ML17309A655

Responds to NRC 990310 RAI Re Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment

ML17309A655
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	06/07/1999
From:	Mecredy R ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	Vissing G NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned), NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
REF-GTECI-A-46, REF-GTECI-SC, TASK-A-46, TASK-OR TAC-M69449, NUDOCS 9906150159
Download: ML17309A655 (289)

Text

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION ~ 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649-0001 Roben C. Mecredy Vice President Nuclear Operating Group June 7, 1999 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Attn: Guy Vissing Project Directorate I-1 Washington, D.C. 20555-0001

Subject:

Response to RAI Regarding Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment (TAC No. M69449)

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50/244

References:

A. Letter from Guy S. Vissing (NRC) to Dr.

Robert C. Mecredy (RG&E)

"Request for Additional Information (RAI )

Regarding the RE Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Summary Report on the Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors, dated January 31, 1997" (TAC No. M69449), dated 3/10/99 B. Letter from Robert C. Mecredy (RG&E) to Document Control Desk (NRC), dated January 31, 1997t "Resolution of Generic Letter 87-02, Supplement 1 and Generic Letter 88-20, Supplements 4 6 5".

Dear Mr. Vissing:

Enclosed are Rochester Gas Sc Electric's responses to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI), reference A.

Very ruly yours, Robert C. Mecredy Enclosures

xc: gr. Guy S. Vissing (mail stop 8C2)

Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects- I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC 20555 Regional Administrator, Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale road King of Prussia, PA 19406 U.S. NRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector

J RG&E Responses to NRC RAZ, 3/10/99 NRC RAZ a:

Describe what reviews were performed to determine reactor(i.e.,

the if any local operator actions required to safely shutdown implement the SSEL) could be affected by potentially adverse environmental conditions (such as loss of lighting, excessive heat or humidity, or in-plant barriers resulting from the seismic event. Describe how the staffing was evaluated and describe the reviews which were conducted to ensure operators had adequate time and resources to respond to such events.

RGSE Response a:

During the SSEL development engineering personnel performed thorough plant walkdowns. Those walkdowns identified several areas where seismic interactions could cause collateral damage which could complicate achieving, saf e shutdown. En the development of the SSEL the equipment outliers were characterized as Group A and Group B Outliers. Group A outliers consisted of equipment that could sustain a potential loss of function which normal proceduralized operator actions do not compensate for; Group B outliers consisted of equipment which could lose its preferred mode require of operation or had the potential to mal-operate and compersatory manual operator action-. The resolution process of the Group B outliers directly addressed the issues identified in this request for additional information.

RG&E developed a Group B outlier resolution plan which was chartered to examine:

"The cumulative a ffect of the losses of pre ferred modes of operation, and the subsequent manual operation of SSEL equipment, should be studied to examine the possibility of physical or procedural enhancements. These studies may also include margin studies to aid in defining the priorities in which manual actions should be taken" .

An operations shift crew was detailed to work on the issue. The SSEL development engineer and the seismic engineer provided training delineating the SSEL development and the expected plant damage states.

The operations crew was then commissioned to the perform plant walkdowns and table top discussions to validate ability to achieve the desired equipment operations. The engineering staff provided "analytical obstacles" that had to be defeated. These obstacles included:

Debris fields Expected harsh environments Blocked/jammed doors Communication system failures Lighting failures Specifically the 'operators were tasked to:

1) Verify the procedural set analyzed'n the SSEL was correct.

2) Review the order in which equipment is operated and the time it takes to cascade to the SSEL equipment through procedural compliance.

3) Identify procedural weaknesses, i.e., identifying where doing things in the wrong sequence (from a priority standpoint) might lead to difficulties in achieving safe shutdown.

4) Walkdown selected procedure steps. The walkdowns included time penalties incurred from working around earthquake induced damage. (i.e., block wall rubble, minor leaks, the need to use ladders, etc.)

The outcome of the operator reviews revealed that the primary obstacle to achieving 'safe shutdown was due to both direct and secondary damage incurred from intermediate building block wall failures'hen the operators hazardous were confronted with the plant damage environments) incurred from state, (including potential postulated failures in the building level which contains the steam

'eader, they expected to experience delays which could hinder the achievement of safe shutdown.

Accordingly, the impediments were resolved by per forming an engineering modification to the affected wall panels which would preclude seismically-induced failure. Additionally the operators identified the need to provide additional procedural clarifications detailing expected seismically induced equipment lossesof and guidance as to how to mitigate those losses. The effects the plant modifications along with the procedural enhancements were then reviewed to ensure that a normal operating shift compliment had sufficient resources and adequate time to achieve all actions necessary to safe shut down.

The plant SSEL, revision 1, addresses. the resolution of the Group A and Group B outliers and includes a description of how resolution was achieved. The table summarizing resolution of all USI A-46 outliers is provided in Enclosure 2.

NRC RAZ b:

As part of the licensee's review, were any control room structures which could impact the operator's ability to respond to the seismic event identif ied? Such items might include but are not limited to: MCR ceiling tiles, non bolted cabinets, and non-restrained pieces of equipment (i.e.,

computer keyboards, monitors, stands, printers, etc.).

Describe how each of these potential sources of interactions has been evaluated and describe the schedule for implementation of the final resolution.

NRC Response b:

During the development of the Safe Shutdown Equipment List (SSEL) and subsequent SQUG walkdown of this equipment various seismic interactions were identified and resolved. The R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Control Room was determined to house ten major SSEL components. Each component walkdown was documented in a Screening Evaluation Work Sheet (SEWS). A review of these SEWS revealed 7 out of the 10 components had at least one seismic interaction step ladder, An unanchored 'ail concern. These interactions included an unsecured cabinet, copier, and air sampler.

miscellaneous storage cabinets, control room ceiling tiles, and box, adjacent masonry walls were also identified. The seismic review team directed removal of identified seismic hazards, researched the control room ceiling evaluation, and documented the block wall qualifications. The SRT confirmed hazard removal in July 1996 and documented equipment seismic acceptance on component SEWS.

NRC RAI c:

Describe what reviews were performed to determine if any local actor operator actions were required to reposition "bad relays". For any such activities describe who adverse environmental conditions (such as loss of lighting, excessive heat or humidity, or in-plant barriers) resulting from the seismic event were analyzed and dispositioned. Describe how staffing was evaluated and describe the xeviews which were conducted to ensure operators had adequate time and resources to respond to such events.

RG&E Response c:

RGEE performed a comprehensive evaluation of all relays associated with the SSEL (App. G of the January 31, 1997 submittal). All relays which were defined as 'low ruggedness'elays were modified or replaced, in accordance with the schedule provided in Enclosure

2. There are currently no 'low ruggedness'elays associated with the Ginna Station safe shutdown methodology equipment, and therefore no local operator actions are credited for resetting such relays.

NRC RAI d:

Describe which of the operator actions associated with resetting SSEL equipment affected by postulated relay chatter are considered to be routine and consistent with the skill of the craft. If not considered skill of the craft, what to training and operational aids were developed resetensure the operators will perform the actions required to affected equipment?

RG6E Response d:

As stated in response to RAI d, no local operator actions are credited for resetting relays in the Ginna Station safe shutdown methodology .

NRC RAI e:

Assume the alarms associated with the "bad actor relays" are expected to annunciate during the seismic event. Do the operators have to respond to those annunciators and review the annunciator response procedures associated with them for potential action? How would those additional actions impact the operators ability to implement the Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency Operating Procedures required to place the reactor in a safe shutdown condition?

RG&E Response e:

This issue has previously been the subject of discussion between SQUG and the NRC, and has already been resolved. For completeness, we will summarize this resolution:

As described in EPRI Report NP-7148, Section 3.5.3, following an earthquake which causes a turbine and reactor trip, 50 to 100 or more alarms are expected to annunciate. The operators will clearly be aware that the plant has tripped.

Plant procedures and operator training require that operators response to the turbine trip and reactor scram by confirming the scram and trip and checking important levels, temperatures, pressures, flows, and electrical switching resulting from associated power transfers. These confirmatory checks will take more than a minute to go through during which time the operators will be busy making these checks and not motion is responding to specific alarms. The earthquake assumed to last less than a minute and the causes of the spurious alarms will have gone away during this period while the operators are responding to the plant trip.

As concluded in EPRI NP-7148, Section 3.5.3, p 3-12, "Accordingly, there appear to be no reasonable bases or evidence which would suggest that spurious alarms resulting adequate' from an earthquake may lead to abnormal operator responses. Therefore, special operating procedures or relay evaluation actions to address potential spurious alarms are not considered warranted and relays af fecting alarms need not be seismically

"

The NRC staff accepted the relay functionality review procedure summarized in GIP-2 and described in detail in EPRI NP-7148 (including the above conclusion) in Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report No. 2 on GIP-2. Therefore, RGSE does not consider the effect it spurious necessary to perform any additional reviews of alarms caused by "low ruggedness" relays or other causes as a result of a seismic event.

NRC RAZ f:

To the extent that Normal, Abnormal, and Emergency Operating Procedures were modified to provide plant staff with additional guidance on mitigating the A-46 Seismic Event, describe what training was required and provided to the licensed operators, non-licensed operators, and other plant .

staff required to respond to such events.

RGEE Response f:

Only minimal changes were required for plant procedures to account for the effects of the A-46 Seismic Event. Because Ginna uses Alternative Shutdown post fire methodologies the RGEE staff was already familiar with ex-control room manipulations to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. The normal and abnormal operating procedures provided for all functional requirements necessary for post seismic safe shutdown. The SQUG driven procedure changes consisted of guidance steps added to procedure ER-SC.4, Earthquake Emergency Plan. For the most part, the additional guidance took the form of reminders - prompting the operators as to the expected worse case equipment losses and to the correct procedure and step which mitigates that loss.

The procedure changes were reviewed by the Emergency Procedure Committee prior to submittal. A training request (TWR 1998-0700) was included with the procedure change submittal. The training department reviewed the change and determined tht read and acknowledge was the appropriate training method. To that end, the changes were reviewed by all operators, shift technical advisors and licensed instructors.

0 OUTLIER TABLE INCLUDES AQS, GROUP B <Airy Rcv. 4, 4/IS/99 DESCRIPTIOH REQUIRED OUTUER ISSUE IHTERMl ACCEPTABIUTY RESOLUTIOH RESOI.UTIOH FUN CTIOH PLAHlSCHEDULE DOCUMEHTS STATUS Molor Conkd conbls Obhbde These MCC'a aro Noor This caveat rosuNod born an SSRAP concern Nr¹ Nlefo Fhakzo doaxnordation ol SNA Anelysb C.O.Hand J power>>ld mounkrd and>>o 15 doop. ware no single socUon MCCO al dabl base silos loss N>>n capacNy h 1991. 93C2709 C022 dr cuit Per the GIP anMCC naslbo 10 deep Ihsl saw ground motion onlho ord<<ol the Revbod SEWS breakers 10 deep or be lop braced. SOUG Rel<<ence St>>ckum (0.5 g ZPA). Since U>>n, Ihe CATS R05S24 9/30/90 plovld4 dhlabsso hss been expanded. SutUdent evidence b lsd¹ion svsibtAe lo domonsVslo capacity above 0 2 g. Ground Va br MCC's bw in s such as Iheso.

Molor Conkd Cenbrs A numb<<ol Ihe anchors Anchorage c¹cubgons wore p<<to/mod using knockdowll Verily emlxxknenl and boN wore Embedn>>nta L and M have siglvticsnt exposed tadors br bw conaolo strength, ossonUal relays and Ughlness dudng 1997 lokrokng I9701247 and and lorquos length. so Iho anchorage unknown anchor type. The reductbns were 0.15 x 0.75 x odago. II nocess>>y kalA 19701240 vorlod accoptstdo.

ombodrrloAl rosy not rllool 0 0 ~ 0.3 (base aaowsbb) and N>> resuN was a malgh ot modgk¹bn durhg 1999 RFO. <<at>>dnl<<lb and Updated SEWS GIP rsqukomonb 1.19 whkhb consldersbb considering N>> reducUon taken torque 3/17/90.

lo mod U>> GIP aN<<la. N>> <<nbedment dopgr shoukt bo OuWer ctoood.

v<<led and a boN Ughk>>ss check made. Tho Nn¹ report br EWR 2013 stela N>>IN>> anchorage Ior MCCMhas a tsdord sat x 10.

52/8YA Rssdor Trip Breakers Tdp Roador The Roador Tdp breakers ION open (Raacbr 'Tdp).They Need bU>> tusUtyhg Docxansntagon 52/8YB and Reacbl Tdp open onbss d DC power and bss ot MG setL Ho acceptance provided by 52/RTA Bypass Breakers asckbb taNuro mode exbb kw UUO scenado. (Dove WUsolvkN)F) 'I 2/7/99 0 52/RT8 WNaon to FNzshsool>>

OuWw cteood BUS 10 Bus 10 SwNctlge>> tk>> 10b adtscod ARB IRC10. The dssranco varies born 3/lPlo almost nN Bus 10 contak>> essenNal. chsUer senaRw relays. Tl>>

concern b Ur¹ rack lo rack Impacts c>>l cause relay chan<<. It b nol Nk¹y N>>t pdonUsl hUracts between BCN cabhots 1991 bgoth<<dudng ro4olhg outage.

PCR 997435 DACE 97423 cola>>dod wotdod cgp

~

at exposed boN hoods. Bus Ihese est@>>ts. The reby cabhel b moulded at N>> ond ot CATS R05)I20 ~ ngbe. InstaN, 10 contains essonUal r obys BUS 10. BUS 10 b 100 bng, 50 deep, 70 IUgh and ConUU¹ ~ t I/gr.

so Oh conhgursUonb an weighs about 150009. The leby cabhet ls 70 ION. 24 Upd¹ed SEWS htsrsdbn ouU>>r because ol deep and bng and weighs about 10009. Tt>> swNdlgear 3/I 7/90. OutN<<

N>> possibb lmpsd d U>> csbhot wiN nol dispbco much at aN abng Ks bng C400ed cstkl¹. dimension and Iho rrNsy cabhel msy Impscl N bd wkh N>>or 'e knb otloct. This b pul¹y a SQUG concern and oubkb ot barb.

OUTLIER TABLE INCLUDES AM, GROUP 8 Rcv. 4, 415/99 OESCRIP'TIOH REQUIRED OUTUER ISSUE INTERQl ACCEPTASILITy RESOLUTIOH RESOLUTION FUNCTION PLANISCNEOULE DOCUKENTS STATUS Cunent LimNng Two bliss. 8>> SRT judged Tho btticod (sknssr lo expanded rnolsi) pÃlob on Iho Perform arkQtbcud anslysb b S4A crdcrdagon No.

Reacbls Q>> csbhots lo bo fakfy fmnt and back of rhe cabinets roquko additional anaiysb dolormhe capscNy by snd of 92C2750C421 Qexibb I<8 Hr). Q>>lebre 1.5 Io delormhe Ihe true cspacky ol tho cabinets, or Ihe 1997. If modigcatbnb x BS vs. Fbor spedrs wss sdditbn of skffonof S. Tho cspacky may nol qugo nleol 8>> necessary Instal dudng I QQQ used. The FRS exceeds 1.5 current Rog. Gukb Ibor specks, bul woukf Ossify meal RFO x BS. Hso. Ihe cabinet original design specks.

structure b quesbonsble due CATS R05827 lo Ihe lsttbsd panelson the konl snd back.

TEQOQA.I RCS Loop A Ilot Leg RCS Hot Leg Cables h BW trays Temperature hrgcsgon Is doskod lo monsoc cool down P<<form addigonal anslysb d Rosokrson d hdude Temp<<strxe Element Temperature rates snd roscdr colo delta T's foc nskxsl drcubtbn. dotormhe cspadty of bbck wsQO. lakhg manual rosdhg PCN.

hdicatbn Shoukf bop A hdicabon be bat. loop lsmpocstures can be obtshodby msnusly resdhg 8>> rosbbnce ol other IPEEE anslysb showed adrstbnal capadty we4 above NR ThfTC provides CR kxgcNon hdd al no ER-SCA Rev. I signed 2I tgrgg RTO's h 0>> RCS bop. The pcocess Invohies obtshhg Q>>t reported durhg IE 801 I bad lave unN ready d SSEL Rav. 1 ee proper measuring device. Iehg leads ln csbhets ln rosokrtbn. Procedure &be uso RTD reargngL 0>> roby loom, takhg cesbtanc>> resdhgs and converlhg QnaQzed In 1997. If n~bagons change SSEL - hdd HR SEWS cpdetea Ihose lo bmperstures. Hthough Ihb ls a fskfy sfmpb sre nscess<<y, they wNbe d SSEL requksrL CCVF procedure snd hss been perlom>>dh Q>> pssL 8 b nol s perfom>>d durhg 199Q RFO. ER-SCA Rev. 4 CATS R05828 SSEL Rev. 1 OuNec closed TE~I RCS Loop B Cold Leg RCS Cold Leg Cabbs h BW Trays See TEROQA-I See TE~1 change SSEL - hdd HR Oaw WQeon Temperature Ebmenl T<<nperakxe CATS RO5828 lo SSEL, ER-SCA Rav. PCH. SSEL hrgcason 4 Rav. 1, ER-SCA OuNer cdeed LT-50S SIG A Wde Range Requkedbr Cabbs in BW Trays OQ>>r wide range level kxfbatbn dovbes are avagsbb, Same as TE~I Cen use SAFW Qow snd pressurizer presa Oave WQeon Level Transmktsr SG A Level bul Q>>y have power hterdepond<<xkes Q>>t may make SSEL Rev. 1 them suscoplibb d oQ>>r slngb fsgules. Shoukl 8 be CATS R05829 have akeady changed necessary, S!G h wkle range level can be obtshed by FR's d OQow use OwNer cdeod msnusyy losdhg Q>> curronl loop sssodsled wtsi bop LT- SAFW Qow le GIPed.

505. This Irwotves obtshhg Q>> proper messurhg hdd SAFW Flow d oquiprnonl. ktgng leads In a cabhol h 8>> roby coom. SSEL taking a current measurement snd coclv<<thg Q>>t lo s SSEL Rev. I 423rgg bvol rosdhg.

Although the process b slmpb, 8 b not a nonnsly ocoduco.

OUTLIER TABLE INCLUOES AQB, GROUP B Rcv. 8, ALIIS/99 BTRTA Be&cry Racks A and 8 DC Power Cols lack dose Qtthg The be&cry racks moot Ihe crsrent design basis lor A modi&cstion lo meal GIP PCR 99743d Iralsped BIRTB spscors between ceKS snd seismic boding in borh horizontal dkectbns. cntens Is h the design process mods. 1997. Need now K>> anchorage ol the racks snd wlK be cornfNeted no bter mod. hr lerpsr ~ ohmtcapy hr norpr south bade does Ihsn Ihe nexl refuothg outage battodos. Buylnp quapped lacks h nol meal Iho GIP (1997). qusK&ed rake: hstaK h 1999. Sewa requkon>>nts CATS R05830 99 RFQ. w.o.'e 19702770. 19702771 PT468 SIG A Pressure SIG Pressure Invesligstion ol bbck wsÃs hr tt>> IPEEE showed Same ss TE<OQA.I DACE-QQ4lf qus8&ed Transmitter ddiibonsl msrgn above Ihsl evslusled durhp IE BuNsth 0>> wa8 K>>rehro 80.11. This anstysts shows thol the wsNs are scceptsbh CATS R05831 removhp 9>> hlersdbn hr the original design spedrs snd possibly for 9>> crsrent QusiKy wsl 97f-Nl R . Gukh a.

Westhghouso CRN-1 Demand i GERS hr a8 The relays noot 9>> demand based on Ihe orighsl pround Analyze cobhet b dolanoho PCR 997431 Door opener Relay states spedrs Induding in csbhel smptt&cstbnhr sK operslnp sdusl demand. K mod. roqukod.

slates ol Ihe relays. Thefebre they meet oul crÃront Instep In IQQ7 RFQ. 11IQT. Updeled desipn basis. SEWS 11$ 8.

CATS R05832 C4Qec closed Westhgtrouse CRN- Tho lrNsys meet Iho demand based on 9>> EÃlghst ground Analyze csbklet lo dotormho PCR QM3f Door esenor IRshy spedrs. hdudhg h cabhel amf~tbn for aK operspnp actual demand. Nmod. req'4 mode. Instaped states ol Ihe retsys. Therehre they meal oui current hstsK ln IQQ7 RFQ. 11$ 7. Updelod desipn basta. SEWS 11$ 8.

CATS R05&32 Oufper chood InM4 Cabinet ampk&cstion Requke lurp>>r analysts lo detormhe cabhel amph&colon. See Group 8 bebw waK ls 42I350SA Westhghouse Size 2 i -

~~

42I3505A DC Motor Starter V3504 A and unknown. outKer K 1.8 Vstves sro Group 8 ouWers tbhck wa8) soe rKscussbn 4

MS V3505A hr Group 8 bobw and ln 9>> SSEL Report CATS R05838 W.O. I980IM3 KOIIDGA AKsn Brarpey -

Need lo Invessgste ekher pel dots. tost robrys replace

~ Detennh dm Rebya rofNscod KfX/DGB 200EOOZI A Relay wkh relays ol known ruggedness. I ~ coopt or replace by 8>> ond ol ,I II97. Updated K>> 1997 RFQ relay oval. Shts 3I I yl98.

DutKer dosed KO.A POuer Brumr>>td 8739- In DGACP & No Dais Need lo Invesbgale - either gel data. Iesl relays or replace Detennhe cspsdty snd ekher PCR 97432 Relays replaced K4.8 83 A2 Relays DGBCP wkh relays ol known ruggedness. replace by K>> end of I IIQ7. Updated 8>> 1997 RFQ relay evsl Shts 3l1 yl98 Outger closed

OUTLIER TABLE INCLUDES A~, GROUP B Rcv. 4, 4II5/99 OSR A Alen Brscley -

Need lo Inveslgsle either gel data. leal rdsys or reptsce Oetelmhe cspscly and dther Relays repdced OSR-8 200E400ZIA Rdays wlh rdsys ol known ruggechess. accept or replace by 9>> end of 11IQ7. Updsdd the 1997 RFO rday evaL Shd 3IITIQe.

Outgec dosed VFX.I.A Alen Brscley -

Need lo InvesUgale erther gel data, leal rdays or repdca Oelermhe cspsdty and elher Rdays replaced VFX-I.B 200E300Z IA Relays with rdsys of known ruggedness. sccepl or repdce by Ihe end of 11I97. Updsdd Ihe 1997 RFO redy eval. Shd 3ltylge.

Outeec cheed VFX-2.A Alen Bradley No Osis -

Need lo InvesUgste dther gel data. lest redye or replace Petennhe cspscly and eWer Relays repdced VFX-2.8 200E300Z IARedye wWr rdays of known ruggedness. accept or repdce by 9>> end of t tl97. Updsisd Ihe 1997 RFO rdsy eval. Stds 3l tylge.

Outger cheed Upon further hvesegsgon and Inspeclon by p. Zebroskl Fhslxe analysis and dther PCR 974I35 Suppod

~

CaMe Trays In Accc. CaMe Trays Hanger A834 does nol meal lhe Lhv'ted hndythal Review and S. AnsgnoNs 9 was judged Qurt even U Qrd hangar accepl or modify by Qe end ol owG 33013-274e ~ nIINlcNnsnts Sdg. EI.253 ohcE-974we Inetaled I II97.

requkemend due lo Ue wss lo be removed (fslj, Ihere was su%dent support ere 1997 RFO.

bendhg momenl devehped provided by hangers lo mahtsh Qe ccarent Ravded OSVS h Ihe hodzondl member sl configurseon. Thd d an erdremdy congested area, wlh CATS R05034 4I3IQe.

Qe lop ol the hanger Rsl csbdkays brsnchhg snd dlopphg hh BUS Ie. Ocdger dosed spans between Ite anchors.

A82710 CsMe Trays hhux. 12'cathe tray d supported on CaNe were Inveslgaled as pit ol Qe bkck wal efhrt See bhck wal clscceston In ER-SCA Rev.4 a bhck wae neld lo Ue Ird SSEL Report and Group 8 SSEL Rev. 1 Sdg. El. 271 pool. resok4on.

CATS R05837 See bhck wal clscusslonh ER-SCA Rev.4 CaMe Trays In InL SSEL Report and Group 8 SSEL Rev. 1 Mdg. Chan Sde EI253 resohthn.

CATS R05937 Csbds were Invesggded as part of 9>> bhck wal dhrt See bkck wse discussion h ER.SCA Rev.4 CaMe Trays In InL SSEL Report and Group 8 SSEL Rev. 1 Sdg. Controled Sde resokrgon.

E1271 CATS R05037 Sock Wsl Problems and tray Cables were hvcrsUgsted as part of Ihe bhck wal effort See bhck wsl discus shn h ER SCA Rev.4 Procedures INT271 Cable Trays In Inl span ~ 10'ue lo nisshg SSEL Report snd Group 8 SSEL Rev. 1 Iretsled HOT Sdg. Contloaed Sde Oudter closed hortzontd suppon member resoLAon.

EI 271 CATS R05837

OUTLIER TABLE INCLUDES A46, GROUP B Rcv.4, 4/1509 Fbr wsl elF Qne Proceduree and See above. See above. PCR 96022 mode. InslaQed VaNe musl Group B W.O. 19801843 OA.CE.96095 OuWer cleeed rema@ dosed.

ER-SC.4 Rev.4 Opens on SSEL REv. 1 LOOP.

Fbr wal elF Ine See above. See above PCR 96422 3410 SrGAKB Musl nol FO.

tB 218'R Sourh ot waNs 2I.3I. 4l. 5l W.O. 19801643 DMX-98495 3411 Abnosphoric relic! NC and FC on ER.SC.4 Rev.4 valves loss ol OC or SSEL REv. 1 IA Procedrre chango:

See above.

See above. See above. PuQ Qrse Pressurlror CATS lO R06966 ER.SC.4 Rev. 4 Healer SSEL Rev.1

OUTLIER TABLE INCLUDES A46, GROUP 8 Rcv. 4, 4II5/99 INT218 Cable Trays in Inl. Csbh trays Csbhs were hvesttgsted as part ot the bhck waa elhrt See bhck wsd rascusshn In F Une drrI278'4 Pro ceduras CLEAN txdg. Chan Sde Eb. SSEL Report snd Group 8 PCft08022 Iretaded INT298 278 d 298 and rasokrtion. ER-SC.4 Rev. 4 OufQer closed Ct.EAN Conko8ed Sde EL. CATS R05837 SSEL Rev. 1 INT293HO 293 W.O. 19801843 1

P<<form Qme and modon skrr0ee Cortrpbis 1218 Loss ol psfeenrad mode ol ~ nd costlbene8t analysts h r,":

~ I opera8on. See SSEL Report ~ vahsle posstbb ant tancenxrnts.

for r0scusston and detads. Compbte sturdes by end ol 1097.

CATS ID R05837 Turbhe Bldg. SW See above. SW Fhw cal. tA%-

4813 botsthn Vahre Servhe Water See above. CATS ID R05837 00007 Turbhe Sdg. SW Isobtion ER.SC.4 Rev. 4 4814 bobdon Valve SSEL Rev. 1 Ak Condi8onhg SW AP-SW.1 botathn Valve Turbhe Sdg. SW 4M4 bobthn Vahr ~

4773 Ak Corrdrgonk~ SW bolaSon Valra SOUG hdushn rube hr Ass spectfy 1 or larger ine. PCR 08052 Rev.1 DA. PCR fe052 5735 SIG A d 8 Bhwdown NO. Musl AOV on 3I4 Ine. Vahres loo The Qne b Iskly wed supfxxkxf verthaly, bul Ihe vshre can CATS ID R08988 CE-00-108 Rev 1 Rev. 1 hataded 5738 Sample botadon Chse. (b8 dexhb. put s kxshnal had on Qra pipe trat shoukl be evahabd lo W.O. 108044S4 DUF 000071 valve opershf Valves dosed on hss meet Ihe htent of Oo cavaaL Thb b s new SQUG crtterb 00 RFO of DCalA) - Ihe cunsnl dcense basb does nol hcfude any such Qmk SEWS updafad on pipe frne size. Ptpe sksss.

Ougbr closed.

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Attachment B Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 1 of 27 B. Fire It is unclear how room-to-room fire scenarios 'were treated in the Ginna IPEEE analysis. Section 3.1 of the submittal indicates that fire areas were screened individually according to the FIVE [1] criteria (i.e, the area contains no Appendix R equipment, and a fire in the area would not cause a demand for safe shutdown) This ~

section also indicates that fire compartments were further screened if they had no credible potential for fire spreading to other fire compartments. While the submittal indicates that the qualitative screening conformed with Phase I, of the FIVE methodology, fire propagation potential between fire compartments is reviewed in the FIVE methodology during the Fire Compartment Interaction Analysis (FCIA) The ~

submittal does not indicate that the FIVE FCIA criteria were used to determine iffire propagation between fire zones was possible.

The submittal does provide qualitative criteria for grouping plant locations, but it is unclear that this approach has adequately treated room-to-room fire scenarios. One of the cited criteria indicates that plant locations were grouped together when a physical barrier (not necessarily fire-rated) separates the subject locations from the rest of the plant and there is a significant time delay for fire propagation from the subject locations to other adjacent locations. In addition, the submittal indicates that one consideration for determining the importance of a location was whether it contains a sufficient amount of combustible material that, ifignited, could potentially propagate to adjacent zones. The basis for making these judgements is not provided. Further, it is not clear that the analysis has adequately considered the potential that active fire barrier elements (e.g., normally open fire doors, ventilation dampers, etc) might fail to activate, or that passive fire barriers (e.g., various fire barriers both rated and unrated and barrier penetration seals) might be challenged by local concentrations of flammable materials. Finally, it is not clear that the analysis has considered the potential for the spread of smoke and heat from one compartment to another in addition to the consideration of actual fire spread.

Please clarify the bases used to assess the potential for cross-zone spreading offire, heat, and smoke. Please provide an analysis for all fire areas of the effect on fire-induced core damage frequency (CDF) thatincludes consideration of the failure potential of active barrier components such as doors and dampers. Please provide an analysis of the potential for cross-zone fire propagation for high hazard areas such as the turbine building, diesel generator room, switchgear rooms, and lube oil storage areas thatincludes consideration of the potential to challenge passive fire barrier elements.

I The requested information is contained in Appendices B ("Location Characteristics Table" )

and E ("Propagation Pathway Credibility Assessment" ) to the 1998 submittal. While these appendices were never submitted to the NRC, selections from these Appendices have been extracted and included as Attachment B.1 to accompany the discussion provided below.

The appendices in their entirety can be provided if required by the NRC..

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 2 of 27 Appendix 8 develops a fire zone adjacency matrix for each fire zone to identify possible propagation pathways (Item 4 in the Location Characteristics Table [LCTj, e.g., as shown on page 8-3 of Attachment 8.1). Appendix E develops criteria to qualitatively screen the credibility of these propagation pathways (see Table E-2 beginning on page E-9 and its Supplement in Attachment 8.1 which lists the propagation scenarios developed for the initial fire zones). As an example, referring to Item 1 on page 8-3 of Appendix 8, there are two fire zones, ABB and ABM, within fire area ABBM. Six fire zones are listed as horizontally adjacent to these two zones in Item 4, along with the corresponding propagation pathways and barrier ratings. These are repeated in Table E-2 (see page E-9 of Appendix E), where they were evaluated with respect to fire propagation as discussed below.

In the spatial interactions analysis, a propagation pathway was assumed to be credible if there is no automatic suppression system in the initial fire zone or in the adjacent fire zone AND at least one of the following criteria were satisfied:

1. There is a permanent opening between the fire zones;

2. The fire duration of the combustible contents in the initial fire zone is greater than 75'/0 of the rating of the fire barrier (e.g., door, wall, etc.) separating the initial fire zone and its adjacent fire zones.'he first criterion is conservative because it does not consider the actual amount of combustible inventory, the location of the fire source, and the separation distance between the fire source and combustibles in the adjacent location(s). The second criterion takes into consideration the potential failure of fire barriers (e.g., a fire door being left open), but requires a minimal amount of combustibles to provide a propagation path. The fire duration and barrier ratings for each fire zone are included under Items 2 and 4 in the LCT (see page 8-3). Table E-2 and Supplement indicate whether or not inter-zonal propagation satisfies Criterion 1 or 2, from above.'he FIVE FCIA permits screening out propagation between compartments, one of which may contain safe shutdown equipment, for ~an of the following:

1. Boundary fire rating of at least two hours

2. Boundary fire rating of one hour with combustible loading in the exposing compartment < 8E+4 BTU/ft'the Ginna IPEEE, by screening for 75/o of this combustible loading, employs a more stringent criterion of < 6E+4 BTU/ft')

3. Very low combustible loading (< 2E+4 BTU/ft') in the exposing compartment, with automatic fire detection present

4. Very Iow combustible loading (< 2E+4 BTU/ft') in both the exposing and exposed compartment (regardless of presence of automatic detection)

5. Presence of automatic fire suppression above combustibles in exposing compartment.

The combustible inventory, listed under Item 2 in the LCT, denotes the maximum combustible loading within a fire zone allowed by procedure. In reality, the actual inventory may be less than the maximum allowable amount. The second criterion suggests that if the combustible inventory fire severity is less than 75'/o of the barrier rating, then there will not be a propagation pathway between fire zones. In order to have a fire propagation pathway if the fire duration is less than 75'/0 of the barrier, the barrier must fail due to random failure (fail before the rated time on demand). Table E-2 and Supplement indicate whether or not the potential fire duration exceeds 75'/0 of the barrier rating.

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 3 of 27 For the fire areas which met one of the two propagation criteria, the analysis considered multi-level fire propagation between locations. Level-1 propagation involves one initial fire zone and fire zone(s) directly adjacent to it through a credible propagation pathway. Level-2 fire propagation involves one initial fire zone, the fire zone(s) directly adjacent to it, and the fire zone(s) that are adjacent to the Level-1 fire zone(s). At Level-2, the fire would have to propagate through two fire barriers, with the time required to burn through being at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (assuming each barrier is at least one-hour rated). The mean generic fire suppression time for most fires is 40 minutes (estimated by Sandia in Ref. 5). A survey of past fire drills at Ginna indicates that the longest total duration of a drill was less than 50 minutes (see Table 3-12 of the 1998 submittal). It is reasonable, then, to assume that the longest response time at Ginna (regardless of the location) is less than 50 minutes.

Therefore, it is expected that the fire brigade will start fire-fighting efforts at the initial fire zone and the Level-1 locations, and respond to the Level-2 locations to start cooling the pathways between Level-1 and Level-2 locations. Thus, the probability of a fire being allowed to propagate to Level-2 fire zones is negligible. As a result, all propagation scenarios involving Level-2 propagation or higher were also screened from the analysis.

Table E-2 and Supplement of Appendix E (see Attachment B.1) summarize the analyses of the potential for inter-zonal fire propagation for all Ginna fire zones. Included among these are high hazard areas such as the turbine building (TB), diesel generator rooms (EDG1A/B), switchgear rooms (distributed among the auxiliary building [ABM and ABO),

turbine building, and screen house [SH]), turbine lube oil storage area (TO), and hydrogen storage area (H2). Review of Table E-2 and Supplement indicates that fire propagation to/from these zones was not considered credible since: (1) they did not meet either of the two screening criteria; or (2) they met at least one of the criteria, but fire propagation was still considered not credible for other reasons (see Notes in Table E-2 and Supplement).

'he LCT from Appendix B (also in Attachment B.1 [see, e.g., pp. B-3 through B-5 and B-48)) includes the following information in greater detail for these zones:

Fire and smoke hazards, as obtained from review of the Ginna Station Appendix R program information (Item 2);

2. Fire protection features, i.e., the fire detection and suppression capabilities (Item 3);

3. Adjacent fire zones (Item 4);

4 Potential key equipment and their associated basic event impacted by fire or smoke hazards (Item 5);

Potential raceways (conduit and cable tray) and their associated equipment/basic events impacted by fire or smoke hazards, where the cable trays associated with the safety equipment were identified from a database relating cables and conduit to the equipment served (Item 6);

Notes taken during the two spatial interactions walkdowns (Item 7).

As reported in Section 3.9.2 of the 1998 submittal, active fire barrier components at Ginna consist of fire doors and dampers. There are also penetration seals, considered to be passive barriers. Fire doors are inspected and maintained through station procedure FPS-15, "Fire Door Identification, Inspection and Maintenance," on a quarterly basis. The

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 4 of 27 procedure also lists all the fire doors and their locations. To date, there have been no failures of fire doors that have not been promptly detected during these plant tours.

Compensatory and corrective actions have been initiated as required. The accessible fire zones are also visited by plant personnel frequently (e.g., auxiliary operator and security rounds), and the plant personnel are trained to maintain fire doors closed. Therefore, it is unlikely that a fire door would be left open and uncorrected for an extended period of time.

Engineering Work Request (EWR) 4882 completed verification in 1991 that all plant fire dampers were installed and configured as designed (or provided for analyses where differences from qualified configurations existed). Fire damper operability is verified through station procedure PT-13.26, "Testing of Fire Dampers." Ten percent of the dampers are drop-tested yearly on a rotating basis so that all dampers are tested at least once every ten years. If any damper fails the drop test, an additional 10% are tested, for every failure. Fire dampers are inspected and maintained through station procedure M-103, "Inspection and Maintenance of Fire Dampers." Both procedures list all the fire dampers, their ratings, and their locations. Adherence to these procedures assures that all fire dampers are present as configured and reduces the likelihood of a failure upon demand.

EWR 4941 completed verification in 1991 that all plant fire penetration seals were installed and configured as designed (or provided for analyses where differences from qualiTied configurations existed). A database was developed and each seal was associated with an industry fire test. This database is updated annually in accordance with station procedures FPS-2.1, "Control and Verification of UFSAR and/or 10CFR50 Appendix R Fire Barriers,"

and FPS-2.2, "Control and Verification of Non-UFSAR and Non-10CFR50Appendix R Fire Barriers." Visual inspections are performed every 18 months for the UFSAR/10CFR50 penetration seals under FPS-2.1 and every 36 months for the non-UFSAR/non-10CFR50 penetration seals under FPS-2.2. Adherence to these procedures assures that all fire penetration seals are present as configured and reduces the likelihood of a failure upon demand.

In summary, the potential for inter-zonal spreading of fire, heat and smoke was assessed using criteria derived from the FIVE FCIA, but considered more conservative. For example, the "critical" combustible loading in the originating fire zone was reduced to 75% of the FIVE FCIA criterion. The potential for inter-zonal propagation was examined for the high hazard areas, individually the turbine building (TB), diesel generator rooms (EDG1A/8),

switchgear rooms (distributed among the auxiliary building [ABM and ABO], turbine building, and screen house [SH]), turbine lube oil storage area (TO), and hydrogen storage area (H2). Fire propagation to/from these zones was not considered credible. This is further supported by the fire protection testing program described earlier.

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 5 of 27

2. The Ginna fire IPEEE submittal indicates that cable vtirap was credited in the quantitative assessments, but the treatment that was given is not clear and may have led to "double counting" of suppression effectiveness. It is also not clear if this approach was used in the screening analyses as well. Section 3.3.4 (Assumption 2) indicates that "a probability of 0.15 was assigned to the failure of cable wrap to account for the probability that a fire is not suppressed within the one hour time frame associated with the fire rating of the cable wrap." This description implies that the modeling of the cable wrap failure implicitly credits fire suppression in the quantitative screening of fire zones that contain the wrap. In the detailed fire PRA evaluations, an additional independent credit for fire suppression efforts would result in double counting suppression efforts.

if Please indicate fire suppression was credited in fire scenarios where cable wrap was independently credited as protecting critical cables. If there are any such scenarios, reevaluate the core damage frequency either (1) assuming that the 0.15 barrier failure probability fullycredits suppression, or(2) assuming anindependent suppression credit and that the cable wrap fails with a probability of 1.0 for all fires lasting greater than one hour.

Double-counting of cable wrap protection and fire suppression efforts did not occur in the IPEEE analysis. The factor of 0.15 is related to the failure to manually suppress the fire within the time that the cable wrap provides protection. The 0.15 cable wrap failure probability represents the conditional probability that longer term manual suppression efforts, using fire hoses or extinguishers, fail to extinguish the fire prior to the damage of wrapped cables. If this occurs, the cable wrap is assumed failed with a probability = 1.0.

In addition, if a fire area for which fire wrap was credited has insufficient combustible loading to support a fire duration of at least one hour, a 0.1 probability was assigned that such a loading might exist. Ifthe fire area already had the sufficient loading, no adjustment was made. It is explicitly assumed that the installed fire sprinklers have failed to extinguish the fire (either automatic or manually actuated). The analysis, therefore, did not apply double credit for fire sprinkler protection and cable wrap protection. No significant dependencies were identified between the performance of manual suppression, using fire hoses or extinguishers, and the functioning of the installed fire sprinklers (including manual actuation of the sprinklers) as discussed in the response to RAI Question ¹9, below.

Therefore, no significant dependencies were identified to exist between the 0.15 cable wrap failure probability and the failure probability of installed fire sprinklers. Finally, as described in the response to RAI Question ¹8 below, the Fire IPEEE was resolved with the fire suppression system specifically modeled. As shown in Section 9.6.3.4 of Attachment B.3 (and Table 9-18), cable wrap failures were not risk significant.

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 6 of 27

3. The 19 fire zones remaining after the qualitative and quantitative screening phases of the Ginna fire assessment were subjected to further detailed evaluation including the analysis of fire propagation and suppression. Actual fire modeling using the FIVE methodology or other techniques was not performed. Instead, probabilities for fire propagation were assigned based primarily upon physical separation of equipment. However, it is not clear upon what basis these judgements were made.

For example, in the analysis of the Auxiliary Building Operating Level (ABO, Page 3-

14) "a 0.01 probability was assigned that a fire occurring in the vicinitywould disable both CCW pumps, and a 0.99 probability was assigned that one CCW pump, in addition to one AC power electrical division, would be disabled." It is not clear that this assumption is well founded. The submittal states the two CCW pumps are located within nine feet of each other, and that there are cables in conduits in the area. Presumably, loss of the cables may lead to loss of the second pump. Further, the fact that the fire source appears to be the CCW pumps themselves, there would be a significant potential for large fires to occur. Given a large fire, nine feet of spatial separation would likely not prevent thermal damage to the second pump, its power cables, or its control cables. This is one specific example where the assumed damage probabilities may be optimistic.

For other fire areas, from the description of fire scenarios presented in the submittal, it appears that fires that are not suppressed were assumed to damage all the equipment in a fire zone. If the fire was suppressed, some level of damage was assumed to occur, and it appears that in many cases suppressed fires were assumed to damage just one electrical division. The submittal states that this is conservative since for many fire scenarios only a portion of components relying on the electrical division would be disabled. In general, this approach is acceptable ifthe critical set of components and cables are relatively far apart, and therefore, it will take a long time for a fire to damage them. On the other hand, ifthe key cables and components are close together, critical damage may occur before successful suppression.

Please provide a general description ofhow the fire damage assumed for each of the fire scenarios considered in the detailed analyses was determined. Include a description of the criteria used to determine the radius of the damage caused by suppressed fires and the timing of component damage. Also indicate to what extent the actual location of critical cables and components was verified and considered in the damage assessment. For suppressed fires,indicateif any time was assumed for the suppression of the fire andif this timeimpacted the assumed damage.

For each fire scenario, the potential fire sources and critical cables and equipment were carefully examined. Fires were assumed to fail all equipment and cables in a fire zone unless the fire was suppressed or physical separation or barriers existed (i.e., a detailed analysis was performed). The grounds upon which physical separation, barriers and fire suppression were credited in these detailed analyses as well as the justification for the extent of damage assumed, including considerations of timing and damage radii, are provided in the following discussion. The discussion is presented in two parts: (1) postulation of damage to one electrical division for scenarios in which fire suppression succeeds, and (2) use of physical separation or barriers as justification for limiting damage of a zone's contents.

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 7 of 27

1. Postulation of Dama e to One Electrical Division for Scenarios in which Fire Su ression Succeeds. Justification for postulating damage to one AC electrical train for scenarios in which fire suppression succeeds is provided as follows.

Cables Fire suppression credited for the protection of plant cables consisted of the automatic actuation of sprinklers as well as manual actuation of the sprinklers in the event that automatic actuation fails. For instances in which automatic actuation succeeds, sprinkler protection is postulated to commence prior to significant cable damage since the sprinkler head fuses melt at a temperature well below the damage and ignition temperatures'of the cable insulation. Similarly, the successful manual actuation of sprinklers was postulated to commence prior to significant cable damage. A failure probability of 0.01 was assigned for the manual actuation when automatic actuation failed to reflect the potential delay of actuation prior to significant cable damage. This value takes into consideration the close proximity of the sprinkler actuators to the control room (within a two-minute response from the time a smoke alarm is received).

On this basis, fires were postulated to fail only the contents of one cable tray for scenarios in which sprinkler protection is successful. By examining the inventories of cables routed in each cable tray in the applicable zones, the conditional core damage probabilities (CCDPs) associated with such damage were found to be bounded by the CCDP for the loss of one AC electrical train.

b. Equipment Fire zones containing multiple equipment trains were also evaluated.

Fire zone ABB (auxiliary building basement) Sprinkler protection is provided for cables installed in the safety injection (Sl) pump area.

Although fire scenarios in this area could disable both Sl pump trains, the loss of Sl in conjunction with the loss of cables for any cable tray in ABB results in CCDPs which are bounded by the CCDP for the loss of an entire AC power train. The assumption, therefore, for the loss of one AC power train is conservative.

Fire zone ABM (auxiliary building mezzanine) The only PSA-related components consist of two electrical buses that belong to a single AC power train, which was then assumed to fail. Fires igniting within the electrical bus cabinets were assumed not to damage cables in surrounding cable trays since flames would be contained within the sealed cabinets for a time sufficient for suppression to commence (that is, for the sprinkler head fuses to melt). Likewise, fires occurring outside of the buses were judged not to be capable of damaging the electrical buses prior to initiation of suppression.

Therefore, no credible fire scenario was identified which could damage the electrical buses and cables belonging to the opposite AC power train. The assumption for the loss of one AC power train is therefore valid.

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 8 of 27 Fire zone AHR (air handling room) The loss of all PSA-related components would cause only a reactor trip. In conjunction with the postulated loss of one cable tray, the CCDP for reactor trip is bounded by that for the loss of one AC power train.

iv. Fire zone BR1A or BR18 (battery room A or 8) The loss of all PSA-related components would cause the loss of only one AC power train, which was then assumed to fail.

V. Fire zone IBN-1 (intermediate building north) The loss of AFW Pumps A and B is credible. However, due to the multiple sources of feedwater not impacted by the fire (i.e., turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, standby auxiliary feedwater pumps C and D, and main feedwater pumps A and 8), the loss of one AC power train assumed for the scenario is bounding.

Use of Ph sical Se aration or Barriers as Justification for Partial Dama e of a Zone's Contents. As discussed in the 1998 IPEEE submittal and expanded upon where pertinent here, physical separation rationales were used in the detailed fire modeling for five fire zones.

Auxiliary Building Operating Level (ABO) Due to the nine-foot separation between the component cooling pumps installed in zone ABO, and a lack of intervening fixed combustibles (all cables in the area are routed in, conduit), a 0.01 probability was assigned that a fire occurring in the vicinity would disable both CCW pumps. This probability was based on the following considerations:

Since no intervening fixed combustibles exist between the two CCW pumps (control and power cables associated with each pump penetrate the floor from below directly adjacent to the pump they serve, and therefore do not travel near the other pump) and no fixed combustibles are installed in the broad vicinity of the pumps, two sources of combustion must be considered: (1) the potential for the ignition of one CCW pump to damage the second CCW pump and (2) the potential for a transient combustible fire to damage both pumps.

The ignition of one CCW pump was judged not to have the potential to cause damage to the second CCW pump based on the following grounds:

No combustible material is installed on the outer surface of the pumps (all cables are installed in conduits) and therefore ignition of the second pump is not likely.

The pumps are installed in a large, open area and therefore the heat from the ignited pump would be dissipated.

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 9 of 27 The pump motors are relatively small, and therefore the heat generated by the ignition of one pump would be limited.

The only lubricant utilized for the pumps is grease located within sealed gear boxes. This significantly reduces the likelihood for leakage of combustible material to the exterior of the pump, which eliminates the potential for a large pump lubricant spill, and also reduces the likelihood for combustion of lubricant of the second pump.

A significant transient combustible fire was judged to be the only credible fire source that could disable both pumps. A very conservative apportionment of 0.01 of the total 'fire initiation frequency for the zone was assigned for the occurrence of a transient fire failing both CCW pumps on the basis that:

Transient combustibles comprise only one category of ignition sources present in the zone. The 0.01 factor addresses, in part, the probability that a transient combustible fire initiates the fire scenario (rather than some other ignition source), and that the fire occurs in the vicinity of the pumps (the pump area occupies less than three percent of the total floor area).

Transient combustibles would normally be in this area only during pump maintenance. The 0.01 factor also addresses, in part, the likelihood that the presence of significant transient combustibles within the vicinity of the pumps (such as a solvent spill) would not be detected within a relatively short period of time by the maintenance personnel, security personnel during hourly rounds, or plant operators during shift rounds.

IV The Fire IPEEE was re-solved assuming that the CCW pumps always failed during a fire on the Auxiliary Building Operating Level (see response to RAI Question ¹8). For this case, the fire CDF only increased by 8.8E-07/yr. This limited increase is due to the small potential for the need for CCW in the short term. While CCW would be required to support RHR cooling, the plant can remain on AFW for a long period of time. Also, there is no real scenario by which a fire at this location could create a PORV LOCA requiring RHR in the shortterm.

b. Turbine Building Basement (TB-1) Cables that supply offsite power to the 480V safeguards Buses 17 and 18 are routed in the turbine building basement near, and parallel to, the eastern wall. A review was performed of the location of potential fire sources. Most fire sources are not located near the cable runs. The primary fire source, the turbine lube oil reservoir and associated equipment, is located at the opposite end of the turbine building and is protected by a fire suppression system. Major lube oil piping

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 10 of 27 is also encased inside a guard pipe to collect leakage. The major portions of the hydrogen seal oil system are located toward the center of the turbine building, inside an enclosure with automatic fire doors and a fire suppression system. The most significant fire sources near the 480V safeguards bus cable runs are two of the condensate booster pumps and the four air compressors. Based on this arrangement of significant fire sources in the zone, a seven percent likelihood was assigned that fires occurring in TB-1 will be in the proximity of the offsite power cables supplying Buses 17 and 18, or will be of sufficient magnitude to propagate to that portion of the zone.

The cables supplying Buses 14 and 16 are also located near, and parallel to, the east wall of fire zone TB-1 and travel a total distance of only ten feet within the zone. One of the condensate booster pumps is located near these cables. The cables supplying Buses 17 and 18 are located more than 20 feet from those supplying Buses 14 and 16. Based on this arrangement, a three percent likelihood was assigned that fires occurring in TB-1 will damage the offsite power cables supplying Buses 14 and 16 in addition to those supplying Buses 17 and 18. All other fires occurring in the zone were postulated not to damage the offsite power cables.

The justification for the use of the three percent and seven percent values is as follows. An area extending 10 feet on either side of the cable runs would comprise a little less than eight percent of the turbine building basement area. Based roughly on these physical dimensions, a ten percent likelihood was assigned that fires occurring in TB-1 would be in the proximity of these cables, and cause damage to them. The most critical length for failing all four safeguards buses, below the 4kV Buses 12A and 12B, comprises about 20 percent of this cable run length. Therefore, the ten percent was further divided into seven percent for the cables to the safeguards Buses 17 and 18, and three percent to cables for all four safeguards buses, including Buses 14 and 16.

Reactor Containment Mezzanine (RC-2) Fires with sufficient intensity to damage equipment located in RC-2, other than those involving ignition of combustibles related to a reactor coolant pump (RCP), were postulated to damage all equipment in the zone, with the exception that RCS circulation was assumed to remain functional. This exception was made on the basis that no credible fire scenario was identified that could disable RCS forced circulation (i.e., both RCPs) and natural circulation (i.e., the pressurizer heaters and both shroud fans). Significant separation was identified between cables associated with these systems. In particular, the power and control cables for RCP A travel through the northwest quadrant of containment and those for RCP B travel through the southeast quadrant and are located over sixty feet apart. The pressurizer heater cables are located 24 feet from RCP B cables at the nearest point and over sixty feet from RCP A cables. The shroud fan control and power cables are located in close vicinity of RCP A cables but not those of RCP B cables. Therefore, for calculational purposes, RCP A and the shroud fans were arbitrarily selected as surviving this fire scenario.

I Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 11 of 27 Auxiliary Building Basement Level (ABB) The auxiliary building basement was divided into three sections for the purpose of defining fire scenarios (the charging room is its own separate zone). The division was based on walkdown observations, cable routing, and examinations of plant layout drawings.

The safety injection pump area contains most of the electrical cables present in ABB; unsuppressed fires occurring in this area were conservatively assumed to damage all equipment and cables in this area.

Propagation of fire from rooms in the northern part to the adjacent safety injection and charging pump rooms was judged not to be credible based on the presence of relatively few combustibles and the enclosure of these northern rooms by concrete walls.

iii. In the RHR pump area, the vital equipment and cables installed in this area are separated from the adjacent safety injection pump area by approximately 40 feet, and the RWST occupies most of the space at the interface of the two areas. Propagation of fire from this area to the adjacent Sl pump area was judged not to be credible.

Screen House Operating Level (SH-2) The PSA-related equipment installed in the screen house operating level consists of two 480-VAC safeguards Buses 17 and 18, and the four service water (SW) pumps. No electrical cables are installed on the operating floor; therefore, consideration of cable-related fires was not necessary.

Buses 17 and 18 are installed end-to-end (note: the cabinets are not installed back-to-back the short ends of the cabinets are adjacent).

'abinet fires that are significant enough to damage more than two bus compartments were assumed to disable both buses, which results in a loss of all SW. Cabinet fires that do not disable more than two bus compartments result in the loss of no more than two SW pumps; therefore, two SW pumps were conservatively assumed to be unavailable for such fires.

For fire scenarios which involve the SW pumps (installed on the operating level), no credible fire scenario was identified that would disable more than two SW pumps. No intervening combustibles are installed between the SW pumps (only the pump'motors are present on this floor; no cables are present) and only one fixed combustible (a diesel-driven fire pump) is installed within 20 feet of the pumps. Therefore, three sources of combustion were considered to be credible: (1) the potential for the ignition of one SW pump to damage other SW pumps, (2) the potential for the diesel-driven fire pump to damage the SW pumps, and (3) the potential for a transient combustible fire to damage the pumps.

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 12 of 27

1. SW pump fire The ignition of one SW pump was judged not to have the potential to cause damage to other SW pumps because:

No combustible material is installed on the outer surface of the pumps; therefore, ignition of the other pumps is not likely.

Damage of other SW pumps would require radiative or convective heat transfer.

The SW pumps are installed in a large, open area and therefore the heat from the ignited pump would be dissipated.

Only the SW pump motors are present on the operating level. Lubricant utilized for the pump motors is a small quantity of grease located within sealed bearings. This significantly reduces the likelihood for leakage of combustible material to the exterior of the pump, which eliminates the potential for a large pump lubricant spill, and reduces the likelihood for combustion of lubricant for neighboring SW pumps.

Diesel fire pump fire Two of the SW pumps are installed at distances of 8 and 16 feet from the diesel-driven fire pump (with the other two at 24 and 32 feet). A berm is installed to collect diesel fuel if spillage occurs and direct the spill to an outside sump. Therefore, a fire involving the diesel fuel (if no spraying of the fuel occurs) would be relatively confined. Conservatively, two SW pumps were postulated to be disabled because of the distance involved.

Transient combustible fire For the analysis, transient combustible fires were judged to be capable of damaging no more than two SW pumps. The bases for this are the same reasons described for the CCW pump in Section 2.a of this same response above (e.g., the pump area occupies less than 5% of the total floor area; transient combustibles would only be in the area during pump maintenance).

A sensitivity analysis was performed for the assumption that only two of the four SW pumps were impacted by a fire on the Screenhouse operating floor.

A 0.001 probability was assigned that a fire would impact all four pumps on the following basis:

Each SW pump occupies less than 5% of the total floor area The SW pumps are installed with a centerline separation of eight feet The only fixed combustible is diesel fuel oil which would have to spray 32 feet to reach all four SW pumps

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 13 of 27

~ Transient combustibles would normally only be in the area during maintenance activities with personnel located nearby. There are also routine walk-throughs by security and plant operators.

The results of the sensitivity analysis indicate that the CDF only increases by 1.50E-7/yr. This is due to the fact that Ginna Station can shutdown without SW and has procedures in place to do so. Basically, the plant can utilize the city water supply to plant hydrants to cool the DGs and provide a suction source to SAFW. This city water source has already been shown to be risk significant as described in Section 9.6.3.2 of Attachment B.3 (see response to RAI Question 48). Since there is sufficient basis to justify not assuming the loss of all 4 SW pumps, and the risk consequences are minimal using a conservati've scenario probability of 0.001, this analysis is considered acceptable.

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 14 of 27 Transient combustible fires were not analyzed separately in the Ginna fire assessment. The submittal states that during the development of the fire frequencies, transient combustibles were grouped with the type of component that was primarily damaged by or exposed to the fire. Thus, the submittal states that the impact and consequences of transient combustible fires are accounted for in the modeled component fires, and no separate evaluation of transient fires was necessary.

Based on the limited descripfion in the submiffal, it is unclear ifthe methodology accounts for transient fires at all crifical locafions in the plant. Specifically, it is if unclear a portion of the frequency of transient fires was accounted for in the evaluation of cable fires. Please provide a more defailed description of how the transient fire frequency was includedin the analysisincluding a description of how the frequency was parfifioned and the types of components assumed damaged or exposed to the fransient fires. Ifcables were notin the list of components damaged or exposed to the transient fires, provide a separate assessment of transient induced fire scenarios involving cables'in the unscreened fire zones containing cables.

Appendices C ("Component/Location-Based Fire Ignition Frequency" ) and D ("Fire Frequency Apportionment" ) to the 1998 submittal detail the development of the fire ignition frequencies for the Ginna fire zones. Included in this process are fires due to transient combustibles, as extracted from the PLG generic fire database (proprietary). While these appendices were never submitted to the NRC, selected portions of Appendices C and D have been extracted and included as Attachment B.2 to supplement the response to this que'stion. The appendices in their entirety can be provided to the NRC if required.

There were 230 fire incidents retained from the PLG generic fire database for applicability as generic fires for Ginna. Of these 230, six (2.6%) could definitively be attributed to the presence of transient combustibles: ¹s 66, 73, 75, 77, 113, and 114 listed in Table C-2 of Appendix C (see Attachment B.2). Three of these occurred in the auxiliary building, and one each in the control room, diesel generator room, and turbine building, of other plants.

These six fires were included among those assigned to their respective locations when generic fire frequencies were estimated for the Bayesian prior distribution. These priors were subsequently combined with the Ginna-speciTic likelihood to yield the posterior fire ignition frequencies. The extracted portions of Appendix C in Attachment B.2 discuss the treatment of the generic data prior to frequency analysis (e.g., grouping, assignment of unidentified plant events).

Of the 14 fire events identified at Ginna Station as being applicable to the analysis (see Table C-3 in Attachment B.2), two (¹2- relay room and ¹13- turbine building basement),

could be attributed to transient combustibles. As shown in Table C-4 (¹s 48 and 72), both of these were included among the plant-specific fires used in the Bayesian likelihood to generate the posterior fire frequency for these zones.

Appendix D (see Attachment B.2) describes the frequency apportionment technique based on combustibles within each fire zone, including the table with the final assigned frequencies by zone and combustible. Tables D-1 and D-2 in Attachment B.2 indicate that cable fires were apportioned for nearly every fire zone, including the five (auxiliary building, control room, diesel generator room, turbine building, and relay room, and their respective

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 15 of 27 sub-zones) mentioned above as specific sites of previous transient combustible fires at Ginna and other plants. Section 3.5 of the 1998 submittal discusses the types of components assumed to be damaged by or exposed to fire effects. These consist of power, control, and instrumentation cables (including hot shorting); and all equipment modeled in the internal events PSA except for the following: piping, tanks, check valves, and manual valves. The areas in which transient fires have historically occurred, either at Ginna or other plants, and in which transient fires were included among the Ginna ignition frequencies, possess all the types of equipment susceptible to fire effects as listed above.

Therefore, these same types of components were assumed to be damaged by or exposed to the effects of transient combustible fires. Consequently, the frequency of transient fires from other plants and from Ginna is included in the fire frequencies for the various Ginna areas. Furthermore, the potential for transient fires was specifically evaluated in the fire scenarios where detailed analyses of critical locations were performed. Examples are discussed in the response to RAI Question ¹3. For all other areas, it was assumed that a fire affected all equipment within the area. Thus, there would be no additional effect on CDF from a transient fire in these areas.

Finally, Section 9.6.3.1 of Attachment 8.3 indicates that only four fire initiators had high Risk Achievement Worth values,(i.e., RAW ~ 10) with a Fussell-Vesely value < 0.05 (i.e.,

these initiators do not contribute significantly to the CDF now, but would do so if they were assumed to occur more frequently).

a. FIDG1B10 (Fire in the DG Room B Cable Vault) This room is normally closed off and requires a "confined space entry" permit to enter. Consequently, this area would not be expected to normally contain any transient combustibles.

FIOCR3-3 (Fire in the Control Room Which Only Fails One Electrical Train) This area is always manned. Transient combustibles would normally be present during maintenance activities when even more personnel are in the Control Room. Since a generic transient combustible fire in this room was already assigned as discussed above, no further consideration is required.

c. FIOOABO1 (Fire in the Auxiliary Building Operating Level) A generic transient combustible fire was already assigned to this area as discussed above. The issue of a transient combustible failing both trains of CCW is described in the response to RAI Question ¹3.

FIOOAHR1 (Fire in the Air Handling Room) This secured area only contains an air handling unit and MCC. Traffic in this area is limited to personnel working in or touring the room. Therefore, transient combustibles would only be present during maintenance activities for which personnel would be in the room.

Consequently, further consideration of transient combustibles would not be expected to offer any more risk insights.

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 16 of 27 Two fire zones (IBM-1 and IBS-1) are identified in the submittal which are not listed as being either qualitatively or quantitatively screened. Since the results of a detailed fire PRA evaluation for these fire zones are also not given in the submittal, the importance of these two fire zones is unknown.

Pleaseindicateif these two fire zones were screened orsubjected to a detailed fire scenario evaluation. Provide descriptions for any fire scenarios modeled for these fire zones and list the estimated core damage frequencies.

Table 3-2 in the 1998 submittal, "Fire Areas and Fire Zones of Ginna Nuclear Power Plant,"

lists the 64 fire zones subjected to the Phase 1 qualitative screening. Both IBN-1 and IBS-1 are included, as parts of the Intermediate Building (IB) and ABI fire area. Table 3-4, "Frequency Allocation for Ginna," indicates the 48.fire zones which survived qualitative screening in Phase 1. Both IBN-1 and IBS-1 are indicated as survivors, for which a fire ignition frequency was estimated. Table 3-6, "Quantitative Screening Results," indicates the 29 fire zones for which conservative estimates of their contribution to CDF fell below the Phase 2 quantitative screening cut-off threshold of 1E-6/yr. IBS-1 is included, with its CDF of 9.9E-8/yr. IBN-1 is not, since it survived for detailed evaluation in Phase 3. Table 3-9, "Quantification Summary for Phase 3 Fire Scenarios," lists all scenarios subjected to detailed CDF evaluation, with their final CDF results. Zone IBN-1 is included, with three scenarios IBN-1-1, IBN-1-2, and IBN-1-3, and CDF estimates of 1.3E-8/yr, 6.2E-8/yr, and 2.1E-6/yr, respectively. The Comments column in Table 3-9 summarizes each of these scenarios. Table 3-10, "Phase 3 Fire Analysis Results Sorted by Contribution," indicates that fire zone IBN-1 contributes 3% to the overall fire CDF.

Also, evaluations of both of these fire zones are described in the new fire results provided in Attachment B.3 (see response to RAI Question iti8). These results indicate slightly smaller contributions to CDF based on more detailed evaluation of required operator actions.

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 17 of 27

6. NUREG-1407 [2], Section 4.2 and Appendix C, and GL 88-20, Supplement 4 [3],

request that documentation be submitted with the IPEEE submittal with regard to the FRSS [4] issues, including the basis and assumptions used to address these issues, and a discussion of the findings and conclusions. NUREG-1407 also requests that evaluation results and potential improvements be specifically highlighted. Control system interactions involving a combination of fire-induced failures and high probability random equipment failures were identified in the FRSS as potential contributors to fire risk.

The issue of control systems interactions is associated primarily with the potential that a fire in the plant (e.g., the INCR) might lead to potential control systems vulnerabilities. Given a fire in the plant, the likely sources of control systems interactions are between the control room, the remote shutdown panel, and shutdown systems. Specific areas that have been identified as requiring attention in the resolution of this issue include:

(a) Electrical independence of the remote shutdown control systems: The primary concern of control systems interactions occurs at plants that do not provide independent remote shutdown control systems. The electrical independence of the remote shutdown panel and the evaluation of the level of indication and control of remote shutdown control and monitoring circuits need to be assessed.

(b) Loss of control equipment or power before transfer: The potential for loss of control power for certain control circuits as a result of hot shorts and/or blown fuses before transferring control from the MCR to remote shutdown locations needs to be assessed.

(c) Spurious actuation of components leading to component damage, loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), or interfacing systems LOCA: The spurious actuation of one or more safety-related to safe-shutdown-related components as a result of fire-induced cable faults, hot shorts, or component failures leading to component damage, LOCA, or interfacing systems LOCA, prior to taking control from the remote shutdown panel, needs to be assessed. This assessment also needs to include the spurious starting and running of pumps as well as the spurious repositioning of valves. It does appear that the assessment has included this aspect of the concern.

(d) Total loss of system function: The potential for total loss of system function as a result of fire-induced redundant component failures or electrical distribution system (power source) failure needs to be addressed.

Please describe your remote shutdown capabi%ty, including the nature and location of the shutdown station(s), as well as the types of control actions which can be taken from the remote panel(s). Describe how your procedures provide for transfer of control to the remote shutdown station(s). Provide an evaluation of whether loss of control power could occur prior to transferring control to the remote shutdown location andidentify the risk contribution of these types of failures (ifthese failures are screened, please provide the basis for the screening).

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 18 of 27 Safe shutdown is normally accomplished from the Control Room by utilizing the safe shutdown equipment along with other available equipment. The plant EOPs are used in these instances. Some operator actions are typically required to be taken outside the Control Room for shutdown and would also be expected as a result of fires in specific fire areas. This is the preferred shutdown method and is defined as "normal safe shutdown."

If there is a fire in any fire area which has the potential to interfere with performing shutdown activities from the Control Room, the operators will proceed to the alternative shutdown stations as directed by Procedure AP-CR.1 (which is a "direct" entry procedure) and the ER.FIRE series of procedures.

For five Ginna Station fire areas, compliance with the provisions of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R cannot be effectively or economically achieved due to the existing plant configuration (i.e., shutdown in these areas cannot be effectively performed from the control room). These areas are:

Control Complex (CC)

a. Control Room (CR)

b. Relay Room (RR)

c. Air Handling Room (AHR)

2. Cable Tunnel (CT)

3. Auxiliary Building Basement/Mezzanine (ABBM) 4 Battery Room A (BR1A)

5. Battery Room 8 (BR1B)

For these areas, RG8 E has determined that the appropriate technical approach necessary to comply with Section III.G of Appendix R is to provide an alternative shutdown capability per the provisions of Section III.G.3.

The alternative shutdown method establishes a coordinated series of operational and procedural manipulations of existing redundant safe shutdown systems. This method provides independent control stations for the equipment and systems normally controlled from the Control Room. The alternative shutdown method provides an additional means to ensure safe shutdown of the Ginna plant in the event of an unmitigated fire in any of these five fire areas of concern.

Two types of alternative shutdown stations have been designated:

1. Primary Shutdown Stations - stations that would be manned continuously and provided with the necessary instrumentation and support functions to meet safe shutdown performance goals; and

2. Support Stations - stations with staffing requirements of a transient nature.

These are discussed below.

Staffing requirements impose a constraint on the location and features of the remote shutdown stations. The Code of Federal Regulations and Ginna Station procedures and Technical Specifications require that at least seven operators and a Shift Technical Advisor

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 19 of 27 (STA) be assigned to each operating crew when in Modes 1 through 4. Since two operators are assigned to the fire brigade and would not be available for the first hour, only five operators and the STA remain for plant shutdown. For fires requiring ex-control room activities, these five operators and the STA are typically dedicated as follows:

Head Control Operator (HCO) responsible for establishing auxiliary feedwater flow to at least one steam generator and monitoring associated process variables.

Control Operator (CO) responsible for assuring makeup and pressure control of the reactor coolant system and isolating secondary systems.

3. Control Room Foreman (CRF) responsible for tripping and manually loading equipment of480V buses in the Screenhouse building and monitoring turbine-driven AFW.

4. Auxiliary Operator (AO) responsible for assisting the STA in establishing on-site power, verification of closure of pressure boundary and spurious operation valves, and assisting other operators in stabilizing the plant.

5. Shift Technical Advisor (STA) - responsible for assuring the availability of on-site power, starting the DGs, and assisting the HCO in stabilizing the plant.

6. Shift Supervisor (SS) responsible for stripping some DC electrical loads and maintaining oversight.

The HCO and the CO are assigned to Primary Shutdown Stations when not performing other duties in support of their prime functions. The Auxiliary Operator acts as a "rover" for the first hour. The STA and CRF are initially assigned to a Support Station and, upon completion of required actions, report back to the SS. These five operators and the STA would be augmented at the end of the first hour by the operators recalled as part of the accident recovery team.

For a fire in any plant area, all required safe shutdown functions can be achieved and maintained either by use of protected plant equipment operated from the Control Room in the normal mode, or by the operation of required equipment from a designated Primary Shutdown or Support Station. For the majority of fires, safe shutdown can be accomplished from the Control Room. However, for the five specified fire areas, shutdown from the Control Room may not be possible. Because of this, certain remote plant locations have been designated as Primary Shutdown or Support Stations. These locations contain the necessary control and instrumentation to achieve and maintain the required safe shutdown functions. A fire at these locations does not impair the achievement and maintenance of safe shutdown from the Control Room. These locations and the capabilities they provide are described as follows.

1. Char in Pum Room Prima Station - Auxilia Buildin Basement

a. Transfer switch to isolate control circuits of Charging Pump A Bus 14 power breakers from fire;

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 20 of 27

b. Independent VCT level and pressurizer level indication to local indicator panel;

c. Independent Appendix R DC power source for the local indicators panel;

d. Local start/stop switches to operate Charging Pump A from this location.

2. Auxilia Feedwater Pum Area Prima Station - Intermediate Buildin North Independent RCS loop temperature', steam generator level, steam generator pressure, turbine-driven AFWflow, pressurizer pressure and level indication;

b. Independent Appendix R DC power source for the local indicator panel; C. Local operation of TDAFW pump DC lube oil pump;

d. Local source range monitor hookup.

Diesel Generator Area Su ort Station

a. Transfer switches to isolate required Control Room control circuits (for DG A);

b. Alternative local DG A start/stop speed and voltage control;

c. Alternative DG A diagnostic instrumentation.

480V AC Bus 14 Su ort Station - Auxilia Buildin Local operation of DG A feeder breaker (52/EG1A1) and isolation of DC control power to control circuit;

b. Local operation of Bus 12 feeder breaker (Bus 14 480V feed from 4160V distribution);

Transfer switch to isolate the control power to Bus 14 and supply Charging Pump A control circuit with alternative DC power; Manual stripping of all non-safe shutdown loads.

Batte Rooms A and B Su ort Station Operation of breakers at Main Fuse Cabinets A and B, and Main DC Distribution Panels A and B to:

a. Verify required power supply to Turbine Building DC Distribution Panel;

b. Verify required power supply to Auxiliary Building Distribution Panels A and B;

C. Verify required power supply to DG A and B DC Distribution Panels;

d. Align TSC diesel generator DC power supply to Main Fuse Cabinet A and/or B for long-term DC supply if necessary; Isolate DC control power to potential spurious operation components.

Motor Control Centers C and D Su ort Station - Auxilia Buildin Isolate motive power to potential spurious operation components.

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 21 of 27

7. 480V AC Bus 18 Su ort Station - Screenhouse Local operation of DG A feeder breaker (52/EG1A2) and isolation of DC control power to control circuit;

b. Local operation of Bus 12 feeder breaker (Bus 18 480V feed from 4160V distribution) and isolation of DC control power to control circuit; Local operation of the feeder breaker for Service Water pump A and isolation of DC control power to control circuits.

Valve Locations Various valves must be checked and verified closed in order to ensure primary system integrity and to preclude spurious operation of these valves affecting the achievement and maintenance of safe shutdown. These valves are listed in the ER-FIRE procedures. Other valves located in the specific safe shutdown flow path for a particular safe shutdown system are verified open or closed by the operator before the operation of the system. All valves that must be verified open or closed, either to ensure normal system operation or to prevent a spurious operation, will have their associated power breakers (AC or DC) shut off prior to the manual operation.

Fire-induced failures (e.g., hot shorts, open circuits or shorts to ground) postulated to cause loss of control power prior to transferral to the remote shutdown location will not prevent operation nor cause mal-operation of the alternative or dedicated shutdown method. Such loss of control power or post-fire mal-operation is prevented by:

1. Isolation/transfer switches which electrically isolate the alternative shutdown circuits from the fire areas of concern;

2. The de-energization of unnecessary DC and AC control and power circuits at various distribution panels and buses;

3. The isolation of instrument air supply to potential spurious operation solenoid valves;

4. The provisions for alternative shutdown electrical power from sources which will be electrically protected and coordinated;

5. The separation of the alternative shutdown circuits from the fire areas of concern by rated fire barriers and penetration seals.

Operator actions that must take place locally in the event of Control Room evacuation to prevent core damage from fire were identified. The ER.FIRE series of procedures were previously developed to guide the operators during alternative shutdown operations. These procedures are entered directly from AP-CR.1 or in parallel to the EOPs. The fire procedures are as follows:

1. ER-FIRE.1 Alternate Shutdown for Control Complex Fire

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 22 of 27

2. ER-FIRE.2 Alternate Shutdown for Cable Tunnel Fire

3. ER-FIRE.3- Alternate Shutdown for Auxiliary Building Basement/Mezzanine Fire

4. ER-FIRE.4 Alternate Shutdown for Battery Room A Fire

5. ER-FIRE.5- Alternate Shutdown for Battery Room B Fire The procedures were reviewed as part of the Fire IPEEE with specific human events added to the fault tree models to reflect each action (see response to RAI Question ¹8). The importances of these human actions are described in Section 9.6.3.2 of Attachment 8.3.

As is evident from this attachment, several of th'e ER-FIRE activities were identified as being of high or medium risk significance.

The ability of the Primary Stations to provide necessary indication to perform the above actions was also specifically modeled, i.e., failure of power or indication to the Stations was assumed to prevent the operator action with a probability = 1. The cumulative contribution to the overall fire CDF from failure to locally perform these human actions is to increase the CDF by a factor of 11.3. (If all these failures are assumed not to occur [i.e., failure probability = 0], the CDF is reduced by 9.5%.)

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 23 of 27

7. The submittal indicates that the "automatic fire detection and suppression systems at Ginna were assumed to be installed per design specifications, following the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and NRC guidelines." The submittal also states that fire protection systems were assumed to be maintained regularly and that generic failure rates were used in the analysis. It is not clear that these assumptions were verified.

Piease verify that the automatic fire suppression systems at Ginna are, in fact, designed and maintained according to NFPA sfandards.

Ginna Station's fire protection systems were installed during three different periods: (1) with the original plant systems from 1966 to 1969, (2) beginning in 1979 with upgrades related to 10CFR50 Appendix A as a result of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP), and (3) finishing in 1985 with 10CFR50 Appendix R upgrades. Original plant fire suppression systems were designed utilizing codes and engineering judgement applicable in the 1966-1969 time frame. SEP-related suppression systems were designed by an A/E firm (Gilbert/Commonwealth, as per RG&E Engineering Work Request [EWR] 1833) using applicable NFPA codes beginning in 1979 for guidance and engineering judgement regarding the hazards to be protected. Plant fire detection and annunciation systems were designedby RG&E engineering personnel utilizing applicable NFPA codes for guidance and engineering judgement, as documented in EWR 1832. NRC SER's dated 2/14/79, 12/17/80, 2/6/81 and 6/22/81 document acceptability of installed systems and other plant fire protection features with respect to General Design Criterion 3.

Appendix R suppression systems were designed by an A/E firm (Gilbert/Commonwealth, as per RG8E EWR 4139) using NFPA codes applicable in 1985 for guidance and engineering judgement regarding the hazards to be protected for additional areas identified to require improved capability. Additional plant detection and annunciation systems were designed by RG8 E engineering personnel utilizing applicable NFPA codes for guidance and engineering judgement, as documented in EWR 4176. Separate NRC SER's dated 2/27/85 and 3/21/85 document acceptability of these installed systems and general compliance with III.G and III.L of Appendix R to 10CFR50.

Plant fire protection systems are regularly tested and maintained as required by the applicable sections of the Ginna Station Technical Requirements Manual (i.e., tests previously required by technical specifications) and plant procedures. Data on the operation of plant suppression and detection systems are included in analysis DA-ME 081 which reviewed six years of plant performance history, in order to justify extended surveillance intervals. This was reviewed and accepted by NRC reviewers.

Therefore, due to the vintage of Ginna Station, the fire suppression systems were not designed to NFPA standards; however, as they have been modified, they have used NFPA standards for guidance. These systems, and their testing program, have been previously reviewed and approved by the NRC as documented above. As such, the impact of the assumption on the IPEEE as documented in the 1998 submittal is considered neglible.

0 Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 24 of 27

8. The Ginna fire IPEEE submittal identifies one plant improvement planned for implementation and five additional plant modifications that were being considered.

It is not clear if these improvements and modification were credited in the analysis, and whether or not the changes have been, or will be, implemented.

Please provide the currenf sfafus ofthese planned and proposed planf modifications andindicafe whefher or nof the changes have been creditedin fhe analysis.

As discussed in Section 6 of the 1998 submittal, the following plant modification was planned and, therefore, credited in the analysis:

"Fuses will be installed on control circuits routed in the screen house associated with the functioning of 4160 VAC circuit breakers 52/1 7SS and 52/1 8SS. The fuses will be designed to open if grounding occurs, as is postulated to occur for screen house fires, permitting the overcurrent protection function associated with circuit breakers 52/17SS and 52/18SS to remain intact."

This modification was implemented on March 4, 1999, with the installation of two fuses in series each with the two circuit breakers, namely fuses FUMCB/XSH1-N and FUMCB/XSH1-P for 52/18SS, and fuses FUMCB/XSH2-N and FUMCB/XSH2-P for 52/1 7SS.

The 1998 submittal also documented five additional plant modifications that were under consideration. In response to several NRC questions, and the desirability to incorporate the Fire IPEEE into the Ginna Station Risk Monitor (i.e., EOOS), the fire analysis was re-performed. This re-analysis maintained the previous fire frequencies and consequences (i.e., assumed fire-induced failures), but added models of the fire suppression systems and modeled required operator actions in more detail. The results of this re-analysis are presented in Attachment B.3.

As shown in Sections 11.6.2 and 11.6.3 (see Attachment B.3), no vulnerabilities were identified, and none of the five plant modiTications identified in the 1998 submittal remain under consideration. The basis for eliminating the need for these plant modifications was primarily removing unnecessary conservatism and appropriately crediting existing procedural actions. As such, no plant modifications are under consideration. A procedural enhancement as discussed in Attachment B.3 was identiTied for commercial considerations only and is not required based on risk insights.

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 25 of 27

9. Both manual actuation of automatic fire suppression systems and manual fire suppression were modeled for selected fire scenarios in the Ginna fire assessment.

In some scenarios, failure of automatic fire suppression, failure to manually initiate automatic suppression systems, and failure to manually suppress the fire were modeled. The submittal does not address the potential for dependent failure of both automatic and manual suppression systems (e.g., common mode failures related to a common water source) ~

Pleaseindicateif dependent failures between the automatic and manual suppression systems were consideredin the assignment of the suppression probabilities. Also if indicate dependencies between the failure of personnel to manually initiate an automatic suppression system and failure of personnel to manually suppress a fire were considered. Indicate ifdependent failures that would cause the failure of an automatic suppression system to actuate and also prevent manually initiating the system were consideredin the analysis.

The potential for dependent failures of systems and operator dependencies were considered and evaluated for the IPEEE. The discussion is presented in three parts: (1) considerations of potential dependencies between automatic and manual suppression systems, (2) considerations of potential dependencies between the failure of personnel to manually initiate automatic suppression systems and the failure of personnel to manually suppress a fire, and (3) considerations of potential dependencies between faults that cause automatic actuation to fail that would also prevent manual initiation of the system.

1. No significant dependencies were found to exist between manual suppression efforts and installed suppression systems at Ginna Station. Although manual suppression efforts may utilize the fire water system, which is shared by the installed fire sprinklers, the unavailability of fire water was found to be insignificant relative to the failures of manual suppression and the fire sprinkler unavailability.

Fire water is supplied to the plant from three independent and redundant sources:

city water provides one source (for plant hydrants), a diesel-driven fire pump supplying lake water provides a second source, and a motor-driven fire pump supplying lake water provides a third source (the pumps have independent suction lines, and actuation mechanisms). The diesel-driven and motor-driven fire pumps, and their actuation systems, were specifically modelled, while the city water system was not. However, there are no dependencies between the plant fire pumps and city water system that could be impacted by a fire. Additionally, many fires can be suppressed manually using extinguishers (in fact, the experience data indicates most fires are manually suppressed with extinguishers). This provides diverse equipment for fire suppression. Smoke sensors that alert operators of the presence of fire operate independently of installed suppression systems.

Due to the presence of multiple fire brigade personnel that dispatch in response to plant fires and the significant differences in the actions associated with manually initiating the installed fire sprinklers from the control room and manually suppressing the fire, no signiTicant dependencies were judged to exist between these two actions. Note that modeling of manual actuation of the fire sprinkler system was included for "early" suppression (within a few minutes), while other manual

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 26 of 27 suppression efforts are longer term, again providing a basis for independence.

Additionally, failure of smoke sensors, which would constitute a common cause failure of fire brigade dispatch, was examined. The smoke sensor circuits are designed such that a break in the circuit, or failure of a sensor, would not impact the remaining circuits and sensors. Also, such a failure will trigger an alarm indicating a circuit failure. Therefore, failure of the smoke sensors is significantly less likely than the combined failure probability for manual actuation of the sprinklers and manual suppression. Finally, a review of the results presented in Attachment B.3 (see Section 9.6.3.4) shows that only failures of the fire brigade to extinguish a fire in the Control and Battery Rooms were of medium risk significance (none were high). These two rooms have no installed suppression system.

3. Dependencies between the automatic sprinkler actuation system and the manual sprinkler actuation system were addressed by only allowing recovery of automatic actuation failures (i.e., start circuitry) vs. hardware failures of the diesel-driven and motor-driven fire pumps or sprinkler deluge valves. That is, the PSA explicitly modeled the manual actuation recoveries and accounted for any dependencies with the automatic actuation systems within the fault tree logic. It should be noted that the model did not specifically model the ability to cross-connect the city water system to the onsite system as this was assumed to be included within the human failure probability to extinguish the fire as discussed in the response to RAI Question ¹1.

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions Page 27 of 27 References

1. EPRI, "Fire-Induced Vulnerability Evaluation (FIVE)," EPRI TR-100370, April 1992.

2. J. Chen, et al., "Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities," NUREG-1407, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 1991.

3. "Independent Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities -10CFR 50.54(f)," Generic Letter 88-20, Supplement No. 4, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, June 1991.

4. J. Lambright, et al., "Fire Risk Scoping Study: Investigation of Nuclear Power Plant Fire Risk, Including Previously Unaddressed Issues," NUREG/CR-5508, prepared for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 1989.

5. "User's Guide for a Personal-Computer-Based Nuclear Power Plant Fire Data Base,"

NUREG/CR-4586, prepared for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, August 1986.

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions ATTACHMENTB. I EXTRACTS FROM APPENDICES B AND E TO THE I998 SUBMITTAL

B. Location Characteristics Table All relevant plant information was assembled into a relational database using the software Microsoft ACCESS. The computer database imported existing plant information provided by the Ginna plant personnel and related each piece of plant information to the fire area and fire zones defined in this analysis. The information was then summarized into a set of location characteristics tables (LCT) for subsequent analyses.'n LCT was developed for each fire area within the control area of Ginna. Each LCT contains 7 items:

Fire Area Description. This section describes the fire zones within each fire area, the location and the floor area covered by the fire area.

Fire/Smoke Hazards in this Fire Area. The information contained in this section was obtained from review of the Ginna Station Appendix R program information. This section provides an estimate of the normal inventory of in-site and transient fire and smoke hazards. An estimate of the fire severity (in hours) is also included. The fire severity was obtained by dividing the fire loadings by the heat rate for Standard Exposure Fire (80,000 BTU/ft'-hr) established by the National Fire Protection Association.

Fire Protection Features in this Fire Area. This section describes the fire detection and suppression capabilities equipped in the fire area. This includes the primary and backup sup'pression system and the barrier rating of the fire area. The information included in this section was obtained from Reference 11 (Tier 1).

Fire Zone'Adjacent to the Fire Zones in this Fire Area. This section lists the adjacent fire zones to the fire zones within the fire area. The adjacency information is essential in the development of fire propagation scenarios.

Potential Key Equipment and their Associated Basic Event Impacted by Fire/Smoke Hazards in this Fire Area. This section includes a list of plant components, within each fire zone in the fire area, that can be affected by fire and smoke hazards and whose failure can lead to an initiating event, or can impact the accident mitigation systems.

Some of the components included in this section also act as fire ignition sources and fire hazards. Thus, each component was categorized to a component type for identification purpose. This information is also used in the consideration of the fire frequency apportionment analysis (see Appendix D).

P:11 686'AGE.B.DOC/oc B-1

0 B-. Location Characteristics Table

6. Potential Raceway (Conduit and Cable Tray) and their Associated Equipment/Basic Event Impacted by Fire/Smoke Hazards in this Fire Area.

This section provides a list of raceways in each of the zones in the fire area, Failure of the raceway can lead to the loss of the intended function of plant components (that are not within the fire zone) whose failure can lead to an initiating event, or can impact the accident mitigation systems.

The cable trays associated with the safety equipment were identified from a database relating cables and conduit to the equipment served. This database resides at the Electrical Engineering Department of the Ginna Station and contains all cable tray information related to the Appendix R and fire PRA programs. The fire zone location of each cable tray was then identified by looking up the identification number of the cable trays and finding the fire zone location from the cable routing diagrams.

7. Walkdown Notes. This section includes the notes taken during the two spatial interactions walkdowns.

PA1886%GE-B.DOCIoc B-2

LOCATION CKQU).CTERISTICS TABLE

~

FlRE AREA: ABBM

1. FIRE ZONES IN THIS FIRE AREA:

~

'IRE ZONE ELEV (FT.) FIRE ZONE DESCRIPTION I BUILDING FLOOR AREA (SQ, FT.)

ABB 23S 8 AUXILIARYBUILDINGBASEMENT LEVEL 9590 ABM 253'UXILIARYBUILDINGMEZZANINELEVEL 10570

2. FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE COMBUSTIBLE LOADING (BTU) FIRE SEVERITY (HRS)

AB8 8.150 6.1 min.

22.819 17.1 min.

3. FIRE PROTECTION FEATUIKS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE FIRE DETECTION FEATURES FIRE SUPPRESSION FEATURES AB8 Smoke deiersors Preackon sprinkfers, manual I

Smoke deleorors Manual

4. FIRE ZONE(S) ADJACENT TO THE FIRE ZONE(S) IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE ADJACENT FIRE ZONE PATHWAY PATHWAY RATING (HOUR) j ABB CHG WALUOPEN AB8 RC-1 WALL AB8 IBS4I WALL ASM RC-2 WALL ASM 68-1 IBS.1 WALL

5. POTENTIAL KEY EQUIPMENT AND THEIR ASSOCIATED BASIC EVENT(S) IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

I FIRE ABB 1108 EQUIPMENT AFFECTED 'VENT BASIC CVAVP01108 BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION AOV 1108 IN UNE FROM BA BLENDER TO CHARGING PUMP SUCTION FAILS TO OPEN (STDBY:

AB8 111 CVAVP00111 AOV 111 IN LINE FROM RMW PUMPS TO BA BLENDER FAILS TO OPEN (STANDBY)

ABB 1120 CVAVC0112C AIR.OPERATED VALVE 112C FAILS TO CLOSE AB8 313 CVMVX0031 3 MOV 313 Fels to Close I ABB 52/CSP1A CSMPFSI02A CONTAINMENTSPRAY PUMP PSI02A FAILS TO RUN (INJECTION)

ABB 52/CSP18 CSMPF S1028 CONTAINMENTSPRAY PUMP PSI028 FAILS TO RUM (INJECTION)

ABB 52/RHRP1A RRMPFAC01A MOTOR. DRIVEN PUMP PACOIA FAILS TO RUM (RECIRC)

ABB 52/RHRP1A RHMPFACOIA RHR PUMPA(PACOIA) FAILSTO RUN ABB 52/RHRP18 RHMPFAC018 RHR PUMP 8 (PACOI 8) FAILS TO RUN ABB 52/RHRP18 RRMPFAC018 MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMP PACOI8 FAILS TO RUN (RECIRC)

! AB8 52/SIP 1 A SNPFSIOIA PSOI A FAILS TO RUM ABB 52/SIP1A SRMPFSIOIA PSIOI A FAILS TO RUN ABB 52/SIPI8 SNPFSI018 PSI018 FAILS TO RUN I ABB 52/SIP I 8 SRMPFSIOI 8 PS/018 FAILS TO RUN AB8 52/SIP I CI SNPFS101C PSI01C FAILS TO RUN ABB 52/SIP 1 C2 SRMPF SIOIC PSIOI C FAILS TO RUN AB8 624 RRAVF00624 FAILURE OF AOV 624 TO THROTTLE FLOW AB8 625 RRAVF00625 FAILURE OF AOV 625 TO THROTTLE FLOW RRMVP0850A MOTORS) PE RATE 0 VALVE850A FAILS TO OPEN (RECIRC)

ABB 8508 RRMVP06508 MOTORAPERATED VALVE6508 FAILS TO OPEN (RECIRC)

AB8 856 RHMVK00656 MOTOR.OPERATED VALVE856 TRANSFERS CLOSED (INJECTION)

MOTORS)PERATED VALVE00656 PALS TO CLOSE (STANDBY)

AB8 657A RRMVP0657A MOV 657A FAILS TO OPEN AB8 6578 RRMVP 08578 MOV 8578 FAILS TO OPEN ABB 8570 RRMVP0657C MOV 857C FAILS TO OPEN ABB 860A CSMVP0660A MOTOR OPERATED VALVE660A FAILS TO OPEN ON DEMAND (INJECTION)

ABB 6608 CSMVP06608 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE6608 FAILS TO OPEN ON DEMAND (INJECTION)

P816361RCE B.I.DOC/cc B-3 9/lb/93 12; IO;06 PM

LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: ABBM

~ AB8 860C CSMVP0660C MOTOR OPERATEO VALVE6600 FAlLS TO OPEN ON DEMAND(INJECTION)

ABB 860D CSMVP06600 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE8600 FAILS TO OPEN ON DEMAND (INJECTION)

ABB MOTOR OPERATEO VALVE896A FAILS TO CLOSE ON DEMAND (RECIRCULATION)

C RMVZ06968 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE8968 FAILS TO CLOSE ON DEMAND (RECIRCULATION)

AB8 LT.920 CSLTLLT920 RWST LEVELTRANSMllTER LT.920 FAII.S LOW LT-921 CSLTLLT921 RWST LEVEL TRANSMllTER LT.921 FAILS LOW 4615 SWMVC04615 Soniice Water Header Isoladon MOV 4615 Fafs To Cisse On Demand ABM 4616 SvvMVC04616 Service Water Header Isola don MOV 4616 Pals To Close On Demand I ABM 4735 SWMVC04735 Service Water Header Isolation MOV 4735 Fels To Close On Demand ABM 52/16 ACCBD16118 Ac BREAKER 52/16 (BUS16/118) FAILS TO OPERATE 52/I 6SS ACT1FSST16 Fauk on 4160/480 VAC Bus 16 supply Transformer PXABSS016 52/COP I 8 ACCBN16168 Ac BREAKER 52/COP 18 (8 US 16/168) FAILS TO OPEN ABM 52/CF18 ACC BN1613C Ac BREAKER 52/CFI 8 (BUS16/13C) FAILS TO OPEN ABii 52ICF1C ACCBN1614A Ac BREAKER 52/CFIC (BUS16/14A) FAILS TO OPEN ABM 52/CHPI 8 ACCBN16158 Ac BREAKER 52/CHPI 8 (BUS16/158) FAILS TO OPEN ABM 52/CHPI C ACCBN1615C AC BREAKER 52/CHP1C (BUS16/15C) FAILS TO OPEN i ABM 52/EG181 ACCBD1611C OGB OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG181 (BUS16/I 1c) FAILS TO OPERATE i ABM 52/MCCD DCCFRA188P Fuse FUDCPDPA8018/2P Fails Opon (To MCC D) 52/MCCD ACCBRMCC ID 460 VAC MCCD Feeder Circuit Breaker 52/MCCO (8VS1 6/I 60) Trans/ors Open)

I ABM 52/SFPPB ACCBN1617A Ac BREAKER 52/SFPPB (BUS16/17A) FA!LS TO OPEN ASM 738A CCMVP0738A MOTOR4)PERATED VALVE736A FAlLS TO OPEN 7388 CCMVP07358 MOTORS) P ERAT ED VALVE7388 FAILS TO OPEN 617 CCMVK00617 MOTOR4)P VALVE817 TRAHSFERS CLOSED 83/I 6 DCREBBUSIB RELAY 83E/16 (BVS 16 Oc THROWOVF R) FAILS TO OEENERGIZE 9704A AFMVX9704A Motor operated valve 9704A fals to dose ABM 97048 AFMVX97048 Motor operated valve 97048 fails lo doss ACPDPAB10 AC82FOAB10 LOCAL FAULT ON 460 VAC DIST PANEL ACPDPA810 TO PRZR PROPOR HEATER GROUP A1 ACPDPA811 ACB2FOA811 LOCAL FAULT ON 460 VAC DIST PANEL ACPDPA811 TO PRZR PROPOR HEATER GROUP A2 ABM ACPDPA812 AC82FOA812 LOCAL FAULT ON 490 VAC DIST PANEL ACPDPA812 TO PRZR BACKUP HEATER GROUP 81 ABM ACPDPA813 AC82FOA813 LOCAL FAULT ON 490 VAC DIST PANEL ACPDPAB13 TO PRZR BACKUP HEATER GROUP 82 BATP1 8 CVMPAPCH38 BORIC ACID MOTOR4)RIVEN PUMP PCH038 FAILS TO START ABM BUS16UV UVREEOX316 Relay 27X3/16 faits lo energize ABM BUS16UV WLCOBX46A RELAY278X4/16 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY ¹2) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL BUS16UV UVLCDBX56A RELAY278X5/16 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY <<2) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL BUS16UV UVREEOX616 Relay 27X6/16 fa¹s to energize BUS16UV WLCD BX66A RELAY 278X6/16 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY <<2) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL BUS16UV WLCDBX16A RELAY 27BXI/16 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY ¹2) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL BUS16UV UVLCDX316A RELAY 27X3/16 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY Nl) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL ABM BVS16UV WLCOX416A RElAY27X4/16 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY Nl) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL I

ABM BUS16VV WLCDX516A RELAY27XS/16 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY NI) GENERATES A SPURtOUS SIGNAL I ABM BUS16UV UVLCDX616A RELAY27X6/16 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY <<1) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL BUS16UV AFCTR78616 CONTACT 27BX6/16 (3A) TRANSFERS OPEN BUS16UV UVREEOX216 Relay 27X2/16 fails to energize BUS16UV WLCOBX616 Relay 278x6/I 6 drtver (Hea\ 5'stk Assembly ¹2) fails to energize I ABM BVS16UV AFCTR07616 CONTACT 27X6/16 (~) TRANSFERS OPEN ABM 8US16UV UVLCOBX36A RELAY278X3/16 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY ¹2) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL BUS16UV UVREEOX116 Retsy 27XI/16 fels lo onorgize ABM BUS16UV UVREKOX416 BUS 16 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27X4I16 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED ABM BUS16W WCFR16FV2 Fuss N2 (FUARBIRC16/2 P) fails open (retay cabinet)

ABM BUS16VV UVRE E BX316 Relay 278X3/I 6 faits lo oner gee ABM BUS'l6UV UVREEBX216 Relay 27BX2/16 fails to energ'ce I

ABM BUS16UV WLCDBX316 Relay 27BX3/I 6 driver (Heal Sink Assembly ¹2) has to energce ABM BU S16UV UVLCDOX418 Relay 27x4/16 drive (Heal sink Assembly <<I) fails to energize 'I 4

ABM BUS16UV UVREEBX116 Relay 278X1/16 fess lo energce ABM BUS16UV WREEBX516 Relay 278X5/I 6 lails to energcs i ABM BUS16UV UVLCDBX116 Relay 278XI/I6 driver (Heat Sink Assembly ¹2) fails lo energize P016¹NIICE.B I.DOC/oc B-4 9/Zz/9¹ )2: lgi07 PM

r.ocarroz CH~CxEIUSxrcS max,E FIRE AREA:; ABBM ABM BUS16UV UVRE EBX616 Retay 27BXB/I6 fails to energize ABM BUS16UV WLCOOX616 Relay 27X6/16 driver (Heat Sink Assembly ¹I) fais to energize ABM BUS16UV UVLCDOX516 Relay 27XS/16 driver (Heat Sink Assembly << I) tails to energize ABM BUS16UV WLCDOX316 Relay 27X3/16 driver (Heat Sink Assembly <<1) fails to energize ABLI BUS16W WLCDBX516 Relay 278X5/18 driver (Heat Sink Assembly ¹2) faits to energize ABM BUS16VV UVLCDOX116 Rotay 27XI/18 drive (Heal Sink Assembly <<1) fails lo energize ABM BUS16UV UVCFR16F U3 Fuse ¹3 (F VARBIRC16/3-N) fails open (relay cabinel)

ABM BVS16UV WLCDBX416 Relay 278X4l16 driver (Heat Sink Assembly ¹2) tails to energize ABM BUS16UV UVRE KBX316 BUS 16 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27BX3/16 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED ABM BUS16UV UVLCD BX216 Relay 27BX2/I 8 driver (Heat Sink Assembly ¹2) Ms to energtze ABM BVS16W UVLCDOX216 Relay 27X2/1 6 drive (Host Sink Assembly ¹I ) tails to enorfjize ABM BVS16W UVLCOX116A RELAY27X1/I 6 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY ¹1) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL ABM BVS16W WREKOX116 BUS 16 VNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27X1/16 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED ABM BVS16UV WREKBX616 BUS 16 UNDERVOLTAGE RElAY27BX6/16 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED ABM BVS16UV VVREEBX416 Relay 278X4/16 fails to energize ABM BVS16UV UVREKBX416 BUS 16 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY278X4/16 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED ABM BVS16W UVREKBX116 BUS 16 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 278X1/16 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED ABM BVS16UV VVREKOX616 BUS 16 VNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27X6l16 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED ABM BUS16UV WRE KOX516 BUS 16 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27XS/16 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED ABM BUS16W UVRE EOX416 Relay 27X4/16 tais to energize ABM BUS16UV UVREKOX316 BUS 16 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27X3/16 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED ABM BUS16VV UVRE EOX516 Relay 27XS/16 tais to energize ABM BUS16UV UVREKBX516 BUS 16 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 278XS/16 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED ABM DCPDPA8018/02 DCCSRA1 BBX Disconnoa Swikcn OCPDPABOI 8/02 Transfers Open (To MCC 0)

ABM DCPDPABOIB/04 DCCF RA1 8 DN Fuse FUDCPDPABOI8/4N Fai/s Open (To Bus 18- Normal)

ABM DCPDPABOI8/05 OCCFRA18EN Fuse FUDCPDPABOI BISH Fais Open (To Bus 14- Emergency)

ABM DCPDPCB038/19 DCBDFAUXDB Auxiliary Building DC Distribution Panel 8 (DCPDABOI 8) Local Faut ASM LT.112 CVLTD00112 VOLUMECONTROL TANK (VCT) LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT-112 FAILS TO RESPOND ABM LT-139 CVLTD00139 VOLUMECONTROL TANK (VCT) LEVELTRANSMITTER LT.139 FAILS TO RESPOND ABM MCCJ ACCBRMCC1 J 480 VAC MCCJ Feoder C'rcuit Breaker 52/MCCJ (MCCO/OSIcK) Transfers Open ABM MCCM ACCBRMCC1M 480 VAC MCCM Foeder Circuit Breaker 52/MCCM (MCCO/1 50) Transfers Open ABM PT-945 ES PTD PT945 CONTAINMENTHIGH PRESSURE TRANSMllTER PT-945 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND ABM PT.946 ESPTDPT946 CONTAINMENTHIGH PRESSURE TRANSMllTER PT-946 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND

6. POTENTIAL RACEWAYS (CONDUITS AND CABLE TRAYS) AND THEIR ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT/BASIC EVENT(S) IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE RACEWAY EQUIPMENT CABLE BASIC EVENT BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION AFFECTED AFFECTED FUNCTION AFFECTED AB8 00702 BSOA P 480 VAC POWER RRMVPOBSOA MOTORS)PERATED VALVE850A FAILS TO OPEN

[RECIRC)

AB8 C0702 85CA P 460 VAC POWER RRMVROBSOA MOTORS)P VALVE850A TRANSFERS OPEN

[RECIRCULATION)

AB8 C0702 BSCA P 480 VAC POWER RHMVR0850A MOTOR-OP VAI.VE850A TRANSFERS OPEN (INJECTtON)

AB8 C0703 850A C 125 VOC CONTROL RRMVPOBSOA MOTOR.OPERATED VALVE850A FAILS TO OPEN (RECIRC)

C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVR0850A MOTOR4)P VALVEBSOA TRANSFERS OPEN

[RECIRCULATION)

AB8 C0703 BSOA C 125 VDC CONTROL RHMVR0850A MOTOR4)P VALVE850A TRANSFERS OPEN (INJECTION[

AB8 C0735 857A P 480 VAC POWER RHMVR0857A MOTOR.OPERATED VALVE857ATRANSFERS OPEN 857A P 480 VAC POWER RRMVP0857A MOV 857A FAlLS TO OPEN AB8 C0735 857A P 480 VAC POWER RRMVR0857A MOTORS)PERATED VALVE857A TRANSFERS OPEN 857A C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVP0857A MOV 857A FAILS TO OPEN 857A C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVR0857A MOTOR.OPERATED VALVE857A TRANSFERS OPEN AB8 CO/36 657A C 125 VDC CONTROL RHMVR0657A MOTOR.OPERATED VALVE857A TRANSFERS OPEN I'.llaz6IRGE 8 I.DOC/oc 8-5 gr)5/gf/ I itigi07 PM

Pages B-6 through B-47 are similar and not included to reduce paper volume.

r.ocaYrON CIA CYmrSYrcS mar,K FIRE AREA: ABBM ABM R3408 PT429 I ALARM/IND/CONT ESPTDPT429 PRESSURIZER LOWPRESSURETRANSMITTER I

I PT429 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND i ABM R3408 PT429 I ALARM/IND/CONT EXPTLPT429 PRESSURIZER LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER I PT429 FAILS LOW ASM R3408 PT429 I ALARM/IND/CONT RCPTLPT429 PRESSURE TRANSMllTER PT429 FAILS LOW ABM R34$ 0 LT426 I INDICATION LT426 PRZR LVLXMTR i

ABM R3412 FT465 I RPS CHANNEL 2 ESFTD00465 STEAM GENERATOR A FLOW TRANSMITTER FT (WHITE) 465 FAILS TO RESPOND I

ABM R3414 FT474 I RPS CHANNEL 3 ESFTD00474 SG 8 STEAM FLOWTRANSMITTER FT474 FAILS (BI.UE) TO RESPOND j ABM R3689 LT-921 CSLTDLT921 RWST LEVEL TRANSMffTER LT-921 FAILS TO RESPOND 1 ASM R3689 LT-921 CSLTLLT921 RWST LEVEL TRANSM(ITER LT-921 FAILS LOW I

ABM R3969 TE41081 C TE41081 TEMPERATURE ELEMENT FOR LOOP B COLD t LEG ABhl I R3971 LT427 I ALARM/IND/CONT RCLYDLM427 INSTRUMENT LOOP CURRENT REPEATFR LM I 427 FAILS TO RESPOND ASM R3973 PT430 I ALARM/IND/CONT ESPTDPT430 PRESSURIZER LOW PRESSURE TRANShliTTER PT430 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND ASM R3973 PT430 I ALARM/IND/CONT EXPTLPT430 PRESSURIZER LOW PRESSURE TRANSM/ITER PT430 FAILS LOW ABM R3973 PT430 I ALARhMND/CONT RCPTLPT430 PRESSURE TRANSMllTER PT430 FAILS LOW ASM R4086 LT428A I INDICATION LT428A PRZR LVL WIDE RANGE.XMTR ASM R4068, PT4208 PT4208 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER REACTOR COOLANT I SYSTEM INST LOOP 4208 I ABM R4360 LT.505 LT-505 STEAM GENERATOR EMSOIA WIDE RANGE I P

LEVEL TRANSMITTER ABM R4369 LT.507 C LT407 STEAM GENERATOR EMSOI8 WIDE RANGE LEVEL TRANSMITTER ASM SAC0212A C 125 VDC CONTROL RC<9$ Spurious ope6ny olRCS head vent if kt corlunctiet with SVW90?

ASM SAC0212A 86198 C 125 VDC CONTROL IASVP86198 SOLENOID VALVE86198 FAILS TO OPEN ABM SAC0212A 86198 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCREB451AX RELAY PC451.X FAILS TO DEZNERGIZE ABM SAC02$ 28 86198 C 125 VDC CONTROL IASVP86198 SOLENOID VALVE86198 FAILS TO OPEN ABM SAC02$ 28 86198 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCRE8451AX RELAY PC45$ .X FAILS TO DE-ENERGIZE ABM SAC0214 593 C 125 VDC CONTROL RC493 Spurious openiny of RCS head vent if in cojjuncten with SV492?

ABM SAC0214 86168 C 125 VDC CONTROL IASVP86168 SOLENOID VALVE86168 FAILS TO OPEN ABM SAC 0216 591 C 125 VDC CONTROL RC491 Spurkxus openiny of RCS head vent it in conjunction with SV.5907 ABM SAC0216 C 125 VDC CONTROL RC-593 Sptukus openksy of RCS head vent 8 in conjunct'en vrith SV-592?

7. SPATIAL INTERACTIONS ANALYSIS WALKDOWNNOTES:

FIRE ZONE WALKDOWNNOTES ABB ~ 3 51 pumps about 6'enter@enter (pheos A2. A3). 2 CS pumps about S'eecreenter. about ly'rom 51 pumps (phao Ae). Coeol panels south of 31 pumps (pleto AS). 3 MOVs west of RWST on ehcr side of eoncrcte wall and I small pump (photo Ad). 2 SFP cooling pumps near west stahwetl (phoe A7). RHR pueps in pit below, thh kvcl near wet stahwell with 5 cher pumps. PCs stored in rack jet ouuide charging pump cubicle.

4/2/98 WD Sl peep abks in conduit. There 4 some rash in ans. Charging pumps in separatc cubkde with fire rated barricn. Heat racing on thc piping to Sl and cbg. No signitiaat combuwibles between RHR arcs on west cnd, and Sl wa. so fire In IIHR arcs unlikely to spread. Conduits to RHR room and pumps are very stpwatc.

ABM 2 SW MOVs (9701 A, 970I8) ncw west sairwell, 3'pan (pheo AS). 3 CCW MOVs (73SA, 73SB, 8 l7) southwcn of RWST, 6'part (photo Ap). 4 CCW MOVs just teuidc conuinmcnt. west of RWST (photo A IO). 2 MOVs (S97, 89S) cwt of RWST. 3'pan (phao A I I). 2 SW MOVs near south wall, southeast of RWST (pheo AI2). Eery to cable tunnel (phaos A13, A l4). Cabl>> rays near ast stauwell, Cf II I (wrapped) and CT I I 0 (not wrapped) (phceo AI5). MCC IM, Bus l6. MCC ID.

DC power abincts. 2 small pumps near cwt stairwell.

4/2/PS WD Rotc thw the line listed on the fisc Response Phn diagram as H2 Is aciualty N2. At the Cf exit. there h a 'smoke banicr (wbkh is sieyar to a fire banier, but is not qualified). and the cables we sprayed for about 6'. There are spray shicMs on thc MCC and bus 16. The charcoal fdtcr unit h 5'rom bus ld, and is totally cncloscd with fire suppression. Thc mini-purge AOV CIV has no local operator, but has lire wrap above the valve. Stalnvcyt betwccn (toes have fue water sprays to prcv<<e lire spread bcrween f)ours.

I".IldgdtRGB B.I.DDC/oc r

B- 48 9/21/yg l2:$ 0:23 PM

LOCATION CHAIR CTEMSTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: ABI

1. FIRE ZONES IN THIS FIRE AREA:

I FIRE ZONE ELEV (FT.) FIRE ZONE DESCRIPTION BUILDING FLOOR AREA (SQ. FT.)

271'UXILIARYBUILDINGOPERATING LEVEL 12740 IBN4 INTERMEDIATEBUILDINGSUB.BASEMENT NORTH IB I IBN.1 253' INTERMEDIATEBUILDINGBASEMENT LEVEL NORTH IB 3570 IBN.2 278 4 INTERMEDIATE BUILDINGMEZZANINELEVEL NORTH IB 3570 I ION 3 298' INTERMEDIATE BUILDINGUPPER LEVEL NORTH IB 3570 315' INTERMEDIATEBUILDINGTOP LEVEL NORTH IB I IBS4 23T IBS.1 271'NTERMEDIATE BUILDINGSVB BASEMENT SOUTH IB 2325 INTERMEDIATEBUILDING BASEMENT LEVEL SOUTH IB 232$

IBS.2 9/TERMEDIATE BUILDINGMEZZANINELEVEL SOUTH IB 2385 IBS.3 293'NTERMEDIATE BUILDINGTOP LEVEL SOUTH IB 2325 N2 271'ITROGEN STORAGE BUILDING NS 430

2. FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE COMBUSTIBLE LOADING (BTU) FIRE SEVERITY (HRS) 6.700 5.Omit

[

I 8N4 0 IB N.l 74,286 I 55.7 mrk s IBM.2 1,214 0.9 mn.

IBM.3 4.693 3.5 mh.

I

~

I IBNA 12,340 9.3 mia IBS4 189-1 15.6 m'n.

I 8 9.2 20.470 15.4 m'n.

IBS4 4.101 3.1 mitk N2 ISN'T

3. FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE FIRE DETECTION FEATURES FIRE SUPPRESSION FEATURES I ABO Smoke deteaore I

IBN4 I

IBM-1 IBN.2 IBN4 IBS4 IBS.1 IBS-2 IBS4

4. HM ZONE(S) ADJACENT TO THE ~i ZONE(S) IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE ADJACENT FIRE ZONE PATHWAY PATHWAY RATING (HOUR)

ABO WALL WALL ABO RC.3 WALL AB0 98-2 WALL IBS 2 WALL IBN4 IBS4 OPEN IBN4 RC-1 WALL IBN 1 IBS.I OPEN IBN.I CT WALL IBN.1 RC-2 WALL PBI666IRCE 8 I.DOC/oe B- 50 9/28/96 l2:IO:23 PM

LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: ABI IBN.I WALUDOOR IBN.I TG.1 WALUD OCR IBM.1 SB.IH6 WALUDOOR IBM.2 None 1864) IBM4) OPEN IBS4) WALL RC 1 WALL IBS 1 IBN 'I OPEN IBS 1 WALL 185-1 RC-2 WALL

'BS-1 SB.IHS WALUDOOR IBS.1 681 WALI.

IBS.2 IBM.2 OPEN IBS-2 ABO WALL IBS 2 RCQ WALL IBS.2 682 WALL 1864 OPEN N2 AGO WALL 3

5. POTENTIAL KEY EQUIPMENT AND THEIR ASSOCIATED BASIC EVENT(S) IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE EQUIPMENT BASIC BASIC EVENT AFFECTED EVENT DESCRIPTION AGO 350 CVMVN03350 MOTOR% PE RATED VALVE350 FAILS TO OPEN AGO, 4734 SWMVC04 734 Sonics Water Header Isolation MOV 4734 Fails To Close On Demand ABO 52/14 ACCBD14168 AC BREAKER 52/14 (BUS14/188) FAILS TO OPERATE ABO 52/I4SS ACT1FSST14 Feud On 4160 I 460 VAC Bus 14 supply Transformer PXABSS014 "

ABO 52/ABEF IG ACC 8 N1421A AC BREAKER 52/ABEF1G (BUS14/21A) FAILS TO OPEN ABO 52/CCPIA CCMPFPUMPA MOTOR-DRIVEN PUMP PACO2A FAILS TO RUM ABO 52/CCP1A ACCBN1423A AC BREAKER 52/CCP 'IA (8US14/23A) FAILS TO OPEN ABO 52/CCPI 8 CCMPFPUMPB MOTOR47RIVEN PUMP PACO28 FAILS TO RUN ABO 52/CFIA ACCBN1423C AC BREAKER 52/CF1A (BUS14/23C) FAILS TO OPEN ABO 52CFIO ACCBN1420C AC BREAKER 52/CF1D (BUS14/20C) FAILS TO OPEN ABO 52CHPIA ACC 8 N14238 AC BREAKER 52ICHP1A (BUS14/238) FAILS TO OPEN ABO 52/EGIA1 ACCBD1416C DG A OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EGIA1 (BUS14/I BC) FAlLS TO CLOSE AGO 52/MCCC DCCFR422NR FUSE FUBUS14/2243 FAILS OPEN (RECIRCULATION)

ABO 52/MCCC DCCFRA1ABN Fuse FUDCPDPABOIA/2N Faib Open (To MCC C)

ABO 52/MCCC ACCBRMCCI C 4mvAc MCCC Feeder Circuit Breaker 52/MCCC (GUSI4/22C) T/ansfors Open ABO 63/14 DCREBBUS14 RELAY636/14 (BUS 14 DC THROV/OVER) FAlLS TO DEENERGIZE ABO 6$ MCCC DCREE66MCC RELAY66/MCCC FAILS TO ENERGIZE AGO 9704A ACCBRML10A BREAKER 52/9704A MCCL POS IJ TRANSFERS OPEN ABO BATP I A CVMPAPCH3A BORIC ACID MOTORNRIVEMPUMP PCH03A FAlLS TO START AGO BATPIA CVMPAPCH3A BORIC ACID MOTORS)RIVEN PUMP PCH03A FAILS TO START ABO GATP I 8 CVMPAPCH38 BORIC ACID MOTORS)RIVEN PUMP PC H038 FAILS TO START ABO BUS14UV UVREKOX614 BUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27X6/14 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED ABO BUS14UV 'REEOX414 Relay 27X4/14 fails lo energize ABO BUS14UV UVREEBX514 Relay 27BXS/14 fats lo energize ABO BUS14UV WREEOX314 Relay 27X3/14 laBs lo energize ABO BUS14UV UVREEBX114 Relay 276XI/14 fads to energize ABO BUS14UV WREEOX214 Relay 27X2/14 faas lo enorgce ABO BUS14UV UVRE 6 BX314 Relay 278X3/I 4 fails lo energize ABO BUS14W UVREEBX414 Relay 278X4/14 lads to energize ABO BUS14UV UVREEOX514 Relay 27X5/14 fails to energiZO ABO GUS14W UVREEBX614 Relay 278X6/14 fails to enorpco ABO BUS14UV UVRE KOX114 BUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27XI/I4 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED ABO BUS14UV UVRE KOX314 . BUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27X3/14 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED Phldd61RGE.B I.DOC/oc B-5) g/26/gd 12;10:24 PM

e LOCATION CHAjRACTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: ABI ABO BUS14UV UVLCOX514A RELAY 27X5/14 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY ¹I) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL ABO BUS14W UVREKBX114 BUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 278X1/14 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED ABO BUS1 <<W UVI.CDOX214 Relay 27X2/I 4 driver (Heal Sink Assembly << I) tails to energize BUS14UV AFCTR78614 CONTACT 278X6/I 4 TRANSFERS OPEN ABO BUS14UV AFCTR70614 CONTACT 27X6/14 (1-2) TRANSFERS OPEN BUS14W UVREKDX414 BUS 14 UNDE RVOLTAGE RElAY 27X4/I 4 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED ABO 8US14UV UVREKBX614 BUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGE RE(AY 278X6/I 4 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED BUS14UV uvLc ogx314 Relay 27x3/14 diver (Hast sink Assembly ¹I) fails lo energize BOS14OV UVLC014 5<<2 BUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGE SOLID STATE SWITCH ¹2 FAILS TO GENERATE A SIGNAL BUS14UV UVREKBX314 BUS 14 UNDE RVOLTAGE RE(AY 278X3/I 4 TRANSFERS TO EN ERG tZED AiiD BUSI4W UVCFR14FU3 . Fuse <<3 (F UARA1RC14/3-N) fails open (relay cabinet)

BUS14UV OVREEOX614 Relay 27x6/14 fah to energize AB0 BUS14UV UVLCOOX1 14 Relay 27xl/14 driver (Hast Sink Assembly ¹1) fails lo energize 8US14UV WLCDOX514 Relay 27XS/14 driver (Heat Sink Assembly ¹1) fails lo energize BUS14UV UVREKBX514 BUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGE RE(AY 278X5/14 TRANSF ERS TO ENERGIZED BUS14W WLCDBX214 Relay 278X2/1 4 driver (Hast Sink Assembly ¹2) fsiis to oner gtte BUS'14UV UVLCOBX34A RELAY 278X3/14 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY ¹2) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL BUS14UV WLCDBX314 Relay 278X3/14 driver (Heal Sink Assembly ¹2) faas lo energize Bus14uv UVLCOBX14A RELAY 278X1/14 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY ¹2) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL i ABO BUS14UV UVLCOX614A RELAY 27X6/14 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY ¹1) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL ABO BUS14UV UVLCOOX414 Relay 27X4/14 driver (Heat Sink Assembly <<1) fails to energize ABO BUS14UV UVLC0 8X114 Relay 278XI/I4 driver (Heal Sink Assembly ¹2) fails to energize ABO BUS14UV WREKBX414 BUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGE RElAY 278X4/I 4 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED BUS14W WREKOX514 BOS 14 ONDERVOLTAGE RE(AY 27XS/14 TRANSFERS TO FNERGIZED ABO BUS14uv UVLCDX414A RELAY 27X4/14 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY ¹1) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL ABO BUS14UV UVLCD BX614 Relay 278X6/14 driver (Heal Sink Assemb/y ¹2) fails to energize ABO BUS14W UVLCDX314A RELAY 27X3/1 4 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY ¹1) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL ABO BUS14UV WREEBX214 Relay 27BXZ/I4 fels lo energize BUS14uv UVLCDOX614 ReLvy 27X6/1 4 driver (Heat Sink Assembly ¹I) fsib to energize BUS14UV uvLcox114A RELAY27X1/14 DRtVER (HEAT SINK ASS EMB'LY ¹1) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL ABO BUS14UV WLC014 S<<1 BUS 14 UNDERVOLTAGE SOLID STATE SWITCH ¹ 1 FAlLS TO GENERATE A SIGNAL BUS14W UVCFR14FU2 Fuse <<2 (FUARAIRc f4/2+) fats open (relay cabinet)

Bustcw UVREEOX114 Relay 27X1/14 faih to energize ABO BUS14UV UVLCDBX64A RELAY 278X6/14 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY<<2) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL BUS14UV UVLCOBX54A RElAY 27BXS/1 4 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY ¹2) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL Bus14uv UVLCOBX514 Relay 278XS/I 4 driver (Hest Sink Assembly <<2) fails lo energize BUS14UV UVLCDBX44A RElAY278X4/14 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY ¹2) GEHERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL BUS14UV UVLCDBX414 Relay 278X4/I 4 driver (Heat Sink Assombly <<2) faits lo energize DCPDPAB01A/02 DCCSRA1ABX D'sccnnect Swlch DCPDPA801 A/02 Transfors Open (To MCC C)

DCPDPA801A/04 DCCFRA1ADM Fuse FUDCPDPA801A/4N Fails Open (To Bus 14- Norma/)

DCPDPAB01A/05 DCCFRA1AEN Fuse FUDCPOPABOI/VSM Fats Open (To Bus 16 - Emergency)

DCPDPC803A/19 DCBDFAUXDA Aux/Iary Buikl'ng OC Distribution Panel A (DCPDPABOIA) Local Fauk MCCH ACCBRMCC1H 480 VAC MCCH Feeder Cucuit Breaker 52/MCCH (MCCC/05MM) Transfers Open MCCL ACCBRMCC11. 460VAC MCCL Feeder Cyciiit Breaker 52/MCCL (MCCC/113) Transfers Open ABO PIO617 CCPCOPC617 PRESSURE INDICATINGCOMTROLLER PS4117 FAILS TO RESPOND ABO RMWP1A CVMPFPCHSA Motor~i pump PCHOSA (RMU Pump A) faits lo run RMWP1A CVMPFPCHSA MotcrMIvan pump PCH08A (RMU Pump A) fails lo n<<I RMWP I 8 CVMPF PC H68 Motor~ pump PCH068 (RMU Pump 8) fags to nst ABO CVMPFPCH88 Motor~i pump PCHOSB (RMU Pump 8) fess to nat TAFPACOP ACCBRPOL10 AC BREAKER MCCC/02H TRANSFERS OPEN TAFPACOP ACCBRPOL10 AC BREAKER MCCC/02H T/IANSFERS OPEN IBN I 4007 AFMV004007 Motor operated valve 4007 tails lo I/vottta flow ~ r

~ ~

IBM.1 4008 AFMV004006 Motor operated valve 4008 tails to I/vottle liow 'I I8M.1 4013 SWMVP04013 Motor operated valve 4013 fazs lo open IBN.I 4027 SWMVP04027 Meter operated valve 4027 tais to open ISN 1 SWMVP04028 Motor operated valve 4028 fats lo open I".'ll6161RCE 8 I, DOC/oc a-sr 9/zsrga Izil(kts PM

LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: ABl I 8N.I 4324 SWSVP04 324 Sc¹enoid valve 4324 fath lo open j IBM.l 4324 SWPSR02094 D/ferentbl pressure swlch DPS.2094 fels lo respond IBN 1 4325 SWPSR02084 Dfferenthl pressure switch DPS 2084 fels to respond IBN.1 SWSVP04 325 Solenoid vahe 4325 faih to open IBN.1 4326 SWPSR02085 Dtfferendal pressure switch DPS.2085 fels to respond IBN I 4326 SWSVP 04326 Solenoid vahe 4328 lails lo open IBN-1 4614 SWMVC04614 Senrice Water Header Isolation MOV 461 4 Faib To Cbse On Demand t I 8N.I SWMVC04663 Senrice Water Header Isolation MOV 4663 Faih To Cbse On Demand

! IBM.1 SWMVC04664 Senrice Water Header Isolation MOV 4664 Faih To Close On Demand j tBN.1 4733 SWMVC04 733 Service Water Header Iso'Iaticn MOV 4733 Faib To Cbse On Demand IBN.I 52/MAFP IA AFMPF PAF I A AFWMotcr4)rivsn Pump 1A fath to nst ISN.1 52/MAFP18 AFMPFPAFI 8 AFW Motcr4)riven Pump 18 fels to nst IBN.1 IAAVK05392 AlR4)PERATED VALVE5392 TRANSFER CLOSED IBN I FT-2001 AFFTDF200$ Rcw tarlsrtlitler FT 2001 fels to respcnd IBN.1 AFFTDFT2002 Fbw transmitter FT.2002 fels lo respond 1

I IBM-1 ESPTDPT468 SG A LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT~ FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND IBM.1 EXPTLPT468 SG A LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT~ FAILS LOW IBN.1 PTAS ESPTDPT469 SG A LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PTAS FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND IBN.1 PTAS EXPTLPT469 SG A LOW PRESSURE TRANSMllTER PT~S FAILS LOW IBN.1 PT<78 ESPTDPT478 SG 8 LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT<78 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND I 8N.I PT<78 EXPTLPT478 SG 8 LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT&78 FAILS LOW I 8N.1 PTAS EXPTLPT479 SG 8 LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT<79 FAILS LOW IBN I ESPTDPT479 SG 8 LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PTAS FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND IBM 1 PT<82 ESPTDPT482 SG A LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT<82 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND IBN.I PT<82 EXPTLPT482 SG A LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT<82 FAILS LOW IBM.1 PT<83 ESPTDPT483 SG 8 LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT&83 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND IBN I EXPTLPT483 SG 8 LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PTAS FAILS LOW Sl TRAIN A EXREKOOOC1 CONTAINMENTISOLATION SIGNAL MASTER RELAY C1 SPURIOUSLY ENERGIZES IBM-1 TAOP DCCSRT1 BNX Disconnect Svvtch DCPDPTB01 8/I 3 Transfers Open po TDAFWPump Oi Pump)

IBN.2 3410 MSRVP03410 ARV 3410 FAILS TO OPEN {STANDBY)

IBN.2 3411 MSRVP03411 ASt4) P ERATE0 VALVE3411 FAILS TO OPEN (ARV A)

IBN.2 MSMVP3504A lA¹cr operated valve 3504A fels to open IBM-2 MSMVP3505A Motor operated valve 3505A faih to open IBM.2 35t6 MSAVXIL)516 MSIV 3516 Faib to Close IBN-2 3517 MSAVX03517 MSIV3517 Faib to Close IBS.2 ESPTDPTS47 CONTAINMENTHIGH PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-947 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND IBS-2 PT.948 ESPTDPT948 CONTAINMENTHIGH PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-948 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND IBS.2 PT.S49 ESPTDPTS49 CONTAINMENTHIGH PRESSURE TRANSMITfER PT-S49 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND IBS-2 PT.950 ESPTDPT950 CONTAINMENTHIGH PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-950 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND

6. POTENTIAL RACEWAYS (CONDUITS AND CABLE TRAYS) AND THEIR ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT/BASIC EVENT(S) IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE RACEWAY EQUIPMENT CABLE BASIC EVENT BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION AFFECTED AFFECTED FUNCT)ON AFFECTED AB0 AH00201 9632A P 120 VAC POWER SWAVN9632A Ale)PERATEO VALVE9632A FAILS TO OPEN C 120 VAC CONTROI. SWAVN9632A Ale)PERATED VALVE9632A FAILS TO OPEN

'BO C 120 VAC CONTROL SVAVN9632A Ale)PERATED VALVE9632A FAILS TO OPEN AHC0219 P 480 VAC POWER HVMFFAFFIA MOTOR4)RIVENFANAFFOIAFAILS TO RUN AB0 AHC0220 0 120 VAC CONTROL HVMFFAFF1A MOTOM>RIVENFAN AFFOIA FAILS TO RUN C0544 BATP1A C 125 VDC CONTROL CVMPAPCH3A BORIC ACID MOTORS)RIVEN PUMP PCH03A FAILS TO START AB0 BATP1A P 480 VAC POWER CVMPAPCH3A BORIC ACID MOTOR-DRIVENPUMP PCH03A I FAILS TO START AB0 CO546 BATP I A C 125 VDC CONTROl. CVMPAPCH3A BORIC ACID MOTOR.DRIVEN PUMP PCH03A t

FAILS TO START AB0 BATP1A C 125 VDC CONTROL CVMPAPCH3A BORIC ACID MOTOR.DRIVEN PUMP PCH03A

)

FAILS TO START AGO TAP PAC OP P 480 VAC POWER ACCBRPOLI0 AC BREAKER MCCC/02H TRANSFERS OPEN PB16SNIcGE.B I.DOC/oc B-53 S/25/Sa 12: 10:24 PM

0 LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE FXRE AREA: ABI I ABO C0591 TAFPACQP I IND/125 VDC ACCBRPOLIO AC BREAKER MCCC/02H TRANSFERS OPEN i CONTROL ABO Ciiii CVTA1 P 460 VAC POWEIl IBT6FCVTA2 tr>>trument Bus B (IBPDPCBBW) Cor>>tant Votlage Transformer CVTAI Fs9s I ABO C0644 .BYCA P 480 VAC POWER DCBCFOOOOA Battery Charger A (BYCA) No Output ABO C0687 MCCH P 480 VAC POWER DCCFRC3ACN Fuse FUDCPDPCB03A/CN Fails Open (To MCC H)

! ABO C0687 MCCH P 480 VAC POWER ACCBRMCCIH 480 VAC MCCH Feeder Ckctit Breaker 52/MCCH (MCCC/05MM) T/ar>>fora Open ABO CO690 516 P 480 VAC POWER RCMVPQ0516 MOTOR.OPERATED VALVE516 FAILS TO OPEN ABO C0690 516 P 480 VAC POWER RCMVKQ0516 MOTOR.OPERATED VALVE516 TRANSFERS CLOSED ABO CQ692 516 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVP00516 MOTO R4)PE RATED VALVE518 FAILS TO OPEN ABQ CQ692 516 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVK00516 MOTOR.OPERATED VALVE51 6 TRANSFERS CLOSED ABO CQ694 516 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVP00516 MOTOR47PERATED VALVE516 FAILS TO OPEN 516 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVKQQ516 MOTOR43PERATED VALVE516 TRANSFERS CLOSED AB0 CQ697 4616 P 480 VAC POWER SWMVC04618 Selvhe Water Header Itohtion MOV 4616 Fess To Close On Demand ABO CO697 4616 P 480 VAC POWER SWMVK04616 Service Water Header isolation MOV 461 6 Transfers Chsod ABO CQ698 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVK04818 Se/vhe Water Header Isotsthn MOV 481 8 Transfers Ck>>ed ABO C0698 4616 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVC04616 Servhe Water Header lactation MQV 461 8 Fails To Chse On Domsnd 4616 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVK04616 Service Water Header Itokttian MOV 461 6 Transfers Ck>>ed ABO CQ699 4616 C 125 VDC CONTRO!. 'WMVC04816 Service Water Header Isolation MOV 4616 Fails To Close On Der/land AGO C0702 P 480 VAC POWER MOTOR 47PERATEO VALVE850A FAILS TO OPEN

[RECIRC)

ABO C0702 P 480 VAC POWER RHMVR0850A MOTOR47P VALVE850A TRANSFERS OPEN

[INJECTION]

ABO C0702 P 480 VAC POWER MOTOR47P VALVE850A TRANSFERS OPEN

[RECIRCULATION)

ABO C0703 C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVR0850A MOTOR47P VALVE850A TRANSFERS OPEN

[RECIRCULATION]

ABO C0703 C 125 VDC CONTROL RHMVR0850A MOTORNP VALVE850A TRANSFERS OPEN

[INJECTION)

ABO C0703 C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVP0850A MOTO RAPE RATED VALVE850A FAILS TO OPEN

[RECIRC)

ABO C0704 C 125 VDC CONTROL RHMVR0850A MOTOR47P VALVE850ATRANSFERS OPEN

[INJECTION]

AGO C0704 C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVP0850A MOTORAPERATED VALVE85CA FAlLS TO OPEN

[RECIRC) '

ABO C0704 C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVR0850A MOTOR47P VALVE850A TRANSFERS OPEN (RECIRCULATION)

ABO COT07 P 480 VAC POWER AFMVD04007 Motor operated valve 4007 faib to th/ottle Qow AGO C0708 4007 C 125 VDC CONTROt. AFMVD04007 Motor operated valve 4007 fails to th/ottte now ABO C0710 4007 C 125 VDC CONTROL AFMVD04007 Motor operated vshe 4007 fails to throttle fhw ABO C0713 P 480 VAC POWER RRMVQ00720 MOV 720 FAILS TO OPEN ABO C0713 P 480 VAC POWER RCS-720 ISLOCA evaluation ABO C0713A P 480 VAC POWER RRMVQ00720 MOV 720 FAILS TO OPEN ABO C0713A P 480 VAC POWER RCS.720 ISLOCA evaluation ABO COT t5 C 125 VDC CONTROl. RRMVQ00720 MQV 720 FAILS TO OPEN ABO C0715 720 C 125 VDC CONTROL' RCS.720 ISLOCA evsk/sthn ABO C0717 720 C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVQ00720 MOV 720 FAILS TO OPEN ABO C0717 720 C 125 VDC CQNTROL RCS.720 ISLOCA ovaiuathn ABO C0720 P 480 VAC POWER RCS 700 ISLOCA ovahstion ABO C0720 P 480 VAC POWER RRMVQOQTOQ MOV 700 FAILS TO OPEN ABO C0720A P 480 VAC POWER RCS.700 ISLOCA evaluation ABO C072QA P 480 VAC POWER RRMVQQQTQO MQV 700 FAILS TO OPEN

~ 7 ABQ C0722 C 125 VDC CONTROL 'RMVQQOTOO MOV 700 FAILS TO OPEN [":

ABO C0722 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCS 700 ISLOCA evaluation I '/ ~ .I ABO CQ724 C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVQQO700 MOV700 FAILS TO OPEN ABO CQT24 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCS 700 ISLOCA evaiuathn P816SChltCE B-I.DOC/oc [)- 54 9/JS/98>>:10:25 PM

Pages B-55 through B-80 are similar and not included to reduce paper volume.

t LOCATION CHAI&.CTERISTICS TABLE RE AREA: ABI

~IBN.2 G11 89 3517 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX03517 MSIV 3517 Fags to Close IBM 2 G1191 3517 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX03517 MSIV 351 7 Falis to Cbse IBN.2 G 1192 3517 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX03517 MSIV 351? Fails to Close IBM-2 G1193 3517 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX03517 MSIV 3517 Faib to Close IBN 2 G1194 3517 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX03517 MSIV 3517 Fags to Close IBM.2 G1195 3517 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX03517 MSIV 3517 Fails to Cbse IBN-2 G1197 351 6 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX03516 MSIV 351 6 Fails to Close IBN.2 G1 198 3516 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX03516 MSIV 3516 Faih to Cbse IBN-2 G1199 3516 C 125 VDC CONTROl MSAVX03516 MSIV3516Faits to Close IBM.2 G 1200 3516 C 12$ VDC CONTROI. MSAVX03$16 MSIV 3516 Fails lo Close I 8N-2 G1201 3516 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX03516 MSIV 351 6 Faiis to Cbse IBN-2 R1279A PT<68 ESPTDPT488 SG A LOW PRESSURE TRANSMllTER PT<88 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND IBN.2 R1279A PT~B EXP TLPT468 SG A LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT<68 FAlLS LOW IBN4 E0032 C 125 VOC Motor operated valve 3505A fels to open CONTROI/POWER IBS 1 C0472 52/CTP 0 120 VAC CONTROL AFMPFPCD04 Condensate Transfer Pump PCD04 fails to tun IBS I C0473 52/CTP C 125 VDC CONTROL AFMPFPCD04 Ccndensate Transfer Pump PCD04 fails lo run IBS I G0339 LT-2022A INDICATION AFLTD2022A Condensate Storage Tank A level ttansmber LT-2022A fags to respond IBS.1 l0642 52IABEFIG C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBN1421A AC BREAKER 52/ABEFIG(BUSI421A) FAILS TO OPEN I 8S.1 R0940 I AIARhMNOIC0NT ESPTDPT948 CONTAINMENTHIGH PRESSURE TRANSMIITER PT-948 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND I 8S.1 R0984 PT-947 I ANALOG SIGNAL ESPTDPT947 CONTAINMENTHIGH PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT.947 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND IBS 1 R3178 5737 MSAVX05737 AOV5737 Fagsto Close I BS.1 R3176 MSAVX05738 AOV 5738 Fails to Cbse I 8S.1 R3183 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX0573$ AOV5735 Faih to Cbse I 8S-1 R3183 5736 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX05736 AOV 5736 Fats lo Cbse IBS 1 R3184 573$ C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX05735 AOV5735 Fats lo Close i8S.1 R31 85 5735 C 12$ VDC CONTROL MSAVX05735 AOV 5735 FaiB to Close IBS.1 R3186 C 12$ VDC CONTROL MSAVX05735 AOV 5735 Fats to Close .

IBS 1 R3187 5736 C 125 VDC CONTROI. MSAVX05736 AOV 5736 Fats to Cbse IBS I R3188 5736 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX05736 AOV 5738 Fags to Close IBS I R3189 5736 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX05736 AOV 5736 Fails to Close IBS.1 R3192 5737 MSAVX05737 AOV 5737 Fags to Close IBS 1 R3192 5738 MSAVX05738 AOV5738 Fags to Close IBS.I R3193 5735 C 125 VDC CONTROL MSAVX0$735 AOV 5735 Fails to Cbse IBS 1 R3193 5736 C 12$ VDC CONTROL MSAVX05736 AOV 5736 Fails lo Cbse IBS.I R3194 5735 C 125 VDC CONTROI. MSAVX05735 AOV 5735 Fails lo Close IBS 1 R3194 5736 C 125 VDC CONTROI. MSAVX05736 AOV 5736 Faib to Close I8S.1 R3194 5737 C 125 VDC CONIROI. MSAVX05737 AOV 5737 Frets to Close I8S-1 R3194 5738 C 125 VDC CONTROt. MSAVX05738 AOV 5738 Fats to Cbse IBS.I R3520 LT-2022A AFLTD2022A condensate storage Tank A level transmkter LT-2022A fats lo respond IBS.1 R3521 LT-20228 AFLTD20228 Condensate Storage Tantt 8 ktvet uansmber LT-20228 fals to tespond IBS.2 L0642 52/AB8F I G C 125 VDC CONTROI. ACCBN1421A AC BREAKER 52/ABEFIG (BUS1421A) FAILS TO OPEN I 8S.2 L0643 52/AB 8F I G C 12$ VDC CONTROL ACCBN1421A AC BREAKER 52/ABEF IG (BUS1421A) FAILS TO OPEN

7. SPATIAL INTERACTIONS ANALYSIS WALKDOWNNOTES:

FIRE ZONE WALKDOWNNOTES ABO 2 RMW pumps, I monitor tank pump, 2 WCT pumps ncv south wall (photo AI6). MCC IC near east stairwell (photo AI7). Boric acid tntttfet pumps ln cubicle with gntiag above. MCC IE near nonh wall. But !4 can of RWST. Waur cunain at suinvcll to ABM.

4nlgg WD But l4 it fcd frets level below. Standby AFW cables in conduit above bus and MCCs. Charging swapover de power twhch is in the Bus l4.

ABO 2 CCW pumps jun south of middt>> of toom (photos A I, Alt). Containmcte penetration cooling fast jun west of RWST (photo Alp). Water curtain st ttakwelt to ABht ~

entgg WD CCW pump ctblcsnre in coaduh coming up from Aeor below. and very separated from any othet cables or fire sources. Some protective clothing stored about l2'way.

p tt666IRGE B-I,DOC/oc B- 81 gngtpg I2:tg:35 PM

LOCATION CHARACTEMSTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: ABI I

ABO Typical smoke detector (photo A20) appmximatcly l2' IS'p from Roor. Spent foci pool.

4/2/98 Wo 02 and H2 lines For rtcombiners are separated from all ssfmy cquipmcnt and nor a ptoblem for lire.

IBN4 enegwo did not walkdown. No safety eriYical equipmcnt, except TDAFW lube oil piping, which would not be damaged by Cire IBN I I T-D AFW PumP. 2 M D AFW PumPs (photo By), 8'pan, about 30'rom T-D AFW pump. 2 A/C chiller wast pumps (Photo BS). 3'Part. 2 A/C chitkrs (Photo B6). S'pat. Several MOVs. Reactor trip breakers at north wall In norrhcast eomcr of building. CRD M4) acts in nonheast corner of building.

t 4/2/98 WD t large Aood drain to ensure fire sprinkkr wsta would not carne Bond. Sprin'klcrs over TDAFW and associated lube oil. Some Instr. Cables wrapped near cable tunnel area. SigniCicant amount of cabk. MG sets and cabinets and Rx trip breakers are bciow cridcal cabks. but the deluge system k in cabks. Rod control eabineu have I spray shield 2'ver top, which would also tend m shieM cables as if ln a tray with a bonom. Cables arc about 6'bove spray shield. and ceiling k about IS'igher.

Mini purge CIV OK (AOV. no manual operator). Hl lines are not Cilkd to H2 recomblner eonuol panel. and are in a area separated by block wall from AFW pumps.

IBN 2 Main rxcam header, main taeam valves, safety valves, T.D AFW pump MOVs.

4/2/98 WD Atmos. relief valves and MSIVs not by Cue sources. ARV is AOV. but with manual operator as well. Block vaive is manual. TDP steam supply valve are MOV.

H2 piping in southwest k separated by block wall, and k not valved in during normal opetadon.

IBN 3 cneg wo

( not walked down, No sa(ety cnYieal cquipmem.

IBNC 4neg wo not walked down. No eritkal safety equipment for Cire ipeee.

IBS4) 4/2/98 WD iot wal'kcd down. No critical safmy cquipmerx for Cire ipeee IBS.I 4/2/98 WD H2 lines are not lilted to H2 recomb'mer control panel. and are in a arcs sepamtcd by block wall from AFW pumps.

IBS.2 4/2/98 WD H2 lines are valved ouh and are In a vea separated by block wall from renh arcs, IBS.3 2 Intermediate buiMing exhaust fans, 3 auxiliary buiMing exhaust fans, containmcnt purg<<supply fans.

Ng P:t1686tRGB B.I.DOC/oc B- 82 pngeg l2:IOt35 FM

LOCATION CH~czzmSnCS mar,E FIRE AREA: EDGlA

1. FIRE ZONES IN THIS FIRE AREA:

, FIRE ZONE ELEV (FT.) FIRE ZONE DESCRIPTION I BUILDING FLOOR AREA (SQ. FT)

EDGIA4 244' DIESEL GENERATOR 1A CABLE VAULT EDGIA-1 253' DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM 1A DG 1265 I

EOG1A-X 244' DIESEL GENERATOR CABlE AREA DG

2. FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE COMBUSTIBLE LOADING (BTU) FIRE SEVERITY (HRS)

( EDG1A4 42 mich I EOGIA-1 45.2 min.

3. FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES IN THIS FIRE AREA:

(

FIRE ZONE FIRE DETECTION FEATURES FIRE SUPPRESSION FEATURES EGG IA4 EDGI A-1

4. PIRE ZONE(S) ADJACENT TO THE PIRE ZONE(S) IN THIS FIRE AREA:

I FIRE ZONE ADJACENT FIRE ZONE PATHWAY PATHWAY RATING (HOUR)

! EDGIA4 EDGI A-1 OPEN EDG I A.l EDGI 8-I WALL EDG1A.1 TO WALL EGG I A.l TB I WALUDOOR EDG I A-X EDG1A4 EDGI A4 EDGI A-X

5. POTENTIAL KEY EQUIPMENT AND THEIR ASSOCIATED BASIC EVENT(S) IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE EQUIPMENT BASIC BASIC EVENT AFFECTED EVENT DESCRIPTION

EOG1A.1 ADFOIA HVMCNDDOIA OG A ROOM FAN AIR.OPERATED DAMPER AODOIAFAILS TO OPEN I

EDG1A.1 ADF018 HVMCN D D018 OG A ROOM FAN AIR OPERATED DAhlPER AOD018 FAILS TO OPEN

(

EOG1A.1 DCPOPC803A/07 DCBDFOGOOA DrG OC Distributen Panel A (DCPDPDGOIA) Local Fault

'OG'IA.1 DCPOPDGOIA/03 DCCSROIACX Disccnnecl switch DGP DPDG01 A/03 Transfers open ITo D/G A- NormaI)

I EOG1A-1 OCPOPDGOIA/03 DCCFRDIACP Puce F UDC POP DGO I A/3P Faaa Open (TO D/G A - NOnnat)

EOG1A-1 DCPDPOG01/V03 DCCFRDIACN Fuse F UDCPDPDGO I A/3N Fats Open (To D/G A - Normal)

EDG1A.1 DCPDPDGOI A/04 DCCSRDIADX Disconnect Switch DCPDPDGOIAN4 Translers Open ITo D/G 8 - Emergency)

EDG1A-1 DTPIA ACRERDTPIA STARTING CIRCUIT RELAY 42/DTPIA TRANSFERS TO DE.ENERGIZED EDG1A.1 DTPIA ACRERDTP1A STARTING CIRCUIT RELAY 42/DTP1A TRANSFERS TO OE.ENERGIZED EDG1A-1 KDG01A DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KOG01A FAILS TO RUN I'.

POTENTIAL RACEWAYS (CONDUITS AND CABLE TRAYS) AND THEIR ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT/BASIC EVENT(S) IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE RACEWAY EQUIPMENT CABLE BASIC EVENT BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION AFFECTED AFFECTED FUNCTION AFFECTED EDGI A4 C1933 - DTPIA C 125 VOC CONTROL ACRERDTPI A STARTING CIRCUIT4IEIAY42/DTPIA TRANSFERS TO OE.ENERGIZED EGG IA4 C1940 ADF01A C 125 VDC CONTROL HVMCNDDOIA OG A ROOM FAN AIR4)PERATEO DAMPER ADDOIAFAI'LS TO OPEN EOGIA4 C1944 ADFOIB C 125 VDC CONTROL HVMCNDDOI 8 OG A ROOM FAN AIR-OPERATEO DAMPER ADD018 FAILS TO OPEN i EDGIA4 C1952 4670 C 12$ VDC CONTROL SWMVK04670 Service Water Header Isolafion MOV 4670 Trans/ers I Closed EOG I A4 C19$ 2 4670 C 125 VDC CONTROl SWMVC04670 Service Water Header Isolation MOV 4670 Fails To Close On Demand i EOGIA4 C1954 P 480 VAC POWER SWMVC04609 Service water Header Isolation hlov 4609 Fels To I

\ Close On Demand EDGIA4 C5075 4670 C 125 VDC CONTROL swMvK04670 service water Header Isolaten Mov 4670 Translers Closed PnldadtRGE B-l. DOC/oc B- 323 9PI/rga I7 3v 23 Pal

LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: EDGlA I EDGIA4 4670 SWMVC04670 Seniice Water Header Isolation MQV 4670 Fess To C5075 C 125 VDC CONTROL Close On Demand

~

I ED G I A4 C5076 C MISC CONTROL SWMVC04609 seniice water Header Isolation Mov 4609 Faas To Close On Demand t

, EDGIA4 E0018 DCPDPDGOI8/04 P 125 VOC POWER OCCFRD1 BOP Fuse F VDCPDPDG018/4P Fels Open (To 0/G A ~

Emergency)

L EDG I A4 E001 8 DCPDPDGOI 8/04 P 125 VDC POWER OCCFRDIBDN Fuse FUDCPOPDGOI 8/4N Fails Open (To 0/G A-Emergency)

EDGIA4 E0018 DCPDPDGO'IB/04 P 125 VDC POWER OCCSRDIBDX Disconnect swacn ocpDpoGOIB/04 T/ansfers Open (To 0/G A - Emergency) I EDGI A4 E001 9 DCPDPDGOIA/03 C 125 VOC POWER DCCSRDIACX DiSCOnneCt Switon OCP DP DGOI A/03 Trana/era I Open (To D/G A ~ Normal)

EDG1A4 E0019 OCPDPDGOIA/03 C 125 VDC POWER DCCFRDIACN Fuse FUDCPDPDGOIA/3N Fails Open (To 0/G A-I Nonnat)

EDGIA4 E0019 OCPDPDGOIA/03 C 125 VOC POWER OCCFRDIACP Fuse FUDCPOPOGOIA/3P Fails Open(yo D/G A ~

Normal)

I EDGIA4 E0020 OCPDPCB03A/07 C 125 VDC POWER DCBDFDGCDA 0/G OC Dist/ibution Panel A (DCP DP DGOI A) Local Fa&

FOG IA4 E0020 OCPDPCB03A/07 C 125 VDC POWER DCCFRC3AGN Fuse FVDCPDPC803A/GN Fails Open (To 0/G OC i Distnbution Panel A)

EDGIA4 E0022 DCPDPCB03A/03 P 125 VDC POWER DCCSRC3ACX Disconnect Switch DCpDpC803A/03 Transfers Open (To MCC H)

EGG IA4 E0022 MCCH P 125 VOC POWER OCCFRC3ACN Fuse FUDCPDPC803A/CN Fails Open (To hlCC H)

EDG I A4 E0022 MCCH P 125 VDC POWER ACCBRMCCIH 480 VAC MCCH Feeder Circu'4 Breaher 52/MCCH (MCCC/05MM) Transfe/s Open i EDGIA4 L0318 52/EGI Al P 480 VAC POWER ACREKEGIA1 DG A SUPPLY BREAKER TO BUS 14 CLOSED I RELAY 18CXI/EG1AI TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED I EDGIA4 L0318 52/EGIA1 P 480 VAC POWER ACCBD1418C DG A OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EGIAI (BVS14/I BC)

FAII.S TO CLOSE I EDGIA4 L0320 52/EGIA1 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBO1418C DG A OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG1A1 (BUS14/I BC)

FAILS TO CLOSE EDGI A4 L0320 52/EG 1A1 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACREKEGIAI DG A SUPPLY BREAKER TO BVS 14 CLOSED i RELAY 18CX1/EGIA1 TRANSFERS TO I

I ENERGIZED

<<EOGIA4 L0508 52/EG1AI P480VAC POWER ACCBD1418C DG A OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EGIA1 (BUS14/18C)

FAILS TO CLOSE EGG I A4 L0508 52/EGIA1 P 480 VAC POWER ACREKEGIA1 DG A SUPPLY BREAKER TO BUS 14 CLOSED RElAY 18CX1/EGIA1 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED EGG IA4 L0508 52/EGIA2 P 480 VAC POWER ACCBO1831C AC BREAKER 52/EG1A2 (BUS18/31C) FAILS TO OPERATE EDGIA4 L0509 52/EGI A2 C 125VDC CONTROL ACCBD1831C AC BREAKER 52/EGlA2 (BUS18/31C) FAILS TO OPERATE EDGIA 0 L0530 KDGOIA I IND/125 VDC OGDGFOCOIA DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RVN CONTROL ED GI A4 L0531 KDGOIA I ALARIWIND/CONT DGDGFOCOI A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIAFAILS TO RUN i EDGIA4 L0532 KDGOIA 0 120 VAC CONTROL DGDGFOCOI A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RVN

! EDGIA-0 L0536 KDGOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL DGOGF000'IA DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN EGG I A.O L0537 KDGOIA C 125 VOC CONTROL OGOGFOOOIA DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUN I EDGIA4 L0541 KDGOI A P 480 VAC POWER OGOGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUN EOGIA4 L0545 KDGOIA P 480 VAC POWER DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUM EDG IA4 L0546 KDGOIA P 480 VAC POWER OGDGF0001 A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RVN tEDGIA4 l L0547 KDGOI A P 480 VAC POWER DGDGFCOOIA DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RVM ED G I A.O L0550 KDGOI A I DGDGFC001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TQ RUN METERING/RELAYIN G

EDGIA4 L0554 KDGOIA I DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGQIA FAILS TQ RUN I/IETERING/RELAYIN G

EDGIA4 L0555 KDGOIA P 120 VAC POWER DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RVM EGG I A4 L0560 KDGOI A I DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUN METERING/R ELAYIN G

EOGIA4 L0561 KDGOI A I DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TQ RUN hlETERING/RELAYIN G

EDGIA4 L0562 KDGO I A I OGDGFOCOIA DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN METERING/RELAYIN G

P:ttearitRCE 8 I.DOC/oc i)- 324 9/28/98 l2:33:24 Phl.

LOCATION CHAIR.CTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: EDGlA EDGIA4 L0563 KDGOIA I DGOGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUN METERINGIRFLAYIN ~

i G

! EDG'IA4 L0564 KOGOI A I OGOGF000tA DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RVN METERING/RHAYIN G

L0565 KDGOIA I DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUM METERING/RELAYIN G

EOGIA4 1.0752 52/IHI 8 CONTROL ACC 8 N1727A AC BREAKER 52/IHI 8 (BUS17/27A) FAILS TO OPEN EDGIA4 L0754 52/IH1D CONTROL ACCBN17278,, AC BREAKER 52/tH) D (BUS17/278) FAILS TO OPEN EDGIA4 L0760 52/IHI A C AC C BN1829A AC BREAKER $ 2/lHIA (BUS18/29A) FAtLS TO OPEN EDGIA4 L0762 52/IHI C CONTROL ACCBN18298 AC BREAKER 52/IHIC (BUS18/298) FAILS TO OPEN EDG IA4 L0778 52/17SS CONTROL. ACT1FSST17 Fautt On 4160/4$ 0 VAC Bua 17 suppttr Transformer PXSHSS017 EDG1A4 L0779 52/18SS CONTRQL ACTIF SST I 8 Fat/3 On 4160/480 VAC Bus 18 supply Transformer PXSHSS018 EOG1A4 L0837 KQGOI A C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF0001A DIES'El. G'ENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUN EDGI A.O L0837A KDGOIA C 120 VAC OGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN CONTROUPOWER ED GIA4 L0836 KOGOI A C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUN EOGLA4 L0836A KOG01A C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RVN EOGIA4 L08388 KDGOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUN BOG I A4 L0838C KDGOIA C 120 VAC CONTROL DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN EOGIA4 L0850 KDGOIA I INDICATIOM DGOGFOCOIA DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN EOGIA4 L0851 KOGOI A C 125 VOC CONTROL DGDGFCCOIA OIFSEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUM EOG IA4 L0658 KOGO IA C 12S VDC CONTROL DGDGFIXOIA DIESEL GENFRATOR KDG01 A FAILS TO RUN EOGI A.I C0667 MCCH P 480 VAC POWER DCCFRC3ACN Fuse FUDCPOPC803A/CN Fails Open (To MCC H)

EDG1A 1 C0687 MCCH P 480 VAC POWER ACCBRMCCIH 480 VAC MCCH Feeder Crcrit Breaker 52/MCCH (MCCC/05MM) Transfers Open EOGIA-1 C1927 OTPIA C 125 VDC CONTAOL ACRERDTP1A STARTING CIRCUIT RHAY 42/DTPI A TRANSFERS TO DE ENERGIZED EDG1A-I C1927 KDG0IA C 12S VDC CONTROL OGOGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KOG01* FAlt.S TO RUN EDGIA.1 C1932 DTPI A C 12$ VDC CONTROL ACRERDTPIA STARTING CIRCUIT RHAY 42/DTPIA TRANSFERS TO DE.ENERGIZED BOG I A.I C1933 DTP I A C 125 VDC CONTAOL ACRERDTPIA STARTING CIRCUIT RELAY 42/OTPIA TRANSFERS TO DE.ENERGIZED EOGIA.I C1938 AOFOI A P 460 VAC POWER HVMCNDDOIA 0 G A ROOM FAN AIR.OPERATED DAMPER ADDOIAFAILS TO OPEN EDGI A.I C1939 ADFOIA C 125 VOC CONTROL HVMCNO DO I A DGA ROOM FAN AIR.OPERATEO DAMPER ADDOIAFAILS TO OPEN EDG1A 1 C1940 ADFOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL HVMCNDDOIA DG A ROOM FAN AIR.OPERATED DAMPER ADDOIAFAILS TO OPEN EOGIA.1 C1941 ADFOIA P 125 VOC POWER HVMCNDD01A DG A ADOM FAN AIR.OFF RATED DAMPER ADDOIAFAILS TO OPEN EDGI A.I C1941 ADF018 P 125 VOC POWER HVMCNOD018 OG A ROOM FAN AtR.OPERATEO DAMPER ADD018 FAILS TO OPEN EDGI A.I C1942 ADF018 P 480 VAC POWER HVMCNDD018 DG A ROOM FAN AIR OPERATED DAMPER ADDOI8 FAILS TO OPEN EOGI A.I C1943 ADFOI 8 P 12$ VDC POWER HVMCNDOOI8 OG A ROOM FAN AIR.OPERATED DAMPER I

ADD018 FAlLS TO OPEN EOG1A.I C1944 ADF018 C 125 VDC CONTROL HVMCNDD018 CGA ROOM FAN AIR OPERATED DAMPER ADDOI8 FAILS TO OP EN-BOG IA.I C1949 KOGOIA I ALARM DGOGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN EOG1A.1 C'I950 4670 P 480 VAC POWER SWMVC04670 Serv'ce Water Header lsolMicn MQv 4670 Fa8s To Cfose On Demand EDGIA-I C1 950 4670 P 480 VAC POWER SeNtce Water Header lsoladcn MQV 4670 Transfers Cfosed I

EDGIA.I C1951 4670 C 125 VOC CONTROt. SWMVK04670 Service Water Header fsobdcn MQV 4670 T/ans/ers I

Closed EOG I A-I C1951 4670 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVC04670 Service Water Header Isotation MOV 4670 Fails To Close On Demand EDG'IA.I C19$ 2 4670 C 125 VDC CONTROL $ WMVK046 70 Senrice Water Header Isolabon Mov 4670 Trans/ers Closed EOGIA-1 C1952 4670 C 125 VOC CONTROL SWMVC04670 senrice water Header lso!alon Mov 4670 Faas To Close On Demand PntbftbtttGB 8 I.DQC/oc B- 325 9/!S/98 12/)7/24 PM

LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE F IRE AREA: EDG1A EOGiA i Ciiii P 480 VAC POWER SWMVC04609 service water Header IsoLsten Mov 4609 Faas To Close On Demand EDGIA 1 C1956 C 125 VDC CONTROL SVIMVC04609 Service Water Header Isolation MOV 4609 Fa>IS To I Close On Demand EDGIA.I C3603 ADFOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL HVMCNDDOIA DG A ROOM FAN AIR-OPERATED DAMPER I ADDO I A FAILS TO OPEN EDGIA.I C3606 ADFOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL HVMCNODOIA DG A ROOM FAN AIR.OPERATED DAMPER I ADDOIA FAILS TO OPEN EDGI A.I C5075 4670 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVK04670 Service Water Header Isoladcn MOV 4670 Trans/ers I

C/osed EDGI A.I 05075 4670 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVC04670 Service Water Header Isotaticn MQV 4670 Fails To I Cosa On Demand j EDGI A I C5076 C MISC CONTROL SWIitVC04609 Service Water Header lactation MOV 4609 Fess To Close On Demand EDGI A-I 05343 KDGOI A C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIAFAILS TO RUN EDGIA.I C5343A KDGOI A 0 125 VOC CONTROL DGDGFCCOIA DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN j EDGIA.I 053438 KDGOI A C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIAFAILS TO RUN i EDGIA I C5343C KDGOI A C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAlLS TO RUN

~ EDGI A.I C53430 KDGOI A C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGFOCOIA DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAlLS TO RUN ED GI A I C5343E KDGOI A C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGFOCOIA DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIAFAlLS TO RUN ~

EDGIA.I C5343F KDGOI A C 125 VDC CONTROI. OGDGFCOOIA DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIAFAtLS TO RUN EDGIA I C5343G KDGOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIAFAILS TO RUN EDGI A.I C5343H KDGOI A C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGFC001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAtLS TO RUN I EDG I A.I 053433 KDGOI A C 125 VOC CONTROL DGDGF0001A OIFSEL GENERATOR KDGOIAFAILS TO RUN EOGI A-1 C5345 KDGOI A C 125 VOC CONTROL OGDGFCCOIA DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIAFAILS TO RUN EDGI A.I C5345A KDGOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGFOCOIA DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIAFAILS TO RUN I

EDG I A.1 053458 KDGOIA i C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIAFAILS TO RUN I EDGIA 1 05346 KDG01 A C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUN EDGI A-I C5346A KDGOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIAFAILS TO RUN EOGI A-I 053468 KDG01 A C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOI A FAILS TO RUN EDGI A.I E0018 DCPOPDG01 8/04 P 125 VDC POWER DCCFRDI BDN Fuse FUDC POP DGOI 8/4N Fails Open (To D/G A-Emergency)

EDGIA.I E0018 DCPDPOGOIBI04 P 125 VDC POWER DCCSRDIBDX Disconnect Switch OCPDPDG018/04 Transfers Open (To 0/G A - Emergency)

ED GI A.I E0018 DCPDPDGOI8/04 P 125 VDC POWER DCCFRDIBDP Fuse F UDCPDPDGOI8/4P Fags Open (To D/G A-Emergency)

E0G1A.I E0019 DCPDPDGOIA/03 C 125 VDC POWER DCCSROIACX Disconnect Swkch DCP DPOGOIA/03 Transfers Open (To D/G A - Normal)

ED GI A I E0019 OCPDPDGOIA/03 C 125 VDC POWER DCCF RD IACN Fuse FUDCPDPDGOIA/3N Fails Open (To D/G A ~

Normal)

EDGIA I E0019 DCPDPDGOIA/03 C 125 VDC POWER OCCFRDIACP Fuse FUDCPDPDGOIA/3P Fails Open (To 0/G A-Nonnat)

EDGIA I E0020 DC('DPCB03A/07 C 125 VDC POWER OCCFRC3AGN Fuse FUOCPOPC803A/GN Fails Open (To 0/G DC D>>tnbuten Panol A) r EDGI A-I E0020 DCPDPCB03A/07 C 125 VDC POWER DCBDFDGCQA D/G OC Distrhuticn Panel A (DCPDPDGOI A) Local Fautt

~ EDGIA.I E0022 DCPDPCB03A/03 P 125 VDC POWER DCCSRC3ACX Disconnect Sun',ch DCPDPCB03A/03 Trans/ers Open j (To MCC H)

EDGIA.I E0022 MCCH P 125 VOC POWER ACCBRMCCIH 480 VAC MCCH Feeder Cacus Breather 52/MCCH j

I (MCCC/05MM) Transfers Open EDGIA-I E0022 MCCH P 125 VDC POWER DCCFRC3ACN Fuse FUDCPDPC803A/CN Fails Open (To MCC H)

EDGIA.I E0088 DCPDPDGOIA/04 C 125 VOC POWER OCCSRDIAOX Disconnect SwkchOCPDPDGOIA/04 Trar>>fera Open (To D/G 8 - Emergency)

EDGIA.I L0318 52/EGI AI P 480 VAC POWER ACCBD1418C OG A OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EGIAI (BUS14/18C)

FAILS TO CLOSE ED GI A.I L0318 52/EGI AI P 480 VAC POWER ACREKEG1AI DG A SUPPLY BREAKER TO BUS 14 CLOSED RELAY 18CXI/EGIAI TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED l ED GI A.I L0320 52/EG I Al C 125 VDC CONTROL ACREKEGIAI OG A SUPPLY BREAKER TO BUS 14 CLOSED RE(AY 18CXI/EGIAI TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED j FDG'IA.I L0320 52/EGI Al C 125 VDC CONTROl. ACCBD1418C DG A OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG1AI (8US14/18C)

FAILS TO CLOSE  !

~ EDGI A I L0508 52/EGI AI P 480 VAC POWER ACREKEGIAI DG A SUPPLY BREAKER TO BUS 14 CLOSED l RELAY 18CXI/EGIAI TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED EDGIA I L0508 52/EGIAI P 480 VAC POWER ACCBD1418C DG A OUTPUT BREAKER 52IEGIAI (BUS14/16C)

FAILS TO CLOSE P01686IRGE B-I.DQC/oc B- 326 sns/96 12 32:25 P<<

r.oem<ON Cm m crEMSrrCs mar.E FIRE AREA: EDG1A EDGI A.l L0508 52/EGIA2 P 480 VAC POWER ACC801831C AC BREAKER 52/EGIA2 (BUS18/31C) FAILS TO OPERATE EDGI A-1 L0509 52/EG IA2 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACC801831C AC BREAKER 52/EG'IA2 (BUS18/31C) FAILS TO I OPERATE EDG1A-1 L0530 KDG01 A I IND/125 VDC OGDGFOC01A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUM CONTROL EDGI A-I L0531 KDGOI A I ALARM/INDIC 0 NT DGOGFOCOIA DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN EDGlA 1 Los32 KDG01 A 0 120 VAC CONTROL OGOGFOCOI A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RVM I

EDG I A-I L0533 KDGOI A C 120 VAC CONTROt. DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN ~

I

<

(

I EDG1A.I EDGI A.l EDGI A.1 L0534 L0534A L0536 KDGOIA KDGOIA KDG01 A C 125 VDC CONTROL I MISC CONTROL C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF0001A DGDGF000)A OGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUM DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUN DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUM I ED G I A'I L0537 KDG0 I A C 125 VOC CONTROL DGOGFOCOIA DIESEL GENFRATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN EDG1A.I L0541 KDGO I A P 480 VAC POWER DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN EDG1A-I L0550 KDGOIA I DGOG F000 IA DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIAFAILS TO RUN METERING/RElAYIN G

EDG1 A-1 L0554 KDGOIA I DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUN I

I METERING/RELAYIH G

EDGI A.l L0555 KDGOIA P 120 VAC POWER DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUN EDG1A-I L0560 KOGOI A I DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUN MFTERlNG/RELAYIN G

ED G I A.I L0561 KDGOIA I DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIAFAILS TO RUN METERING/REtAYIN G

ED G I A-I L0562 KDGOIA I OGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUN METERING/REIAYIN G

EDGI A.I L0752 52/IHI 8 CONTROL ACCBN1727A AC BREAKER 52/IH18 (BUS17/27A) FAILS TO OPEN ED G1A.1 L0754 52/IH ID CONTROL ACCBN17278 AC BREAKER 52/IHI0 (BUS17/278) FAILS TO OPEN EDG1A.I L0760 52/IHIA ACCBNI829A AC BREAKER 52/IHIA (BUS18/29A) FAILS TO OPEN EDG1A.I L0762 52/IHI 0 CONTROL ACCBN18298 AC BREAKER 52/IHIC (BUS18/298) FAILS TO OPEN EDGIA-1 L0778 52/1768 CONTROL ACTIFSST17 Fault On 4160/480 VAC Bus 17 supply Transformer PXSHSS017 EDG IA-1 L0779 52/18SS CONTROL ACTIFSST18 Fault On 4160/480 vAC Bus 18 supply Trans/armer PXSHSS018 EDGIA.1 L0781 KDGOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL DGOGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KOG01A FAILS TO RUM EDGIA-I L0783 KDGOIA C 125 VDC COMTROL DGOGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIAFAILS TO RVN EDG1A-I L0837 KDGOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUN EDG I A I L0837A KDG01A C 120 VAC DGOGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUN CONTROVPOWER EDGIA.I L0838 KDG01A C 125 VOC CONTROL OGOGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUN EDGIA.I L0838A KDGOIA 0 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RVN EDG I A-I L08388 KDGOIA C 125 VOC CONTROL DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN EDG1A-I L0838C KDGOIA C 120 VAC CONTROL OGOGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN I EDG1A.1 L0839 KDGOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL OGOGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUH EDG IA.1 L0839A KDGOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL DGOGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUM (

i EDGlA.I L0839C KOGOI A C 120 VAC CONTROL DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAII.S TO RUH I

EGG I A-1 L08390 KDGOIA P 120 VAC POWER OGOGFOCOIA DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUH

[

EDGIA.1 L0839E KDGOIA P 120 VAC POWER DGDGFOCOI A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN EDGI A.I L0841 KDGOIA P 125 VDC POWER DGDGFOCOIA DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RVH EDG1A.I L0650 KOGOI A I INDICATION DGDGFOCOIA DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN EDGIA.l L0851 KDGO I A C 125 VOC CONTROL DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIAFAILS TO RUN I j EDG1A.1 L0858 KDGOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIA FAILS TO RUN EDGI A.X C0687 MCCH P 480 VAC POWER ACCBRMCCIH 480 VAC MCCH Feeder Cire<it Brea'ker 52/MCCH (MCCC/05MM) Transfers Open EDGI A.X C0687 MCCH P 480 VAC POWER OCCFRC3ACN Fuse FVDCPDPC803A/CN F ass Open (To MCC H) A EDGI A.X C1952 4670 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVK04670 San<lee Water Header Isolauon Mov 4670 Transfers Closed EDGI A.X 01952 4670 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVC04670 Serves Water Header Isola<en MOV 4670 Fels To Close On Demand I

PBI686IIIGE 8 I,DOC/oc B 317 9/28/98 l!:32: 5 Pat

aoCmrox cHAmn'amSxrcs vmr.z FIRE AREA: EDG1A EDGIA X C5075 4670 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVC04670 Senrice Water Header lsotatkut MOV 4670 Fade To Close On Demand ED G I A.X C5075 4670 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVK04670 Sen/ice Water Header IsoIation MOV 4670 Trans/ers I Closed EDGIA.X C5076 C MISC CONTROL SWMVC04609 Senrice Water Header Isation MOV 4609 Fags To Close On Demand E0G1A.X E0018 DCPDPDGOIB/04 P 125 VDC POWER DCCFROIBDP Fuse FUDCPDPDGOI8/4P Fails Open (To 0/G A-Emergency)

EOG1A-X E0018 DCPDPDG018/04 P 125 VDC POWER DCCFROIBDN Fuse FUDCPDPDGOI8/4N Foils Open (To 0/G A-Emergency)

EDG1A.X E0018 DCPDPDG018/04 P 125VDC POWER OCCSRDI BOX Ooccnnect Swgch DCPDPDGOIBI04 Transfers Open (To 0/G A- Emergency)

I EDGIA X E0020 DCPDPC803A/07 C 125 VDC POWER OCBDFDGOOA D/G DC Dist/gtutionPanel A(OCPDPDG01A) Local Fautt EDG1 A X E0020 DCPDPCB03A/07 C 125 VOC POWER OCCFRC3AGN Fuse FUDCPDPC803AIGN Fels Open(To 0/G OC l ~

I Dist/ktut'cn Panel A)

EDG1A X E0022 DCPDPCB03A/03 P 125 VDC POWER OCCSRC3ACX Otsconnect Swrtch DCPDPCB03A/03 Transfers Open

)

(To MCC H)

EDG1A.X E0022 MCCH I P 125 VDC POWER ACCBRMCCIH 480 VAC MCCH Feeder Ci/erat Breaker 52/MCCH (MCCCI05MM) T/andre/s Open EGG I A.X E0022 MCCH P 125 VDC POWER DCCFRC3ACN Fuse FUDCPOPC803A/CNFails Open(ToMCC H)

I EDGIA X L0318 52/EG1AI P 460 VAC POWER ACCBD1418C OG A OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG1A1 (BUS14/18C)

FAI(.S TO CLOSE EOGI A X L0318 52/EGIA1 P 480 VAC POWER ACREKEG1A1 DG A SUPPLY BREAKER TO BUS 14 CLOSED RELAY 18CX1/EGIA1 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED EDG1 A X L0320 52/EGIAI C 125 VDC CONTROL ACREKEG1A1 DG A SUPPLY BREAKER TO BUS 14 CLOSED RELAY 18CXI/EG1A1 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED EOG1A X L0320 52/EGIA1 C 125 VOC CONTROL ACCBD1418C OG A OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EGIA1 (BUS14/18C)

FAILS TO CLOSE EDGIA X L0554 KDGOIA I DGDGFOOOIA DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOIA FAILS TO RUN METERING/RELAYIN G

7. SPATIAL iNTERACTIONS ANALYSIS WALKDOWNNOTES:

FIRE ZONE WALKDOWNNOTES EDGIA.O Stated companmcet below diesel generator room.

EDGIA I D.G fuel oil transfer pump. fire water Ieokup for cooling DN.

4/2/gg WD Coctsiru cmc/g local control panel sod App. R locker. 8 OG docs net bsw similar control panel. aod msy not bc as easy to sun If control room Is cvscustcd. Fully spriuklcrcd ar<<a.

Eitbcr DG can be switched to citbcr bancry.

Pttl6161RGE 8 I,DOC/oc B. 328 9/78/gg 12:31835 Pal

LOCATION CHAIU).CTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: *,

EDG13

1. FIRE ZONES IN THIS FIRE AREA:

t FIRE ZONE ELEV (FT.) FIRE ZONE DESCRIPTION BUILDING FLOOR AREA (SQ. FT.)

I EDG10.0 244' DIESEL GENERATOR 10 CABLE VAULT DG EDG10.1 253' DIESEL GENERATOR ROOM 10 DG 1265

2. FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE COMBUSTIBLE LOADING (BTU) FIRE SEVERITY (HRS)

" EDG10O 42 mirk I

(

EOG18.1 77.099 57.6 min.

3. FIRE PROTECTION FEATURE IN THIS FIRE AREA:

j FIRE ZONE FIRE DETECTIOH FEATURES FIRE SUPPRESSION FEATURES EDGIBO EDG10 1

4. FIRE ZONE(S) ADJACENT TO THE FIRE ZONE(S) IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE ADJACENT FIRE ZONE PATHWAY PATHWAY RATING (HOUR)

EDGI BO EDGI 0 I OPEN EDGI B-I EDGIA.l WALL EDG10 I TB 1 WALUDOQR

5. POTENTIAL KEY EQUIPMENT AND THEIR ASSOCIATED BASIC EVENT(S) IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE EQUIPMENT BASIC BASIC EVENT AFFECTED EVENT DESCRIPTION EOG18.1 4670 SWMVC04670 Senrice Water Header Isolagon MOV 4670 Fals To Close On Demand EDGI8 I 52/EG183 ACCBR00103 AC BREAKER52/EG103 TRANSFERS OPEN EDG10 1 ADF02A HVMCNDD02A DG ROOM 0 FAN 01 AIR.OPERATEO DAMPER ADD02A FAILS TO OPEN

) EDGIB 1 ADF020 HVMCNDD020 OG 0 ROOM FAN 02 AIR OPERATEO DAMPER AOD028 FAILS TO OPEN EDGI8-I DCPOPC8030/16 DCBDFDGOOB 0/G DC Oistnbution Panel 8 (DCPDPOG01 8) Local part(

EDG10.1 DCPDPDG010$ 3 DCCFRD1BCN Fuse FUDCPDPDG010/3N Farts Open (To D/G 8 -Normal)

EOG10-1 DCPDPDG010/03 OCCFROIBCP Fuse FUDCPDP 0G010/3P Fade Open (To D/G 8 - Normal)

EDG18.1 OCPDPDGOIB/03 DCCSRO18CX Disconnect Switch DCP DPDG018/03 T/ans/ers Open (To D/G 0 - Normal) j EOG10 I OCPOPDGOI8/04 DCCFRDIBDN Fuse FUDCPOPDG010/4N Fails Open (To D/G A- Emergency)

'DG10.1 DCPDPDG010/04 DCCFRDIBDP Fuse F UDCPOPDGOI 8/4P Fels Open (To D/G A - Emergency)

EDGI 0-1 DCPDPDG010/04 OCCSROIBDX D'tconnect swdch ocPDP DG01 8/04 Transfers open (To 0/G A - Emergency)

EDG18.1 DTP18 ACRERDTPIB STARTING CIRCUIT RELAY 42/DTPI0 TRANSFERS TO DE.ENERGIZED EDG10.1 OTP10 ACRERDTPIB STARTING CIRCUIT RELAY 42/DTPI 0 TRANSFERS TO OE-ENERGIZED

) EDG10-I KOG018 OGDGF00010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TQ RUN

6. POTENTIAL RACEWAYS (CONDUITS AND CABLE TRAYS) AND THEIR ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT/BASIC EVENT(S) IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE RACEWAY EQUIPMENT CABLE BASIC EVENT BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION AFFECTED AFFECTED FUNCTION AFFECTED EGG ISO C1049 MCC J P 480 VAC POWER ACCBRMCC1J 480VACMCCJ Feeder Cgcuil Breaker 52/MCCJ (MCCO/05KK) Transfers Open EOGI BO C1955 C 125 vDG cQNTROL SWMVC04609 Senrice water Header IsotatktnMOV 4609 Fails To I Close On Demand EOG I BO C1990 ADF02A C 125 VDC CONTROL HVMCNDD02A OG ROOM 8 FAN 01 AIR-OPERATEO DAMPER r ADD02A FAILS TO OPEN EOGI BO C1994 ADF028 C 125 VOC CONTROL HVMCNDD028 OG 0 ROOM FAN 82 AIR.OPERATED DAMPER ADO020 FAILS TO OPEN I EDG ISO C1997 KOG010 OGDGF00010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TO RUN EGG ISO 4760 P 480 VAC POWER SWMVC04760 SenriCe Water Header ISOtatrcnMQV 4760 Fada TO Close Qn Demand EOG10O C2005 4780 C 125 VOC CONTROL SWMVC047IO Senrice water Header Isolation MOV 4760 Fags To Close On Demand Pt tledQRQE B.I.DQC/rc B- 329 9/ld/9d 12:32:26 PM

LOCATION CHMU.CTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: EDG18 I EDGIBO E0018 DCPOPDG018I04 P 125 VOC POWER OCCFRO18DN Fuse F VDCPDPDGOIBI4N Fails Open (To D/G A-I Emergency)

EDG184 E0018 OCPDPDG018/04 P 125 VDC POWER DCCSROIBDX sconnrect swsch ocpDpDG018$ 4 Transfers Open (To OIG A - Emergency)

EDG184 E0016 DCPOPOG018/04 P 125 VDC POWER DCCFRO1BDP Fuse F VDCPDPOG018I4P Fails Open (To O/G A-Emergency)

EDG18O E0030 DCPDPCB03A/11 C 125 VDC POWER DCCFRC3ALN Fuse FUOCPDPC803A/LN Foils Open (To Screen

(

I House OC Oisvbutkvt Panel A)

EDG184 E0030 DCPDPCB03A/11 C 125 VDC POWER DCBDFSCRNA Screen House OC Oisvibution Panel lA (DCPOPSHOIA) Local Fautt EDGI BO E0068 OCPDPDGOIA/04 C 125 VDC POWER DCCSRDIADX Disconnect Switch DCPDPDGOIA/04 T/ans/ers Open (To D/G 8 - Emergency)

EDG18O E0089 DCPDPDGOI BI03 C 125 VDC POWER DCCSRDIBCX Disconnect Switch DCPDpDG018/03 Transfers Open (To 0/G 8 ~ Normal)

I EDG18O E0069 OCPDPDG018/03 C 125 VDC POWER DCCFROIBCN FuSe FUDCPDPDG018/3N Faila Open (TO D/G 8- 1 Normal)

EDG184 E0069 OCPDPDGQI8/03 C 125 VDC POWER DCCFRD18CP Fuse FUDCPDPDGOI 8/JP Fess Open (To D/G 8 - ~

I Normal)

EDGI BO E0090 OCPDPC8039/16 C 125 VDC OCBDFOGOCB D/G DC Distribution Panel 8 (DCPDPDG018) Local CDNTROUPOWER Fautl EDG184 E0090 DCPDPC8038/16 C 125 VDC OCCFRC38RN Fuse FUDCPDPCB038/RN Fags Open (To D/G OC CDNTROUPOWER Disvibution Panel 8)

EDGI 84 E0091 OCPDPC8038/ol C 125 VDC DCCFRC38DN Fuse FUDCPDPCB038/DN Fa Is Open (To MCC J)

CONTROUPOWER EDGI 84 E0091 C 125 VOC ACCBRMCC1J 480 VAC MCCJ Feeder Circtat Breaker 52/MCC J CDNTROUPOWER (M 0 CD/05KK) T/ansfers Open EGG 1 84 E0127 DCPDPC8028/05 I MISC POWER OCBDF SCRNB Screen Hcuse OC Distnbution Panel 18 (DCPDPSH018)LocalFautt EDGI 84 F0127 OCPDPC8028/05 I MISC POWER 'CCFRC28EN Fuse FUDCPOPC8028/5N Faas Open (To Screen House DC Obtribution Panel 8)

EDGI 84 L0180 52/I 6 C 125 VOC CONTROL ACCBD16118 AC BREAKER 52/16 (BUS16/118) FAILS TO OPERATE EDG184 LOIBO 52I16 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBR00016 460 VAC Bus 16 Feeder Circuit Breaker 52/16 (BUS16/118) Transfers open EDG184 L0166 52/EG181 P 460 VAC POWER ACCBD1611C OGB OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG181 (BUS16/11C)

FAII.S TO OPERATE EDGI 84 L0166 52/EG181 P 460 VAC POWER ACREKEG181 OG 8 SUPPLY BREAKER TO BVS 16 CLOSED RELAY 11XC1/EG181 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED EDG184 L0190 52/EG181 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBD1611C DGB OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG181 (BUS16II I C)

FAILS TO OPERATE EDG184 LOIBO 52/EG181 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACREKEG181 DG 8 SUPPLY BREAKER TO BVS 16 CLOSED RELAY 11XC1/FG181 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED FDG18O L0429 52/17 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBR00017 480 VAC Bus 17 Feeder Circuit Broaker 52/17 (BVS17/258) Transfers open EDG184 L0429 52/17 C 125 VOC CONTROL DCCFRSI BGN Fuse F UOCPDPSH018//N Fa7s Open (To Bus 17 ~

Norma 8 EDG184 L0429 52/17 C 125 VDC CONTRQI. OCCFRSIAAN Fuse FUDCPDPSH01A/IN Fails Open (To Bus 17-Emergency)

EDG184 L0429 52/17 C 125 VDC CONTROL. ACCBD17258 AC BREAKER 5V17 (BUS17/258) FAILS TO OPERATE EOG184 L0429 52/8717-16 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBR17 16 Breaker 52/bl17-1 6 Vans/era open EDG184 L0432 52/EG182 P 460 VAC POWER ACCBD1725C DG 8 OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG182 (BUS17/25C)

FAILS TO OPERATE EDG184 L0432 SVEGI 83 P 460 VAC POWER ACCBRC0183 AC BREAKER 52/EG183 TRANSFERS OPEN EOGI BO L0432A 52/EG181 P 460 VAC POWER ACREKEG181 OG 8 SUPPLY BREAKER TD BUS 16 CLOSED RELAY 11XC1/EG181 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED EDG ISO L0432A 52/EG181 P 460 VAC POWER ACCBD1611C DGB OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG181 (BVS16/11C)

! FAILS TO OPERATE ED G18O L0432A 52/EG182 P 460 VAC POWER ACCBD1725C DG 8 OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG182 (BVS17/25C)

FAILS TO OPERATE EDG184 L0432A 52/EG183 P 480 VAC POWER ACCBR00183 AC BREAKER 52/EG183 TRANSFERS OPEN EDGIBO L0434 52/EG182 C125VDC POWER ACCBD1725C OG 8 OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG182 (BUS17/25C)

FAILS TO OPERATE EDG184 L0435 52/EG182 C 125 VDC POWER ACC801725C DG 8 OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG182 (BUS17/25C)

FAILS TO OPERATE EDGI 84 L0446 52/MCC1 G2 ACCBN1726C AC BREAKER 52/MCCIG2 (BVS17/26C) FAILS TO I OPEN ED G18 4 L0462 52/SWP)8 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMPFSW018 San ice water pump pswolB Fails To Run For The r Requved Mission Trna (

P81666IRCE B-l. DDC/oc 8- 330 9/26/N 12 32 26 Pal

LOCATION CHARACTEMSTICS TABLE X<'IRE AREA: EDG1B EDG184 L0462 52/SWPI0 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBN1727C AC BREAKER 52/SWPI 8 (BUS17/27C) FAILS TO I OPEN EDG184 Loser 52/SWP I 0 I ALARM/125 VDC SWMPFSW010 Seniice Water Pump PSW018 Fails To Run For The i CONTROL Requi ed Missk/n Time EOG184 L0463 52/SWP I 0 I ALARM/125VDC ACCBN1727C AC BREAKER 52/SWPI 8 (BUS17/27C) FAILS TO CONTROL OPEN EDG'I 84 L0463 52/SWP ID I ALARM/125VDC ACCBN1727D AC BREAKER 52/SWPID (BVS17/27D) FAILS TO CONTROL OPEN EDG184 L0463 52/SWP ID I ALARM/125 VDC SWMPFSW01D Service Water Pump PSW010 Fails To Run For The CONTROL Requ'red M'idion Time EDG I 84 L0466 52/SWP ID C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBN1727D AC BREAKER 52/SWPID (BUS17/270) FAILS TO OPEN EDG184 L0466 52/SWPID C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMPFSW010 Service Water Pump PSW010 Fails To Run For The Requied Mission Time

( ED G1 8 4 L0469 52/BT17-18 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBR17 16 Bniaker 52/bt17.18 transfers open EDG104 L0472 52/14 C '125 VDC CONTROL ACCBR00014 480 VAC Bus 14 Feeder Circu'I Breaker 52/14 (BUS14/168) Trans/ers open I EOG104 L0472 52/14 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBD'l4168 AC BREAKER 52/14 (BUS14/188) FAILS TO i OPERATE EDG184 L0472 52/BT17-18 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBR17 18 Breaker 52/bl17.18 lransfe/s open EDG184 L0463 52/SWP I A C 125 VDC CONTROt. ACCBN18290 AC BREAKER 52/SWPIA (BUS16/290) FAILS TO OPEN EDG10 0 L0463 52/SWP1A C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMPFSW01A Service Water Pump PSW01A Fats To Run For Tho Required Mission Time EDG184 L0464 52/SWPI A I AlARM/120 VAC SWMP F SW01 A Seniice Water Pump PSWOIA Fails To Run For The CONTROL Requied Mission Time EDG104 L0484 52/SWPIA I AlARM/120 VAC ACCBN1829C AC BREAKER 52/SWPI A (BUS18/290) FAILS TO COMTROL OPEN EDG184 L0484 52/SWP I C IAlARM/120VAC ACCBN1829D AC BREAKER 52/SWPIC (BUS18/29D) FAILS TO CONTROL OPEN EDG104 L0464 52/SWP I C I AlARM/120 VAC SWMPFSVtOIC Service Water Pump P SW01 0 Fats To Run For The  !

CONTROL Requied Mission Tine EDG184 L0467 52/SWP1 0 0 125 VDC CONTROL SWMPFSViOIC Service Water Pump PSW01 0 Fails To Run For The Required Mission Tine EDG184 L0487 52/SWP1 0 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBN18290 AC BREAKER 52/SWPIC (BUS18/290) FAILS TO OPEN EDG184 L0499 52/MCC1GI C 125 VDC COHTROL ACCBN1830C AC BREAKER 52/MCCIGI (BUS16/30C) FAILS TO OPEN EDG184 L0504 52/18 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBD18318 AC BREAKER 52/16 (BUS18/318) FAILS TO OPERATE EDG184 L0504 52/18 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBR00018 460 VAC Bus 18 Feeder Circus Breaker 52/18 (0 US 18/318) Transfers open EDG184 L0504 52/18 C 125 VDC CONTROL DCCFRS10FN Fuse FUDCPDPSH018/6N Fails Open (To Bus 16-Emergency)

EDG184 L0505 52/18 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBD18318 AC BREAKER 52/18 (BUSI0/310) FAILS TO OPERATE EDG184 L0505 52/18 C 125 VDC COHTROL ACCBR00018 480 VAC Bus 18 Feeder Circuit Breaker 52/18 (BUS18/310) Trans/ers open EOG104 L0505 52/18 C 125 VDC CONTROL DCCFRS18FN Fuse FUDCPDPSHOI0/6N Fats Open (To Bus 18-Emergency)

EDG104 L0510 52/EG1A2 C 125 VDC POWER ACCBD1831C AC BREAKER 52/EG1A2 (BUS18/31C) FAILS TO OPERATE EDG104 t 0570 KDG018 I MISC CONTROL DGDGF00010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TO RUN j EDG184 L0571 KDGOI 8 I MISC CONTROL DGDGFC0010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TO RUN EDG104 L0572 KOG010 C 120 VAC CONTROL DGDGFC0010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAlLS TO RUN EGG! 84 t.0576 KDGOI 8 C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGFC0010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TO RVN EOGI 8.O L057/ KOG010 C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGFCC018 DIESEL GENERATOILKDGOI0 FAII.S TO RUN EDG184 L0579 KDGO I 0 C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGF00010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOI 8 FAILS TO RUN EDG184 L0562 KDG010 P 460 VAC POWER OGDGF00010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOI 8 FAILS TO RUN EDG184 L0563 P 480 VAC POWER DGDGFCC010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOI0 FAILS TO AUN EDG184 L0565 KDG018 P 460 VAC POWER DGDGFCC010 DIESEL GFNERATOR KDG010 FAILS TO RUN EDGI8 0 L0566 KDGOI 0 P 460 VAC POWER DGDGFCC010 DIFSEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TO RVN EDG184 L0567 KDG018 P 460 VAC POWER DGDGF00010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TO RUN EDG184 L0590 KDG010 I DGDGFCC010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TO RUN METEAING/RELAYIN G

EDG18.0 L0591 KDG010 I DGDGFC0010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TO RVH METERING/AEIAYIN G

PnledQRGE 8 I.DOC/oc B- 33) 9/26/93 12:32:26 PM

LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: EDG18 EGG I 84I L0592 KDG018 I DGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUN METERING/RELAYIN G

EOGI M L0593 KDG018 I DGDGF00018 OI SEL GFMERATOR KOG018 FAtLS TQ RUM METERING/RELAYIN G

EDGI 84I L0594 KDG018 I DGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUN METERING/RELAYIN G

EDGI 84I L0600 KDG018 I DGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUM METERING/RELAYIM G

EDG184I L0602 KDGOI 8 I OGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOI 8 FAlLS TQ RUN I METERING/RELAYIN i

G

~EDG I 847 LC603 I DGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOI8 FAILS TO RUM METERING/RE LAYIN G

EDGI 841 L0604 KDG018 k I OG DG F00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KOG018 FAILS TO RUN METERING/RELAY IN G

EDG1841 L0605 KDG018 I DGOGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KOG018 FAILS TO RUN I METERING/RE LAYIN G

EDGI 84I L0765 KOG018 C 125 VOC CONTROL OGDGF00018 OiESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUM EDGI Ba L0767 KOG018 C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGFCOOI8 DIF SEL GENERATOR KDGOI 8 FAILS TQ RUN EDGI 841 L0854 LIT 2051A NSTRUMENTATION OGPSL2051A PRESSURE SWITCH LC.2051A FAILS, NDICATINGFALSE LOW LEVEL IN TDG048 EDGI841 L0854 UT.2051 A INSTRUMENTATION OGPSH2051A PRESSURE SWITCH LC-2051A.2 FAILS.

L INDICATINGFALSE HIGH LEVEL IN TDG048 EDGI84I L0855 KDG018 C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUN I EDG1 841 L0855 LIT-2051A C 125 VDC CONTROL OGPSL2051A PRESSURE SWITCH LC-2051A FAILS, INDICATINGFALSE LOW LEVEL IN TDG048 EDGI 841 L0655 UT.205 1 A C 125 VDC CONTROL DGPSH2051A PRESSURE SWITCH LC-2051A.2 FAILS.

INDICATINGFALSE HIGH LEVEL IM TDG048 EDGI 84I L0656 KDG018 C 125 VOC CONTROL DGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDGDI8 FAILS TQ RUN EDG184I L0656 LIT 2051A C 125 VDC CONTROL DGPSH2051A PRESSURE SWITCH LC.2051A.2 FAILS.

INDICATINGFALSE HIGH LEVEL IM TPG048 EDG184I L0656 LIT.2051A C 125 VDC CONTROL DG PS L2051A PRESSURE SWITCH LC.2051A FAILS.

NOICATIMGFALSE LOW LEVEL IM TDG048 I EDGI 8% M0089 52II BSS M 4160 VAC POWER ACTIFSSTI8 Fault On 4160/460 VAC Bus 18 supply Transformer PXSHSS018 EDGI 841 M0108 52I1766 M 4160 VAC POWER ACT IF SST17 Fault On 4160/460 VAC Bus 17 supply Trans/ormer PXSHSS017 FDG18.1 C104S MCCJ P 460 VAC POWER ACCBRMCCIJ 480 VAC MCCJ Feeder Crcua Breaker 52/MCCJ (MCCD/05KK) Transfers Open EDG18-1 C1950 4670 P 460 VAC POWER SWMVK04670 Senrice Water Header lsoiadcn MQV 4670 Trans/ers Qosed EDGI 8-1 C1950 4670 P 460 VAC POWER SWMVC04670 Service Water Header Isolation MOV 4670 Fails To Qose On Demand EDGI8 I C1951 4670 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVC04670 SenriCe Wale/ Header ISOtatiOn MOV 4670 Faila TO I Qose On Demand EDGIB I C1951 4670 C 125 VOC CONTROL SWMVK04670 Service Water Header Iso/alen MOV 4670 Transters Cbsed EDGI 8 I C1955 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVC04609 SenriCe Water Header ISOIadcn MQV 4609 Faila TO Qose On Demand EDGI 8 I CI S56 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVC04609 Service Water Header Isolation MQV 4609 Faits To Close On Demand EDGI 8.1 C1977 DTP18 C ACREROTPI8 STARTING CIRCUIT RELAY 42/OTPI 8 I TRANSFERS TO DE EAERG12ED EDGI 8 1 C1962 OTP I 8 C 125 VOC CONTROL ACREROTPI 8 STARTING CIRCUIT RELAY 42/OTPI 8 TRANSFERS TO OE ENERGIZED EDGI 8-1 C1986 ADF02A P 460 VAC POWER HVMCNDD02A DG ROOM 8 FAM 81 AIR.OPERATED DAMPER ADD02A FAILS TO OPEN EDG18.1 CI SSS ADF02A C 125 VOC CONTROL HVMCNDO02A OG ROOM 8 FAN 81 AIR4)PERATEO DAMPER ADIX2AFAILS TO OPEN EDGI 8 1 C1990 ADF02A C 125 VDC CONTROL HVMCNDD02A DG ROOM 8 FAN 81 AIR.OPERATED DAMPER 4

ADD02A FAILS TO OPEN EDGIB I C1991 ADF02A P 125VOC POWER HVMCNDD02A OG ROOM 8 FAM 81 AIR OPERATEO DAMPER ADD02A FAII.S TQ OPEN I EDGI 8 I C1991 ADF028 P 125 VDC POWER HVMCNDD028 DG 8 ROOM FAN 82 AIR-OPERATED DAMPER ADD028 FAII.S TQ OPEN PAI684IRGE 8 I.DDC/oc 8- 332 9/l SISS ll:31:27 PM

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X,OCAYroN CH~m.nmarSnCS maaE FIRE AREA: EDG13 ED G10.1 ID160 52/16 C 125 VDC CONTROL AGCBR00016 460 VAC Bus 16 Feeder Cvcuil Breaker 52/16 (BUS16/110) Transters open EDG10.1 L0168 52/EGI 8l P 460 VAC POWER ACREKEG101 DG 0 SVPPI.Y BREAKER TO BVS 16 CLOSED RELAY I IXCI/EG181 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED EDGI 0 I L0186 52/EG101 P 460 VAC POWER ACCBD1611C DGB OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG101 (BUS16/I IC)

I FAILS TO OPERATE EDG18.1 L0190 52/EG101 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACC 8 D1611C OGB OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG101 (BUS16/I IC)

FAILS TO OPERATE EDG10.1 L0190 52/EGI BI G 125 VDC CONTROL ACREKEG101 DG 0 SUPPLY BREAKER TO BVS 16 CLOSED RELAY 11XGIIEGIBI TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED r

E0G10.1 L0429 52/17 C 125 VDC CONTROL, ACCBR00017 460 VAC Bus 17 Feeder Circuit Brea'ker 52/17 (BUS17/250) Transters open I EDG10.1 L0429 52/17 6 125 VDC CONTROL. DCCFRSIAAN Fuse FUDGPDPSHOIA/INFagsOpen(ToBus17-

) Emergency) I

~ EDG18.1 L0429 52/17 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBD17258 AC BREAKER 52/17 (BVS17/250) FAILS TO OPERATE EDG'18.1 L0429 52/17 C 125 VDC CONTROL DGCFRSIBGN Fuse FVDGPDPSH018/7N Fails Open (To Bus 17-Normal]

I EDGI 8-I L0429 52/0T17.16 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBR17 16 Breaker 52/OIL 7-I 6 uansfers open I EDGI 0-1 L0432 52/EG182 P 460 VAC POWER ACCBD1725C DG 8 OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG102 (BUS17/25C)

FAlLS TO OPERATE EDG10-1 L0432 52IEGI 83 P 460 VAC POWER ACGBR00183 AC BREAKER 52/EG183 TRANSFERS OPEN EDGI 0-1 L0432A 52/EG101 P 460 VAC POWER ACCBD1611C DGB OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG101 (BUS16/I IG)

FAILS TO OPERATE I

EDG10.1 L0432A 52/EG I 0 1 P 460 VAC POWER ACREKEG101 DG 0 SUPPLY BREAKER TO BUS 16 CLOSED RELAY I IXCI/EGIBI TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED EDGI0-I L0432A 52/EG182 P 480 VAC POWER ACCBD1725C DG 8 OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG102 (BUS17/25C)

FAILS TO OPERATE EDGI 8-1 L0432A 52IEG183 P 480 VAC POWER ACCBR00\ 83 AC BREAKER 52/EG183 TRANSFERS OPEN EDGI B-I L0434 52/EGI 02 C 125 VDC POWER ACCBD17250 DG 0 OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG102 (BUS17/25C)

FAILS TO OPERATE EDGI 0 I L0446 52/MCCI G2 C ACCBM1726C AC BREAKER 52/MCC1G2 (BUS17/26C) FAILS TO OPEN EDG10.1 L0463 52/SWP10 I ALARM/125VDC SWMPF SW018 Seriice Water Pump PSW010 Faas To Run For The CONTROL Required Mission Tune EDG10.1 L0463 52/SWPI 0 I ALARM/125VDC ACCBN1727C AC BREAKER 52/SWPI 0 (BVS17/270) FAILS TO CONTROL OPEN EDGI0 I L0463 52/SWP 1 0 I ALARM/125VDC SWMPF SW010 Service Water pump pSWOIO Faas To Run For The CONTROL Required MBsion Tene EDG10.1 L0463 52ISWP I 0 I ALARM/125VDC ACCBN1727D AC BREAKER 52/SWPID (BUS17/27D) FAILS TO CONTROL OPEN EDG10 I L0499 52/MGG161 C 12S VDC CONTROL ACCBN1630C AC BREAKER 52IMCCIG1 (BUS16I306) FAILS TO OPEN ED G I B-I L0504 52/16 6 125 VDC CONTROL DCCFRSI BFN Fuse FUDCPDPSH010/6M Fairs Open (To Bus 16-Emergency)

EDG10.1 L0504 52/16 G 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBR00016 480 VAC Bus 16 Feeder Queue Breaker 52/16 (BUSI6/310) Transters open EDG10.1 L0504 52/I 6 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACC 8 D16310 AC BREAKER 52/16 (BUS16/310) FAILS TO OPERATE EDGI 0 I L0505 52/16 6 125 VDC CONTROL DCCFRSI BFN Fuse FUDCPDPSH010/GN Fels Open(To Bus 18 ~

Emergency)

EDGI 0-I L0505 52/18 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACC 0 R00016 460 VAC Bus 16 Feeder Circuit Breaker 52/I 6 (BVS16/3( 0) Transters open EDG10.1 L0505 52/16 G 125 VOC CONTROL ACGBD16310 AC BREAKER 52/16 (BVSI6/310) FAILS TO I OPERATE EDG18 I L0570 I MISC CONTROL - DGDGF00010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOI 0 FAILS TO RVM EDG10.1 L0571 KD6010 I MISC CONTROL DGDGF00010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUN EDG18 1 L0572 KDG010 C 120VAC CONTROL DGDGF00010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TO RVN EDGI 8 I L0573 KD6018 I h'IISC CONTROL OGDGF00010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOI 0 FAILS TQ RVM FD610 1 L0574 KD6018 C 125 VDC CONTROl. DGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAlLS TO RUN EGG I 0 I L0576 KD6010 C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAlLS TQ RUN EGG I 0 I L0577 KD6010 C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TQ RUN EDG18.1 L0579 KDGO I 0 C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGF00010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG010 FAILS TO RUM EDG10.1 L0561 KD6010 P 480 VAC POWER DGDGF00010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIB FAILS TO RVM EDGI 8 I L0562 KD6010 P 480 VAC POWER DGDGF00010 DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIB FAILS TO RUM EDG10.1 L0584 KDGOI 8 P 480 VAC POWER DGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOI0 FAILS TO RUN P;115SQRCE 0 I.DQC/oc )3- 334 9/23/93 11:32KT7 Phl

LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE I<'IRK ARE<A: ~ 'DG18 I ED G18.1 L0590 KDG018 I OGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KOG018 FAILS TO RUN METERING/RELAYLN G

EDGI 8 1 L0594 KDG018 I DGDGFOCOI 8 DIESEL GENERATOR KOGOI 8 FAILS TO RUN METERING/RELAYIN G

EDG18 1 L0595 KDG018 P 120 VAC POWER OGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUN EDG18 1 L0600 KDGOI 8 I OGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUN METERING/RELAYIN G

EDG18.1 1.0601 KDG018 I OGDGFC0018 DIESEL GENERATOR KOG018 FAiLS TO RUN METERING/RELAYIN I

G EDG18.1 L0602 KDG018 I OGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUM METERING/RELAYIN c

G EDG18.1 L0765 KDG018 C 125 VOC CONTROL DGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KOG018 FAILS TO RUN EDG18 L0767 r 1 KDG018 C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG019 FAILS TO RUN EDG18.1 L0654 LIT-205<A INSTRUMENTATION OGPSH2051A PRESSURE SWITCH LC-2051A-2 FAILS, INDICATINGFALSE HIGH LEVEL IN TOG049 I EDG18.1 L0654 UT-2051 A PISTRUMENTATION DGPSL2051A PRESSURE SWITCH LC-2051A FAILS.

INDICATING FALSE LOW LEVEL IN TOG048 EDG18-1 L0855 KDG018 C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAlLS TO RUM ED G18.1 L0655 LIT.2051A C 125 VOC CONTROI. DGPSH2051A PRESSURE SWITCH LC.2051A-2 FAILS.

INDICATINGFALSE HIGH LEVEL IN TDG048 i EDG18'1 L0655 LIT-2051A C 125 VDC CONTROL OGPSL2051A PRESSURE SWITCH LC.2051A FAILS.

INDICATINGFALSE LOW LEVEL IN TOG048 j EDG18 1 L0856 KDG018 C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUN EDG18.1 L0656 LIT.205<A C 125 VOC CONTROL DGPSH2051A PRESSURE SWITCH LC-2051A.2 FAILS,

/ INDICATINGFALSE HIGH LEVEL IM TDG048 ED G18.1 L0656 LIT-2051A C 125 VDC CONTROI. OGPSL2051A PRESSURE SWITCH LC.2051A FAlLS.

I INDICATINGFALSE LOW LEVEL IN TDG048 EDG18.1 M0069 52/1855 M 4160 VAC POWER ACT1FSST18 Fauk On 4160/460 VAC Bus 18 supply Transformer I PXSHSS016 EOGIB 1 M0106 52/1 758 h'I 4160 VAC POWER ACT1FSST17 Fautl On 4160/460 VAC Bus 17 supply Trans/armer I

PXSHSS017

7. SPATIAL INTERACTIONS ANALYSIS WALKDOWNNOTES:

FIRE ZONE WALKDOWNNOTES EDGI 841 Seakd companmen< below diesel gcncra<or room.

5DG I 8.l D G foci oil <ramfcr pump. Fire wa<cr hookup for cooling D.G.

4/2/98 V/D sec no<ca for DG A room.

PAI686<RCE 8.1. DOC/oc B. 335 9/28/98 1202:28 Phl

LOCATION Cm,mCYKmsxrCS Ymr.z FIRE AREA: H2

1. FIRE ZONES IN THIS FIRE AREA:

t FIRE ZONE ELEV (FT.) FIRE ZONE DESCRIPTION BUILDING FLOOR AREA (SQ. FT.)

H2 2$ tt 6 HYDROGEN STORAGE ROOM HS

2. FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE COMBUSTIBLE LOADING (BTU) FIRE SEVERITY (HRS)

H2 14.846 11.1 /nba

3. FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE FIRE DETECTION FEATURES FIRE SUPPRESSION FEATURES H2 4 FIRE ZONE(S) ADJACENT TO THE FIRE ZONE(S) IN THIS FIRE AREA:

I FIRE ZONE ADJACENT FIRE ZONE PATHWAY PATHWAY RATING (HOUR) j H2 TO WALL TB-1 WALL

5. POTENTIAL KEY EQUIPMENT AND THEIR ASSOCIATED BASIC EVENT(S) IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

, 6. POTENTIAL RACEWAYS (CONDUITS AND CABLE TRAYS) AND THEIR ASSOCIATED EQUIPiMENT/BASIC EVENT(S) IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

7. SPATIAL INTERACTIONS ANALYSIS WALKDOWNNOTES:

FIRE ZONE WALKDOWNNOTES H2 Adjacent to turbine oil stcra8e room. 2 DG foci oil stora8c tanks (6000 8at tons each) unde/8round bettwu bydroien sin/abc area.

4/2/98 WD no safety critical equipment PhldIQRGE 0 I.DOC/uc B- 336 9/28/98 12:22:28 Phl

FIRE AREA:

1.

'C FIRE ZONES IN THIS FIRE AREA:

LOCATION CHAIR CTERISTICS TABLE I FIRE ZONE ELEV (FT.) FIRE ZONE DESCRIPTION BUILDING FLOOR AREA (SQ. FT.)

RC.1 235EACTOR CONTAINMENTBASEMENT RC 8825 RC.2 253EACTOR CONTAINMENTMEZZANINE RC 8825 RCQ 74' 6 278' REACTION CONTAINMENTOPERATING LEVEL RC 8825

2. FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE COMBUSTIBLE LOADING (BTU) FIRE SEVERITY (HRS) c RC I 23,187 17.4 mi/L RC-2 5,731 4.3 miA.

3.182 2.4 mn.

3. FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE FIRE DETECTION FEATURES FIRE SUPPRESSION FEATURES RC-1 RC.2 RC.3

4. I<'IRE ZONE(S) ADJACENT TO THE FIRE ZONE(S) IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE ADJACENT FIRE ZONE PATHWAY PATHWAYRATING (HOUR)

RC.1 ABB WALL RC.l IBN47 WALL RC-1 1864I WALL RC-2 WALL RC.2 IBM.1 WALL RC-2 IBS-1 WALL RC4 AGO WALL RCO IBM.2 WALL IBS.2 WALL

5. POTENTIAL KEY EQUIPMENT AND THEIR ASSOCIATED BASIC EVENT(S) IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE EQUIPMENT BASIC BASIC EVENT AFFECTED EVENT DESCRIPTION RC-1 294 AIR43PERATED VALVE294 TRANSFER CLOSED RC-1 392A CVRVP0392A aovrrv392a fails lo reseve to res RC-1 52/CFIC HVMCP05876 AIR47PERATED DAMPER 5876 FAILS TO OPEN (CONTAINMENTI RC.1 52/CFIC HVMCP05874 AIR47PERATED DAMPER 5874 FAILS TO OPEN (CONTAINMENTI Rc.l 52/CF10 HVMCC05875 AIR OPERATED DAMPER 5875 FAILS TO CLOSE RC-I 52/CF1D HVMCK05877 AIR.OP DAMPER 5877 TRANSFERS CLOSED RC-1 700 R RMV000700 MOV 700 FAILS TO OPEN RC.1 701 R RMV000701 MOV 701 FAII.S TO OPEN RC.I 720 R RMV000720 MOV 720 FAI'LS TO OPEN RC I 721 RRMV000721 MOV 721 FAILS TO OPEN RC.l 852A RHMV00852A MOV 852A FAILS TO OPEN RC.l 8528 RHMV008528 MOV 8528 FAILS TO OPEN RC.I PT-452 RCBINPC452 ALARMPCW2 FAILS TO OPERATE ON DEMAND RC-2 52/CF IA HVMFFACFBA MOTOR4)RIVEN FAN ACFBA FAILS TO RUN (CONTAINMENTI RC-2 52/RCP I A RCMPFRCPIA REACTOR COOLANT PUMP PRCOIA FAILS TO RUN RC-2 52/RCPI8 RCMPFRCPIB REACTOR COOLANT PUMP PRCOI 8 FAILS TO RUN RC-2 8620A IASVP 8620A SOLENOID VALVE8620A FAILS TO OPEN RC.2 86208 IASVP86208 SOLENOID VALVE86208 FAILS TO OPEN RC.2 LTA27 RCLYDLM427 INSTRUMENT LOOP CURRENT REPEATER LM<27 FAILS TO RESPOND RC.2 LT&28 RCLYDLM428 INSTRUMENT LOOP CURRENT REPEATER LM<28 FAlLS TO RESPOND RC 2 LT.934 SILTHLT934 LEVEL TRANSMITfER LT-934 FAILS HIGH P Llbd6CRGE 8 I.DOC/oc B- 337 9/dd/98 12 32 dd PM

LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: RC RC 2 LT 935 SILTHLT935 LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT.935 FAILS HIGH RC.2 LT-938 S ILTHLT%8 LEVEL TRANSMITTERLT-938 FAILS HIGH RC.2 LT.939 S ILTHLT939 LEVEL TRANSMITTERLT-939 FAILS HIGH RC 2 RRPTHP T420 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT<20 FAILS HIGH RC.2 F7<29 RCPTLPT429 PRESSURE TRANSMIITER PT<29 FAILS LOW RC-2 RCPTLPT430 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT<30 FAILS LOW RC 2 F7<31 RCPTLPT431 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT<31 FAILS LOW RC.2 PT449 RCPTLPT449 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT<49 FAILS LOW RC.3 431A RCAVN0431A AIR-OPERATED VALVEPCV<3IA FAILS TO OPEN RC4 4318 RCAVN0431B AIR43PERATED VALVE PCVP318 FAILS TO OPEN RC-3 515 RCMVP00515 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE515 FAILS TO OPEN RC-3 516 RCMVP00516 MOTOR47PERATEO VALVE516 FAlLS TO OPEN RC-3 IAPVK8612A PRESSURE CONTROL VLV8612A TRANSFERS CLOSED RC4 86128 IAPVK8612B PRESSURE CONTROL VLV8612B TRANSFERS CLOSED RC-3 861 6A IASVP861 6A SOLENOID VALVE8616A FAILS TO OPEN RCC 861 68 IASVP8616B SOLENOID VALVF86168 FAILS TO OPEN RC-3 8619A IASVP8619A SOLENOID VALVE8619A FAILS TO OPEN 86198 IASVP86198 SOLENOID VALVE86198 FAILS TO OPEN RC4 CRSFIA HVMFFACFSA CONTROL ROD SHROUD FAN A FAILS TO RUN RCQ CRSFI 8 HVMFFACF58 CONTROL ROD SHROUD FAN B FAILS TO RUN RC-3 ESFTD00464 STEAM GENERATOR A FLOW TRANSMITTER FT<64 FAILS TO RESPOND RC-3 ESFTD00465 STEAM GENERATOR A FLOWTRANSMllTERFT<65 FAILS TO RESPOND RCQ F7<74 ESFTD00474 SG 6 STEAM FLOW TRANShtlTTER F7<74 FAILS TO RESPOND RC-3 F7<75 ESFTO00475 SG B STEAM FLOW TRANSMITTER F7<75 FAlLS TO RESPOND RC-3 LT<61 MF LTD00461 Level transmitter LT<61 fails to respond RC-3 LT<62 MF LTO00462 Level transmitter LTe62 fails to respond RC.3 LT463 MF LTD00463 Level transminer LT<63 fails to respond RC4 LT<71 MFLTD00471 Level transmitter LTA71 fails to respond RC.3 LT472 MFLTD00472 Level transmitter LTA72 faih to respond RC 3 LT473 MF LTD00473 Level transmilter LT<73 faiIS tO reapOnd

6. POTENTIAL RACEWAYS (CONDUITS AND CABLE TRAYS) AND THEIR ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT/BASIC EVENT(S) IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE RACEWAY EQUIPMENT CABLE BASIC EVENT BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION AFFECTED AFFECTED FUNCTION AFFECTED RC.1 C0714 P 480 VAC POWER RRMVQ00720 MOV 720 FAILS TO OPEN RC.1 C0714 P 480 VAC POWER RCS-720 ISLOCA evaluation RC.1 C0716 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCS-720 ISLOCA evaa/ation RC.1 C0716 C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVQ00720 MOV 720 FAILS TO OPEN RC.l C0721 P 480 VAC POWER RRMVQ007CO MOV 700 FAILS TO OPEN RC 1 C0721 P 480 VAC POWER RCS-700 ISLOCA evaluation RC.1 C0723 C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVQ00700 MOV 700 FAlLS TO OPEN RC-1 00723 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCS-700 ISLOCA evas/ation RC1 C0729 852A P 480 VAC POWER RHMVQ0852A MOV 852A FAILS TO OPEN RC.1 C0731 852A C 125 VDC CONTROL RHMVQ0852A MOV 852A FAILS TO OPEN RC.I C0741 878A P 480 VAC POWER SIXVR0878A MOV 878A TRANSFERS OPEN RC 1 C074\ 878A P 480 VAC POWER SRXVR0878A MOV878A TRANSFERS OPEN RC.1 C0743 878A C 125 VDC CONTROL SIXVR0878A MOV 878A TRANSFERS OPEN RC 1 C0743 878A C 125 VDC CONTROL SRXVR0878A MOV878ATRANSFERS OPEN RC-1 C0748 8780 P 480 VAC POWER SIXVR0878C MOV 8780 TRANSFERS OPEN RC I C0748 878C P 480 VAC POWER SRXVR0878C MOV 878C TRANSFERS OPEN RC.1 878C C 125 VDC CONTROL SIXVR0878C MOV 878C TRANSFERS OPEN RC 1 878C C 125 VOC CONTROL SRXVR0878C MOV 878C TRANSFERS OPEN RC 1 C1080 721 P 480 VAC POWER RCS.721 ISLOCA evatuation RC-1 C1080 721 P 480 VAC POWER RRMVQ00721 MOV 721 FAILS TO OPEN RC-I C1082 721 C 125 VDC CONTROL RRMVQC0721 MOV 721 FAILS TO OPEN RC-I C1082 721 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCS.721 ISLOCA evaluation PAIMQRGE 9 I.DOC/oc 8- 338 9/la/98 12:37:29 Pht

Pages B-339 through B-350 are similar and not included to reduce paper volume.

LOCATION CHAIR CTERISTICS TABLE RE AREA:; RC RC-2 R3594 RC.592 Spulous opening of RCS head vent 8 in conjunction with SV493?

RC-2 R3595 RC-592 Spurious opening of RCS head vent if st conjunction with SVC93?

RC-2 R3596 593 P RC<93 Spurious operwrg of RCS head vent if in conjunction with SV<92?

RC-2 R3597 RC493 Spurious opening of RCS head vent à at conjunction whh SV492?

RC.2 R3596 591 P RC491 Spurious openhg of RCS head vent if in conjunction wah SV<907 RC-2 R3599 591 C 125 VDC CONTROL RC491 Spurious openng of RCS head vent if ln con(unction with SVW90?

RC 2 R3968 TE-11081 C TE<1081 TEMPERATURE ELEMENTFOR LOOP 8 COLD LEG RC-2 R3970 LT<27 RCLYDLM427 INSTRUMENT LOOP CURRENT REPEATER LM.

427 FAILS TO RESPOND RC 2 R3972 PT~ EXPTLPT430 PRESSURIZER LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER F7<30 FA!LS LOW RC-2 R3972 PT<30 C ESPTDPT430 PRESSURIZER LOW PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT<30 FAILS TO RESPOND ON DEMAND RC.2 R3972 PT<30 RCPTLPT430 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PRO FAILS LOW RC.2 R3993 TE~B I TE40981 LOOP 8 HOTLEGTEMPELEMENT RC 2 R4081 LT~ I INDICATION STEAM GENERATOR EMSOIA LEVEL WIDE RANGE APPENDIX R TRANSM(ITER RC-2 R4085 LT<26A C 125 VDC CONTROL LT<28A PRZR LVLWIDE RANGE-XMTR RC-2 R4087 PT<208 I A(ARM/IND/CONT PRESSURE TRANSMITTER REACTOR COO(ANT SYSTEM INST LOOP 4208 RC.2 R4295 LT.504 LT 504 STEAM GENERATOR EM SOIA WIDE RANGE LEVEL TRANSMITTER RC.2 R4298 LTD? C LT-507 STEAM GENERATOR EMS018 WIDE RANGE LEVEL TRANSMITTER RC-2 SAC0201A 8619A C 125 VDC CONTROL IASVP8619A SOLENOID VALVE8619A FAILS TO OPEN RC.2 SAC02018 8619A IASVP861 9A SOLENOID VALVE8619A FAILS TO OPEN RC-2 SAC0202A 86198 IASVP86198 SOLENOID VALVE86198 FAILS TO OPEN RC.2 SAC0202A 86198 C RCRE8451AX RELAY PC~I.X FAlLS TO DE.ENERGIZE RC.2 SAC02028 86198 RCRE8451AX RELAY P~SI-X FAILS TO DE ENERGIZE RC-2 SAC02028 86198 IASVP86198 SOLFNOID VALVE88198 FAILS TO OPEN RC-2 SAC0205A 6816A C IASVP8616A SOLENOID VALVE8616A FAlLS TO OPEN RC-2 SAC0206A 86168 IASVP86168 SOLENOID VALVE88168 FAILS TO OPEN RC-2 SAI0101 PT<50 I RPS CHANNEL 3 RCBINPC450 ALARM PCA50 FAILS TO OPERATE ON DEMAND (BLUE)

RC.2 SAO102 PT<51 I RPS CHANNEL 2 RCBINPC45'( ALARMPC<51 FAILS TO OPERATE ON DEMAND (WHITE)

RC-2 6/N)103 PT<52 IRPS CHANNEL 1 RC 8 INPC 452 ALARM PC<52 FAILS TO OPERATE ON DEMAND (REO)

RC4 C0691 516 P 480 VAC POWER RCMVK00516 MOTORS)PERATEO VALVE516 TRANSFERS CLOSED RC4 C0691 516 P 480 VAC POWER RCMVP00516 MOTORS)PERATEO VALVE516 FAILS TO OPEN RCQ C0691A 516 P 480 VAC POWER RCMVK00516 MOTORNPERATED VAI.VE516 TRANSFERS CLOSED RC4 C0691A 516 P 480 VAC POWER RCMVP00516 MOTOR.OPERATED VALVE516 FAILS TO OPEN RC3 CC693 516 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVP00516 MOTORS)PERATED VALVE516 FAILS TO OPEN 516 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVK00516 MOTOR.OPERATED VALVE516 TRANSFERS CLOSED RC4 CC693A 516 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVK00516 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE516 TRANSFERS CLOSED RC4 C0693A 516 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVP00516 MOTORAPERATED VALVE516 FAILS TO OPEN R~ C1057 515 P 480 VAC POWER RCMVP00515 MOTORPERATED VALVE515 FAILS TO OPEN RCG C1057 515 P 480 VAC POWER RCMVK00515 MOTORS)PERATED VALVE515 TRANSFERS CLOSED R~ C1057A 515 P 480 VAC POWER RCMVKC0515 MOTORPERATED VALVE515 TRANSFERS CLOSED RCQ C1057A 515 P 480 VAC POWER RCMVP00515 MOTORS) PE RATED VALVE515 FAILS TO OPEN RCQ C1059 515 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVK00515 MOTORNPERATEO VALVE515 TRANSFERS CLOSED RCD C1059 515 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVP00515 MOTOR. OPERATED VALVE515 FAILS TO OPEN RCQ C1059A 515 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVK00515 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE515 TRANSFERS CLOSED lhlldtdtROE.B I.DOC/oc B-351 9/23/93 )2132133 PM

LOCATION CHAIR CTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: ':

RC RC4 C1059A 515 C 125 VDC CONTROL RCMVP00515 MOTORS)PERATED VALVE515 FAILS TO OPEN CRSFI8 P 480 VAC POWER HVMFFACF 5 8 CONTROL ROD SHROUD FAN 8 FAILS TO RUN RCQ L0082A CRSF I 8 P 480 VAC POWER HVMFFACF58 CONTROL ROD SHROUD FAN 8 FAILS TO RUM RO0 L0093 CRSF IA P 480 VAC POWER HVMFFACF5A CONTROL ROD SHROUD FAN A FAILS TO RUN RC4 L0093A CRSFIA P 480 VAC POWER HVMFFACFSA CONTROL ROD SHROUD FAN A FAlLS TO RUN RO0 l0343 52/CF1A 0125VDCCONTROL HVMFFACFBA MOTORS)RIVEN FAN ACFBA FAILS TO RUN (CONTAINMENT)

RC4 (0343 52/CF I A C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBN1423C AC BREAKER 52/CF I A (BUS14/230) FAILS TO OPEN RC4 l0346 52/CFI A C 125 VDC CONTROL HVMFFACFBA MOTORS) RIVEN FAN ACFBA FAILS TO RUN (COMTAINMEMT)

RC4 L0346 52/CF1A C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBN1423C AC BREAKER 52/CF1A (BUS14/230) FAILS TO OPEN RC4 L0360 52/CF1D C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBN14200 AC BREAKER 52/CFID (BUS14/200) FAILS TO OPEN RC4 L0360 52/CF10 0 125 VDC CONTROL HVMFFACF80 MOTOR.DRIVEN FAN ACF8D FAILS TO RUM (CONTAINMENT)

RC 3 L0360 52/CF) D C 125 VDC CONTROL HVMCK05877 AIR OP DAMPER 5877 TRANSFERS CLOSED RC 3 R0872 FT~ I ALARM/IND/CONT 8SFTD00464 STEAM GENERATOR A FLOW TRANSMITTER FT 464 FAILS TO RESPOND RC 3 R0878 LT~t I ALARM/IND/CONT MFLTD00461 Level transrnittor LT<61 fails lo rospond RC4 R0916 FT~ I ALARM/IND/CONT ESFT000465 STEAM GENERATOR A FLOW TRANSMITTER FT 465 FAILS TO RESPOND RC4 R0965 LTD I ANALOG SIGNAL MFLTD00462 Level transmkter LT~2 fake to respond RC4 R1014 LTwt63 I ANALOG SIGNAL MFLTD00463 Level transmitter LT~ fats to respond RC4 R1018 LTD? 1 I ANALOG SIGNAL MFLTD00471 Level I/ansmkter LTD?1 lais to respcnd RC4 R3592 550 P RC-590 Spacious opening of RCS head vent if n cortunctkn wkh SV.591'?

RC4 R3593 590 P RC490 Sptnous openng of RCS head vent if in conjunseion with SV491?

RC-3 R3594 592 P RC492 Spudous openng of RCS head vent if in coskunction wkh SV493?

RC-3 R3595 592 P RC492 spacious opening of Rcs head vase if n oonjunctkn wkh SV493?

RC-3 R3596 593 P RC493 Sptnous openng of RCS head venl 8 n conjunctksn with SV492?

RC-3 R3597 593 C RC493 SPurious openng of RCS head vent if n conjunction with SV.592?

RC4 R3598 591 P RC491 Spurous openng of RCS head vere if n conjunction with SV4M?

R04 R3599 591 C 125 VDC CONTROL RC491 of RCS head vent if n conjunction with SV490?

RCQ SAC0201A C 125 VDC CONTROL IASVP8619A SOLENOID VALVE8619A FAILS TO OPEN RC-3 SAC02018 8619A IASVP8619A SOLENOID VALVE8619A FAlLS TO OPEN RC4 SAC0201C 86'l9A C 125 VDC CONTROL IASVP8619A SOLENOID VALVE8619A FAILS TO OPEN RC4 SAC0202A 86198 C RCREB451AX REIAY PCMI.X FAII.S TO DE-ENERGIZE RC-3 SAC0202A 86198 IASVP86198 SOLENOID VALVE86198 FAILS TO OPEN RC.3 SAC02028 8619 B IASVP86198 SOLENOID VALVE861SB FAILS TO OPEN RCQ SAC02028 86198 C RCRE8451AX REIAY PC<51.X FAILS TO DE-ENERGIZE RC4 SAC02020 86198 C IASVP86198 SOLENOID VALVE86198 FAILS TO OPEN RC4 SAC0202C 861SB RC RE 8451AX RELAY PC<51-X FAlLS TO OE-ENERGIZE RC4 SAC0203 SOLENOID VALVE8620A FAllS TO OPEN RC4 SAC0204 IASVP86208 SOLENOID VALVE86208 FAILS TO OPEN RC4 SAC0205A 8616A C IASVP8616A SOLENOID VALVE8616A FAILS TO OPEN RCQ SAC02058 8616A C IASVP8616A SOLENOID VALVE8616A FAILS TO OPEN RC4 SAC0206A 86168 IASVP861 68 SOLENOID VALVE86168 FAILS TO OPEN RC4 SAC02068 86168 IASVPI6168 SOLENOID VALVE86168 FAILS TO OPEN

7. SPATIAL INTERACTIONS ANALYSIS WALKDOWNNOTES:

FIRE ZONE INALKDOWNNOTES RC.I in/Ss wD did ne cnicr conuinmeat fnr fire walkdown RC.2 4/2/SS WD did ne enter conssinmcnt fer fisc wal'kdown. RGE suff need sbas PORVs and block valve cables sse all In eondvis. and are soecd separately.

RC-3 ineS WD did nnt enter consstnmcnt for fisc walkdown PhldbdtRGE 8-1.0OC/cc B- 352 9/ld/Sk lih37434 PM

LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA:: SH

1. FIRE ZONES IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE ELEV (FT.) FIRE ZONE DESCRIPTION I BUILDING FLOOR AREA (SQ. FT.)

SH.1 243CREEN HOUSE BASEMENT LEVEL SH2 SCREEN HOUSE OPERAT9/G LEVEL SH

2. FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE COMBUSTIBLE LOADING (BTU) FIRE SEVERITY (HRS)

SH.1 9,106 6.8 mn.

SH.2 5.8 a'sL

3. FIRE PROTECTION FEATUI&S IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE FIRE DETECTION FEATURES FIRE SUPPRESSION FEATURES SH.1 SH-2

4. IttE ZONE(S) ADJACENT TO THE FIRE ZONE(S) IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE ADJACENT FIRE ZONE PATHWAY PATHWAYRATING (HOUR)

SH-1 SH 2 STAIRWELL SH.2 SH.l STAIRWELL

5. POTENTIAL KEY EQUIPMENT AND THEIR ASSOCIATED BASIC EVENT(S) IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE EQUIPMENT BASIC BASIC EVENT AFFECTED EVENT DESCRIPTION SH 1 4609 SWMVC04 609 Service Water Header isolation MOV 4M9 Fails To Close On Demand SH 1 4780 SWMVC04760 Service Water Header Isolation MOV 4780 Fails To Close On Demand SH 1 52/17 DCCFRS1AAN Fuse FUDCPDPSHOIA/IN Fa1s Open (To Bus 17 - Emergency)

SH.I 52/1'7 ACCBD17258 AC BREAKER 52/17 (BUS17/258) FAILS TO OPERATE SH.1 52/17 DCCFRS18GN Fuse FUOCPDPSH018//N Fails Open (To Bus 17 - Normal)

SH-1 52/1768 ACT1FSST17 Fautt On 4160/480 VAC Bus 17 supply Transformer PXSHSS017 SH.I 52/I 8 DCCFRS18FN Fuse FUDCPDPSH018/6M Faih Open (To Bus 18 - Emergency)

SH.1 52/I 8 ACCBD18318 AC BREAKER 52/I 8 (BUS18/318) FAILS TO OPERATE SH.1 52/185 S ACT1FSST18 Fault On 4160/480 VAC Bus 18 supply Transformer PXSHSS018 SH.1 52/EG1A2 ACCBO1831C AC BREAKER 52/EGIA2 (BUS18/31C) FAILS TO OPERATE SH 1 52/EG182 ACCBD1725C DG 8 OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG182 (8US17/25C) FAILS TO OPERATE SH-1 52/IHIA ACCBI41829A AC BREAKER 524HIA (BUS18/29A) FAILS TO OPEN SH.1 52/I HI 8 ACC 8 N1727A AC BREAKER 52/IHI8 (BUS17/27A) FAILS TO OPEN SH.I 52/IHI 0 ACCBN18298 AC BREAKER 52/IH1C (BUSI8/298) FAILS TO OPEN SH-1 52/IHID ACCBN17278 AC BREAKER 52/IHID (BUS17/278) FAILS TO OPEN SH-I 52/MCC1G1 ACCBN1830C AC BREAKER 52/MCC1Gl (BUSI8/30C) FAILS TO OPEN SH.1 52/MCC1G2 ACCBN1726C AC BREAKER 52/MCC1G2 (BUSI7/26C) FAILS TO OPEN SH.1 $ 2/SWP I A SWMPF SYRIA Service Water Pump PSWDIA Faas To Run For The Required Mhsion limo SH 1 52/SWP I A ACCBN1829C AC BREAKER 52/SWPI A (BUS18/29C) FAILS TO OPEN SH.1 52/SWPI 8 SWMPFSWOI B Service'Water Pump PSW01 8 Fess To Rtn For The Reqvged Mission limo SH.1 52/SWP I 8 ACCBN1727C AC BREAKER 52/SWPI 8 (BUS17/27C) FAILS TO OPEN SH.1 52/SWP I 0 SWMPF SW01 C Service Water Pump PSW01 0 Faas To Run For lho Required Mission Time SH-1 52/SWP I C AC C 8 M18290 AC BREAKER 52/SWPlC (BUS18/29D) FAILS TO OPEN SH-1 52/SWP ID SWMPFSWO I D Service Water Pump PSWOID Fails To Run For Tho Reqvgod Mission Time SH I 52/SWP ID ACCBM1727D AC BREAKER 52/SWP I D (8US17/27 D) FAILS TO OPEN SH.I 83/17 DCREBBUS17 RELAY 83E/17 (BUS 17 DC THROWOVER) FAII.S TO DEEMERGIZE SH.I 83/18 DCREBBUS18 RELAY 83E/18 (BUS 18 DC THROWOVER) FAlLS TO DEEMERGIZE SH.I OCPDPC8028/05 DCBDFSCRMB Screen House DC Distnbution Panel 18 (DCPDPSH018) Local F avtt SH I OCPDPC803A/11 OCBDFSCRNA Screen House DC Distnbuten Panel 1A (DCPDPSHOIA) Local Fautl SH.l DCPDPSHOIA/02 DCCFRSIABN Fuse FUDCPDPSHOIA/2N Fels Open (To Bus 18 - Normal)

SH I DCPDPSHOIA/04 'CCFRSIADN Fuse FUDcpDpSHOIA/4M Fess Open(To Bus 18 ~ Norm, Bus 17 -Emorg UV Ctrl Cab)

PRI636IRGE 8 I.DOC/oc B-359 9/2565 12O2:36 PM

LOCATION CHAIMCTERISTICS TABLE RE AREA: SH SH-I DCPDPSHOIA04 DCCFRSIADP Fuse F VOCPDPSHOI A/4P Fails Open (To Bus 18 - Noon, Bus 17 Emery W Ctrl Cab)

SH 1 DCPDPSHOI 8/06 DCCSRSIBFX Diccnnez Switch OCPDPSHOI 8/06 Transfers Open (To Bus 18- Emergency)

SH.I DCPDPSHOI 8/07 OCCSRSIBGX Disconnect Switch DCPDPSH01 8/07 Transfers Open (To Bus 17 - Norma0 SH.1 DCPDPSH018/08 DOC FR S18HP Fuse FUDCPDPSHOI 8/BP Fade Open (To Bus 17 - Noon, Bus 18 - Emery W Ctrl Cab)

SH-l OCPDPSHOI 8/08 DCCFRSIBHN Fuse FUDCPDPSHOI 8/8N Fa'Is OPen (To Bus 17- Norm, Bus 18- Emorg W Ct/I Cab)

SH.1 DCPDPSHOIB/08 OCCSRSI BHX scuxonnerz switch DcpDpsHOI 8/08 T/ans/o/s open (To Bus 17 - Norm Uv ctrl cab)

Service water Header Isotaticn MOV 4609 Fels To Close On Demand SWMVC04 780 Senrice Water Header Isohgon MOV 4780 Fails To Close On Demand 52/I 7 ACCBD17258 AC BREAKER 52/17 (BVS17/258) FAILS TO OPERATE 52/17 DCCFRS1AAN Fuse FUDCPDPSHOI/VIN Fels Open (To Bus 17 - Emergency) 52/17 DCCFRSI BGN Fuse FUDCPDPSHOI 8/7N Fade Open (To Bus 17 - Normal) 52/17SS ACTIFSST17 Fav/IOn4160/480VAC Bvs 17 supplyTrans/ormer PXSHSS017 DCCFRSIBFN Fuse FVDCPDPSHOI 8/6N Fails Open (To Bus 18- Emergency) 52/I 8 ACCBD18318 AC BREAKER 52/I 8 (BU8 I 8/3 I 8) FAILS TO OPERATE 52/I 8SS ACT1FSST18 Fault On 4160/480 VAC Bus 18 supply Transformer PXSHSS018 SH.2 52/EG IA2 ACCBD1831C AC BREAKER 52/EG1A2 (BVS18/31C) FAILS TO OPERATE SH-2 52/EG182 ACC801725C DG 8 OUTPUT BREAKER 52/EG182 (BUS17/25C) FAILS TO OPERATE SH-2 52hHIA ACCBN1829A AC BREAKER 52/IHIA (8US18/29A) FAILS TO OPEN 52/lHI 8 ACCBN1727A AC BREAKER 52/IHI 8 (BUS17/27A) FAILS TO OPEN SH.2 52/IHI 0 ACCBN18298 AC BREAKER 52/IHIC (BUS18/298) FAILS TO OPEN SH2 52/IHI D ACCBN17278 AC BREAKER 52/IHID (BUS17/278) FAILS TO OPEN SH.2 52/MCC1GI ACCBNINOD AC BREAKER 52/M 0 0 I G 1 (8 US18/30C) FAII.S TO OPEN SH 2 52/M 0 0 I G2 ACCBN1726C AC BREAKER 52/MCC1G2 (BUS17/260) FAll.S TO OPEN 52/SWPI A SWMPFSWO I A Service Water Pump PSW01A Fails To Rtst For The Requked Missicn Time SH.2 52/SWPI A ACCBN1829C AC BREAKER 52/SWPI A (BUS18/29C) FAILS TO OPEN SH2 52/SWP I 8 ACCBN1727C AC BREAKER 52/SWPI8 (BUS17/27C) FAILS TO OPEN SH.2 52/SWP I 8 SWMPFSWOI8 Senrice Water Pump PSW018 Fade To Rtst For The Required Mission Time SH.2 52/SWPI 0 SVAIPFSW010 Service Water Pump PSWOIC Fade To RNt For The Required Misskrn Time SH.2 52/SWPIC ACCBN18290 AC BREAKER 52/SWPIC (BUS18/29D) FAILS TO OPEN SH.2 52/SWP ID SWMPF SW01D Senrice Water Pump PSW010 Faiis To RNt For The Requked Musion Timo SH.2 52/SWP ID ACCBN1727D AC BREAKER 52/SWPI0 (BUS17/270) FAILS TO OPEN SH.2 N/17 DCREBBUS17 REIAY NE/17 (BUS 17 DC THROWOVER) FAILS TO DEENERGIZE 83/I 8 OCREBBUS18 REtAY 83E/18 (BUS 18 DC THROWOVER) FAILS TO DE ENERGIZE BUS17UV UVREKOX117 BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE RElAY 27XI/17 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED BVS17UV UVRER278D7 BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27D/8/17 TRANSFERS TO OE ENERGIZED SH-2 BVS17UV UVRER27817 BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 278/17 TRANSFERS TO OE.ENERGIZED SH.2 BUS17W UVLCD17L81 BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROL LOGIC BOARD tl FA!LS TO GENERATE A SIGNAL SH-2 BVS17UV UVLCDOX317 Relay 27X3/17 driver (Heat Sink Assembly t 1) fails to energize BUS17UV UVREKBX217 BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27BX2/17 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED BUS17UV UVLCDOX217 Retay 27X2/17 driver (Heat Sink Assembly t I) fade to enorgize SH.2 BUS17W UVREKBX117 BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 278X1/17 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED SH.2 BUS17UV UVREKOX317 BUS 17 UNOERVOLTAGE RELAY 27X3/17 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED SH 2 BUS17W UVLCDOX117 Relay 27X1/17 driver (Heal Sink Assembly tl) fels to enegizo SH.2 BUS17W UVLCD17L82 BVS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROL LOGIC BOARD t2 FAILS TO GENERATE A SIGNAL SH.2 BUS17UV WLCOBX117 Relay 278xl/17 driver (Hoal sink Assenbly t2) /&is to energizo BUS17UV UVREKBX317 BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 278X3/17 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED BVS17UV UVRE KOX217 BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27X2I17 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED SH.2 BUS17W UVCFR17FU6 Fuse t6 (FUAR82CC17/64t) fabs open (control cabinet)

SH-2 BUS17UV WLCDBX27A RELAY 278X2/17 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY t2) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL SH 2 BUS17W UVCFR17FU3 Fuse t3 (FUAR82RC1 7/3-N) fails open (relay cabktet)

SH.2 BUS17UV UVLCDBX217 Relay 278X2/17 driver (Heat Sink Assembly t2) fade to energize SH.2 BUS17UV WLCDBX17A RELAY27BX1/17 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY t2) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL SH.2 BUS17VV UVRE E BX217 Retay 278X2/17 fats lo energize SH.2 BVS17UV UVRE R27 017 BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 270/17 TRANSFERS TO OE ENERGIZE0 BUS17W UVCFR17F US Fuse s5 (FUARB2cc17/S.p) fails open (convol cabine)

SH.2 BVS17W UVLCOBX317 Relay 27 BX3/I7 driver (Heat Sink Assenbly t2) fails to energize P016161RGE 8-1.0OC/oc B- 360 9/dd/9d 12:32:$ 6 PM

IRK AREA: ASH

~

BUS17VV UVREEBX117 Relay 27BX1/17 faih to energize SH.2 BUS17UV WREEOX317 Relay 27X3/17 fails to energize SH.2 8US17UV UVRE EOX217 Rohy 27X2/17 fails lo energize BUS17UV UVRE E BX317 Rolay 27BX3/1 7 fails lo energize SH.2 BUS17UV UVREEOX117 Relay 27X1/17 flails lo energce SH.2 BUS17UV UVRU827817 Undervottage relay 278/I 7 fads lo doenorgize SH-2 BUS17UV UVCFR17F V2 Fuss ¹2 (F UARB2RC17/2-P) /ah open (relay cabnel)

SH-2 BUS17UV UVRU827D17 Unde/voltage relay 27D/17 faih to doenergizo SH2 BUS17UV UVLCD BX37A RELAY 27BX3/17 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY ¹2) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL SH.2 BUS17UV UVLCDX117A RELAY 27X1/17 DRNER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY ¹1) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL SH.2 BUS17UV UVLCDX217A RELAY 27X2/17 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY <<I) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL SH.2 BUS17UV UVLC017S¹1 BUS 17 VNDERVOLTAGE SOLID STATE SWITCH ¹ 1 FAILS TO GENERATE A SIGNAL SH.2 BUS17UV UVRV82'7017 Unde/voltage relay 27/17 fails to doenergize SH.2 BUS17UV WLC017S<<2 BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE SOLID STATE SWITCH ¹2 FAILS TO GENERATE A SIGNAL SH 2 BUS17W WLCDX317A RELAY 27X3/17 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY ¹I) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL SH.2 8US17UV WRU8278D7 Undervokago foley 27D/8/17 tails to de~nergize SH.2 BUS17UV WRER02717 BUS 17 VNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27/17 TRANSFERS TO DE ENERGIZED SH.2 BUS18UV UVC FR18F VS Fuse ¹8 (F VARA2CC18/B.N) fails open (control cabinet)

SH-2 BVS18UV UVCFR18FUS Fuse ¹5 (FUARA2cc18IS-P) fails open (control cabinet)

Assembly<<I)

SH-2 BUS18UV UVLC018LBI BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROL LOGIC BOARD ¹1 FAILS TO GENERATE A SIGNAL SH-2 'US18UV UVC FR18F V3 Fuse ¹3 (FUARA2RC1 ~) faih open (relay cabinet)

SH.2 GVS18UV WLCDOX218 Relay 27X2/18 driver (Heat Sink faih to energize SH2 BUS18UV UVLC018LBZ BUS 18 UNDERVOt.TAGE CONTROL LOGIC BOARD ¹2 FAILS TO GENERATE A SIGNAL SH.2 BUS18W UVLCDI BS¹1 BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE SOLID STATE SWITCH ¹I FAILS TO GENERATE A SIGNAL SH-2 BUS18UV UVLCD18$<<2 BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE SOLID STATE SWITCH ¹2 FAILS TO GENERATE A SIGNAL SH2 BUS18UV UVLCDOX118 Relay 27X1/1 8 driver (Heat Shk Assembly ¹I) fats lo energhs SH.2 BUS18UV UVLCDOX318 Rehy 27x3/I 8 driver (Heat sink Assembly <<1) fmh lo energcs SH.2 BUS18UV UVCFR18F V2 Fuse ¹2 (FUARA2RC18/2 P) fads open(relay cabhel)

SH.2 BUS18UV UVLCDBX1 8A RELAY 278X1/18 ORNER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY ¹2) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL SH.2 BUS18VV UVRER27018 BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 270/18 TRANSFERS TO DE-ENERGIZED SH.2 BVS18UV UVRV827 8 D8 Undervotage relay 270/8/1 8 fazs to energize SH.2 BUS18UV WRU 827018 Undervokage relay 27/18 fails to deans/gee SH.2 BUS18W WLCDBX118 Relay 278x1/1 8 driver (Heat sink Assembly ¹2) fails lo energize SH 2 BUS18UV UVRER27818 BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 278/18 TRANSFERS TO DE-ENERGIZED 8US18UV WREEBX318 Relay 278X3/I 8 faih to energize SH.2 BUS18UV UVLCDX218A RElAY 27X2/18 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY ¹1) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL SH2 G(IS18UV WLCDX118A RELAY 27X1/18 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY ¹I) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL SIt.2 BUS18UV WR ER02718 BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27/18 TRANSFERS TO DE-ENERGIZED SH-2 8US18W UVLCDBX28A RELAY 278X2/18 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY ¹2) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL SH 2 BUS18UV UVRV827818 Undervoitage relay 278/ 18 foils to doenelgtse SH2 BUS18UV UVLCDBX318 Relay 278x3/1 8 driver (Heat sirA Assembly <<2) fats lo energize SH2 BUS I BUY UVLCDBX218 Relay 27BX2/18 driver (Heat Sink Assembly <<2) faih lo onergize SH2 BUS18W UVLCDX318A RELAY 27X3/I 8 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY ¹1) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL SH-2 BUS18UV UVREEGX218 Relay 27GX2/I 8 tails lo anodize SH.2 BUS18UV UVREEBX118 Relay 278Xt/I 8 fad s lo enorg'ze SH.2 BVS18UV UVREEOX318 Rolay 27X3/18 fath lo onergize SH-2 Bt/S18UV UVREEOX118 Relay 27X1/18 fags to energize SH.2 GUS18UV WREEOX218 Relay 27X2/18 fails lo energize SH.2 BUS18UV UVLCDBX38A RELAY 27BX3/18 DRIVER (HEAT SINK ASSEMBLY ¹2) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL SH.2 BUS18UV UVREKBX318 BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 278X3/18 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED SH.2 BUS18UV WREKBX218 BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 278X2/18 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED SH-2 BVS18UV UVREKBX118 BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27BX1/18 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED SH.2 GVS18UV UVRE KOX318 BUS 18 UNOERVOLTAGE RELAY 27X3/18 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED SH2 BUS18UV UVRE KOX218 BUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27X2/18 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED SH.2 BUS18UV UVREKOX118 BUS 18 VNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27XI/18 TRANSFERS TO ENERGtZED SH.2 BVS18UV VVRER27GD8 GUS 18 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27D/8/I8 TRANSFERS TO DE.ENERGIZED POIsd61RGE B.I.DOC/oc 8- 361 9/ld/9d l2:33:36 PM

4 LOCATION CHAIMCTEMSTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: '. SH SH-2 BUS I BUY UVRU 827 D18 Undervoaage relay 270/18 lails to d~nergize SH.2 DCPDPC8028J05 DCBDFSCRNB Screen House DC Distnbvtion Panel 18 (DCPDPSH018) Local Fault SH.2 DCPDPC803A/11 DCBDFSCRltA screen House Dc Distnbution panel 1A(DcpDpsHOIA) Local Faua SH-2 DCPDPSHOIA/01 DCCSRS1AAX Disconnett Switch OCPDPSHOIAI01 Transfers Open (To Bus 17 ~ Emergency)

SH-2 DCPDPSHOIA/02 OCCSRS1ABX i'sconnoct Switch DCPDPSHOIA/02 Transfers Open (To Bus 18- Normag SH-2 DCPDPSHOIAI02 DCCFRS1ABM Fuse FVDCPDPSH01A/2N Fafs Open (To Bus 18- Normal)

SH-2 DCPDPSHOIA/04 DCCFRS1AON Fuse FUDCPOPSH01A/4N Pals Open (To Bus 18- Ncnn, Bus 17- Emery W CVI Cab)

SH-2 OCPDPSH01A/04 DC CSRS1ADX Disconnett Svntch DCPDPSHOIA/04 Transfers OPen (To Bus 18 and 17 UV Ctrl Cab)

SH-2 DCPDPSH01A$ 4 DCCFRS1ADP Fuse FUDCPDPSHOIA/4P Fafs Open(To Bus 18. Norm, Bvs 17 - Emerg W Ctrl Cab)

SH-2 DCPDPSHOIBI06 DCCSRS18FX Disconnect Switch DCPDPSH018/06 Transfers Open (To Bus 18- Emergency)

SH-2 DCPDPSH018/07 OCCSRS18GX i'sconnect Switch DCPDPSHOIBI07 Trans/ers Open (To Bus 17- Normal)

SH-2 DCPDPSH018/08 DCCSRS18HX Disconnect Switch DCPDPSH018/08 Trar>>fera Open (To Bus 17- Norm UV Ctrl Cab)

SH.2 OCPDPSH018/08 DCCFRS1BHP Fuse FUDC PDPSH01 BIBP Fails Open (To Bus 17 - Norm. Bus 18 - Em erg W Ctrl Cab)

SH.2 DCPDPSHOIBI08 OCCFRS18HM Fuse FVDCPDPSH01 8/BN Fags Open (To Bus 17- Norm. Bus 18 - Emorg W Girl Cab)

SH-2 FUARA2CC18/11.P UVCFR7FU11 Fuse N11 (FUARA2CC18/11 P) fails oPen SH.2 FUARA2CC18/12 N UVCFR7F U12 Fuse N12 (F VARA2CC1 8/12 N) faits cpen SH.2 FVAR82CC17/11 P WCFR8FU11 Fuse N11 (FVARB2CC17/11.P) fails open SH.2 FUAR82CC17/12 N UVCFRBFU12 Fuse N12 (FUARB2CC17/12.N) farls open

6. POTENTIAL RACEWAYS (CONDUITS AND CABLE TRAYS) AND THEIR ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT/BASIC EVENT(S) IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE RACEWAY EQUIPMENT CABLE BASIC EVENT BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION AFFECTED AFFECTED FUNCTION AFFECTED SH I C1954 4609 P 480 VAC POWER SWMVC04609 Servce Water Header iso!aden MOV 4609 Fags To Close On Demand SH 1 01955 4609 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMVC04609 Service Water Heador Isolation MOV 4609 Fa9s To Close On Demand SH.l C2004 4780 P 480 VAC POWER SWMVC04780 Service Water Header lsohthn MOV 4780 Fails To Close On Domand SH 1 C2005 4780 c 125 vDc coNTRol. swMvc04780 service water Header Isolation Mov 4780 Faas To Ck>>e On Demand SH-1 E0030 OCPDPC803A/11 C 125 VDC POWER OCBDFSCRNA Screen House OC Oistnbvtion Panel 1A (DCPDPSHOIA) Local Fault SH 1 E0030 DCPDPCB03A/11 C 125 VDC POWER OCCFRC3ALN ~ . Fuse FUDCPDPC803A/LN Faih Open (To Screen Hcvse DC Dhtr9rution Panol A)

SH 1 E0031 83/17 C 125 VDC DCREBBUS17 RELAY 83E/17 (BUS 17 OC THROWOVER) FAlLS CONTROUPOWER TO DEENERGIZE SH-1 E0031 DCPDPSH01A/01 C 125 VDC DCCSRS1AAX D'sconect Swgch OCPOPSHOIA/01 Transfers OPen CONTROUPOWER (To Bus 17- Emergency)

SH-1 E0031A 83/I 7 P 125 VDC POWER DCREBBUS17 RElAY 83E/17 (BUS 17 DC THROWOVER) FAILS TO OEEMERGIZE SH.1 E0031A DCPDPSH018/07 P 125 VDC POWER DCCSRS18GX D'cconect Switch DCPDPSH018/07 Transfers OPen (To Busty-Ncrmag SH-I E0127 OCPDPCB028/05 I MISC POWER DCCFRC28EN Fuse FUDCPDPC8028/5M Fails Open(To Screen Hcuso DC Olstrbution Panol 8)

SH.I E0127 DCPDPC8028/05 I MISC POWER DCBDFSCRNB Scroen House DC Distribution Panel 18 (DCPDPSHOI8) Local Fault SH.1 E0159 83/'I 8 P 125 VDC POWER DCREBBUS18 RELAY 83BI8 (BUS 18 OC THROWOVER) FAILS TO DEENERGIZE SH 1 E0159 DCPDPSHO'IB/06 P 125 VDC POWER DCCSRS18FX Disconnect Switch DCPDPSHOI8/06 Transfers OPen (To Bus 18 - Emergency)

SH I E0160 83/18 C DCREBBUSI 8 RELAY 83B18 (BVS 18 DC THROWOVER) FAILS TO DEENERGIZE SH 1 E0160 DCPDPSHOIA/02 C OCCSRS1ABX Ohconnect Switch OCpOpsH01A/02 Transfers Open (To Bus 18 - Normal)

SH.1 E0160 DCPDPSHOIA/02 C OCCFRS1ABN Fuse FUDCPDPSHOIA/2N Fags Open (To Bus 18-Normal)

SH-1 E0270 BUS17UV P 125 VDC POWER VVLCOTLBZA BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE CONTROL LOGIC BOARD N2 GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL SH.I E0270 BUS17UV P 125 VDC POWER INREK17298 RELAY 29.8 IN BUS 17 UNDERVOLTAGE CIRCUIT TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED SH I E0270 8US17UV P 125 VDC POWER UVREKBX117 BUS 17 UMDERVOLTAGE RELAY 278X1/17 TRANSFERS TO ENERGIZED SH.1 E0270 BUS17UV P 125 VDC POWER UVLCOT217A RELAY 27X2/17 DRIVER(HEAT SINKASSEMBLY Nl) GENERATES A SPURIOUS SIGNAL PAINRGE 8 I.DOC/oc B- 362 9/78/98 I2/37:37 PM

Pages B-363 through B-392 are similar and not included to reduce paper volume.

LOCATION CHAIUCTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA:  ! SH SH 2 L0763 52/SWP I A C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBN1829C AC BREAKER 52/SWPIA(BUS18/29C) FAlLS TO OPEN SH.2 L0763 52/SWP I A C 125 VOC CONTROL SWMPFSWDIA Service Water Pump PSWDIA Fels To Run For The Required Musion Time SH.2 L0764 52/SWPI 0 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBN18290 AC BREAKER 5VSWPI C (BUS18/290) FAILS TO OPEN SH.2 L0764 52/SWPI 0 C 125 VDC CONTROL SWMPFSWDIC Service Water Pump PSWDI C Fags To Run For The Required Musion oneI SH.2 L0767 52/MCCIGI C 125 VDC POWER ACCBN1830C AC BREAKER 52/MCCIGI (BUS18/30C) FAILS TO OPEN SH 2 L0769 52/18 0 125 VDC CONTROL DCCFRSIBFN Fuse FVDCPDPSH018/6N Fags Open (To Bus 18-Emer0oncy)

SH-2 L0769 52/18 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBR00018 480 VAC Bus 18 Feeder Circuit Breaker 52/18 (BUS18/318) Transfers open SH-2 L0769 52/18 C 125 VDC CONTROL ACCBD18318 AC BREAKER 52/18 (BVS18/318) FAILS TO OPERATE SH-2 L0778 52/1768 CONTROL ACTIFSST17 Fnt/IOn4160/480VACBus17supplyTrans/onner PXSHSS017 SH.2 L0779 52/I BSS CONTROL ACT1FSSTIB Feuit On 4160/480VAC Bus 18 supply Transteemer PXSHSS018 SH-2 L0781 KDGOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDGOIAFAILS TO RUN SH-2 L0783 KDGOIA C 125 VDC CONTROL OGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KOG01A FAlLS TO RUN SH-2 L0785 KDG018 C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUN SH-2 L0787 KDGOI 8 C 125 VDC CONTROL DGDGF00018 DIESEL GENERATOR KDG018 FAILS TO RUN

7. SPATIAL INTERACTIONS ANALYSIS WALKDOWNNOTES:

FIRE ZONE WALKOOWN NOTES SH I Cable uay>> (photo 83).

4/2/96 WD Incoming cables all come through cast wall. There 8 an auto water deluge system. There are no signifiant fire soutca, but thcrc arc a few (sns with hot water heating coih. They would be very unlikely to be able to sun a fire in the aabl. 5 dacctors noted.

Small pumps (sump and hypoehlotite) in narby room. but very linis huervening combustibla. Atro has 6 wetded, rod hung naursl gas line coming in (rom ovutde, and going up to boiler on Boor above.

SH2 4 SW pumps. 8'pan (photos Bl, 82). I dicscl fue pump with 200 gatkot diatl fvel unk. I avsiliay boikr. I M D tire pump about 20'rom diael tuc pomp, Bus lg shout 20'chhtd SW pumps (photo Bl).

4/2/98 WD Qosedheadsprtnklersystcmhtghup ovctSW pumps. Fvcloilunkand DG fire pumpsrelndgtedaa,wtthovuidc sump. Bus lyand lghavesprayshieldson openings.

Natural gas line (rom below to house hcaung boiler. Mod Is being made m ender boikr m prcvcnt seismic lmeraaiots.

SH2 2 circulating water pumps, 2 propane heaters. 3 uavcl ling scream.

4/2/98 WD Not really scparai>> from scnenhovtc cast. but no significant lntcrvcnkg combustibles. Salamander portable haters not anchored, bvt have 6't'tkx conduit for natural gas svpply. Fixed natural gas piping sppcan well supponed. Not a problem for SW pumps or ss(try equipmcm.

PRIdgdtRGS B.I.DOC/oc B- 393 9/Ig/pg 12:32:eg Pht

LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: I YB

1. FIRE ZONES IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE ELEV (FT.) FIRE ZONE DESCRIPTION BUILDING FLOOR AREA (SQ. FT.)

l TB.1FP 253'" TURBINE BUILDINGBASEMENT LEVEL FEEDPUMP ROOM TB TB.I 253'" TURBINE BUILDINGBASEMENT LEVEL TB 30370 T8.2 27 1'URBINE BUILDINGME2ZANINE LEVEt.

784 269 6" TURBINE BUILDINGOPERATING LEVEL TB

2. FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE COMBUSTIBLE LOADING (BTU) FIRE SEVERITY (HRS)

TB-IFP 17,691 13.4 ma.

T8.1 48.4 mi/L T82 6,590 4.9 m'n.

TBG 16,500 12.4 min.

3. FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE FIRE DETECTION FEATURES FIRE SUPPRESSION FEATURES TB 1FP TB-1 T82

4. FIRE ZONE(S) ADJACENT TO THE FIRE ZONE(S) IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE ADJACENT FIRE ZONE PATHWAY PATHWAY RATING (HOUR)

TB-1F P WALUDOOR TB-1FP 68.1 WALL T8.1 EDGtA.1 WALUDOOR TB-1 EDG18.1 WALUDOOR WALL TB-1 TO WALUDOOR T8.1 WALL TB 1 BR1A BR18 WALL TB 1 CT WALL T8-1 IGN 1 WALUDOOR T8-1 S8.1 WALUDOOR TB-2 S8.2 WALUDOOR TB-2 TB-2 TSC.1N WALUDOOR TSC IM WALL T8.2 TSC.I 8 WALL T8.2 IBN 2 WALUDOOR T8.3 WALUDOOR T8-3 IBN4 WALUDOOR

5. POTENTIAL KEY EQUIPMENT AND THEIR ASSOCIATED BASIC EVENT(S) IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE EQUIPMENT BASIC BASIC EVENT AFFECTED EVENT DESCRIPTION T8.1 4613 SWMV004613 Savice Water Iteader Isolation MOV 4613 Fails To Close On Demand TB 1 52/CP1A Cond 1A Condensate 1A T8-1 52/CP18 Cond 18 Condensate 18 T8-1 52/CP1C Ccnd 1C Condensate 10 T8-1 52/CTP AFMPFPCD04 Condensate Transfer Pump PCD04 foR to run T8.1 52/IAC I A IAAMF C02A INSTRUMENT AIR COMPRESSOR A (CIA02A) FAILS TO RUN T8.1 52/IAC18 IAAMF C028 INSTRUMENT AIR COMPRESSOR 8 (CIA028) FAILS TO RUN TB 1 52/IAC1C IAAMF C02C AIR COMPRESSOR CIA02C FAILS TO RUN PhlaastftGE 8 I.DOC/oc B- 394 9/2S/93 Ih32:43 7M

LOCATION CHAIMCTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA:  ! TB TB-1 52/SAC IAAMFCSA02 SERVICE /dR AIR COMPRESSOR CSA02 FAILS TO RUN TB-1 ACPDPT802 AC84FPT802 Local Fault on 120 vAc power Distribuuon panel AcpDpTB02 TB 1 IAAMACSA03 AIR COMPRESSOR CSA03 FAILS TO START T8.1 DCPDPT8018 DCBDFTBPNL Turbine Bcakfot9 Dc 0'tnriutj'on panel (Dc pDpT8018) Local F stat T8.1 TAOP DCCSRT18NX Dnconnect Swift OCPDPT8018/13 Transfers Open (To TDAFW Pump Oa Pump)

T8.1FP 52/FWPI A MFMPFFW1A MFW Pump A fsis to not TB-1FP 52/FWP18 MFMPFFWIB MFW Pump 8 fels lo run T8.2 3976 MFW3976 Makt Feedwater 3977 MFW3977 Main Feedwater TB-2 4269 MFW 4269 Loss cf Main F oeciwater T8.2 4270 MFW 4270 Loss of Makt Foedwater TB 2 52/11A ACCBDS211A 4160 VAC Circu3 Breaker 52/11A (BUS11A/10) Fails To Open on Demand T8.2 52l118 ACCBD52118 4160 VAC Bus 118 Feeder Circuit Brea'ker 52l118 (BUS118/22) Fels to OPen T8.2 52l13SS ACT1FSST13 Fault On 4160/460 VAC bus 13 supply Trsnsfoaner PXTBSS013 TB 2 52/1558 FSST15

'CTI Fault On 4160/460 VAC Bus 15 supply Transformer PXTBSS015 52/BTA.A ACC8028TAA 4160 VAC Bus 11A / Bus 12A Tie Breaker 52/BTA A (BUS11N11) Fels to Close 52/BTB.B ACCBD28TBB 4160 VAC Bus 118 Bus 128 Tie Breaker 52/BTB-B (BUS118/21) Foils To Close T8.2 52/M CGA ACCBRMCC1A 460 VAC MCCA Feeder Ckcuil Breaker 52/MCCA(BVS13/INB) Transfers Open TB-2 52/MCCB ACCBRMCC18 460 VAC MCCB Feeder Ckcuit Breaker 52/MCCB (BUSISN4A) Transfers Open TB.2 63/13 DCREBBUS13 RElAY 63E/13 (BVS 13 OC THROWOVER) FAILS TO DEENERGIZE TB-2 63/15 DCREBBUS15 RELAY 83E/tS (BUS 15 OC THROWOVER) FAILS TO DEENERGIZE TB 2 ACPDPT807 AC84FPT807 Local Fat/t On 120 VAC Power Obtrattafon Panel ACPDPT807 AKA028 ACCBRM807H AC CIRCUIT BREAKER MCCB//H TRANSF ERS OPEN (TO BAT RM HEATER AKA28)

TB-2 BUS11A/11 UVCFRA112N DC FUSE FUBUSI(H1IUVZNFAILS BUS11AW UVRU81/11A BUS 11A UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY 27 1/I 1A FAILS TO OEENERGIZE ON DEMAND TB-2 BUS11AUV UVCFRA111P DC FUSE FUBUS11A/1'IUVIP FAILS T8-2 BVS11AUV UVRU82/11A BUS 11A UN DERVOt.TAG E RELAY 27.2/1 1A FAILS TO 0 EENERGIZE ON DEMlWD TB-2 BUS11AUV WRUEX111A BUS 11A UN DE RVOLTAGE AUXILIARY REIAY 27XI/1 1A FAILS TO ENERGIZE ON DEMAND BUS11AUV WRUEX211A BUS 11A UNDERVOLTAGEAUXILIARYRELAY 27X2/11A FAILS TO ENERGIZE ON DEMAND T8-2 BUS118UV UVRUB2/118 BUS 118 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAY27-2/118 FAILS TO OEENERGIZE ON DEMAND BUS118UV VVRUB1/118 BUS 118 VNDERVOLTAGE RELAY27 1/1 18 FAILS TO OE ENERGIZE ON DEMAND BUS118W UVCF R8211P DC FUSE FUBUS118/21UVIP FAILS T8.2 BUS118UV UVRUEX1118 BUS 118 UNDERVOI.TAGE AUXILIARYRELAY 27XI/118 FAILS TO ENERGIZE ON DEMAND TB-2 BUS118UV VVRUEX2118 BUS 118 UNDERVOLTAGE AUXILIARYRELAY 27X2/118 FAILS TO ENERGIZE ON DEMAND T8.2 MFPXA AUX RELAYS ACCTNFWPA1 MFW PUMP 1A BREAKER AUX CONTACT 11.12 FAILS TO CLOSE ON PUMP TRIP T8.2 MFPXB AUX RElAYS ACCTNFWPA2 MFW PUMP 1A BREAKER AUX CONTACT 19.20 FAILS TO CLOSE T84 TURB TRIP AUX MSPSD34AST PRESSURE SWITCH 634/AST FAILS TO RESPOND RELAYS T84 TURB TRIP AUX MSPSD33AST PRESSURE SWITCH 630/AST FAILS TO RESPOND RElAYS TURB TRIP AVX MSPSD35AST PRESSURE SWITCH 63-5/AST FAlLS TO RESPOND RELAYS

6. POTENTIAL RACEWAYS (CONDUITS AND CABLE TRAYS) AND THEIR ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT/BASIC EVENT(S) IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE RACEWAY EQUIPMENT CABLE BASIC EVENT AFFECTED AFFECTED FUNCTION

" AFFECTED BASIC EVENT DESCRIPTION C0273 3977 P 460 VAC POWER MFW 3977 Main Feedwster TB I C0274 3977 C 125 VDC CONTROL MFW 3977 Main Foedwater C0275 3977 C 125 VDC CONTROI. h'IFW 3977 Main Foodwater T8.1 C0471 52/CTP P 460 VAC POWER AFMPFPCD04 Condensate Transfer Pump PCD04 fab Io run CVTA2 P 460 VAC POWER IBT6FCVT18 Instrument Bus 0 (IBPDPCBDY) Constant Voas9e Transformer CVTA2 Fels IBPDPCBOY P 460 VAC POWER l884FBUslD 120 vAc Instnroent Bus 0 (IBPDPGBDYI Bus Faults TB I 3976 P 460 VAC POWER MFW3976 Main Feedwatsr TB I 3976 C 125 VDC CONTROL MFW 3976 Main FOedwater TB.I C0695 4613 P 460 VAC POWER swMvc04613 sevico water Header Isotat'en Mov 4613 Faas To Close On Demand P:L161QIIGE 8 I.DOC/oc B-395 9/7 a/95 I2:32:46 PM

Pages B-396 through B-404 are similar and not included to reduce paper volume.

s LOCATION CHARACTERISTICS TABLE FIRE AREA: I TB T8.2 R0770 4270 C 125 VOC CONTROL MFW4270 Loss of Ma'n Feedwater TB 2 R0771 4270 C 125 VDC CONTROL MFW4270 'oss of Man Feedwater TB-2 R0782 4269 C 125 VDC POWER MFW 4269 Loss ot Ma'n Feedwater TB 2 R0782 4270 C 125 VDC POWER MFW 4270 Loss of Man Feedwaier T8.2 R0763 4269 C 125 VDC POWER MFW 4269 Loss ol Man Feedwater T8.2 R0832 PT<85 I RPS CHANNEL 2 PT&85 PRESSURE TRANSMITTER TURBINE 1ST STAGE (WHITE)

T8.2 R0852 PT<86 I ANALOG SIGNAL PRESSURE TRANSMflTERTURBINE 1ST STAGE TB-3 G0084A 3544 c 125 voc coNTR0L Msszc03544 Main steam stop valve Lims swah 33/3544 Pass To Close On Demand T84 G0084A'2SV C 125 VDC CONTROL MSRTD062SV Turbkte Stop Valves Tuner Relay 62SV Fails On Demand TB4 G0091A C 125 VOC CONTROL MSSZC03545 Ma'n Steam Step Valve Lknh Switctt 330545 Fags To Ctose On Demand

7. SPATIAL INTERACTIONS ANALYSIS VfALKDOWNNOTES:

FIRE 20NE WALKOOWNNOTES TB IFP Fccdwvcr pumps. each with Its own oil tank (Photo 84).

4/2/pg WD Enckucd arcs. Lube oil on FW pump 8 scaled.

"lB.I 3 IA comprcssots. scniice air compressor. IA dryers, all near cast wall. 3 condensatc pumps just nonhcast of main condensci B.

an6s wo H2 line from H2 storage trawls to gcncnhor area. bui is rxx ckssc tocriYical safety cctuipmcnt. CriYical cables aho travel S to N along Eastern pan olbuilding.

"IB.I Several small pumps including vaamm priming pumps. MCC lb.

an/ss wo Tutbine lube oil vca (center.west)has fire water syvcrn. and is diked. Portable IA compressor ouuide Nonh side ol bldg, with whcch blocked and long flex line.

TB.I 3 aedcnsam booster pumps about ls'pvt.

4/2/9S WD H2 scat oil unk in enclosure wkh I hr walls, and roll down Brc doon. and fire water system. SE corner has cables lor main buses on Iloa above. TSC mbsncry A and 8 manual throwovtr switch 8 by stsinwcll in SE comet.

5-G blowdown flash ianL and pump.

4/2/PS WD H2 In <<y! inders 8 kiw conccntradon fot calibration. only one restraining chain per cylinder.

T8.2 Condcmate beaten.

4n/98 wo Hs cylindca and H2 haisrd area by gcncrator area. No significant safety cquipmcnt around.

EH system (pumps and rescrvoii).

4/2/pg WD turbine lube oil arcs has lire water proteaion.

T8.2 Bus II ~ bus l2, bus l3, bus 15, MCC IB.

an/98 wo Incoming ofBke power is enclosed ln vccl 'box conduip for explosion proteaion, Main stcam header.Fcedwaicr rcguhiing valves near south wall.

an/ps wo Fire waits pracef on for lube oh lm'ide guvd pipe (tod hung-seems OIO.

Generator and exciter.

HP turbine, 2 I.P mibincs.

I".'lldgdtRGE.B-I.DOC/oc B-405 sng/pg 11:32:52 PM

FIRE AREA:

1.

'O FIRE ZONES IN THIS FIRE AREA:

LOCATION CHARACTEMSTICS TABLE

! FIRE ZONE ELEV (FT.) FIRE ZONE DESCRIPTION BUILDING FLOOR AREA (SQ. FT.)

TO 253' TI/RENE OIL STORAGE ROOM TO 1760 I I

2. FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE COMBUSTIBLE LOADING (BTU) FIRE SEVERITY (HRS)

TO 1,886.364 23.6 hra.

3. FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES IN THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE RRE DETECTION FEATURES FIRE SUPPRESSION FEATURES TO

4. FIRE ZONE(S) ADJACENT TO THE FIRE ZONE(S) W THIS FIRE AREA:

FIRE ZONE ADJACENT FIRE ZONE PATHWAY PATHWAY RATING (HOUR)

TO EDG1A-1 WALL TO WALUOOOR

5. POTENTIAL KEY EQUIPMENT AND THEIR ASSOCIATED BASIC EVENT(S) IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

6. POTENTIAL RACEWAYS (CONDUITS AND CABLE TRAYS) AND THEIR ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT/BASIC EVENT(S) IMPACTED BY FIRE/SMOKE HAZARDS IN THIS FIRE AREA:

7. SPATIAL INTERACTIONS ANALYSIS WALKDOWNNOTES:

FIRE ZONE WALKDOWNNOTES To As nonheasr wall of su/bine buiMiag, berwecn diesel building and hydrogen are/age vea. Turbine lube oil srorage sank.

4/2/Pg WD did nor waltdown. 3 hr l>re raring. Fully spriaklered.

P lldgNRGE 8 I.DOC/oc B- 407 S/22/93 l2:32:52 PM

E. rROr<GAr>ON rxrHWm mED>Sjr.i'SSESSMENT The spatial interactions analysis conservatively assumes that the occurrence frequency of both the localized scenario and propagation scenario(s) developed from a fire zone are equal to the fire occurrence frequency apportioned to that fire zone. Furthermore, the localized scenarios assume that any fire occurring within a fire zone will damage all components and raceways within that fire zone. These are obviously conservative assumptions because the fire occurrence frequency apportioned to a fire zone accounts for all fires initiated by the fire sources within the fire zone. Thus, the sum of the occurrence frequencies of the localized and propagation scenarios developed for a fire zone should be equal to the fire occurrence frequency apportioned to that fire zone.

Also, only a very small fraction of fires initiated in a given location will have energy significant enough to damage all components and raceways within the location without being detected or controlled before the damage occurs.

f For propagation scenarios, if one assumes that any fire occurring within a fire zone can propagate in all directions to the adjacent fire zones, there can be an enormous, unmanageable number of propagation scenarios developed. Since not all fire propagation pathways are credible, the spatial interactions analysis considers only propagation scenarios that involve credible propagation pathways.

The fire zone adjacency matrix was first developed to identify possible propagation pathways (see the Location Characteristics Tables, Appendix A). Screening criteria were developed to qualitatively screen the credibility of potential propagation pathways.

Propagation scenarios were then developed for pathways that satisfy the screening criteria. The scenario table lists the propagation scenarios developed for the initial fire zones.

This appendix presents the evaluation of the credibility of propagation pathways. The screening criteria are first described. Justifications to the screening criteria are then provided. I E.1 PROPAGATION CRITERIA In the spatial interactions analysis, a propagation pathway was assumed to be credible only if one of the following criteria were satisfied:

1. There is a permanent opening between the fire zones, and there is no automatic suppression system in the initial fire zone or in the adjacent fire zone.

The fire duration of the combustible contents in the initial fire zone is greater than 75% of the rating of the fire barrier (e.g., door, wall, etc.)

separating the initial fire zone and its adjacent fire zones, and there is no automatic fire suppression system.

PA1686iRge-E.docjoc

E. Propagation Pathway Crerlibilihg Assessment The first criterion is obviously conservative because it does not consider the actual amount of combustible inventory, the location of the fire source, the presence of automatic fire suppression system, and the separation distance between the fire source and combustibles in the adjacent location(s).

The second criterion takes into consideration the failure of fire barriers; e.g., fire door being left open. The fire duration and barrier ratings for each fire zone are taken from Reference E-1 and are summarized in the Location Characteristics Tables.

E.2 COMBUSTIBLE INVENTORYAND PIRE BARRIER FAILURE RATE The combustible inventory denotes the maximum allowable combustible loading within a fire zone. In reality, the actual inventory may be less than the maximum allowable amount. The second criterion suggests that if the combustible inventory fire severity is less than 75% of the barrier rating, then there will not be a propagation pathway between fire zones. In order to have a fire propagation pathway if the fire duration is less than 75% of the barrier, the barrier must fail due to random failure (fail before the rated time on demand).

The generic industry failure rate for fire barriers is approximately 10'er y'ear. There are approximately 81 rated fire doors and 2,540 fire seals at the Ginna site (see Appendix F). To date, there have been no failures of Fire Doors, Fire Dampers or Penetration Seals that have not been promptly detected during plant tours.

Compensatory and corrective actions have been prompt and appropriate for the circumstance.

The accessible fire zones are visited by plant personnel frequently and the plant personnel are trained to operate the fire door correctly. It is very unlikely that a fire door would be left open and uncorrected for an extended period of time. Using an average mean exposure time of a fire door of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> that a door is left open, and an average failure rate of 1.0E-03 per door-yr, the unavailability of a fire door is estimated to be less than 5.0E-07. Thus, fire propagation via fire barriers due to random failures is insignificant.

E,3 FIRE BARRIER RATING AND FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM The second criterion suggests that, if the fire duration of the combustible contents in the initial fire zone is less than 75% of the rating of the barrier (e.g., door, wall, etc.)

separating the initial fire zone and its adjacent fire zones, fire propagation from the initial fire zone to its adjacent fire zones is not credible. This assumption is valid for the same reason presented in Section E.2.

If the fire duration of the combustible contents in the initial fire zone is greater than 75%

of the rating of the fire barrier (e.g., door, wall, etc.) separating the initial fire zone and its adjacent fire zones and there is an automatic fire suppression system at either side of the barrier, fire propagation between the initial fire zone and its adjacent fire zones is also not credible.

PA16861Rge-E.doc/oc E-2

E. Propagation Patlrtoay Credibility Assessment For locations where the combustible loading fire severity is greater than 75% of the barrier rating (or the total rating), the presence of an automatic fire suppression (and plant personnel) would detect the initiation of any fire within the barrier's rated time (for most locations, it is at least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />). The actuation of the automatic fire suppression system (although it may not suppress the fire) would alarm the operators such that manual suppression efforts and recovery actions can be initiated in a timely manner.

Thus, the chance that a fire with sufficient energy to damage multiple cable trains (or components) is left undetected (directly or indirectly via other instruments) and uncontrolled for a period longer than the barrier rating (typically, longer than an hour) is incredible. Therefore, the second criterion is valid for propagation pathway screening during the spatial interactions analysis.

E.4 LEVEL OP PROPAGATION PATHS The analysis considered fire propagation between locations for more than one level.

(Level 1 propagation involves one initial fire zone and fire zone(s) directly adjacent to it through a credible propagation pathway. A level two fire propagation involves one initial fire zone, the fire zone(s) directly adjacent to it, and the fire zone(s) that are adjacent to the level one fire zone(s). No scenarios were identified that could be considered two-level propagation scenarios.

In order for a fire to initiate at the initial fire zone and propagate to level two fire zones, the fire will have to propagate through two fire barriers. The time required to burn through two fire barriers will be at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (assuming each barrier is at least one hour-rated). The mean generic fire suppression time for most fires is 40 minutes (estimated by Sandia). A survey of past fire drills at Ginna is shown in Table E-1. This indicates that the longest total duration of a drill was less than 50 minutes. It is reasonable then, to assume that the longest response time at Ginna (regardless of the location) is less than 50 minutes*. Therefore, it is expected that the fire brigade will start fire-fighting efforts at the initial fire zone and the Level 1 locations, and response to the Level 2 locations to start cooling the pathways between Level 1 and Level 2 locations.

Thus, the probability of a fire allowed to propagated to Level 2 fire zones is negligible.

As a result, all propagation scenarios involving Level 2 propagation or higher were also screened from the analysis.

E.5 EVALUATIONOI: PATHWAYCREDIBILITY Table E-2 presented in this Appendix summarizes the results of the propagation pathway credibility evaluation and contains 12 columns:

1. Fire Zone. This column lists the fire zones that survived the preliminary screening.

2. Fire Severity (Hours). This column denotes the fire severity (in terms of fire duration) of the fire zone. This information is taken from the Fire Hazard Analysis.

3. Primary Suppression Type. This column denotes whether an automatic fire suppression system exists in the initial fire zone. This information is taken from the Fire Hazard Analysis.

" Drill is considered to be terminated when the fire is extinguished and the crew is ready to fight another fire.

P:t1686tRge-E.docloc E-3

E. Propagation Patlnoay Credibilihj Assessment

4. Suppression Actuation Method. This column indicates whether the fire suppression system actuation is automatic or manual.

5. Adjacent Fire Zone. This column lists the fire zone adjacent to the initial fire zone.

6. Barrier. This column gives information about the type of structure that separates the adjacent fire zones.

7. Barrier Rating. This column describes the barrier rating of the pathway separating the initial fire zone and its adjacent fire zone. This information is taken from the Fire Hazard Analysis.

Permanent Opening. This column denotes whether there is a permanent opening between the initial fire zone and its adjacent fire zone.

This information is taken from the Fire Hazard Analysis, plant drawings and walkdown notes.

9. Fire Duration 2 Rating*0.75. This column evaluates whether the fire severity (listed in Column 2) is less than or equal to 75% of the barrier rating (listed in Column 5).

10. Auto FSS Exists. This column states whether there is automatic fire suppression system in either the initial fire zone or the adjacent fire zone.

Criterion 1. This column evaluates whether screening criterion 1 (see Section E.1) is satisfied.

12. Criterion 2. This column evaluates whether screening criterion 2 (see Section E.1) is satisfied.

13. Localized Fire. This column evaluates whether there is a credible propagation pathway between the initial fire zone and its adjacent fire zone. The column shows "YES" if either Column 11 or 12 contains a "TRUE".

14. Notes. This column contains additional notes about the propagation pathway.

~ ~ J P&1686%ge-E.docloc E-4

E. Propngntion Pnthtvny Credibilihg Assessment E,6 REFERENCES

1. Ginna Station Fire Combustible Loading Analysis, DA-ME-98-004, Revision 0, April 3, 1998 P:51686ERge-E.docfoc E-5

F.. Propagation Pallnoay Credibility Ass nt Table E-1 Ginna Fire Drills Time of Time Drill Duration No. Date Location Type* Alarm Completed Minutes Weaknesses Other Notes 27-Jul-97 EDG1A P 18:14 18:21 None 14-Jun-97 TY-?? P 10:40 11:27 47 Communication difficult with radios 12-Jun-97 TB-1 S 17:47 .

18:02 15 Communications, Captain Main Feedwater pump did not have turnout gear room on 4 3-Jun-97 IBN-0 S 17:34 17:52 18 Communication difficult Main Feed pump room due to poor transmission, supply/storage area did not shut door to Main Feed pump room 24-May- IBN-0 S 10:06 10:21 15 Communications, Turnout Main Feedwater pump 97 gear usage 'rusty' oom 19-May- IBN-0 P 17:37 17:48 None 97 14-May- IBN-0 P 19:05 19:17 12 SCBAs make East of MDAFWPs 97 communications a problem 9-May-97 IBM-0 21:05 21:19 14 Hose reel rewinding 19-Mar-97 TSC-IS S 21:36 21:48 12 None Diesel room 10 14-Mar-97 TSC-IS S 1:28 1:39 Proper checking of Diesel room adjacent rooms for fire spreading and damage P.." age-E.dodoc

E. Propagation Patlnuay Credibility Ass irt Table E-1 Ginna Fire Drills (Continued)

Time of Time Drill Duration No. Date Location Type* Alarm Completed Minutes Weaknesses Other Notes 9-Mar-97 TSC-IS P 11:32 11:43 Captain should stay Diesel room father away from fire 12 22-Feb-97 TSC-IS S 8:52 9:05 13 Captain too close to Diesel room scene without gear 13 21-Feb-97 TSC-IS S 3:37 3:49 12 Radio communication Diesel room problem 14 15-Feb-97 TSC-IS P 10:42 10:58 16 None Diesel room 15 1-Feb-97 TSC-IS S 9:36 9:49 13 Captain didn't stand clear Diesel room of area 16 10-Jan-97 SB-1 S 1:33 1:42 None 17 22-Dec-'6 SB-1 S 20:40 20:48 None 19-Dec- SB-1 S ~

4:40 4:48 Captain slow to shut Personal lockers 96 overhead door 19 15-Dec- =

SB-1 18:49 19:06 17 Should have run hose line, PCN submitted for 96 communications 20 8-Dec-96 SB-1 S 13:05 13:24 19 Captain too involved; communications need to be better 21 2-Dec-96 SB-1 S 16:13 16:29 16 Could have ventilated a little sooner 22 26-Nov- SB-1 S 16:43 16:53 10 Took too much time to Personal lockers 96 open personnel locker PAi 686Nge-E.doctoc E-7

E. Propagation Pattnvay CredibilityAs ent Table E-1 Ginna Fire Drills (Continued)

Time of Time Drill Duration No. Date Location ape* Alarm Completed Minutes Weaknesses . Other Notes 23 29-Sep- SH-2 S 12:57 13:04 None "D" Service water pump 96 24 26-Sep- SH-2 S 3:54 4:08 14 None "D" Service water pump 96 25 25-Sep- SH-2 S 17:16 17:26 10 None 96 26 14-Sep- SH-2 17:49 17:58 None SW Pump Area 96 27 13-Sep- SH-2 3:36 3:45 None "C" Service water pump 96 28 25- JUI-95 EDG1A S 8:57 9:10 13 Brigade did not bring enough equipment to scene

• P Preannounced S Surprise P::='-~6'.E.doctoc

E. Propagation Pattccva ji Crerlibility Ass nt Table E-2 Fire Propogation Table for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Fire Fire Primary Suppression Adjacent Barrier Duration Auto Fire Severity Suppression Actuation Fire Rating Permanent > 0.75

• FSS Criterion Criterion Localized Zone (Hours) Type Method Zone Barrier (Hours) Opening Rating Exists 1 2 Fire- Notes V'.75 ABB I

Preaclion spcinklers Auto CHG Wall/Open 3 TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE ABB 0.75 P reaction Auto IBS-0 Waii FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE sprinklers ABB 0.75 Preaction Auto RC-1 Wail FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE sprinkle rs ABM 0.75 Preaction Auto IBS-1 Wail FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE sprinklers ABM 0.75 Preaction Auto RC-2 Waii FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE sprinklers ABM 0.75 Preaction Auto SB-1 Waii FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE sprinklers ABO 0.75 None N/A IBS-2 Waii FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE ABO 0.75 None N/A Wall FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE ABO 0.75 None N/A RC-3 Wali FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE'ALSE ABO 0.75 None N/A SAF Wall FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE N/A SB-2 Waii 3 - FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE ABO 0.75 None Notes:

7. The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.

8. Fire barrier is a block wall and locked door that is not fire rated. However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and separation of the combustibles from the barrier.

physical

9. Fire barrier is a block wall and a door that is not fire rated. However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.

10. No additional icnpacts due to propagation of fire.

11. Charging pump room is almost completely enclosed by concrete walls. The ceain combustible in the charging room is oil and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oil. Pcopagation out of the charging pump room is assumed to be incredible.

12. The nearest combustible material is the lube oil for the main turbine lube oil cooler which is protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump coom door. Fire propagation is assumed to be incredible.

P t1686%ge-E.doc/oc E-9

0 E. Propagatio/r Patinvay Creriibi!ity Ass eat Table E-2 Fire Propogation Table for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Continued)

Fire Fire Primary Suppression Adjacent Barrier Duration Auto Fire Severity Suppression Actuation Fire Rating Permanent > 0.75 FSS Criterion Criterion Localized Zone (Hours) Type Method Zone Barrier (Hours) Opening Rating Exists 1 2 Fire Notes IBN-1 1.50 Predction Auto CT Wall FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE sprinklers IBN-1 1.50 P reaction Auto IBS-1 Wall/Door TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE sprinklers IBN-1 1.50 Preaction Auto RC-2 Wall FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE sprinklers IBN-1 1.50 Preaclion Auto SB-1 Wall/Door FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE sprinklers IBN-1 1.50 Preaction Auto SB-1HS Wall/Door FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE sprinklers IBN-1 1.50 P reaction Auto TB-1 Wall/Door FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE sprirtklers IBN-2 0.75 P reaction Auto IBS-2 Wail/Door FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE sprinklers IBM-2 0.75 Preaction Auto RC-3 Wali FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE sprinklers IBN-2 0.75 Preaclion Auto SB-2 Wali FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE sprinklers Notes:

1. The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.

2. Fire barrier is a block wall and locked door that is not fire rated. However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.

i

3. Fire barrier is a block wall and a door that is not fire rated. However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation ot the combustibles from the barrier.

4. No additional impacts due to propagation of fire.

5. Charging pump room is almost completely enclosed by concrete walls. The main combustible in the charging room is oil and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oil. Propagation out of the charging pump room is assumed to be incredible.

6. The nearest combustible material is the lube oil for the main turbine lube oil cooler which is protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump room door. Fire propagation is assumed to be incredible.

r 'age-E.doc/oc I

E. Propagation Patlrtvay CrerlibilityAsse eat Table E-2 Fire Propogation Table for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Continued)

Fire Fire Primary Suppression Adjacent Barrier Duration Auto Fire Severity Suppression Actuation Fire Rating Permanent >0.75* FSS Criterion Criterion Localized Zone (Hours) Type Method Zone Barrier (Hours) Opening Rating Exists 2 Fire Notes I

IBN-2 0.75 Preaction Auto TB-2 Wall FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE sprinklers IBN-3 0.75 P reaction Auto IBS-3 Wall/Door FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE sprinklers IBN-3 0.75 Preaction Auto TB-3 Wali FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE sprinklers IBN-4 0.75 P reaction Auto TB-3 Wall FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE sprinklers IBS-1 0.75 None N/A ABM Wail FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE IBS-1 0.75 None N/A IBN-1 Wall/Door FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE IBS-1 0.75 None N/A RC-2 Wall FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE IBS-1 .0.75 None N/A SB-1HS Wall/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE IBS-1 0.75 None N/A SB-1WT Wall FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE IBS-2 0.75 None N/A ABO Wali FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE IBS-2 0.75 None NIA IBN-2 Wall/Door 0- FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE IBS-2 ~ 0.75 None N/A RC-3 Wall FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE Notes:

1. The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.

2. Fire barrier is a block wall and locked door that is not fire rated. However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.

3. Fire barrier is a block watl and a door that is not lire rated. However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.

4. No additional impac/s due to propagation of fire.

5. Charging pump room is almost completely enctosed by concrete walls. The main combustible in the charging room is oil and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oik Propagation out of the charging pump roomis assumed to be incredible.

6. The nearest combustible material is the lube oil for the main turbine lube oil cooler which is protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump room door. Fire propagation is assuined to be incredible.

P:t1686tRge-E.doc/oc E-11

E. Propagation Patlnvay Credibility Asses tent Table E-2 Fire Propogation Table for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Continued)

Fire Fire Fire .

Severity Primary Suppression Suppression Actuation Adjacent Fire Barrier Rating Permanent > 0.75 'SS Duration Auto Criterion Criterion Localized Zone (Hours) Type Method Zone Barrier (Hours) Opening Rating Exists 2 Fire Notes i

IBS-2 0.75 None N/A SB-2 Wall FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE IBS-3 0.75 None N/A IBN-3 Wall/Door FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE IBS-3 0.75 None NIA RC-3 Wali FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE N2 0.00 None N/A ABO Wall FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE 0.75 TB-1 Wali/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TSC-1M 0.75 TB-2 Wall FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TSC-1M 0.75 TSC-1N Waii FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TSC-1M 0.75 TSC-1S Wall/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TSC-1N 0.75 TB-2 Wall/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TSC-1N 0.75 TSC-1M Wall FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TSC-1 S 0.75 RR Waii FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TSC-1S 0.75 TB-2 Waii FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TSC-1S 0.75 TSC-1M Walt/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE 8R1A 0.75 None N/A AHR Wali FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE 8R1A 0.75 None N/A BR18 Wall/Door FAI SE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE Notes:

1. The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.

2. Fire barrier is a block wall and locked door that is not fire rated. However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.

3. Fire barrier is a block waII and a door that is not fire rated. However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.

4, No additional impacts due to propagation of fire.

5. Charging pump room is almost completely enclosed by concrete walls. The main combustible in the charging room is oil and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oil. Propagation out of the charging pump room is assumed to be incredible.

6. The nearest combustible material is the lube oil for the main turbine lube oil cooler which is protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump room door. Fire propagation is assumed to be incredible.

f,'age-E.doc/oc V

A

E. Propngntioa Pntlnvny Credibility Ass at Table E-2 Fire Propogation Table for.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Continued)

Fire Duration Auto Fire Fire Severity Primary Suppression Suppression Actuation Adjacent Fire Barrier Rating Permanent > 0.75 'SS Criterion Criterion Localized Zone (Hours) Type Method Zone Barrier (Hours) Opening Rating Exists 1 2 Fire Notes BR1A 0.75 Nohe N/A TB-1 Wall FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE BR1B 0.75 None N/A Wall/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE

'R1A BR1B 0.75 None N/A TB-1 Wail FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE BR1B- BR1B Concrete TRUE CV floor AHR 1.50 Auto Water Auto BR1A Waii FAI SE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Spray AHR 1.50 Auto Water Auto CT Smoke FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Spray Barrier AHR 1.50 Auto Water Auto TB-1 Watt FAI SE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Spray BRRM 1.50 None N/A RR Wall/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE CR-3 0.75 None N/A TB-3 Wall/Door FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE RR 3.00 Auto Halon Auto, Manual BRRM Wall/Door FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE - FALSE TRUE Systems, Manual Sprinkler Notes:

1. The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.

2. Fire barrier is a block wall and locked door that is not fire rated. However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.

3. Fire barrier is a block wail and a door that is not fire rated. However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles froin the barrier.

4. No additional impacts due to propagation of fire.

5. Charging pump room is almost completely enclosed by concrete walls. The main combustible in the charging room is oil and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oil. Propagation out of the charging pump room is assumed to be incredible.

6. The nearest combustible material is the lube oil for the main turbine lube oil cooler which is protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump room door. Fire propagation is assumed to be incredible.

P.0686%ge-E.doc/oc E-13

E. Propagation Paflnuay Credibility As eat Table E-2 Fire Propogation Table for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Continued)

Fire Fire Primary Suppression Adjacent Barrier Duration Auto Fire Severity Suppression Actuation Fire Rating Permanent > 0.75

• FSS Criterion Criterion Localized Zone (Hours) Type Method Zone Barrier (Hours) Opening Rating Exists 1 2 Fire Notes RR 3.00 Auto Halon Auto, Manual RRA Wali FALSE TRUE TRUE FAI SE FALSE TRUE Systems, Manual Sprinkler RR 3.00 Auto Halon Auto,Manual TB-2 Waii FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Systems, Manual Sprinkter RR 3.00 Auto Halon Auto, Manual TSC-1S Watt FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Systems, Manual Sprinkler RRA 0.00 Manual CO2 Manual RR Waii FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE CHG CT 0.75 3.75 Auto Deluge Auto ABB AHR Wall/Open 3 TRUE FALSE 'ALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE Smoke FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Barrier CT 3.75 Auto Deluge Auto IBN-1 Wall FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE CT 3.?5 Auto Deluge Auto TB-1 Waii FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE -TRUE EDG1A- 0.75 EDG18-1 Waii FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE 1

Notes:

1. The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.

2. Fire barrier is a b'lock wall and locked door that is not fire rated. However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.

3. Fire barrier is a block we'll and a door that is not fire rated. However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.

4. No additional impacts due to propagation of fire.

5. Charging pump room is almost completely enclosed by concrete walls. The main combustible in the charging room is oil and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oil. Propagation out of the charging pump room is assumed to be incredible.

6. The nearest combustible material is the lube oil for the main turbine lube oil cooler which is protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump room door. Fire propagation is assumed to be incredible.

P" -" tQRge-E.docloc

E. Propagation Patlnuny Credibility As nt Table E-2 Fire Propogation Table for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant(Continued)

Fire Fire Primary Suppression Adjacent Barrier Duration Auto Fire Severity Suppression Actuation Fire Rating Permanent > 0.75

• FSS Criterion Criterion Localized Zone (Hours) Type Method Zone Barrier (Hours) Opening Rating Exists 1 2 Fire Notes EDG1A- EDG1A-1 Steel Hatch FALSE TRUE 0

EDG1A- 0.75 TB-1 Wall/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE 1

EDG1A- 0.75 TO-1 waii FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE 1

EDG18- 1.50 Auto Water Auto EDG1A-1 Wali FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE 1 Spray EDG18- EDG18-1 Steel Hatch TRUE 0

EDG18- EDG1A-X Wall TRUE TRUE 0

EDG18- 1.50 Auto Water Auto TB-1 Wall/Door FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE 1 Spray H2 0.75 TB-1 Wall FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE H2 0.75 TO-1 waii FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE RC-1 0.75 ABB waii FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE RC-1 0.75 IBM-0 wali FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE Notes:

1. The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.

2. Fire barrier is a block wall and locked door that is not fire rated. However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.

3. Fire barrier is a block w/II and a door that is not fire rated. However, propagationis assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.

4. No additional impacts due to propagation of fire.

5. Charging pump room is almost completely enclosed by concrete walls. The main combustible in the charging room is oil and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oil. Propagation out of the charging pump room is assumed to be incredible.

6. The nearest coinbustible material is the lube oil for the main turbine lube oil cooler which is protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump room door. Fire propagation is assumed to be incredible.

PA1686tRge.E.doc/oc E-15

E. Propagafion Paflnvay Credibility As nt Table E-2 Fire Propogation Table for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Continued)

Fire Fire Primary Suppression Adjacent Barrier Duration Auto Fire Severity Suppression Actuation Fire Rating Permanent > 0.75 FSS Criterion Criterion Localized Zone (Hours) Type Method Zone Barrier Opening Rating Exists

'Hours) 1 2 Fire Notes RC-1 0.75 IBS-0 waii FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE RC-2 0.75 ABM waii FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE RC-2 0.75 IBN-1 wati FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE RC-2 0.75 IBS-1 wati FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE RC-3 0.75 ABO waii FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE RC-3 0.75 IBN-2 watt FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE RC-3 0.75 IBS-2 wait FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE SAF 0.75 ABO wag FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE SB-1 0.75 Dry chemical, Manual ABM wati FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE CO2, Water SB-1 0.75 Dry chemical, Manual IBM-1 Wall/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE CO2, Water SB-1 0.75 Dry chemical, Manual IBS-1 waii FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE CO2, Water SB-1 0.75 Dry chemical, Manual SB-1HS Wall/Door FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE CO2, Water Notes:

1. The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.

2. Fire barrier is a block wall and locked door that is not fire rated. However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.

3. Fire barrier is a block w/lt and a door that is not fire rated. However, propagation is assumed to be lncredibte due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.

4. No additional impacts due to propagation of fire.

5. Charging pump room is almost completely enclosed by concrete walls. The main combustible in the charging room is oil and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oil. Propagation out of the charging pump room is assumed to be incredible.

6. The nearest combustible material is the lube oil for the main turbine lube oil cooler which is protected by an automalic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump room door. Fire propagation is assumed to be incredible.

P - 'age-E.doc/oc

E. Propagation Patinvay Credibility Asse ut Table E-2 Fire Propogation Table for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant(Continued)

Fire Fire Primary Suppression Adjacent Barrier Duration Auto Fire Severity Suppression Actuation Fire Rating Permanent > 0.75

• FSS Criterion Criterion Localized Zone (Hours) Type Method Zone Barrier (Hours) Opening Rating Exists 1 2 Fire Notes SB-1 0.75 Dry chdmical, Manual SB-1WT Wall/Door FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE CO2, Water SB-1 0.75 Dry chemical, Manual TB-1 Wall/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE CO2, Water SB-1 0.75 Dry chemical, Manual TB-1FP Wali FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE CO2, Water SB-1HS 0.75 Ory chemical, Manual IBN-1 Wall/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE CO2 SB-1HS 0.75 Ory chemical, Manual IBS-1 Waii FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE CO2 SB-1HS 0.75 Dry chemical ~ Manual SB-1 Wall/Door FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FAI SE CO/

SB-1WT 0.75 Dry chemical Manual SB-1 Open FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE SB-2 1.50 Dry chemical, Manual IBN-2 Walt/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE CO2, Water SB-2 1.50 Dry chemical, Manual IBS-2 Wail FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE CO2, Water Notes:

The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.

2. Fire barrier is a block wail and tocked door that is not fire rated. However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.

3. Fire barrier is a block wail and a door that is not fire rated. However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.

4. No additional impacts due to propagation of fire.

6. Charging pump room is almost completely enclosed by concrete walls. The main combustible in the charging room Is oit and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oik Propagation out of the charging pump room is assumed to be incredible.

6. The nearest combustible material is the lube oil for the main turbine lube oil cooler which is protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump room door. Fire propagation is assumed to be incredible.

P:ii1686%ge-E.doc/oc E-17

E. Propngntion Pntlitvny CreitibilityAss it Table E-2 Fire Propagation Table for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Continued)

Fire Fire Primary Suppression Adjacent Barrier Duration Auto Fire Severity Suppression Actuation Fire Rating Permanent FSS Criterion Criterion Localized Zone (Hours) Method Zone Barrier (Hours) Rating Exists Fire Notes

>0.75'pening Type 1 2 SB-2 1.50 Dry chemical, Manual T8-2 Wall/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE CO2, Water SH-1 0.75 Auto Sprinklers Auto SH-2 Stairwell TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE TB-1 1.50 AHR watt FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TB-1 1.50 AVT Wall/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TB-1 1.50 BR1A Wail FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TB-1 1.50 BR18 Wali FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TB-1 1.50 CT waii FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TB-1 1.50 EDG1A-1 Wall/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TB-1 1.50 EDG18-1 Wall/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TB-1 1.50 H2 Wali FAI SE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TB-1 1.50 IBM-1 Wall/Door FAl SE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TB-1 1.50 S8-1 Wall/Door FAI SE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TB-1 1.50 TO-1 Wall/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE Notes:

1. The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.

2. Fire barrier is a block wall and locked door that is not fire rated. However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.

3. Fire barrier is a block waif and a door that is not fire rated. However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.

4. No additional impacts due to propagation of fire.

6. Charging pump room is atmost completely enclosed by concrete walls. The main combustible in the charging room is oil and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oil. Propagation out of the charging pump room is assumed to be incredible.

6. The nearest combustible material is the lube oil for the main turbine lube oil cooler which is protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump room door. Fire propagation is assumed to be incredible.

P:-'"age-E.doc/oc

\

E. Propagation Patlnuay Credibility Asses tt Table E-2 Fire Propogation Table for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant(ContinLted)

Fire Fire Primary Suppression Adjacent Barrier Duration Auto Fire Severity Suppression Actuation Fire Rating Permanent > 0.75 FSS Criterion Criterion Localized Zone (Hours) Type Method Zone Barrier (Hours) Rating Exists

'pening 1 2 Fire Notes TB-1 1.50 Partial coverage TB-1FP Wall/Door 0 FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE over lube oil cooler TB-1FP 0.75 Dry chemical, Manual SB-1 Wall FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE CO2 TB-1FP 0.75 Dry chemical, Manual TB-1 Watt/Door FALSE TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE CO2 TB-2 0.75 IBN-2 Walt/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TB-2 0.75 RR Waii FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TB-2 0.75 SB-2 Wall/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TB-2 0.75 TSC-1M Wati FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TB-2 0.75 TSC-1N Walt/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TB-2 0.75 TSC-1S Wall FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE TB-3 0.75 Auto Water Auto CR-3 Wall/Door FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE -FALSE TRUE Spray TB-3 0.75 IBN-3 Wall/Door FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE Notes:

1. The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.

2. Fire barrier is a block wail and locked door that is not fire rated. 8owever, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.

3. Fire barrier is a block vrallbnd a door that is not fire rated. 8owever, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.

4. No additional impacts due to propagation of fire.

5. Charging pump room is almost completely enclosed by concrete walls. The main combustible in the charging room is oil and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oil. Propagation out of the charging pump roomis assumed to be incredible.

6. The nearest combustible material is the lube oit for the main turbine lube oil cooler which is protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump room door. Fire propagation is assumed to be incredible.

P t1686tRge-E.doc/oc E-19

E. Propagation Patlnuay Crerlibilihg Asse t Table E-2 Fire Propogation Table for Ginna Nuclear Power Plant (Continued)

Fire Fire Primary Suppression Adjacent Barrier Duration Auto Fire Severity Suppression Actuation Fire Rating Permanent > 075'SS Criterion Criterion Localized Zone (Hours) Type Method Zone Barrier (Hours) Opening Rating Exists 2 Fire Notes TO 23.60 Preaclion Auto EDG1A-1 Wall FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE-Sprinklers TO 23.60 Preaction Auto H2 Waii FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Sprinklers TO 23.60 Preaction Auto TB-1 Wall/Door FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Sprinklers Auto Water Auto RR Wali FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE Spray TY-E Auto Water Auto TY-W Wall FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE Spray TY-W Auto Water Auto RR Waii FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE Spray TY-W Auto Water Auto TY-E Wall FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE Spray Notes:

1. The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete walls or steel hatches.

2. Fire barrier is a block wall and locked door that is not fire rated. However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.

3. Fire barrier is a block wall and a door that is not fire rated. However, propagation is assumed to be incredible due to barrier and physical separation of the combustibles from the barrier.

4. No additional iinpacts due to propagation ot fire.

5. Charging pump room is almost completely enclosed by concrete walls. The main combustible in the charging room is oil and the concrete curbs around each pump are designed to contain any spilled oiL Propagation out of the charging pump room is assumed to be incredible.

6. The nearest combustible material is the lube oil for the main turbine lube oil cooter which is protected by an automatic fire sprinkler system, and is physically separated from the feed pump room door. Fire propagation is assumed to be incredible.

F. '6tRge-E.doctoc

Table E-c, pplement Fire Propagation Table for Ginna Nuclear Plant Vertically Adjacent Fire Zones Fire Suppres- Fire Per-Sever- Primary Adjacent Barrier Dura- Auto Cri- Cri- Local-Fire Zone sion manent Suppres- Fire Barrier Rating tion FSS terion terion Ized Notes ity Actuation Open-sion Type Zone (Hrs) )0.75>> Exists 1 2 Fire (Hrs) Method ing I Rating Pre-action Floor/

ABB 0.75 Auto . i ABM Unrated TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Sprinkle rs Ceiling Floor/

ABB Unrated TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE A Ceiling Pre-action Floor/

ABM 0.75 Auto ABO TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Sprinklers Ceiling Floor/

CHG FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Ceiling ABO 0.75 Floor/

Ndne N/A ABM TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE Ceiling Auto BRRM Floor/ Zone-AHR 1.50 Water Auto FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE RR Ceiling Specific Spray TSC-1M Floor/

0.75 None N/A TSC-1N Unrated FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE Ceiling TSC-1S BR1A Floor/

0.75 None N/A RR FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE I Ceiling Floor/

RR FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE Ceiling BR1B 0.75 None N/A Floor/

BR18-CV Unrated FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE D,E Ceiling E.S-1

Fire Per-Fire Suppres-Sever- Primary Adjacent Barrier Dura- Auto Cri- Cri- Local-Fire Zone sion manent Suppres- Fire Barrier Rating tion FSS terion terion Ized Notes ity Actuation Open-sion Type Zone (Hrs) >0.75~ Exists 2 Fire (Hrs) Method ing Rating BR18-CV Floor/

BR18 Unrated FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE D,E Ceiling AHR Floor/ Zone-8RRM 1.50 None N/A FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE I

CR-3 Ceiling Specific Floor/

CHG 0.75 ABM 3 FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE FALSE TRUE Ceiling BRRM Floor/ Zone- FALSE FALSE CR-3 0.75 None N/A TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE RR Ceiling Specific TRUE TRUE C,F Floor/

ED G1A-0 0.75 EDG1A-1 Unrated TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE O,Z Ceiling EDG1A-0 Floor/ TRUE TRUE O,Z ED G1A-1 0.75 Unrated TRUE FALSE TRUE FALSE EDG1A-X Ceiling FALSE FALSE Floor/

EDG1A-X EDG1A-1 Unrated FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE Ceiling Floor/

EDG18-0 0.75 EDG18-1 Unrated TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE P,Z Ceiling Auto Floor/

EDG18-1 1.50 Water Auto EDG18-0 Unrated TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE P,Z Ceiling Spray IBN-0 Floor/

0.00 IBN-1 Unrated TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE G,H Ceiling I

Pre-action IBN-0 Floor/ G IBN-1 1.50 Auto Unrated TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Sprinklers IBN-2 Ceiling Pre-action IBN-1 Floor/

IBN-2 0.75 Auto Unrated TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Sprinkiers IBN-3 Ceiling

Fire Fire Suppres- Per-Sever-Primary Adjacent Barrier Dura- Auto Cri- Cri- Local-Fire Zone sion manent Suppres- Fire Barrier Rating tion FSS terion terion ized Notes ity Actuation Open-sion Type Zone (Hrs) >0.75~ Exists 2 Fire (Hrs) Method Irlg Rating Pre-action IBN-2 Floor/

IBN-3 0.75 Auto Unrated TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Sprinklers Ceiling J,K Pre-action Floor/

IBNQ 0.75 Sprinkle rs Auto IBN-3 Ceiling Unrated TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE JK IBS-O Floor/

0.00 IBS-1 Unrated TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE L,X Ceiling IBS-0 Floor/ L,Z IBS-1 0.75 None N/A Unrated TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE- FALSE IBS-2 Ceiling M,Z IBS-1 floor/ M,Z IBS-2 0.75 None N/A Unrated TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE IBS-3 Ceiling N,Z Floor/

IBS-3 0.75 None N/A IBS-2 Unrated TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE N,Z Ceiling RC-1 0.75 RC-2 None N/A TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE I RC-1 RC-2 0.75 None N/A TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE I RC-3 RC-3 0.75 RC-2 None N/A TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE I Zone-AHR FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE C specific Auto Halon BR1A Auto, Floor/

RR 3.00 Systems, FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Manual BR18 Ceiling Manual Sprinkler Zone-CR-3 TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE C F specific E.S-3

"I Per- Fire Fire Suppres-Sever- Primary Adjacent Barrier Dura- Auto Cri- Cri- Local-sion manent Fire Zone Suppres- Fire Barrier Rating tion FSS terion terion =

ized Notes ity Actuation Open-sion Type Zone (Hrs) >0.75~ Exists 1 2 Fire (Hrs) Method ing Rating Auto Water Spray, Dry Auto, Floor/

SB-1 0.75 SB-2 Unrated TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Chemical, Manual Ceiling CO~,

Water Auto Water Auto, Floor/

SB-1HS 0.75 Spray, Dry SB-2 Unrated FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Manual Ceiling Chemical, CO~

SB-1WT SB-2 (CST (CST None N/A TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Area) Auto Area)

Water Aut0, 0.75 Spray, Dry Manual SB-2 SB-1WT Chemical (Non- Floor/

(Non-CST Unrated FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE

. CST Ceiling Area)

Area)

Auto Water SB-1 TRUE Spray, Dry Auto, Floor/

SB-2 1.50 Unrated TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE Chemical, Manual Ceiling CO~, SB-1HS FALSE Water SB-2 SB-1WT (CST Auto (CST None N/A TRUE Area) Water Area)

Spray, Dry Auto, 1.50 SB-1WT TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE SB-2 Chemical, Manual CO~, (Non- Floor/

(Non-CST Unrated FALSE Water CST Ceiling Area)

Area)

E.S-4

0 Fire Fire Suppres- Per-Sever- Primary Adjacent Barrier Dura- Auto Cri- Cri- Local-Fire Zone sion manent Suppres- Fire Barrier Rating tion FSS terion terion ized Notes ity Actuation Open-sion Type Zone (Hrs) )0.75>> Exists 1 2 Fire (Hrs) Method . ing Rating SH-1 SH-2 (Circ W (Circ W None N/A TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE Area) Area) i, 0.75 SH-2 SH-1 (SW Auto Floor/ Zone-Auto (SW TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE C,T Area) Sprinklers Ceiling specific Area)

SH-2 SH-1 (Circ W (Circ W None NIA TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE Area) Area) 0.75 SH-1 SH-2 (SW Auto Floor/ Zone-Auto (SW TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE C,T Area) Sprinklers Ceiling specific Area)

TB-1 Floor/

1.50 TB-2 Unrated TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE Ceiling Dry Floor/

TB-1FP 0.75 Chemical, Manual TB-2 Unrated FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE Ceiling CO~

TB-1 TRUE TRUE U,V,I TB-2 Floor/

0.75 TB-1FP Unrated FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE Ceiling TB-3 TRUE TRUE U,W,I TB-3 Floor/

0.75 TB-2 Unrated TRUE TRUE FALSE TRUE TRUE FALSE U,W,r Ceiling TSC-1M 0.75 AVT

'loor/ Unrated FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE Ceiling Floor/

TSC-1N 0.75 AVT Unrated FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE Ceiling E.S-S

Fire Fire Suppres- Per-Primary Adjacent Barrier Dura- Auto . Cri- Cri- Local-Sever- sion manent Fire Zone Suppres- Fire Barrier Rating tion FSS terion terion ized Notes ity Actuation Open-sion Type Zone (Hrs) )0.75~ Exists 1 2 Fire (Hrs) Method ing Rating Floor/

TSC-1S 0.75 AVT Unrated FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE TRUE FALSE Ceiling NOTES A. There are two stairways and a 120-ft'pen hatch connecting zones ABB, ABM, and ABO. AII three pathways are protected by close-spaced, closed-head sprinklers at the ceiling of zone ABM.

B. Although zone ABO has no automatic suppression system per se, the only pathways to zone ABM are protected (see Note A), so downward fire propagation is not deemed credible.

C. The fire resistance of the floor/ceiling has been analyzed under the Ginna Fire Protection Program as sufficient for the fire duration based on the zone-specific combustible loading.

D. The analysis assumes that a fire cannot propagate through concrete structures.

E. Zone BR1B-CV has very limited access to air flow, which would preclude any significant fire development inside the zone.

F. A stairway connecting zones CR-3 and RR is enclosed in a 2-hr, fire-rated vestibule with 2-hr, fire-rated doors at the zone RR level (there is also a non-fire-rated vestibule and door at the zone CR-3 level).

G. There is a stairway and two 3.1-ft'rating-covered manholes connecting zones IBN-0 and IBN-1 ..

H. Zone IBN-0 has no combustibles. Only a transient fire could occur, which is assumed to be of insufficient intensity or duration to propagate to zone I4N-1, especially since the latter is protected by pre-action sprinklers.

I. There is a stairway connecting zones IBN-1 and IBN-2.

J. There are two stairways connecting zones IBN-2, IBN-3, and IBN-4, one of which is enclosed in a non-fire rated vestibule with non-fire-rated doors.

K. There is a 92-ft'rating-covered equipment access hatch connecting zones IBN-3 and IBN-4.

L. There is a stairway and 3.1-ft'rating-covered manhole connecting zones IBS-0 and IBS-1. Combustibles and safety critical equipment are not located near the stairway or manhole.

M. There are two stairways connecting zones IBS-1 and IBS-2. Combustibles and safety critical equipment are not located near the stairways.

N. There is a stairway connecting zones IBS-2 and IBS-3. Combustibles and safety critical equipment are not located near the stairway.

O. There is a 7.1-ft'teel-plate-covered manhole connecting zones EDG1A-0 and EDG1A-1. This is sealed so as to prevent spread of the types of fires which could possibly propagate, i.e., oil spill fires and cable fires. The DG area is bermed to contain oil spills, while cables are not located nea( the hatch.

There is a 7.1-ft'teel-plate-covered manhole connecting zones EDG1B-0 and EDG1B-1. This is sealed so as to prevent spread of the types of fires which could possibly propagate, i.e., oil spill fires and cable fires. The DG area is bermed to contain oil spills, while cables are not located near the hatch.

Q There are two stairways connecting zones SB-1 and SB-2, each of which is enclosed in a vestibule with a 1.5-hr, fire-rated door.

R An open grating connects the CST Areas of zones SB1-WT and SB-2.

S Open spaces connect the Circ W Areas of zones SH-1 and SH-2.

E.S-6

0 ere is a stairway connecting the SW Areas of zones SH-1 and U. There are four stairways and an elevator shaft connecting zones TB-1, TB-2, and TB-3. One of the stairways is enclosed in a vestibule with 1.5-hr, fire-rated doors. The elevator shaft is enclosed with non-fire-rated doors.

V. There are a 42.4-ft'rating-covered heater drain pump withdrawal hatch, 128-ft'rating-covered condensate pump withdrawal hatch, and 6390-ft'f open space and grating connecting zones TB-1 and TB-2.

W. There is a 940-ft'pen access hatch connecting zones TB-2 and TB-3.

X. Zone IBS-0 has no combustibles. Only a transient fire could occur, which is assumed to be of insufficient intensity or duration to propagate to zone IBS-1.

Y. Zones AVT, TSC-1M, TSC-1N, and TSC-1S do not contain safety critical equipment.

Z. The concrete floor/ceiling is considered sufficient to prevent spread of the types of fires which could possibly propagate, i.e., oil spill fires and cable fires.

I. No additional impact due to propagation of fire.

E.S-7

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions ATTACHMENTB.2 EXTRACTS FROM APPENDICES C AND D TO THE 1998 SUBMITTAL

C. Component/Location Based Fire Ignition I'requency A quantitative screening process is perfoimed during the scenario analysis phase of the internal plant hazards analysis. The screening process applies numerical criteria to determine the relative risk significance of each hazard scenario. If it is determined that a scenario is insignificant compared with these numerical screening criteria, that scenario is removed from further consideration in the PSA models. Therefore, it is important that the hazard occurrence frequencies that are assessed during this step of the piocess satisfy the following objectives.

im The hazard scenario frequency must consistently account for generic industry data and any plant-specific experience for the type of hazard that is being evaluated in the type of location that is being modeled.

a The hazard scenario frequency must provide a conservative upper bound for the actual frequency of more detailed event scenarios that may eventually be developed for the location. In other words, the total scenario frequency may be consistently subdivided to more realistically represent any specific event scenario in the location, if it is necessary to develop more detailed models for the location.

The industry event data are combined with actual plant-specific experience through a two-stage Bayesian analysis that forms the basis for the hazard frequency assessment.

The generic data for the internal fire frequency assessment are collected from a variety of sources. For example, the PLG proprietary database for fire events provides the generic input for the assessment of fire event frequencies. This database contains summaries of more than 750 fire events that occurred at U.S. nuclear power plants through the end of 1993. These event summaries are derived from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Licensee Event Report (LER) data, American Nuclear Insurer data, and plant-specific data that have been collected by PLG du'ring its previous PSA studies. The generic fire event database for the Ginna analyses was limited to events that occurred between January 1, 1980, and December 31, 1992. The starting date for this database period accounts for substantial improvements in fire protection systems and personnel awareness that may affect the applicability of pre-1980 data for current analyses. The end date accounts for the fact that the PLG database contains a number of fire events that were reported in 1993, but it may not be complete for that year.

C.1 Pire Event Categories Three general types of fire event categories were defined for these analyses. Two of these classifications may be characterized broadly as "location-type" categories and "equipment-type" categories. The third general classiTication applies to control room p:E1 666% ge-C.docloc C-1

C. Component/Location Based Fire Ignition Freqnenag fires. Generic and plant-specific fire events were assigned to these categories according to the type of location in which they occurred or the type of equipment that was affected by the fire.

C.l.l Location Fire Categories It is generally most reasonable to use location-type data for large areas that contain a variety of mechanical equipment. The composite fire event data account for the types of equipment (e.g., pump motors, valves, oil systems, etc.) that are typically found in these areas. The data also account generally for the types of operating, testing, and maintenance activities that occur around mechanical equipment, the possible presence of transient combustibles associated with these activities, and the general amount of personnel traffic in large open areas of the plant. The following four location-type classifications were used for the Ginna database.

h a Containment -Other than RCP Fires. This category includes fires that occur inside the Containment, except for fires that are directly associated with the reactor coolant pumps or their oil systems.

This category excludes fires that occur in electrical switchgear, motor control centers, control cabinets, and cables inside the Containment. These fire events are classified separately in the database, and they are allocated to specific locations inside the Containment that contain these types of equipment. No high voltage switchgear or motor control centers are located inside the Containment.

a Auxiliary Building Radwaste. This category includes fires that occur in Auxiliary Building and Intermediate Building areas that contain primarily solid, liquid, or gaseous radioactive waste handling systems. It also includes generic fire events that have occurred in similar equipment areas, even though the facilities are outside the plant auxiliary building.

This category excludes fires that occur in electrical switchgear, motor control centers, control cabinets, and cables in radioactive waste handling areas.

im Auxiliary Building Other than Radwaste. This category includes fires that occur in Auxiliary Building and Intermediate Building areas that contain primarily safety-related mechanical equipment. This category excludes Auxiliary Building fire events that have occurred in areas that contain solid, liquid, or gaseous radioactive waste handling systems.

This category excludes fires that occur in electrical switchgear, motor control centers, control cabinets, and cables in the Auxiliary Building.

im Turbine Building Other. This category includes fires that occur in the Turbine Building, except for fires that are directly associated with the main turbines, the turbine oil systems, the main generators, or the generator hydrogen systems.

The Ginna main feedwater pumps are motor-driven. Therefore, this category excludes generic fire events that have occurred in main feedwater pump turbine oil systems.

P:51686ERge.c.docloc C-2

C. Contponent/Location Based Fire Ignition Freqnenc1g This category excludes fires that occur in electrical switchgear, motor control centers, control cabinets, and cables in the Turbine Building.

a Screenhouse. This category includes fires that occur in the screenhouse at Ginna. It includes generic fire events that have occurred in similar equipment as at Ginna, service water pumps and traveling screens, circulating water pumps, diesel-driven and motor-driven fire water pumps and auxiliary boilers, even though such equipment may not be with service water pumps. This category excludes fires that occur in electrical switchgear, motor control centers, control cabinets, and cables in areas around such equipment.

C.Z.2 Equipment Fire Categories It is generally most reasonable to use equipment-type data for the following types of locations.

Locations that contain only a single type of relatively unique mechanical component; e.g., diesel generators, ventilation units, motor-generators, etc.

2. Locations that contain equipment that represents a unique hazard source or that has unique operational considerations; e.g., reactor coolant pumps, main turbine-generator, etc.

3. Locations that contain electrical equipment, instrumentation and control cabinets, and cables The following 16 equipment-type classifications were used for the Ginna database.

Ii Containment - Reactor Coolant Pumps. This category includes fires that are directly associated with the reactor coolant pumps or their oil systems.

Ii Turbine/Generator. This category includes fires that are directly associated with the main turbines, the turbine oil systems, the main generators, or the generator hydrogen systems.

Diesel Generator Sets. This category includes fires that occur in emergency diesel generators. The category includes fires that affect the diesel engine; fires in lubrication, fuel, cooling, and control systems that are mounted on the engine skid or that are typically located in the diesel generator room; and fires that affect the generator or exciter.

This category excludes fires that occur in local control cabinets and fires that affect the diesel generator output circuit breaker. Control cabinet fires are included in the Logic Cabinet category to account for the types of equipment and control circuits that are typically located in these cabinets. Circuit breaker fires are included in one of the switchgear fire event categories, depending on the specific voltage.

P:51686ERge-c.docfoc C-3

C. Con>ponent/Location Based Fire ignition Freqnency HVAC Chiller. This category includes fires that occur in ventilation system chiller units. The category includes fires that affect the compressor, expansion valves, lubrication systems, refrigeration equipment, and local controls that are typically mounted on the chiller package or skid.

HVAC Fan. This category includes fires that occur in ventilation system fans. No distinction'is made to account for the size of the fan or the specific type of drive; e.g., direct drive, belts, fluid coupling, etc.

Motor-Generator Sets. This category includes fires that occur in motor-generator sets, rotating inverters, and similar types of electro-mechanical converters. The category includes fires that affect the motor, generator, voltage regulator, lubrication equipment, cooling equipment, and local controls that are typically mounted on the unit.

Battery Charger/ Inverter. This category includes fires that occur in battery chargers and static inverters. No distinction is made to account for the AC voltage, the DC voltage, or the specific design of the unit. The category includes fires that affect the converter circuits, input circuit breakers, output circuit breakers, power monitoring and control circuits, and other components that are typically mounted inside the battery charger or inverter cabinet.

Battery. This category includes fires that occur in emergency power system batteries. No distinction is made to account for the specific type of battery or its voltage.

Transformer - High Voltage. This category includes fires that occur in high voltage offsite power transformers. These transformers provide connections from the in-plant buses to the switchyard or to other offsite power supplies. They are typically located outside the plant buildings.

Examples include main power transformers, auxiliary power transformers, startup transformers, etc. No distinction is made to account for the specific primary and secondary voltages or the transformer design; e.g.,

oil-cooled, gas-cooled, air-cooled, etc.

Transformer - Low Voltage. This category includes fires that occur in intermediate voltage station service transformers. These transformers provide connections from the high voltage buses (e.g., 4.16kV) to the low voltage buses (e.g., 480V) in the plant electric power systems. They are typically located inside the plant buildings. No distinction is made to account for the specific primary and secondary voltages or the transformer design.

Transformer - Instrument Power. This category includes fires that occur in large control power transformers and regulated voltage transformers; e.g.,

SOLA transformers. No distinction is made to account for the specific primary and secondary voltages or the transformer design.

P:K1686%ge-c.dodoc C-4

C. Component/Location Based Fire Ignition Freqnenag This category excludes fires that occur in low voltage transformers (e.g., 220V and below) for power, control, and monitoring circuits that are typically located inside switchgear cubicles, instrumentation power supplies, control cabinets, etc. Fires that affect these types of transformers are included in the respective categories for switchgear, motor control centers, logic cabinets, etc., depending on the location of the fire event.

a Switchgear - Above 480V. This category includes fires that occur in high voltage switchgear (e.g., 4.16kV) that is located inside the plant buildings.

No distinction is made between safety-related and non-safety electrical systems. This category is designated "Above 480V" for this analysis to account for the actual voltages at Ginna. How'ever, in practice, the category includes fires that occur in any switchgear with a nominal voltage rating that is higher than approximately 800V. The category includes fires that occur in the switchgear buswork, circuit breakers, instrumentation, control, and protection circuits that are typically mounted inside the switchgear cubicles.

This category excludes high voltage switchgear fires that occur in the plant switchyard or in other offsite electrical facilities because the environment, personnel traffic, testing and maintenance programs, housekeeping controls, etc. may be much different for these facilities, compared with the in-plant electrical systems.

~ Switchgear - 480V and Below. This category includes fires that occur in intermediate voltage switchgear (e.g., 480V) that is located inside the plant buildings. No distinction is made between safety-related and non-safety electrical systems. This category is designated "480V and Below" for this analysis to account for the actual voltages at Ginna. However, in practice, the category includes fires that occur in any switchgear with a nominal voltage rating that is less than approximately 800V. The category includes fires that occur in the switchgear buswork, circuit breakers, instrumentation, control, and 'protection circuits that are typically mounted inside the switchgear cubicles.

This category excludes fires that occur in motor control centers, vital AC instrument power buses, low voltage AC distribution panels (e.g., 220V and below), and DC buses.

This distinction accounts for the lower power ratings of these panels and differences in the designs, duty cycles, and operating characteristics of the associated circuit breakers.

Motor Control Center. This category includes fires that occur in motor control centers. For this analysis, the category also includes fires that occur in vital AC instrument power buses, low voltage AC distribution panels (e.g., 220V and below), and DC buses.

Logic Cabinet. This category includes fires that occur in instrumentation, control, and protection cabinets. No distinction is made to account for the specific types of circuits that are contained in the cabinet (e.g., relays, solid state electronics, etc.), the location of the cabinet (except as noted below), or whether the circuits are safety-related or non-safety.

p:i1686%ge-o.doctoc C-5

~,

C. Component/Location Based Fire Ignition Frequency This category excludes cabinet fires that occur in main, auxiliary, or emergency control rooms. These cabinet fires are included in the Control Room category. This distinction is made to account for differences in the normal occupancy and administrative controls that may apply for control room cabinets, compared with cabinets in other plant locations.

Ii Cable. This category includes fires that damage electrical cables. No distinction is made to separately account for fires that affect instrumentation, control, or power cables. Fire events are included in this category if the cables or their terminations were the source of fire ignition or if cable damage was the primary impact from an exposure fire; e.g.,

welding sparks that ignite cable insulation in an open tray. Fire events are excluded from this category if cable damage was consequential to a fire that is assigned to another equipment category; e.g., pump motor fires, switchgear fires, cabinet fires, main generator hydrogen fires, etc.

C.1.3 Control Room Fires 8ecause of its unique features, continuous occupancy, and strict administrative controls, a separate category is defined for fires that occur in main, auxiliary, or emergency control rooms. This category includes all fires that occur in plant control rooms, regardless of the cause or specific type of panel that is affected.

C.2 Classification of Generic Event Data The first step of the fire frequency assessment involves a thorough review of the industry experience data to develop a "specialized generic database" for Ginna. This database accounts for design features of the plant that is being evaluated, the scope of the PSA models, and characteristics of the specific hazard scenarios that have been defined for the analysis. 1 The PLG database contains a total of 484 fire events during the 13-year period from 1980 through 1992. These events were screened first to select only those events that apply to the Ginna plant design, the types of locations that are included in the PSA fire analyses, and the scope of the PSA models. This screening was based on observations made by the spatial interactions analyst during the plant walkdowns and on the analyst's understanding of Ginna operating procedures and practices. The following general considerations were used to determine which events from the industry data do not apply for this analysis.

The Ginna plant has been operating for several years. Therefore, a fire event was removed from the generic database if the event occurred during plant construction or during pre-commercial startup testing activities.

Table C-1 lists the Ginna plant locations that were retained after qualitative examination during the spatial interactions analyses. A fire event was removed from the database if the event occurred in a location that is not relevant to the Ginna analyses or if the event was uniquely PA1 686Ãge.c.doc/oc C-6

C. Co/nponent//Location Bnseci Fire Ignition Fre/inenng associated with a type of component that is not installed at Ginna.

Examples of the location screening criterion include fires in office areas, warehouses, machine shops, cooling towers, switchyard facilities (except for relevant transformers), other fires outside of the plant protected area, etc.

Event reports are included in the PLG generic database to satisfy several possible applications. The criteria for adding a particular event to the database are usually much broader than the criteria that apply for a particular plant-specific analysis. For example, some events in the database are included for studies that examine precursor events, studies that confirm analytical models for fire ignition and growth, etc. An event was removed from the database for this study if the event description clearly indicates that no actual fire was present, and no automatic or manual extinguishing actions were required. Examples of these types of events include overheated pump bearings, small amounts of smoke from oil films or foreign material on hot piping or other surfaces (with no indication of pooling or ignition), electrical faults and short circuits that do not ignite any material, etc.

An event was removed from the database if the cause for the event was associated with a plant design feature that does not apply to Ginna. An example of this type of event includes fires that have occurred in the main condenser offgas systems for some boiling water reactors.

a A few events were screened out according to miscellaneous criteria such as reported degradation or cracking of cable insulation, duplicate event reports, etc.

A total of 230 events remained in the database after this first level of screening. These events were judged to be relevant to the Ginna plant design, the locations and types of equipment that were identified in the spatial interactions analyses, and the specific scope of the fire analyses. These events were next classified into the 22 fire event categories that are described in Section C.1.

There are a few plant-specific design features and PSA modeling issues that must be considered during the categorization of the events. The most important of these considerations are summarized below.

Equipment for the Ginna boric acid recycle systems and radioactive waste processing systems is distributed throughout several areas of the Auxiliary Building. These systems are more clearly separated from safety-related equipment areas in many newer U.S. plants. Fire events that occur in boric acid recycle systems and radioactive waste processing systems are retained in the Ginna database because these events may occur in locations that also contain PSA equipment. However, these events are classified separately to account for the actual distribution of this equipment among the Ginna Auxiliary Building locations.

The Ginna plant has motor-driven main feedwater pumps. Fire events that occur in the Electro-Hydraulic oil systems for turbine-driven main PA1686<Rge-c.doc/oc C.-7

0 C. Component/Location Baserl Fire Ignition Frequency feedwater pumps are not relevant for the Ginna main feedwater related fire analyses.

x Diesel-driven and motor-driven fire pump related events and events related to auxiliary boilers have been assigned to the screen house category.

In practice, different hazard frequencies may apply for a particular plant location during

-

power operation and during shutdown. There are many reasons for this difference.

Experience has shown that the causes for some events may be closely associated with equipment operating conditions or with personnel activities that apply uniquely to a specific plant operating mode. For example, hydrogen fires that are caused by electrical faults in the main generator are very unlikely when the plant is shut down. Fires that are caused by welding and cutting work inside the Containment are very unlikely when the plant is operating at power. Fires that are caused by electrical faults in normally energized switchgear may occur at any time. However, switchgear fires that are caused by personnel errors during periodic testing, inspection, or maintenance activities may be most likely during shutdown.

To develop a comprehensive database that applies consistently for the Ginna model, each generic event must also be examined to determine whether its cause was uniquely associated with a specific plant operating mode. Thus, each event is assigned to one of the following categories.

Power Operation Only (P). The causes for these events are uniquely associated with equipment operating conditions or personnel activities that apply primarily during plant power operation.

x Anytime (A). The causes for these events may occur at any time, regardless of the plant operating mode.

The event classifications are based on the normal equipment operating conditions, testing and inspection programs, and maintenance practices at Ginna. For example, if an equipment fire occurred during shutdown at Plant X, but it is concluded that the same cause applies during all operating modes at Ginna, the event is, assigned to the Anytime (A) category. W The product from this step of the frequency assessment process is a specialized generic database. This database contains only the hazard event summaries that are relevant for the plant that is being modeled, for the specific operating conditions that are being evaluated. This database is presented in Table C-2. The table summarizes the 230 fire events that were retained in the Ginna specialized generic database and their final classifications.. The actual plant identities and occurrence dates have been omitted to protect the proprietary nature of this information; However, consistent plant designation codes are used to provide an indication of the observed plant-to-plant variability in the generic experience.

PA1686<Rge.c.dodoc C-8

C. Component/Location Based Fire Ignition Freqneunf C.3 Treatment of Unidentified Plant Events Each nuclear power plant site contains one to several reactor units. For this analysis, it is assumed that the frequency of internal hazards may vary considerably from site-to-site, but not from unit-to-unit at a particular site. An exception to this assumption may be made for sites at which there are known to be significant differences between the units.

This assumption is based on the belief that much of the observed variability in hazard occurrence rates may be caused by differences in plant design, operating and maintenance practices, and plant management policies.

A two-stage Bayesian analysis is performed to combine the industry data with actual experience from the plant that is being studied. The first stage of this analysis develops a generic frequency distribution for each hazard that consistently accounts for the observed site-to-site variability in the industry experience data. The second stage updates this generic frequency to account specifically for the actual historical experience at Ginna.

In order to account for the observed site-to-site variability in the industry experience data properly, it is necessary to have detailed information about the specific site at which each event has occurred. For example, site X has had N1 fire events of Type A in X1 years; site Y has had N2 fire events of Type A in Y1 years; etc. Unfortunately, some of the industry data sources do not identify the specific sites at which these events have occurred. A small number of events in the PLG database'are related to plants that are not identified. Based on their descriptions, these event summaries document valid fires that have occurred at some plants and not duplicates of events at "identified plants".

At first, it may seem most conservative to assign an unidentified event either to the "worst plant" or to the "best plant" from the generic population. In this context, the "worst plant" is the plant that has had the la'rgest number of occurrences in the smallest number of years, and the "best plant" is the plant that has had no other occurrences in the largest number of years. However, this may actually introduce undesired optimism when the second stage of the Bayesian update is performed. For example, suppose that the plant being evaluated (e.g., Ginna) has had no fires in a particular event category.'he second stage of the updating process will then numerically discount the generic evidence from any plant that has a relatively high frequency of fires. The amount of numerical reduction depends on the quantity of plant-specific data and the difference between the plant-specific and generic experience. Thus, in this case, assignment of the unidentified event to the "worst plant" will actually give that event less weight in the final results from the second stage update, compared with assignment of the event to the "best plant" or the "average plant". In practice, it has been determined that it is usually most conservative to assign each unidentified event to a plant that meets the following criteria.

a The plant has had no other events in the category that is being evaluated.

a The total plant operating years are approximately equal to the average of the generic plant population.

p51666%ge-o.docloc C-9

C. Coniponent/Location Based Fire Ignition Freqnenng This process was used for assignment of all unidentified plant events during the Ginna updates.

C.4 Development of Frequencies for Power Operation The numerical results from a PSA are typically presented as an occurrence frequency for the undesired event. Care must be used during the hazard frequency analyses to ensure that the initiating frequency for each event scenario is quantified consistently with other events that are analyzed in the PSA models, whether it is a frequency per calendar year or a frequency per year of power operation.

Generic events for these analyses are classified into the two operational categories; i.e.,

Power Operation Only (P), and Anytime (A). The total initiating event frequency for the Ginna model should account for all events that can occur only during power operation, plus a fraction of the events that can occur at any time. The appropriate weighting fractions for the Anytime events are determined by the Ginna average plant availability factor.

Suppose that the following data are available for a particular type of event at generic Plant X.

Number Experience Category of Events (mode years)

Power Only (P)

Shutdown Only (S) 2 Anytime (A) ,8+ 2 =10 To develop a frequency that is consistent with the format of the overall PSA results, the

. appropriate initiating event frequency for the Ginna models is determined by the answer to the following question:

During the $ 0 years of experience at Plant X how many events have occurred during power operation?

The answer to this question is the sum of the sum of the events that have occurred during power (category P) and the fraction of the events from category A that would occur during power 1 + (8/10)

• 2 = 2.6 events The corresponding initiating event frequency is:

2.6/8 = 0.31 events per year of power operation P:516864Rge-c.docloc C- l 0

C. Component/Location Based Fire Igntion Fry/nency The following steps were used to quantify the fire event frequencies:

For each category (location or component), fire frequencies were developed for the generic population of nuclear sites. The frequencies were developed for the two groups, Power Only (P), and Anytime (A).

These two frequencies were defined per calendar year. An average availability factor (a) of 0.7 was used to define a total generic fire frequency for each component or location category according to the expression:

P/[N*a]+A/N Where N is the number of calendar years for the data.

Perform the first stage of the Bayesian update with the generic plant data from Step 1.

For Ginna, count the total number of events that have actually occurred during plant power operation. The number of years corresponding to this time was multiplied by the average Ginna availability factor of 0.8.

Perform the second stage of the Bayesian update with the generic prior distribution from Step 2 and the plant-specific data from Step 3. Use the results from this step as the Ginna fire events frequencies.

C.5 Plant-Specific Fire Event Data and Frequencies Plant-specific fire event data for the Ginna study were compiled from the Ginna Internal Fire Brigade reports. All reports from 1979 through mid 1997 (18.5 years) were examined. The events were screened to determine which events apply to the fire event categories and plant locations being considered for the fire analysis. For example, the fires that occurred in the office areas, workshops, locations outside the plant protected area are not relevant for these analyses.

Events were also screened out if the reports document only smoke from overheated pump bearings or other mechanical equipment, small quantities of smoke from foreign materials on hot surfaces, or other events with no indication of flames or evidence of fire damage. This is the same criterion used to screen the generic fire events database.

However, these types of events were retained in the database if the reports document actuation of automatic suppression systems or manual extinguishing actions.

Table C-3 summarizes the 14 fire events that were retained in the plant-specific database for power conditions. The table also lists the relevant Ginna category for each event.

Initiating event frequencies for each fire category were quantified through the two-stage Bayesian updating process. The total Ginna operating experience used is 14.8 power operation years. Step 3 of the Ginna fire event frequency quantification process p:51686ERge.C.doc/oc C-11

C. Component/Location Based Fire Ignition Frertnenng developed plant-specific evidence for each fire event category, based on the events listed in Table C-3 and the 14.8-year operating time. This evidence was then input to the second stage of the Bayesian updates to quantify the final initiating event frequency for each fire category according to Step 4 of the process. Table C-4 lists the plant-specific evidence, the generic mean frequency from Step 2, and the final updated frequency distribution from Step 4 for each fire event category.

p:51686(Rge-o.docloc C-1 2

Only relevant pages from C-13 through C-60 are included to reduce paper volume.

C. Corupoirerrt/Location Based Fiie r Frequency Table C-2 Generic Fire Events Applicable to the Ginna Station Fire PRA (Continued)

Fire Fire Operation Incident Fire Initiators Initiators ID Site-Unit Mode Date Location Cause (Equipment) (Fuel) Event Description Category Applicability 65 5/16/87 Reactor Electrical Camera An underwater TV camera was Aux Bldg-Building Failure placed into a plastic bag while the Other lights were still hot and ignited bag and insulation.

66 HN Power 11/15/90 Reactor Welding & Torch: Construction During welding, sparks fell and Aux Bldg-Operation Building Culling Material ignited dry-up rags. Other 67 HN 10/28/91 Personnel Fan Insulation While an electrician was Low Power Error troubleshooting a problem with a Cabinet cooling fan for power supply (1C11-PSY6), the fan shorted to the frame. This caused visible smoke and flame. The fire was quickly extinguished with a portable Halon extinguisher.

68 Power 6/11/92 Turbine Spontaneous Unknown Oil Extensive report available. Large Turbine Bldg.

Operation Building Combustion issue is what was the ignition -Other source.

69 HO Cold 4/15/80 Reactor Electrical Circuit Breaker The RCS Bus/Generator "A", Low Power Shutdown Building? Failure 2C71S001A, experienced a logic Cabinet power failure, causing a reactor half scram on the "A" channel. The "A" channel was placed in the trip condition per Tech. Specs. The redundant "B" RPS was operable.

The cause was an open circuit o 70 11/26/80 Diesel Component Diesel Generator Oil Cylinder in the emergency diesel Diesel A Generator Failure generator failed under testing. The Generator heat ignited the fuel oil. The generator was removed from service and the fire extinguished.

Notes Applicability: A - Anytime / P - During Power Only P."t1686%e 'c/oc C-28 I

C. C p t/L t on Based Fire I Frequency Table C-2 Generic Fire Events Applicable to the Ginna Station Fire PRA (Continued)

Fire Fire Operation Incident Fire Initiators Initiators ID Site-Unit Mode Date Location Cause (Equipment) (Fuel) Event Description Category Applicability 71 HO 2/1/81 Diesel Personnnel Diesel Generator Insulation The insulation on the diesel Diesel Generator Error? generator was oil soaked. It Generator Building ignited when the generator was started.

72 HO 7/22/83 Turbine Component Feed Pump Oil Oil had leaked into the insulation Turbine Bldg.

Building Failure Turbine around the turbine. The heat from-the turbine apparently ignited the Turbine/Gener oil. ator 73 HO 10/26/83 Diesel Defective Diesel Generator Oil Maintenance had replaced oil filter Diesel Generator Procedure and left some oil on the ground Generator Room which caught fire later. CO2 extinguished.

74 HO 9/19/84 Diesel Component Turbocharger Oil During the running of a diesel Diesel Generator Failure generator, oil was noticed to be Generator Building leaking from the turbocharger. The oil was near the exhaust manifold.

The oil ignited, but was extinguished.

75 HO 4/23/90 Turbine Personnel Waste Cigarette was thrown into trash Turbine Bldg.

Building Error drum which then ignited. - Other Extinguished with water from a drinking fountain.

76 HO 8/29/90 Diesel Component Turbocharger Solvent Leak of Glycol antifreeze from a Diesel Generator Failure small coolant jacket for a Generator Building turbocharger. The coolant dropped onto the hot exhaust manifold. Suppressed with CO2.

77 HO 5/16/91 Control Electrical Relay Piece of damaged phone jack fell Control Room Room Failure on relay causing it to short.

Notes Applicability: A-Anytime/P - During Power Only P;t1 686'Nge-C.doc/oc C-29

C. Coniponent/Location Based Fire Ig Freqnenag Table C-2 Generic Fire Events Applicable to the Ginna Station Fire PRA (Continued)

Fire Fire Operation Incident Fire initiators Initiators ID Site-Unit Mode Date Location Cause (Equipment) (Fuel) Event Description Category Applicability KQ Power 4/13/86 Tranformer Electrical Transformer On 4/13/86 at 1107 with unit 2 at Transformer-Operation Yard Failure 72% power and Unit 3 shutdown, Hi Voltage containment isolations occurred on both Units when the No. 3 Startup Source was deenergized. The No.

3 Startup Source was deenergized when the 3435 breaker opened because a fire involving t 112 RK Refueling 5/5/80 Trubine Electrical Generator Fire involving generator exciter Diesel Outage Building Failure, cubicle located in the DGB. Generator Component Discovered while conducting 24-Failure hour performance test.

113 Power 2/24/81 Reactor Personnel Insulation A fire occurred in the reactor Aux Bldg-Operation Building Error building. The fire was ignited by Other welding sparks falling on foam rubber that a contractor had placed to prevent pipes from contacting temporary thermal shielding installed for the welding operation.

The fire burned for app 114 RK Power 6/15/81 Reactor Welding and Torch Construction A Class 'A'ire (Foam Rubber) Aux Bldg-Operation Building Cutting Materials occurred above the Yardway rack Olher (95% Power) (Foam on the 51 ft level in the reactor Rubber) Building. The fire was ignited by welding sparks falling on the foam rubber that a contractor had emplaced. The fire burned for 2 -

minutes before it was iden Notes Applicability: A-Anytime/P - During Power Only PAt686N '.oc/oc C-38 ~:;l

C. Coinponent/Location Based Fire.lg reqnency Table C-3 Fire Events at Ginna Station Fire Applicable to the Fire PRA Operation Incident Fire No. Mode Date Location Cause Event Summary Event Category Power 5/5/92 Aux. Bldg. Temporary heat trace At 21:45, operator discovered fire in Aux Bldg - Other Operation Top floor connection wires exposed insulation in Aux. Bldg. Top floor North East

-. North East to plastic danger flag in corner. The fire was extinguished with CO2 Comer immediate vicinity of by 21:47.

exposed wires caught fire and spread to the insulation Power 2/23/81 Relay Welding Overhead Smoldering rag in Relay Room. Removed to Logic and Low Operation Room Exterior of Building. Room Aired Out. Power Cabinet (100%)

Power 2/25/83 Relay Transformer Fire First alarm received on S-08 (Relay Room) in Logic and Low Operation Room the control room. Personnel responded to Power Cabinet (100%) find smoke in the relay room and fire on backup transformer for the plant computer.

The second alarm and auto actuation occurred shortly after. All personnel exited t Power 7/31/91 Electrical Failure An electrical fault in an ESF undervoltage Logic and Low Operation cabinet resulted in burned insulation. Power Cabinet Power 12/29/80 MCC A Fire in the MCC A Breaker Cubicle MCC Operation Breaker Cubicle Power 9/22/88 MCC B "B" EH pump tripped. Smell of smoke MCC Operation Position 1M noticed at MCC B. Fire called off. Operator opened breaker and opened door and removed fuses. Fire secured.

p:51686%ge.C.doctoc C-61

C. Couiponeut/Location Baserl Fire I FrequetlcJl Table C-3 Fire Events at Ginna Station Fire Applicable to the Fire PRA (Continued)

Operation Incident Fire No. Mode Date Location Cause Event Summary Event Category 7 Power 2/18/97 "B" MG Set Failed bearing in "B" MG Fire alarm sounded at 01:45, and fire brigade Motor Generator Operation set. responded. Fire was out at 01:50, the cause Set was a failed bearing in the "B" MG set Power 12/25/96 Screenhou Short circuit in "C" SWP Operator heard fire alarm, and found light Swtichg ear - 480V Operation se around breaker smoke at "C" Service Water pump breaker and Below SW pump cubicle. There was a short circuit in the "C" area SW pump that caused a fire in the breaker.

9 Power 4/11/79 Main Electrical Short At approximately 10:45 a.m. on April 11, Transformer above Operation Transforme 1979, a fire call was announced at the main 4.16kv (100%) r control board, it was the main transformer.

The fire Brigade responded, the sprinkler system cut in, and also the Ontario Fire Department responded (with two trucks and 10 Power 1/7/81 Main Feed Smoking fire water storage tank booster Turbine Building-Operation Pump pump motor. Other Room 11 Power 8/4/87 Turbine Dirty, clogged fan causing Operator discovered smoke coming from Turbine Building-Operation Plant it to burn up. turbine sample rack upon opening cabinet. A Other Sample 15 Ib CO2 extinguisher was used to put out Rack the fire. After fire was out, the fire source was found to be the cooling fan in the base of the cabinet.

12 Power 8/27/87 Turbine Dirty Motor Security guard found secondary sample sink Turbine Building-Operation Building chiller pump motor burning up and reported Other Intermediat the fire. Fire brigade responded and secured e level power to the pump. Smoke began to dissipate.

PA1686N~ iootoc

C. Coniponcnt/Location Based Fire Ign Freqnenag Table C-3 Fire Events at Ginna Station Fire Applicable to the Fire PRA (Continued)

Operation Incident Fire No. Mode Date Location Cause Event Summary Event Category 13 Power 4/6/91 Turbine Faulty welder's lead or At 15:23 control room was reported that a fire Turbine Building-Operation Building overloaded welding had been extinguished. A welder's lead Other basement machine irisulation had started to burn. The welder outside had used a 5 lb. CO2 extinguisher to main feed extinguish the fire.

PulllP i OOill 14 Power 5/2/91 Turbine Faulty solenoid on the Fire was reported to the control room. Fire Turbine Building-Operation Building crane or overloaded brigade responded, power was secured to Other crane. turbine building crane. Fire went out.

pA1686Nge-o.doctoc C-63

C. Component/Location Based Fire / i Frertnenng Table C-4 Generic and Ginna-Specific Fire Frequencies by Location/Equipment No. of Power- Posterior No. Description Events Years Mean 5th%ile Median 95th%ile Aux Bldg - Other Fire Frequency - Anytime - Prior 1.61E-02 1.28E-03 9.57E-03 5.20E-02 Aux Bldg - Other Fire Frequency - Power Only- 3.02E 1.69E-04 1.51E-03 1.16E-02 Prior Aux. Bldg. - Other Fire Frequency - Power - Prior 2.03E-02 2.97E-03 1.45E-02 5.40E-02 Aux. Bldg. - Other Fire Frequency - Power 14.8 2.78E-02 5.78E-03 1.94E-02 7.88E-02 Aux Bldg - Rad Waste Fire Frequency - Anytime- 3.14E-03 2.18E-04 1.47E-03 1.20E-02 Prior Aux Bldg - Rad Waste Fire Frequency - Power 2.25E-03 2.51E-04 1.32E-03 7.16E-03 Only - Prior Aux Bldg. - Rad,Waste Fire Frequency- Power- 6.42E-03 1.01E-03 3.92E-03 1.88E-02 Prior Aux Bldg. - Rad-Waste Fire Frequency - Power 14.8 5.60E-03 9.86E-04 3.67E-03 1.61E-02 Battery Fire Frequency - Anytime - Prior 1.19E-03 3.69E 4.10E-04 4.41E-03 10 Battery Fire Frequency - Power Only - Prior 6.23E-04 3.22E-05 2.07E-04 2.18E-03 Battery Fire Frequency - Power - Prior 2.08E-03 1.98E-04 1.01E-03 6.84E-03 12 Battery Fire Frequency - Power 14.8 1.92E-03 'l.97E-04 9.80E-04 6.33E-03 Battery Charger/Inverter Fire Frequency- Anytime 5.89E-03 2.71E-04 2.71E-03 2.21E-02

- Prior 14 Battery Charger Inverter Fire Frequency - Power 6.77E-03 5.60E-04 3.82E-03 2.85E-02 Only - Prior PA16868oi- 'octoc C-64 f

C. Coniponent/Location Baserl'Fire,ig~ Freqnenag Table C-4 Generic and Ginna-Specific Fire Frequencies by Location/Equipment (Continued)

No. of Power- Posterior No. Description Events Years Mean 5th%ile Median 95th%ile 15 Battery Charger/Inverter Fire Frequency - Power- 1.55E-02 2.35E-03 1.03E-02 4.74E-02 Prior 16 Battery Charger/lnverter Fire Frequency - Power 14.8 1.28E-02 2.16E-03 8.79E-03 3.78E-02 17 Cable Fire Frequency - Anytime - Prior 5.56E-03 1.47E-04 1.97E-03 2.07E-02 18 Cable Fire Frequency - Power Only - Prior 2.46E-03 1.53E-04 1.25E-03 7.68E-03 19 Cable Fire Frequency - Power - Prior 9.22E-03 9.80E-04 4.78E-03 2.64E-02 20 Cable Fire Frequency - Power 14.8 7.02E-03 9.52E-04 4.27E-03 2.11E-02 Control Room Fire Frequency - Anytime - Prior 3.04E-03 1.02E-04 1.21E-03 1.20E-02 22 Control Room Fire Frequency - Power Only - Prior 2.07E-03 5.82E-05 7.96E-04 8.06E-03 23 Control Room Fire Frequency - Power - Prior 6.03E-03 5.82E-04 3.49E-03 2.05E-02 24 Control Room Fire Frequency- Power 14.8 5.12E-03 5.40E-04 3.34E-03 1.61E-02 25 Containment - Other Fire Frequency - Anytime- 8.02E-03 1.19E-03 5.17E-03 2.27E-02 Prior 26 Containment - Other Fire Frequency - Power Only- 7.23E-03 1.23E-03 4.97E-03 1.91E-02 Prior 27 Containment - Other Fire Frequency - Power- 1.84E-02 4.69E-03 1.44E-02 4.33E-02 Prior 28 Containment -Other Fire Frequency - Power 14.8 1.58E-02 4.47E-03 1.30E-02 3.53E-02 29 Containment - RCP Fire Frequency - Anytime- 8.03E-03 1.17E-03 5.07E-03 2.31E-02 Prior pA1686%ge-C.docjoc C-65

C C p t/L t' d F' F q Table C-4 Generic and Ginna-Specific Fire Frequencies by Location/Equipment(Continued)

No. of Power- Posterior No. Description Events Years Mean 5th%ile Median 95th%ile 30 Containment - RCP Fire Frequency - Power Only- 8.06E-03 1.19E-03 5.17E-03 2.28E-02 Prior 31 Containment - RCP Fire Frequency - Power - Prior 1.95E-02 4.88E-03 1.47E-02 4.80E-02 32 Containment - RCP Fire Frequency - Power 14.8 1.63E-02 4.71E-03 1.33E-02 3.70E-02 33 Diesel Generator Fire Frequency - Anytime - Prior 3.50E-02 2.06E-03 1.94E-02 1.39E-01 34 Diesel Generator Fire Frequency - Power Only- 1.11E-02 1.09E-03 5.89E-03 3.73E-02 Prior 35 Diesel Generator Fire Frequency - Power - Prior 5.05E-02 8.17E-03 3.49E-02 1.60E-01 36 Diesel Generator Fire Frequency - Power 14.8 3.19E-02 6.58E-03 2.43E-02 8.28E-02 37 HVAC/Chiller Fire Frequency - Anytime - Prior 2.55E-03 1.1 9E-04 1.36E-03 9.45E-03 38 HVAC/Chiller Fire Frequency - Power Only - Prior 4.63E-04 1.23E-05 1.48E-04 1.77E-03 39 HVAC/Chiller Fire Frequency - Power - Prior 3.21E-03 2.65E-04 1.69E-03 1.22E-02 40 HVAC/Chiller Fire Frequency - Power 14.8 3.04E-03 2.59E-04 1.64E-03 1.19E-02 41 . HVAC/Fans Fire Frequency - Anytime - Prior 1.77E-03 5.41E-05 7.38E-04 7.18E-03 42 HVAC/Fans Fire Frequency - Power Only - Prior 4.63E-04 1.23E-05 1.48E-04 1.77E-03 43 HVAC/Fans Fire Frequency - Power - Prior 2.42E-03 1.92E-04 1.43E-03 8.27E-03 44 HVAC/Fans Fire Frequency - Power 14.8 2.31E-03 1.85E-04 1.38E-03 7.78E-03 45 Low Power Cabinet Fire Frequency - Anytime- 2.43E-02 7.40E-04 1.10E-02 1.06E-01 Prior PA1686%o <~octoc C-66

C. Coinponent/Location Based Fire 1g~ Frer/nency Table C-4 Generic and Ginna-Specific Fire Frequencies by Location/Equipment (Continued)

No. of Power- Posterior No. Description Events Years Mean 5th%ile Median 95th%ile 46 Low Power Cabinet Fire Frequency - Power Only- 5.52E-03 1.57E-04 1.80E-03 2.1 3E-02 Prior 47 Low Power Cabinet Fire Frequency - Power - Prior 3.22E-02 2.60E-03 1.73E-02 1.04E-01 48 Low Power Cabinet Fire Frequency - Power 14.8 1.13E-01 3.04E-02 9.28E-02 1.94E-01 49 MCC Fire Frequency - Anytime - Prior 8.36E-03 2.29E-04 3.08E-03 2.59E-02 50 MCC Fire Frequency - Power Only - Prior 2.81E-03 1.42E-04 1.34E-03 1.01E-02 51 MCC Fire Frequency - Power - Prior 1.21E-02 1.16E-03 6.24E-03 3.95E-02 52 MCC Fire Frequency - Power 14.8 4.78E-02 7.10E-03 3.57E-02 1.28E-01 53 Motor Generator Set Fire Frequency -Anytime- 2.75E-03 1.19E-04 1.29E-03 1.24E-02 Prior 54 Motor Generator Set Fire Frequency - Power Only 4.45E-04 1.25E-05 1.35E-04 1.72E-03

- Prior 55 Motor Generator Set Fire Frequency - Power- 3.38E-03 2.61E-04 1.62E-03 1.21E-02 Prior 56 Motor Generator Set Fire Frequency - Power 14.8 8.60E-03 9.14E-04 5.82E-03 2.31E-02 57 Screen House Fire Frequency - Anytime - Prior 6.75E-03 3.78E-04 3.16E-03 2.34E-02 58 Screen House Fire Frequency - Power Only - Prior 1.86E-03 1.40E-04 9.93E-04 5.99E-03 59 Screen House Fite Frequency - Power - Prior 9.38E-03 1.19E-03 5.58E-03 2.82E-02 60 Screen House Fire Frequency- Power 14.8 7.66E-03 1.14E-03 5.11E-03 2.24E-02 pA1666%ge-C.docloc C-67

C. Component/Location Based Fire Ig Freqnenag Table CP Generic and Ginna-Specific Fire Frequencies by Location/Equipment (Continued)

No. of Power-Posterior No. Description Events Years Mean 5th%ile Median 95th%ile 61 Switchgear - Above 480v Fire Frequency - Anytime 1.38E-02 4.84E-04 4.92E-03 4.85E-02 I

- Pnor 62 Switchgear - Above 480v Fire Frequency - Power 3.11E-03 1.42E-04 1.41E-03 1.23E-02 Only - Prior 63 Switchgear - Above 480v Fire Frequency - Power- 1.79E-02 1.69E-03 8.76E-03 5.71E-02 Prior 64 Switchgear - Above 480v Fire Frequency - Power 14.8 1.17E-02 1.57E-03 7.76E-03 3.51E-02 65 Switchgear - 480v 8 Below Fire Frequency- 1.21E-02 2.48E-04 3.41E-03 4.41E-02 Anytime - Prior Switchgear - 480v 8 Below Fire Frequency - Power 3.24E-03 1.40E-04 1.43E-03 1.29E-02 Only-67 Switchgear - 480v 8 Below Fire Frequency - Power 1.68E-02 1.33E-03 7.70E-03 5.52E-02

- Prior 68 Switchgear - 480v 8 Below Fire Frequency - Power 14.8 2.66E-02 3.49E-03 1.69E-02 7.86E-02 69 Turbine Bldg - Other Fire Frequency - Anytime- 7.88E-03 3.76E-04 3.19E-03 3.05E-02 Prior 70 Turbine Bldg - Other Fire Frequency - Power Only- 1.16E-02 7.30E-04 6.53E-03 3.83E-02 Prior Turbine Bldg - Other Fire Frequency - Power- 2.47E-02 3.47E-03 1.61E-02 7.81E-02 Prior 72 Turbine Bldg - Other Fire Frequency - Power 14.8 1.45E-01 6.05E-02 1.50E-01 2.19E-01 P 31686%9+'oetoc C-68

e C. Co>uponenf/Location Baserl Fire Eg reguenny Table C-4 Generic and Ginna-Specific Fire Frequencies by Location/Equipment (Continued)

Posterior No. of Power-No. Description Events Years Mean 5th%ile Median 95th%ile 73 Turbine Bldg - Turbine/Generator I

Fire Frequency- 3.68E-03 5.06E-04 2.10E-03 1.16E-02 Anytime - Prior 74 Turbine Bldg - Turbine/Generator Fire Frequency- 2.08E-02 1.90E-03 1.35E-02 6.70E-02 Power Only - Prior 75 Turbine Bldg - Turbine/Generator Fire Frequency- 3.31E-02 5.24E-03 2.25E-02 9.31E-02 Power - Prior 76 Turbine Bldg - Turbine/Generator Fire Frequency- 14.8 2.35E-02 4.49E-03 1.87E-02 5.96E-02 Power 77 Transformer- Hi Voltage Fire Frequency -Anytime 1.83E-02 1.67E-03 1.28E-02 5.34E-02

- Prior 78 Transformer - Hi Voltage Fire Frequency - Power 3.04E-03 3.85E-04 1.64E-03 9.21E-03 Only - Prior 79 Transformer - Hi Voltage Fire Frequency - Power- 2.26E-02 4.10E-03 1.62E-02 5.93E-02 Prior 80 Transformer- Hi Voltage Fire Frequency - Power 14.8 2.98E-02 6.87E-03 2.27E-02 7.67E-02 81 Transformer - Instrument Fire Frequency - Anytime 6.12E-03 3.01E-04 2.05E-03 2.04E-02

- Pnor 82 Transformer - Instrument Fire Frequency - Power 3.03E-03 3.86E-04 1.64E-03 9.06E-03 Only - Prior 83 Transformer - Instrument Fire Frequency - Power- 1.05E-02 1.56E-03 5.77E-03 2.99E-02 Prior 84 Transformer - Instrument Fire Frequency - Power 14.8 8.04E-03 1.49E-03 5.43E-03 2.33E-02 P:51686Nge-c.docfoc C-69

0 C. Con3ponent/Location Based Fire Ig Freqnency Table C-4 Generic and Ginna-Specific Fire Frequencies by Location/Equipment (Continued)

Posterior No. of Power-No. Description Events Years Mean 5th%ile Median 95th%ile 85 Transformer - Lo Voltage Fire Frequency - Anytime 4.33E-03 3.57E-04 2.00E-03 1.54E-02

- Pnor 86 Transformer- Lo Voltage Fire Frequency - Power 3.04E-03 3.85E-04 1.64E-03 9.21E-03 Only - Prior 87 Transformer - Lo Voltage Fire Frequency - Power- 8.60E-03 1.66E-03 5.53E-03 2.32E-02 Prior 88 Transformer - Lo Voltage Fire Frequency - Power 14.8 7.29E-03 1.60E-03 5.1 5E-03 2.03E-02 C-70 3

J

D. Fire Freqnennf Apporlionnient D. Pire Prequency Apportionment Location-based scenarios developed for a fire zone in the spatial interactions analysis phase of the analysis describe all possible fire events that can occur in the fire zone and conservatively assume that each fire event can damage all components within the fire zone.. Thus, all fire initiators within a fire zone must be accounted for. Since more than one component type that can initiate a fire may be found in a fire zone, the fire initiation for a fire zone must account for the composite nature of the fire hazards. The primary fire initiation frequency for each fire zone was then assumed to be the sum of the component-based ignition frequency of the components found in the fire zone, except for locations whose total fire frequencies are determined through data analysis. 'hose D.1 Frequency Apportionment of a Category of Components The component-based fire frequencies obtained for the fire occurrence frequency of each component category must be apportioned to different plant locations to correctly reflect the variety of the component categories and the actual inventory of the components, in situ fuel sources, and the personnel activities at the fire zone.

The primary objective of the fire frequency apportionment was to develop a reasonable estimate for the hazard frequency that consistently accounts for the actual configuration of equipment in each location. For example, the plant-specific mean fire occurrence frequency for the component category "battery-related fires" is assessed to be 1.92E-03 per year. This frequency stands for the estimated fire frequency from all battery-contributed fire events throughout the entire unit. To utilize this frequency, it must be systematically apportioned to different plant areas that contain batteries. [Note that the term "battery" is referred to banks of battery cells similar to those commonly found in a battery room. Fires related to small-sized backup batteries frequently found in control cabinets (e.g., control cabinet fires) are included as cabinet-related fire events instead of battery-related fire events.]

One method is to count all batteries in the plant and to apportion the fire frequency of battery component category to these areas proportionally. Another method is to assign a relative weighing factor to locations with battery banks. A weighing factor would be developed for each component type in each plant location of interest. The factor, which is based on inventory count, observations of the plant walkdown team, and the judgment of the plant personnel and analysts, is the relative fraction of the quantity of a particular component type in a location to the total quantity of such components found in the plant.

The LCTs (Appendix B) present a cross-reference table between the fire zories and the population of the fire initiating components in the plant. For the countable equipment (e.g., pump), the entries would be the component count of the equipment type. For human error-related events, the entries are an activity level assigned through observations during walkdowns. For cable-related events, the entries are the estimated weighting factor of cable occupancy.

P:51686Nge-o.doc/oc D-1

D. Fire Freqnenng Apportion>nent D.2 Development of Frequencies for Locations with Multiple Hazard Sources ln some locations, it is necessary to combine data for various types of hazards to develop the best possible frequency estimate for a particular scenario. These cases often apply to locations that contain combinations of mechanical equipment, electrical equipment, control cabinets, cables, etc. These combinations may result from a specific design feature of the plant that is being evaluated, or they may be a byproduct of the manner in which the fire frequencies have been defined. For example (not Ginna), an air compressor may be located in an open corner of a large cable spreading room. The air compressor may not be important for the PSA models. The estimated frequency for fire events in this location must account for the composite nature of the fire hazards, that is cables as well as the compressor. It is unreasonable to develop a fire occurrence frequency that is based only on "cable spreading room" fire events, even though the PSA impacts are derived only from failures of the cables.

These situations are addressed by developing a composite hazard frequency that accounts for the types of equipment and the relative density of equipment in each location. For example, a composite fire frequency would be developed for the cable spreading room by adding a fraction of the "turbine building air compressor" fire event frequency data to the "cable spreading room" fire event frequency data. The fractions are often based on general observations from the plant walkdown and the personal experience and judgment of the fire analysis experts. In the specific case of Ginna, an equipment location database is also available.

D.3 Allocation of Pire Event Categories to Ginna Plant Locations This step of the spatial interactions analysis allocates the 22 fire event categories among the 47 Ginna plant locations (generic information was used for the diesel/generator fuel tank area in the yard). These allocations are derived from notes and information collected during the plant walkdowns, the cable routing database (Reference D.l) and the fire response plan drawings (Reference D.2). In some cases, the assigned percentages are very approximate. However, they provide a method to consistently allocate the fire event frequency data among the plant locations in a manner that accounts for the types, quantities, and distribution of equipment among these areas.

Three general considerations were used as the bases for these allocations.

Specific types of equipment in the location Relative amount of each equipment type, compared with all other locations Relative size of the location, compared with all other similar locations The third consideration was used primarily for large, open areas in the Containment, Auxiliary Building, and Turbine Building.

The following simple example illustrates the basic elements of this allocation process.

Suppose that Plant X contains only three locations. The spatial interactions walkdown has documented the following equipment inventories in each location.

P:$ 1686Nge-o.doc/oc . D-2

D. Fire Frertuenaf Apportionnient Location 1: 2 pumps, 1 motor control center, 25% of the cables.

Location 2: two 480V buses, 4 motor control centers, 45% of the cables.

Location 3: 3 pumps, 30% of the cables.

Thus, Plant X contains a total of 5 pumps, 5 motor control centers, two 480V buses, and cables. The percentage of cables in each location is gener'ally based on the walkdown analyst's notes and approximate estimates. (For the Ginna Station, the amount of cable in the fire zones was available from Reference D.3). The following table summarizes how this information is used to allocate the relevant fire event categories among these locations.

Event Category for Plant X Location 1 Location 2 Location 3 Total Auxiliary Building - Other 0.40 0.60 1.00 Switchgear - 480V and Below 1.00 1.00 Motor Control Center 0.20 0.80 1.00 Cable 0.25 0.45 0.30 1.00 In this example, the Auxiliary Building - Other allocations are based only on the total inventory of similarly sized pumps in each location. However, the analyst may subjectively adjust these percentages if Location 1 also contains a storage area, if Location 2 has substantially higher personnel traffic, etc.

Based on these allocations, the total fire frequency for Location 1 is the sum of 40% of the Auxiliary Building - Other fire frequency, plus 20% of the Motor Control Center fire frequency, plus 25% of the Cable fire frequency. This process accounts for the specific types and quantities of equipment in each location. The resulting composite fire frequencies are appropriately weighted combinations that account for the plant-specific distribution of equipment and numerical differences in the fire event frequencies for each type of equipment.

To arrive at a finalized count of equipment at any location, the total equipment at the plant was apportioned amongst the locations. Exercises similar to the above were conducted for the mechanical equipment, MCCs, and logic cabinets. As far as possible, References D.1 and D.2 were used to determine the components in the fire zones and supplemented by the walkdown observations. Larger components were given a twice the weight of the smaller components. The fractions used and the basis for the fractions (equipment coupt) for each fire zone and each type of equipment is shown in4he Table D-1.

In addition to the actual equipment and material count, adjustment is made for fires caused by human errors. For example, the H~ storage room and the turbine oil storage rooms have no mechanical equipment, no MCCs or cables. However, they do contain combustible material that may ignite due to human error. To account for these types of events, we consult the generic fire database. The auxiliary building fires in the generic database total 16 out of which, 5 were caused due to human error. Therefore, 5/16ths of P:41686iRge-o.docloc D-3

D. Fire Freeze>i'pportionn>eut the fire total frequency in the auxiliary building was assigned as human error related fires. This frequency was again apportioned among the fire zones in the auxiliary building. The bases for these fractions, once again, depend on the observations during plant walkdown, noticing activity levels in different locations of the building. Added to this is the analyst's judgment about how much other activity is involved during normal plant operation with actions such as maintenance and testing of equipment.

The fire frequencies for each of the 47 Ginna locations were developed using the described apportioning techniques. The final fire frequency for each location is shown in Table D-2 0.4 References

1. Ginna Station Cable Routing Database, Microsoft Access Database, CABLETRK.MDB, June 1998.

2. Ginna Station Fire Response Drawings, Nos. 33013-2540 through 33013-2581.

3. Ginna Station Fire Combustible Loading Analysis, DA-ME-98-004, Revision 0, April 3, 1998.

PA16861Rge.o.docloc D-4

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D. Fire Freqnenag Apportionntcnt Notes:

1. Rad waste equally distributed over the three floors of the aux building

2. 3 out of 16 events in aux building-other category (generic database) involve charging pumps

3. 5 out of 16 events in aux building-other category (generic database) involve human error initiated fires.

4. Mechanical equipment count of the three levels in the aux building, intermediate building, service building, and standby aux feedwater pump room (except fans)

ABB 5 small and 11 large pumps or other components ABM 2 small compressors ABO 7 small and 2 large pumps or other components IBN-1 5 small and 3 large pumps or other components IBN-2 no mechanical components IBN-3 no mechanical components IBN-4 no mechanical components IBS-1 1 small pump IBS-2 no mechanical components I BS-3 no mechanical components SAF 2 large pumps I

5. 2.5 of the 8 events in the turbine building-other (generic database) involve human error initiated fires.

Mechanical equipment (except fans) count and human error is assigned as follows:

H2 no mechanical equipment, 5% of human error frequency TO no mechanical equipment, 5% of human error frequency TB-1FP 1 small and 2 large pumps and 10% of human error frequency':51686ERge D.docloc D-7

D. Fire Freqnenng Apportion~nent TB-1 14 small and 10 large pumps and 40% of human error frequency TB-2 9 small pumps and 20% of human error frequency TB-3 no mechanical equipment, 20% of human error frequency

7. A count of the HVAC fans (total 87) is as follows:

ABB-1 ABM-2 ABO-3 AHR AVT 7 CR 1 EDG1A-1 2 EDG1B-1 2 IBN-1 1 IBN-2 IBM-3 IBS-1 IBS-3 RC-1 RC-2 RR SB-1 SB-1WT 1 SB-2 6 SH-2 I TB-1 6 TB-1FP 1 P:$ 1686>Rge-o.dooloc D-8

D. Fire Frertnenag Apportionment TB-2 TSC-1M TSC-1N

8. A count of the low power cabinets (total 116) is as follows:

ABB-1 10 ABM-2 ABO-3 AHR BR1A BR1B BRRM IBN-1 IBN-2 IBS-1 IBS-2 RR 68 SAF SH-2 SH-1 P:51686'Ago-o.docloc D 9

Response to Fire IPEEE Questions ATTACHMENTB.3 EXTRACTS FROM SECTION 9.6 (INTERNAL FIRE RESULTS) AND 11.6 (

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSION) OF THE GINNA PSA

r.ocAYrON Cm,IU nmarSxrCS vox,E FIRE AREA:

Phl6265RCE B L.DOC/oc 8- 406 9/22IN l2:22;S2 Phl

GINNA STATION PSA REVISION 1 FIRE IPEEE FINALREPORT PAGE 9-1 9.0 LEVEL 1 RESULTS 9.6 Internal Fire Results Similar to the internal events PSA, the internal fire results were assessed with respect to sensitivities and importance measures. The results are summarized below.

9.6.1 Internal Fire Results The total core damage frequency (CDF) due to internal fire is 3.3E-5/yr. The listing ofthe top 50 (and ties) of the final cutsets is shown in Table 9-14 (note these account for 43% of the CDF due to internal fire).

A summary of the fire scenarios contributing at least 5.0% to the fire CDF is provided below.

9.6.1.1 Control Room Fires Among the final cut sets, the largest contribution to the fire CDF (19.8%) comes from ignition of a fire in the Control Room's main control board and any two electrical cabinets that subsequently requires Control Room evacuation due to a significant loss of instrumentation and control (FIOCR3-1 and FACR-MCB).

Thirty-five cabinets are installed in the Control Room in addition to the main control board cabinets. The total ignition frequency for a fire in the Control Room of 5.1E-3/yr (Ref. 164) was apportioned such that I/50~ of the frequency was assigned for the ignition of any one cabinet and 15/50~'f the frequency was assigned for the ignition ofthe main control board cabinets, based on the relative sizes of each. The ignition frequency is therefore (15/50+ 2/50)*(5.1E-3/yr) = 1.7E-3/yr. This is considered to be a transient which does not result in conditions for Safety Injection (SI) (AAAATRANSIN), nor does it cause a station blackout (NOSBO). Since there is no automatic suppression in the Control Room (FSAASUPPXX), only manual suppression by the Fire Brigade is possible. This is assumed to fail with a probability'f 0.03 (FSHFDCR-3-X). Each of the dominant cut sets leading to core damage includes one of the following:

Non-fire-induced failure of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Diesel Generator (DG) to start or run (DGDGATSCXX or DGDGFTSCXX);

Unavailability ofthe turbine-driven AuxiliaryFeedwater (TDAFW)Pump due to: (1) its train being out for test and maintenance (AFTMOTDAFW),(2) failure to correctly restore its train to service after test and maintenance (AFHFLTDAFW), or (3) non-fire-induced failures of its components (AFMMOTDAFW);

Spurious opening of SG A Blowdown Isolation AOV 5738 due to hot shorting of its control cable (MSHSF05738) while the TDAFW train injection line to SG B is out of service for test and maintenance (AFTMTDAFWB);

Any of the following fire-induced human errors:

Failure to locally open discharge MOV 3996 from and steam supply MOV 3505A to the TDAFW Pump, per the attachments to the ER-FIRE Procedures (FSHFDAFWXX);

Failure to align TSC DC power supply to Battery B for the TDAFW pump, per the attachments to the ER-FIRE Procedures (FSHFDDCPWR);

Failure to locally operate PORV 430, per the attachments to the ER-FIRE Procedures (FSHFDPORVS);

S GINNA STATION PSA REVISION I FIRE IPEEE FINALREPORT PAGE 9-2 Failure to employ alternate AFW/Steam Generator (SG) instrumentation aAer Control Room indication has been lost (FSHFDCROM2);

Failure to find alternative cooldown paths (specifically the TDAFW steam lines)

(FSHFDREC03), aAer non-fire-induced failure of nitrogen bottles to supply SG A Atmospheric Relief Valve (ARV) 3411 (MSMMN2BOTA).

9.6.1.2 Turbine Building Fires The next largest contribution among the final cut sets to the fire CDF (14.7%) arises from ignition of fires in the Turbine Building, at specific locations on the Mezzanine and Basement Levels. These are discussed below.

The larger contribution (9.6%) from fires in the Turbine Building arises from ignition of a fire in Bus Cabinet 11A/12A or 11B/12B at the Mezzanine Level (FIOTB2-1 and FATB-2-2). The total ignition frequency for these cabinets is 1.2E-2/yr (Ref. 164). There is no automatic suppression, and manual suppression, even ifsuccessful, was assumed not to extinguish the fire within the affected cabinet in time to prevent accident progression (FSAASUPPOK). This is followed by a loss of AC Train A (ACTRAINA)as a direct result of the fire. These particular events lead to two sets of scenarios characterized by: (1) a transient without station blackout (NOSBO), but with a small LOCA (SLO); and (2) a transient with station blackout (SBO). Each set is discussed below.

Transients without Station Blackout, but with a Small LOCA. In these scenarios, a small LOCA occurs after the loss of Main Feedwater (MFW) (as supplied by AC Buses 11 and

12) when PORV 430 fails to reseat after steam relief(RCRZT00430) and its motor-operated block valve (516) has no AC power. The dominant cut sets leading to core damage include coincident events among the following:

Unavailability of RHR train B due to its being out ofservice for test or maintenance (RHTMOOOOOB);

Non-fire-induced failure to open of MOV 738B to supply Component Cooling Water (CCW) to Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Heat Exchanger (HX) B (CCMM00738 8);

Human mispositioning of CCW throttling isolation valve 780B on the outlet side of RHR.HX B (CCHFL0780B).

Transients with Station Blackout. In this scenario, the loss of all offsite power following the reactor trip (ACLOPRTALL)causes loss of AC Train B (ACTRAINB)when the fire forces an interlocked feeder breaker to Bus 16 to fail to open, thereby preventing DG B from connecting to Bus 16. With the assumed unavailability ofthe TDAFWtrain due to its being out for test and maintenance (AFTMOTDAFW),core damage results.

GINNA STATION PSA REVISION 1 FIRE IPEEE FINALREPORT PAGE 9-3 The smaller contribution (5.1%) from fires in the Turbine Building arises from ignition of a fire in the vicinity of the power supply cables to AC Buses 14, 16, 17, or 18 at the Basement Level (FIOTB1-1 and FATB-1-1). The total ignition frequency for combustibles in this location is 1.4E-3/yr (Ref. 164). This is considered to be a transient initiating event which does not result in conditions for SI (AAAATRANSIN),but involves a station blackout (SBO). Non-fire-induced failure ofDG A to run (DGDGF0001A) occurs. (As above, the fire itself forces an interlocked feeder breaker to Bus 16 to fail to open, which prevents DG B from connecting to Bus 16.) Although automatic suppression is available(Suppression Systems S24 through S27), the one in the immediate vicinity of the fire is assumed to fail (FSAASUPPXX). This is assumed to fail power cables to the affected AC bus from DG B. Each of the dominant cut sets leading to core damage includes failure of one of the following automatic sprinkler systems, specifically the one in the immediate vicinity of the fire:

1. Spray S24 (Turbine Condenser Pit vicinity) (FSXXXTR768);

2. Spray S25 (Generator Hydrogen Seal vicinity) (FSXXXTR769);

3. Spray S26 (Turbine Island vicinity) (FSXXXTR770);

4. Spray S27 (Main Turbine Oil Reservoir vicinity) (FSXXXTR771).

9.6.1.3 Battery Room Fires The next largest contribution among the final cut sets to the fire CDF (11.8%) arises from ignition of fires in Battery Rooms A and B (FIBR1A-3 and FABR1A; FIBRIB-3 and FIBR1B). Each room contains batteries, battery chargers, inverters, cables, and transformers. The total ignition frequency for each room is 6.9E-3/yr (Ref. 164), assuming fire can occur in any one ofthese combustibles. Since there is no automatic suppression in the Battery Rooms (FSAASUPPXX), only manual suppression by the Fire Brigade is possible.

This is assumed to fail with a probability of 0.03 (FSHFDBR1A3 and FSHFDBR1B3). It is further assumed that the fire has spread beyond its initial source (probability = 0.1) prior to suppression (FSASPROP01).

Each Battery Room is discussed separately below.

Battery Room A. Fire in this room, which contributes 6.8% to the fire CDF, is considered to be a transient which does not result in conditions for Sl (AAAATRANSIN),nor does it cause a station blackout (NOSBO). Each of the dominant cut sets leading to core damage includes one of the following:

Non-fire-induced failure of the TSC DG to start or run (DGDGATSCXX or DGDGFTSCXX);

Unavailability of the TDAFW Pump due to: (1) its train being out for test and maintenance (AFTMOTDAFW),or (2) non-fire-induced failures of its components (AFMMOTDAFW);

Human failure to align TSC DC power supply to Battery B for the TDAFW pump, per the attachments to the ER-FIRE Procedures (FSHFDDCPWR).

GINNA STATION PSA REVISION I FIRE IPEEE FINALREPORT PAGE 9-4

b. Salary Room B. Fire in this room, which contributes 5.0% to the fire CDF, is considered to be a transient which induces a station blackout (SBO). The fire itself fails AC Train B. Each of the dominant cut sets leading to core damage includes one of the following which prevents AC Train A from being powered:

l. Unavailability of DG A due to test or maintenance (DGTM00001A);

2. Loss ofAC Motor Control Center (MCC) H when feeder circuit breaker 52/MCCH transfers open due to a cable wrap failure (ACWPFMCC1H) that occurs once the fire duration reaches one hour (FSAAFIREIH);

Loss of AC MCC H when disconnect switch,DCPDPCB03A/03 transfers open due to a cable wrap failure (DCWPFC3ACX) that occurs once the fire duration reaches one hour (FSAAFIRE I H).

9.6.2 Internal Fire Sensitivity Analysis As described in Section 9.3.1, sensitivity analyses were performed for eight types of basic events within the internal events PSA models (i.e., human errors, test and maintenance, common cause failures, initiating events, MOVs, AOVs, DGs, and pumps). Since the fire analysis used the same fault tree models and event trees as the internal events PSA, only the new basic events need to be assessed. Also, every cut set contains a similar fire initiating event(vs. the internal events PSA which addressed LOCAs, steam line breaks, reactor trips). As such, no sensitivity was performed on the fire initiators. Therefore, ofthe eight basic event types, only human errors were considered. However, another category, hot-short-induced failures, was also addressed. Both are discussed below.

9.6.2.1 Human Errors Two sensitivity studies were performed with respect to human errors. First, all human errors were set to "false" (i.e., all were assumed to be performed successfully). As a result, the fire CDF decreased by 69%

to a value of 1.0E-S/yr, indicating a large sensitivity of the accident sequences to human reliability failure rates. The decreases in the contributions from the dominant scenarios were as follows.

For the dominant Control Room fires (FIOCR3-1 and FACR-MCB), the contribution to fire CDF dropped by 99.2%. This indicates that these Control Room fire scenarios essentially are totally dependent on successful human intervention. This is evident from the description in Section 9.6.1.1. Nearly all Control Room fire scenarios are conditional upon failure of manual suppression (FSHFDCR-3-X).

For the dominant Turbine Building fires (FIOTB2-1 and FATB-2-2; FIOTB1-1 and FATH-1-1), the contribution to fire CDF dropped by 30.5%. Therefore, the dependence of these Turbine Building fire scenarios upon successful human intervention was much less pronounced that those for the Control Room, as one might expect. For the Turbine Building Mezzanine fires, recall from Section 9.6.1.2 that manual suppression, even if successful, was assumed not to extinguish the fire in time to prevent accident progression (FSAASUPPOK). For the Turbine Building Basement fires, only automatic suppression was available, and this was assumed to fail (FSAASUPPXX).

GINNA STATION PSA REVISION 1 FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT PAGE 9-5 For the dominant Battery Room fires (FIBR1A-3 and FABR1A; FIBR1B-3 and FIBR1B), the contribution to fire CDF dropped by 87.2%, nearly as much as for the Control Room. As for the Control Room, most Battery Room fire scenarios (see Section 9.6.1.3) are conditional upon failure of manual suppression (FSHFDBRIA3 and FSHFDBR1B3) since no automatic suppression exists.

The second sensitivity study on human errors involved setting all human errors to "true," equivalent to assuming that humans always erred. The fire CDF increased by a factor of 1.48E+4 to a value of 0.494/year as a result. This indicates that successful human intervention is very important to prevent core damage from fires and that humans are considered to be highly reliable in performing the required actions.

9.6.2.2 Hot-Short-Induced Failures The sensitivity of the fire CDF to spurious energization/de-energization of control and power cables due to hot shorting was also assessed in a manner similar to that for human errors. When all hot short failures were set to "false" (i.e., assuming no hot shorts occurred), the fire CDF decreased by only 6.0% to a value of 3.15E-5/yr. The effect on the dominant accident scenarios was similarly small. This indicates that hot-short-induced failures are a small contributor to the fire CDF. A review of Section 9.6.1 indicates only one contribution among the dominant scenarios, that arising from MSHSF05738 for the Control Room fires.

When all hot short failures were set to "true," equivalent to assuming that they always occurred, the fire CDF increased by 61% to a value of 5.41E-S/yr. This relatively modest increase indicates, again, that hot shorts are a small contributor to the fire CDF, but that their conditional probability of occurrence (many assumed to be 0.1) is already fairly high.

9.6.2.3 Internal Fire Truncation Limit Evaluation As a final sensitivity study, the truncation limitwas evaluated with respect to its impact on the final results.

This was performed by generating Figure 9-14 which shows the contribution ofthe cut sets in each "decade" (e.g., 1E-6/yr, 1E-7/yr, etc.) to the final fire CDF. Figure 9-14 indicates that the CDF contained in each decade initiallyrises, peaking at 1.11E-5/yr in the third decade (1E-7/yr to 1E-8/yr), then decreases rapidly over the last two decades. The cut sets whose frequencies are >1E-9/yr contribute over 93% to the final CDF. Also, as noted on the figure, over 76% of the total number of cut sets have frequencies in the last decade (1E-9/yr to 1E-10/yr); however, these contribute less than 7% to the final CDF. Consequently, further reduction of the truncation limit should not significantly impact the CDF estimation.

9.6.3 Importance Analysis As described in Section 9.3.2, two types of importance measures were generated for most basic events contained in the final cutsets: (1) Fussell-Vesely (F-V), and (2) Risk Achievement Worth (RAW). These importance measures were combined as follows:

a. Ifthe F-V value is z 0.05 at the system level (z 0.005 at the component level) and the RAW a 10 at the system level (a 2 at the component level), then the system or component will be identified as being "high" risk significant.

GINNA STATION PSA REVISION 1 FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT PAGE 9-6

b. Ifthe F-V value is z 0.05 at the system level (z 0.005 at the component level) or the RAW a 10 at the system level (a 2 at the component level), then the system or component will be identified as being "medium" risk significant.

c. Ifthe F-V value is < 0.05 at the system level (< 0.005 at the component level) and the RAW < 10 at the system level (< 2 at the component level), then the system or component willbe identified as being "low" risk significant.

The F-V and RAW importance measures were generated for fire initiating events, human errors, test and maintenance activities, fire modeling assumptions, and on a system and component basis. Each of these is described below in detail. Included within these discussions is a reference to a table and figure containing the specific F-V and RAW values. The table is self-explanatory; however, additional information with respect to the figure is necessary to ensure correct interpretation.

In order to provide a visual depiction of the risk profile associated with various events modeled within the Ginna Station PSA, the F-V and RAW importance measures were plotted against one another. In this manner, it can be easily identified which events are ofhigher risk than others. For example, all human error F-V and RAW values plotted are on Figure 9-16. A "cross-hair" was provided on the figure for F-V values equal to 0.005 (vertical line) and RAW values equal to 2 (horizontal line). Any event to the left of the F-V.

line or below the RAW line is not risk significant with respect to that specific importance measure.

However, an event to the left of the F-V line but above the RAW line is risk significant with respect to RAW only. Similarly, an event to the ~ri ht of the F-V line but below the RAW line is risk significant with respect to F-V only (e.g., FSHFDREC03). Events which are to the right of the F-V line and above the RAW line are risk significant with respect to both importance measures (e.g., FSHFDDCPWR).

In summary, an event in the upper left hand corner or lower right hand corner is ofmedium risk significance.

An event in the upper right hand corner is of high risk significance while events in the lower left hand corner are of low risk significance. Further insights can also be obtained by which "corner" a given event is in as described below:

An event in the upper left hand corner is generally of high reliability; consequently, the event did not contribute significantly to the final CDF. However, ifthe component were to fail, the impact on the final CDF would be significant. Typically, this corner contains passive components, highly redundant systems, or events which are easily performed by operators.

An event in the lower right hand corner is typically of lower reliability than is justified by the fault tree model. That is, the event contributes to the final CDF; however, ifthe event were assumed to always fail, it is not expected to further affect the final results. Generally, this is due to the fact that the event's failure probability is already close to 1.0 such that increasing its value to 1.0 would not have much of an effect on the CDF. It should be noted that an event's failure probability may have been a conservative value selected by the PSA analyst due to limited data and is not necessarily reflective of the specific component history. Ifso, this is noted in the descriptive text below.

0 GINNA STATION PSA REVISION I FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT PAGE 9-7

c. An event in the upper right hand corner contributes significantly to the final results and would significantly affect the CDF if it were assumed to always fail. Therefore, this event is very important with respect to the risk profile.

d. An event in the lower left hand corner does not contribute to the final result, and even ifit were assumed to fail with a probability of 1.0, would not significantly impact the CDF.

9.6.3.1 Internal Fire Initiating Events The importance measures for the internal fire initiating events are listed in Table 9-15 and displayed in Figure 9-15. The following three events are of high importance:

Fire in Zone CR-3 (Control Room)

Fire in Zone BR1A (Battery Room A)

Fire in Zone TB1-1 (Turbine Building Basement)

Each contributed a 5.0% to the fire CDF (F-V a 0.05), as discussed in Section 9.6.1; and ifthe initiator were assumed to be "true," it would raise the fire CDF by a factor a 10 (RAW a 10).

Two events are of medium importance based on an F-V value a 0.05:

a. FIOTB2-1 Fire in Zone TB2-1 (Turbine Building Mezzanine)

b. FIBR1B-3 Fire in Zone BR1B (Battery Room B)

Both were discussed in Section 9.6.1.

Four events are of medium importance based on a RAW value a 10:

a. FIDG1B10 Fire in Zone EDGIB-0 (DG Room B Cable Vault)

b. FIOCR3-3 Fire in Zone CR-3 (Control Room) (Fails Division A only)

c. FIOOABO I Fire in Zone ABO (Auxiliary Building Operating Level)

d. FIOOAHRI Fire in Zone AHR (Air Handling Room)

While none of these contributes at least 5.0% to the fire CDF, each, ifassumed to be "true," would increase the fire CDF by a factor of at least 10. These could be of concern ifthe combustible loadings, and therefore the fire ignition frequencies, in the zones were to increase, e.g., via presence of transient combustibles.

9.6.3.2 Human Errors The importance measures for the human errors are listed in Table 9-16 and displayed in Figure 9-16.

Excluded are the following two groups of "human errors:"

a. Latent human errors associated with test and maintenance activities, which have been included with the test and maintenance activities in Section 9.6.3.3.

GINNA STATION PSA REVISION 1 FIRE IPEEE FINALREPORT PAGE 9-8

b. Failures to manually suppress fires, which have been included with the modeling assumptions in Section 9.6.4.4.

For the human errors included in this section, the following 11 events are of high importance:

a. FSHFDCROM2 Failure to employ alternate AFW/SG instrumentation aAer Control Room indication has been lost

b. FSHFDDCPWR Failure to align TSC DC power supply to Battery B for the TDAFW pump, per the attachments to the ER-FIRE Procedures

c. AFHFDSAFWX Failure to correctly align Standby AFW (SAFW)

d. FSHFDPORVS Failure to locally operate PORV 430, per the attachments to the ER-FIRE Procedures

e. AFHFDCITYW Failure to use city fire water for SAFW, per Procedure ER-AFW.1

f. FSHFDAFWXX Failure to locally open discharge MOV 3996 from and steam supply MOV 3505A to the TDAFW Pump, per the attachments to the ER-FIRE Procedures

g. AFHFDALTTD Failure to provide cooling to the TDAFW pump lube oil from the diesel-driven Fire Service Water (SW) pump

h. FSHFDCROM1 Failure to use alternate instrumentation for natural circulation when Control Room indication is lost RCHFDRHRSB Failure to rapidly depressurize the primary system to the level for initiating RHR, or failure to use AFW in the long term J~ AFHFDBLOWD Failure to isolate SG blowdown locally k SWHFDSTART Failure to start a SW pump.

Each contributed a 0.5% to the fire CDF (F-V a 0.005); and ifthe event were assumed to be "true," it would raise the fire CDF by a factor a 2 (RAW a 2). Four actions ([a], [b], [d], and [f])were discussed in Section 9.6.1. Four of the other human errors appear in ([e] and [g]) or near ([c] in 852 and [i] in 857) the top 50 cut sets. Of the remaining three human errors, FSHFDCROM1 appears in cut sets containing several different initiators; SWHFDSTART appears in cut sets where the initiator is a fire in the West Transformer Yard; and AFHFDBLOWD appears in cut sets similar to those discussed in Section 9.6.1.1 resulting from Control Room fire initiator FIOCR3-1, where an SG blowdown isolation AOV spuriously opens due to a hot short (in this case, AOV 5737 instead of AOV 5738). Finally, all actions but [d] and [k] are directly tied to AFW or SAFW.

All human errors of medium importance arose solely due to an F-V value a 0.005. None had RAW values a 2 (other than the ones of high importance). The six human errors of medium importance are as follows:

RCHFDPLOCA Failure to close the block valve corresponding to an open PORV within three minutes

b. FSHFDREC03 Failure to find alternative cooldown paths (specifically the TDAFW steam lines) (discussed in Section 9.6.1.1)

c. DGHFDCITYW Failure to connect city water to DG cooling per Procedure ER-DG (appearing in the top 50 cut sets)

GINNA STATION PSA REVISION I FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT PAGE 9-9

d. CVHFDSUCTN Failure to locally open the suction line from the Reactor Water Storage Tank (RWST) to the charging pumps upon loss of Instrument Air (IA)

(appearing in the top 50 cut sets)

e. HVHFDSAFWB Failure to recover cooling to the SAFW Room for long-term protection of the SAF W pumps (appearing in cut sets containing the initiator FIDG1B10, discussed in Section 9.6.3.1)

FSHFDDGAXY Failure to strip Bus 18 loads and locally close the breaker for DG A, per the attachments to the ER-FIRE Procedures (appearing in cut set 861 containing initiator FIBRI B-3, discussed in Section 9.6.1.3).

9.6.3.3 Test and Maintenance Activities The importance measures for the unavailabilities due to test and maintenance activities are listed in Table 9-17 and displayed in Figure 9-17. Note that these include latent human errors associated with test and maintenance activities, as discussed in Section 9.6.3.2. The following eight events are of high importance:

a. AFTMOTDAFW Unavailability of the TDAFW Pump due to its train being out for test and maintenance

b. RHTM00000B Unavailability of RHR train B due to its being out of service for test or maintenance

c. AFTMMAFSGB Unavailability of motor-driven AFW Train B to SG B due to its being out of service for test or maintenance

d. AFHFLTDAFW Failure to correctly restore the TDAFW pump train to service after test and maintenance

e. DGTM00001A Unavailability of DG A due to test or maintenance.

CCHFL0780B Human mispositioning of CCW throttling isolation valve 780B on the outlet side of RHR HX B

g. AFHFLOAFWB Failure to restore AFW Motor-Driven Pump Train B to service after test and maintenance

h. AFHFLSAFWB Failure to restore SAFW Pump Train D to service aAer test and maintenance.

Each contributed a 0.5% to the fire CDF (F-V a 0.005); and ifthe event were assumed to be "true," it would raise the fire CDF by a factor a 2 (RAW a 2). Five of the events ([a], [b], [d], [e], and [f])were discussed in Section 9.6.1. AFTMMAFSGB appears in the cut sets among the top 50 which result from a fire in the AuxiliaryBuilding Basement. These cut sets also contain the event AFMMOTDAFW,discussed in Section 9.6.1.1, and represent similar types of scenarios. AFHFLOAFWB and AFHFLSAFWB appear in cut sets containing different initiators. These cut sets also contain either of the events AFMMOTDAFW or AFTMOTDAFW, discussed in Section 9.6.1.1, and represent similar types of scenarios.

GINNA STATION PSA REVISION 1 FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT PAGE 9-10 Allunavailabi1ities due to test and maintenance activities of medium importance arose solely due to an F-V value a 0.005. None had RAW values x 2 (other than the ones of high importance). The seven of medium importance are as follows:

a. AFTMTDAFWB Unavailability of the TDAFW train injection line to SG B due to it being out of service for test and maintenance (discussed in Section 9.6.1.1)

b. CVTMCHPMPA Unavailability of Charging Pump A due to test and maintenance

c. AFTMTDAFWA Unavailability of the TDAFW train injection line to SG A due to it being out of service for test and maintenance (appearing in cut sets containing FIOTB2-1, discussed in Section 9.6.1.2)

d. DGTM00001B Unavailability of DG B due to test or maintenance (appearing in cut sets containing several different initiators)

e. AFTMSAFSGB Unavailability of SAFW Train D injection line to SG B due to it being out of service for test and maintenance (appearing with its sister event AFTMSAFSGA in cut sets containing several different initiators)

f. AFTMSAFSGA Unavailability of SAFW Train C injection line to SG A due to it being out of service for test and maintenance (appearing with its sister event AFTMSAFSGB in cut sets containing several different initiators)

g. AFTMMAFSGA Unavailability of motor-driven AFW Train A to SG A due to its being out of service for test or maintenance (appearing in cut sets containing the initiator FIOBR1B-3, discussed in Section 9.6.1.3).

Observe that RHTMOOOOOB and DGTM00001A are of high importance, while their counterparts RHTMOOOOA and DGTM00001B are of low and medium importance, respectively. The differences arise from the difference between initiating events. For fires in the West Transformer Yard (FIOOTYW1), there is a direct loss of offsite power. If DG B is unavailable (including its being out of service for test and maintenance, DGTM00001B), core damage results ifRHR Train A is also unavailable (including its being out of service for test and maintenance, RHTMOOOOOA). Likewise, ifDG A is unavailable (including its if being out of service for test and maintenance, DGTM00001A), core damage results RHR Train B is also unavailable (including its being out of service for test and maintenance, RHTMOOOOOB). Thus, equal contributions to the fire CDF arise from the four events due to fire in the West Transformer Yard. However, contributions from RHTMOOOOB and DGTM00001A also arise from fires on the Turbine Building Mezzanine Level (FIOTB2-1) and fires in Battery Room B (FIOBR1B-3), respectively due to the consequences ofthese fires (see Section 9.6.1). Since both of these fire initiators are ofhigh importance (see Section 9.6.3.1), the contributions to the fire CDF from RHTMOOOOB and DGTM00001A are increased over those from their counterparts RHTMOOOOA and DGTM00001B. Thus, their importances become high.

GINNA STATION PSA REVISION 1 FIRE IPEEE FINALREPORT PAGE 9-11 9.6.3.4 Modeling Assumptions The importance measures for the modeling assumptions are listed in Table 9-18 and displayed in Figure 9-18. Note that these include failures to manually suppress fires, as discussed in Section 9.6.3.2. None of the modeling assumptions are of high importance. There are eight of medium importance, solely due to an F-V value a 0.05. None had RAW values a 10. The eight modeling assumptions of medium importance are as follows:

a. FSHFDCR-3-X Failure of the Fire Brigade to manual suppress a Control Room fire

b. FACR-MCB Tag representing equipment assumed failed by ignition of a fire in the Control Room's main control board and any two electrical cabinets that subsequently requires Control Room evacuation due to a significant loss of instrumentation and control

c. FSASPROP01 Tag representing assumption that fire spread beyond its initial source prior to suppression

d. FADIVA Tag representing equipment assumed failed by loss of AC Electric Power Division A due to fire

e. FATB-2-2 Tag representing equipment assumed failed by ignition of a fire in Bus Cabinet 11A/12A or 11B/12B at the Turbine Building Mezzanine Level FSHFDBR1A3 Failure of the Fire Brigade to manual suppress a fire in Battery Room A

g. FABR1A Tag representing equipment assumed to be failed by ignition of a fire in Battery Rooms A

h. FALOSP-R Tag representing equipment assumed to be failed by a recoverable loss of offsite power due to a fire.

All of the above are discussed in Section 9.6.1 except for [d] and [h]. The tagging event FADIVAappears in cut sets containing several different initiators and appears in the top 50 cut sets. The tagging event FALOSP-R appears in cut sets resulting from a fire in the West Transformer Yard (FIOOTYWI), which has been discussed in the previous section.

9.6.3.5 Systems The importance measures for the systems are listed in Table 9-19 and displayed in Figure 9-19. The following nine systems are of high importance:

a. FSW Fire Service Water

b. AC AC Power

c. AFW Auxiliary Feedwater

d. CCW Component Cooling Water

e. DG Diesel Generator SAFW Standby AFW

g. RC Reactor Coolant

h. RHR Residual Heat Removal

i. SW Service Water

GINNA STATION PSA REVISION 1 FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT PAGE 9-12 Each contributed 2 5.0% to the fire CDF (F-V z 0.05); and ifthe all the events associated with they system were assumed to be "true," it would raise the fire CDF by a factor a 10 (RAW a 10). A review of Section 9.6.1 indicates that initiators, tags, flags, and events associated with all nine of these systems except SAFW and SW are directly mentioned among the dominant scenarios. Similar items from the SAFW and SW systems appear in (SAFW) or near (SW, in cut set 853) the top 50 cut sets, as well as being discussed in Sections 9.6.3.2 and 9.6.3.3. The front-line systems FSW, AFW, SAFW, RC, and RHR serve either to mitigate the fire or reduce the likelihood ofresulting core damage. The support systems AC, CCW, DG, and SW provide required functions, such as electric power or component cooling, to these and other critical front-line systems.

All systems of medium importance arose solely due to a RAW value z 10. None had F-V values z 0.05 (other than the ones of high importance). The seven of medium importance are as follows:

a. DC 125-VDC Power

b. IB 120-VAC Instrument Bus C. HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air-Conditioning

d. ESFAS Engineered Safeguards Features Actuation

e. MS Main Steam

f. UV Undervoltage CVCS Chemical Volume and Control.

These are characteristically reliable and redundant systems, requiring minimal human action for their operation.

9.6.3.6 Components I

The importance measures for the components are listed in Table 9-20 and displayed in Figure 9-20. The following 21 components are of high importance:

a. AFMMOTDAFW Non-fire-induced failure of the TDAFW pump

b. DGDGFTSCXX Non-fire-induced failure of the TSC DG to run C. RCRZT00430 Non-fire-induced failure of PORV 430 to reseat after steam relief

d. AFMMSAFWPD Non-fire-induced failure of SAFW Pump Train D

e. SWCXXSUCTN. Non-fire-induced total failure of common SW/FSW suction

f. FSXXXTR803 Non-fir-induced failure of the Relay Room Halon Suppression System (S08)

g. RCRZT0431C Non-fire-induced failure of PORV 431C to reseat after steam relief

h. AFCCAFWSTR Non-fire-induced common cause failure (CCF) of all three AFW pumps to start

i. FSDGAPFP01 Non-fir-induced failure of the diesel-driven FSW pump to start

j. DGDGFASCXX Non-fire-induced failure of the TSC DG to start DGMMASTART Non-fir-induced failure of DG A to start due

1. CCMM00738B Non-fir-induced failure to open of MOV 738B to supply CCW to RHR HXB

m. ACMMMCC01D Non-fir-induced failure of MCC D

GINNA STATION PSA REVISION 1 FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT PAGE 9-13

n. AFMMSGBINJ Non-fire-induced failure of AFW Train B injection line to SG B

o. DGMMBRKR14 Non-fire-induced failure of DG A supply breaker to Bus 14 to close

p. TLCCFBRKRF Non-fire-induced failure to SCRAM due to electrical failure ofthe Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs)

q. AFMMMDFP1B Non-fire-induced failure of motor-driven AFW Pump Train B

r. RHMMACOI BA Non-fire-induced failure of the RHR Pump B to start

s. DGCCOOORUN Non-fire-induced CCF ofboth DGs to run

t. TLCCFMATWS Non-fire-induced failure to SCRAM due to mechanical failures

u. DGCCOSTART Non-fire-induced CCF of both DGs to start.

Each contributed a 0.5% to the fire CDF (F-V a 0.005); and, ifthe event were assumed to be "true," it would raise the fire CDF by a factor a 2 (RAW a 2). Several ([a], [b], [c], [j], and 1]) were discussed in Section 9.6.1. All of the remaining, except the two related to SCRAM failures ([p] and [t]), are associated with systems of high importance as discussed in Section 9.6.3.5. TLCCFBRKRF and TLCCFMATWS are pertinent to ATWS scenarios, one ofwhich appears as cut set ¹59, another as cut set ¹76. The ATWS events are caused by electrical and mechanical failures to trip the reactor following a loss ofoffsite power with fire-induced failures of the PORVs to provide necessary primary system relief.

Cutsets with Descriptions Report

@FIRE1 = 3.34E-05 Inputs Description Rate Exposure Probability FIOCR3-1 Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 1 and 2) 0.0 1.53E-06 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 DGDGFTSCXX TSC biesel Generator fails to run 1.25E-03 24.0 FACR-MCB CR-HCB Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSHFDCR-3-X Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room 0.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 FZOOORC3 Fire in Zone RC-3 0.0 1.338-06 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 FARC-3 RC-3 Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPOK FLAG - Fire Suppression successful or N/A 1.0 FSCORR0003 CORRECTION FACTOR FOR RECOVERY OF CONTROL ROOM INDICATION FOR CNMT FIRE 0.1 FSH FDCROi~l2 Ops fail /

to use alternate AFW SG instrumentation when Control Room indication los0.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 FIOCR3-1 Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 1 and 2) 0.0 1.06E-06 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SZ Conditions 1.0 AFTHOTDAFW TDAFW Pump Train out-of-service for maintenance 0.0 FACR-MCB CR-MGB Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSHFDCR-3-X Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room 0.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 FIOTB2-1 Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 1 and 2) 0.0 7.26E-07 ACTRAINA Failure of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 FATB-2-2 TB-2-2 Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPOK FLAG - Fire Suppression successful or N/A 1.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 RCHVD00516N Motor-Operated Valve 516 Is Not Closed Due To PORV Leakage 1.0 RCRZT00430 PORV PCV-430 Fails To Reseat After Steam Relief 5.00E-03 1.0 RHTHOOOOOB ,TRAIN B OOS FOR MAINTENANCE 0.0 SLO SMALL LOCA SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 1.0 TLSTRANS TAGGING EVENT TO IDENTIFY TL S TRANS SEQUENCES 1.0 FIOCR3-1 Fire,in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 1 and 2) 0.0 6.47E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG I- Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SZ Conditions 1.0 AFHMOTDAFW Failure of TDAFW pump train components 0.0 FACR-MCB CR-MCB Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSHFDCR-3-X Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room 0.0 NOSBO NO STATiON BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 C: ICAF TA-WWEWFIRESIFIRESENS. CUT Page 1

0 s Description Rate Exposure Probability FIBR1A-3 Fire in Zone BR1A (Scenario 3 and 4) 0.0 6.21E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 DGDGFTSCXX TSC Diesel Generator fails to run 1.25E- 03 24.0 FABRlA BRlA Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSASPROP01 Fire propagates beyond initial source 0.1 FSHFDBRIA3 Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Battery Zone BRlA-3 0.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 FIOCR3-1 Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 1'nd 2) 0.0 5.10E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 FACR-MCB CR-MCB Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG '- Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSHFDAFWXX HCO fails to locally open MOV 3996 and MOV 3505A per Attach 3 of ER-FIRE 0.0 FSHFDCR-3-X Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room 0.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 FIOCR3-1 Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 1 and 2) 0.0 5.10E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 FACR-tjCB CR-MCB Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Pire Suppression fails 1.0 FSHFDCR-3-X Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room 0.0 FSHFDDCPWR Failure to align TSC DC supply to Battery B for TDAFW pump per Attachment 8 of ER-FO.O NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 FIOCR3-1 Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 1 and 2) 0.0 5.10E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 FACR-MCB CR-MCB Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSHFDCR-3-X Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room 0.0 FSHFDPORVS Operators/I&C fail to perform ER-FIRE.1 Attachment 9 (PORV 430 local oper ation) 0.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 10 FIOTB1-5 Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 5) 0.0 4.42E-07 ACAZDLOSPl Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour 0.4 ACLOPNOSI2 CORRECTION FACTOR FOR NO SI CONDITION 0.1 ACLOPRTALL Loss of All Off-Site Power Following Reactor Trip 0.0 ACTRAINA Failure of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 ACTRAINB Failure of Train B (tagging event) 1.0-DGTtj00001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A UNAVAILABLE DUE TO TESTING OR MAINTENANCE 0.0 FATB-1-3 TB-1-3 Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPOK FLAG - Fire Suppression successful or N/A 1.0 SBO STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 1.0 FIBRIA-3 Fire in Zone BR1A (Scenario 3 and 4) 0.0 4.31E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 AFTMOTDAFW TDAFWI Pump Train out-of-service for maintenance 0.0 FABRlA BR1A Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSASPROP01 Fire propagates beyond initial source O.l FSHFDBR1A3 Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Battery Zone BR1A-3 0.0 IBAABUSCMX FLAG - Instrument Bus C on Normal Supply 1.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 C: tCAF7A-WWEWFIRES\FIRESENS.CUT Page 2

Description Rate Exposure Probability 12 FIOTB2-3 Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 3) 0.0 3.31E-07 ACAZDLOSP1 Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour 0.4 ACLOPNOSI2 CORRECTION FACTOR FOR NO SI CONDITION 0.1 ACLOPRTALL Loss of All Off-Site Power Following Reactor Trip 0.0 ACTRAINA Failure of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 ACTRAINB Failure of Train B (tagging event) 1.0 AFTt40TDAFW TDAFW Pump Train out-of-service for maintenance 0.0 FATB-2-3 TB-2-3 Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPOK FLAG - Fire Suppression successful or N/A 1.0 SBO STATiON BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 1'. 0 13 FIOCR3-3 Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 3) 0.0 3.06E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG i- Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 DGDGFTSCXX TSC Diesel Generator fails to run 1.25E-03 24.0 FACR-HCB CR-HCB Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSASPROP01 Fire pxopagates beyond initial source 0.1 FSHFDCR-3-X Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room 0.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 FIOTB2-1 Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 1 and 2) 0.0 2.70E-07 ACTRAINA Failuxe of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 CCMM00738B HOV 738B PAILS TO OPEN 0.0 FATB-2-2 TB-2-2 Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPOK FLAG - Fire Suppression successful or N/A 1.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 RCHVD00516N Motor-Operated Valve 516 Is Not Closed Due To PORV Leakage 1.0 RCRZT00430 PORV PCV-430 Fails To Reseat After Steam Relief 5.00E-03 1.0 SLO SMALIn, LOCA SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 1.0 TLSTRANS TAGGING EVENT TO IDENTIFY TL S TRANS SEQUENCES 1.0 15 FIBR1A-3 Fire in Zone BR1A (Scenario 3 and 4) 0.0 2.63E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 AFHt40TDAFW Failure of TDAPW pump train components 0.0 FABR1A BR1A Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSASPROP01 Fire propagates beyond initial source 0.1 FSHFDBR1A3 Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Battery Zone BR1A-3 0.0 IBAABUSCHX FLAG - Instrument Bus C on Normal Supply 1.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 16 FIOCR3-1 Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 1 and 2) 0.0 2.55E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 FACR-MCB CR-MCB Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSHFDCR-3-X Fire brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room 0.0 FSHPDCROM2 Ops fail to use alternate AFW / SG instrumentation when Control Room indication los0.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 C: tCAF TA-WtNEWFIRES lFIRESENS. CUT Page 3

In s Description Rate Exposure Probability 17 FZOCR3-1 Fire. in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 1 and 2) 0.0 2.49E-07 AAAATRANS IN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 DGDGATSCXX TSC Diesel Generator fails to START 4.88E-03 1.0 FACR-MCB CR-f<CB Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSHFDCR-3-X Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room 0.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 18 FIOCR3-3 Fixe in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 3) 0.0 2.12E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 AFTMOTDAFW TDAFW Pump Train out-of-service for maintenance 0.0 FACR-MCB CR-MCB Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG ~ Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSASPROP01 Fire propagates beyond initial source 0.1 FSHFDCR-3-X Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room 0.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 19 FIBR1A-3 Fire in Zone BR1A (Scenario 3 and 4) 0.0 2.07E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 FABR1A BR1A Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSASPROP01 Fire propagates beyond initial source 0.1 FSHFDBRlA3 Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Battery Zone BR1A-3 0.0 FSHFDDCPWR Failure to align TSC DC supply to Battery B for TDAFW pump per Attachment 8 of ER-FO.O NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 20 FIOTB1-3 Fire in Zone TB-1 (Scenario 3 and 4) 0.0 1.93E-07 ACTRAINA Failure of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 FAD IVA DIVA Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPOK FLAG 4 Fire Suppression successful or N/A 1.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 RCMVD00516N Motor-Operated Valve 516 Is Not Closed Due To PORV Leakage 1.0 RCRZT00430 PORV PCV-430 Fails To Reseat After Steam Relief 5.00E-03 1.0 RHTMOOOOOB TRAIN B OOS FOR t4AINTENANCE 0.0 SLO SMALL LOCA SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 1.0 TLSTIVglS TAGGING EVENT TO IDENTIFY TL S TRANS SEQUENCES 1.0 21 FIBR1B-3 Fire in Zone BR1A (Scenario 3 and 4) 0.0 1.84E-07 ACAZDLOSPl Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour 0.4 ACTRAINA Failure of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 ACTRAINB Failure of Train B (tagging event) 1.0 DGTM00001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A UNAVAILABLEDUE TO TESTING OR ttAINTENANCE 0.0 FABR1B BRlB Tag 1.O FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fixe Suppression fails 1.0 FSASPROP01 Fire propagates beyond initial source O.l FSHFDBRZB3 Fire Blrigade fail to manually suppress fire in Battery Zone BR1B-3 0.0 SBO STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 1.0 C:tCAF TA-WINEWFIRESIRRESENS.CUT Page 4

tr s Description Rate Exposure Probability 22 FIOTB2-3 Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 3) 0.0 1.78E-07 ACAZDLOSP1 Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour 0.4 ACLOPNOSI2 CORRECTION FACTOR FOR NO SI CONDITION 0.1 ACLOPRTALL Loss of All Off-Site Power Following Reactor Trip 0.0 ACTRAINA Failure of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 ACTRAINB Failure of Train B (tagging event) 1.0 AFMMOTDAFW Failure of TDAFW pump train components 0.0 FATB-2-3 TB-2-3 Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPOK FLAG - Fire Suppression successful or N/A 1.0 SBO STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 1.0 SBOCORR007 SBO CORRECTION FACTOR II7 - TDAFW RUN FAILURES DURING SBO ALLOW MORE TIME 0.9 23 FIOOORR3 Fire 'in Zone RR (Scenario 3) 0.1 1.77E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 DGDGFTSCXX TSC Diesel Generator fails to run 1.25E-03 24.0 FARRX RR Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSASPROP01 Fire propagates beyond initial source 0.1 FSHFDRROOH Fire Brigade fail to manually extinguish fire in relay room 0.0 FSXXXTR803 Relay Room Halon System S08 Inoperable 1.00E-03 24.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 FIOTB1-5 Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 5) 0.0 1.76E-07 ACAZDLOSP1 Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour 0.4 ACLOPNOSI2 CORRECTION FACTOR FOR NO SI CONDITION 0.1 ACLOPRTALL Loss of All Off-Site Power Following Reactor Trip 0.0 ACTRAINA Failure of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.O ACTRAINB Failure of Train B (tagging event) 1.0 DGHFDCITYW Operators fail to connect city water to DG cooling per ER-DG 0.0 FATB-1-3 TB-1-3 Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPOK FLAG - Fire Suppression successful or N/A 1.0 SBO STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 1.0 UVBUS17 UV on Bus 17 Tagging Event 1.0 UVBUS18 UV on Bus 18 Tagging Event 1.0 25 FIOTB2-1 Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 1 and 2) 0.0 1.74E-07 ACTRAINA Failure of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 CCHFL0780B CCW THROTTLING VALVE 780B HISPOSITIONED 0.0 FATB-2-2 TB-2-2 Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPOK FLAG - Fire Suppression successful or N/A 1.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 RCMVD00516N Motor-Operated Valve 516 Is Not Closed Due To PORV Leakage 1.0 RCRZT00430 PORV PCV-430 Fails To Reseat After Steam Relief 5.00E-03 1.0 SLO SMALL LOCA SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 1.0 TLS TRANS TAGGI)IG EVENT TO IDENTIFY TL S TRANS SEQUENCES 1.0 C:tCAF7A-WWEWFIRES)FIRESENS.CUT Page 5

s Description Rate Exposure Probability 26 FIDG1B10 Fire in Zone EDG1B-0 0.0 1.71E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 AFHFDCITYW Operators fail to use city fire water for SAFW per ER-AFW.1 0.0 AFTHOTDAFW TDAFW Pump Train out-of-service for maintenance 0.0 FAEDG1B-0 EDG1B-0 Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPOK FLAG - Fire Suppression successful or N/A 1.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 UVBUS17 UV on Bus 17 Tagging Event 1.0 UVBUS18 UV on Bus 18 Tagging Event 1.0 27 FIOCR3-1 Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 1 and 2) 0.0 1.53E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 AFHFLTDAFW Faildre to restore TDAFW pump train to service post test/maintenance 0.0 FACR-MCB CR-MCB Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSHFDCR-3-X Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room 0.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 28 FIOTB2-1 Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 1 and 2) 0.0 1.48E-07 ACTRAINA Failure of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 FATB-2-2 TB-2-2 Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPOK FLAG - Fire Suppression successful or N/A 1.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 RCHVD00516N Motor-Operated Valve 516 Is Not Closed Due To PORV Leakage 1.0 RCRZT00430 PORV PCV-430 Fails To Reseat After Steam Relief 5.00E-03 1.O RHHHAC01BA RHR PUMP B (PAColB) FAILS TO START 0.0 SLO SHALL LOCA SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 1.0 TLS TRANS TAGGING EVENT TO IDENTIFY TL S TRANS SEQUFNCES 1.0 29 FIOCR3-1 Fire fn Zone CR-3 (Scenario 1 and 2) 0.0 1.46E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 FACR'-HCB CR-HCB Tag / 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSHFDCR-3-X Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room 0.0 FSHFDREC03 Failure to find alternative cooldown paths (TDAFW steam lines) 0.1 MSMHN2BOTA NITROGEN BOTTLES FAIL TO SUPPLY ARV 3411 0.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 30 FIOTB1-5 Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 5) 0.0 1.32E-07 ACAZDLOSP1 Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour 0.4 ACLOPNOSI2 CORRECTION FACTOR FOR NO SI CONDITION 0.1 ACLOPRTALL Loss of All Off-Site Power Following Reactor Trip 0.0 ACTRAINA Failure of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 ACTRAINB Failure of Train B (tagging event) 1.0 DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FA1LS TO RUN 1.25E-03 24.0 FATB-1-3 TB-1-9 Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPOK FLAG - Fire Suppression successful or N/A 1.0 SBO STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 1.0 SBOCORR006 SBO CORRECTION FACTOR tt6 - DG RUN TIME FAILURES ALLOW ) 1 HR TO RESTORE OFFSITE PWR0.3 C tCAFTA-WWEWFIREStFIRESENS.CUT Page 6

Description Rate Exposure Probability 31 FIOCR3-3 Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 3) 0.0 1.29E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 AFMMOTDAFW Failure of TDAFW pump train components 0.0 FACR-MCB CR-HCB Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSASPROP01 Fire propagates beyond initial'source 0.1 FSHFDCR-3-X Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room 0.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 32 FIOOORR3 Fire in Zone RR (Scenario 3) 0.1 1.23E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 AFTMOTDAFW TDAFW Pump Train out-of-service for maintenance 0.0 FARRX RR Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSASPROP01 Fire propagates beyond initial source 0.1 FSHFDRROOM Fire Brigade fail to manually extinguish fire in relay room 0.0 FSXXXTR803 Relay Room Ha)on System S08 Inoperable 1.00E-03 24.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 33 FIOOABB1 Fire in Zone ABB (Scenario 1 and 2) 0.0 1.14E-07 AAAATRANSXN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 ACTRAINA Failure of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 AFMHOTDAFW Failure of TDAFW pump train components 0.0 AFt 1MSAFWPD Failure of SAFW Pump 1D Train 0.0 AFTMHAFSGB MOTOR DRIVEN AFW TRAIN B TO B S/G O.O.S DUE TO T/M 0.0 FADXVA DIVA Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPOK FLAG Fire Suppression successful or N/A 1.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 FIOCR3-1 Fire jn Zone CR-3 (Scenario 1 and 2) 0.0 1. 13E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Xnitiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 AFTHTDAFWB TDAFW Pump Train injection line to S/G B out-of-service for maintenance 0.0 FACR-MCB CR-MCB Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSHFDCR-3-X Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room 0.0 MSHSF05738 Hot short causes AOV 5738 to fail to close 0.1 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 35 FIOOABO1 Fire in Zone ABO (Scenario 1 and 2) 0.0 1.11E-07 ACAZDLOSP1 Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour 0.4 ACCORR0003 CORRECTION FACTOR FOR RECOVERY OF HOT SHORT LOOP EVENTS 0.1 ACHSF00016 Hot short causes 480 VAC Bus 16 feeder circuit breaker 52/16 (BUS16/11B) to transfe0.1pen ACTRAINA Failure of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 ACTRAINB Failure of Train B (tagging event) 1.0 AFTMOTDAFW TDAFW Pump Train out-of-service for maintenance 0.0 CCAACCPMPB FAABO FLAG ABO Tag

] CCW PUMP B IS ALXGNED TO RUN 0.5 1.0 FSAASUPPOK FLAG - Fire Suppression successful or N/A 1.0 SBO STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 1.0 SFAARPAC7B FLAG - SFP Pump B Running 1.0 C: tCAF TA-WWEWFIRES tFIRESENS. CUT

IF F I Description Rate Exposure Probability 36 FIBRlB-3 Fire in Zone BR1A (Scenario 3 and 4) 0.0 1.10E-07 ACAZDLOSP1 Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour 0.4 ACTRAINA Failure of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 ACTRAINB Failure of Train B (tagging event) 1.0 ACWPFMCC1H Cable wrap failure causes 480 VAC MCCH feeder circuit breaker 52/MCCH (Mccc/osMM) t0.2ra nsfer open FABR1B BR1B Tag 1.0 FSAAFIRElH FLAG - Special multiplier to indicate fire duration >1 hr (prob ~ O.l) O.l FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSASPROP01 Fire propagates beyond initial source 0.1 FSHFDBRlB3 Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Battery Zone BRlB-3 0.0 SBO STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 1.0 37 FIBR1B-3 Fire u.n Zone BR1A (Scenario 3 and 4) 0.0 1.10E-07 ACAZDLOSP1 Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour 0.4 ACTRAINA Failure of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 ACTRAINB Failure of Train B (tagging event) 1.0 DCWPFC3ACX Cable wrap failure causes disconnect switch DCPDPCB03A/03 to transfers open (to MCC 0.2 FABR1B BR1B Tag 1.0 FSAAFIRE1H FLAG - Special multiplier to indicate fire duration >1 hr (prob = 0.1) 0.1 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSASPROP01 Fire propagates beyond initial source 0.1 FSHFDBRIB3 Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Battery Zone BR1B-3 0.0 SBO STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 1.0 38 FIOSH2-1 Fire in Zone SH-2 (Scenario 1 and 2) 0.0 1.09E-07 ACHSF00014 Hot short causes 480 VAC Bus 14 feeder circuit breaker 52/14 (BUS14/18B ) to transfeo.lpen ACTRAINA Failure of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 FASH-2-R SH-2-R Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPOK FLAG - Fire Suppression successful or N/A 1.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 RCMVD00516N '-Motox-Operated Valve 516 Is Not Closed Due To PORV Leakage 1.0 RCRZT00430 PORV PCV-430 Fails To Reseat After Steam Relief 5.00E-03 1.0 RHTMOOOOOB TRAIN B OOS FOR MAINTENANCE 0.0 SLO SMALL LOCA SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 1.O TLSTRANS TAGGING EVENT TO IDENTIFY TL S TRANS SEQUENCES 1.0 39 FIOTB2-1 Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 1 and 2) 0.0 1.07E-07 ACAZDLOSP1 Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour 0.4 ACLOPNOSI2 CORRECTION FACTOR FOR NO SI CONDITION 0.1 ACLOPRTALL Loss of All Off-Site Power Following Reactor Trip 0.0 ACTRAINA Failure of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 ACTRAINB Failure of Train B (tagging event) 1.0 AFTMOTDAFW TDAFW Pump Train out-of-service for maintenance 0.0 FATB-2-2 TB-2-2 Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPOK FLAG $ Fire Suppression successful or N/A 1.0 SBO STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 1.0 C tCAF7A-WWEWFIRESU IRESENS.CUT Page 8

tr s Description Rate Exposure Probability 40 FIOTB2-3 Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 3) 0.0 1.06E-07 ACAZDLOSP1 Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour 0.4 ACLOPNOSI2 CORRECTION FACTOR FOR NO SI CONDITION 0.1 ACLOPRTALL Loss of All Off-Site Power Following Reactor Trip 0.0 ACTRAINA Failure of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 ACTRAINB Failure of Train B (tagging event) 1.0 AFHFDALTTD OPERATORS FAIL TO PROVIDE COOLING TO TDAFW LUBE OIL FROM D1ESEL FIRE PUMP 0.0 FATB-2"3 TB-2-3 Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPOK FLAG - Fire Suppression successful or N/A 1.0 SBO STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 1.0 UVBUS17 UV on Bus 17 Tagging Event 1.0 UVBUS18 UV oh Bus 18 Tagging Event 1.0 4l FIDGlB10 Fire in Zone EDGIB-0 0.0 1.05E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 AFHFDCITYW Operators fail to use city fire water for SAFW per ER-AFW.1 0.0 AFMMOTDAFW Failure of TDAFW pump train components 0.0 FAEDG1B-0 EDG1B-0 Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPOK FLAG - Fire Suppression successful or N/A 1.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 UVBUS17 UV on Bus 17 Tagging Event 1.0 UVBUS18 UV on Bus 18 Tagging Event 1.0 42 FIOOABB3 Fire in Zone ABB (Scenario 3 and 4) 0.0 1.03E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 CVAACHPMPB FLAG - CHARGING PUMP B RUNNING 0.6 CVAACHPMPC FLAG - CHARGING PUMP C RUNNING 0.6 CVTMCHPMPA TEST OR MAINTENANCE RENDERS CHARGING PUMP A UNAVAILABLE 0.1 FAABB-3 ABB-3', Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG '- Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSHFDAUXBB Fire Brigade fail to manually extinguish fire in Aux Bldg Basement 0.0 FSXXXTR746 Sprinkler S01 Inoperable (Aux Bldg Basement Cable Trays - SI Pump)l.OOE-03 24.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 FIOCR3-3 Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 3) 0.0 1.02E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 FACR-MCB CR-MCB Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSASPROP01 Fire propagates beyond initial source 0.1 FSHFDAFWXX HCO fails to locally open MOV 3996 and MOV 3505A per Attach 3 of ER-FIRE 0.0 FSHFDCR-3-X Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room 0.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 FIOCR3-3 Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 3) 0.0 1.02E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 FACR-MCB CR-MCh Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSASPROP01 Fire propagates beyond initial source 0.1 FSHFDCR-3-X Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room 0.0 FSHFDDCPWR Failure to align TSC DC supply to Battery B for TDAFW pump per Attachment 8 of ER-FO.O NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 C:tCAF TA-WtNEWFIREStFIRESENS.CUT Page 9

s Description Rate Exposure Probability 45 FIOCR3-3 Fire in Zone CR-3 (Scenario 3) 0.0 1.02E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 FACR-MCB CR-MCB Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSASPROP01 Fire propagates beyond initial source 0.1 FSHFDCR-3-X Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Control Room 0.0 FSHFDPORVS Operators/IRC fail to perform,ER-FIRE.1 Attachment 9 (PORV 430 local operation) 0.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 FIOOABB3 Fire in Zone ABB (Scenario 3 and 4) 0.0 1.02E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 CVHFDSUCTN Operators Fail to Manually Open Suction Line Upon Loss of IA 0.0 FAABB-3 ABB-9 Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG .-. Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSHFDAUXBB Fire Brigade fail to manually extinguish fire in Aux Bldg Basement 0.0 FSXXXTR746 Sprinkler Sol Inoperable (Aux Bldg Basement Cable Trays - SI Pump)1.OOE-03 24.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 FIBRIA-3 Fire in Zone BRlA (Scenario 3 and 4) 0.0 1. 01E-07 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 DGDGATSCXX TSC Diesel Generator fails to START 4.88E-03 1.0 FABR1A BR1A Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSASPROP01 Fire propagates beyond initial source 0.1 FSHFDBR1A3 Fire Brigade fail to manually suppress fire in Battery Zone BRlA-3 0.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 FIOTB1-1 Fire in Zone TB-1 (Scenariol and 2) 0.0 8.95E-08 ACAZDLOSP1 Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within.l Hour 0.4 ACTRAINA Failure of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 ACTRAINB Failure of Train B (tagging event) 1.0 DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUN 1.25E-03 24.0 FATB-1-1 TB-1-1 Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSXXXTR768 Spray S24 Inoperable (Turbine Condenser Pit) 1.00E-03 24.0 SBO STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 1.0 SBOCORR006 SBO CORRECTION FACTOR t)6 - DG RUN TIME FAILURES ALLOW ) 1 HR TO RESTORE OFFSITE PWR0.3 FIO'gBl-l. Fire in Zone TB-1 (Scenariol and 2) 0.0 8.95E-08 ACAZDLOSP1 Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour 0.4 ACTRAINA Failure of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 ACTRAINB Failure of Train B (tagging event) 1.0 DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUN 1.25E-03 24.0 FATB-1-1 TB-1-1 Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSXXXTR769 Sprayf S25 Inoperable (Generator Hydrogen Seal) 1.00E-03 24.0 SBO STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 1.0 SBOCORR006 SBO CORRECTION FACTOR tt6 - DG RUN TIME FAILURES ALLOW ) 1 HR TO RESTORE OFFSITE PWR0.3 C:tCAF TA-WWEWFIREStFIRESENS.CUT Page 10

In s Description Rate Exposure Probability 50 FIOTB1-1 Fire in Zone TB-1 (Scenariol and 2) 0.0 8.95E-08*

ACAZDLOSPl Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour 0.4 ACTRAINA Failure of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 ACTRAINB Failure of Train B (tagging event) 1.0 DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUN 1.25E-03 24.0 FATB-1-1 TB-1-1 Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppression fails 1.0 FSXXXTR770 Sprinkler S26 Inoperable (Turbine Island) 1.00E-03 24.0 SBO STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 1.0 SBOCORR006 SBO CORRECTION FACTOR tt6 DG RUN TIME FAILURES ALLOW 1 HR TO RESTORE OFFSITE PWR0.3 51 FIOTB1-1 Fire in Zone TB-1 (Scenariol and 2) 0.0 8.95E-OS ACAZDLOSP1 Failu're to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour 0.4 ACTRAINA Failure of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 ACTRAINB Failure of Train B (tagging event) 1.0 DGDGF0001A DIESEL GENERATOR KDG01A FAILS TO RUN 1.25E-03 24.0 FATB-1-1 TB-1-1 Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPXX FLAG - Fire Suppx'ession fails 1.0 FSXXXTR771 Spray S27 Inoperable (Main Turbine Oil Reservoir) 1.00E-03 24.0 SBO STATXON BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 1.0 SBOCORR006 SBO CORRECTION FACTOR N6 - DG RUN TIME FAILURES ALLOW 1 HR TO RESTORE OFFSITE PWR0.3 52 FIDGlB10 Fixe in Zone EDG1B-0 0.0 8.90E-OS AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Txansient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 AFHFDSAFWX OPERATORS FAIL TO CORRECTLY ALIGN SAFW 0.0 AFTHOTDAFW TDAFW Pump Train out-of-service for maintenance 0.0 FAEDG1B-0 EDG1B-0 Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPOK FLAG - Fire Suppression successful or N/A 1.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGXNG EVENT 1.0 UVBUS17 UV on Bus 17 Tagging Event 1.O UVBUS18 UV on Bus 18 Tagging Event 1.0 53 FXOOORR6 Fire in Zone RR (Scenario 6) 0.0 8.76E-08 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 ACTRAINA Failure of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 AFHMSAFWPD Failure of SAFW Pump 1D Train 0.0 FADIVA DIVA Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPOK FLAG - Fire Suppression successful or N/A 1.0 NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 SWCXXSUCTN TOTAL FAILURE OF COMMON SW/FIRE WATER SUCTION 0.0 FIOTB1-5 Fire in Zone TB-2 (Scenario 5) 0.0 8.71E-OS ACAZDLOSPl Failure to Restore Offsite Power Within 1 Hour 0.4 ACLOPNOSI2 CORRECTION FACTOR FOR NO SI CONDITION 0.1 ACLOPRTALL Loss of All Off-Site Power Following Reactor Trip, 0.0 ACTRAINA Failuxte of AC Train A (tagging event) 1.0 ACTRAINB Failure of Train B (tagging event) 1.0 DGHHASTART FAXLURES OF D/G A TO START 0.0 FATB-1-3 TB-1-3 Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPOK FLAG - Fire Suppression successful or N/A 1.0 SBO STATION BLACKOUT SEQUENCE TAGGING EVENT 1.0 C:tCAF TA-WINEWFIREStFIRESENS.CUT Page 11

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¹ I s Description Rate Exposure Probability 55 FIDG1B10 Fire in Zone EDG1B-0 0.0 8.57E-08 AAAATRANSIN FLAG - Transient Initiating Event Which Do Not Result in SI Conditions 1.0 AFTrlOTDAFW TDAFW Pump Train out-of-service for maintenance 0.0 FAEDG1B-0 EDG1B-0 Tag 1.0 FSAASUPPOK FLAG - Fire Suppression successful or N/A 1.0 FSHFDCRON2 Ops fail to use alternate AFW / SG instrumentation when Control Room indication loso.o NOSBO NO STATION BLACKOUT TAGGING EVENT 1.0 UVBUS17 UV on Bus 17 Tagging Event 1.0 UVBUS18 UV on Bus 18 Tagging Event 1.O Report Summary:

Filename: C:>CAFTA-VNNEWFIRES(FIRESENS.CUT Print date: 6/18/99 2:47 PM Not sorted Printed the first 55 C:tCAF TA-WWEWFIREStFIRESENS. C U7 Page 12

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e GINNA STATION PSA REVISION 1 FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT PAGE 11-1 1 1.0

SUMMARY

AND CONCLUSION 11.6 Internal Fire Summary The final calculated CDF due to internal fires for Ginna Station is 3.338E-05/yr. Figure 11-4 illustrates how each location contributes to this value. Over 80% of the contribution arises from three locations: (1) Control Building (42.4%), (2) Turbine Building (25.5%), and (3) Auxiliary Building (12.2%). Fires in these locations and significant human errors and systems are described below.

Control Buildin The Control Building includes the Control Room, Battery Rooms, Relay Room, and Air Handling Room. Section 9.6.1 discussed the dominant scenarios arising from fires in the Control and Battery Rooms. When all possible Control Room fire scenarios are considered, the total contribution to the fire CDF for the Control Room becomes 23.8%. The largest single contribution (19.8%) arises from ignition of a fire in the Control Room's main control board and any two electrical cabinets that subsequently requires Control Room evacuation due to a significant loss of instrumentation and control. When all possible Battery Room fire scenarios are considered, the total contribution to the fire CDF for the Battery Room becomes 11.8%. The largest single contribution (6.8%) arises from ignition of a fire in Battery Room A. When all possible Relay Room fire scenarios are considered, the total contribution to the fire CDF for the Relay Room becomes 6.4%. The largest single contribution (3.0%) arises from ignition of a fire in any of the Relay Room electrical cabinets, assumed to damage all associated cables and equipment and necessitate Control Room evacuation.

The contribution from the Air Handling Room fire scenarios is minimal (0.4%).

Turbine Buildin The Turbine Building contains three levels Basement, Mezzanine, and Operating Levels. Section 9.6.1.2 discussed the dominant scenarios arising from fires at the Basement and Mezzanine Levels.

When all possible Turbine Building fire scenarios are considered, the tofal contribution to the CDF for the Turbine Building becomes 25.5%, with 13.8% arising from fires on the Mezzanine Level and 11.7% from fires on the Basement Level. There is essentially no contribution from fires on the Operating Level. The largest single contributions arise from ignition of a fire in 4160V Bus 11A/12A or 11B/12B at the Mezzanine Level (9.6%) and ignition of a fire in the vicinity of the power supply cables to 480V Buses 14, 16, 17, or 18 at the Basement Level (5.1%).

Auxilia Buildin The AuxiliaryBuilding contains three levels Basement, Mezzanine, and Operating Levels. When all possible Auxiliary Building fire scenarios are considered, the total contribution to the CDF for the Auxiliary Building becomes 12.2%, with 5.7% arising from fires on the Basement Level, 3.6%

arising from fires on the Mezzanine Level, and 2.9% from fires on the Operating Level. The largest single contribution from a Basement Level fire (3.0%) arises from ignition of a fire in an electrical cabinet in the vicinity of the Safety Injection (SI) pumps, disabling all three SI pumps. The largest single contribution from a Mezzanine Level fire (2.2%) arises from ignition ofa fire in cables which

0 GINNA STATION PSA REVISION 1 FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT PAGE 11-2 interface with the Cable Tunnel, all ofwhich are assumed to be vital. The largest single contribution from an Operating Level fire (2.8%) arises from ignition of a fire in components located near Component Cooling Water (CCW) or Reactor Makeup Water (RMW) equipment, disabling both CCW pumps and the RMW equipment.

Human Errors As discussed in Section 9.6.3.2, the human errors contributing the most to the fire CDF are the following (contributions included in parentheses):

Failure to employ alternate AFW/SG instrumentation after Control Room indication has been lost (13.1%)

Failure to align TSC DC power supply to Battery B for the TDAFW pump, per the attachments to the ER-FIRE Procedures (3.6%)

C. Failure to correctly align Standby AFW (SAFW) (3.0%)

d. Failure to locally operate PORV 430, per the attachments to the ER-FIRE Procedures (2.2%)

e. Failure to use city fire water for SAFW, per Procedure ER-AFW.1 (2.2%)

f. Failure to locally open discharge MOV 3996 from and steam supply MOV 3505A to the TDAFW Pump, per the attachments to the ER-FIRE Procedures (2.2%).

All but action [d] are directly tied to operation of AFW or SAFW.

~Sstems As discussed in Section 9.6.3.5, the systems contributing the most to the fire CDF are: (1) Fire Service Water (FSW) (58.7%), (2) AC Power (52.4%), and (3) AFW (37.1%). Each of these three systems also had the potential to increase the fire CDF by a factor > 2500 ifall equipment associated with the system were assumed to be failed (Risk Achievement Worth). Two of these (FSW and AFW) are front-line systems which serve either to mitigate the fire or reduce the likelihood of resulting core damage. The third (AC Power) is a support system which provides required electric power to these and other critical front-line systems.

1 1.6.1 Unique and Important Safety Features The internal events PSA identified three attributes that helped to reduce the calculated CDF at Ginna Station:

a. Standby Auxiliary Feedwater (SAP W) System;

b. Limited requirements for ventilation due to "open" building design;

c. Service Water (SW) System design (i.e., common header for all four SW pumps).

As shown in Section 9.6.3.5, both the SAF W and SW systems are considered of high importance with respect to the fire CDF. SAFW serves as a backup to normal AFW to provide decay heat removal, and is located in a separate building. This design attribution was shown to be very important with respect to fire mitigation due to the potential of a fire to fail all three AFW pumps located in the Intermediate Building. SW is a

GINNA STATION PSA REVISION 1 FIRE IPEEE FINALREPORT PAGE 11-3 support system which provides required component cooling to critical front-line systems. Although all four SW pumps are located in a common area of the Screenhouse, no credible fire scenario was identified that would disable more than two SW pumps because: (1) no intervening combustibles are installed between the SW pumps (only the pump motors are present on this floor; no cables are present); (2) the SW pumps are installed with a centerline separation of eight feet; and (3) only one fixed combustible (a diesel-driven fire pump) is installed within 20 feet of the pumps. Furthermore, Ginna Station can shutdown without SW for non-LOCA scenarios and has procedures in place to do so. Basically, the plant can utilize the city water supply to plant hydrants to cool the DGs and provide a suction source to SAFW. The ability to perform these actions was identified as being of high risk-significance. The design of the SW system utilizing a single header was not a significant consideration for fire-related risk.

The lack of a need for ventilation is based on the limited use of compartments or rooms to protect and separate various equipment trains. This, in turn, created fire issues since multiple trains could be affected by the same fire. However, location-specific suppression systems help to reduce the likelihood of a fire growing large enough to affect multiple trains. In the end, no specific vulnerability was discovered with respect to this "open" design.

1 1.6.2 Vulnerabilities One of the major objectives of Generic Letter 88-20 (Ref. 7) was to identify potential plant vulnerabilities.

Using the definition of vulnerability provided in the internal events PSA (Section 11.0), no items were identified as vulnerable due to the effects of fire. However, the PSA did identify a fire scenario in the DG B Vault (fire zone EDG1B-O), located beneath the DG B Room, in which both trains of AC electric power could be affected. Basically, a worst-case fire could fail the B electrical train (Buses 16 and 17) and fail offsite power and all control power to Bus 18 of the A electrical train (DG A would still remain available).

This, in turn, would result in the loss of all SW. While the scenario was not risk-significant due to the low ignition frequency of a fire in this location and the available plant procedures to handle a loss of SW, ACTION Report 99-948 was generated to evaluate the scenario. The result of the ACTION Report was to recommend consideration of procedural changes to instruct plant personnel to manually close the required Bus 18 breakers to prevent leaving the plant in a Station Blackout condition. These procedural changes are being evaluated on the basis of commercial considerations and not as a defined vulnerability. They are expected to be implemented by November 1999.

11.6.3 Changes Made to the Facility Based on the insights obtained from the internal fire evaluation, no changes have been made to or proposed for Ginna Station.

GINNA STATION PSA REVISION 1 FIRE IPEEE FINAL REPORT PAGE 11-4 FIGURE 11K. CONTRIBUTIONS TO FIRE CDF BY LOCATION Intermediate Building r

12%

Cable Tunnel Screenhouse 0.8% 3 1% Containment 43%

Tech Sup port Center DG Rooms 0.1% 6%

Control Building Transformer Yard 42.2% 58%

Auxiliary Building 12 2%

Turbine Building 255