004 MEMORANDUM TO: James W. Clifford, Chief, Section 2 Project Directorate I Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Victor Nerses, Sr. Project Manager /RA/
Project Directorate I, Section 2 Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
MILLSTONE POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION, DRAFT REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (RAI) TO BE DISCUSSED IN AN UPCOMING CONFERENCE CALL (TAC NO. MC1284)
The attached draft RAI was transmitted by facsimile on August 18, 2004, to Mr. Paul Willoughby, Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (DNC). This draft RAI was transmitted to facilitate the technical review being conducted by the staff and to support a conference call with DNC in order to clarify certain items in the licensees submittal. The draft RAI is related to DNCs submittal dated November 10, 2003, regarding the implementation of a risk-informed inservice inspection program plan. Review of the RAI would allow DNC to determine and agree upon a schedule to respond to the RAI. This memorandum and the attachment do not convey a formal request for information or represent an NRC staff position.
Docket No. 50-336
Enclosure:
Draft Request for Additional Information DISTRIBUTION:
PDI-2 Rdg PUBLIC MMelnicoff BFu SDinsmore VNerses Accession No.: ML042310014 *see previous concurrence OFFICE PDI-2/PM SC/SPSB*
NAME VNerses MRubin DATE 8/18/04 8/17/04 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
DRAFT REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION MILLSTONE POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 (TAC NO. MC1284)
- 1. Regarding socket welds and branch connection welds NPS2 or less,DNC s RAI response dated July 6, 2004, stated that UT won't provide meaningful results. If thats the case, why were they selected in the first place?
- 2. In the list of socket welds and branch connections, can they be substituted with larger butt welds of the same materials in the same system, section, environment, risk category so that a volumetric examination can be performed?
- 3. Are those welds where only a VT-2 is practical, insulated? If yes, is VT-2 performed with the insulation removed?
- 4. In a case where only a tight crack is developed, how can a VT-2 detect a small leak?
- 5. In Table 3.10-1 of DNCs submittal, the results given for the RC system's contribution to LERF "with operator action" appears to be erroneous. In all of the other categories of risk information in this table, the RC system contributes almost 100% to total risk. In fact, to 3 significant digits the RC system's contribution matches the total Class I piping contribution, except in this category. Is the figure given for the RC system's contribution to LERF "with operator action" correct as stated, or should it be "1.16E-07"? If the current figure is correct, please explain why the RC system doesnt contribute to virtually all of the LERF risk for this case as it does for all of the other cases?
- 6. Section 3.4 of the DNC's submittal states that, "The SRRA code could not be used for all failure mechanisms or piping materials. In these instances, values were determined using alternative means. Please describe "alternative means" and provide technical bases.