IR 05000338/2008005
Download: ML090290113
Text
January 28, 2009
Mr. David President and Chief Nuclear Officer Virginia Electric and Power Company Innsbrook Technical Center 5000 Dominion Boulevard Glen Allen, VA 23060
SUBJECT: NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000338/2008005 AND 05000339/2008005
Dear Mr. Christian:
On December 31, 2008, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on January 20, 2009, with Mr. Daniel Stoddard and other members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your licenses as they related to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your licenses. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, one NRC-identified finding was identified and determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of its very low safety significance and because it was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this finding as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. In addition, one licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green), is listed in Section 4OA7 of this report. If you contest these non-cited violations, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the North Anna Power Station.
VEPCO 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if any, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/ Gerald J. McCoy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-338, 50-339 License Nos. NPF-4, NPF-7
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000338/2008005 and 05000339/2008005
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information cc w/encl. (See next page)
VEPCO 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, if any, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/ Gerald J. McCoy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-338, 50-339 License Nos. NPF-4, NPF-7
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000338/2008005 and 05000339/2008005
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information cc w/encl. (See next page)
X PUBLICLY AVAILABLE G NON-PUBLICLY AVAILABLE G SENSITIVE X NON-SENSITIVE ADAMS: X Yes ACCESSION NUMBER:_________________________ X SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRP SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA By e-mail//RA By e-mail//RA By e-mail//RA By e-mail//RA By e-mail//RA By e-mail/NAME JReece RClagg CWelch RHamilton WLoo ELea AVargas JDodson DATE 1/23/09 1/23/09 1/23/09 1/23/08 1/23/09 1/23/09 1/23/09 1/23/09 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: G:\RPB5\NORTH ANNA\REPORTS\2008\NA 08-05\NA2008-005 FINAL.DOC VEPCO 3 cc w/encl: Daniel G. Stoddard Site Vice President Virginia Electric and Power Company Electronic Mail Distribution Eric Hendrixson Director, Nuclear Safety and Licensing Virginia Electric and Power Company Electronic Mail Distribution Chris L. Funderburk Director, Nuclear Licensing & Operations Support Virginia Electric and Power Company Electronic Mail Distribution Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq. Senior Counsel Dominion Resources Services, Inc. Electronic Mail Distribution Executive Vice President Old Dominion Electric Cooperative Electronic Mail Distribution Attorney General Supreme Court Building 900 East Main Street Richmond, VA 23219 Senior Resident Inspector North Anna Power Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 490 Mineral, VA 23117 County Administrator Louisa County P.O. Box 160 Louisa, VA 23093 Michael M. Cline Director Virginia Department of Emergency Services Management Electronic Mail Distribution Ginger L. Alligood (NORTH ANNA EXAM REPORTS ONLY) Virginia Electric and Power Company Electronic Mail Distribution VEPCO 4 Letter to David from Gerald J. McCoy dated January 28, 2009.
SUBJECT: NORTH ANNA POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000338/2008005 AND 05000339/2008005 Distribution w/encl: C. Evans, RII EICS (Part 72 Only) L. Slack, RII EICS (Linda Slack) OE Mail (email address if applicable) RIDSNRRDIRS PUBLIC S. P. Lingam, NRR Richard Jervey, NRR Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II
Docket Nos: 50-338, 50-339 License Nos: NPF-4, NPF-7 Report No: 05000338/2008005 and 05000339/2008005 Licensee: Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)
Facility: North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: 1022 Haley Drive Mineral, Virginia 23117 Dates: October 1, 2008 through December 31, 2008 Inspectors: J. Reece, Senior Resident Inspector R. Clagg, Resident Inspector C. Welch, Senior Resident Inspector - Surry Power Station R. Hamilton, Senior Health Physicist, Sections 2OS1, 2PS2, and 4OA5.4 W. Loo, Senior Health Physicist, Sections 2OS2 and 4OA1.2 E. Lea, Senior Operations Engineer, Section 1R11 A. Vargas, Reactor Inspector, Section 4OA5.3 Approved by: Gerald J. McCoy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects
Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
......................................................................................................... 3
REPORT DETAILS
..................................................................................................................... 4
REACTOR SAFETY
................................................................................................................... 4 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection ................................................................................ 4 1R04 Equipment Alignments ......................................................................................... 5 1R05 Fire Protection ..................................................................................................... 6 1R07 Heat Sink Performance--------.. ......................................................... 8 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program ....................................................... 8 1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness .................................................................................. 9 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control ............................. 9 1R15 Operability Evaluations ...................................................................................... 10 1R18 Plant Modifications ......................................................................................... ...10 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing ................................................................................. 11 1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities ............................................................... 11 1R22 Surveillance Testing .......................................................................................... 12 1EP6 Drill Evaluation.........................
RADIATION SAFETY
............................................................................................................... 13 2OS1 Access Control To Radiologically Significant Areas........................................... 13 2OS2 ALARA Planning and Control ............................................................................ 15 2PS2 Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation
OTHER ACTIVITIES
................................................................................................................ 17
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification .................................................................... 17
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems ......................................................... 18
4OA3 Event Followup ................................................................................................. 20
4OA5 Other Activities .................................................................................................. 21
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit .................................................................................... 25
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations ............................................................................ 26
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
................................................................................................... A-1
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
........................................................ A-1
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
....................................................................................... A-3
LIST OF ACRONYMS
- ...... .................................................................................................... A-10
- OF [[]]
- FINDIN [[]]
GS
IR 05000338/2008-005, 05000339/2008-005; 10/01/2008 - 12/31/2008; North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2; routine integrated report, Fire Protection.
The report covered a three month period of inspection by resident and regional inspectors. One Green non-cited violation (NCV) was identified. The significance of most findings is identified by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the
- NRC 's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
- A. [[]]
NRC Identified and Self-Revealing Findings Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems * Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of the North Anna Power Plant Facility Renewed Operating Licensee NPF-4 & 7, Condition D, Fire Protection Program, which involved the failure to install adequate conduit
penetration seals in various sections of the Units 1 and 2 reactor coolant pump motor oil collection systems, and inadequate oil lift pump enclosure vents which provided a direct escape path from the oil collection systems for potential oil spray from the lift pump and related oil piping leaks. The licensee entered these issues into their corrective action program which included development of
compensatory actions until completion of all corrective actions. The finding was more than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and the related attribute of protection against external factors such as fire which
could impact the operability of a reactor coolant pump (RCP). This finding had a credible impact on safety because the inadequate installation and fabrication of the oil collection system presented a degradation of a fire confinement component which has a fire prevention function of not allowing an oil leak to reach hot surfaces. The finding was of very low safety significance or Green
because of the low degradation rating of the fire confinement category related to the reactor coolant pump (RCP) motor oil collection system, the extremely low frequency of
RCP oil leaks during the past operating cycle, and other area fire protection defense-in-depth features such as automatic fire detection, manual suppression capability (fire brigade), and safe shutdown
capability from the main control room. There was no cross-cutting aspect due to the legacy aspect relating to both examples. (Section 1R05) B. Licensee Identified Violations A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee
have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program. The violation and corrective actions are listed in Section
- REPORT [[]]
DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 began the period at full Rated Thermal Power (RTP) and operated at full RTP for the entire report period.
Unit 2 began the inspection period in a refueling outage (RFO), which began on September 14, 2008. On November 15, 2008, Unit 2 reached full
RTP for the remainder of the inspection period.
1.
SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection .1 Seasonal a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensee's adverse weather preparations for cold weather operations specified in 0-GOP-4.2, "Extreme Cold Weather Operations," and
0-GOP-4.2A, "Extreme Cold Weather Daily Checks," and the licensee's corrective action data base for cold weather related issues. The inspectors walked down the two risk-significant areas listed below to verify compliance with the procedural requirement and to verify that the specified actions provided the necessary protection for the structures, systems, or components. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's
corrective action program (CAP) database to verify that weather related problems due to temperature were being identified at the appropriate level, entered into the
EDG) Rooms
- Unit 1 and 2 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Rooms b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .2 External Flooding a. Inspection Scope The inspectors assessed the external flooding vulnerability of the North Anna site from the service water pond and Lake Anna. The inspectors verified the condition of
the emergency flood protection dike between the service water pond, and the plant and related drainage ditches and culverts, in addition to the west side flood protection dike. The inspectors also reviewed applicable station procedures and design documents to assess proper surveillance and maintenance for external flood protection features. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
Enclosure b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .3 Review of Offsite Power and Alternate
- AC Power Readiness a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the offsite and alternate alternating current (
AC) power systems by reviewing the licensee's procedures that address measures to monitor and maintain the availability and reliability of the offsite and alternate
- AC [[power systems. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1R04 Equipment Alignments .1 Partial Walkdowns a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted four equipment partial alignment walkdowns to evaluate the operability of selected redundant trains or backup systems, listed below, with the other train or system inoperable or out of service. The inspectors reviewed the functional systems descriptions, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), system operating procedures, and Technical Specifications (TS) to determine correct system lineups for the current plant conditions. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the systems to verify that critical components were properly aligned and to identify any discrepancies which could affect operability of the redundant train or backup system. * Unit 2 '2H']]
- EDG * Unit 2 'B' train low head safety injection (LHSI) pump during emergent maintenance on the 'A' train
EDG during emergent work on '2H'
EDG b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .2 Complete Walkdown a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a detailed walkdown and inspection of the Unit 2 '2J' EDG and related support systems to assess proper alignment and to identify discrepancies
that could impact its availability and functional capacity.
Enclosure The inspection also included a review of the alignment and the condition of support systems including fire protection, room ventilation, and emergency lighting. Equipment deficiency tags were reviewed and the condition of the system was discussed with the engineering personnel. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1R05 Fire Protection a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted tours of the five areas listed below that are important to reactor safety to verify the licensee's implementation of fire protection requirements as described in Virginia Power Administrative Procedure (VPAP)-2401, Revisions 28 and 29, "Fire Protection Program." The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, conditions related to: (1) licensee control of transient combustibles and ignition
sources; (2) the material condition, operational status, and operational lineup of fire protection systems, equipment, and features; and (3) the fire barriers used to prevent fire damage or fire propagation. * Containment Unit 2 (fire zone 1-2a / RC-2)
- Auxiliary Service Water Pump House (fire zone 13a /
APSB) b. Findings Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Oil Collection System Installation and Design Problems Introduction: A Green non-cited violation (NCV) of the North Anna Power Plant Facility Renewed Operating License NPF-4 & -7, Condition D, Fire Protection was
identified by the
- NRC for the failure to adequately install adequate conduit penetration seals and oil lift pump enclosure vents on the oil collection system for the Units 1 and 2
RCP motors. Description: On October 9, 2008, during a containment closeout tour that included a fire protection review, the inspectors identified two issues associated with the RCP
motor oil collection system enclosures. The first issue involved enclosure penetrations for conduit that were not sealed in accordance with drawings from the modification that originally installed the RCP motor oil collection system. The second issue was inadequate lift pump oil enclosure vents. The vent boxes, two per enclosure, consisted of a baffle design which was intended to provide a tortuous path to preclude the release of any oil spray from a potential leak. However, the enclosure opening to which the vent box was attached was sufficiently large enough to allow a
direct path for potential oil spray from the lift pump and related piping leaks to escape the enclosure. These problems affected all three RCP motors on Unit 2, and subsequent review determined that Unit 1 is also affected.
Enclosure The inspectors reviewed design change, DC 80-S47, "Addition of oil containment enclosures, oil drain piping, and drain collection tanks to each reactor coolant pump motor," to determine: * Installation requirements of the conduit penetrations, and * Design requirements for the lift pump enclosure vents.
The inspectors subsequently determined from drawing, 5251M2509, that penetrations for conduits must be sealed by the use of grommets to eliminate gaps. The inspectors also determined from drawing, 5251M2514, that the enclosure vents had been fabricated and installed as specified and, therefore, concluded that the installed vents were designed inadequately. Analysis: The inspectors determined that the failure to adequately seal enclosure penetrations and to install inadequate enclosure vents for the oil lift pump on the RCP oil collection systems was a performance deficiency. This finding had a credible impact on safety because the inadequate installation and design of the oil collection system presented a degradation of a fire confinement component which has a fire prevention function of not allowing an oil leak to reach hot surfaces. The inspectors
determined the finding was more than minor because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and the related attribute of protection against external factors such as fire which could impact the operability of a RCP. The inspectors determined that the finding was of
very low safety significance or Green because of the low degradation rating of the fire confinement category related to the
RCP oil leaks and no actual RCP oil leaks during the past operating cycle, and other area fire protection defense-in-depth features such as automatic fire detection, manual suppression capability (fire brigade), and safe shutdown capability
from the main control room. This finding involved a legacy issue associated with a modification for original installation; therefore, there are no cross-cutting aspects were assigned. Enforcement: North Anna Power Plant Facility Renewed Operating License
- VEPCO shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program as stated in the
RCP shall be equipped with an oil collection system which shall be so installed that failure will not lead to fire during normal or design
basis accident conditions and such collection systems shall be capable of collecting lube oil from all potential pressurized and unpressurized leakage sites in the reactor coolant pump lube oil systems. Contrary to the above, on October 9, 2008, the licensee failed to adequately seal enclosure penetrations and install appropriate enclosure vents for the oil lift pump on the RCP oil collection systems that were capable of collecting oil from pressurized leakage sites. Because the finding is of very low safety significance and because it has been entered into the licensee's
corrective action program (CAP) as Condition Reports 113116, 113670, 113243, and 120397, this violation is being treated as a Green
NCV 05000338, 339/2008005-01, Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Oil Collection System Installation and Design Problems.
Enclosure 1R07 Heat Sink Performance a. Inspection Scope The inspectors selected the risk significant Unit 2 recirculation spray (RS) heat exchangers (HX) and reviewed inspection records, test results, maintenance work
orders, and other documentation to ensure that deficiencies which could mask or degrade performance were identified and corrected. The test procedures and records were also reviewed to verify that they were consistent with Generic Letter 89-13 licensee commitments, and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Guidelines. In addition, the inspectors reviewed
inspection documentation of the related service water piping to assess general material condition and to identify any degraded conditions. Documents reviewed included
ER-AA-HTX-1003, Revision 0, "Heat Exchanger Monitoring and Assessment." b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
.1 Annual Review of Licensee Requalification Examination Results a. Inspection Scope On February 8, 2008, the licensee completed administering the annual requalification
operating tests which are required to be given to all licensed operators in accordance with 10 CFR 55.59(a) (2). The inspectors performed an in-office review of the overall pass/fail results of the individual operating tests, as well as the crew simulator operating tests. These results were compared to the thresholds established in Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix I, Operator Requalification Human Performance
Significance Determination Process. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified .2 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed a crew examination on December 2, 2008 which involved a loss of a main turbine first stage pressure channel, a loss of a main feedwater pump,
a failure of a reactor coolant pump number one seal, a failure of the main turbine to automatically trip from a reactor trip, and a faulted steam generator. The inspectors observed crew performance in terms of communications; ability to take timely and proper actions; prioritizing, interpreting, and verifying alarms; correct
use and implementation of procedures, including the alarm response procedures;
Enclosure timely control board operation and manipulation, including high-risk operator actions; and oversight and direction provided by the shift supervisor, including the ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions. The inspectors observed the post training critique to determine that weaknesses or improvement areas revealed by the training were captured by the instructor and reviewed with the operators. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness a. Inspection Scope For the equipment issue listed below, the inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the corresponding licensee's preventive and corrective maintenance. The inspectors performed walkdowns of the accessible portions of the systems, performed in-office reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held discussions with system engineers.
The inspectors compared the licensee's actions with the requirements of the Maintenance Rule (10
- RS [[]]
ST load tap changer relays in (a)(1) status. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control a. Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated, as appropriate, the four activities listed below for the following: (1) effectiveness of the risk assessments performed before maintenance activities were conducted; (2) management of risk; (3) upon identification of an unforeseen situation, necessary steps were taken to plan and control the resulting
emergent work activities; and (4) maintenance risk assessments and emergent work problems were adequately identified and resolved. The inspectors verified that the licensee was complying with the requirements of
- 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) and the data output from the licensee's safety monitor associated with the risk profile of Units 1 and 2. * Emergent work to repair seat leakage on 2-
LHSI pump * Unit 2 planned outage work on November 4, 2008, associated with replacement of the C main transformer and Unit 1 C waterbox work. * Emergent work to repair Unit 2 '2H' EDG air start system
Enclosure b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1R15 Operability Evaluations a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed three operability evaluations affecting the risk-significant mitigating system, listed below, to assess, as appropriate: (1) the technical adequacy of the evaluations; (2) whether continued system operability was warranted; (3)
whether other existing degraded conditions were considered as compensating measures; (4) whether the compensatory measures, if involved, were in place, would work as intended, and were appropriately controlled; and (5) where continued operability was considered unjustified, the impact on
- SDP. The inspectors' review included a verification that determinations of operability followed procedural requirements of
AA-102, Revision 3, "Operability Determination."
- Operability Determination (OD) 000206, "NAPS Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Flow Potentially in Excess of Mechanical Design Flow" * Condition Report (CR) 317398, "Perform common cause failure analysis prior to 12/17/08, 2345 hours0.0271 days <br />0.651 hours <br />0.00388 weeks <br />8.922725e-4 months <br />, on 2 'H'
OA7 of this
report. 1R18 Plant Modifications a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed two temporary modifications to verify that the modifications did not affect system operability or availability as described by the
- UFSAR. In addition, the inspectors verified that the temporary modifications were in accordance with
- VP [[]]
AP-1403, Revision 11, "Temporary Modifications," and the related work
package, and that adequate controls were in place, procedures and drawings were updated, and post-installation tests verified the operability of the affected systems. The temporary modifications reviewed were: * Procedure controlled temporary modification for 0-ECM-1202-01 for pressurizer heater #65 lead lifted due to a grounded condition, and * Temporary Modification 1804, "Unit 1 Cable Spreading Room CO2 System installation of temp vent on south exterior wall." b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
Enclosure 1R19 Post Maintenance Testing a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed five post maintenance test procedures and/or test activities, as appropriate, for selected risk-significant mitigating systems to assess whether: (1)
the effect of testing on the plant had been adequately addressed by control room and/or engineering personnel; (2) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (3) acceptance criteria were clear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing basis documents; (4) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy consistent with the
application; (5) test were performed as written with applicable prerequisites satisfied; (6) jumpers installed or leads lifted were properly controlled; (7) test equipment was removed following testing; and (8) equipment was returned to the status required to perform in accordance with licensee procedure
- VP [[]]
AP-2003, Revision 13, "Post Maintenance Testing Program." Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
- Work order (WO) 59101782908, Assemble valve after welders *
MS-TV-201C, 'C' Main Steam trip valve in accordance with engineering instructions b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities a. Inspection Scope The inspectors used NRC Inspection Procedure 71111.20, "Refueling and Outage Activities," to continue their observation portions of the refueling, maintenance activities, and startup activities to verify that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth
commensurate with the outage risk plan and applicable
- RFO [[, which began September 14, 2008. The inspectors monitored licensee controls over the outage activities listed below. * Licensee configuration management, including daily outage reports, to evaluate defense-in-depth commensurate with the outage safety plan and compliance with the applicable]]
- TS when taking equipment out of service. * Controls over the status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard to ensure that
TS and outage safety plan requirements were met. * Licensee implementation of clearance activities to ensure equipment was appropriately configured to safely support the work or testing. * Decay heat removal processes to verify proper operation and that steam generators, when relied upon, were a viable means of backup cooling.
Enclosure * Controls to ensure that outage work was not impacting the ability to operate the spent fuel pool cooling system during and after core offload. * Reactor water inventory controls including flow paths, configurations, and alternative means for inventory addition, and controls to prevent inventory loss. * Reactivity controls to verify compliance with
- TS and that activities which could affect reactivity were reviewed for proper control within the outage risk plan. * Refueling activities for compliance with
- TS [[, to verify proper tracking of fuel assemblies from the spent fuel pool to the core, and to verify foreign material exclusion was maintained. * Containment closure activities, including a detailed containment walkdown prior to startup, to verify that evidence of leakage did not exist and that debris had not been left which could affect the performance of the containment sump. * Heatup and startup activities to verify that]]
- TS , license conditions, and other requirements, commitments, and administrative procedure prerequisites for mode changes were met prior to changing modes or plant conditions. Reactor Coolant System (
RCS) integrity was verified by reviewing RCS leakage
calculations and containment integrity was verified by reviewing the status of containment penetrations and containment isolation valves. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. 1R22 Surveillance Testing a. Inspection Scope For the three surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the test procedure, witnessed testing or reviewed test records and data packages, to determine whether the scope of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was functional and operable, and that the surveillance requirements of
- TS were met. The inspectors also determined whether the testing effectively demonstrated that the systems or components were operationally ready and capable of performing their intended safety functions.
- PT -52.2A, Revision 35, "Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate (Computer Calculation)" In-Service Testing: * 1-PT-71.2Q, Revision 33, "1-FW-P-3A, A Motor-Driven
PT-61.3, Revision 38, "Containment Type C Testing"
Enclosure b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness 1EP6 Drill Evaluation a. Inspection Scope On October 21, 2008, the inspectors observed the performance of a simulator drill
that involved a
- AFW [[pump, spurious trips of the 1H and 1J emergency bus feeder breakers, fuel failure, a large break Loss of Cooling Accident, Technical Support Center uninterruptable power supply breaker trip, and a leak on a discharge check valve for a low head safety injection pump, which required an Alert and General Emergency to be declared over the course of the drill. The inspectors assessed emergency procedure usage, emergency plan classification, notification, and the licensee's identification and entrance of any problems into their corrective action program. This inspection evaluated the adequacy of the licensee's conduct of the drill and critique performance. Drill issues were captured by the licensee in the corrective action system as]]
- SAFE [[]]
- 2OS [[1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas a. Inspection Scope Access Controls. The inspectors reviewed and evaluated licensee guidance and its implementation for controlling and monitoring worker access to radiologically significant areas and tasks associated with the 2008 Unit 2]]
RFO. The inspectors
evaluated changes to, and adequacy of, procedural guidance; directly observed implementation of established administrative and physical radiological controls; appraised radiation worker and technician knowledge of, and proficiency in implementing, Radiation Protection (RP) activities; and assessed radiation worker exposures to radiation and radioactive material. The inspectors directly observed the administrative and engineered controls for
radiologically significant areas. Controls and respective implementation for Locked High Radiation Areas (LHRA) and Very High Radiation Areas (VHRA). This included the review and discussion of keys and storage of irradiated material within the spent fuel pool. Established radiological controls were evaluated for selected RFO tasks including transfer canal blind flange removal, upper internals set, head set, refueling
operations, valve maintenance, radioactive waste (radwaste) processing and storage,
Enclosure and radioactive material/waste shipping activities. In addition, licensee controls for areas where dose rates could change significantly because of plant shutdown and refueling operations were reviewed and discussed. The inspectors discussed the expected response to unexpected radiological conditions on backshift with two responsible
- RWP ) details and attended pre-job briefings to assess communication of radiological control requirements to workers. Occupational worker adherence to selected
HPT) proficiency in providing job coverage were evaluated through direct observations, remote observations, and interviews with
licensee staff. Electronic dosimeter alarm set points and worker stay times were evaluated against applicable radiation survey results. For High Radiation Area (HRA) tasks involving significant dose gradients, the inspectors evaluated the use and placement of whole body and extremity dosimetry to monitor worker exposure. Postings and physical controls established within the radiologically controlled area (RCA) for access to the Unit 2 reactor containment building (RCB), the Unit 1 and
Unit 2 reactor auxiliary building (RAB) locations, radioactive material storage locations, decontamination building, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) were evaluated during facility tours. Results were compared to current licensee surveys and assessed against established postings and radiation controls. Licensee controls were observed for selected Unit 1 and Unit
- VH [[]]
RA locations. The inspectors evaluated implementation and effectiveness of licensee controls for both airborne and external radiation exposure. The inspectors directly observed processes used for externally contaminated individuals, including those with potential
uptakes of radioactive material. The inspectors reviewed administrative and physical controls including air sampling, barrier integrity, engineering controls, and postings for tasks having the potential for individual worker internal exposures to exceed 30 millirem committed effective dose
equivalent. Radiation protection activities were evaluated against the
- 10 CFR Parts 19 and 20 requirements. Detailed procedural guidance and records reviewed for this inspection area are listed in Sections 2
OS1 and 4OA5 of the Attachment to
this report. Problem Identification and Resolution. Licensee
- CAP documents associated with access controls to radiologically significant areas were reviewed and assessed. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues in accordance with procedure
PI-AA-200, Revision 2, "Corrective Actions." Licensee CAP documents associated with access control
issues, personnel radiation monitoring, and personnel exposure events which were reviewed and evaluated in detail during inspection of this program area are identified in Sections
- 4OA 5 of the Attachment to this report. The inspectors completed the 21 specified line-item samples detailed in
NRC
Inspection Procedure 71121.01.
Enclosure b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
- ALARA Planning and Controls a. Inspection Scope As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA). Implementation of the licensee's
- ALA [[]]
RA planning, dose estimates, and
prescribed
- ALARA controls for outage work tasks expected to incur the maximum collective exposures that included insulation removal and installation, reactor head disassembly and reset, and outage health physics (
- HP ) coverage. Incorporation of planning, established work controls, expected dose rates, and dose expenditure into the
RWPs for those activities were also reviewed. Work in progress reviews were inspected for select RWPs in which the actual dose was approaching the estimated dose for the job. Selected elements of the licensee's
source term reduction and control program were examined to evaluate the effectiveness of the program in supporting implementation of the
RCB and RAB dose rate trending data were reviewed and discussed with cognizant licensee representatives. Trends in individual and collective personnel exposures at the facility were reviewed. The inspectors examined the dose records of all declared pregnant workers from April 2006 to 2008 year-to-date to evaluate total or current gestation doses. Applicable procedures were reviewed to assess licensee controls for declared pregnant workers.
Trends in the plant's three-year rolling average collective exposure history, outage, non-outage, and total annual doses for selected years were reviewed and discussed with licensee representatives. The licensee's
- ALA [[]]
RA program implementation and practices were evaluated for
consistency with
- CFR Part 20 requirements; Regulatory Guide 8.29, Instruction Concerning Risks from Occupational Radiation Exposure, February 1996; and licensee procedures. Documents reviewed during the inspection of this program area are listed in Section
- 2OS 2 of the Attachment to this report. Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed the
- ALARA program. The inspectors assessed the licensee's ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues in accordance with
- NRC [[Inspection Procedure 71121.02 (minimum sample size is 15; however, additional line items were completed since the licensee was in the 2nd quartile 3 year rolling average for occupational collective dose ranking). All samples have now been completed for this]]
NRC inspection procedure.
Enclosure b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety
- 2PS [[2 Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation a. Inspection Scope Waste Processing and Characterization. During system walk-downs, the inspectors observed selected liquid and solid radwaste processing system components for material condition and system configuration agreement with the]]
UFSAR and Process Control Program (PCP). The inspectors compared the capabilities of the previous vendor liquid processing skid with the new vendors skid to determine if a change in capability or effectiveness would be expected. The inspectors reviewed the 2008 Annual Effluent Report and the 10 CFR 61
radionuclide characterizations for each major waste stream. The inspectors evaluated analyses for hard-to-detect nuclides, reviewed the use of scaling factors, and examined comparison results between licensee waste stream characterizations and outside laboratory data. The licensee's waste stream mixing and concentration averaging methodology was evaluated and discussed with radwaste personnel. The
inspectors also discussed the licensee's guidance for monitoring changes in waste stream isotopic mixtures with knowledgeable personnel. Radwaste processing activities were reviewed for compliance with the licensee's
UFSAR, Chapter 11. Waste stream characterization analyses were reviewed
against regulations detailed in
- CFR [[Part 61, and guidance provided in the Branch Technical Position on Waste Classification and Waste Form. Reviewed documents are listed in the Attachment to this report. Transportation. The inspectors directly observed preparation activities for the shipment of pressurizer safety relief valves. The inspectors noted appropriateness of package markings and placarding and interviewed shipping technicians regarding Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations. The inspectors observed radiation surveys of the transport vehicle prior to shipment. A total of eight shipping records were reviewed for consistency with licensee procedures and compliance with]]
DOT regulations, four of which underwent detailed review. The inspectors reviewed emergency response information, DOT shipping package classification, radiation survey results, and evaluated whether receiving licensees were authorized to accept radioactive materials. Licensee procedures for opening and closing Type B shipping casks were compared to recommended vendor protocols and Certificate of Compliance requirements. In
addition, training records for selected individuals currently qualified to prepare radioactive material shipments were reviewed.
Enclosure Transportation program implementation was reviewed against regulations detailed in
- 49 CFR [[Part 172 Subpart H. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report. Problem Identification and Resolution. Several condition reports were reviewed and assessed. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's ability to characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues in accordance with procedure]]
PII-AA-200. Documents reviewed for problem identification and resolution are listed in the Attachment to this report. The inspectors completed the six specified line-item samples detailed in NRC Inspection Procedure 71122.02. b. Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4.
- OTHER [[]]
PI) Verification
.1 Mitigating Systems PI a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures for developing the data for Safety
System Functional Failures. The inspectors examined Unit 1 and Unit 2 data reported to the
PI information and records used by the licensee to identify potential PI occurrences were also reviewed for both units. The inspectors
reviewed the licensee event reports,
- CAP documents, and maintenance rule records as part of the verification process. The inspection was conducted in accordance with
NRC Inspection procedure 71151, "Performance Indicator Verification." NEI 99-02, Revision 5, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelines," was used as reference criteria.
b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .2 Radiation Safety
PI data for the periods listed below.
Enclosure To verify the accuracy of the
PI definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02 and the NEI Frequently Asked Questions list were used to verify the basis in report for each data element. Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone. The inspectors reviewed the Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Performance Indicator results for the
period of July 2007 through June 2008. For the assessment period, the inspectors reviewed
- HP shift log entries, electronic dosimeter alarm logs, and licensee procedural guidance for collecting and documenting Performance Indicator data. Condition Reports (
OS1 contains additional details regarding the inspection of controls
for high dose areas and review of related
- CR s. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone. The inspectors reviewed the Radiological Control Effluent Release Occurrences
PI results for the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone from July 2007 through June 2008. For the assessment period, the inspectors reviewed cumulative and projected doses to the public, out-of-service
effluent radiation monitor data logs, and selected plant issue reports related to Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications (RETS)/ODCM issues. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report. The inspectors completed the two
- 4OA 2 Identification and Resolution of Problems .1 Review of items Entered into the Corrective Action Program: As required by
- NRC [[Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems," and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's]]
CR report summaries and periodically attending daily CR Review Team
meetings. .2 Semi-Annual Trend Review - Fire Protection Hydropneumatic Tank Air Compressor a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a review of the licensee's correction action program
documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors' review was focused on repetitive equipment and corrective maintenance issues but also considered the results of daily inspector corrective action program item screening discussed in Section 4OA2.1. The review included issues documented outside the normal correction action program in system
health reports, corrective maintenance work orders, component status reports, site
Enclosure monthly meeting reports, and maintenance rule assessments. The inspectors' review nominally considered the six month period of July through December, 2008, although some examples may have expanded beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the
licensee's latest integrated quarterly assessment report. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensee's trend report were reviewed for adequacy. b. Assessment and Observations No findings of significance were identified. In general, the licensee has identified trends and has addressed the trends with their corrective action program. However, the inspectors identified an adverse trend in the equipment status of the fire protection air compressor. Specifically, the inspectors identified the following CRs involving repeated instances where water was noted in the compressor oil:
FP-2 check valve back leakage of water into 1-FP-C-1 oil sump
- FP [[-C-1 out of service for > 7 days *]]
FP-C-1 * CR120019, Oil level high in fire protection air compressor
FP-C-1 (FP hydropneumatic Tk compressor) is foamy white Additionally, the inspectors identified the following CRs involving repeated instances where low oil level was noted for the fire protection air compressor:
FP-C-1 (Fire Protection Air Compressor) has low oil level
FP-C-1 oil level low (below minimum level line) The licensee has identified this negative trend and initiated corrective action, CA088157, which will investigate installing a compressor style more appropriate to this particular application.
Enclosure .4 Annual Samples Review of Operator Workarounds a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a review regarding the licensee's assessments and corrective actions for operator workarounds (OWAs). The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of the licensee's
OP-AA-1700, Revision 0, "Operations Aggregate Impact." The inspectors reviewed the data package associated with this procedure which included an evaluation of the cumulative effects
of the
- OWA [[s on the operator's ability to safely operate the plant and effectively respond to abnormal and emergency plant conditions. The inspectors reviewed and monitored licensee planned and completed corrective actions to address underlying equipment issues causing the]]
OP-AA-100, Revision 5, "Conduct of Operations." b. Findings and Observations No findings of significance were identified. In general, the inspectors verified that the licensee has identified operator workaround problems at an appropriate threshold and
entered them in the corrective action program, and has proposed or implemented appropriate corrective actions. The inspectors noted one OWA specified for Unit 2 that involves corrective actions to upgrade the reserve station service transformers and adding a similar main generator breaker to Unit 2 as currently used on Unit 1. This would eliminate potential conditions of degraded bus voltage based on
secondary plant component alignments. The inspectors also identified that
- OD 000190, Underground Fuel Oil Storage Tank Vents Not Tornado Missile Protected, specified compensatory actions; however, it was not identified as an
OWA. The licensee evaluated and subsequently included
this deficiency as an
OA3 Event Followup
(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000339/2008-001-00: Manual Reactor Trip Due to Shutdown Bank 'A' Group Step Counter Deviation Greater Than Allowed On February 8, 2008, with Unit 2 in Mode 3, zero percent power and preparing for a unit restart following a planned maintenance outage, the operators received a rod control urgent failure alarm during withdrawal of the 'A' shutdown bank control rods. The operators noted that the respective group step counters had deviated by three
steps and consequently, in accordance with Technical Requirements Manual 3.1.3, initiated a manual reactor trip. The most likely cause was determined as an intermittent open circuit on the slave cycler moveable decoder card, A503, due to two spread pins.
Enclosure The licensee revised their procedures to incorporate a vendor practice to periodically reform the pins. The licensee documented the corrective actions associated with this event in
OA5 Other Activities .1 Quarterly Resident Inspector Observations of Security Personnel and Activities a. Inspection Scope During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with the licensee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security. These observations took place during both normal and off-normal plant working hours. These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and
activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an integral part of the inspectors' normal plant status review and inspection activities. .b Findings No findings of significance were identified. .2 (Open) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/176, Emergency Diesel Generator Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Regarding Endurance and Margin Testing a. Inspection Scope The objective of this
EDG endurance and margin testing as prescribed by plant-specific
- TS. The inspector interfaced with the appropriate station staff to obtain the information specified in Attachment 1 of the
- EDG s as the onsite standby power supply. The inspector verified the accuracy of the information by review of
DBE) loading calculations, EDG endurance run test procedures, test data from
the last three endurance tests performed on each
- EDG operating history. The information gathered will be forwarded to Nuclear Reactor Regulation/Division of Engineering/Electrical Engineering Branch (
- EDG testing at nuclear stations. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment. b. Findings and Observations The
DE/EEEB review.
Enclosure .3 (Open) Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/172, Reactor Coolant System Dissimilar Metal Butt Welds (DMBWs) a. Inspection Scope From December 3 to 10, 2008, the inspector reviewed the licensee's activities related
to the inspection and mitigation of
RCS) to ensure that the licensee activities were consistent with the industry requirements established in the Materials Reliability Program (MRP) document MRP-139, Primary System Piping Butt Weld Inspection and Evaluation Guidelines, July 2005. This inspection was limited to the review of licensee activities with regard to the scoping,
classification, inspection, and mitigation of dissimilar metal butt welds in accordance with the industry requirements of
TI 2515/172 was completed prior to this inspection. The direct observation and documentation review of baseline volumetric Ultrasonic examination (UT) and the application of Full Structural Weld Overlays (FSWOLs) was completed and documented in Integrated Inspection Report 05000339/2008004, Section 4OA5.
b. Findings and Observations No findings of significance were identified.
- MRP -139 Baseline Inspections 1) Have the baseline inspections been performed or are they scheduled to be performed in accordance with
MRP-139 guidance
Yes. The licensee has performed all required baseline inspections at the time of this review and the licensee has scheduled the remaining baseline inspections in accordance with
- PRZ [[]]
MRP-139 program during the fall 2007 refueling outage for Unit 1, and the spring 2007 refueling outage for Unit 2. There were no ultrasonic (UT) examinations performed prior to the installation of weld overlays.
Reactor Vessel Nozzles - The hot and cold leg nozzles from the reactor vessel are stainless steel and not susceptible to
DMBWs for Unit 2 are not in
contact with the
- MRP -139 inspections are required for those welds. The Steam Generators for Unit 1 were replaced in 1994, but there were no inlays applied to the
- DM [[]]
BWs of Unit 1. The licensee has scheduled the
remaining baseline volumetric examinations for Unit 1 hot legs greater than 14
Enclosure inches and the cold legs during the spring 2009 outage, which will meet the
- MRP -139 implementation deadline of December 31, 2009 for the hot legs. 2) Is the licensee planning to take any deviations from
- SW -5) 1) For each examination inspected, was the activity performed in accordance with the examination guidelines in
- MRP -139, Section 5.1, for unmitigated welds or mechanical stress improved welds and consistent with
NRC staff relief request authorization for overlaid welds?
Yes. For details, see Integrated Inspection Report 50-339/2008-004, Section
- 4OA 5. 2) For each examination inspected, was the activity performed by qualified personnel? Yes. For details, see Integrated Inspection Report 50-339/2008-004, Section 4
OA5.
3) For each examination inspected, was the activity performed such that deficiencies were identified, dispositioned, and resolved? Yes. For details, see Integrated Inspection Report 50-339/2008-004, Section
- NRR staff authorization to install weld overlays? Yes. For details, see Integrated Inspection Report 50-339/2008-004, Section 4
OA5.
Enclosure 2) For each weld overlay inspected, was the activity performed by qualified personnel? Yes. For details, see Integrated Inspection Report 50-339/2008-004, Section
- 4OA 5. 3) For each weld overlay inspected, was the activity performed such that deficiencies were identified, dispositioned, and resolved? Yes. For details, see Integrated Inspection Report 50-339/2008-004, Section 4
- OA 5. Mechanical Stress Improvement (Not Applicable) The licensee has not implemented Mechanical Stress Improvement as a mitigation method for
MRP -139 inspection program consists of the
documents listed below, which were previously prepared documents, and the inclusion of
- MRP -139 commitments. 2) Are welds appropriately categorized? Yes. All welds were appropriately categorized. The inspectors reviewed all welds categorized at the time of the inspection for appropriate categorization in accordance with
MRP-139, Section 6.
3) Are inspection frequencies consistent with the requirements of
- MRP -139. 4) What is the licensees' basis for categorizing welds as H or I and plans for addressing potential
- FSW [[]]
OL. Therefore, all welds were able to be volumetrically inspected to greater than 90%.
5) What deviations has the licensee incorporated and what approval process was used? No deviations to MRP-139 have been incorporated by the licensee, therefore
no approval was needed.
Enclosure .4 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Radiological Controls Inspection a. Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted independent gamma and neutron surveys of the
- ISF [[]]
SI facility and compared the results to previous surveys. The inspectors also observed
and evaluated implementation of radiological controls, including
ISFSI casks were also reviewed and discussed. The inspectors reviewed environmental thermoluminescent dosimeter records and discussed the use of the dosimeters and resultant neutron/gamma data with
cognizant
- CFR Part 72, and applicable licensee procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report b. Findings No findings of significance were identified. .5 (Closed)
- URI 05000338/2007004-03: Containment Type C Test and Corrective Maintenance Evaluation a. Inspection Scope As described in Unresolved Item (
- URI ) 05000338/2007004-03, NRC inspectors identified an issue related to the adequacy of corrective actions associated with 1-
- MOV [[-103D, service water (SW) supply to 'D' recirculation spray heat exchanger isolation valve, containment type C leakage testing test results as compared to similar testing during a previous outage. The inspectors performed an extensive review of the licensee's type C leakage testing procedures and corrective actions relating to the valve in question, along with its' function and placement within the associated system. Consequently, the inspectors concluded that there were no findings of significance. This]]
OA6 Meetings, Including Exit .1 Exit Meeting Summary On January 20, 2009, the senior resident inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. Daniel Stoddard and other members of the staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
Enclosure .2 Occupational
- RP Baseline Inspection Exit Meeting On October 2, 2008, the inspectors discussed the results of the Occupational
- TI ) 2515/172, Reactor Coolant System Dissimilar Metal Butt Welds (DMBWs) Exit Meeting An exit meeting was conducted on December 10, 2008 with licensee management to discuss the results of this inspection.
- 4OA 7 Licensee Identified Violations The following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of
III, requires in part that measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Contrary to this, on September 5, 2008, during a field walkdown of the fuel oil system to identify single point vulnerabilities, the licensee discovered that the design basis for the missile protection of vent lines associated with the
underground fuel oil storage tanks were incorrectly translated into specifications and drawings. The absence of tornado missile protection impacted safety significance since a single missile could crimp both vent lines impacting both
CR108328 and the licensee has established compensatory
measures to provide a redundant vent path when a tornado watch or warning exists on site. Also contrary to these requirements, on December 17, 2008, during an extent of condition walkdown connected to
- CR 108328, the licensee discovered that the design basis for the missile protection of vent and vacuum breaker lines for the emergency condensate storage tanks (
ECST) were
incorrectly translated into specifications and drawings. The absence of tornado missile protection impacted safety significance since each unit's
- EC [[]]
STs if a tornado has been sighted on site and to enter the related
abnormal procedure to provide alternative suction sources to the
- SUPPPL [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- ATION [[]]
- SUPPLE [[]]
- MENTAL [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- ATION [[]]
- KEY [[]]
- POINTS [[]]
- OF [[]]
CONTACT
Licensee personnel:
- J. Breeden, Supervisor, Radioactive Analysis and Material Control W. Corbin, Director, Nuclear Engineering E. Dreyer, Supervisor, Health Physics (
HP) Technical Services
R. Evans, Manager, Radiological Protection and Chemistry E. Hendrixson, Director, Nuclear Safety and Licensing T. Huber, Director, Site Engineering S. Hughes, Manager, Nuclear Operations W. Hunsberger, Supervisor, Engineering P. Kemp, Supervisor, Station Licensing W. Anthes, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance
- L. Lane, Plant Manager M. Lane, Supervisor, Operations G. Lear, Manager, Organizational Effectiveness T. Maddy, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services M. Main, Component Engineer
- G. Marshall, Manager, Nuclear Outage and Planning C. McClain, Manager, Nuclear Training F. Mladen, Manager, Nuclear Site Services B. Morrison, Supervisor Nuclear Engineering D. Plemen,
- ALA [[]]
- RA J. Rayman, Nuclear Emergency Preparedness J. Scott, Supervisor, Nuclear Training (operations) D. Stoddard, Site Vice President R. Williams, Component Engineer M. Young, Supervisor, Radioactive Material Control
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- ITEMS [[]]
- CLOSED [[]]
- AND [[]]
- DISCUS [[]]
- TI Emergency Diesel Generator Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Regarding Endurance and Margin Testing (Section 4
- NCV Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Oil Collection System Installation and Design Problems. (Section 1R05) 05000339/2008-001-00
LER Manual Reactor Trip Due To Shutdown Bank 'A' Group Step Counter Deviation Greater Than Allowed (Section 4OA3)
Attachment Closed 05000338/2007004-03
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- DOCUME [[]]
- NTS [[]]
- REVIEW [[]]
- UFS [[]]
AR Section 2.4.2, "Floods"
UFSAR Section 2.4.10, "Flood Protection Requirements"
- PT -9.3, "Erosion Control Inspection - Station Site;" annual frequency and completed on January 23, 2008 * Procedure 0-AP-40, "Abnormal Level in North Anna Reservoir (Lake)" * Procedure 0-OP-59.1, "Reservoir Spillway" *
- AP -8, "Response To Grid Instability," Revision 6 * 1-OP-15.2, "Main Generator Operation," Revision 47 * 1-OP-26.8, "500
- MISC "-32, "Electrical Disturbance Report," Revision 7 Section 1R04: Equipment Alignments * Drawing, 12050-FM-107A, Sheets 3 & 4, Emergency Diesel Air Services * Drawing, 11715/12050-1.30-201A, Revision 4, Emergency Diesel Generator Jacket Coolant Schematic" * Drawing, 11715/12050-1.30-202A, Revision 4, Emergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil System Schematic" * Drawing, 11715/12050-1.30-266B, Revision 2, [[system" contains a listed "[" character as part of the property label and has therefore been classified as invalid. Fuel Oil System Schematic" * Procedure, 2-OP-6.2A, Revision 9, "Valve Checkoff - 2J Diesel Cooling Water * Procedure, 2-OP-6.4A, Revision 6, "Valve Checkoff - 2J Diesel Engine Lube Oil System" * Procedure, 2-OP-6.7A, Revision 3, "Valve Checkoff - Diesel Air" * Procedure, 2-OP-6.8A, Revision 8, "Valve Checkoff - Emergency Generator Fuel Oil System" * Procedure, 2-OP-6.5A, Revision 42, "2H and 2J Emergency Diesel Generator Post-Operational Check" * Procedure, 2-OP-26A, Revision 43, "Breaker Checklist" *]]
- ET -N-08-0092, "Reconciliation of spare body for use in 2-MS-TV-211B," Revision 0 * Procedure 0-MCM-0450-02, "Repair of Fisher Valves Designs
EWT," Revision 14
Attachment * Procedure 0-MCM-0450-52, "Inspection and Repair of Fisher Type 476 Piston Actuators," Revision 8 * Procedure 0-ICM-XX-AOV-001, "AOV Inspection and Diagnostic Testing," Revision 14 * Repair/Replacement Plan Program # 2008-132 * Repair/Replacement Plan Program # 2008-133
- Procedure 2-PT-213.20, "Valve Inservice Inspection (2-MS-TV-211A and 211B)," Revision 15-P1 * Procedure 2-PT-214.7, "Valve Inservice Inspection (Main Steam Valve Position Indication)," Revision 16 Section
- 2OS 1: Access Controls to Radiologically Significant Areas Procedures, Manuals, and Guidance Documents *
AA-223, Contamination Surveys, Revision 0
AA-240, Discrete Radioactive Particle Control, Revision 0
AA-263, Steam Generator Secondary Side Work Controls, Revision 0 * C-HP-1031.023, RWP Dosimetry: Exposure Control Support, Revision 4
- C-HP-1031.024, Administrative Dose Control, Revision 4 * C-HP-1031.025, Dosimetry Requirements for Site Restricted Areas, Revision 3 * C-HP-1031.032, Dosimetry Processing and Dose Determination, Revision 3 * C-HP-1041.011, Evaluating and Tracking Intakes of Radioactive Material, Revision 3 * C-HP-1041.020, DAC-Hour Determination Based On Bioassay Results, Revision 3
- C-HP-1041.021, Radionuclide Intake Determination Based On Bioassay Results, Revision 5 * C-HP-1041.022, Internal Dose Calculation Based On
HP-1041.023, Internal Dose Calculation Based On Radionuclide Intake, Revision 6
Surveys, Data, Records * Extensive documentation of 3 uptake evaluations in 2007
CR for BMA 000840 (identification of program gaps)
- CR 100852, Digital Alarming Dosimeter indicated a dose rate higher than the ambient dose rates accessed. Electrical interference suspected *
CR 026682, Worker received a DAD dose rate alarm
DAD dose rate alarm while tightening lid on primary
resin
- ALARA ) Procedures * C-HP-1041.025, Declared or Expected Pregnant Woman, Revision 2 * C-HP-1081.012, Radiation Work Permits: Preparing and Approving, Revision 2 * C-HP-1081.022, Radiation Work Permits:
- HP -1081.030, Radiation Work Permits: Extending, Revising and Terminating, Revision 4 * C-HP-1081.040, Radiation Work Permits: Providing
VPAP-2105, Temporary Shielding Program, Revision 9
Records and Data Reviewed * North Anna Power Station (NAPS), 2007 Unit One, Refueling Outage
- RWP 08-2215, Disassemble, Inspect, Repair, Repack, Cut Out and Replace Valves and Flanges in Support of the U-2 Outage *
RWP 08-2219, Perform Repairs to 2-RC-PCV-2455A & B
Attachment *
- RWP 08-2252, Lift and Set Reactor Vessel Head, Includes Inspection in Cavity and All Support Functions * Temporary Shielding Request No. 08-
- TSR -022, Reduce General Area Dose Rates for Work under Pressurizer and in Cube, Also for Valve Work
- AE No.08-019, Perform Valve Maintenance to Include Repack, Adjustment, Cut Out, Inspection of Valves & Check Valves during Unit Two 2008 Refueling Outage *
- TEDE [[]]
- TEDE [[]]
ALARA Program, Cumulative Dose Reduction
Section
- 2PPS 2: Radioactive Material Processing and Transportation Procedures, Guidance Documents, and Manuals * C-
HP-1071.040, Packaging and Shipment of Radioactive Material, Revision 4
HP-1072.040, Radioactive Waste Disposal Using the Barnwell Disposal Facility, Revision 7 * C-HP-1072.030, Computer Programs for Radwaste and Radioactive Material, Revision 0
- C-HP-1071.030, Receiving Radioactive Material, Revision 0
Attachment * C-HP-1072.010, Packaging Radioactive Waste, Revision 0 * C-HP-1072.071, Radioactive Waste Disposal Using The Energy Solutions Bulk Waste Facility, Revision 0 * 0-OP-20.2, High Activity Resin Transfer Checklist, Revision 2 *
PCP), Revision 6
Records and Data * Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, 04/28/08 *
CVCS Filters, Spent Fuel Pool Filtration, Primary Resin, Liquid Waste Resin, Oil, Powdex Resin and Sewage, 07/15/08
- Design Change No.07-160, Replacement of Duratek System with Energy Solutions Ion-Exchange System, 03/11/08 * Training attendance record for: Radioactive Waste Packaging, Transportation, and Disposal, Training Cycle 08-02 covering the period of 03/19 through 04/25/08 Shipping Papers * Shipment 08-1013, Confirmatory Sr-89/90, Fe-55 samples (LQ)
- Shipment 08-1016, Samples (Exempt Quantity) * Shipment 08-1014, Confirmatory samples to Surry (LQ) * Shipment 08-1007, Package 9140036, Loaded with U-2 "A"
CR 110652, Radiological boundary moved such that radioactive material breeched demarcation * CR 096723, Inaccurate shipping documentation on incoming shipment
- CR 021539, Shipping paper for radioactive material shipment did not include a recent regulatory change. *
LLLWT's (Low Level Liquid Waste Tanks)
NAPS NRC Performance Indication Data for the Months of July 2007 to June 2008
Section
- EPRI [[]]
- MRP -126, Generic Guidance for Alloy 600 Management * 1-PT-11, "Reactor Coolant Test" * 2-PT-11, "Reactor Coolant Test" *
STD-088, "Underwater Visual Examination for Reactor Vessel and Reactor Vessel Internals," Revision 2
Attachment Corrective Action Documents
- NCR 2007-1381, After starting the sever cut it was noticed that the permanent name tag was approx. 1" below the cut. This would not allow room for the
- PSI [[]]
- NCR 2007-1472, Relief nozzle thickness discrepancies 2007-1551, Spray (RC-415) nozzle axial shrinkage with the average number is greater than 0.100"
NDE-280-00, are incorrect Other Records Inservice Inspection Manual, Revision 3
Augmented Inservice Inspection Manual
RCS Loop C Isometric Drawing Work Order #:771185-01, 02, 03 ,"Channel Head Drain Connections Removal and
Replacement" Design Change Package #06-004, "Alloy 600 - Pressurizer Nozzle Repair/
- WC [[]]
- AP -15990, "Design Drawing Information on Dissimilar Metal Welds for North Anna and Surry Pressurizer and Boron Injection Tank" Underwater Visual Examination for Reactor Vessel and Reactor Vessel Internals Inspection Results
NA-VTM-000-59-F173-00002, PT-002, Rev. 34, Emergency Diesel Engines
- PT -002, Rev. 2, Alternating Current High & Low Speed Synchronous Machines Ball and Sleeve Bearings *
HV Boost Exciter-Regulator * Tech Spec Bases, 3.8.1 * Procedure: 1-PT-83.7H, Rev. 14, "1H EDG 24-Hour Run"
- Calculations: Emergency Diesel Generator Load Sequencing, various revisions * Specification: Emergency Diesel Generator Sets, 05/26/71, Revision 3 * Procedure:
ISFSI Radiological Controls Procedures * 0-HSP-ISFSI-001, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI), Health
Physics
- ISF [[]]
SI Survey Results 05/21/07- 05/25/08
Attachment *
- ALARA Evaluation Package 08-003, Load, transport, and store spent fuel dry storage cask. Includes all associated support. * Radiation Work Permit 08-1224 * Various Radiological Surveys associated with loading and transport of Nuhoms casks under
RWP 08-1102 and 08-1224
Attachment
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- ACRONY [[]]
- MS [[]]
- VP [[]]