IR 05000247/2006003
Download: ML062060434
Text
July 24, 2006
Mr. Fred R. DacimoSite Vice President Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Indian Point Energy Center 295 Broadway, Suite 1 P.O. Box 249 Buchanan, NY 10511-0249
SUBJECT: INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT 3 - NRC INTEGRATEDINSPECTION REPORT 05000286/2006003
Dear Mr. Dacimo:
On June 30, 2006, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection atIndian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 3. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on June 28, 2006, with you and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. This report documents one finding of very low safety significance (Green). The finding wasdetermined to be a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safetysignificance, and because it is entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treatingthe finding as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC EnforcementPolicy. If you contest the NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC SeniorResident Inspector at Indian Point Unit 3.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of Mr. F. Dacimo2NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/Eugene W. Cobey, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket No. 50-286License No. DPR-64
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 05000286/2006003
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information M
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
...................................................iii
REPORT DETAILS
..........................................................1
REACTOR SAFETY
.........................................................11R01Adverse Weather Protection .......................................1
1R04 Equipment Alignment ............................................1
1R05 Fire Protection .................................................3
1R06 Flood Protection Measures ........................................41R07Heat Sink Performance ...........................................5
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Inspection .........................51R13Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control ..............61R15Operability Evaluations ...........................................81R19Post-Maintenance Testing.........................................91R22Surveillance Testing............................................10
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications ....................................10
1EP5Correction of Emergency Preparedness Weaknesses and Deficiencies ....111EP6Drill Evaluation.................................................12RADIATION SAFETY.......................................................122OS1Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas .....................12 2OS2ALARA Planning and Controls ....................................132PS1Gaseous and Liquid Effluents .....................................142PS3Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP)
OTHER ACTIVITIES
........................................................194OA1Performance Indicator Verification .................................19
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution ...............................194OA5Other Activities.................................................22
4OA6Meetings, including Exit..........................................22
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
...........................................A-1
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
...........................A-1
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
..........................................A-1
LIST OF ACRONYMS
......................................................A-8
EnclosureiiiSUMMARY
- OF [[]]
FINDINGSIR 05000286/2006-003; 04/01/2006 - 06/30/2006, Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 3;Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control.The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and regionalinspectors. One Green non-cited violation was identified. The significance of most findings is
indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process," (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply
may be Green or be assigned a severity level after
- NRC 'sprogram for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
NRC Identified and Self-Revealing FindingsCornerstone: Initiating EventsGreen. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations (CFR), Part 50.65(a)(4) for failure to perform a risk assessment of
emergent maintenance conducted on nuclear power range channel N42 on
April 6, 2006. In response to this finding, Entergy performed a risk assessment and
entered the deficiency into their corrective action program. Corrective actions
completed included a review of the risk assessment process and promulgation of
lessons learned by the work week manager. Ongoing corrective actions include a
review of risk assessment practices by the Operations department and issuance of a
new condition report to evaluate ongoing risk assessment deficiencies. The inspectors determined that this finding is more than minor because it is similar toExample 7.e in Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor
Issues," in that, the licensee's risk assessment failed to consider maintenance activities
that could increase the likelihood of initiating events. The inspectors assessed the
finding using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix K, "Maintenance Risk Assessment andRisk Management Significance Determination Process," Flowchart 1, "Assessment of
Risk Deficit," and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because
the incremental core damage probability deficit was less than 1 x 10-6. The inspectorsalso determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human
performance because, during work planning for emergent maintenance on nuclear
power range channel N42, the licensee did not appropriately incorporate risk insights in
accordance with
SMM-WM-101, "Online Risk Assessment." (Section 1R13)B.Licensee-Identified Violations None.
EnclosureREPORT
- DETAIL [[]]
- SS ummary of Plant StatusUnit 3 operated at or near full power for the duration of the inspection period.
- 1.REACT [[]]
- OR [[]]
- SAFETY "Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity1R01Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 - 1 sample) a.Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed Entergy's administrative controls and implementation of amaintenance program to prepare . b. FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R04Equipment Alignment .1Partial Walkdown ([[Inspection procedure" contains a listed "[" character as part of the property label and has therefore been classified as invalid. - 4 samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed system walkdowns during periods of system trainunavailability in order to verify that the alignment of the available train was proper tosupport the availability of safety functions, and to ensure that Entergy had identified andproperly addressed equipment discrepancies that could potentially impair the functionalcapability of the available train. The following system walkdowns were counted as foursamples:*31 emergency diesel generator (]]
EDG out of service for quarterly maintenance andtesting;*Safety injection (SI) system during maintenance activities on 33 SI pump; and*Service water system alignment to verify proper alignment of essential servicewater.
2Enclosure b. FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.2. Complete Walkdown (71111.04S - 1 sample) a.Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted one complete walkdown of the motor-driven and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) systems to verify the functional capability of thesystem. The inspectors used the licensee procedures and other documents listed belowto verify proper system alignment:*Drawings 9321-F-20193, "Flow Diagram Boiler Feedwater," and 9321-F-20183,"Flow Diagram Condensate & Boiler Feed Pump Suction;"*Operations check off list procedure 3-COL-FW-2, "Auxiliary Feedwater System;"and*Standard operating procedure 3-SOP-FW-004, "Auxiliary Feedwater SystemOperation."The inspectors also verified motor-driven and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater systemselectrical power requirements, operator workarounds, labeling, hangers and support
installation, and associated support systems status. Operating pumps were examinedto ensure that any noticeable vibration was not excessive, pump leakoff was not
excessive, bearings were not hot to the touch, and that the pumps were properlyventilated. The walkdowns also included evaluation of system piping and supportsagainst the following considerations:*Piping and pipe supports did not show evidence of water hammer;*Pump and motor oil reservoir levels appeared normal;
- Snubbers did not appear to be leaking hydraulic fluid;
- Hangers were functional; and
- Component foundations were not degraded.A review of outstanding maintenance work orders was performed to verify that thedeficiencies did not significantly affect the motor-driven and turbine-driven auxiliaryfeedwater systems function. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the condition report(CR) database to verify that motor-driven and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater systemsequipment alignment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved. The
complete system walkdown was counted as one sample. b. FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
3Enclosure1R05Fire Protection (71111.05Q - 9 samples).1Fire Protection - Tours a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors toured areas that were identified as important to plant safety and risksignificance. The inspectors consulted the Indian Point 3 Individual Plant Examination
for External Events (IPEEE), Section 4.0, "Internal Fires Analysis," and the top
risk-significant fire zones in Table 4.6-2, "Summary of Core Damage Frequency
Contributions from Fire Zones." The objective of this inspection was to determine if
Entergy had adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant,
effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability, and had adequatelyestablished compensatory measures for degraded fire protection equipment. The inspectors evaluated conditions related to: (1) control of transient combustibles andignition sources; (2) the material condition, operational status, and operational lineup of
fire protection systems, equipment, and features; (3) the fire barriers used to prevent firedamage or fire propagation; and (4) compensatory measures for out-of-service,
degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment in order to determine if they were
implemented in accordance with Entergy's fire plan. The documents reviewed during
the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The following areas constitute nine samples:Fire Zones 10, 36A, 101A, 102A;Fire Zone 23;Fire Zones 94A, 95A, 96A, 97A, 98A;Fire Zones 11, 12, 13;Fire Zones 7A, 74A, 60A, 73A;Fire Zones 21, 37A, 38A, 40A;Diesel Fire Pump Repair;Fire Zones 37A; andFire Zone 131. b. FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..2Fire Protection - Drill Observation (71111.05A - 1 sample) d.Inspection Scope The inspectors observed an unannounced fire brigade drill. The drill was conducted inaccordance with the Entergy's preplanned drill scenario and simulated an explosion andsubsequent electrical fire in the 480 volt switchgear room. The drill was a routinetraining exercise for current fire brigade members. The inspectors evaluated the
readiness of the fire brigade to suppress and contain the fire, and evaluated the
following aspects of the drill:
4Enclosure*Donning of protective clothing/turnout gear by fire brigade members;*Proper use of self-contained breathing apparatus equipment (SCBA);
- Capability and use of fire hose lines to reach all necessary fire hazard locations;*Control of fire brigade members' entrance into the fire area;
- Adequacy of the fire fighting equipment brought to the scene by the fire brigade;
- Clarity and effectiveness of the fire brigade leader's fire fighting directions;
- Efficiency and effectiveness of radio communications with the plant operatorsand between fire brigade members;*Adequacy of fire brigade members' search for fire victims;
- Effectiveness of simulating smoke removal operations;
- Use of the fire fighting pre-plan strategies;
- Adequacy of fire brigade members' search for propagation of the fire into otherplant areas;*Adherence to the licensee's pre-planned drill scenario; and*Adequacy of the drill objectives and acceptance criteria.The inspectors also reviewed the results of the post-drill critique and evaluated it forthoroughness and degree of critical self-assessment. The documents reviewed during
the inspection are listed in the Attachment. The inspection of the unannounced fire
brigade drill represents one inspection sample. b. FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R06Flood Protection Measures (71111.06 - 1 sample) q.Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed Entergy's internal flood analysis, flood mitigation procedures
and design features of the primary auxiliary building to verify whether theywere consistent with the design requirements of Unit 3. The inspector walked down
several internal plant areas that contained equipment important to safety. The inspectorevaluated the condition and adequacy of mitigation equipment to assess whether flood
protection design features were adequate. The inspector reviewed a sample of Entergy's preventive maintenance and surveillanceprocedures on flood mitigation equipment. In addition, the inspector reviewed the
Corrective Action Program (CAP) to verify whether previous flood related issues had
been appropriately evaluated and resolved. This review was sample of internal floodprotection. b. FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R07Heat Sink Performance (71111.07A - 1 sample)
5Enclosure a. Inspection Scope The inspectors performed an inspection of the Unit 3 EDG lube oil coolers. Theinspector verified that Entergy used the periodic maintenance method outlined in Electric
Power Research Institute (EPRI) document NP-7552, "Heat Exchanger Performance
Monitoring Guidelines." The inspector reviewed the results of the last inspections and
eddy current tests for each of the lube oil coolers. The documents reviewed during the
inspection are listed in the Attachment. The inspection of Unit 3 EDG lube oil coolers
represents inspection sample. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R11Licensed Operator Requalification Inspection (71111.11Q - 1 sample) a.Inspection ScopeDuring the simulator portion of the June 14, 2006, emergency planning exercise, theinspectors evaluated the team's performance for: (1) clarity and formality of
communications; (2) correct use and implementation of emergency operating
procedures (EOP) and abnormal operating procedures; (3) operators' ability to properlyinterpret and verify alarms; (4) operator's ability to classify events in a timely fashion;and (5) operators' ability to take timely actions in a safe direction based on transientconditions. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the control room supervisor's ability toexercise effective oversight and control of the crew's actions during the exercise.On June 15, 2006, the inspectors observed simulator training for licensed operators whoparticipated in a series of scenarios conducted in accordance with lesson plan
I3SG-LOR-AOP020, "AOP [abnormal operating procedure]-138kV[kilovolt]-1 and AOP13.8kV-1 Simulator," to determine if the scenarios contained (1) clear event descriptions
with realistic initial conditions; (2) clear start and end points; (3) clear descriptions of
visible plant symptoms for the crew to recognize; and (4) clear expectations of operator
actions in response to abnormal conditions. The review of the licensed operatorrequalification activities represents one inspection sample. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
6Enclosure1R12Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q - 4 samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors evaluated four samples listed below to assess the effectiveness ofEntergy's work practices and corrective actions for selected systems, structures, andcomponents (SSC). The inspectors reviewed the performance history of those SSCs
and assessed extent of condition determinations performed by Entergy personnel for
those issues with potential common cause or generic implications to evaluate the
adequacy of corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed problem identification and
resolution actions for these issues identified by Entergy personnel to evaluate whether
they had appropriately monitored, evaluated, and dispositioned the issues in accordance
with Entergy's procedures and the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.65(a)(4),
"Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance." In addition, the
inspectors reviewed selected SSC classification, performance criteria and goals, and
Entergy's corrective actions that were taken or planned, to verify whether the actions
were reasonable and appropriate. The following four systems were evaluated and treated as fourinspection samples:* 32 central control room air conditioning system;* 31 emergency diesel generator;
- Weld channel containment penetration and pressurization system; and* Pressurizer power operated relief valve
PCV-455C nitrogen supplysubsystem. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R13Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 5 samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspector observed selected portions of emergent and planned maintenance workactivities to assess Entergy's risk management in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.65(a)(4). The inspector verified that Entergy took the necessary steps to plan and
control emergent work activities, to minimize the probability of initiating events, and tomaintain the functional capability of mitigating systems. The inspector observed and/ordiscussed risk management with maintenance and operations personnel. The followingthree emergent activities and two planned activities were observed and treated as five
inspection samples:*Work Order (WO)
WO IP3-05-19400, "Nuclear Power Range Channel 42 Axial Offset Calibration;"
- WO
EDG Testing;"
- WO
BFD-FCV-427 Steam Leak;" and
7Enclosure*WO
- IP 3-05-15971, "Inspection of Diesel Fire Pump Engine." b.Findings Introduction: The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10
CFR Part50.65(a)(4) for Entergy's failure to perform a risk assessment for emergent maintenance
conducted on nuclear power range channel N42.Description: On April 6, 2006, 3-PC-Q109B, "Nuclear Power Range Channel N42 AxialOffset Calibration," was performed as an emergent work activity. The calibration is risk
significant due to increased potential for a reactor trip. The inspectors identified that the
shift manager did not perform a risk assessment that included the nuclear instrument
calibration with other risk significant maintenance when it was performed on
April 6, 2006.
- 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requires that licensees assess the risk of maintenance activitiesprior to conducting work on certain structures, systems, and components. Entergyprocedure
IP-SMM-WM-101, "On-Line Risk Assessment," requires that the on-line risk
assessment process be performed for emergent work affecting risk significant activities.
No risk assessment was completed for this work as part of the work planning process;
and as a result, no risk management actions were developed.Analysis: The inspectors determined that Entergy's failure to assess the risk ofemergent maintenance activities on nuclear power range channel N42 is a performance
deficiency. The inspectors determined that this issue was within Entergy's ability toforesee and prevent, given that procedural guidance directed a risk assessment for this
type of work. Traditional enforcement does not apply because there were no actual
safety consequences or potential for impacting the
NRC requirements or Entergyprocedures. This finding is more than minor because it is similar to Example 7.e in
Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," in that, the
licensee's risk assessment failed to consider maintenance activities that could increase
the likelihood of initiating events. The inspectors assessed the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, AppendixK, "Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination
Process," Flowchart 1, "Assessment of Risk Deficit," and determined the finding to be of
very low safety significance (Green). Equipment included in the overall risk assessment
due to maintenance or surveillance activities included the 31 boric acid transfer pumpand the nuclear power range channel N42 axial offset calibration. The aggregate risk
for the equipment removed from service, not including the nuclear instrument
calibration, represented a core damage frequency (CDF) of 1.12 x 10-5 per year. The aggregate risk including the nuclear instrument calibration represented a CDF of
1.66 x 10-5 per year. Although the actual aggregate CDF for the maintenance activitieswas higher than initially calculated, the overall risk remained very low, and required no
additional risk management actions. The inspectors determined the incremental core
damage probability deficit (ICDPD) from the licensee's
ICDPD to be 1.12
8Enclosurex 10-9. This was determined to be a Green finding having very low safety significancebecause the calculated risk deficit was not greater that 1 x 10-6 . The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area ofhuman performance because, during work planning for emergent maintenance on
nuclear power range channel N42, the licensee did not appropriately incorporate risk
insights in accordance with
SMM-WM-101, "Online Risk Assessment."Enforcement: 10 CFR Part 50.65(a)(4) requires that before performing maintenanceactivities (including but not limited to surveillance, post-maintenance testing, and
corrective and preventive maintenance), the licensee shall assess and manage the
increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activities. The scope of
the assessment may be limited to structures, systems and components that a risk-informed evaluation process has shown to be significant to public health and safety.
Contrary to the above, the inspectors identified that on April 6, 2006, Entergy failed toperform a risk assessment for emergent maintenance conducted on nuclear power
range channel N42. Entergy performed a risk assessment in response to this finding
and entered the deficiency into their corrective action program. Because this finding is
of very low safety significance and has been entered into the corrective action program
(CR-IP3-2006-01093), this violation is being treated as an
NCV 05000286/2006003-01, Failure to Perform an
Adequate Risk Assessment when required by 10 CFR Part 50.65(a)(4) for the Nuclear
Power Range Channel N42 Axial Offset Calibration.Corrective actions completed included a review of the risk assessment process andpromulgation of lessons learned by the work week manager. Ongoing corrective actions
include a review of risk assessment practices by the Operations department and
issuance of a new condition report to evaluate ongoing risk assessment deficiencies. 1R15Operability Evaluations (71111.15 - 5 samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors selected a sample of Entergy's operability evaluations for review on thebasis of potential risk significance. The operability evaluations selected as samples areassociated with the condition reports listed below. The inspectors assessed the
accuracy of the evaluations, the use and control of compensatory measures (if needed),
and compliance with the Technical Specifications. The inspectors' review included a
verification that the operability evaluations were made as specified by procedure
OP-104, "Operability Determinations." The inspectors reviewed the technicaladequacy of the evaluations. References used during these reviews included the
Technical Specifications, the Technical Requirements Manual, the Updated Final Safety
Analysis Report (UFSAR), and associated design basis documents. The following operabilityevaluation reviews were considered five inspection samples:
9Enclosure*Condition Report (CR)
- PAB [[[primary auxiliary building] Exhaust Fan inspectionwith]]
- CR [[]]
- CR [[]]
SI Pump support evaluation;" and
- CR
EDG Peak Load Analysis." b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R19Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 6 samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed post maintenance testing (PMT) procedures and associatedtesting activities to assess whether: (1) the effect of testing in the plant had been
adequately addressed by control room personnel; (2) the testing was adequate for the
maintenance performed; (3) the acceptance criteria were clear and adequately
demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design and licensing documents;
(4) the test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, and accuracy for the
application; and (5) the test equipment was removed following testing.The selected testing activities involved components that were risk significant asidentified in the Unit 3 Individual Plant Examination. The following testing activities wereevaluated, and constituted six inspection samples:*
- WO [[]]
- CCR [[[Central Control Room] Not Functioning Correctly;" *]]
WO-IP3-05-20245, "32 EDG Following Quarterly Maintenance;"
IP3-06-00998, "32 FRV [flow regulating valve] Packing Leakage;"
IP3-06-00800, "AOV [air-operated valve] 791 Retest;"
IP3-06-16321, "Fire Pump Functional Test;" and
- WO [[]]
IP3-06-13638, "32 EDG East Side Air Start Motor Reconfiguration." b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
10Enclosure1R22Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 6 samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors observed portions of the surveillance tests listed below and reviewed thetest procedures to assess whether: (1) the test preconditioned any of the components;
(2) the effect of the testing was adequately addressed in the control room; (3) the
scheduling and conduct of the tests were consistent with plant conditions; (4) the
acceptance criteria demonstrated system operability consistent with designrequirements and the licensing basis; (5) the test equipment range and accuracy were
adequate for the application, and the test equipment was properly calibrated; (6) the testwas performed in the proper sequence in accordance with the test procedure; and (7)
the affected system was properly restored to the correct configuration following the test. Theinspection of the following tests represented six inspection samples (one RCS leak
detection sample, two in-service test (IST) samples and three surveillance testsamples):*
RPS Logic Channel Functional Test;"
- * 3-PT-Q016, Revision 19, "EDG and Containment Temperature
- TCV -1104 & 1105." b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R23Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23 - 1 sample) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspector reviewed documentation on temporary alteration
RCP Upper Oil Reservoir." The inspectorsassessed the temporary modification, any planned compensatory actions, and reviewed
drawings to evaluate any potential impact on equipment indications, alarms, or
protective functions. The inspection represented one inspection sample. b. FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
11EnclosureCornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
OA) - 1 sample) a.Inspection ScopeA region-based specialist conducted an inspection of Entergy's corrective actionsrelated to the current Indian Point alert and notification system, and also of the progressmade in the design and installation of the new siren system. The inspection wasconducted on June 6 and 7, 2006, per the Reactor Oversight Process deviation
authorized by the NRC Executive Director of Operations in a memorandum signed onOctober 31, 2005.In order to assess the continued effectiveness of Entergy's corrective actions, theinspector discussed and reviewed the corrective actions implemented and all condition
reports written against the current siren system since the inspector's March 2006inspection. To assess the effectiveness of the corrective actions and the performance
of Entergy's communication systems used in conjunction with the siren system, theinspector observed the performance of the monthly emergency planning communication
test conducted on June 7, 2006. This test was conducted, in part, to validate the properoperation of the recently installed Radiological Emergency Communication System and
the local four county Executive Hotline. The inspector monitored the test from the IndianPoint emergency operations facility and observed the use of the two phone systems toestablish contact with the local four county operation centers and warning points, andwith the New York State Emergency Management Office (SEMO). On June 28, 2006,
the inspectors observed the full siren sounding test from the emergency offsite facility and at siren W-46.The inspector discussed, with the assigned project manager, the status of the new sirensystem to understand Entergy's progress toward meeting the milestone dates requiredby the
- NRC 's Confirmatory Order dated January 31, 2006. The inspector also reviewedand discussed the initial Indian Point Energy Center prompt alert and notification systemdesign report, which Entergy had submitted to
SEMO for review. The inspector learned
of planned changes to this submittal, such as the intent to add two new transmission
towers for siren actuation to supplement the two existing towers. The inspector also
visited a site in Putnam County to observe the construction and installation of one of the
new siren towers in order to assess the progress of the installation and compliance with
the schedule. The inspection represented one inspection sample. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
2Enclosure1EP6Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 1 sample) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill conducted on June 14, 2006. The inspectors used NRC Inspection Procedure 71114.06, "Drill Evaluation," asguidance and criteria for evaluation of the drill. The inspectors observed the drill andcritiques that were conducted from the participating facilities on-site, including the IndianPoint Unit 3 plant simulator, and the emergency operations facility. The inspectorsfocused the reviews on the identification of weaknesses and deficiencies in
classification; and notification timeliness, quality, and accountability of essentialpersonnel during the drill. The inspectors observed Entergy's critique and compared thelicensee's self-identified issues with the observations from the inspectors' review to
ensure that performance issues were properly identified. The observation of the drillrepresented one sample. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.2.RADIATION
OS1Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01 - 8 samples) a.Inspection ScopeFrom May 1 to May 11, 2006, the inspector conducted the following activities duringrefueling outage 2R17 and during a subsequent in-office review of an unintended
exposure of a worker during core support barrel installation.(1)The following exposure significant work areas were evaluated to determine ifradiological controls (e.g., surveys, postings, and barricades) were acceptable:* Sump strainer modification;* Reactor disassembly/reassembly;
- Steam generator primary inspection;
- Valve work;
- Reactor coolant pump work; and
- Core support barrel replacement.(2)The radiation work permits (RWPs) associated with the above work activitieswere reviewed with respect to high radiation area controls, including electronic
dosimeter alarm setpoints.
13Enclosure(3)With respect to the work activities listed in (1) above, a walkdown of these workareas was conducted with a radiation survey instrument to determine whether:* RWPs, procedures, and engineering controls were in place; * Entergy's surveys and postings were complete and accurate; and
- To verify that air samplers were properly located.(4)The work activities listed in (1) above were reviewed against the radiologicalcontrol requirements as specified in the applicable RWP and "as low as
reasonably achievable" (ALARA) reviews, as well as verbal instructions provided
by radiation protection technicians during radiological briefings to workers.(5)With respect to the work activities listed in (1) above, the conduct of necessarysystem breach surveys and evolving radiological hazards associated with workactivities were observed to evaluate the radiation protection job coverage and
contamination controls.(6)During observations of the work activities listed in (1) above, radiation workerperformance was evaluated with respect to radiological work requirements and
radiological briefing instructions.(7)Corrective action reports related to access controls were reviewed to determine ifthe follow-up activities were conducted in an effective and timely manner
commensurate with safety and risk (see Section
PI event were reviewed todetermine if there were any overexposures or substantial potential for
overexposure associated with this incident.The inspector verified that Entergy was properly implementing physical, engineering,and administrative controls for access to high radiation areas and other radiologically
controlled areas, and that workers were adhering to these controls when working in
these areas. Implementation of the access control program was reviewed against the
criteria contained in 10 CFR 20, Indian Point Unit 3 Technical Specifications, and
Entergy's procedures. The inspections constituted eight inspection samples. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.2OS2ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02 - 5 samples) a.Inspection ScopeFrom May 1 to May 11, 2006, the inspector conducted the following activities to verifythat Entergy was properly maintaining individual and collective radiation exposures as
low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). Implementation of the
- ALA [[]]
RA program was
14Enclosurereviewed against the criteria contained in 10 CFR 20.1101(b) and Entergy's procedures. The following inspections constituted five inspection samples. (1)The plant collective exposure history trend and current three-year rolling averagecollective exposure data was reviewed. (2)The following highest exposure work activities for the Unit 2, Spring 2006refueling outage were selected for review: * Sump strainer modification;
- Reactor disassembly/reassembly;
- Steam generator primary inspection;
- Valve work;
- Reactor coolant pump work; and
- Core support barrel replacement.(3)The site procedure associated with maintaining occupational exposures
- ALA [[]]
RA Planning," was reviewed to
evaluate the processes used to estimate and track work activity exposures. (4)With respect to the highest exposure work activities listed in (2) above, these jobsites were observed to evaluate if surveys and
- ALA [[]]
RA controls were
implemented as planned. Radiation worker and radiation protection technician
performance was observed during the performance of these work activities to
demonstrate the
- ALA [[]]
RA principles. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety2PS1Gaseous and Liquid Effluents (71122.01 - 10 samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspector reviewed the following documents to evaluate the effectiveness of thelicensee's radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent control programs. The requirements
for radioactive effluent controls are specified in the Technical Specifications (TS) and
the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). The following inspections constituted ten
inspection samples. (1)The 2004 and 2005 Radiological Annual Effluent Release Reports werereviewed, including calculated public dose assessments. The inspector
evaluated the licensee's analysis of this abnormal release pathway and verified
that the licensee had in place a program of sampling and dose assessment for
this effluent pathway. Chapter 11 of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
15Enclosure(UFSAR) for Units 1 and 2 and Unit 3 were reviewed for those sections thatdescribed the gaseous and liquid radioactive waste systems. The latest QualityAssurance Audit (QA Audit
IP-1, "IPEC Effluent and Environmental
Programs," conducted 9/19-12/5/2005) was also reviewed.(2)The inspector observed the following plant equipment and work activities toevaluate the effectiveness of the licensee's radioactive gaseous and liquid
effluent control programs:* Walkdown of the radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent radiationmonitoring (RMS) and effluent sampling systems to determineequipment operability and material condition;* Observation of effluent sampling and laboratory analysis of thosesamples;* Walkdown to determine the operability and material condition of aircleaning systems; and* Control room walk down of effluent
RMS readouts were in agreement, and to verify the
effluent RMS alarm set points.The inspector assessed the licensee's understanding of the on-site ground watercontamination problem that was leading to the abnormal offsite liquid release of
tritium and strontium-90 via this pathway. The inspector verified that the licensee
had developed a technical basis for the onsite ground water monitoring program,
understood the groundwater flow patterns for the site, and had in place
acceptable dose calculation methodology for this pathway.(3)Selected gaseous and liquid radioactive waste release permits for 2005 and2006 to date were reviewed with respect to procedural and
- OD [[]]
CM requirements.
The calculations were independently verified.(4)Recent Unit 2 liquid effluent releases through effluent radiation monitor R-54were reviewed. This monitor was inoperable, and the required program for
compensatory sampling and analysis for radioactive effluent releases was
verified.(5)Changes to the
- ODCM (Revision 9 for Units 1 and 2, Revision 17 for Unit 3)were reviewed along with the justifications for each change.(6)Monthly radioactive effluent dose projections were reviewed for each month of2005 and 2006 to date with respect to
CFR
50, Appendix I public dose requirements. The inspector verified calculations to
ensure no regulatory requirements were exceeded.(7)The inspector reviewed the most recent air cleaning system filter surveillanceresults required by Technical Specifications. This included visual inspection,
pressure differential, in-leakage tests, laboratory charcoal efficiency test, and air
flow capacity test, as required for the following:
16Enclosure* Unit 2 control room ventilation system;* Unit 3 control room ventilation system; and
- Unit 3 containment fan cooler unit 32.(8)The inspector reviewed the most recent calibration results for the gaseous andliquid effluent radiation monitors and associated flow rate measurement devices
as required by the
- OD [[]]
CM for the following:* Unit 2 liquid radioactive waste (R54);* Unit 2 plant vent (R43/44);
- Unit 3 liquid radioactive waste (R18);
- Unit 3 plant vent (R14); and
- Unit 3 plant vent, wide range (R27).The inspector also reviewed the calibrations of the laboratory instrumentation(gamma ray spectrometers and liquid scintillation counting systems) and samplepreparation apparatus used for the analysis of effluent samples. Quality Control data for this instrumentation was reviewed in order to verify thatthe instrumentation was being operated within acceptable performance
parameters.(9)Implementation of the laboratory quality assurance program for the analysis ofeffluent samples was reviewed, including the interlaboratory Quality Control
program and the interlaboratory Quality Control program. The inspector also
reviewed Quality Assurance Audit
IP-1, conducted from September
19, 2005 to December 5, 2005 of the
- IPEC effluent and environmental programs.(10)The inspector reviewed eight condition reports relative to the effluent controlprograms at Units 1, 2 and 3 from April 2005 to May 2006. (see Section 4
- OA [[2). b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.2PS3Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) (71122.03 - 10 samples) a.Inspection Scope (1)The inspector reviewed the current Annual Radiological Environmental OperatingReport, and Entergy assessment results, to verify that the]]
- RE [[]]
MP was
implemented as required by
- OD [[]]
CM with respect to environmental monitoring commitments in terms of
sampling locations, monitoring and measurement frequencies, land use census,
interlaboratory comparison program, and analysis of data. The inspector also
reviewed the
- OD [[]]
CM to identify environmental monitoring stations. In addition,
the inspector reviewed:
17Enclosure*Entergy self-assessments and audits;*Event reports;
- Inter-laboratory comparison program results;
- The updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) for informationregarding the environmental monitoring program and meteorological
monitoring instrumentation; and *The scope of the audit program to verify that it met the requirements of10
- CFR 20.1101. (2)The inspector walked down six air particulate and iodine sampling stations, threeground water sampling locations, and seven thermoluminescent dosimeter (
TLD)
monitoring locations to determine that they were located as described in the
- OD [[]]
CM and to determine the equipment material condition. (3)The inspector observed the collection and preparation of a variety ofenvironmental samples to include airborne particulate, iodine, and Hudson River
aquatic vegetation samples. Other sample locations and sample aliquot
compositing methods were demonstrated to include water inlet and discharge
points, and shoreline sediment samples. (4)The inspector reviewed meteorological instruments to ensure they wereoperable, calibrated, and maintained in accordance with guidance contained in
the
NRC Safety Guide 23, and Entergy procedures. The inspectorreviewed the meteorological data readout and recording instruments reflecting
the control room readout and the tower to ensure they were operable and
provided the same data values. (5)The inspector reviewed each event documented in the Annual RadiologicalEnvironmental Monitoring Report which involved a missed sample, inoperable
sampler, lost TLD, or anomalous measurement for the cause and corrective
actions. The inspector conducted a review of Entergy's assessment of any
positive sample results. (6)The inspector reviewed any significant changes made by Entergy to the
- OD [[]]
CMas the result of changes to the land census or sampler station modifications
since the last inspection. The inspector also reviewed technical justifications for
any changed sampling locations and verified that Entergy performed the reviews
required to ensure that the changes did not affect its ability to monitor theimpacts of radioactive effluent releases on the environment.
18Enclosure(7)The inspector reviewed the calibration and maintenance records for air samplers. The inspector reviewed: *The results of Entergy's interlaboratory comparison program to verify theadequacy of environmental sample analyses performed by Entergy; *Entergy's quality control evaluation of the interlaboratory comparisonprogram and the corrective actions for any deficiencies; *Entergy's determination of any bias to the data and the overall effect onthe
- ODCM requirements. (8)The inspector verified that the appropriate detection sensitivities with respect to
- OD [[]]
CM are utilized for counting samples and reviewed the results of thequality control program including the interlaboratory comparison program to
verify the adequacy of the program. (9)The inspector observed the health physics control point egress point from theradiologically controlled area (RCA) where Entergy monitors potentially
contaminated material leaving the RCA. The inspector inspected the methods
used for control, survey, and release from these areas including observing the
performance of personnel surveying and releasing material for unrestricted use. (10)The inspector inspected radiation monitoring instrumentation to ensure it wasappropriate for the radiation types present and was calibrated with appropriate
radiation sources. The inspector reviewed Entergy's equipment to ensure the
radiation detection sensitivities were consistent with the NRC guidance containedin Circular 81-07, "Control of Radioactively Contained Material," Information Notice 85-92, "Surveys of Wasted Before Disposal from Nuclear Reactor
Facilities," and
LLD) for PotentiallyContaminated Oil." (11)The inspector reviewed Entergy's audits and self-assessments related to theradiological environmental monitoring program since the last inspection to
determine if identified problems were entered into the corrective action program
as appropriate. Selected corrective action reports were reviewed since the last
inspection to determine if identified problems accurately characterized the
causes and corrective actions were assigned to each commensurate with their
safety significance. Any repetitive deficiencies were also assessed to ensure
that Entergy's self-assessment activities were identifying and addressing these
deficiencies.(12)The inspectors verified several commitments made by Entergy as described inEntergy letter to the
- NRC dated April 10, 2006. Quarterly tritium and strontium-90 analyses of site perimeter monitoring well samples (
MW-38, 48, 51, and 40)
had been performed during the second quarter of 2006 and the sampling
requirements were incorporated in Radiation Protection Standing Order
REMP Water Sampling."
19Enclosure b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4.OTHER
- ACTIVI [[]]
- TIES [[]]
- 4OA 1Performance Indicator Verification (71151 - 1 sample) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the licensee's data submitted to the
NRC for the performanceindicators (PIs) listed below, and performed an independent verification that the source
data was consistent with plant records. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's
collecting and reporting process for
SAO-114,
"Preparation of
WANO Performance Indicators." The purpose of thesereviews was to determine whether the methods for reporting PI data were consistent
with the guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory
Assessment Performance Indicator Guidelines," Revision 2. The inspection included a
review of the indicator definitions, data reporting elements, calculation methods,
definition of terms, and clarifying notes for the performance indicators. Plant records
and data, including operator log entries, daily morning reports
(including daily
PI data sheets were
sampled and compared to the reported data. In addition, the inspectors also
interviewed licensee personnel responsible for the PI data collection, evaluation, and
distribution. This inspection activity represents the completion of one sample.Reactor Safety Cornerstone*Unplanned Transients per 7,000 Critical Hours (January 2004 - December 2005) b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152).1Daily Review a. Inspection ScopeAs required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"and in order to help identify repetitive failures or specific human performance issues for
follow-up, the inspectors screened all items entered into Entergy's corrective action
program. This review was accomplished by reviewing hard copies or computer records
of each condition report. b.Findings
20EnclosureNo significant findings were identified..2Semi-annual Trend Review (71152 - 1 sample) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed a semi-annual review to identify trends that might indicate theexistence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors included in this review
repetitive or closely related issues that may have been documented by Entergy outsideof the normal Corrective Action Program (CAP), such as trend reports, performance
indicators, major equipment problem lists, maintenance rule assessments and
maintenance and
CAP database during the first and second quartersof 2006 to assess the total number and significance of condition reports written in
various subject areas such as equipment or processes and to discern any notable
trends in these areas. The inspectors reviewed Entergy's quarterly assessment/trend
reports for both CAP and Quality Assurance for the fourth quarter of 2005 and the first
quarter of 2006 to ensure they were appropriately evaluating and trending identified
conditions. b.FindingsNo significant findings were identified.
.3PI&R Annual Sample - Selected Issue Follow-up Inspection - Station and Unit AuxiliaryTransformer Tap Changer Alarms / 480VAC Bus Undervoltage Alarms (71152 - 1 Sample) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors conducted a review of problems associated with transformer tap changerand 480 volt safety bus undervoltage alarms, and the effectiveness of the associated
corrective actions. The alarms were noted to occur during offsite power transients and
large motor starts. The inspectors interviewed the engineers responsible for the system,reviewed condition reports from 2003 to present which documented the issue and
reviewed the associated engineering evaluations and corrective actions. The inspectors
evaluated plant response following relay replacements and the addition of a time delay
circuit. b.FindingsNo significant findings or observations were identified.
21Enclosure.4 Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone (71122.01) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspector reviewed 25 corrective action condition reports that were initiated betweenJuly 2005 and May 2006 which were associated with the radiation protection program.
The inspector verified that problems identified by these condition reports were properly
characterized in the licensee's event reporting system, and that applicable causes andcorrective actions were identified commensurate with the safety significance of the
radiological occurrences. b.FindingsNo significant findings or observations were identified..5Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone (71122.01) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspector reviewed eight condition reports initiated between April 2005 and May2006 relative to the radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent control programs.
The inspector verified that problems identified by these condition reports were properly
characterized in the licensee's event reporting system, and that applicable causes andcorrective actions were identified commensurate with the safety significance of the
occurrences. T b.FindingsNo significant findings or observations were identified..6Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone (71122.03) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspector reviewed the following four corrective action condition reports that wereinitiated between January 2004 and May 2006, and were associated with the
radiological environmental monitoring program: *
JAFLO-2005-0134, "Radiation Protection Self Assessment Tracking Report;"
- IP 3-2004-3863, "Meteorological Data Review Showed 122 m to 10 m Delta-TReading High for Existing Conditions;" and*
IP3-2005-4690, "122 m Temperature Sensor Failed and is Reading Low."The inspector verified that problems identified by these condition reports were properlycharacterized in the licensee's event reporting system, and that applicable causes and
2Enclosurecorrective actions were identified commensurate with the safety significance of theradiological occurrences. b.FindingsNo significant findings or observations were identified.4OA5Other Activities1.Implementation of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/165 - Operational Readiness ofOffsite Power and Impact on Plant Risk a.Inspection ScopeThe objective of TI 2515/165, "Operational Readiness of Offsite Power and Impact onPlant Risk," was to gather information to support the assessment of nuclear power plant
operational readiness of offsite power systems and impact on plant risk. The inspectorevaluated licensee procedures against the specific offsite power, risk assessment, and
system grid reliability requirements of
TI was forwarded to the Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation for further review and evaluation on April 3, 2006. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4OA6Meetings, including Exit Exit Meeting SummaryOn June 28, 2006, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Fred Dacimoand other Entergy staff members, who acknowledged the inspection results presented.
Entergy did not identify any material as proprietary.
- ATTACH [[]]
- MENT [[:]]
- SUPPLE [[]]
- MENTAL [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- POINTS [[]]
- OF [[]]
- CONTAC [[]]
TLicensee PersonnelF. Dacimo, Site Vice PresidentP. Rubin, General Manager, Plant Operations
J. Ventosa, Director, Engineering
IP3 Operations Manager
A. Vitale, Site Operations Manager
T. Barry, Security Manager
T. Carson, Manager, Maintenance
P. Conroy, Manager, Licensing
F. Inzirillo, Emergency Planning ManagerM. Miele, Project Manager, Operations Support
T. Jones, Licensing Supervisor
L. Lee, Systems Engineering Supervisor
T. Orlando, Manager, Systems Engineering
C. Smyers, Shift Manager, Operations
P. Parker, Superintendent, Maintenance
M. Imai, Systems Engineer
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- ITEMS [[]]
- AND [[]]
CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the Nuclear Power Range Channel N42
Axial Offset Calibration.LIST
- OF [[]]
- REVIEW [[]]
EDSection 1R01: Adverse Weather ProtectionProcedures:Miscellaneous:IP3-DBD-324, Rev 2: "Design Basis Document for the Service Water System"Condition Reports:
A-2AttachmentIP3-2005-03544Work Orders:IP3-05-00712I3-027709969I3-027709968Section 1R04: Equipment AlignmentProcedures: 3-COL-EL-5, Rev 28: "Diesel Generators"
3-PT-M079A, Rev 36: "31 EDG Functional Test"
3-PT-M079C, Rev 36: "33 EDG Functional Test"
3-COL-RW-2A, Rev 12: "Service Water Header Realignment"
3-COL-RW-2, Rev 41: "Service Water System"Drawings9321-F-20333, Rev 49: "Flow Diagram - Service Water System" New York Power Authority, 9321-F-27223, Rev 41: "Flow Diagram - Service Water System
Nuclear Steam Supply Plant"Condition ReportsIP3-2004-02126IP3-2004-02243
IP3-2004-03957
IP3-2005-02402IP3-2005-03432
IP3-2005-05500
IP3-2006-00561IP3-2006-00569
- ENN -DC-161, Rev 1: "Transient Combustible Program"FP-31, Rev 3: "Fire Door Inspection (Balance of Plant)"
SMM-TQ-122, Rev. 0: "Fire Protection Training Program"
3-PT-M042B, Rev 3: "Diesel Fire Pump Test"
3-ENG-001-FIR, Rev 7: "Diesel Driven Fire Pump Engine Major Preventive MaintenanceInspection"3-Eng-002-FIR, Rev 6: "Diesel Driven Fire Pump Engine Minor Preventive MaintenanceInspection"0-CY-2510, Rev 2: "Closed Cooling Water Chemistry Specifications and Frequencies"
0-CY-2515, Rev 0: "Adding Chemicals to Closed Cooling Systems"
A-3AttachmentMiscellaneous:
- NYPA #1108-100000811: "Cummins Construction/Industrial Diesel Engine Operation andMaintenance Manual"Condition Reports:
IP3-2001-03228IP3-2006-01618IP3-2006-01732IP3-2006-01798Work Orders:IP3-06-15596IP3-06-15597IP3-06-15971Section 1R06: Flood Protection MeasuresProcedures: 3-AOP-FLOODING-1, Rev 2: "Flooding"
3-ARP-22, Rev 21: "Waste Disposal Panel"Condition Reports:
IP3-2006-01317Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification ProgramProcedures: 3-AOP-138KV-1: "Loss of Power to 6.9KV Bus 5 and/or Bus 6"
3-AOP-13.8KV-1: "Loss of 13.8KV Power"Miscellaneous:Section 1R12: Maintenance EffectivenessProcedures: 3-PT-M079A, Rev 34: "31 EDG Functional Test"
3-IC-PC-I-T-31EDG, Rev 10: "EDG #31 Temperature Instruments Calibration"
3-IC-PC-I-EDG-EL31, Rev 1: "Diesel Generator No. 31 Electrical Instrumentation"
3-IC-PC-I-P-31DF, Rev 14: "Diesel Generator No. 31 Fuel Oil Pressure"
3-IC-PC-I-P-31DJW, Rev 9: "Diesel Generator No. 31 Jacket Water Pressure"
3-IC-PC-I-P-31DLO, Rev 14: "Diesel Generator No. 31 Lube Oil Pressure"
3-IC-PC-I-L-1204S, Rev 5: "Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank No. 31 Level"
HVAC, Rev 11: "CCR Air Conditioning System Preventive Maintenance"ENN-DC-171, Rev 2: "Maintenance Rule Monitoring"Condition Reports:IP3-2006-01455IP3-2006-01450IP3-2006-01451IP3-2006-01616
A-4AttachmentIP3-2006-01665IP3-2006-00582IP3-2006-00439IP3-2006-00438IP3-2006-00362IP3-2006-00327IP3-2006-00324IP3-2006-00313
EDG 31, 32"
System Health Report,
IP3-DBD-314, Design Basis Document for the Reactor Coolant System
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station Units 2 and 3 Maintenance Rule Basis Document -
Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Rev. 1DrawingsEntergy Dwg. No. 9321-F-27233: "Flow Diagram of Nitrogen to Nuclear Equipment"Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work ControlProcedures:3-PC-Q109B: "Nuclear Power Range Channel N 42 Axial Offset Calibration"3-SOP-FW-1, Rev 43: "Main Feedwater System Operation"
FIR, Rev 6: "Diesel Driven Fire Pump Engine Minor PM Inspection"
3-PT-R084, Rev 16: "Fire Pump Functional Test"
3-ENG-001-FIR, Rev 7: "Diesel Driven Fire Pump Engine Major Prev Maint Insp"
0-CY-2510, Rev 2: "Closed Cooling Water Chemistry Specifications and Frequencies"
0-CY-2515, Rev 0: "Adding Chemicals to Closed Cooling Systems"
Work Orders:IP3-06-15884IP3-06-16024Condition Reports:IP3-2006-01082IP3-2006-01093IP3-2006-00245IP3-2006-01471
IP3-2003-06114IP3-2003-06107IP3-2006-01574
IP3-2006-01598Miscellaneous:
A-5AttachmentIP3-DBD-321, Rev 2: "New York Power Authority, Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant WaterSupply and Distribution System, Tab I"Section 1R15: Operability EvaluationsProcedures:ENN-CS-S-008, Rev 0: "Pipe Wall Thinning Structural Evaluation"3-SOP-V-001, Rev 14: "PAB Heating and Ventilation System Operation"IP3-DBD-315, Rev 1: "Indian Point 3 Primary Auxiliary Building Heating and Ventilation System"Fan-006-VSS, Rev 6: "Inspection of
VC Purge Exhaust Fan and Filter Replacement"
Calculations:Drawings:Condition Reports:
IP3-06-16254IP3-05-13617Condition ReportsIP3-2006-01419IP3-2006-01533IP3-2006-01574IP3-2006-01822Work OrdersIP3-06-00247IP3-05-20192IP3-05-20243IP3-05-20244IP3-05-20245IP3-05-23569IP3-06-13795IP3-06-18472
A-6AttachmentSection 1R22: Surveillance TestingProcedures:3-PT-W019, Rev 5: "Electrical Verification of Offsite Power Sources and
PT-Q93A, Rev 1: "Reactor Coolant Flow Functional Test - Channel 1"
3-PT-Q016, Rev 19: "EDG and Containment Temperature
TCV-1104 & 1105"
Condition ReportsPFM-22A, Rev 7: "Inservice Testing Program #9"Section 1R23: Temporary Plant ModificationsProcedures:ENN-DC-136, Rev 8: "Temporary Alterations"
Condition ReportsSection
EP-130, Rev 4: "Emergency Notification and Mobilization,"IP-EP-430, Rev 3: "Site Assembly, Accountability and Relocation of Personnel Offsite"IP-EP-250, Rev 9: "Emergency Operations Facility" (EOF)Condition Reports:IP3-2006-01829Section 2:
A-7AttachmentProceduresRWP Preparation and
- RP -RWP-400, Rev. 3Condition ReportsIP3-2005-03609IP2-2005-04152IP2-2005-04150IP2-2005-04105IP2-2005-04131IP2-2006-00928IP2-2005-02913IP2-2005-04262
SMM-OP-104, "Offsite Power Continuous Monitoring and Notification," Rev. 3
EL-7, "Loss of a 480V Bus - Above Cold Shutdown," Rev. 6
3-AOP-480V-1, "Loss of Normal Power to Any Safeguards 480V Bus," Rev. 1
A-8AttachmentLIST
- OF [[]]
- ALA [[]]
AOPabnormal operation procedure
CAPcorrective action program
- CF [[]]
RCode of Federal Regulations
CRcondition report
- EO [[]]
FEmergency Operations Facility
EOPemergency operating procedure
- IPE [[]]
- IPE [[]]
- LO [[]]
OPloss of offsite power
- NE [[]]
- NR [[]]
- OD [[]]
- PA [[]]
RSpublicly available records
PIperformance indicator
PMTpost maintenance testing
- RE [[]]
MPradiation effluent monitoring program
RMArisk management action
RMSradiation monitoring system
RPradiation protection
- SC [[]]
BAself-contained breather apparatus
- SEM [[]]
TItemporary instruction
TLDthermo luminescent dosimeter
- USFA [[]]
RUpdated Final Safety Analysis Report