IR 05000277/2010003
Download: ML102170163
Text
- with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U. S. NRC, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at the PBAPS. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). Docket Nos.
- 50-277,50-278 License Nos.: DPR-44, DPR-56
Sincerely,Paul G. Krohn, Chief Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000277/2010003 and 05000278/2010003 w/AUachment: Supplemental Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). Distribution w/encl: (via E-mail) M. Dapas, Acting RA (Rl0RAMAIL Resource) D. Lew, Acting DRA (Rl0RAMAIL Resource) J. Clifford, DRP (Rl DRPAMAIL Resource) D. Collins, DRP (Rl DRPAMAIL Resource) D. Roberts, DRS (R1DRSMaii Resource) P. Wilson, DRS (R1DRSMaii Resource) P. Krohn, DRP A. Rosebrook, DRP E. Torres, DRP J. Bream, DRP F. Bower, DRP, SRI A. Ziedonis, DRP, RI S. Schmitt, DRP, OA L. Trocine, RI OEDO RidsNrrPMPeachBottom Resource RidsNrrDorlLpll-2 Resource ROPreportsResource@nrc.gov
Sincerely,IRA! Paul G. Krohn, Chief Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects SUNSI Review Complete: AAR (Reviewer's Initials) ML 102170163 DOC NAME:G:\DRP\BRANCH4\1nspection Reports\Peach Bottom\2010\ 2nd Qtr. Inspection\PBIR2010-003.docx After declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it will be released to the Public. To receive a copy of this doct.Jment, indicate in the box:'C' = Copy without attachment/enclosure "En = Copy w/attachmentJenclosure"N"= No copy OFFICE mmt RIIDRP I RIIDRP I R1/DRP I NAME FBower/AAR for ARosebrookl AAR PKrohnl PGK DATE 07/30110 08/05/10 08/05/10 Docket Nos.: License Nos.: Report No.: Licensee: Facility: Location: Dates: Inspectors: Approved by: 1 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 50-277, 50-278 DPR-44, DPR-56 05000277/2010003 and 05000278/2010003 Exelon Generation Company, LLC Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Delta, Pennsylvania April 1, 2010 through June 30, 2010 F. Bower, Senior Resident Inspector A. Ziedonis, Resident Inspector F. Arner, Senior Reactor Inspector S. Pindale, Senior Reactor Inspector L. Scholl, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector K. Young, Senior Reactor Inspector Paul G. Krohn, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure 2
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
......................................................................................................... 3
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
............................................................................................................... 4 1 R01 Adverse Weather Protection .................................................................................. 4 1 R04 Equipment Alignment ............................................................................................. 5 1 R05 Fire Protection ........................................................................................................ 6 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures .................................................................................... 6 1 R07 Heat Sink Performance .......................................................................................... 7 1 R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program .................... '" .................................... 8 1 R12 Maintenance Effectiveness .................................................................................... 9 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control ................................ 9 1 R 15 Operability Evaluations ........................................................................................ 10 1 R18 Plant Modifications ............................................................................................... 11 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing .................................................................................... 11 1R22 Surveillance Testing ............................................................................................. 12 1 EP6 Drill Evaluation
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
.................................................................................................... 13 40A 1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification ................................................................. 13 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (PI&R) ................................................. 13 40A6 Meetings, Including Exit ........................................................................................ 16 ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
................................................................................................... A-1
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
....................................................... A-1.
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
....................................................................................... A-2
LIST OF ACRONYMS
- ...... ..................................................................................................... A-15 Enclosure
- OF [[]]
- FINDIN [[]]
- GS [[]]
- PBAPS ), Units 2 and 3; Integrated Inspection. The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections by five senior regional reactor inspectors. The
- NRC 's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006. Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity None. Other Findings A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensee's CAP. This violation and the licensee's corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 40A7 of this report. Enclosure
Summary of Plant Status
- 4 REPORT [[]]
- DETAIL [[S Unit 2 began the inspection period at 100 percent rated thermal power (RTP) where it generally remained until May 21, 2010, when a planned power reduction to 40 percent was conducted to support summer readiness maintenance and testing that included control cell friction testing and single loop operations to replace the 2 'B' reactor recirculation pump breaker. On May 25, 2010, the unit was returned to 100 percent]]
- RTP where it remained until the end of the inspection period, except for brief periods to support planned testing and rod pattern adjustments. Unit 3 began the inspection period at 100 percent
- RTP where it generally remained until May 14, 2010, when power was reduced to approximately 60 percent to support summer readiness maintenance and testing. On May 16, the unit was returned to 100 percent
- RTP where it remained until the end of the inspection period, except for brief periods to support planned testing, rod pattern adjustments, and planned hydraulic control unit (
- SAFETY "Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1 R01 Adverse Weather Protection ([[Inspection procedure" contains a listed "[" character as part of the property label and has therefore been classified as invalid. -3 Samples) .1 Grid Reliability (1 Sample) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed plant features and procedures for operation and continued availability of offsite and backup power systems during adverse weather (summer conditions). The inspectors reviewed communication protocols between the control room personnel and electrical system operations, as well as measures prescribed and taken to maintain the availability and reliability of these alternating current systems. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified . . 2 External Flooding (1 External Flooding Sample) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed selected risk-important plant design features intended to protect the plant and its safety-related equipment from external flooding events. On May 24, 2010, the inspectors reviewed the Unit 3 external flood barrier breach during planned chemical maintenance treatment (clamtrol) injection into the Unit 3 service water (SW) system. The inspectors walked down the pump structure during the barrier breach condition, reviewed the barrier breach permit, reviewed the station guidance in]]
PB-201, "Hazard Barrier Control Program," and discussed the field condition with operators to verify that the station had appropriate controls in place to mitigate an Enclosure
external flood event during the barrier breach condition. The inspectors reviewed the external flood analyses in Design Bases Document (DBD) P-T-07, "External Hazards," selected sections of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and Special Event Procedure,
- SE [[-4, "Flood Procedure," to verify that the barrier breach controls were maintained in accordance with the licensing basis. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified . . 3 Summer Seasonal Readiness Preparations (1 Seasonal Readiness Sample) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted a review of]]
- PBAPS 's preparations for the 2010 summer conditions to verify selected features of the plant's design were sufficient to protect mitigating systems from the effects of adverse weather. The inspectors reviewed
- WC [[-AA-1 07, "Seasonal Readiness," in preparation for summer season readiness. Documentation for selected risk-significant systems was reviewed to ensure that these systems would remain functional when challenged by inclement weather. During the inspection, the inspectors focused on plant specific design features and the licensee's procedures used to mitigate or respond to adverse weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed the]]
- CAP records to verify that the licensee was identifying adverse weather issues at an appropriate threshold and entering them into their
- CAP. [[In addition, the inspectors reviewed the "Certification of 2010 Summer Readiness" memorandum dated May 14, 2010. Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors walked down the following systems and equipment: * High Pressure Service Water (]]
HPSW) Pump Room; * Emergency Service Water (ESW) Pump Room; * Emergency Booster Pump Room; and * Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Rooms. 1 R04 Eguipment Alignment (71111.040 -3 Samples) .1 Partial Walkdown a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a partial walkdown of three systems to verify the operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety-related equipment was inoperable. The inspectors performed walkdowns to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and potentially increase risk. The inspectors reviewed selected applicable operations procedures, walked down system components, and verified that selected breakers, valves, and support equipment were in the correct position to support system operation. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The three systems reviewed were: Enclosure
- 'B' Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) Train during 'A'
- OOS [[). b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1 R05 Fire Protection (71111.05Q -6 Samples) .1 Fire Protection -Tours a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment. The inspectors reviewed areas to assess whether]]
- FPP [[) and adequately: controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant; maintained fire detection and suppression capability; and maintained the material condition of passive fire protection features. For the areas inspected, the inspectors also verified that]]
OOS, degraded or inoperable fire protection equipment, systems, or features. The inspectors verified: that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient combustible materials were managed in accordance with plant procedures; and fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors toured the following areas: * Unit 2 Turbine Building, Lubricating Oil Tank Room (Fire Zone 88); * Unit 2 Reactor Building, Reactor Core Isolation Coolant (RCIC) Room (Fire Zone 60); * Turbine Building Common, Radiation Chemical Area (Fire Area 78C); * Unit 2 Turbine Building, Emergency Battery Switchgear Room (Fire Area 127); * Unit 3 Turbine Building, Emergency Battery Switchgear Room (Fire Area 117); and * Radwaste Building, Unit 3 Recirculation Pump Motor Generator (MIG) Set Room (Fire Area 12C). b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1 R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06 -1 Sample) .1 Internal Flood Protection a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed selected risk-important plant design features intended to protect the plant and its safety-related equipment from internal flooding events. The Enclosure
inspectors reviewed the flood analysis and
- HPCI ) pump room to evaluate the condition of penetration seals, watertight doors, and other internal design features to verify that they were as described in the Individual Plant Examination. The inspectors also reviewed Exelon's monitoring and control of
- HPCI [[pump mechanical seal leakage in this area to ensure the leakage would not adversely impact the operability of the system. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1 R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07T -2 Samples) a. Inspection Scope Based on a plant specific risk assessment, previous inspections, recent operational experience, and resident inspector input, the inspectors selected the following heat sink samples: * Operation and Performance Testing of the]]
- HPSW Piping Integrity and Intake Structure Functionality. The Conowingo Pond, supplied directly from the Susquehanna River, functions as the normal heat sink for both Peach Bottom units. The
- HX s) under post-accident conditions. The emergency cooling tower (ECT) provides the heat sink for the related pump bays in the unlikely event that the Conowingo Dam fails or the Conowingo pond floods. The inspectors reviewed the
- HPSW , and intake design to evaluate the adequacy of system monitoring and performance testing. The inspectors reviewed a sample of
- HPSW [[pump and valve performance tests, system health and Generic Letter (GL) 89-13 Program reports, and in-service test (1ST) vibration monitoring results for adverse trends and to verify that the systems functioned as designed. The inspectors verified that Exelon performed the pump and valve]]
- IST s in accordance with American Society of Mechanical Engineers Code requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed Exelon's monitoring, maintenance, and testing of interface valves between safety-related
- SW flow is available post-accident consistent with design basis assumptions. The inspectors reviewed Exelon's buried pipe inspection and monitoring program to independently assess the condition and structural integrity of the
- HPSW pipe nondestructive examination records and intake structure inspections to ensure that Exelon appropriately identified and dispositioned any
- HPSW piping or intake structure degradation. The inspectors performed an above ground walkdown of accessible areas containing buried
- HP [[]]
- ESW piping to look for soil subsidence or other indications of piping leakage and/or degradation. The inspectors also directly observed the condition of
- HPSW systems. The inspectors also observed the condition of several zebra mussel monitoring locations. The inspectors reviewed Exelon's procedures for
- SW [[operations; intake flooding; and for a loss of the Conowingo Pond. The inspectors verified that Exelon maintained these procedures consistent with their design and licensing basis, and that plant operators could reasonably implement the procedures as written. The inspectors independently verified that the]]
- HPSW [[pump bay and intake level instrumentation, which operators rely upon for decision making, was available and functional. The inspectors also reviewed the most recent third party structural inspection of the Conowingo Dam to assess the integrity and availability of the Conowingo Pond heat sink. The inspectors walked down control room instrument panels, accessible portions of]]
- RHR [[]]
- SW traveling water screens) to assess the material condition and configuration control of these structures, systems and components (SSCs). The inspectors also reviewed a sample of corrective action issue reports (IRs) related to the
- ESW isolation valves, pumps, and piping integrity to ensure that Exelon appropriately identified, characterized, and corrected problems related to these essential
- SSC [[s. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1R11 Licensed Operator Regualification Program (71111.11Q -1 Sample) .1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review a. Inspection Scope On May 3, 2010, the inspectors observed operators in]]
- PBAPS [['s simulator during licensed operator requalification training to verify that operator performance was adequate and that evaluators were identifying and documenting crew performance issues. The inspectors verified that performance issues were discussed in the crew's post-scenario critiques. The inspectors discussed the training, simulator scenarios, and critiques with the operators, shift supervision, and the training instructors. The inspectors observed the following scenario: *]]
- PS [[]]
EG-1109R: Evaluation Scenario. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. Enclosure
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q -2 Samples) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated
- EOC ) determinations for those issues with potential common cause or generic implications to evaluate the adequacy of the
- PBAPS had appropriately monitored, evaluated, and dispositioned the issues in accordance with Exelon procedures, including
- 0 CFR 50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance." In addition, the inspectors reviewed selected
- PBAPS 's corrective actions that were taken or planned, to evaluate whether the actions were reasonable and appropriate. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors performed the following two samples: * 2 'C'
- IR "1084973); and * Maintenance Activities Associated with Failure Mode Causal Tree (FMCT) for Tritium Leakage Mitigation Efforts (IR 1046838, Activity 6). b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1 R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control ([[Inspection procedure" contains a listed "[" character as part of the property label and has therefore been classified as invalid. -6 Samples) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated]]
- PBAPS 's implementation of the Maintenance Risk Program with respect to the effectiveness of risk assessments performed for maintenance activities that were conducted on
- PBAPS had taken the necessary steps to plan and control emergent work activities and to manage overall plant risk. The inspectors selectively reviewed
PBAPS's use of the online risk monitoring software and daily work schedules. The activities selected were based on plant maintenance schedules and systems that contributed to risk. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors completed six evaluations of maintenance activities on the following: * Control of Work and Management of Plant Risk, between April 6-7, 2010, during Partial Loss of 3 'A' Main Power Transformer Cooling (IR 1053261); * Control of Work and Management of Plant Risk, between April 26-30, during Week 1 of 5 of the 11th Annual Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Campaign (SF-221); Enclosure
- Control of Work and Management of Plant Risk, on May 20, 2010, during Troubleshooting and Repair of Backup Nitrogen Supply to the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) valves (Action Request (AR) A1730354 and
- ST [[-M-016-400-3); * Control of Work and Management of Plant Risk, between May 10-28, 2010, during Transfer of Reactor Protection System Power Supplies for Cooper Substation Tie-In to Off-Site Source 220-08 (Clearance 10000772); * Control of Work and Management of Plant Risk, between April 4-5, 2010, during on-line steam leak injection repairs to]]
- CV -2-08-4018: Main Steam Supply to Recombiner System Control Valve (Operational Technical Decision Making (OTDM) associated with
- IR 1045319); and * Control of Work and Management of Plant Risk during and following Identification of a Leak in the Unit 2 'C'
- RHR [[]]
- RT [[-O-010-630-2). b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1 R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15 -6 Samples) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed six issues to assess the technical adequacy of the operability evaluations, the use and control of compensatory measures, and compliance with the licensing and design bases. Associated adverse condition monitoring plans (ACMPs), engineering technical evaluations, and]]
- OTDM documents were also reviewed. The inspectors verified these processes were performed in accordance with the applicable administrative procedures and were consistent with
- NRC [[]]
- IMC Part 9900, "Operability Determinations & Functionality Assessments for Resolutions of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety." The inspectors also used Technical Specifications (TSs),
- DBD s as references during these reviews. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The following degraded equipment issues were reviewed: * Operability Evaluation Number 10-002, Engineer Evaluation of Submerged Cable Issue (
ACMP for Monitoring of 3 'B' Phase Main Power Transformer Combustible Gases (IR 1082693). b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. Enclosure
1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18 -1 Sample) .1 Permanent Modifications a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed one permanent modification to verify that modification implementation did not place the plant in an unsafe condition. The review was also conducted to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of risk significant
- SSC s had not been degraded as a result of these modifications. The inspectors verified the modified equipment alignment through control room instrumentation observations;
- UFSAR [[, drawings, procedures, and work order ryvO) reviews; staff interviews; and plant walkdowns of accessible equipment. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The following engineering change request (ECR) for a permanent modification was reviewed: *]]
- HPCI [[Main Pump Seal Water Line. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 -5 Samples) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors observed and reviewed completed test records for selected post-maintenance testing (PMT) activities. The inspectors observed whether the tests were performed in accordance with the approved procedures or instructions and assessed the adequacy of the test methodology based on the scope of maintenance work performed. In addition, the inspectors assessed the test acceptance criteria to evaluate whether the test demonstrated that components satisfied the applicable design and licensing bases and the]]
- TS requirements. The inspectors reviewed the recorded test data to verify that the acceptance criteria were satisfied. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed five
- EDG Engine Inspection ryvO R1108074); * Unit 2 End-of-Cycle Recirculation Pump 'B' Trip Breaker Replacement ryvO C0299083-07); * Unit
ST-O-014-305-3 performed on May 19, 2010). b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. Enclosure
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22-5 Samples) a. Inspection Scope (3 Routine Surveillances;
- ST [[Sample) The inspectors reviewed and observed selected portions of the following surveillance tests (STs), and compared test data with established acceptance criteria to verify the systems demonstrated the capability of performing the intended safety functions. The inspectors also verified that the systems and components maintained operational readiness, met applicable]]
- TS requirements, and were capable of performing design basis functions. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The five
- 1ST [[[1 1]]
- ST [[Sample]; *]]
- ST [[-O-020-560-2/3, Units 2 & 3 -Reactor Coolant Leakage Test [1 Reactor Coolant System (]]
- RCS [[) Leakage sample]; *]]
- 1ST [[[1 1]]
- ST [[sample]; *]]
- HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump and Manual Trip Lever Tension Test, performed on May 22,2010. The inspectors noted that
- IR 1068090 was entered into the corrective action system to address a question related to the acceptance criteria contained in
- 1EP 6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06 -1 Sample) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a
- PBAPS emergency drill on May 10, 2010, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification and notification activities. The drill was conducted, in part, to provide drill and exercise performance (DEP) opportunities for the
- PI [[). The inspectors observed operators respond to events in the simulator control room through the declaration and notification of an alert. The inspectors observed the operations shift manager transition emergency response command and control responsibilities to the site emergency director in the technical support center (TSC). The inspectors relocated to the]]
- TSC [[to observe command and control of the emergency response organization and dose assessment as the event escalated to the declaration and notification of a site area emergency, followed by further escalation to a general emergency. The inspectors verified that the event classification and notifications were done in accordance with]]
- PBAPS. " The inspectors verified that the drill evaluators correctly counted the drill's contribution in the calculation of the
DEP PI. The inspectors also verified that operations personnel in the Enclosure
simulator control room identified weaknesses or deficiencies during the critique of the drill. The following simulated events were classified during this training exercise: *
- OTHER [[]]
- ACTIVI TIES (OA) 40A1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 -4 Samples) Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity .1 Barrier Integrity Pis (71151 -4 Samples) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed a sample of
- PBAPS 's submittals for the four Barrier Integrity Pis listed below to verify the accuracy of the data reported. The
- PI definitions and the guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline," Revision 6, and Exelon procedure
- NRC [[]]
- PI data collected from January 2009 to April 2010. The inspectors compared the graphical representations from the most recent
- PI data to verify the data was properly included in the report. The Pis reviewed were: * Unit 2 and Unit
- BI 02). b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 40A2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (PI&R) (71152 -1 Semi-annual Trend Sample;
- CAP [[a. Inspection Scope As required by Inspection Procedure (IP) 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems," and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for fOllOW-Up, the inspectors performed screening of all items entered into the licensee's]]
AR / IR and attending daily management review committee meetings. Enclosure
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified . . 2 Semi-Annual Review to Identify Trends (1 Semi-annual Resident Inspector Sample) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed lists of
- NRC or licensee identified) that might indicate the existence of a safety issue requiring more detailed inspection follow-up. The inspectors reviewed a list of approximately 6,700
- CAP action tracking system (Passport) from December 1, 2009 through June 1, 2010. The inspectors also reviewed a list of approximately 3,200
- IR s for which corrective actions remained open. The lists were reviewed and screened to complete the required semi-annual
- IR [[s (listed in the Attachment) were selected from the list and reviewed in more detail to verify whether the issues were adequately identified and evaluated, and that corrective actions were either closed or planned appropriately. The inspectors evaluated the]]
- XVI ", "Corrective Action." b. Assessments and Observations No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors noted that during this trend review period, two significant unplanned transients occurred. One involved the trip of the 2 'A'reactor recirculation pump (IR 1026936) and the other involved a Unit 2 load reduction that was performed in response to a loss of isophase bus duct cooling ([[Issue report" contains a listed "[" character as part of the property label and has therefore been classified as invalid.). The inspectors observed that the]]
- PBAPS appropriately performed root cause analyses for these two events. The inspectors also noted that
- PBAPS [[performed a root cause analysis of an event involving multiple control rods that had slow scram times during the initial portions of their insertion (IR 1023827). A common cause analysiS was performed to review multiple equipment related reactivity events. The inspectors observed that the licensee appropriately used the]]
- PBAPS took appropriate action to perform common cause analyses of two additional areas. The first involved an adverse trend of problem identification and resolution cross-cutting aspects associated with
- NRC "findings (IR 1060396). The second involved security department training and qualification failures that required remediation (IR 1061573). The inspectors also noted that maintenance personnel identified (IR 1059363) a list of historical deficiencies that supported their conclusion that poor operating reliability existed for the glycol chillers in the offgas system and contributed to adverse environmental impacts. The inspectors noted additional trends related to the following subject areas: [[Isotope" contains a listed "[" character as part of the property label and has therefore been classified as invalid. (IR 1044318,]]
IR 106316, IR 1047196). The inspectors also observed a trend of aged issues that remained open Enclosure
during the inspection period that included engineering issues identified during or in preparation for
- PBAPS personnel. However, based on the overall review of the selected sample, the inspectors concluded that
- CAP , adequately evaluating the identified issues, and acceptably identifying adverse trends before they became more safety significant problems . . 3 Review of Operator Work Arounds (1
- CAP , and proposed or implemented appropriate corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the list of
- OWA s for mitigating systems affected the mitigating system's safety functions or affected the operators' ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures. The inspectors reviewed the following open
- HPCI Pump Inboard and Outboard Seal Leakage (AR A1752639). The inspectors also reviewed the lists of open
- OC s (deficiencies that are obstacles to normal plant operations), periodically walked down the panels in the main control room, and have reviewed control room deficiencies to identify and be cognizant of: (1)
OWAs that increase the potential for personnel error, including OWAs that: * Require operations contrary to past training or require more detailed knowledge than routinely provided; * Require a change from longstanding operational practices; * Require operation of a system or component in a manner different from similar systems or components; * Create the potential for the compensatory action to be performed on equipment or under conditions for which it is not appropriate; * Impair access to required indications, increase dependence on oral communications, or require actions under adverse environmental conditions; and * Require the use of equipment and interfaces that have not been designed with consideration of the task being performed. The inspectors accompanied the Unit 2 turbine building equipment operator during dayshift rounds on June 3, 2010, and the Unit 3 reactor building nuclear equipment operator during day shift rounds on June 24, 2010, to observe any potential work around challenges. The inspectors also interviewed operators to determine if any compensatory actions they routinely take are (or should be) categorized as workarounds/challenges. Finally, the inspectors reviewed current operator turnover Enclosure
documentation to determine if there are documented compensatory actions that should be categorized as workarounds!challenges. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 40A6 Meetings, Including Exit .1 Commissioner Site Visit and Meeting On June 2, 2010, Commissioner
- PBAPS , toured the site and met with senior Exelon management. Commissioner Magwood was accompanied by Mr.
- S. [[Collins, Regional Administrator, Region I and Mr. P. Krohn, Branch Chief, Region I, Division of Reactor Projects . . 2 Quarterly Resident Exit Meeting Summary On July 16,2010, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Thomas Dougherty and other]]
- USNRC [[, Region 1, Division of Reactor Projects, Branch 4, attended this quarterly inspection exit meeting. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified . . 3 Triennial Heat Sink Performance Exit Meeting Summary On May 21, 2010, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Thomas Dougherty, Site Vice President, and other members of the Exelon staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was documented. 40A7 Licensee-Identified Violations The following violation of very low significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of]]
- PBAPS shall develop and maintain strategies for addressing large fires and explosions. On May 11, 2010, the licensee discovered that equipment used for a single mitigation strategy, described in
- TSG -4.1, Attachment 15, had been removed from its designated location. The finding was assessed in accordance with
- IMC 0609, Appendix L, Table 2, and determined to be of very low (Green) safety significance because the finding only impacted an individual mitigation strategy. The licensee restored the equipment and entered the issue into their
- ATIACH [[]]
- MENT [[:]]
- SUPPLE [[]]
- MENTAL [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- SUPPLE [[]]
- MENTAL [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- ATION [[]]
- KEY [[]]
- POINTS [[]]
- OF [[]]
- T. [[Dougherty, Site Vice President G. Stathes, Plant Manager J. Armstrong, Regulatory Assurance Manager M. Weidman, Acting Engineering Director R. Franssen, Work Management Director J. Kovalchick, Security Manager L. Lucas, Chemistry Manager P. Navin, Operations Director R. Holmes, Radiation Protection Manager T. Wasong, Training Director J. Donell,]]
- NRC [[Personnel P. Krohn, Branch Chief F. Bower, Senior Resident Inspector A. Ziedonis, Resident Inspector F. Arner, Senior Reactor Inspector S. Pindale, Senior Reactor Inspector L. Scholl, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector K. Young, Senior Reactor Inspector]]
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- ITEMS [[]]
- AND [[]]
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- DOCUME [[]]
- NTS [[]]
- REVIEW [[]]
- SE -16, Attachment A, Revision 2, Power Team Generation Dispatcher/Power System Director (PTGD/PSD) Communications to Peach Bottom
- AA -1 08-107-1 002, Revision 4, Interface Agreement between Exelon Energy Delivery and Exelon Generation for Switchyard Operations
- AA -8003, Revision 1, Interface Procedure between Energy D'elivery (COMED/PECO) and Exelon Generation (Nuclear/Power) for Design Engineering and Transmission Planning Activities McDonald, John
- PECO Nuclear Station Switchyard Readiness Certification for Summer 2009, Memo to Michael Pacillio; May 15, 2009 Single Line Diagram E1, Revision 45, Station System Health Report,
- DC [[Systems (Unit 2 and Unit 3), 10/1/2009 -12/31/2009 System Health Report, 4 kV (Unit 2 and Unit 3), 10/1/2009 -12/31/2009 System Health Report, Emergency Diesels, 10/1/2009 -12/31/2009 System Health Report, Station Blackout, 10/1/2009 -12/31/2009 System Health Report, Substations/Startup Sources, 10/1/2009 -12/31/2009]]
- PB -201, Revision 0, Hazard Barrier Control Program Drawing A-490, Revision 4, Barrier Plans: Circulating Water Pump Structure,
- SW Systems (Spring) Memorandum from Thomas Dougherty to Joseph Grimes, Jr., dated May 14, 2010: Certification for 2010 Summer Readiness
- EDG [[]]
EOC/RPT Breaker Inspection Results IR 1076476, 'B' Cooling Tower Lift Pump Failed to Start Attachment
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment
- RBCCW [[]]
- 60 PF -88, Revision 3, Prefire Strategy Plan, Unit 2 Turbine Building, Lube Oil Tank Room, Elevation 116'-0" Fire Zone 88
- PF -78C, Revision 5, Prefire Strategy Plan, Turbine Building Common, Radiation Chemical Area, 116' Elevation, Fire Area 78C
- PF -117, Revision 6, Prefire Strategy Plan, Unit 3 Turbine Building, Emergency Battery Switchgear Rooms, 135' Elevation, Fire Area 117
- PF -127, Revision 6, Prefire Strategy Plan, Unit 2 Turbine Building, Emergency Battery Switchgear Rooms, 135' Elevation, Fire Area 127 *
- AO [[]]
- 20A. 1, Temporary Removal and Installation of Flood Barriers in the Reactor Building Drainage System, Revision 13
- HPCI Vent Valve Installation T-103, Secondary Containment Control, Revision 16 Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance Memo from Joseph G. Schoppy to Paul G. Krohn Thru Richard J. Conte dated June 1, 2010, regarding
- GL 89-13 Program Functional Area Self Assessment, dated 2/28/07 703604-03,89-13 Program Check-in Assessment, dated 6/28/09 989394, Pre-
- DBD P-T-07, Revision 2, External Hazards Design Baseline Document Drawings 6280-M-315 Shts. 1, 2, 4, & 5, Revisions 68, 55, 53, & 57,
- HPSW Systems 6280-M-330 Sh. 1, Revision 35, Emergency Cooling System A-490 Sh. 1, Revision 4, Barrier Plan
IRs 304543 532363 536910 543926 574158 685077 660310 678567 708222 708248 708255 708261 708284 712457 712465 758678 758690 766675 791321 793791 793803 Miscellaneous 89-13 Program Improvement Plan, dated 6/28/09 794363 798807 805940 822594 823612 824075 824082 846746 849833 896894
899886 920405 933013
2904 1026915
26919 1026921 1058866 1071180 1071347 Equipment Operator Rounds (Unit 2 & 3 Intake Areas), dated 3/29/10 -4/4/10 G3 Wavemaker (G366) Certificate of Conformance, dated 8/8/08 & 11125/08 Inspection Report Susquehanna Electric Company Conowingo Hydroelectric Station, January
SW (Room 806) MR Walkdown Datasheet, performed 12/16/97, 11/15/99, and Attachment
6/12/04 Unit 2 Circulating Pump Room
NDE Reports 180-2-32-4 E04 0/8, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 8/8/08 180-2-32-4 E05 0/8, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 4/15/09 180-2-32-4 E05 U/8, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 4/15/09 180-2-32-4 R03 U/8, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 8/8/08 180-2-32-4 T01 BR, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 8/8/08 180-2-32-5 E03, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 7/9/08 180-2-32-5 E03 U/8, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 1/2/09 180-2-32-5 P01, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 7/9/08 180-2-32-10 V01, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 12/8/08 180-2-32-10 V02, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 12/14/08 180-2-32-10 V04, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 12/14/08 180-2-32-10 V05, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 12/9/08 180-2-32-10 V06, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 12/14/08 180-2-32-10 V07, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 12/10/08 180-2-32-10 V08, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 12/10/08 180-3-32-6 F02 0/8, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 4/27/09 180-3-32-6 F02 U/8, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 4/27/09 180-3-32-6 F04 U/8, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 4/27/09 180-3-32-6 V03 0/8, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 4/28/09 180-3-32-6 V03 U/8, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 3/4/09 180-3-32-7 E02 U/8, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 3/4/09 180-3-32-7 F01 0/8, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 11/24/08 180-3-32-7 V03 0/8, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 4/28/09 180-3-32-10 V01, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 12/14/08 180-3-32-10 V02, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 11/18/08 180-3-32-10 V04, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 11/19/08 180-3-32-10 V05, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 11/25/08 180-3-32-10 V06, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 11/18/08 180-3-32-10 V07, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 12/16/08 180-3-32-10 V09, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 11/18/08 180-3-32-10 V10, Raw Water Corrosion Ultrasonic Examination Report, dated 12/16/08 Attachment
Report No. 0800534.401.RO, G-Scan Assessment of Various Piping Lines, dated 12/31/08 Report No. 0901287.401.R1, G-Scan Assessment of Various Safety Related Piping, December 2009 Operating Experience Generic
- PBAPS [[]]
- RHR [[]]
- RHR [[]]
- ESW System Routine Inspection While System is in Operation System Health Reports. Maintenance History & Trending
- HPSW System Health Report (Unit 2 & Unit 3), 4th Quarter 2009 Intake Silt Level Readings (In Front of Outer Screen Structure), performed 7/31/07
- PBAPS [[]]
- RT -0-28B-800-2, River Temperature and Flow Monitoring, performed 4/4/10 Waterbox Debris Collected Unit 2 (Trend Data), dated 9/13/02 -1/30/10 Waterbox Debris Collected Unit 3 (Trend Data), dated 5/18/02 -3/15/09 Attachment
- WO s C0223901 C0225314 C0225515 C0225614 C0229231 C0229556 C0230346 R0880510 R0916150 A-7 Section 1 R11: Licensed Operator Regualification Program
- PSEG -1109R: Evaluation Scenario, Revision 2, performed 05/03/10 Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness
- FMCT [[]]
- RHR [[]]
- RHR [[]]
- RHR [[]]
- RHR [[]]
- RHR [[]]
- RHR [[]]
- RHR [[]]
- RHR [[]]
- AO [[]]
- TCCP and Replace Breakers E-1-42-A, Sheet 3, Revision 0, Hyundai Transformer Power Control Circuit Diagram E-1-42-A, Sheet 4, Revision 0, Hyundai Transformer Power Control Circuit Diagram
- IR 1053261, 3 'A' Main Transformer Cooling Control Power Breaker Tripped Narrative Logs: April 6, 2010, Night Shift
- SO [[]]
IR 1059078, Remove Unirradiated Fuel Channels from Peach Bottom Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pool IR 1064201, High Silica in Refuel Water Storage Tank Attachment
Narrative Logs: April 26, 2010, Night Shift; April 27, 2010, Night Shift; and April 28, 2010, Night Shift
- OOS [[]]
- UFSAR Section 10.17, Instrument Air, Service Air, and Instrument Nitrogen Systems Clearance 10000772, Tie-in of Cooper Substation to 220-08 Line
- SO 60F.6.A-2, Revision 13, Transferring Reactor Protection System Power Supplies Narrative Logs: May 27,2010, Night Shift P-S-06, Revision 14, Reactor Protection System
- UFSAR Section 9.4, Gaseous Radwaste / Off-Gas System Addendum 2 to Specification 6280-M-87, Revision 1, Off-Gas Recombiners for the
- RHR [[]]
- RHR [[]]
- RHR [[]]
- RHR [[]]
- RHR [[]]
- RHR [[]]
- DIER [[]]
- RHR [[]]
- AST [[]]
- HPSW [[]]
- RHR [[]]
- HX Leak Inspection and Repair, dated 06/16/10 Regulatory Guide 1.183, Alternate Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating DeSign Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors
- RHR [[]]
- 1ST [[]]
- UFSAR Section 14.9.2, Current Licensing Basis Dose Evaluation Using Alternate Source Term Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations Operability Evaluation Number 10-002, Revision 0, Engineering Evaluation of Submerged Cable Issue Nuclear Event Report
- NRC [[]]
- NOS [[]]
- WANO [[]]
- AFI [[:]]
- HPCI 30P038 Inboard and Outboard Seal Leak After Run Operability Evaluation Number 10-003, Revision 0, Unit
- HPCI [[]]
- RBCCW [[]]
- AR A 1765051, 3 'B' Main Power Transformer Serveron Indicated Gas Levels Rising Section 1 R18: Plant Modifications
PB-2007-042-S, Revision 0, 50.59 Screening Associated with ECR 07-00274 Attachment
Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing A1552281, Evaluate Max Re-Torque Value for
- RBCCW [[]]
- RBCCW [[]]
- ST -I-052-252-2, E-2 Diesel Generator Inspection Post-Maintenance Instrumentation and Logic Test, Revision
- 9 ST -I-052-262-2, E-2 Diesel Generator Inspection Post-Maintenance Handswitch Logic Test, Revision 4
- 20 ST -I-02A-406-2, Determination of 2 'B' System I End of Cycle-Recirculation Pump Trip Breaker Arc Suppression Response Time, performed
- EOC [[]]
- CRL [[]]
- ST -0-014-306-3, Core Spray Loop 'B' Pump, Valve, Flow, and Cooler Functional and Inservice Test, performed 05/19/2010
- ST -0-014-355-3, Core Spray Loop 'B' Valve Alignment and Filled and Vented Verification, Performed 05/19/2010
NDE Exams of Unit 3 Core Spray Piping Attachment
Section 1 R22: Surveillance Testing M-315, Revision 52,
- ISFSI [[]]
- HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump and Manual Trip Lever Tension Test, performed 04/24/10, 04/30/10, and 05/22/2010 *IR 1068090,
- GE [[]]
- GE [[]]
- GE [[]]
- PBAPS [[]]
- NRC [[]]
- NRC [[]]
- CH -C-601, Determination of Dose Equivalent 1-131 Section 40A2: Identification and Resolution of Problems *
- EDG [[]]
- SBO [[]]
- HPCI [[]]
- CCA [[]]
- ACE [[]]
- NRC [[]]
- CM [[]]
- RBC [[]]
- OP -AA-102-103-1001, Revision 2, Operator Burden and Operationally Significant Decisions Impact Assessment Program
- PB -112-1 01-1 007, Reactor Building Equipment Operator Shift Turnover Checklist, Unit 3, 06/25/10 Night Shift
- PB -112-101-1008, Turbine Building Equipment Operator Shift Turnover Checklist, Unit 2, 06/03/10, Day Shift
- NER [[]]
- NC -10-028 (Yellow), Importance of Understanding Circuit Breaker Control Power Indications (lR 1061366)
- OWA Board Meeting Minutes, 03/30/10 Unit 2 Turbine Building Rounds List from eSoms, 06/03/10 Dayshift Unit 3 Reactor Building Rounds List from eSoms, 06/24/10 Day Shift * Indicates
NRC-identified Attachment
Section 40A7: Licensee-Identified Violations
- ADAMS [[]]
- ADS [[]]
- AR [[]]
- CAP [[]]
- CFR [[]]
- DBD [[]]
- DEP [[]]
- ECCS [[]]
- ECR [[]]
- ECT [[]]
- EDG [[]]
- EOC [[]]
- ESW [[]]
- FMCT [[]]
- FPP [[]]
- GL [[]]
- HCU [[]]
- HPCI [[]]
- HPSW [[]]
- HX [[]]
- IMC [[]]
- IP [[]]
- IR [[]]
- ST [[]]
- MCC [[]]
- MIG [[]]
- MR [[]]
- MSO [[]]
- NCV [[]]
- NDE [[]]
- NEI [[]]
- NRC [[]]
- OOS [[]]
- OTOM [[]]
- OWA [[]]
- PARS [[]]
- PBAPS [[]]
- PI [[]]
- PI&R [[]]
- PMT [[]]
- RBCCW [[]]
- RCIC [[]]
- RCS [[]]
- RHR [[]]
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- ACRONY [[]]
- MS "Adverse Condition Monitoring Plans Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System Automatic Depressurization System Action Request Corrective Action Program Code of Federal Regulations Design Basis Document Drill and Exercise Performance Emergency Core Cooling System Engineering Change Request Emergency Cooling Tower [[system" contains a listed "[" character as part of the property label and has therefore been classified as invalid. Extent-of-Condition Emergency Service Water Failure Mode Causal Tree Fire Protection Plan Generic Letter Hydraulic Control Unit High Pressure Coolant Injection High Pressure Service Water Heat Exchanger Inspection Manual Chapter I nspection Procedure Issue Report Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation In-Service Test Motor Control Center Motor Generator Maintenance Rule Multiple Spurious Operations Non-cited Violation Non-Destructive Examination Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operator Challenges Out-of-Service Operational Technical Decision Making Operator Work Around Publicly Available Records Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Performance Indicator Problem Identification and Resolution Post-Maintenance Testing Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water Reactor Core Isolation Coolant Reactor Coolant System Residual Heat Removal Rated Thermal Power Attachment]]
- SGTS [[]]
- SSC [[]]
- SW [[]]
- TRM [[]]
- TS [[]]
- TSC [[]]
- UFSAR "WO A-16 Standby Gas Treatment System Structure, System, and Component Surveillance Tests Service Water Technical Requirements Manual Technical Specifications Technical Support Center [[Licensing Basis Document" contains a listed "[" character as part of the property label and has therefore been classified as invalid. Work Order Attachment]]