IR 05000317/2007002
Download: ML071270730
Text
May 7, 2007
Mr. James A. Spina, Vice PresidentCalvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc.
Constellation Generation Group, LLC 1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway Lusby, Maryland 20657-4702
SUBJECT: CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATEDINSPECTION REPORT 05000317/2007002 AND 05000318/2007002
Dear Mr. Spina:
On March 31, 2007, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspectionat Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 19, 2007, with Mr. Joseph Pollock and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.This report documents two NRC-identified findings and one self-revealing finding of very lowsafety significance (Green). Two of these findings were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and because these issues have been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCV in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of 2J. SpinaNRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website athttp://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/Blake D. Welling, Acting Chief Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.50-317, 50-318License Nos. DPR-53, DPR-69
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000317/2007002 and 05000318/2007002 w/
Attachment:
Supplemental Information cc w/encl:M. J. Wallace, President, Constellation Generation J. M. Heffley, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer President, Calvert County Board of Commissioners C. W. Fleming, Senior Counsel, Constellation Generation Group, LLC J. Gaines, Director, Licensing Director, Nuclear Regulatory Matters R. McLean, Manager, Nuclear Programs K. Burger, Esquire, Maryland People's Counsel P. Birnie, Esquire, Co-Director, Maryland Safe Energy Coalition R. Hickok, NRC Technical Training Center G. Aburn, SLO (2)
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
..................................................-iii-
REPORT DETAILS
..........................................................1
REACTOR SAFETY
.........................................................11R02Evaluation of Changes, Tests, or Experiments .........................11R04Equipment Alignment.............................................2
1R05 Fire Protection .................................................2
1R08 Inservice Inspection (ISI)
.........................................3
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program ...........................5
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness ........................................61R13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control..............71R15Operability Evaluations ...........................................81R17Permanent Plant Modifications ....................................111R19Post-Maintenance Testing .......................................111R20Refueling and Outage Activities ...................................121R22Surveillance Testing.............................................12
1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications
RADIATION SAFETY
.......................................................132OS1Access Control To Radiologically Significant Areas ....................13 2OS2ALARA Planning and Controls ....................................152OS3Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
...................................................174OA1Performance Indicator (PI) Verification .............................17 4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems ............................184OA3Event Followup ................................................18 4OA5Other Activities.................................................23 4OA6Meetings, Including Exit..........................................28ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
................................................A-1
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED...........................A-2
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
..........................................A-3
LIST OF ACRONYMS
.....................................................A-14
-iii-SUMMARY
- OF [[]]
FINDINGSIR 05000317/2007002, 05000318/2007002; 01/1/2007 - 3/31/2007; Calvert Cliffs NuclearPower Plant, Units 1 and 2; Operability Evaluations and Event Followup. The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announcedinspections performed by regional inspectors. Three Green findings were identified, two of
which were determined to be non-cited violations (NCVs). The significance of most findings is
indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC)
0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply
may be Green or be assigned a severity level after
NRC's
program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing FindingsCornerstone: Mitigating Systems* Green. The inspectors identified a finding for Constellation's failure to taketimely action to evaluate and correct adverse conditions associated with the
station blackout (SBO) diesel generator. During a February 14, 2007 operational
performance evaluation, the SBO diesel experienced high crankcase pressure, a
high lube oil filter fouling rate, and glycol in the lube oil. Constellation inspected
the diesel engine and identified that the head of the A4 cylinder of the SBO
diesel 0C2 engine was cracked. The inspectors determined that similar
symptoms existed during a January 14, 2007 performance evaluation; however,
the degraded conditions were not adequately evaluated and corrected in a timely
manner as specified by the augmented quality assurance program for the SBO
diesel. Constellation replaced the cracked cylinder head and entered the
deficiency into the corrective action program for resolution. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the equipmentperformance attribute of the Mitigating System cornerstone. The finding
represented an actual loss of safety function of one non-technical specification
train of equipment and based on a SDP Phase 3 analysis, the finding was of low
safety significance (Green). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area
of problem identification and resolution because Constellation did not properly
prioritize and evaluate conditions adverse to quality. (Section 1R15)*Green. A self-revealing NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a occurredbecause Constellation did not adequately implement foreign material exclusion
(FME) procedures and controls to prevent debris from entering a fuel assembly
guide tube while in the spent fuel pool (SFP). This was the most likely issue to
cause a control element assembly (CEA) to bind and become inoperable
(untrippable). Constellation submitted a licensee event report (LER) and entered
this issue into their corrective action program for resolution.
-iv-This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the humanperformance attribute of the Mitigating System cornerstone and it affected the
reliability of the reactivity control system. The inspectors evaluated this finding
using Phase I of IMC 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination of Reactor
Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations," and determined it to be of very low
safety significance because it was not a qualification deficiency; it did not
represent a loss of safety function for a train or system; and it was not risk
significant due to external event initiators. The inspectors determined that this
finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because
Constellation did not define and effectively communicate expectations regarding
following
OA3.2)*Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of TechnicalSpecification (TS) 3.3.1, because Constellation did not recognize that one or
more channels of the high rate-of-change (startup rate) trip function did not meet
TS requirements following the completion of linear power channel calibration
surveillances on several occasions over a three year period. Constellation
discovered this issue during a reduction of power to perform maintenance on the
Unit 2 voltage regulator drawers. The inspectors identified additional
discrepancies related to this finding, thereby adding value. Constellation
submitted a licensee event report (LER) and entered this issue into the corrective
action program for resolution. The finding is more than minor because the reliability of the reactor protectionsystem was reduced with one or more channels of the startup rate trip function
inoperable. This finding is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the
Mitigating System cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure
the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating
events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors evaluated this
finding using Phase I of IMC 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination of
Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations," and determined it to be of
very low safety significance because it was not a qualification deficiency; it did
not represent a loss of safety function for a train or system; and it was not risk
significant due to external event initiators. This finding has a cross-cutting
aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution because Constellation
did not take actions to address safety issues in a timely manner, commensurate
with their significance. (Section 4OA3.5)B.Licensee-Identified ViolationsNone
EnclosureREPORT
- DETAIL [[]]
SSummary of Plant StatusCalvert Cliffs Unit 1 (Unit 1) began the inspection period at 100 percent power. OnJanuary 31, 2007, reactor power was reduced to less than 10 percent, due to a steam leak on
the high pressure turbine exhaust piping of the 12 moisture separator reheater (MSR). On
February 2, 2007, following piping repair activities, reactor power was increased to 100 percent,
where it remained unchanged for the rest of the inspection period. Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 (Unit 2) began the inspection period at 100 percent power. OnFebruary 4, 2007, Unit 2 began its end of cycle power reduction to support a scheduled
refueling outage (RFO). Constellation commenced a reactor shutdown on February 25, 2007,
to begin the
- SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity1R02Evaluation of Changes, Tests, or Experiments (71111.02 - 1 sample) aInspection ScopeUnit 2 Replacement Reactor Vessel Closure Head (
- 2 RRV [[]]
CH is similar to
the original Unit
- 2 RV [[]]
CH except for the replacement of the Alloy 600 penetration tube
material and Alloy 600 weld material with a new and improved primary water stress
corrosion cracking (PWSCC) resistant material Alloy 690. The inspectors reviewed the
material compatibility, functional properties, environmental and seismic qualification, and
the
RRVCH;
control element drive mechanisms (CEDMs); thimble support plate (TSP); and,
enhanced service structure (ESS).The inspectors reviewed the associated
- 10 CFR 50.59 screening/evaluations to verifythat changes between the original reactor vessel closure head (
- RRV [[]]
CH,
and modifications to structures, systems, and components resulting from installation of
the
CFR 50.59.The inspectors reviewed the design specifications for the replacement components andevaluations of applicability determination and screening questions for each design
change to determine, for each change, whether a 10 CFR 50.59 had been screened out
or performed, and the justification for each. The inspectors reviewed the certified
design report for the Unit
- 2 RRV [[]]
CH to verify the component was designed and analyzed
in accordance with the applicable requirements of the American Society of Mechanical
Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section III, Division 1, 1995Edition, 1996 Addenda.
2EnclosureThe inspectors also reviewed various
- AS [[]]
ME Boiler Pressure
Vessel Code, Section
III, 1998 Edition through the 2000 Addenda requirements. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R04Equipment AlignmentPartial Walkdown (71111.04Q - 4 Samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors verified that selected equipment trains of safety-related and risksignificant systems were properly aligned. The inspectors reviewed plant documents to
determine the correct system and power alignments, as well as the required positions of
critical valves and breakers. The inspectors verified that the licensee had properly
identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events
or potentially impact the availability of associated mitigating systems. The applicable
documents used for this inspection are located in the attachment to this report. The
inspectors performed a partial walkdown for the following four systems:*12 emergency core cooling system (ECCS) train due to maintenance on the
- EDG ) safety related heating ventilation airconditioning (HVAC) system following maintenance;*12 low pressure safety injection (LPSI) train due to failed
- 11 LP [[]]
SI train valvestroke test; and*Unit 2 containment penetrations due to containment closure verification activities. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R05Fire Protection (71111.05).1Quarterly Sample Review (71111.05Q - 9 Samples) a.Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted a tour of accessible portions of the nine areas listed below to
assess the licensee's control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire
detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and related compensatory
measures when required. The inspectors assessed the material condition of fire
protection suppression and detection equipment to determine whether any conditions or
deficiencies existed which could impair the availability of that equipment. The
3Enclosuredocuments reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment to this report. The nine areas are as follows:*Unit 1 No.
EDG room, Fire Area 28, Room 416;
- Unit 2 intake structure (IS), Fire Area IS, Intake Room;
- Unit 1 turbine building, 12' eIevation Fire Area TB, Room 601/607;
- Unit 1 main plant exhaust & equipment room, Fire Area 11, Room 524;
- Unit 2 main plant exhaust & equipment room, Fire Area 11, Room 526;
- Unit 2 containment (Cnmt), Fire Area
- CN [[]]
MT, Room 229;
- Unit 2 west electrical penetration room, 45' elevation, Fire Area 38, Room 532;and*Unit 2 east electrical penetration room, 45' elevation, Fire Area 26, Room 409. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..2Fire Brigade Observations (71111.05A - 1 Sample) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors observed the fire brigade on January 31, 2007, following a report of aminor fire in motor control center (MCC) 101-AT located on the 27 foot elevation of the
turbine building. The inspectors observed the verification of the fire and initiation of
response, including identification of the fire location, dispatching the fire brigade, and
sounding alarms. Once the fire brigade responded to the location, the inspectors
observed the fire brigade leader performing an assessment of the fire, communicating
with team members and the control room supervisor. The documents reviewed during
this inspection are listed in the attachment to this report. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R08Inservice Inspection (ISI) (71111.08 - 5 Samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe purpose of this inspection was to assess the effectiveness of the licensee's ISIprogram for monitoring degradation of the reactor coolant system boundary, risk
significant piping system boundaries, and the containment boundary. The inspectors
assessed the
ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code, Section
- NRC Regulatory Requirements. The inspectors selected a sample of nondestructive examination (NDE) activities forreview and evaluation for compliance with the requirements of
XI. Also,
4Enclosurethe inspectors selected samples of activities associated with the repair and replacementof safety related pressure boundary components. The sample selection was based on
the inspection procedure objectives, risk significance, and availability. Specifically, the
inspectors focused on components and systems where degradation would result in a
significant increase in risk of core damage. The inspectors reviewed examination
procedures, personnel qualifications, and test results. This sample includes the review
of nondestructive tests performed on dissimilar metal welds that were direct attachments
to the pressurizer. The inspectors reviewed a sample of examination reports and
condition reports (CR) initiated during ISI examinations to evaluate the licensee's
effectiveness in the identification and resolution of problems.The inspectors performed a review of nondestructive test results of a sample ofdissimilar metal welds made to the pressurizer. The welds selected were subjected to
the mechanical stress improvement process (MSIP) which was used to enhance weld
resistance to cracking. The inspectors reviewed the
- MS [[]]
IP application procedure,
equipment qualification and personnel qualifications for application of the process. The
inspectors reviewed results of examinations performed on the welds both before and
after application of the process.The inspectors reviewed the procedures used to perform visual examinations forindications of boric acid leaks from pressure retaining components including
- CE [[]]
connections above the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head. The inspectors reviewed a
sample of CRs initiated as a result of the inspections performed in accordance with the
licensee's boric acid control program. The inspectors selected CRs that identified
evidence of both active and inactive leak locations which could result in degradation of
safety significant components. The inspectors reviewed five CRs which identified active
and inactive leaks identified through plant walkdowns performed during the plant
shutdown. The inspectors reviewed operability evaluations and corrective actions
provided in the CR and determined that the actions specified were consistent with the
requirements of the
CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.Steam generator tube inspection was not performed this outage. The currentgenerators were installed in 2003 and tube baseline inspection performed in 2005. The
next Unit 2 steam generator tube inspection is scheduled to be performed in 2009. The inspectors performed a documentation review of five nondestructive examinationswhich included volumetric and surface examinations:* Ultrasonic Test (UT), Volumetric Examination, Surge Line to #21
PSL-13, Safe end to Nozzle Weld;
SR-2005-1, Safe End to Nozzle Weld;* Magnetic Particle Test (MT), Surface Examination, Pressurizer Lower Head to Support (Skirt), Weld C69-PZR, Circumferential Attachment Weld;* Liquid Penetrant Test (PT), Surface Examination, Valve 2-CV-100E-2 Upper Body Weld; and
5Enclosure*Visual Examination (VT), Visual Examination of General Mechanical and Structural Condition of Component Support # HB23-2157-R1.The inspectors reviewed repair/replacement activities as follows:
The inspector reviewed documentation of two maintenance work orders (MaintenanceWork Order 2200303715 for use on steam generator #21 and 2200303716 for use on
steam generator #22) for repair and replacement activity which involved welding on an
- AS [[]]
XI repair/replacement plan. The activity included the replacement of a
portion of the steam generator feed water supply piping and the weld build up repair of
an internal portion of check valve
Section XI plan, piping replacement material, weld procedure specifications and
qualifications, welder qualifications, weld filler metals, specified non-destructive tests,acceptance criteria and post work testing. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R11Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q - 1 Sample) a.Inspection ScopeOn February 13, 2007, the inspectors observed licensed operator requalification trainingfor shutdown scenarios to assess operator performance and the adequacy of the
licensed operator training program. The shutdown scenarios involved a shutdown to
twenty percent of reactor power, cooldown and depressurization of the reactor coolant
system (RCS), entry into reduced inventory, and lower mode operations with a variety of
malfunctions. The inspectors focused on high-risk operator actions performed during
implementation of shutdown operating procedures, entry into abnormal operating
procedures (AOP), and classification of the events related to loss of RCS inventory and
shutdown cooling (SDC) issues. The inspectors evaluated the clarity and formality of
communications, the completion of appropriate actions in response to alarms, the
performance of timely control board operations and manipulations, and the oversight
and direction provided by the shift manager. Documents reviewed are listed in the
attachment to this report.
b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
6Enclosure1R12Maintenance Effectiveness .1Quarterly Review (71111.12Q - 3 Samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the three samples listed below for items such as: (1) appropriate work practices; (2) identifying and addressing common cause failures;
(3) scoping in accordance with
MR);
(4) characterizing reliability issues for performance; (5) trending key parameters for
condition monitoring; (6) charging unavailability for performance; (7) classification and
reclassification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2); and
(8) appropriateness of performance criteria for structures, systems, and components
(SSCs) classified as (a)(2) and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and
corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1). Documents reviewed are listed in the
attachment to this report.*1A
SBO diesel generator cylinder head cracked; and
- Unit 2 main steam safety valves (MSSV). b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..2Triennial Review (71111.12B - 6 Samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspector conducted a review of Constellation's periodic evaluation ofimplementation of the Maintenance Rule as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3). The
evaluation covered a period from October 2004 to September 2006 at Calvert Cliffs.
The purpose of this review was to ensure that Constellation established appropriate
goals, and effectively assessed system performance and preventive maintenance
activities. The inspectors verified that the evaluation was completed within the required
time period and that industry operating experience (OE) was utilized, where applicable.
Additionally, the inspectors verified that Constellation appropriately balanced equipment
reliability and availability and made adjustments when appropriate.The inspectors selected a sample of six risk-significant systems to verify that: (1) thestructures, systems, and components were properly characterized, (2) goals and
performance criteria were appropriate, (3) corrective action plans were adequate, and
(4) performance was being effectively monitored in accordance with ER-1-103,
"Maintenance Rule Program Implementation."
7EnclosureThe following systems were selected for this detailed review:*Switchgear
SI);
- Auxiliary feed water (AFW);
- Service water (SRW);
- Salt water (SW); and
- Reactor coolant pumps (RCP).These systems were either in (a)(1) status, had been in (a)(1) status at some timeduring the assessment period, or experienced degraded performance. The inspectors
reviewed corrective action documents for malfunctions and failures of these systems to
determine if: (1) system failures had been correctly categorized as functional failures,
and (2) system performance was adequately monitored to determine if classifying a
system as (a)(1) was appropriate. The inspectors interviewed the maintenance rule coordinator and several systemmanagers, reviewed documentation for applicable systems, and reviewed a sample of
CRs. The documents that were reviewed are listed in the Attachment. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 7 Samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the following seven activities to verify that station personnelperformed the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work.
When emergent work was performed, the inspectors verified that the plant risk was
promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors compared the risk assessments
and risk management actions performed by station procedure NO-1-117, "Integrated
Risk Management," to the requirements of
- NUMA [[]]
RC 93-01, Revision 2, "Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of
Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," and approved station procedures. In addition,
the inspectors assessed the adequacy of Constellation's identification and resolution of
problems associated with maintenance risk assessments and emergent work activities.
Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment to this report.*Unit 1 No. 11 emergency core cooling system being out of service due toplanned maintenance*Unit 1 high pressure turbine casing nozzle and 42" cold reheat piping steam leak
- Unit 2 No. 24 4kV bus (alternate feeder) to support MJ switch replacement
- Unit 2 No. 23 SW pump out of service due to planned maintenance
- SBO diesel generator out of service due to cracks identified in engine two(ENG-2) A4 cylinder head
8Enclosure*480V bus out of service during the Unit 2 refuel outage due to plannedmaintenance *Motor control center (MCC) 204 out of service during the Unit 2 refuel outagedue to planned maintenance b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R15Operability Evaluations (71111.15 - 8 samples) a.Inspection ScopeFor the eight operability evaluations described below, the inspectors evaluated thetechnical adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that Constellation properly justified TS
operability and that the subject component or system remained available such that no
unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final
Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to verify that the system or component remained
available to perform its intended function. In addition, the inspectors reviewed
compensatory measures implemented to verify that the measures worked as stated and
that they were adequately controlled. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of CRs to
verify that Constellation identified and corrected any deficiencies associated with
operability evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment to this report.*Unit
IRE-019-640)
- 22A service water heat exchanger diverter valve (IRE-019-641)
- 0C
IRE-020-200)
- Unit 1 low pressure safety injection valve (1-SI-615-MOV) stroke time (IRE-020-420)*Functional evaluation for 12 steam generator feed flow instrumentation (IRE-020-409)*1A
IRE-021-274) b.FindingsStation Blackout DieselIntroduction. The inspectors identified a Green finding for Constellation's failure to taketimely action to evaluate and correct adverse conditions associated with the SBO diesel
generator.Description. During a February 14, 2007, operational performance evaluation, the SBOdiesel experienced high crankcase pressure, a high lube oil filter fouling rate, and glycol
in the lube oil. Constellation inspected the diesel engine and identified that the head of
9Enclosurethe A4 cylinder of the
- SBO diesel 0C2 engine was cracked. This condition allowedcoolant from the high temperature cooling system to enter the crankcase.The inspectors interviewed personnel and reviewed the
SBO diesel logs and conditionreports associated with a previous performance evaluation on January 14, 2007. The
inspectors determined that similar symptoms existed during the January 14, 2007,
performance evaluation; however, the degraded conditions were not adequately
evaluated and corrected in a timely manner as specified by the augmented quality
assurance program for the
IRE-019-458 concerning high out ofspecification crankcase pressure and lube oil leakage coming from the generator shaft
area. Operations concluded that there was no water in the oil without confirmation from
a lube oil analysis and that crankcase pressure was proportional to the SBO diesel load
without adequate supporting information for this condition. In addition, Constellation
initiated IRE-019-457 to document a high lube oil filter differential pressure alarm.
Operators swapped the filters but did not promptly evaluate and determine the cause of
the high differential pressure alarm. The inspectors noted that one of the potential
causes of high lube oil filter differential pressure and high crankcase pressure is lube oil
contamination with water. However, the results of a lube oil sample taken on January
14, 2007, were not pursued in a timely manner. The results were not received until
February 15, 2007, following the February performance evaluation. The results
revealed that glycol was present in the crankcase on January 14, 2007. Following the
discovery of the cracked cylinder head on the 0C2 engine on February 14, 2007,
Constellation determined that glycol and water from the high temperature cooling
system leaked through a crack in the cylinder head and into the crankcase. The glycol
reacted with the oil in the crankcase and created a sludge like substance which caused
the lube oil filters and crankcase breather filters to clog and the subsequent high lube oil
filter differential pressure and high crankcase pressure. Based on results of the January
2007 oil sample and other symptoms, the inspectors concluded that the head of the
SBO diesel A4 cylinder was cracked as early as January 14, 2007. Constellation
replaced the cracked cylinder head and entered the deficiency into the corrective action
program for resolution. Analysis. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency is thatConstellation did not take timely action to evaluate and correct an adverse condition on
the
UFSAR, Section 8.4.5.1, states that guidelines set forth in
Regulatory Guide 1.155, "Station Blackout," were used for quality assurance activities
associated with station blackout diesel. Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.155, states,"Measures should be established to ensure that failures, malfunctions, deficiencies,
deviations, defective components, and nonconformances are promptly identified and
corrected." Contrary to the above, the inspectors determined that on January 14, 2007,
Constellation did not promptly evaluate and correct deficiencies associated with the
SBO diesel. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the equipmentperformance attribute of the Mitigating System cornerstone, and it affected the
10Enclosurecornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems thatrespond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was
evaluated in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination of
Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations," using Phase 1, Phase 2, and
Phase 3 SDP analyses. The Phase 1 analysis required a Phase 2 evaluation because
the finding represented an actual loss of safety function of one non-technical
specification train of equipment designated as risk-significant per 10 CFR 50.65, for
greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.A fault exposure time of 32 days was used for loss of offsite power (LOOP) initiatingevents. The internal events Phase 2 analysis, for core damage frequency (CDF) was
conducted in accordance with IMC 0609 Appendix A, using the Risk-informed Inspection
Notebook for Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2, revision 2, dated
September 30, 2005. From a Phase 2 perspective, utilizing a fault exposure of greater
than 30 days and not crediting the time the EDG would have been able to function
before it exceeded its lube oil filter loading, the finding had low to moderate CDF safety
significance. In accordance with IMC 0609 Appendix H, for large dry containments, only
interfacing systems loss of coolant accidents (ISLOCA) and steam generator tube
ruptures are contributors for large early release frequency (LERF). Since this finding
was only associated with
LERF.
A senior reactor analyst (SRA) conducted a Phase 3 Risk Assessment, to
refine the Phase 2 analysis exposure time and to evaluate the available engine run time
and possible recovery credit. The analysis used an updated Calvert Cliffs
- SP [[]]
AR model,
Revision 3 plus, dated October 28, 2005. Based on the Phase 3 analysis, the finding represented very low safety significance andwas determined to be Green for Units 1 and 2 based on CDF. The analysis resulted in
an increase in CDF of less than 1 E-7 for the 32-day exposure period. The dominant
core damage sequence was a station blackout with a successful reactor shutdown along
with a failure to recover the EDGs and restore offsite power in four hours. In
accordance with IMC 0609, App. A, since the finding was determined to be Green and
less than 1 E-7, it was not evaluated for external events. This finding has a cross-
cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution because Constellation
did not properly prioritize and evaluate conditions adverse to quality. Enforcement. Because no violation of regulatory requirements occurred, this issue isbeing treated as a finding. This issue was entered into Constellation's corrective actionprogram (IRE-020-200). (FIN 05000317,05000318/2007002-01: Failure to TakeTimely Actions to Evaluate and Correct Station Blackout Diesel Degraded
Conditions)
11Enclosure1R17Permanent Plant Modifications (71111.17 - 1 sample)Unit 2 Replacement Reactor Vessel Closure Head (RRVCH) Modifications a. Inspection Scope Recent industry events involving
- PWS [[]]
CC of Alloy 600 at other plants throughout the
industry prompted Constellation to take the preemptive measure of replacing the Unit 2
- RVCH during the Spring 2007 R17 refueling outage.The inspectors performed direct field observations of the Unit 2
ESS modifications inside the onsite pre-assembly facility
(PAF).
September
- 2006.T he inspectors reviewed various records, including design specifications, calculations,drawings, and
ESS were performed and documented in accordance with
these requirements. The inspectors reviewed the design modification packages to verify
that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of the modified
components were not degraded through the modifications. The inspectors reviewed the
Unit
- 1 RRV [[]]
- RRV [[]]
CH design, modification, procedures, and outage activities. In addition,
contingency plans associated with the modifications were reviewed to verify that
guidance had been developed if problems were to occur during the installation process.
b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R19Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 7 Samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the seven post-maintenance tests listed below to verify thatprocedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The
inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that the procedure adequately tested
the safety function(s) that may have been affected by the maintenance activity, that the
acceptance criteria in the procedure were consistent with information in the applicable
licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that the procedure had been
properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also witnessed the test or reviewed
test data, to verify that the test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the
affected safety function(s). Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment to this
report.*Unit 1 No.
MO#1200603098)*Unit 2 containment high range radiation monitors (MO #2200700152)
2Enclosure*Repair steam leak on Unit 1 high pressure turbine cold reheat line(MO#1200700305)*Performance evaluation of 0C diesel generator following engine-2 cylinder A4repair (MO#0200700815)*Unit 2 No. 2B
MO#2199801933)
- Unit 2 No. 21 main steam isolation valve actuator overhaul (MO#2200503868)
- Unit 2 No. 22A reactor coolant pump motor replacement (MO#2200503578) b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified. 1R20Refueling and Outage Activities (71111.20 - 1 Sample) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors evaluated Unit 2 refueling outage activities to ensure that Constellationconsidered risk in the development of outage schedules; implemented administrative
risk reduction methodologies developed to control plant configuration; developed
mitigation strategies for losses of key safety functions, and adhered to operating license
conditions and TS requirements that ensure defense in depth. The inspectors reviewed
the following specific areas: *Review of outage plan*Monitoring of shutdown activities
- Licensee control of outage activities
- Reduced inventory and mid-loop conditions
- Refueling activities
- Monitoring of heatup and startup activities b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R22Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 7 Samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors observed and/or reviewed the seven surveillance tests listed belowassociated with selected risk-significant structures, systems, and components to verify
TS compliance and that test acceptance criteria was properly specified. The inspectors
also verified that proper test conditions were established as specified in the procedures,
no equipment preconditioning activities occurred, and that acceptance criteria had been
satisfied.
13EnclosureThe documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment to thisreport.*STP-562-2, Containment High Range Radiation Monitor Alignment Check*STP-O-073A-1, Saltwater Pump And Check Valve Quarterly Operability Test
- ECCS [[]]
LPSI Loop Isolation Valves Quarterly Operability Test
- STP-O-55A-2, Containment Closure Verification
- OI-30, Nuclear Instrumentation Daily Technical SpecificationSurveillance (SR 3.3.1.2)*STP-O-182D-2, Containment Penetration Local Leak Rate Tests (CIV) b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.1R23Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23 - 1 Sample) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed one temporary modification to verify that safety systems did notdepart from the design basis and system established criteria. The inspectors reviewed
the associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening against the system design bases
documentation, including the
TS. The inspectors walked down each
modification to verify that proper configuration control was maintained to ensure
continued system operability. In addition, the inspectors verified that Constellation
controlled the modification in accordance with the requirements of procedure MD-1-100,
"Temporary Alterations."*Unit 1 high pressure turbine exhaust line modification (TA-1-07-0002) b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.2.RADIATION
OS)2OS1Access Control To Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01 - 11 Samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors identified exposure significant work areas within radiation areas, highradiation areas (<1 R/hr), or airborne radioactivity areas in the plant and reviewed
14Enclosureassociated licensee controls and surveys of these areas to determine if controls(e.g. surveys, postings, barricades) were acceptable.The inspectors walked down these areas or their perimeters to determine: whetherprescribed radiation work permits, procedure, and engineering controls were in place,
whether licensee surveys and postings were complete and accurate, and whether air
samplers were properly located.The inspectors examined the licensee's physical and programmatic controls for highlyactivated or contaminated materials (non-fuel) stored within spent fuel and other storage
pools.The inspectors reviewed radiation work permits (RWPs) [called special work permits atCalvert Cliffs] used to access high radiation areas and identify what work control
instructions or control barriers had been specified. The inspectors reviewed electronic
personal dosimeter (EPD) alarm set points (both integrated dose and dose rate) for
conformity with survey indications and plant policy.The inspectors reviewed RWPs for airborne radioactivity areas with the potential forindividual worker internal exposures of >50 mrem Committed Effective Dose Equivalent
[CEDE] (20 DAC-hrs). The inspectors verified barrier integrity and engineering controls
performance (e.g., High Efficiency Particulate Air ventilation system operation).The inspectors reviewed and assessed the adequacy of the licensee's internal doseassessment for any actual internal exposure greater than 50 mrem committed effective
dose equivalent (CEDE). Through March 8, 2007, no uptakes of this magnitude had
occurred.Based on the licensee's schedule of work activities, the inspectors selected three jobsbeing performed in radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas, or high radiation areas(<1 R/hr) for observation (reactor vessel head replacement; reactor disassembly;
containment sump modifications). The inspectors reviewed radiological job
requirements (RWP requirements and work procedure requirements). The inspectors
observed job performance with respect to these requirements. The inspectors
determined that radiological conditions in the work area were adequately communicated
to workers through briefings and postings. The inspectors attended the pre-job briefing
for the upper guide structure lift presented on March 7, 2007.During job performance observations, the inspectors verified the adequacy ofradiological controls, such as: required surveys (including system breach radiation,contamination, and airborne surveys), radiation protection job coverage (including audioand visual surveillance for remote job coverage), and contamination controls.For high radiation work areas with significant dose rate gradients (factor of 5 or more),the inspectors reviewed the application of dosimetry to effectively monitor exposure to
personnel. The inspectors verified that licensee controls were adequate.
15EnclosureDuring job performance observations, the inspectors observed radiation workerperformance with respect to stated radiation protection work requirements. The
inspectors determined that they were aware of the significant radiological conditions in
their workplace, and the RWP controls/limits in place, and that their performance took
into consideration the level of radiological hazards present.During job performance observations, the inspectors observed radiation protectiontechnician performance with respect to radiation protection work requirements. The
inspectors determined that they were aware of the radiological conditions in their
workplace and the RWP controls/limits, and that their performance was consistent with
their training and qualifications with respect to the radiological hazards and work
activities. The inspectors observed actions taken by the radiation protection staff in
response to the stuck control element assembly during the lifting of the upper guide
structure on March 7, 2007.The inspectors observed activities taken by the radiation protection staff onJanuary 30-31, 2007, in response to the possible need to shut down one of the units in
order to effect repairs on the secondary side. The inspectors noted that the licensee
had in place a listing of activities to occur in the containment should the plant shut down;
mobilized personnel in radiation protection to support potential containment activities;
and had in place an extensive telemonitoring system for containment activities that
would allow for teledosimetry for all personnel entering the containment, along with
sufficient cameras to follow work. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.2OS2ALARA Planning and Controls (71121.02 - 10 Samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the assumptions and basis for the current annual collectiveexposure estimate. The inspectors reviewed applicable procedures to determine the
methodology for estimating work activity-specific exposures and the intended dose
outcome. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's method for adjusting exposure estimates, orre-planning work, when unexpected changes in scope or emergent work are
encountered. Based on scheduled work activities and associated exposure estimates, the inspectorsselected three work activities in radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas, or high
radiation areas for observation, as noted in Section 2OS1 above. The inspectors
evaluated the licensee's use of
- ALA [[]]
RA controls for these work activities by performing
the following: evaluated the licensee's use of engineering controls to achieve dose
reductions; procedures and controls consistent with the licensee's
- ALA [[]]
RA reviews;
16Enclosuresufficient shielding of radiation sources provided for; and whether dose expended toinstall/remove the shielding exceeded the dose reduction benefits afforded by the
shielding.The inspectors observed radiation worker and Radiation Protection (RP) technicianperformance during work activities being performed in radiation areas, airborne
radioactivity areas, or high radiation areas. The inspectors determined that workers
demonstrated the
- ALA [[]]
RA philosophy in practice and that there were no procedure
compliance issues. Also, the inspectors observed radiation worker performance to
determine whether the training/skill level was sufficient with respect to the radiological
hazards and the work involved.The inspectors reviewed the integration of
RWP documents. Limited information was provided in these types of documents.
Most
- ALA [[]]
RA information was transmitted during job briefings. The inspectors compared
the person-hour estimates provided by maintenance planning and other groups to the
radiation protection group with the actual work activity time requirements and evaluated
the accuracy of these time estimates.The inspectors determined that work activity planning included consideration of thebenefits of dose rate reduction activities such as shielding provided by water filled
components/piping, job scheduling, and shielding and scaffolding installation and
removal activities.The inspectors reviewed the licensee's exposure tracking system. The inspectorsdetermined that the level of exposure tracking detail provided by radiation protection on
a daily basis during the refueling outage appeared minimal; however, exposure report
timeliness and exposure report distribution were sufficient. Supervisors and contractor
supervisors were also authorized access to the station computer data base which did
provide more detailed
- ALARA information.The inspectors determined that workers were utilizing the low dose waiting areas andwere generally effective in maintaining their doses
ALARA. A few instances were
observed when work was stopped and workers were not prompt in moving to low dose
waiting areas, or leaving the
- RCA awaiting work to recommence.The inspectors determined that workers received appropriate on-the-job supervision toensure
ALARA requirements are met. The inspectors determined that the first-line job
supervisor aided in ensuring that the work activity was conducted in a dose efficient
manner.Since the outage exposure goal was established, it has been twice lowered based onbetter than expected dose rates in the containment. Lower dose rates were the result of
a successful crud burst at Unit 2 in November 2006 during a forced shutdown, in
conjunction with a successful crud burst during the shutdown for the refueling outage.
17Enclosure b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.2OS3Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation (71121.03 - 2 Samples) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed corrective action program reports related to exposuresignificant radiological incidents that involved radiation monitoring instrument
deficiencies since the last inspection in this area.The inspectors reviewed licensee self-assessments, audits, and Licensee Event Reportsand focused on radiological incidents that involved personnel contamination monitoralarms due to personnel internal exposures. For internal exposures >50 mrem
- CE [[]]
DE,
the inspectors determined that appropriate procedures were in place to ensure that the
affected personnel would be properly monitored utilizing calibrated equipment and that
the data would be analyzed and internal exposures properly assessed in accordance
with licensee procedures. The inspectors also reviewed the actions taken by the licensee in response to acontractor arriving on site who was found to have contamination on his clothing. The
licensee properly denied the worker entry to the protected area, notified the NRC,
notified the last facility at which the person had worked and entered the actions taken in
its condition report system. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4.OTHER
- ACTIVI [[]]
TIES (OA)4OA1Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151 - 1 Sample)Mitigating Systems Cornerstone a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed Constellation's submittal of Safety System Functional Failures(SSFF) performance indicators (PIs) for Units 1 and 2. The PIs were reviewed for the
period of January 2006 through December 2006. These dates account for the previous
four quarters that have been reported in
- LE [[]]
RS, maintenance rule records, and
maintenance work orders that prevented, or could have prevented, the fulfillment of a
safety function. The inspectors used the guidance provided in NEI 99-02, Revision 4,
"Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," to assess the accuracy of PI
data collected and reported. The inspectors reviewed Constellation's PI data and plant
18Enclosurerecords associated with the
- SSFF [[]]
PI that also included operator logs and system healthreports. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems Review of Items Entered Into the Corrective Action Program (CAP)The inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into Constellation's CAP asrequired by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems."
The review facilitated the identification of potentially repetitive equipment failures or
specific human performance issues for follow-up inspection. This was accomplished by
reviewing the description of each new
OA3Event Followup (71153 - 6 samples).1Unit 1 Steam Leak on the Main Turbine High Pressure Cold Reheat Line a.Inspection ScopeOn January 31, 2007, operators commenced a power reduction to 5 percent to removethe main turbine from service due to a steam leak on the turbine exhaust line to
moisture separator reheater. Following completion of the piping repair, operators
restored the unit to 100 percent power on February 1, 2007. The inspectors discussed
the event with Constellation management, operations, engineering, and maintenance
personnel to gain an understanding of the event and to assess the methods used for
flaw characterization. In addition, the inspectors assessed whether the repair method
was in accordance with the
- AS [[]]
ME code. The inspectors reviewed and discussed the
non-destructive test results with Constellation personnel. Documents reviewed are
listed in the attachment to this report. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..2(Closed)
TS 5.4.1.a. occurred becauseConstellation did not adequately implement foreign material exclusion (FME) procedures
and controls to prevent debris from entering a fuel assembly guide tube while in the
SFP. This caused a control element assembly to bind and become inoperable
(untrippable).
19EnclosureDescription. On April 08, 2006, Unit 1 experienced a misaligned
CEA was declared untrippable and the
reactor was manually tripped per station procedures. Constellation submitted a licensee
event report (LER) and entered this issue into the corrective action program for
resolution. Inspectors reviewed LER 2006002, Control Element Assembly Determined
to be Untrippable, Revision 1. The
CEA was untrippable due to
the presence of debris in or on top of a fuel assembly guide tube. The debris was most
likely introduced into the fuel assembly guide tube while in the spent fuel pool. The inspectors determined that the debris in the spent fuel pool was due to inadequateimplementation of administrative maintenance procedure MN-1-109, Foreign Material
Exclusion. The procedure requires that personnel prevent and control the introduction
of foreign material into systems, structures, and components. Contrary to the
procedure, during the Unit 1 2006 Refueling Outage, personnel did not take appropriate
precautions to prevent foreign material from entering the SFP. As a result, foreign
material in the SFP area caused debris to enter the fuel assembly guide tube, which
caused the control element assembly to bind. Constellation performed subsequent tests
to demonstrate that the previously stuck
were no new issues identified after the subsequent tests were performed.
Constellation's corrective actions included improvements to the site FME training
program and a new Fleet
- FME procedure.Analysis. The performance deficiency is that Constellation did not adequatelyimplement
FME procedures and controls to prevent debris from entering a fuel
assembly guide tube while in the SFP. This issue is more than minor because it was
associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating System cornerstone
and it affected the reliability of the reactivity control system. Specifically, a CEA was
untrippable and operators had to perform a manual shutdown of the plant. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of InspectionManual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection
Findings for At-Power Situations." The inspectors determined that this finding was of
very low safety significance because it was not a qualification deficiency; it did not
represent a loss of safety function for a train or system as defined in the plant specific
risk-informed inspection notebook; and it was not risk significant due to external event
initiators. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance
because Constellation did not define and effectively communicate expectations
regarding following FME procedures.Enforcement. Technical Specification 5.4.1.a. requires, in part, that written proceduresshall be established, implemented, and maintained as recommended in Appendix A of
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2. Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 9,
Procedures for Performing Maintenance, states that maintenance activities that affect
the performance of safety-related equipment should be performed in accordance with
written procedures appropriate to the circumstances. Contrary to the above, during the
Unit 1 2006 Refueling Outage in February and March 2006, Constellation did not
adequately implement maintenance procedure MN-1-109, Foreign Material Exclusion, to
20Enclosureprevent the introduction of foreign material into plant systems and components. Thisresulted in the binding of a CEA. Because this finding is of very low safety significance
and since it has been entered into the corrective action program as IRE-013-755, this
violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section
LER 05000317/2006003-00, Impact on Safety-Related Equipment NotConsidered When High Energy Line Break (HELB) Barrier RemovedOn August 30, 2006, inspectors identified that the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump roomdouble doors were opened during the performance of an AFW surveillance test. This
action was in accordance with the procedure to provide personnel safety for operators.
However, the procedure did not consider the high energy line break (HELB) design
support function of the doors. As a result, the inspectors determined that the AFW
pumps were inoperable because one of design support function of the doors was to
protect the
HELB postulated to occur outside the room. The
issue and associated non-cited violation were discussed in NRC inspection report
2006004 as NCV 05000317,318/2006004-01. The inspectors performed a follow-up
inspection to review and assess the causes of the issues identified in the LER. The
inspectors reviewed Constellation's evaluation, changes to procedures, and training
conducted on the event to assess if the actions taken would address the issue.
Additionally, the inspectors performed walkdowns in several areas of the turbine building
and safety related rooms to ensure that procedure changes encompassed the
- HE [[]]
boundary doors identified during the walkdown. No new findings of significance were
identified. This
LER 05000318/2006001-01, Reactor Trip During Performance of MaintenanceClearance OrderOn November 16, 2006, Unit 2 automatically tripped from 100 percent power due to apressurizer pressure high signal. The high pressure signal was caused by a turbine
load rejection which resulted from a personnel protective clearance applied for service
transformer work. The clearance affected the main turbine electro-hydraulic control
system, which was not identified by the operators that prepared the clearance. The
issue and associated non-cited violation was discussed in NRC inspection report
2006005 as
LER was reviewed by the inspectors, and
no additional findings of significance were identified. This
LER 05000317/318/2006005-00, Startup Rate Trip Bypass Enabling FunctionBelow SetpointIntroduction. The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of TechnicalSpecification (TS) 3.3.1, because Constellation did not recognize that one or more
channels of the high rate-of-change (startup rate) trip function did not meet TS
21Enclosurerequirements following the completion of the linear power channel calibrationsurveillance test on several occasions over a three year period.Description. On December 17, 2006, during a reduction in power on Unit 2,Constellation identified that the reactor protection system (RPS) High Rate of Change of
Reactor Power (startup rate) trip enabling function did not reset below the TS required
value of 12 percent rated thermal power (RTP) on RPS channel. Constellation
performed a subsequent review of previous Unit 1 and Unit 2 linear power channel
calibration surveillances (STP M-310-1 and M-310-2) and identified that this condition
existed on several occasions during a three year period. Constellation determined that
the cause of this event was a failure to recognize that, when Improved Technical
Specifications (ITS) were adopted at Calvert Cliffs in 1997, Footnote (a) to TS Table
3.3.1-1 added new acceptance criteria to the startup rate (SUR) trip function. The SUR
trip function new acceptance criteria was added to STP M-310-1 and M-310-2. As a
result, one or more channels of the startup trip function were determined to be
inoperable on a number of occurrences over a three year period. Constellation
submitted a LER and entered this issue into their corrective action program for
resolution.The inspectors reviewed
- LER 2006005, Startup Rate Trip Bypass Enabling FunctionBelow Setpoint, Revision 0. Based on the review of the event, the
LER, personnel
interviews, and the associated corrective actions, the inspectors identified the following
issues and discrepancies: *Constellation did not identify all applicable
TS required reset enabled value of
percent RTP. This includes a failure to identify that the plant should have
implemented TS 3.3.1.E when two or more channels were inoperable after
performing STP-M-310. *Constellation did not promptly correct the surveillance test procedure to add theacceptance criteria so as to preclude repetition of the event. As a result, during
a subsequent surveillance in February 2007, inspectors identified that one
channel was recorded below the
- TS required reset enabling value of 12 percent. *Constellation did not fully assess the actual and potential safety consequencesand implications of the event. The
LER stated that there is a lack of any safety
analysis crediting the high rate-of-change trip function. However, the inspectors
identified that the SUR trip is credited in the safety analysis to prevent subcritical
events and minimize transients for low power events such as a boron dilution
event and uncontrolled
- CEA withdrawal event. *Additionally, based on the inspectors discussion with Constellation personnel, itwas determined that the direct current (
DC) voltage bistable signal provides a
more accurate indication of actual power level as compared to the Linear Power
Range Nuclear Instrumentation meter since it is the DC voltage that causes the
Bistable to trip and reset. The DC voltage acceptance criteria was not included
2Enclosureas part of the corrective actions associated with this LER. Therefore,Constellation decided to review previous surveillance procedures and power
conditions to determine occurrences where the DC voltage bistable signal did not
meet the
LER to address the DC voltage
bistable signal, corrective actions associated with this information, and other deficiencies
that were identified.Analysis. The performance deficiency is that Constellation did not recognize that one ormore channels of the high rate SUR trip function did not meet Technical Specifications
requirements following the completion of the Linear Power Channel Calibration
surveillance test on several occasions during a three year period. This issue is more
than minor because the finding is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the
Mitigating System cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the
availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to
prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the reliability of the Reactor ProtectionSystem (RPS) was reduced with one or more channels of the Rate-of-Change of Power
High function (SUR trip) inoperable. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of InspectionManual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection
Findings for At-Power Situations." The inspectors determined that this finding was of
very low safety significance because it was not a qualification deficiency; it did not
represent a loss of safety function for a train or system as defined in the plant specific
risk-informed inspection notebook; and it was not risk significant due to external event
initiators. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification
and resolution because Constellation did not take actions to address safety issues in a
timely manner, commensurate with their significance.Enforcement. Technical Specification 3.3.1
RPS bistable trip units and the applicable automatic bypass removal
features for the
OPERABLE and is applicable in modes 1 and 2.
Contrary to the above, on several occasions from December 2003 through December
2006, Constellation did not enter and complete
TS 3.3.1.D or
3.3.1.E due to a failure to recognize that one or more channels of SUR trip function did
not meet the TS requirements. Because this finding is of very low safety significance
and it has been entered into the corrective action program as IRE-019-028, this violation
is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section
NRCEnforcement Policy. (NCV 05000317, 05000318/2007002-03: Failure to recognizethat one or more channels of the high rate-of-change trip function wasinoperable).6(Closed) LER 05000317/2006004, Reactor Trip Due to Loose Wire During Maintenanceon Turbine Control System
23EnclosureOn December 12, 2006, Unit 1 was manually tripped due to a pressure transient on theRCS during maintenance on the main turbine control system. The details of this event
were discussed in Section
NRC Inspection Report 2006005. The inspectors
reviewed the
LER is
closed.4OA5Other Activities.1Reactor Pressure Vessel Head and Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles a.Inspection ScopeThe reactor pressure vessel head and head penetration nozzles were not inspected, asthe vessel head was being replaced in its entirety this outage.The licensee performed appropriate examinations for indications of boric acid leaks frompressure-retaining components above the RPV head. The inspector reviewed the
examination procedures and examiner qualifications and determined they were in
accordance with the requirements of
XI. Examination results were
reviewed and anomalies, deficiencies, and discrepancies identified during the
examination process were evaluated and documented in the licensee's corrective action
program. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified. .2Unit 2 Replacement Reactor Vessel Closure Head (71007 - 1 sample) a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the Unit
- NRCI nspection Procedure 71007, "Reactor Vessel Head Replacement Inspection." Constellation elected to replace the Unit 2
CEDM nozzles and UNS W86182 weld filler
material in the existing
- RV [[]]
CH to primary water stress corrosion cracking. The design of
the
RVCH except for the replacement of the Alloy 600
nozzle material and weld material with a new and improved
- PWS [[]]
CC resistant material
(Alloy 690).The Unit
- RRV [[]]
CH is a two piece welded low alloy steel forging
clad with stainless steel. There are
- 61 CE [[]]
DM Alloy 690 nozzles, 8 in-core
instrumentation nozzles made from Alloy
RRVCH, and a
3/4" schedule 80 Alloy
RRVCH. In
24Enclosureaddition, a new
- 2 RRV [[]]
CH.Design and PlanningFrom January 9, 2007 - March 16, 2007, the inspectors conducted in-office and onsitereviews of engineering service packages, engineering calculations, analyses, design
specifications, material specifications, component specifications, and certified designreports for the Unit
CEDMs, and ESS to assess the technical adequacy of
the design changes and to verify that the design bases, licensing bases, and the
performance capability of the modified components were not degraded through the
modifications. Detailed review of the design changes/modifications of the
- RRV [[]]
TSP, and ESS are covered in Section 1R02 and 1R17 of this report.The inspectors reviewed the original design drawings of the Unit 2 reactor vessel andreactor vessel head. Based on the drawings and dimensional data collected from the
original components, the information was reconciled to the replacement components
design dimensions and photogrammetry measurements of the original components
as-built drawings were developed. The inspectors verified that the
- RRV [[]]
CH conformed
to as-built design drawings and there were no fabrication deviations from design, and
the component was manufactured in accordance with the requirements of
- AS [[]]
ME Boiler
Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, Division 1, 1995 Edition, 1996 Addenda. The inspectors verified that no major structural modifications were performed for the
Unit
- 2 RRV [[]]
CH activity and that no temporary modifications were needed for primary
containment access to support the replacement activity.Lifting/Rigging and Transportation of the
RVCHs, from March 12, 2007 to March 16, 2007, to ensure the devices were tested
and/or evaluated in accordance with procedure requirements and to verify that the
maximum anticipated loads to be lifted would not exceed the capacity of the
lifting/rigging equipment and supporting structures.The inspectors reviewed the procedures for heavy lifting, inspection, maintenance, andtesting of the cranes and lifting equipment to verify compliance with phase 1 of
- NUR [[]]
EG-0612 guidance. The review focused on applicable lifting and handling
procedure
- CCNPP [[]]
- CCN [[]]
PP Industrial Safety Manual Chapter
11, Cranes, Rigging and Forklifts and
- CCN [[]]
PP Reactor Vessel Head Replacement
Project Heavy Loads Assessment Report LH00258.The inspectors reviewed the potential impact of load handling activities on the reactorcore, spent fuel cooling, and other plant support systems and the consequence of any
impact loading of structures, systems, and components due to a
- RV [[]]
CH drop accident.
The inspectors reviewed risk management documents and various task plans
supporting installation of these components.
25EnclosureThe inspectors reviewed the Unit 2 polar crane used to handle the
NUREG-0612 and guideline requirements
were verified by the inspectors. The inspectors verified that the guidelines were being
properly implemented by reviewing the heavy load safe load path drawings for lifts
inside Unit 2 Primary Containment, plant procedures
- RV [[]]
CH load
handling operations, training and certification records of crane operators, special lifting
devices, and periodic preventive mechanical and electrical maintenance, inspections,
and tests.Removal and Replacement of
RVCHs and observed portions of the lifting, rigging and
transporting of the
- RV [[]]
CHs into and out of the Unit 2 primary containment. The
inspectors observed activities in-progress, from March 12, 2007 to March 16, 2007,
inside the primary containment via remote video monitor, including underwater welding
of the reactor vessel level monitoring system (RVLMS) probe holders. The inspectors
observed the old
- RV [[]]
CH movement from the primary containment to the transporter.
The inspectors noted that Constellation personnel were conducting direct management
oversight observations of the lifting and rigging activities.The inspectors reviewed these activities to ensure that the heavy load handling activitieswere safely performed and properly controlled in accordance with plant procedures and
in accordance with the guidelines of
- UFSAR. Fabrication InspectionsThe inspectors performed in-office reviews, from January 9, 2007 - March 16, 2007, ofBabcock & Wilcox Canada Ltd. (BWC) Certified Design Specification
- BWC [[]]
TS-2955
and Replacement Reactor Vessel Closure Head For Unit #2
- AS [[]]
- 2 RRV [[]]
CH to verify that the specified material, design,
fabrication, inspection, examination, testing, certification, documentation, and functional
requirements were consistent with the requirements of the
- AS [[]]
ME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel (B&PV) Code, Section
ESS were inspected inside the PAF by the inspectors. Theinspectors also reviewed documents, including the material used for fabrication, to
ensure that the activities were accomplished in accordance with certified specifications,
design drawing, and
ASME Code Data Report Form-2, certified material testreport (CMTR), hydro test results report, certificate of compliance, heat treatment
records, non-destructive examination reports, and non-conformance reports for the
manufacture of the Unit
CEDMs. The inspectors also verified that the
Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI) inspected the replacement parts and certified that
the components were fabricated and tested in accordance with the
- AS [[]]
ME Code.
26EnclosureReview of Quality Assurance (QA) ActivitiesThe inspectors reviewed documentation to verify that Constellation implemented adequate Quality Assurance (QA) oversight of the manufacturing activities at the
QA personnel, which covered
activities during the fabrication of the Unit 1 and Unit
BWC
manufacturing facility. The inspectors reviewed the indicated inspection activities in the
QA surveillance reports and verified their adequacy and thoroughness of the
surveillances and the impact of findings on the fabrication of the
- NRC Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/166 - Pressurized Water ReactorContainment Sump Blockage a.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed this inspection in accordance with
TI was developed to
support the
GL) 2004-02, "Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency
Sump Recirculation at Pressurized Water Reactors." The inspectors reviewed a sample
of the licensing and design documents to verify that they were either updated or in the
process of being updated to reflect the modifications. A sample of material
specifications, testing and surveillance procedures, and calculations were reviewed to
verify that they were updated to reflect the effects of the modifications, and the new
requirements for the containment sumps and debris generation sources. The inspectors
performed a walkdown of the strainer installation to verify it was performed in
accordance with the approved design change package. Additionally, the inspectors
verified that work was in progress to remove and replace CalSil insulation in
containment that could be dislodged during a loss of coolant accident. Finally, the
inspectors verified that all choke-points that could prevent water from reaching the
recirculation sump during a design basis accident had been identified. b.Evaluation of Inspection Requirements:The TI requested the inspectors to evaluate and answer the following questions:
1. Did Constellation implement the plant modifications and procedure changes committed to in their
- GL 2004-02 response?The inspectors verified that actions implemented by Constellation as described inresponse to
GL 2004-02 were complete as it related to the installation of the sump
screen. The inspectors noted that Constellation had not completed the debris source
27Enclosureevaluation, updated net positive suction head (NPSH) calculations, materialspecifications, long term downstream effects evaluation, or the effects of chemical
precipitants on the strainer head loss at the time of the inspection.2. Has Constellation updated its licensing basis to reflect the corrective actions taken in response to
UFSAR, that were identified in Constellation's GL 2004-02 response were reviewed and
documented in accordance with
SR 3.5.2.8. The surveillance set
the requirements for visual inspection of the new sump and screens. Finally, the
inspectors verified that Constellation intends to update the Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 licensing
bases to reflect the final modification and associated procedure changes taken in
response to
TI will remain open to allow for the review of portions of the GL response that havenot been completed. Specifically, Constellation had not completed several analyses
related to the determination of head loss on the strainer and downstream effects of
screen bypass material. The results of these analyses have the potential to impact the
final size of the strainer, licensing basis and programmatic procedures. Therefore, the
inspection will be considered incomplete until the results are reviewed. Constellation
plans to evaluate the strainer for adequacy once the test and inspection results needed
to quantify the head loss are known. The NRC has set a December 31, 2007, deadline
for the completion of these evaluations. c.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified..4Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) a.Inspection Scope (60855 & 60856)The inspection consisted of evaluating
- ISF [[]]
SI-related activities, including procedures anddocumentation, characterization of selected fuel assemblies for storage, handling and
lifting of heavy loads, and review of personnel training and qualification records
associated with a recent
- ISF [[]]
SI fuel loading campaign. Inspection activities also includedan evaluation of corrective actions implemented to address two violations detailed in
NRC Inspection Report 07200008/2005-001. This is a supplement to the review
performed for NRC Inspection Report 07200008/2007-008 and 05000317/2007-008.
28EnclosureThe inspectors reviewed and verified the following attributes: The licensee demonstrated the ability to safely load spent fuel into a storage cask. Work activities were performed in accordance with approved procedures in compliance
with technical specification requirements. Spent fuel loaded into storage casks was
properly characterized. Storage casks were properly sealed, tested, surveyed and
inspected and met the requirements of technical specifications. Corrective actions fortwo previous violations were determined to be acceptable and completed in accordance
with the licensee's corrective action program. b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4OA6Meetings, Including ExitExit Meeting SummaryOn April 19, 2007, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Joseph Pollock and other members of your staff, who acknowledged the findings.
The inspectors asked Constellation whether any of the material examined during the
inspection should be considered proprietary. Although the inspectors reviewed some
proprietary items during the inspection, no proprietary information is presented in this
report.ATTACHMENT:
- SUPPLE [[]]
- MENTAL [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- SUPPLE [[]]
- MENTAL [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- POINTS [[]]
- OF [[]]
- CONTA [[]]
CT Constellation PersonnelJ. Spina, Vice President
J. Pollock, Plant General Manager
D. Bauder, Operations Manager
R. Camerson, Senior Engineering Analyst
RVH replacement
G. Detter, Fleet Security and Emergency Preparedness Manager
ALARA Supervisor
P. Fatka, System Manager
M. Flaherty, Engineering Services Manager
D. Frye, Outage Management
J. Gaines, Licensing Manager
J. Gines, Engineering Consultant
K. Gould, Radiation Protection Manager
RVH Projects
M. Lewis, System Manager
S. Loeper, System Manager
K. Mills, System Engineering Supervisor
D. Murphy, Balance of Plant Engineering Supervisor
C. Neyman, Engineering Analyst
B. Pumphrey, Security
RVH Project
E. Schinner, Calvert Cliffs Emergency Preparedness Manager
A. Simpson, Senior Licensee Engineer
V. Trojan, System Manager
J. Wynn, System Manager
J. York, Radiation Protection Supervisor
M. Yox, Engineering Analyst & Licensing
M. Fick, Work Coordinator Manager
E. Kreahling, Senior Engineering Analyst
P. Furio, Senior Licensing Supervisor
A-2AttachmentLIST
- OF [[]]
- ITEMS [[]]
- CLOSED [[]]
- AND [[]]
DISCUSSEDOpened05000318/2515/166TIPressurized Water Reactor ContainmentSump Blockage (4OA5.3)Opened and Closed05000317,318/2007002-01FINFailure To Take Timely Actions to EvaluateAnd Correct Station Blackout Diesel
Degraded Conditions (1R15)05000317/2007002-02NCVFailure To Adequately Implement
OA3.2)05000317,318/2007002-03NCVFailure to Recognize that One Or MoreChannels Of The High-Rate-Of-Change
Trip Function Was Inoperable. (4OA3.5)Closed05000317,318/2006-002-01LERControl Element Assembly (CEA)Determined to Be Untrippable (4OA3.2)05000317/2006-003-00LERImpact On Safety-Related Equipment NotConsidered When High Energy Line Break
Barrier Removed (4OA3.3)05000318/2006-001-01LERReactor Trip During Performance OfMaintenance Clearance Order (4OA3.4)05000317/2006-004LERReactor Trip Due To Loose Wire DuringMaintenance On Turbine Control System
(4OA3.6)05000317/318/2006-005-00LERStartup Rate Trip Bypass Enabling FunctionBelow Setpoint (4OA3.5)072-00008/2005-001-01NOVFailure to Document Written Evaluation Per72.48(d)(1) (4OA5.4)072-00008/2005-001-02NOVFailure To Properly Evaluate DesignChange Per 72.48(c)(2)(vii) (4OA5.4)
A-3AttachmentLIST
- OF [[]]
- REVIEW [[]]
- EDS ection 1R04: Equipment AlignmentProceduresOI-03A-1, Revision 20, Safety Injection and Containment SprayOI-22M, Revision 7, 1A and 0C
- HVAC [[]]
IRE-019-607IRE-020-109Work Orders1200603098
Clearance Orders1200600974
DrawingsDRWG. No.
- HV [[]]
SA-1, Revision 6, Fire Protection ProgramSA-1-102, Revision 2, Fire Protection/Appendix R Compensatory Actions
SA-1-100, Revision 13, Fire Prevention
SA-1-101, Revision 3, Fire Fighting
FP-0002, Revision 0, Fire Hazards Analysis Summary Document
Fire Fighting Strategies Manual, Revision 0Condition ReportsIRE-019-880IRE-020-590
IRE-020-712
DRWG. No. 15960-0065SH0001, Revision 0A, Radial Duct Outline Assembly Drawing
A-4AttachmentDRWG. No. 15960-0071SH0001, Revision 0A, Radial Duct Connector Outline Assembly Implementation of Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/166 - Pressurized Water ReactorContainment Sump BlockageAction Item
- BGE [[]]
- CT [[]]
- DWG. [[]]
NO. 15960-0022SH0001, Strainer Module for Row A, B, B, Typical Modular
Configuration Assemble Drawing, Rev. 0A
NPSH for
the Safety Injection and Containment Spray Pumps During Post-RAS Operation, Rev. 0
ES200400048-001, Engineering Services Package for Unit 2 Emergency Containment Sump
Strainer, Rev. 0
ES200400048-002, Form 5, Equivalent Change Evaluation to address interferences impacting
the installation of the Containment Sump Strainer, Rev. 0
SE00498, 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation Form, Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 Cycle 17
core reload, Rev. 1
RFO Containment Coatings Walkdown for 2006, Rev. 0
Head Loss Calculation, Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 Reactor Building Emergency Sump,
10/27/2006
MN-3-100, Safety-Related and Controlled Protective Coatings, Rev. 6
Norms Doc
CT-RFO12, 1999 Calvert Cliffs Unit 2 RFO12 Service Level 1 Coatings
Program
Norms Doc
CCNPP Unit 1 2004 RFO Containment Coating Assessment
N-REP-34320-10000, Jet Impact Tests, Rev. R00
PWR Containments,September 2002
NRC Letter: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos. 1 & 2 - License Amendment Request:
Revise Containment Sump Surveillance Requirement to Verify Strainer Integrity, dated
February 1, 2007
2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation during Design Basis
Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors, dated June 30, 2006
2004-02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency
Recirculation during Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized Water Reactors, dated September20, 2006
- NRC [[]]
NUREG/CR-6742, Vol. 1, GSI-191 Technical Assessment: Parametric Evaluations for
Pressurized Water Reactor Recirculation Sump Performance, August 2001
NRC Generic Letter 2004-002, Nuclear Energy Institute
Guidance Report: Pressurized Water Reactor Sump Performance Evaluation Methodology,
2/06/2004
Nuclear Energy Institute Guidance Report: Pressurized Water Reactor Sump Performance
Evaluation Methodology, Rev. 1
A-5AttachmentOP-6, Pre-startup Checkoff, Rev.
- UCR 00553, Technical Specifications Bases Change Request, 01/26/2007Section 1R08: Inservice InspectionExamination Procedures
- NDE -5110-CC Rev. 3, Dry Powder AC Yoke Magnetic Particle Examination Of NuclearComponents And Welds
CC Rev. 5, Color Contrast Liquid Penetrant Examination Of Nuclear Components
And Welds
UT-10 Rev. 22, Performance Demonstration Initiative (PDI) UT Qualified Instrument
Equipment/Associated Essential Settings
- CC 07-BV-007, Visual Examination At #22 Hot Leg, System 064, Reactor Coolant SystemCC07-EV-011, Visual/Surface Evaluation Of Boric Acid #22 Hot Leg, CR -553
- IM -014, Magnetic Particle Examination, Lower Head To Support Work Orders2200701547, Boric Acid Leak At Sample Valve, (IRE-020-448), Clean And Adjust Packing2200701560, Boric Acid Leak At Valve
IRE-020-445), Clean, Inspect, And Repair
200701580, Boric Acid Buildup On Insulation At #22
IRE-020-553), Clean,
Determine Source
200700158, Tighten Loose Jam Nut, Evaluate, Document Acceptance Of Zero Clearance
200303715, Repair/Replacement Plan #2006-2-053a, Replace Pipe Section On
SG Feed Water Supply
200303716, Repair/Replacement Plan # 2006-2-054a, Replace Pipe Section On
- SG Feed Water SupplyWelding ProceduresWPS P1-T-LH, Manual Gas Tungsten Arc And Shielded Metal Arc Weld ProcessesWPS P1-T, Manual Gas Tungsten Arc Welding
LH, Manual Shielded Metal Arc Welding
PQR 28, Shielded Metal Arc Welding Procedure Qualification Record
PQR 64G, Shielded Metal Arc Welding Procedure Qualification Record
A-6AttachmentMiscellaneousMN-3-105 Rev 5, Qualification Of Nondestructive Examination Personnel and ProceduresES200700020, Engineering Evaluation of
- CR [[]]
PJF-1303367-TR-008, Demonstration Report/Technical Basis For Manual UT Of
Pressurizer Safety And Relief Nozzle Dissimilar Metal Welds (DSM)
MN-3-105 Rev 5, Qualification Of Nondestructive Examination Personnel And Procedures
U2-UT-10-001, Procedure Field Change Request For
UT-10 Rev C
Letter 03/09/2006, Letter From NRC, Technical Specification Changes And Safety Evaluation
(Amendments #278 and 255)Condition ReportsIRE-020-448IRE-020-445
IRE-020-474
IRE-020-477
LOR-202-3B-S-07, Shutdown OperationsNO-1-200, Revision 32, Control of Shift Activities
NO-1-103, Revision 24, Conduct of Lower Mode Operations
OP-3, Revision 43, Normal Power Operation
IR4-031-327Section 1R12: Maintenance EffectivenessProceduresNO-1-115, Revision 7, Operations Maintenance CoordinationNO-1-203, Revision 12, Operations Section Performance Evaluation
DRWG. No. 61403BSH00134, Revision 0, Main Steam Safety Valves
Condition Reports (CR)IRE-001-326
IRE-019-372 IRE-021-038
A-7AttachmentWork OrdersMO#1200404746MO#1200606127
- CR [[]]
- HVA [[]]
CI-038, Revision 0, Removal, Storage, Installation, and Inspection of Reactor Coolant Pump
Vibration Probes, dated January 4, 2006Maintenance Rule Documents(A)(3) Periodic Assessment of Maintenance Rule Program, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant,October 2004 through September 2006
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP) Maintenance Rule (MR) Scoping Document,
Revision 26(A)(1) - Evaluation, Corrective Action, and Goal Setting PlansIRE-007-423, Area and Process Radiation Monitoring System, Rev.
AFW) System, Rev. 0
IRE-008-929, Unit 2 Instrument Power Supply, Rev. 0
IRE-009-485, Closed Cooling Water Radiation Monitoring System, Rev. 0
IRE-015-094, Reactor Coolant Pumps, Rev. 0
IRE-016-507, Process Radiation Monitoring, Rev. 0
PHC) Meeting MinutesDecember 7, 2004 April 5, 2005April 26, 2005September 20, 2005November 3, 2005 November 15, 2005
November 29, 2005December 13, 2005January 10, 2006
February 14, 2006April 25, 2006August 1, 2006
August 15, 2006September 19, 2006October 24, 2006
October 31, 2006Health ReportsAuxiliary Building And Radwaste Heat & Ventilation Systems, Unit 1 & 2, 4th Quarter 2006Auxiliary Feed Water System, Units 1 & 2, 4th Quarter 2006
Power Supplies Program, Unit 1, 1st Quarter 2007
Process Radiation Monitoring System, Units 1 & 2, 3rd Quarter 2006
Reactor Coolant Pumps, Units 1 & 2, 4th Quarter 2006
Safety Injection (SI) System, Units 1 & 2, 4th Quarter 2006
Salt Water Cooling (SW) System, Units 1 & 2, 4th Quarter 2006
Service Water (SRW) System, Units 1 & 2, 4th Quarter 2006
A-8AttachmentMiscellaneous DocumentsCalvert Cliffs Maintenance Rule Indicator, (a)(1) SSCs, January 2007List of Risk Significant System Functional Failures That Occurred January 1, 2005 Through
December 30, 2006
Maintenance Rule Unavailability Report, dated 1/17/2007 Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work ControlProceduresMN-1-123, Revision 17, Integrated Work PlanningNO-1-117, Revision 18, Integrated Risk ManagementIntegrated Work Schedule Integrated Work Schedule Week 704
Integrated Work Schedule Week 705
Integrated Work Schedule Week 706
Integrated Work Schedule Week 708
Integrated Work Schedule Week 709
Integrated Work Schedule Week 710Miscellaneous DocumentsRefuel Outage Scripts and Contingency Plans Section 1R15: Operability EvaluationsCondition ReportsIRE-019-350IRE-019-457IRE-019-458IRE-019-640IRE-019-641IRE-019-881IRE-019-987IRE-020-200
OI-30, Revision 23, Nuclear Instrumentation 2K200-ALM, Revision 7, Service Water Heat Exchanger Alarm Manual
OI-6, Revision 17, Reactor Protection System
OI-03A-1, Revision 20, Safety Injection and Containment Spray
STP-O-55A-2, Revision 34, Containment Closure Verification
0C188-ALM, Revision 5, 0C DG Local Control Panel Alarm Manual
NO-1-106, Revision 10, Functional Evaluation/Operability DeterminationCalculationE5200100656-000, Rev. 0, Total Loop Uncertainty For The Plant ComputerDetermination Of Maintenance Feedwater Flow
Calculation No. D-92-014,
- HV [[]]
AC-Diesel Generator Heating Requirements
A-9AttachmentDrawingsDRWG. No.
EDG Oil Analysis History ReportInservice Testing Basis Document (ISTBD), Revision 10, Section 14, Safety Injection System
Operator Logs, dated February 26, 2007
OC Diesel Generator Operator Logs dated January 14, 2007, February 22, 2007, and February
23, 2007
Calvert Cliffs Updated Final Safety Analysis ReportSection 1R19: Post-Maintenance TestingProceduresNO-1-208, Revision 11, Nuclear Operations (NO) Post Maintenance TestingMD-1-100, Revision 13, Temporary Alterations
- MS [[]]
MO#2200700152MO#1200603098
MO#1200700305
MO#0200700815
MO#2199801933
MO#2200503868
MO#2200503578Clearance Orders1200600974
DrawingsDRWG. No.: 12310-0080SH0002B-1001SH0002, Revision
SH00031-2006SH0002, Revision 12
A-10AttachmentOtherSD-077, Revision 3, Radiation Monitoring SystemTCF-2200700152Section 1R20: Refueling and Other Outage ActivitiesProceduresNO-1-103, Revision 24, Conduct of Lower Mode OperationsNO-1-200, Revision 32, Control of Shift Activities
OP-2, Revision 43, Plant Startup from Hot Standby to Minimum Load
OP-3, Revision 43, Normal Power Operation
OP-4, Revision 16, Plant Shutdown from Power Operation to Hot Standby
OP-5, Revision 22, Plant Shutdown from Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown
OP-6, Revision 51, Pre-Startup Checkoff
- PS [[]]
- PS [[]]
- PS [[]]
TP-10, Revision 14, Coastdown Procedure
STP-O-55A-2, Revision 34, Containment Closure Verification
MN-1-123, Revision 17, Integrated Work Planning
NO-1-117, Revision 18, Attachment 9, High Risk Activity Plan
MN-1.01-1001, Revision 1, Foreign Material ExclusionCondition ReportsIRE-021-790IRE-020-293IRE-020-433IRE-020-690IRE-021-048IRE-020-865IRE-021-561Work Orders22006005222200700165
200701906
200701793
200701657Clearance Orders22006003732200503272
200600374OtherRefuel Outage Scripts and Contingency PlansGeneric Letter 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal, dated October 17, 1988
- NUMA [[]]
RC 91-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management
A-11AttachmentSection 1R22: Surveillance TestingProceduresSTP-M-562-2, Revision 6, Containment High Range Radiation Monitor Alignment CheckSTP-O-073A-1, Revision 16, Saltwater Pump and Check Valve Quarterly Operability Test
- LO [[]]
CI Sequencer
- ECCS [[]]
- LP [[]]
SI Loop Isolation Valves Quarterly Operability Test
ASME Inservice Testing of Power-Operated Valves & Manual Valves
OI-30, Revision 23, Nuclear Instrumentation
OI-15-2, Revision 45, Service Water System
OI-29-2, Revision 53, Saltwater System
Pump-3, Revision 6, Saltwater Pump Overhaul
Pump-3A, Revision 1, Saltwater Pump Removal and ReplacementWork OrdersMO#2200602402MO#2200600440
MO#2200700152Clearance Orders2200700045
OtherSD-012, Revision 6, Saltwater System DescriptionSection 1R23: Temporary Plant ModificationsProceduresMD-1-100, Revision 13, Temporary AlterationsEN-1-102, Revision 10,
CFR 72.48 Reviews
Temporary Alteration No. 1-07-0002,
IRE-020-675IRE-020-711Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 11, Waste Processing and Radiation ProtectionReactor Head Project: Radiation Protection Task Plan, November 1, 2006
2AttachmentReactor Vessel Head Replacement
RVH Replacement Project Unit #2 Disposal Task Plan
Special Work Permits: 2007-2003; 2007-2008; 2007-2306; 2007-2307; 2007-2308; 2007-2311Section 40A1: Performance Indicator VerificationOther:LER 2006-003, Impact Of Safety Related Equipment Not Considered When High Energy LineBreak Barrier Removed
Unit 1 Safety System Failure Rate Indicator
Unit 2 Safety System Failure Rate IndicatorSection 40A3: Event FollowupProceduresNO-1-117, Revision 18, Attachment 9, High Risk Activity PlanMN-1-123, Integrated Work Planning, Rev. 18
IRE-016-870IRE-019-028IRE-019-929IRE-021-190IRE-021-192IRE-021-739IRE-022-025IRE-022-239OtherLER 2006-005, Startup Rate Trip Bypass Enabling Function Below SetpointLER 05000317/2006-003, Revision 0, Impact On Safety-Related Equipment not Considered
When High Energy Line Break Barrier Removed
Control Room Logs
IR 05000317/2006004 and 05000318/2006004, Calvert Cliffs Integrated Inspection Report
NRC Information Notice 2000-20, Potential Loss of Redundant Safety-Related Equipment
Because of the Lack of High-Energy Line Break Barriers
NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2001-009, Control of Hazard Barriers
Nuclear Plant Operations Section Standing Order 07-01, Rev. 1
Technical Specification 3/4.7.10, Watertight Doors
Technical Specifications 3.7.3, Auxiliary Feedwater System
- UFS [[]]
- UFS [[]]
- UFS [[]]
- UFS [[]]
TS-40.03), Revision 1, Tech Spec Action Basis Document Module 7 - Thermal
PowerSection 40A5: Other ActivitiesES 200200485, Supp. No. 000,
- RRV [[]]
CH, Rev. 01
A-13AttachmentES 200200485, Supp. No. 201, 202, & 203, Transport & Handling Inside Containment, Rev. 01ES 200200768, Supp. No. 00, New Thimble Support Plate, Rev. 7
JE014, Sht. 2, As-Built Dimension -RV2, Rev. 02
CE Drawing No. 12017-0078, Rev. 0, Nozzle Requirements Closure Head, Sheet 0001A
Framatome Engineering Information Record Doc 51-5037285-01, Photogrammetry
Measurements of the Reactor Vessel & Head at Calvert Cliffs
- RV [[]]
CH Key-
Keyway Gap Study
Westinghouse Calculation
- RV [[]]
CH Key-Keyway
Gap Structural Evaluation
Bigge Power Constructors Drawings 05E01 Drawing 5, Sheets 1-12, Rev. 1, Drawing 6 Sheets
1-12, Rev. 2 and Drawing 50, Sheet 1, Rev. 1
PO 408800 - BWC 04 - Surv 01, Quality Assurance Surveillance of Babcock & Wilcox
Canada, dated June 28, 2004
PO 408800 - BWC 05 - Surv 04, Quality Assurance Surveillance of Babcock & Wilcox
Canada, dated May 20, 2005
PO 408800 - BWC 05 - Surv 05, Quality Assurance Surveillance of Babcock & Wilcox
Canada, dated August 4, 2005
- CCN [[]]
PP Reactor Vessel Head Replacement Project, Heavy Loads Assessment Report,
- DESIGN [[]]
- INPUT [[]]
REQUIREMENTS
(DIR)
- EVALUA [[]]
- TION [[]]
- UNIT [[]]
- 2 ASME [[]]
- DESIGN [[]]
- REPO [[]]
- 2 RRV [[]]
- 2 RRV [[]]
CH Post-Weld Heat Treatment Records
B&W Code Data Report & Supplier Code Data Report
Certified Material Test Reports
IRE-018-597
B&W Non-conformance Report 27191
A-14AttachmentLIST
- OF [[]]
- AF [[]]
- ALAR [[]]
- AN [[]]
- AO [[]]
- ASM [[]]
- B&P [[]]
- BW [[]]
- CA [[]]
- CCNP [[]]
- CD [[]]
- CE [[]]
- CED [[]]
- CED [[]]
- CF [[]]
- CI [[]]
- CMT [[]]
- CNM [[]]
TContainment
CRCondition Report
DCDirect Current
- DI [[]]
- DS [[]]
- ECC [[]]
- ED [[]]
- ES [[]]
- EP [[]]
- ES [[]]
- FM [[]]
EForeign Material Exclusion
- HEL [[]]
- HVA [[]]
- IM [[]]
- ISF [[]]
- IS [[]]
- ISLOC [[]]
- IR [[]]
- IS [[]]
TInservice Test
KvKilovolt
- LE [[]]
- LER [[]]
- LOO [[]]
- LP [[]]
- MC [[]]
CMotor Control Center
A-15AttachmentMOMaintenance Work OrderMRMaintenance Rule
- MSI [[]]
- MSI [[]]
- MS [[]]
RMoisture Separator Reheater
- NC [[]]
- ND [[]]
ENon-Destructive Examination
- NPS [[]]
- NR [[]]
CNuclear Regulatory Commission
OAOther Activities
- PA [[]]
- PAR [[]]
- PH [[]]
CPlant Health Committee
- PQ [[]]
- PWSC [[]]
CPrimary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking
PTLiquid Penetrant Test
- RC [[]]
- RC [[]]
- RC [[]]
- RF [[]]
ORefueling Outage
- RP [[]]
- RP [[]]
- RRVC [[]]
- RT [[]]
- RVC [[]]
- RVLM [[]]
- RW [[]]
- SB [[]]
- SD [[]]
- SD [[]]
- SF [[]]
PSpent Fuel Pool
- SR [[]]
- SR [[]]
- SS [[]]
- SSF [[]]
- SU [[]]
RStart-Up Rate
SWSalt Water
TITemporary Instruction
- TS [[]]
PThermal Support Plate
A-16AttachmentUFSARUpdated Final Safety Analysis ReportURIUnresolved Item
UTUltrasonic Test
- WP [[]]