IR 05000413/2006002

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May 12, 2006

Duke Energy CorporationATTN:Mr. D. M. JamilSite Vice President Catawba Nuclear Station4800 Concord RoadYork, SC 29745

SUBJECT: CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT05000413/2006002 AND 05000414/2006002

Dear Mr. Jamil:

On March 31, 2006, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspectionat your Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents theinspection results, which were discussed on April 12, 2006, with you and other members of yourstaff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewedpersonnel.This report documents two NRC-identified findings of very low safety significance (Green) whichwere determined to be violations of NRC requirements. However, because of their very lowsafety significance and because these violations were entered into your corrective actionprogram, the NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent withSection VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCV in this report, youshould provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis foryour denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk,Washington, DC, 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region II; the Director,Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC,20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Catawba Nuclear Station.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and itsenclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document DEC2Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/D. Charles Payne, Acting ChiefReactor Projects Branch 1Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.:50-413, 50-414License Nos.:NPF-35, NPF-52

Enclosure:

Integrated Inspection Report 05000413/2006002 and 05000414/2006002

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Informationcc w/encl: (See page 3)

DEC2Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site atwww.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/D. Charles Payne, Acting ChiefReactor Projects Branch 1Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.:50-413, 50-414License Nos.:NPF-35, NPF-52

Enclosure:

Integrated Inspection Report 05000413/2006002 and 05000414/2006002

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Informationcc w/encl: (See page 3)G PUBLICLY AVAILABLE G NON-PUBLICLY AVAILABLEG SENSITIVE G NON-SENSITIVEADAMS: G YesACCESSION NUMBER:_________________________OFFICERII/DRPRII/DRPRII/DRPRII/DRPRII/DRSSIGNATURECWRGXGSAWATSNLSNAMEC. RappE. GuthrieS. WalkerA. SabischN. StaplesDATE5/11/20065/11/20065/11/20065/11/20065/11/2006E-MAIL COPY? YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: C:\MyFiles\Copies\IIR 2006002.wpd DEC3cc w/encl:Randy D. HartRegulatory Compliance ManagerDuke Energy CorporationElectronic Mail DistributionLisa VaughnAssociate General CounselDuke Energy Corporation526 South Church StreetMail Code EC 07HCharlotte, NC 28202Timika Shafeek-HortonAssistant General CounselDuke Energy Corporation526 South Church Street-EC07HCharlotte, NC 28202David A. RepkaWinston & Strawn LLPElectronic Mail DistributionNorth Carolina MPA-1Electronic Mail DistributionHenry J. Porter, Asst. DirectorDiv. of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.S. C. Department of Health and Environmental ControlElectronic Mail DistributionR. Mike GandyDivision of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.S. C. Department of Health and Environmental ControlElectronic Mail DistributionElizabeth McMahonAssistant Attorney GeneralS. C. Attorney General's OfficeElectronic Mail DistributionVanessa QuinnFederal Emergency Management AgencyElectronic Mail DistributionNorth Carolina ElectricMembership CorporationElectronic Mail DistributionCounty Manager of York County, SCElectronic Mail DistributionPiedmont Municipal Power AgencyElectronic Mail DistributionR. L. Gill, Jr., ManagerNuclear Regulatory Issues and Industry AffairsDuke Energy Corporation526 S. Church StreetCharlotte, NC 28201-0006Distribution w/encl: (See page 4)

DEC4Letter to D. of Duke Energy Corporation dated April 27, 2006

SUBJECT: CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT05000413/2006002 AND 05000414/2006002Distribution w/encl:S. Peters, NRRL. Slack, RII EICSRIDSRIDSNRRDIPMLIPB EnclosureU. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IIDocket Nos.:50-413, 50-414License Nos.:NPF-35, NPF-52Report No.:05000413/2006002 and 05000414/2006002Licensee:Duke Energy CorporationFacility:Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2Location:4800 Concord RoadYork, SC 29745Dates:January 1, 2006 through March 31, 2006Inspectors:E. Guthrie, Senior Resident InspectorA. Sabisch, Resident InspectorS. Walker, Acting Senior Resident InspectorN. Staples, Reactor Inspector (Section 4OA5)Approved by:D. Charles Payne, Acting ChiefReactor Projects Branch 1Division of Reactor Projects 2Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000413/2006-002, 05000414/2006-002; 1/1/2006 - 3/31/2006; Catawba Nuclear Station,Units 1 and 2; Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation and OtherActivitiesThe report covered a three-month period of inspection by three resident inspectors and areactor inspector. Two Green NRC-identified non-cited violations (NCVs) were identified. Thesignificance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not applymay be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC'sprogram for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described inNUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," (ROP) Revision 3, dated July 2000.A.NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

An NRC-identified NCV was identified for the failure to adequately assess andmanage the risk pertaining to a portion of the maintenance activities associated with theremoval of the A train of nuclear service water (RN) from service for a planned 14-dayoutage as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4).The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the EquipmentPerformance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected thecornerstone objective of ensuring that the availability, reliability and capability of systemsthat respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences is maintained. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low risk significance (Green),based on the resulting magnitude of the calculated Incremental Core DamageProbability (5.8E-7/day), the length of time that the two A train diesels were unavailable(<18 hours) and that no actual loss of safety function of the 2B DG occurred. Thisfinding involved the cross-cutting aspect of human performance. (Section 1R13)

Green.

An NRC-identified NCV of Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS) Operating LicenseCondition 2.C.5, Fire Protection Program (FPP), was identified. The licensee made achange to the approved fire protection program which had the potential to affect post-fire safe shutdown capability. Specifically, the licensee derated the time requirement for43 battery powered emergency lighting units (ELUs) from 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. Theevaluation for this change was not adequate to ensure that derating the ELUs would notadversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.This finding is more than minor because it had the potential to impact the licensee'spost-fire safe shutdown capability by delaying operator response in the event of a loss ofpower to normal lighting during a fire. The finding was of very low risk significance(Green) because operators would likely be able to accomplish the actions with the useof flashlights. (Section 4OA5.1)

B.Licensee-Identified Violations

None 3Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant StatusUnit 1 began the inspection period operating at 100 percent (%) Rated Thermal Power (RTP). Power was reduced to 65% RTP on March 25 to support swapping main turbine lube oil coolersdue to a tube leak that had increased on the in-service cooler. The unit was returned to 100%power on March 26 and remained there through the end of the inspection period.Unit 2 began the inspection period operating at 100% RTP. End-of-cycle power coast downcommenced on March 14. Power was reduced to 94% on March 15 to conduct main steamsafety relief valve testing and remained there until the unit was removed from service for aplanned refueling outage on March 18. The unit remained off-line through the end of theinspection period.1.REACTOR SAFETYCornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity1R04Equipment Alignmenta.Inspection ScopePartial System Walkdowns. The inspectors walked down the following five systemalignments to verify that critical portions of equipment alignments remained operablewhile the redundant trains for that system were inoperable. The inspectors reviewedplant documents to determine the correct system and power alignments, as well as therequired positions of selected valves and breakers. The inspectors reviewed equipmentalignment problems which could cause initiating events or impact mitigating systemavailability to verify that they had been properly identified and resolved. Documentsreviewed are listed in the Attachment.*The B Train of nuclear service water (RN) when the A Train was removed from servicefor the 14-day Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) to clean, coat, replace andrepair the RN piping*The B Train of component cooling water (KC) when the A Train of KC was removedfrom service as part of the 14-day RN train LCO period*The A Train of RN when the B Train was removed from service for the 14-day LCO toclean, coat, replace and repair the RN piping*Cross-train alignment of the KC system in support of the B Train RN LCO AllowedOutage Time (AOT)*B Train of RN in the RN pump house structure when the A Train of RN was removedfrom service for the 14-day LCOb.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

4Enclosure1R05Fire Protectiona.Inspection ScopeFire Protection Walkdowns. The inspectors walked down accessible portions of thefollowing eight plant areas to assess the licensee's control of transient combustiblematerial and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers,and any related compensatory measures. The inspectors observed the fire protectionsuppression and detection equipment to determine whether any conditions ordeficiencies existed which could impair the operability of that equipment. The inspectorsselected the areas based on a review of the licensee's safe shutdown analysisprobabilistic risk assessment, sensitivity studies for fire-related core damage accidentsequences, and summary statements related to the licensee's 1992 Initial PlantExamination for External Events submittal to the NRC. Documents reviewed are listedin the Attachment.* Unit 1 Exterior Doghouse* Main Control Room* Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room* Unit 1 Mechanical Penetration Room, 543 foot elevation

• Unit 1 Electrical Penetration Room, 560 foot elevation* Unit 2 Mechanical Penetration Room, 577 foot elevation* Unit 1 Spent Fuel Building Fan Room, 636 foot elevation* Nuclear Service Water Pump HouseFire Drill Observation. On March 3, the inspectors observed a shift fire drill simulatingan oil fire in the Unit 1 Main Turbine Oil Tank room located on the 594 foot elevation ofthe turbine building. The purpose of this annual inspection was to: monitor the firebrigade's use of protective gear and fire fighting equipment; verify that fire fighting pre-plan procedures and appropriate fire fighting techniques were used; and verify that thedirections of the fire brigade leader were thorough, clear, and effective. The inspectorsalso attended the subsequent drill critique to assess whether it was appropriately critical,included discussions of drill observations, and identified any areas requiring correctiveaction. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalificationa.Inspection ScopeResident Quarterly Observation.

The inspectors observed Active Simulator ExamScenario 16 to assess the performance of licensed operators. The exercise included aloss of condenser vacuum, loss of 6.9 kV bus, loss of a reactor coolant pump, loss ofnormal power to an essential train, an Anticipated Transient without a Scram, and a 5Enclosuresteam line break outside of containment. The inspection focused on high-risk operatoractions performed during implementation of the emergency operating procedures,emergency plan implementation and classification, and the incorporation oflessons-learned from previous plant events. Through observations of the critiqueconducted by training instructors following the exam session, the inspectors assessedwhether appropriate feedback was provided to the licensed operators regardingidentified weaknesses.b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectivenessa.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the licensee's effectiveness in performing the two followingroutine maintenance activities.

This review included an assessment of the licensee'spractices pertaining to the identification, scope, and handling of degraded equipmentconditions, as well as common cause failure evaluations and the resolution of historicalequipment problems. For those systems, structures, and components (SSCs) scoped inthe maintenance rule per 10 CFR 50.65, the inspectors verified that reliability andunavailability were properly monitored, and that 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(1) and (a)(2)classifications were justified in light of the reviewed degraded equipment condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.*Repair of a through-wall leak found on the B Train RN supply header betweenmanways #8 and #9*Repairs of the 1B Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pumpb.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluationa.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the licensee's assessments concerning the risk impact ofremoving from service those components associated with the eight emergent andplanned work items listed below.

This review primarily focused on activities determinedto be risk significant within the maintenance rule. The inspectors also assessed theadequacy of the licensee's identification and resolution of problems associated withmaintenance risk assessments and emergent work activities. The inspectors reviewedNuclear System Directive (NSD) 415, Operational Risk Management (Modes 1-3) andNSD 403, Shutdown Risk Management (Modes 4,5,6, and No Mode), for appropriateguidance to comply with 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4). Documents reviewed are listed in theAttachment.

6Enclosure*Entry and day-to-day activities related to the A Train of RN outage*Entry and day-to-day activities related to the B Train of RN outage*Schedule review and evaluation of planned/in-progress work following the discovery ofa potential RN header leak*Schedule review and evaluation of planned/in-progress work following the discovery ofa potential RN header leak between manholes #8 and #9*Schedule review and assessment of planned activities with Orange grid status due toproblems at Belews Creek Steam Station*Schedule review and assessment of planned activities on Unit 2 following the failure ofthe primary Digital Feedwater Control System controller and unexpected replacementof a pressurizer level transmitter*Review and assessment of rescheduled major Unit 2 refueling outage activities due tofailure of the Containment Closure Test*Review and assessment of rescheduled major outage activities due to maintenanceon 2B Spent Fuel Cooling Pump prior to core offload, failure of the Unit 1 Reactor TripBreaker during surveillance testing, and a turbine lube oil transfer pipe leakb.FindingsIntroduction. A Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) was identified by the inspectors forthe licensee failing to adequately assess and manage the risk pertaining to a portion ofthe maintenance activities associated with the removal of the A Train of nuclear servicewater (RN) from service for a planned 14-day outage.Description. On January 5, the A Train of nuclear service water (RN) was removed fromservice to allow for the header to be drained, inspected and refurbished due to ongoingdegradation of the piping. The removal of the A Train of RN from service resulted inother equipment and systems being rendered inoperable including the 1A and 2Aemergency diesel generators (DG). As part of the licensee amendment that granted aone-time extension of the normal 72-hour LCO allowed outage time (AOT) to 14 days,the licensee committed to implement a number of actions to manage the elevated riskcreated by this activity. These included providing temporary cooling to the DG via thefire protection system during the period the RN header was out of service and to protectequipment on the opposite train; i.e., the B Train and protecting the opposite trainequipment when one train of RN was removed from service.The A Train of RN was removed from service at approximately 2100 on January 5 andthe 1A and 2A DGs were declared inoperable at that time. Installation of the temporarycooling lines from the fire protection system to the diesel jacket water heat exchangersdid not commence until the morning of January 6, 2006 and was not workedcontinuously until completed (approximately 1300 for the 1A diesel and 1500 for the 2Adiesel). The initial efforts were directed at restoring the 1A DG; however, the 2A DGwas required for the operation of the 1A DG because the 2A DG powered the A firepump which would be required to provide cooling to the A Train DGs on a loss of offsitepower. This sequence requirement had not been identified by the licensee inscheduling the installation of the temporary cooling to the DGs prior to enter the 14-dayLCO.

7EnclosureDuring the period of time in which the two A Train DGs were unavailable, a mobile cranetraversed the roof area of the 2B DG on two occasions preparing to lift the 2A dieselroom roof hatches. While the crane movement was done in accordance with anapproved station procedure for the work on the 2A DG, the licensee did not consider thecurrent plant condition; i.e., two of four DGs inoperable with both units in an OrangeORAM/SENTINEL risk condition. In addition, while the 2B DG itself had been postedwith protected equipment signage, the roof area and support equipment such as thediesel lube oil storage tanks and the 2A/2B fire protection and carbon dioxide (CO2)headers had not been posted. As a result of not protecting these components andareas, the crane movement had the potential to render the 2B DG inoperable leavingthe station with only one operable DG in the event normal AC power was lost. OnJanuary 5, the A Train of RN was removed from service to allow for the header to bedrained, inspected and refurbished due to ongoing degradation of the piping. Theremoval of the A Train of RN from service resulted in other equipment and systemsbeing rendered inoperable including the 1A and 2A emergency DGs. As part of thelicensee amendment that granted a one-time extension of the normal 72-hour LCO AOTto 14 days, the licensee committed to provide temporary cooling to the DG via the fireprotection system during the period the RN header was out of service and to protectequipment on the opposite train; i.e., the B Train.Analysis. Aspects of this maintenance work which demonstrated inadequateassessment and management during planned maintenance on the A Train of the RNsystem increased risk included the following:The licensee's risk assessment failed to fully consider risk significant SSCs and supportsystems that were unavailable during the maintenance activities.*Restoring the DGs to available status was a commitment made as part of the licenseeamendment request submitted by the licensee. Work to restore the 1A and 2A DGs toavailable status was not initiated promptly when appropriate conditions wereestablished nor was the work performed on a continuous basis until complete. Inaddition, the correct sequence of restoring the 2 DGs (2A followed by 1A) was notimplemented. These actions would have minimized the Incremental Core DamageProbability value that resulted from this portion of the planned LCO activities.The licensee's risk assessment failed to account for the possible unavailability of asingle train of a system (primary or back-up) that provides a shutdown key safetyfunction.*The potential impact on the station's emergency AC power system due to movementof a mobile crane on the 2B DG roof in close proximity to support equipment was notconsidered in the risk assessment performed in support of the A Train RN LCOoutage schedule nor once the outage.The licensee failed to effectively implement or manage prescribed significantcompensatory measures.*As part of the license amendment request, the licensee committed to protect the 1B 8Enclosureand 2B diesel generators during the A Train LCO outage to minimize the overallstation risk exposure and developed a plan to post the equipment when the LCO wasentered. However, the roof area and adjacent support equipment was not includedwithin this protected equipment boundary and as a result, work was allowed to beperformed in close proximity to equipment which had the potential to adversely impactthe operability of the 2B DG. *Changes in work scope and activities conducted in the vicinity of the 2B DG were notcommunicated back to Operations or Engineering to ensure that the changes wereassessed in a timely manner and did not affect the overall station risk values.The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the EquipmentPerformance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected thecornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systemswhich respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences is maintained. The inspectors determined that the finding is of very low risk significance (Green),based on the resulting magnitude of the calculated Incremental Core DamageProbability (5.8E-7/day), the length of time that the two A Train diesels were unavailable(<18 hours) and that no actual loss of safety function of the 2B DG occurred. Thisfinding involved the cross-cutting aspect of human performance.Enforcement. 10 CFR65 (a)(4), "Requirements for monitoring the Effectiveness ofMaintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," requires in part, that prior to performingmaintenance activities, the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk thatmay result from the proposed maintenance activities. Contrary to the above, on January5 and 6, 2006, the licensee failed to implement the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)to adequately assess and manage the increase in risk during the execution of plannedmaintenance associated with the A Train of RN, which placed the station in an OrangeORAM risk condition, and minimize the overall risk exposure as demonstrated throughthe following:*The licensee failed to expeditiously install temporary cooling to the 1A and 2A DGs ascommitted to in the License Amendment Request (LAR) that allowed the 14-day LCOwhich resulted in unnecessary unavailability of the DGs, when the RN header wasdrained and the temporary cooling was being installed, by not starting the work assoon as conditions permitted or working the job on a continuous basis.*The licensee failed to post the roof area above the 1B and 2B DGs and adjacentsupport equipment as protected equipment as committed to in the LAR to ensure theoperability of the remaining safety-related equipment was not jeopardized.*The licensee allowed a mobile crane to traverse the roof area above the 2B DG priorto restoring the 2A DG to available status to minimize the potential impact thismovement could have on an operable piece of safety-related equipment.*The licensee failed to properly sequence the actions taken in restoring the A Traindiesel generators to available status to ensure the 2A diesel generator was returnedfirst, which was required to provide cooling to both A Train DGs in the event of aLOOP.*The licensee failed to effectively communicate the elevated risk associated withplanned work activities to station personnel to ensure that changes in work scope or 9Enclosureschedules were elevated to the appropriate personnel for review and assessment. Because this finding is of very low safety significance and has been entered into thelicensee's corrective action program as PIP C-06-0057, this violation is being treated asan NCV consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement manual (NCV05000413, 414/2006002-01, Inadequate Risk Assessment and Management Associatedwith Planned Nuclear Service Water System Maintenance).

1R14 Operator Performance During Non-Routine Plant Evolutions and Eventsa.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors observed operator performance during the shutdown of Unit 2 for therefueling outage.

The inspectors observed licensed operators' use of procedures,control room pre-evolution briefing, and plant equipment manipulations during the powerreduction, manual reactor trip, and portions of the subsequent cooldown.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluationsa.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed five operability evaluations to verify that the operability ofsystems important to safety were properly established, that the affected components orsystems remained capable of performing their intended safety function, and that nounrecognized increase in plant or public risk occurred.

Operability evaluations werereviewed for the five issues listed below. Documents reviewed are listed in theAttachment.*2B Chemical & Volume Control (NV) charging pump oil leak (PIPs C-05-7243 and C-06-0197)*Non-conservative setpoints for the reactor coolant system (NC) flow instrument loopuncertainty calculations (PIP C-06-0061)*Top left stud on 2B DG crankcase door 8R was broken during reinstallation of thecover (PIP C-06-1238)*2A DG room ventilation system damper found to have a broken weld affecting itsoperation (PIP C-06-0997)*Operability Assessment to determine past operability/reportability of the FWST to NDsuction valves when realigning from Residual Heat Removal (RHR) mode to Injectionmode while in Mode 4 (PIP C-06-0809)b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

10Enclosure1R19Post-Maintenance Testinga.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors witnessed and/or reviewed six post-maintenance testing proceduresand/or test activities, as appropriate, for selected risk significant systems to verify if: (1) testing was adequate for the maintenance performed; (2) acceptance criteria wereclear and adequately demonstrated operational readiness consistent with design andlicensing basis documents; (3) test instrumentation had current calibrations, range, andaccuracy consistent with the application; (4) tests were performed as written withapplicable prerequisites satisfied; and (5) equipment was returned to the status requiredto perform its safety function. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.*Verification of piping/flange integrity following completion of the B RN supply header14-day LCO outage involving replacement of existing piping and addition of newcross-over connections*Calibration and functional testing of B Train RN supply header annubar flowinstrumentation*Functional stroke testing of 2RN69B; B Train RN supply header isolation valve,following 14-day LCO outage work*Operational testing of the 1B/2B RN pumps following the B Train RN LCO AOT*Testing of the 1B RN pump strainer differential pressure switch followingrefurbishment of the strainer and associated instrumentation*Functional test of the 1B RN pump strainer following refurbishment

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Outage Activitiesa.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors evaluated Unit 2 refueling outage activities to verify that the licenseeconsidered risk in developing and implementing outage schedules; adhered toadministrative risk reduction methodologies developed to control plant configuration;developed mitigation strategies for losses of key safety functions; and adhered tooperating license and TS requirements that ensure defense-in-depth.

The followingspecific areas were reviewed. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.*Review of Outage Plan*Monitoring of Shutdown Activities*Licensee Control of Outage Activities*Clearance Activities*Reactor Coolant System Instrumentation*Electrical Power*Decay Heat Removal System Monitoring*Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Operation 11Enclosure*Inventory Control*Reactivity Control*Containment Closure*Reduced Inventory and Mid-Loop Conditions*Refueling Activitiesb.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testinga.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors observed and/or reviewed the six surveillance tests listed below to verifythat TS surveillance requirements and/or Select Licensee Commitment requirementswere properly complied with, and that test acceptance criteria were properly specified. The inspectors verified that proper test conditions were established as specified in theprocedures, that no equipment preconditioning activities occurred, and that acceptancecriteria had been met.

Additionally, the inspectors also verified that equipment wasproperly returned to service and that proper testing was specified and conducted toensure that the equipment could perform its intended safety function followingmaintenance or as part of surveillance testing. Documents reviewed are listed in theAttachment.Surveillance Tests*Flow balance of the A Train of RN following completion of the 14-day LCO AOT*1RN-28A; 1A RN pump discharge isolation valve, inservice test*2A DG EQC System Time Delay and Undervoltage Relay CalibrationIn-Service Tests*Quarterly In-Service Test for motor operated valve 1RN-63A; RN header A return toStandby Nuclear Service Water Pond Ice Condenser Surveillance Tests*MP/0/7/7150/006, Ice Condenser Lower Inlet Doors Inspection and Testing (AsFound), Rev. 24*MP/0/A/7150/005; Ice Basket Weight Determination (Unit 2, Bay 4, Baskets 6-9, 7-9,8-9 and 9-9); Rev. 24b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

12Enclosure1R23Temporary Plant Modificationsa.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the following two temporary plant modifications to determinewhether the individual modification was properly installed; the modification did not affectsystem operability, drawings and procedures were appropriately updated; and post-modification testing was satisfactorily performed. Documents reviewed are listed in theAttachment. *Installation of temporary cooling to the lube oil heat exchanger and air compressoraftercoolers on the 1A and 2A DGs in support for the 14-day A Train RN outage.*Bypassing the non-essential chiller trips on the B Train control room area (YC) chillerin support for the 14-day A Train RN outage.b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness1EP6Drill EvaluationaInspection ScopeThe inspectors observed and evaluated the licensee's performance in the Control Roomsimulator and in the Technical Support Center during an emergency drill conducted onMarch 2. The NRC's assessment focused on the timeliness and location ofclassification, development of notification and protective action recommendations, andthe licensee's expectations of response. The performance of the emergency responseorganization was evaluated against applicable licensee procedures and regulatoryrequirements. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique of the drill to evaluatethe licensee's self-assessment process for identifying deficiencies related to individualand overall performance during the emergency drill. The inspectors assessed the drillfor weaknesses and deficiencies in performance of classification and notificationrequirements.b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.

13Enclosure4.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems.1Daily ReviewAs required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems," andin order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issuesfor follow-up, the inspectors performed screening of items entered into the licensee'scorrective action program. This was accomplished by reviewing copies of PIPs, attendingsome daily screening meetings, and accessing the licensee's computerized database.

.2 Annual Sample Reviewa.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors selected PIPs C-05-6471 and C-05-7516 for detailed review.

Bothinvolved increased outboard pump bearing temperatures on the 1B Spent Fuel Coolingpump. These PIPs were reviewed to determine whether the full extent of the issueswere identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate correctiveactions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the PIPs against therequirements of the licensee's corrective action program document and 10 CFR 50,Appendix B. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.b. Findings and ObservationsNo findings of significance were identified.4OA5Other Activities.1(Closed) URI 05000414/2004007-03: Derating Selected Emergency Lighting Units Requiredfor Post-Fire Safe Shutdowna.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors preformed an in-office review of the documents listed in the Attachmentto determine if the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown (SSD) was adverselyaffected.b.FindingsIntroduction. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of CNS operating LicenseCondition 2.C.5, Fire Protection Program. The licensee made a change to the approvedFPP which had the potential to affect post-fire safe shutdown capability. Specifically,the licensee derated the time requirement for 43 battery-powered ELUs from 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. The licensee's evaluation for this change did not adequately demonstratethat the change would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain SSD in theevent of a loss of power to normal lighting during a fire.

14EnclosureDescription. The licensee derated the time requirement for 43 battery-powered ELUsfrom 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> by minor modification CE-70695. These ELUs were creditedfor illumination of access/egress pathways or equipment for local manual operatoractions associated with alternative shutdown. This change to the FPP was notconsistent with the licensing basis, which stated that 8-hour battery-powered emergencylights would be provided. The justification for derating selected ELUs credited for post-fire SSD was provided in calculation CNC-1435.00-00-0018. The calculation stated thatderating selected SSD ELUs was acceptable because access, operator activities, andegress could occur well within 30 minutes. However, as discussed in NRC InspectionReport 05000413, 05000414/2004007, the abnormal procedures in effect at the time ofthat inspection may not have activated the standby shutdown facility (SSF) within the30-minute or 1.5-hour timeframes for fire events which may require activation of theSSF. Instead, the procedures directed operators to remain in the control room until itbecame uninhabitable or became incapable of maintaining primary or secondaryinventory. Then the procedures directed operators to go to the alternate shutdownpanel, in a lower level of the auxiliary building, and remain there until the controls therewere determined to be inadequate to maintain safe plant conditions. Only then didabnormal procedures direct operators to activate the SSF. The delays in activating theSSF were not addressed in Calculation CNC-1435.00-00-0018 nor the 10 CFR 50.59safety evaluation performed for minor modification CE-70695 and the associatedUpdated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) revision for this change.Analysis. This finding is more than minor because it had the potential to impact thelicensee's post-fire safe shutdown capability by delaying operator response in the eventof a loss of power to normal lighting during a fire. Access, operator activities, andegress may occur at later times than assumed in the calculation for the derated ELUs. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the inspectorsdetermined that operators would likely be able to accomplish the actions with the use offlashlights.Enforcement. Operating License Condition 2.C.5 requires that the licensee implementand maintain in effect all provisions of the approved FPP, as described in the UFSAR,as amended, for the facility and as approved in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER)through Supplement 5. Branch Technical Position (BTP) CMEB 9.5-1, whichincorporated the guidance of Appendix A to BTP ASB 9.5-1 and the technicalrequirements of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, established the regulatory and licensingrequirements for the FPP at CNS. The CNS FPP was reviewed against and approvedfor conformance with BTP CMEB 9.5-1 in the SER through Supplement 5. BTP CMEB9.5-1, Item C.5.g.(1), states, in part, that lighting is vital to safe shutdown andemergency response in the event of fire. In addition, fixed self-contained lightingconsisting of fluorescent or sealed-beam units with individual 8-hour minimum battery-power supplies be provided in areas that must be manned for safe shutdown and foraccess and egress routes to and from all fire areas.Contrary to the above, on June 25, 2004, the inspectors identified that the licensee'sevaluations failed to ensure that the derating of selected ELUs from 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to 1.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />swould not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the eventof a loss of power to normal lighting during a fire. Procedural delays for activating the 15EnclosureSSF were not addressed in either Calculation CNC-1435.00-00-0018 or the10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation performed for minor modification CE-70695. Access,operator activities, and egress may occur at times later than the 30 minutes or 1.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />sassumed in the calculation for the derated ELUs. This condition has existed since May2001. The licensee documented this violation in the corrective action program as PIPC-04-04276. The emergency light testing procedure, IP/0/B/3540/002, was changedfrom the 1.5-hour test period back to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. In addition, CNS also retested thederated ELUs for compliance with the 8-hour requirement. Twenty-three of the 43 ELUsprovided less than the minimum 8-hour lighting requirement. The licensee replaced thebatteries for the 23 ELUs. Because of the very low safety significance and the licenseehas entered this violation into their corrective action program, this violation is beingtreated as an NCV, consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and isidentified as NCV 05000414/2006002-02, Derating Selected Emergency Lighting UnitsRequired for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown.4OA6Meetings.1Exit Meeting Summary On April 12, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. D. Jamil andother members of licensee management, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectorsconfirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspectionperiod..2Annual Assessment Meeting SummaryOn April 26, the NRC's Acting Chief of Reactor Projects Branch 1 and the ResidentInspectors assigned to the CNS met with Duke Energy Corporation to discuss the NRC'sROP and the NRC's annual assessment of CNS safety performance for the period ofJanuary 1, 2005 - December 31, 2005. The major topics addressed were: the NRC'sassessment program and the results of the CNS assessment. This meeting was open to thepublic. A listing of meeting attendees and information presented during the meeting areavailable from the NRC's document system (ADAMS) as accession number ML061170325. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

K. Adams, Human Performance Manager

E. Beadle, Emergency Planning Manager

S. Beagles, Chemistry Manager

W. Byers, Security Manager

J. Ferguson, Safety Assurance Manager

J. Foster, Radiation Protection Manager

W. Green, Reactor and Electrical Systems Manager

G. Hamrick, Mechanical, Civil Engineering Manager

D. Jamil, Catawba Site Vice President

R. Hart, Regulatory Compliance Manager

A. Lindsay, Training Manager

J. Pitesa, Station Manager

L. Reed, Modifications Engineering Manager

R. Repko, Engineering Manager

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Open and

Closed

05000413,414/2006002-01 NCV Inadequate Risk Assessment and ManagementAssociated With Planned Nuclear Service Water SystemMaintenance (Section 1R13)

05000414/FIN-2006002-02NCVDerating Selected Emergency Lighting Units Required forPost-Fire Safe Shutdown (Section 4OA5.1)

Closed

05000413,414/2006002-01 NCV Inadequate Risk Assessment and ManagementAssociated With Planned Nuclear Service Water SystemMaintenance (Section 1R13)

05000414/FIN-2006002-02NCVDerating Selected Emergency Lighting Units Required forPost-Fire Safe Shutdown (Section 4OA5.1)

Section 1R04: Equipment AlignmentOP/1/A/6400/005, Rev. 102; Component Cooling SystemSection 1R05:

Fire ProtectionPre-Fire Plan for Fire Strategy Area 2; Auxiliary Building 543 foot elevation; Rooms 260 and

260APre-Fire Plan for Fire Strategy Area 21; Auxiliary Building 594 foot elevation, Room 573Pre-Fire Plan for Fire Strategy Area 51; Exterior DoghousePre-Fire Plan for Fire Strategy Area 18; Auxiliary Building 577 foot elevationPre-Fire Plan for Fire Strategy Area 6; Auxiliary Building 560 foot elevation, Room 370Pre-Fire Plan for Fire Strategy Area 4; Auxiliary Building 543 foot elevation, Rooms 200 - 248Pre-Fire Plan for Fire Strategy Area 30; RN Pump StructureCatawba Nuclear Station Fire Drill Scenario 2005-5

A-2AttachmentAttachmentCatawba Nuclear Station Fire Strategy M, Unit #1 Turbine Building, Elevation 594'Nuclear System Directive 112; Fire Brigade Organization, Training and Responsibilities, Rev. 7PIP C-05-0807; Fire brigade scenarios were conducted with insufficient number of evaluators/controllers to ensure adequacy of responders performance

Section 1R12: Maintenance EffectivenessMinor Modification

CD500832; Repairs of RN underground supply header leak identified on2/22/06Minor Modification VN CD500832A; Repairs of second RN underground supply header leakidentified on 2/23/06PIP C-06-1265; Unplanned Tech Spec entry -

RN 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO due to underground leak in theB train RN supply headerPIP C-05-6471, 1B Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump outboard bearing temperature in Hi alarmPIP C-05-7516, 1B KF Pump outboard pump bearing temperature rose rapidlyPIP C-06-0798, 1B KF Pump rubbed during alignment and would not rotate freely due toimproper radial centering following rebuilding pumpPIP C-06-1583, KF Pump 2A operational parameters are not as good as prior to rebuildingpumpPIP C-06-1618, The KF system is Maintenance Rule status A1 based on a Repeat MaintenancePreventable Functional Failure of 1B pump

Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work EvaluationA Train of

RN outage scheduleB Train of RN outage scheduleDaily work control center scheduled work activities during the A Train RN outageDaily work control center scheduled work activities during the B Train RN outageEmerging Issue Training Package for the Nuclear Service Water System 14 Day LCOModification Work, Rev.

022006 LCO Readiness Review Matrix dated 12/30/05SWP Readiness Assessment dated 01/03/06Open Items List for the RN LCO dated 12/30/05Critical Evolution Plan for the 1A, 2A, 1B and 2B DG RN piping replacement, Rev. 1Critical Evolution Plan for A & B train RN modification CD500175; 1(2)RN67A and 1(2)RN69Bvalve replacement, Rev. 1SOER 91-01 Infrequently Performed Tests / Evolution Plan for the A and B RN train LCO AOTCritical Evolution Plan for Modification CD500063, addition of isolation valves and spools in RNdischarge headerCritical Evolution Plan for the A & B train RN supply header clean and coat projectCritical Evolution Plan for RN pump house LCO work on train A and B, Rev. 3Critical Evolution Plan for A train RN return header modification, Rev. 1PIP C-05-7587; Corrective actions from the SRG Independent Assessment Team Readinessreview of the

RN 14 day AOT windowsB Train RN AOT Readiness Action Register, dated 01/25/06Catawba RN Outage NOED evaluation risk matrixCNC-1535.00-00-0025; Section 9.7, 14 day LCO assuming backup YD cooling limitationsPIP C-06-1221; Inspect / repair potential RN header leakWork Week 8 schedule (changes made following identification of potential RN header leak)

A-3AttachmentAttachmentUnit Threat Team reports associated with the underground leak on the RN headerMP/0/A/7300/027, Mobile Crane Operations Over Safety Related Structures, Systems orComponents, Rev. 002 MP/0/A/7400/056; Diesel Room Equipment Hatch Covers Removal and Replacement, Rev. 010 Service Water Project A Train Extended LCO Hi Level scheduleCatawba Nuclear Station Calculation 1139.13-02-0001, Crane loading analysis of the dieselgenerator building roofs, Rev. 32Work Order

WO 98714306, Task 41, Remove and replace DG 1A roof hatchWork Order

WO 98709781, Task 36,

Remove and replace DG 2A roof hatchCatawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Issuance of License Amendments to allow on a one-time basis, the removal of a nuclear service water supply header from service for 14 days forsystem upgrades, dated November 17, 2005NSD 213; Risk Management Process, Rev. 06NSD 415; Operational Risk Management; Rev. 03OMP 2-18; Equipment Protection and Quarantine, Rev. 066

==Section 1R15: Operability EvaluationsWR

98367994; Inspect and repair diesel generator damper 2DSF==

DCNS-1579.VD-00-0001, Diesel Building Ventilation Design Basis DocumentWO

98721416; Perform inspection of damper and hydramotor on 2VD DA DSFD01OAC traces for 2A diesel room ambient temperatures and outside air temperatures for dieselrun datesDesign Basis Specification

CNS-1579.VD-00-001; Diesel Building Ventilation System, Rev. 15PIP C-06-1762; Return air dampers on the 2A DG rom ventilation system found to have gapswhen the dampers were required to be fully closedPIP C-06-1762, Document results of extent of condition inspection performed on VD systemdampers

Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance TestingMP/0/A/7650/088; Controlling procedure for systems pressure testing of

ASME Section XI DukeClass A, B and C systems and components; Rev. 031Modification Test Plan for Engineering Change CD500175; Unit 2 RN Train BModification Test Plan for Engineering Change CD500062; Rev. 3TT/0/A/9100/100; Nuclear Service Water pump annubar calibration; Rev. 01Emerson Process Management / Dietrich Standard field calibration report for the CatawbaNuclear Station annubar 1RNFE7510, 7520 and 2RNFE7510, 7520CNR-1210.06-00-0002, Technical Requirements for RN pump discharge flow elements1/2RNFE7510, 7520; Rev. 0WO

98709787, Task 23; Perform functional test of 2RN069B under CD500174PT/0/A/4400/022B; Nuclear Service Water Pump Train B Performance Test, Rev. 65, changesA and BPT/0/A/4400/008B; RN Flow balance, Train B, Rev. 44IP/0/A/3112/002; Calibration procedure for RN system time delay relays and strainer pressureswitches; Rev. 27IP/0/A/3816/010; Barton model 580 and 581 DP switch calibration; Rev. 27WO

98755026; Task 42, Calibrate RN pump strainer DP switchWO

98755026; Task 28; Functionally test the 1B RN pump strainer during functional test of the

A-4AttachmentAttachment1B RN pumpModification Package CD500062; Installation and testing of RN system components

Section 1R20: Refueling OutagePIP

C-06-1876; PIP documenting the results of the Unit 2 Mode 3 Inside Containment Boric

Acid Check for 2EOC14PIP C-06-1873; PIP documenting the loss of reactor coolant pump oil during the Mode 3 walkdownPIP C-06-1890; Main Steam Isolation Valve 2SM-005 failed to fully close when the close pushbutton was depressedWestinghouse presentation on presence of whiskers on new fuel received for 2EOC14PIP C-06-2062; 2B KF pump outboard seal failure requiring seal replacement prior to core offloadPIP C-06-1959; Critique comments on the Unit 2 cooldown from Mode 3 to Mode 5PIP C-06-2035; Three incorrect baskets in the ice condenser were emptied due to expired data sheets being left in the ice condenser work bookCN-06-006, 2EOC-14-IRT Outage Risk AssessmentSite Directive 3.1.30, Unit Shutdown Configuration Control (Modes 4,5,6 or No Mode), Rev. 32,

NSD 403, Shutdown Risk Management (Modes 4, 5, 6 or No Mode), Rev. 14, tagouts 05-2685, 2686, 2692 and 2693PT/2/A/4150/001H, Inside Containment Boric Acid CheckPT/2/A/4350/003, Electrical Power Source Alignment Verification, Rev. 44.PT/2/A/4200/002C, Containment Closure Verification (Part I); Rev. 62PT/2/A/4200/002I, Containment Closure Verification (Part II); Rev. 34PT/2/A/4200/002J, Containment Closure Verification Penetration Status Change; Rev. 12PT/0/A/4150/037, Fuel/Component Movement Accounting; Rev. 6PT/2/A/4550/001C, Refueling Communications Test; Rev. 15PT/0/A/4150/017, Total Core Unloading; Rev. 32PT/0/A/4150/017, Total Core Unloading Tailgate Briefing; Rev. PT/2/A/4550/001D; Reactor Building Manipulator Crane Load test; Rev. 12PT/2/A/4550/001E; Spent Fuel Building Manipulator Crane Load test; Rev. 7Enclosure 4.2, Decreasing the NC System Level;Enclosure 4.10, Requirements for Operation with the NC System Level Below 16%OP/2/A/6150/006, Draining The Reactor Coolant System, Rev. 68OP/2/A/6200/005, Spent Fuel Cooling System, Rev. 61OP/0/A/6100/014, Penetration Control for Modes 5 and 6; Rev. 28OP/1/A/6550/015; Receipt, Inspection and Storage of New Fuel, Rev. 30OP/2/A/6550/006, Transferring Fuel with the Spent Fuel Manipulator Crane Rev. 49OP/2/A/6550/007, Reactor Building Manipulator Crane Operation; Rev. 24OP/2/A/6550/008, Fuel Transfer System Operation; Rev. 9 MP/0/B/7150/012, Refueling Canal Cleanliness; Rev. 6

Section 1R22: Surveillance TestingPT/0/A/4200/013;

RN Shared Valves Inservice Test; Enclosure 13.11; 1RN-63A Valve InserviceTest; Rev. 27PT/0/A/4400/008A, RN Flow Balance Train A; Rev. 49PT/1/A/4200/013C; RN Valve Inservice Test (Quarterly), Rev. 65IP/2/A/3680/008A; DG 2A EQC Sys. Time Delay and Undervoltage Relay Calibration; Rev. 004Complex Evolution Plan associated with the 2A DG PM work, dated 2/7/06PIP C-06-487; Retest on valve 1RN-28A required following rework of the component

A-5AttachmentAttachmentMP/0/A/7150/006, Ice Condenser Lower Inlet Doors Inspection and Testing, Rev. 24

Section 1R23: Temporary Plant ModificationsPIP

C-06-0460; Temporarily raise the upper operability limit on the YC chillers to 220FDesign Change CD500733; Block the non-essential A and B YC Chiller TripsMinor Modification CD500308; Provide temporary cooling to the 1A and 2A diesel generators insupport of the A train RN LCOMinor Modification CD500309; Provide temporary cooling to the 1B and 2B diesel generators insupport of the B train RN LCOOMP 2-31, Attachment 8.2; Increased surveillance sheet for monitoring the YC chiller duringthe 14 day LCO with several trips bypassedYC chiller alarm response table for safety trips in override - dated 01/02/06AP/1/A/5500/007; Enclosure 35, DG 1A local start during the 14 day LCO, Rev 47AP/1/A/5500/007; Enclosure 36, DG 1A local start during the 14 day LCO, Rev 47AP/2/A/5500/007; Enclosure 36, DG 2A local start during the 14 day LCO, Rev 46AP/2/A/5500/007; Enclosure 37, DG 2A local start during the 14 day LCO, Rev 46CNC-1535.00-00-0025; Section 9.7, 14 day LCO assuming backup YD cooling limitations

Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and ResolutionPIP

C-06-1583, KF Pump 2A operational parameters are not as good as prior to rebuilding pumpPIP C-02-968, Elevated bearing oil temperatures on Unit 2B KF pumpPIP C-04-537, Discovered 2B KF pump IB pump bearing oil bubbler emptyPIP C-04-567, 2B KF pump inboard bearing oil bubbler emptyPIP C-04-858, KF pump bearing house needs to be ventedPIP 03-1394, The 1A KF motor inboard was found to be rubbed in axial directionPIP 04-3950, 2A KF pump high inboard motor bearing temperature

Section 4OA5: Other ActivitiesAP/0/A/5500/045, Plant Fire, Rev. 002IP/0/B/3540/002, Emergency Battery Lighting (ELD) Periodic Maintenance and Testing, Rev.32CNC-1435.00-00-0018, Evaluation of Battery Powered Emergency Lights, Rev. 1PIP

C-04-04276, URI discussed in the TFPI - Catawba inspection issueUFSAR Chapter 9.5.1, Fire Protection, dated 3/27/2003W.O.

98705970-01 Emergency Battery Lighting (ELD) Periodic Maintenance, 12-07-04.