ML20057F448

Requests NRC to Enhance Civil Penalty Assessed Against Vynp for Operating Outside TS from 921015 to 930406

ML20057F448
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png
Issue date:	09/01/1993
From:	Block J, Daley M NEW ENGLAND COALITION ON NUCLEAR POLLUTION
To:	Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
Shared Package
ML20057F444	List: ML20057F443 ML20057F445 ML20057F448
References
EA-93-112, NUDOCS 9310180014
Download: ML20057F448 (4)

Text

\

New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution,InC.

Box 545, Brattleboro, Vermont 05301 Phone (802) 257-0336 1 l

i September 1,1993 l James M. Taylor,  ;

Executive Director of operations '

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  ;

Washington, D.C. 20555 BY FAX: 301-504-2162 1 l

RE: Docket No. 50-271; Lic. No. DPR-28; EA 93-112, Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty-550,000/ Inspection Rpt.No. 50-271/93-09 I

SUBJECT:

PETITION FOR ENHANCEMENT OF ASSESSED CIVIL PENALTY

Dear Mr. Taylor,

Pursuant to 10 CFR Ch. 1 & 2.206(a), we hereby request the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to enhance the civil penalty assessed against Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VY) for operating outside Technical Specifications i (TS) from October 15,1992 to April 6,1993.

In October of 1992, routine surveillance of control rod scram insertion revealed that VY was operating outside TS 3.3.C.I.1 and 3.3.C.I.2. Limiting conditions for operating the plant require an immediate shutdown under such circumstances. VY did not shut down. VY did not report this situation to the NRC.

VY continued to operate until the situation was again observed in April of 1993 By this time, many more control rods were s!cw. Again, however, VY did not shut down. Instead, VY asked the NRC to exercise " enforcement discretion" by permitting the plant operate outside the TS. The NRC gave VY forty-eight (48) hours 10 provide a detailed analysis of the causes of the problem, and state how long VY wanted to operate under enforcement discretion. Before the 48 hour5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> period expired, VY shut down for an unrelated emergency. An on-site safety inspection of VY was conducted April 14 to 16,1993. The report of that inspection, and an evaluation of it at Region I offices, was issued on May 24, 1993, with a cover letter '

from M. Wayne Hodges that contained six questions for VY.'

The NRC Regional Administrator called VY to a meeting at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, June 15, 1993, the ostensible purpose of which was to discuss VY's answers to the questions propounded by Mr. Hodges, Director, NRC Division of Reactor Safety. Mr. Hodges asked VY to explain: ,

'Sce Drysdale and Eapen, Safety Inspection at Vermont YanAce, inspection Report No. 50-271/93-o9, EA-93-112: 1. Calvo Ass't Dir. Region 1 Reactors. Letter to D. Reid, V.P. Operation, VY (April 9,1993); T.

Martin, Regional Administrator, Notice of Violation and Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty - $50.000 Inspection Report No. 50-271/93-09 (August 2,1993).

9310100014 931012 PDR ADCCK 05000271 G PDR Educating the Pu b lic in Cle a n Alternatives to Nuclear Po w e r

A 2

(1) the corrective actions you plan to take to address the programmatic issues identified, (2) the specific reasons for not shutting down the plant when required by the Technical SpeciGcations and the approved test procedure, (3) the reasons for not pursuing a root cause determination and corrective actions for approxi-mately six months, (4) the results of your historical reviews of control rod testing to determine if there were previous Technical Specification violations, (5) your design control processes, including one-for-one equivalency evaluations, as they apply to material changes in safety-related equipment, and (6) your methods for control-ling safety-related material which has service life restrictions.2 We believe that Vermont Yankee never adequately answered questions two (2) through five (5), based on an examination of the available materials VY submitted to the NRC. This failure to directly and simply answer such questions is part of what Thomas Martm referred to as " programmatic weaknesses" at VY.'

VY consistently fails to heed and learn from the history of industry practice.

In this regard, NRC Region I has not set a good example for VY. For example, Mr.

Martin shows a lack of awareness of NRC policy when he refers to the " low potential safety consequences of the actual degradation [of scram insertion times]." Id. An examination of NRC memoranda on NUDOCS reveals the historic NRC position:

where the operability of control rods is at issue, failure to shutdown and investigate the root cause of the problem represents a major hazard to the health and safety of the surrounding community. In a 1987 memorandum, M. W. Hodges, then Chief of the Reactor Systems Branch Division of Engineering & Systems Technology, succinctly stated this position:

The purpose of the Technical Specification Safety Umit CPR [ Critical Power Ratio] is to protect the fuel cladding from over-heating and possibly failing. ,

Additionally, the Safety limit CPR meets, in part, the requirements of GDC 10. The intent of the Technical Specification Safety Limit CPR and GDC 10 is to protect the first barrier to fission product release. On this basis, we believe that a substantial safety hazard, as defined in 10 CFR Part 21.3(k), would exist in that there would have been a loss of safety function to the extent that a major reduction in the degree of protection provided to the health and safety of the public could occur. The seriousness of a breach of this barrier is reflected in the 10 CFR Part 50.36(c)(1) requirement that a plant immediately shut <!own under these conditions. ..[A]n operating configuration which would result ic a violation of a safety limit during an anticipated operational occurrence is of itself a substantial safety hazard.'

VY apparently ignored a legal requirement that they deal with this issue 2

M. Hodges to D. Reid, V.P. Op. at VY (May 24, 1993).

'See Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty-550,000, Inspection Report No. 50-271/93-o9, at 2 (August 2,1993).

'M. W. Hodges, Memorandumfor Ellis W. Merschof, at 3 (May 26,1987) (emphasis added).  !

l l

A 3

previously.' VY should have known about the historic concerns over deterioration of components required for safe operation of the plant and, therefore, subject to the NRC's stringent requirements for safety grade equipment. Moreover, VY should not have ignored any warning signs of such deterioration. When the control rod drive scram time insertion anomalies were Grst observed at VY in October 1992 during required TS scram time testing, VY neither reported to the NRC nor shut down to 6nd out what was wrong and correct the problem.' VY could have easily conducted industry-wide research. Similar problems had occurred at other GE BWRs [ Boiling Water Reactors]. Some 6fty documents relating to scram insertion times can be found r on NUDOCS. A number of these documents deal with BWRs that have similar tech-nical speci6 cations, problems, testing procedures, scram insertion time calculations, operations, and repairs. Moreover, the NRC had previously dealt with this problem.

Incredibly, VY apparently neither read nor implemented the legal requirements of IE 78-14, Deterioration of Buna-N Components in ASCO Solenoids (Dec. 19, 1978),

wherein the NRC stated that all GE BWR power facilities with an operating license must:

1. Review Buna-N material applications in your cmitrol rod scram systems

, and determine the time since installation, and for installed material, the time since packaging.

2. Report the results of the review set forth in item 1 above and describe your schedule for replacement, both in response to this Bulletin and for periodic maintenance.

3. Describe the bases for your schedule of replacement identified in response to item 2 above. Justify any proposed time in excess of three years.'

r There is no evidence available on the NUDOCS system that VY ever complied with these directives. There is no evidence that the on-site NRC inspectors were aware of this failure to comply. How did VY manage to substitute a different manufacturer's component GE, ASCO, or the NRC?' Why (Viton 0-Rings) did components failin theVYpilot after had solenoids found them to without be consu environmentally qualified as safety-grade? How did the on-site inspectors Lil to notice any problem with scram insertion times during any routine surveillance conducted between October 1992 and April 1993?

' Nuclear Regulatory Commission, lE 78-14, Deterioration of Buna-N Components in ASCO Solenoids (December 19, 1978).

'See id. at 2.

'/d. at 2 (emphasis added). l 1

'VY told the NRC, *No consideration [was] given to coordinating with ASCO or GE as Environmental I Qualification was not based on ASCO/GE Reports but on a IVY] specific DOR Qual. Report. Key attribute l affecting SCRAM Timing was not being changed." Eichenholtz and Harris, NRC Inspection Report, No. 93- T 13 (July 21,1993), Attachment B. June 15, 1993 Enforcement Conference, Control Rod Drive Insertion limes, Scram Solenoid 0-Ring Replacement (n.p.}.

4 t

4 Given the large numbers of serious, unanswered questions in the investigation of this violation of safety rules, why is Mr. Martin able to mitigate the penalty in this case? Surely, where VY was generating more than $20,000 net income for share-holders every day for the entire six months that it avoided shutting down, a $50,000 penalty is no penalty at all. Region I has failed to effectively penalize VY's

" programmatic weaknesses." This failure has contributed to increasingly slip-shod practices at VY over the past five years, slip-shod practices which we have repeatedly documented. See e.g., Letter from Michael Daley to NRC Region I Administrator (December 16, 1992).

We believe that these unanswered questions provide a sufficient basis to warrant review of the Region I mitigated penalty imposed on VY. We ask that such a review be undertaken immediately.

Sincerely, i w y _

a en ] 'tu MichaeliDfey, ' - - onathan M. Block, Trustee esearch Associate for the Board of Trustees, New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution l

cc: Senator Judd Gregg (NH)

Senator James Jeffords (VT)

Senator Edward Kennedy (MA)

Senator John Kerry (MA)

Senator Patrick Leahy (VT)

Senator Robert Smith (NH)

Representative John Olver (MA)  !

Representative Bernard Sanders (VT)

Representative Richard Swett (NH) i Representative William Zeliff, Jr. (NH)

William Sherman, State Nuclear Engineer Thomas Martin, NRC Region I Administrative Director M. Wayne Hodges, NRC Division of Reactor Safety James Liebman, NRC Office of Enforcement ,