IR 05000334/2010003
| ML102000216 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 07/19/2010 |
| From: | Ronald Bellamy NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6 |
| To: | Harden P FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| bellamy RR | |
| References | |
| EA-08-319 IR-10-003 | |
| Download: ML102000216 (27) | |
Text
UNITED STATES uly 19, 2010
SUBJECT:
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000334/2010003 AND 05000412/2010003, EA-08-319
Dear Mr. Harden:
On June 30,2010, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Beaver Valley Power Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 7,2010, with you and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html(the Public Electronic Reading Room). We appreciate your cooperation. Please contact me at 610-337-5200 if you have any questions regarding this letter.
~~-
Ronald R. Bellamy, Ph.D., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-334,50-412 License Nos: DPR-66, NPF-73
Enclosures:
Inspection Report 05000334/2010003; 05000412/2010003 wi Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION I==
Docket Nos. 50-334, 50-412 License Nos. DPR-66, NPF-73 Report Nos. 05000334/2010003 and 05000412/2010003 Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC)
Facility: Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Post Office Box 4 Shippingport, PA 15077 Dates: April 1, 2010 through June 30, 2010 Inspectors: D. Werkheiser, Senior Resident Inspector E. Bonney, Resident Inspector S. Barber, Senior Project Engineer S. Chaudhary, Reactor Inspector C. Newport, Project Engineer D. Silk, Senior Operations Engineer Approved by: R. Bellamy, PhD., Chief Reactor Projects Branch 6 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
TABLE of CONTENTS 1. REACTOR SAFETY ........................................................................................................4 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection ................................................................................. .4 1R04 Equipment Alignment. ............................................................................................5 1R05 Fire Protection .......................................................................................................6 1R06 Flood Protection Measures ....................................................................................6 1R07 Heat Sink Performance .......................................................................................... 6 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program ........................................................... 8 1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation ......................................................................... 9 1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control ............................... 10 1R15 Operability Evaluations ........................................................................................ 10 1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing ................................................................................... 11 1R22 Surveillance Testing ............................................................................................ 12 1EP6 Drill Evaluation ..................................................................................................... 12 4. OTHER ACTIVITIES .......... '" ........................................................................................ 13 40A 1 Performance Indicator Verification ....................................................................... 13 40A2 Problem Identification and Resolution .................................................................. 13 40A3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion ................................. 15 40A6 Management Meetings ........................................................................................ 15 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION ......................................................................................... A-1 KEY POINTS OF CONTACT .................................................................................................. A-1 LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED ....................................................... A-1 LIST OF DOCUMENTS REViEWED ..........................................................................A-2 LIST OF ACRONyMS ............................................................................................................. A-7 Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000334/2010003, IR 05000412/2010003; 04/01/2010 - 06/30/2010; Beaver Valley Power
Station, Units 1 & 2; Routine Integrated Report The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and regional reactor inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.
No findings were identified.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status:
Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On April 16, the unit was down-powered to 82 percent for planned condenser waterbox cleaning and returned to full power on April 29. The unit remained at 100 percent power for the rernainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at 100 percent full power nearly the entire inspection period. On May 22, the unit was reduced in power to 97 percent power for throttle and governor valve testing. The unit was returned to full power the same day.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstone: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity [R]
R01 Adverse Weather Protection
.1 Seasonal Susceptibility
a. Inspection Scope
(2 samples - Hot Weather, Offsite and Alternate AC Power System Readiness)
The inspectors reviewed the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) design features and FENOC's implernentation of procedures to protect risk significant mitigating systems from adverse weather effects due to summer weather. Two systems listed below were reviewed in detail for hot weather readiness. The inspectors conducted interviews with various station personnel to gain insights into the station's hot weather readiness and reviewed the status of various work orders categorized as warm weather preparation activities. The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program database, operating experience, and the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), to determine the types of adverse weather conditions to which the site is susceptible, and to verify that the licensee was appropriately identifying and resolving weather-related equipment problems.
- On May 21, Unit 1 System Station Service Transformer and Main Transformer
- On May 24, Unit 2 System Station Service Transformer and Main Transformer The inspectors also reviewed BVPS design features and FENOC's implementation of procedures to handle issues that could impact offsite and alternating current (AC) power systems. The inspectors reviewed FENOC's procedures and programs which discussed the operation and availability/reliability of offsite and alternate AC power systems during adverse weather. The inspectors verified that communication protocols between the transmission system operator and FENOC existed, and the appropriate information would be conveyed when potential grid stress and disturbances existed. The inspectors also verified that FENOC's procedures contained actions to monitor and maintain the availability/reliability of offsite and onsite power systems prior to and during adverse weather conditions.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R04 Eguipment Alignment
.1 Partial System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
(4 samples)
The inspectors performed four partial equipment alignment inspections during conditions of increased safety significance, including when redundant equipment was unavailable during maintenance or adverse conditions. The partial alignment inspections were also completed after equipment was recently returned to service after significant maintenance. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems, including associated electrical distribution components and control room panels, to verify the equipment was aligned to perform its intended safety functions:
- On May 5, Unit 2, 'S' train Emergency Diesel Generator during 'A' train system troubleshooting;
- On May 21, Unit 1, 'A' train Component Cooling (Reactor) during 'C' pump post-maintenance testing on the'S' train;
- On June 8 and June 9, Unit 1, River Water System; and
- On June 21, Unit 2, High Head Safety Injection during the performance of Charging Pump (2CHS-P21A) Lube Oil Temperature Controller Calibration.
b. Findings
No findings were identified .
.2 Complete System Walkdown
a. Inspection Scope
(1 sample)
The inspectors completed a detailed review of the alignment and condition of the Unit 2 (2-1) Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). The inspectors conducted a walkdown of the mechanical systems to verify that the critical portions, such as fuel oil, starting air, lube oil, jacket water cooling and air intake systems, were correctly aligned in accordance with procedures, and to identify any discrepancies that may have had an effect on operability.
The inspectors also reviewed outstanding maintenance work orders to verify that the deficiencies did not significantly affect the 2-1 EDG system function. In addition, the inspectors discussed system health with the system engineer and reviewed the condition report database to verify that equipment alignment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
R05 Fire Protection
.1 Quarterly Sample Review
a.
Inspection Scope (5 samples)
The inspectors reviewed the conditions of the fire areas listed below, to verify compliance with criteria delineated in Administrative Procedure 1/2-ADM-1900, "Fire Protection," Rev. 21. This review included FENOC's control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, material condition of fire protection equipment including fire detection systems, water-based fire suppression systems, gaseous fire suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and the adequacy of compensatory measures for any fire protection impairments.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment:
- Unit 1, Diesel Generator 1 Room (Fire Area DG-1);
- Unit 1, Diesel Generator 2 Room (Fire Area DG-2);
- Unit 2, System Station Service Transformer A (Fire Area TR-4);
- Unit 2, System Station Service Transformer B (Fire Area TR-5); and
- Unit 1, Turbine Building (Fire Area TB-1).
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
(1 sample)
The inspectors reviewed a sample of internal flood protection measures for equipment in the Unit 2 'A'-train service water valve pits (VP-2). This review was conducted to evaluate FENOC's protection of the enclosed safety-related systems from internal flooding condition. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the area, reviewed the UFSAR, related internal flooding evaluations, and other related documents. The inspectors examined the as-found equipment and conditions to ensure that they remained consistent with those indicated in the design basis documentation, flooding mitigation documents, and risk analysis assumptions. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
R07 Heat Sink Performance
.1 Annual Resident Sample Review
a. Inspection Scope
(1 sample)
The inspectors reviewed a thermal performance test associated with the Unit 2 'A' Component Cooling (Primary) heat exchanger [2CCP-E21A] conducted on April 7, 2010, in accordance with work order 200366392. The review included an assessment of the testing methodology and verified consistency with Electric Power Research Institute document NP-7552, "Heat Exchanger Performance Monitoring Guidelines," December 1991, and Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment." The inspectors reviewed inspection results, related condition reports and leak test results against applicable acceptance criteria.
b. Findings
No findings were identified .
.2 Triennial Regional Sample Review
a. Inspection Scope
(2 samples)
The inspectors verified that processes and programs were adequate to ensure proper heat exchanger performance for the following heat exchangers:
- Unit 1 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger
- Unit 1 'A' and'S' emergency diesel generator (EDG) heat exchangers
- Unit 2 'A', 'S', and 'c' charging pump lube oil coolers
- Unit 2 'A', 'S', and 'c' service water (SW) pump motor coolers The methods (inspection, cleaning, maintenance, and performance monitoring) used to ensure heat removal capabilities for the selected components were reviewed and compared to commitments made to NRC Generic Letter (GL) 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment."
The inspection, maintenance methods, and cleaning frequencies were reviewed with the system engineers and the heat exchanger performance engineer to ensure that they were consistent with expected degradation trends. The inspectors reviewed inspection and cleaning records for the last five years to verify that the results were recorded and evaluated to ensure proper heat exchanger operation. The inspectors reviewed design basis values and assumptions (Le., plugging limits and vendor information) and verified that they were incorporated into the heat exchanger inspection and maintenance procedures. The inspectors reviewed the system engineers' trending of key parameters (temperature, differential pressure, and flow) used to assess heat exchanger performance.
The SW and river water (RW) chemical treatment program was reviewed and discussed with the system engineers to verify that potential biofouling mechanisms had been identified, treatments were conducted as scheduled, and results were monitored for effectiveness. In addition, a sample of condition reports (CRs) related to eqUipment and programs utilized to ensure heat sink performance was reviewed to verify that identified problems were appropriately resolved. The inspectors conducted a walkthrough inspection and visual examination of the SW and RW systems including the selected heat exchangers in order to assess material condition and current operational lineup.
In addition to the above heat exchanger reviews, the Buried Pipe Integrity Program was reviewed for technical adequacy and effective implementation of the procedure for compliance to the approved program. Condition Reports related to Buried Pipes for the last two years were reviewed to assess performance of the system. This review indicated that the Cathodic Protection system has not been maintained and has been abandoned-in-place for past several years. The Cathodic Protection system is not credited in determining the inspection frequency of buried piping and heat exchangers.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review (71111.11 Q)
a.
Inspection Scope (1 sample)
The inspectors observed one sample of Unit 2 licensed operator simulator training on June 24. The inspectors evaluated licensed operator performance regarding command and control, implementation of normal, annunciator response, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures, communications, technical specification review and compliance, and emergency plan implementation. The inspectors evaluated the licensee training personnel to verify that deficiencies in operator performance were identified, and that conditions adverse to quality were entered into the licensee's corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors reviewed simulator physical fidelity to assure the simulator appropriately modeled the plant control room. The inspectors verified that the training evaluators adequately addressed that the applicable training objectives had been achieved.
b. Findings
No findings were identified .
.2 Biennial Review by Regional Specialist (71111.11 B)
a. Inspection Scope
(inspection continuing)
The following inspection activities were performed using NUREG 1021, Rev. 9, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Inspection Procedure
===7111111, "Licensed Operator Requalification Program," Appendix A "Checklist for Evaluating Facility Testing Material" and Appendix B "Suggested Interview Topics."
A review was conducted of recent operating history documentation found in inspection reports, licensee event reports, the licensee's corrective action program, and the most recent NRC plant issues matrix (PIM). The inspectors also reviewed specific events from the licensee's corrective action program which indicated possible training deficiencies, to verify that they had been appropriately addressed. The senior resident inspector was also consulted for insights regarding licensed operator performance.
These reviews did not detect any operational events that were indicative of possible training deficiencies.
The content of the operating tests for the weeks of April 26, 2010, May 10, 2010, and May 24, 2010 was reviewed for compliance with the applicable standard. Two written examinations (to be administered later in this requalification cycle) were also reviewed against the applicable standard. Both operating and written examinations were checked for acceptable levels of overlap.
Observations were made of the dynamic simulator examinations and job performance measures (JPMs) administered during the week of May 24. These observations included facility evaluations of crew and individual performance during two dynamic simulator examinations and five JPMs.
The remediation plans for one individual and one crew failure during an operating evaluation were reviewed to assess the effectiveness of the remedial training.
One SRO license reactivation was reviewed to ensure that 10 CFR 55.53 license conditions and applicable program requirements were met.
Operators, instructors and training/operations management were interviewed for feedback on their training program and the quality of training received.
Simulator performance and fidelity were reviewed for conformance to the plant control room.
One crew's medical records were reviewed for compliance with license conditions.
The results of the annual operating tests for year 2010 and the biennial written examination for 2010 were not available at the conclusion of this inspection. These results (as well as the results for Unit 2) will be available in the next calendar quarter.
These results will be reviewed to determine whether pass fail rates are consistent with the guidance of NUREG-1 021, Revision 9, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors" and NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, "Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process (SOP)."
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation
a. Inspection Scope
=
The inspectors evaluated Maintenance Rule (MR) implementation for the issues listed below. The inspectors evaluated specific attributes, such as MR scoping, characterization of failed structures, systems, and components (SSCs), MR risk characterization of SSCs, SSC performance criteria and goals, and appropriateness of corrective actions. The inspectors verified that the issues were addressed as required by 10 CFR 50.65 and the licensee's program for MR implementation. For the selected SSCs, the inspectors evaluated whether performance was properly dis positioned for MR category (a)(1) and (a)(2) performance monitoring. MR System Basis Documents were also reviewed, as appropriate. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- CR 10-74713, U1 System 44E (Area Ventilation System), condition monitoring criteria exceeded;
- CR 10-76437, U2 System 36 (Emergency Diesel Generator), maintenance preventable functional failure and condition monitoring evaluation during simultaneous start on May 5; and
- CR 10-77126, U2 System 6 (Power Operated Relief Valve), condition monitoring criteria exceeded.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Control
a.
Inspection Scope (5 samples)
The inspectors reviewed the scheduling and control of five activities, and evaluated their effect on overall plant risk. This review was conducted to ensure compliance with applicable criteria contained in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
- April 5, Unit 1, extended unplanned ventilation testing on 'A' train emergency diesel generator [EDG 1-1];
- April 23, Unit 2, risk assessment regarding emergency service water 'B' pump
[2SWE-P21 B] transfer during 2B system station service transformer maintenance as documented in CR 10-75905;
- April 26, Unit 2, risk associated with unplanned loss of the 'B' station air compressor;
- April 27, Unit 1, risk assessment due to unavailability of the diesel-power air compressor [1IAC-4] fan during roof ventilator [1 VS-F-90] maintenance as documented in CR 10-75964; and
- May 27, Unit 1, review of weekly Maintenance Risk Summary green risk re-assessment for planned, previously assessed Yellow risk, maintenance for emergency switchgear supply fans [1 VS-F-55A and 1VS-F-55B].
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a.
Inspection Scope (6 samples)
The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the following selected immediate operability determinations (IOD), prompt operability determinations (POD), and functionality assessments (FA), to verify that determinations of operability were justified.
In addition, the inspectors verified that technical specification (TS) limiting conditions for operation (LCO) requirements and UFSAR design basis requirements were properly addressed. In addition, the inspectors reviewed compensatory measures implemented to ensure the measures worked and were adequately controlled. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
- On April 5, Unit 1, 1-1 EDG crankcase pressure switch actuation and related ventilation louver gap issues documented in CR 10-74881 and 10-74998;
- On April 26, Unit 1,10 CFR 21 notification (EN#45875) regarding EMD jacket water pump impeller orientation as documented in CR 10-76002;
- On May 5 - 7, Unit 2, 2-1 EDG slower time to voltage issue during simultaneous dual start testing (2BVT-1.36.2) as documented in CR 10-76437;
- On May 31, Unit 1, B Charging Pump outer bearing oil leak documented in CR 10-76978;
- On June 11, Unit2, Emergency Diesel Generator 2-1 analysis of fuel pump failures documented in CR 10-78100; and
- On June 16, Unit 2, Replacement of C Incore Detector due to instrument failure during flux mapping as documented in CR 10-78095.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
(6 samples)
The inspectors reviewed the following activities to determine whether the post-maintenance tests (PMT) adequately demonstrated that the safety-related function of the equipment was satisfied given the scope of the work, and that operability of the system was restored. In addition, the inspectors evaluated the applicable acceptance criteria to verify consistency with the design and licensing bases, as well as TS requirements. The inspectors witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify results adequately demonstrated restoration of affected safety functions. The inspectors also verified that conditions adverse to quality were entered into the corrective action program for resolution. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
- On April 6, Unit 1, 1MSP-36.68-1, following crankcase pressure switch replacement;
- On April 8, Unit 1, WO 200412175 after 1-1 Emergency Diesel Generator room intake damper adjustments;
- On May 18, Unit 1, 1CAL-6-T408D following reinstallation and wiring of the steam dump control system signal comparator;
- On May 21, Unit 1, 10ST-15.3 (WO 200371054), 1CC-P-1C pump test and check valve (1CCR-6) reverse-flow check valve test (WO 200274642) after valve replacement;
- On May 31, Unit 1, 1OST-7.5 following repair of a 'B' charging pump outboard bearing oil leak; and
- On June 10, Unit 1, 1MSP-2.04-1, following an unplanned power range nuclear instrument (N-42) power supply replacement.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
(6 samples: 1 leak rate, 2 in-service testing and 3 routine)
The inspectors witnessed the performance of or reviewed test data for the six following Operation Surveillance Test (OST) and Maintenance Surveillance (MSP) packages. The reviews verified that the equipment or systems were being tested as required by TS, the UFSAR, and procedural requirements. The inspectors also verified that the licensee established proper test conditions, that no equipment pre-conditioning activities occurred, and that acceptance criteria were met.
- On April 28, 10ST-36.22A, Rev. 9, "Diesel Gen. No.1 Simulated Undervoltage Start Signal" (1ST);
- On May 3, 1RST-3.1, Rev. 8, "Incore Moveable Detector Normalization" (R);
- On May 3, 1RST-3.2, Rev. 11, "Incore Flux Mapping" (R);
- On June 9, 20ST-6.2A, Rev. 28, "Operating Surveillance Test, Computer Generated Reactor Coolant System, Water Inventory Balance" (LRT); and
- On June 14, 10ST-24.3, Rev. 41, "0 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump Test" (1ST).
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
(1 sample)
The inspectors observed an emergency preparedness mini-drill and Unit 2 licensed-operator simulator evaluation on June 24. Senior licensed-operator performance regarding event classifications and notifications were specifically evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the simulator-based scenario that involved multiple, safety-related component failures and plant conditions that would have warranted emergency plan activation, emergency facility activation, and escalation to the event classification of Alert. The licensee planned to credit this evolution toward Emergency Preparedness Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) Indicators, therefore, the inspectors reviewed the applicable event notifications and classifications to determine whether they were appropriately credited, and properly evaluated consistent with Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Rev. 6, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline." The inspectors reviewed licensee evaluator worksheets regarding the performance indicator acceptability, and reviewed other crew and operator evaluations to ensure adverse*
conditions were appropriately entered into the Corrective Action Program. Other documents utilized in this inspection include the following:
- 1/2-ADM-1111, Rev. 4, "NRC EPP Performance Indicator Instructions;"
- 1/2-ADM-1111.F01, Rev. 3, "Emergency Preparedness Performance Indicators Classifications/Notifications/PARS;"
- EPP-I-1a/b, Rev. 14, "Recognition and Classification of Emergency Conditions;"
- 1I2-EPP-I-2, Rev. 35, "Unusual Event;"
- 1/2-EPP-I-3, Rev. 33, "Alert;"
- 1/2-EPP-I-4, Rev. 33, "Site Area Emergency;" and
- 1/2-EPP-I-5, Rev. 34, "General Emergency."
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
fOAl 40A 1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
a. Inspection Scope
(6 samples total)
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for Performance Indicators (PI) listed below for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 to verify accuracy of the data recorded from July 2009 through June 2010. The inspectors reviewed Licensee Event Reports, condition reports, portions of various plant operating logs and reports, and PI data developed from monthly operating reports. Methods for compiling and reporting the Pis were discussed with cognizant engineering and licensing personnel. To verify the accuracy of the PI data reported during this period, PI definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline," Revision 6, were used for each data element.
Comerstone: Mitigating Systems (2 samples)
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 Safety System Functional Failure [MS05];
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity (4 samples)
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Activity [BI01]
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Leak Rate [BI02]
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
40A2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152 - 1 sample total)
.1 Daily Review of Problem Identification and Resolution
a Inspection Scope As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"
and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into FENOC's corrective action program. This review was accomplished by reviewing summary lists of each CR, attending screening meetings, and accessing FENOC's computerized CR database.
b. Findings
No findings were identified .
.2 Annual Sample: Review of The Operator Workaround (OWA) Program
a. Inspection Scope
(1 sample)
The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of the existing operator workarounds, the list of operator burdens, existing operator aids and disabled alarms, and the list of open main control room deficiencies. This review was performed to identify any effect on emergency operating procedure operator actions, and any impact on possible initiating events and mitigating systems. The inspectors evaluated whether station personnel had identified, assessed, and reviewed OWAs as specified in Beaver Valley administrative procedure BVBP-OPS-0002, "Operator WorkArounds, Operator Burdens, and Control Room Deficiencies" Rev. 11.
The inspector reviewed BVPS's process to identify, prioritize and resolve main control room distractions to minimize operator burdens. The inspector reviewed the system used to track these operator workarounds and burdens and recent licensee self assessments of the program. The inspectors reviewed the corrective report database.
The inspector toured the control room, and discussed the following items with the operators to ensure the items were being addressed on a schedule consistent with their relative safety significance:
- Burden 200286133, "B System Station Service Transformer Oil Leakage."
Impact is increased monitoring requirements for operators.
- Burden 200369748, "Isolation of Hot Water Heating System Temperature Control Valve." Impact is operator monitoring and manual operation is required.
- Burden 200337316, "Pressurizer heaters trip when taking Steam Dump Mode selector to reset." Impact is additional operator actions may be required.
- Burden 600454502, "10S-186 Torqued to 75 ft-Ibs." Impact is additional monitoring is required.
- Burdens 600600513 and 600596535, "1WT-P-30A and 30B high vibrations."
Impact is additional action required by operators.
b. Findings
. Assessment. and Observations No findings were identified. During the inspection, FENOC tracked only three operator burdens at each unit. The inspectors verified that quarterly aggregate impact assessments were performed as expected by the program. The licensee assessed that the aggregate impact of the burdens were minimal and would not adversely affect the operators' ability to promptly and appropriately respond to an event. The inspectors also noted that the program had recently been turned over to a new owner within the operations department.
40A3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153 - 2 samples total)
The inspectors performed two event followup inspection activities. Documents reviewed for this inspection activity are listed in the Supplemental Information attached to this report .
.1 Plant Event Review
a. Inspection Scope
(1 sample)
For the plant event below, the inspectors reviewed and/or observed plant parameters, reviewed personnel performance, and evaluated performance of mitigating systems.
The inspectors reviewed FENOC's follow-up actions related to the events to assure that appropriate corrective actions were implemented commensurate with their safety significance. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.
- Unit 2: On April 26, during a planned maintenance outage of the 'A' station air compressor, the '8' station air compressor failed to continue to load. The loss of the '8' station air compressor resulted in the lowering of system header pressure.
The standby diesel-powered air compressor started as designed and maintained system air pressure, preventing an adverse secondary plant response.
Operators referenced the Loss of Station Air abnormal operating procedure and took appropriate actions in an attempt to restart the '8' air compressor and expedited restoration of the 'A' air compressor. This issue was documented in CR 10-75910.
b. Findings
No findings were identified .
.2 Review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) (1 sample)
(Closed) LER 05000412/2009-002-00. Unacceptable Indications Identified During Reactor Vessel Head Inspection.
The LER discussed the basic cause of the head indications during 2R14 (October 2009)and that the cause is a known issue in the industry No new issues were identified. The inspectors reviewed the LER and no findings of significance were identified and no violation of NRC requirements occurred. This LER is closed.
40A5 Other
.1 EA-08-319, Followup ofTraditional Enforcement Actions
a. Inspection Scope
By letter dated January 20, 2009 (05000334-412/2008008, ML090220632), the NRC issued a violation to FENOC related to the security program. The licensee documented the issue in CR 08-35373.
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions concerning the violation in accordance with the requirements of inspection procedure 92702, Rev 1/10108. Per the letter issued by the NRC (ML090220632), credit was given to the licensee for the immediate corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the intial CR and interviewed security access and regulatory affairs personnel.
b. Observations and Findings
Concerning corrective actions, the inspectors determined the licensee's response and corrective actions were timely and appropriate since no further actions were needed after the initial response. The inspector did identify deficiencies in the implementation of select processes and corrective action documentation but not to the extent that appropriate actions could not be verified. Based on the document reviews, observations, and interviews, the inspectors concluded that adequate corrective actions were implemented for the documented violation .
.2 Review of Licensee Inspection of Unit 1 Containment Liner on May 7
a. Inspection Scope
On May 6, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's plan to conduct two of eight non-random ("smart") samples to ultrasonically measure the liner thickness of the Unit 1 containment liner. The two areas selected were located near the personnel airlock door.
The selection was based on previously agreed criteria. The measurements were obtained by qualified personnel using an approved procedure (NDE-UT-308). Minimum wall thickness criteria and actions were established. On May 7 measurements were recorded. The lowest measured wall thickness point at the two non~random areas was 0.406 inches. Design nominal wall thickness is 0.375 inches. All points at the two areas were assessed to be satisfactory.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
40A6 Management Meetings
.1 Triennial Heat Sink
The inspector presented the inspection results of 1R07T to Mr. Raymond Lieb, Director or Site Operations, and other members of FENOC staff, at the conclusion of the inspection on April 29. No proprietary information is presented in this report .
.2 Unit 1 LORT Biennial
The inspector presented the inspection results of 1 R11 B to Mr. Paul Harden, Site Vice President, and other members of FENOC staff, at the conclusion of the inspection on May 28. No proprietary information is presented in this report .
.3 Quarterly Inspection Report Exit
On July 7, the inspectors presented the normal baseline inspection results to Mr. Paul Harden, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not retained at the conclusion of the inspection period.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
B. Boyle System Supervisor
T. Dileo Reactor Engineer
- N. Dipetra Security, Fleet
- A. Ellis Secu rity, Access
W. Etzel PRA Engineer
P. Harden Site Vice President
S. Keener System Engineer
R. Kuhn Engineer
G. Lauck System Engineer
- R. Lieb Director, Site Operations
J. Lutz Shift Manager
- C. Mancuso Manager, Design Engineering
J. Mauck Senior Nuclear Specialist
J. Miller Site Fire Marshall
J. Meyers River Water System Engineer (System 30)
C. O'Neil Reactor Engineer
R. Palonis PRA Engineer
- P. Pauvlinch Superintendent, Construction Services
- D. Price Supervisor, Nuclear Engineering
- M. Ressler Supervisor, Engineering Analysis
- B. Sepelak Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance
- B. Tuite Manager, Regulatory Compliance
Other Personnel
- L. Ryan Inspector, Pennsylvania Department of Radiation Protection
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Closed
- 05000412/2009002-00 LER Unacceptable Indications Identified During Reactor Vessel Head Inspection. (Section 40A3)