Information Notice 1992-85, Potential Failures of Emergency Core Cooling Systems Caused by Foreign Material Blackage
- - UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 December 23, 1992 NRC INFORMATION
NOTICE 92-85: POTENTIAL
FAILURES OF EMERGENCY
CORE COOLING SYSTEMS CAUSED BY FOREIGN MATERIAL BLOCKAGE
Addressees
All holders of operating
licenses or construction
permits for nuclear power reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice to alert addressees
to the potential
failure of emergency
core cooling systems (ECCS) caused by foreign material blockage.
It is expected that recipients
will review the information
for applicability
to their facilities
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
However, suggestions
contained
in this information
notice are not NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
of Circumstances
H. B. Robinson Unit 2 On August 23, 1992, while the H. B. Robinson Nuclear Plant was in mode 4, hot shutdown, plant personnel
were performing
an operations
surveillance
test of the B safety injection (SI) pump. This test found that the recirculation
flow was 20 percent lower than it had been when it was last measured on July 12, 1992. Prompted by the resident inspector, the Carolina Power and Light Company (the licensee)
retested this pump on August 24, 1992, and found no recirculation
flow. The licensee also tested the A SI pump and found the recirculation
flow was 10 percent lower than when it was last measured.
The licensee declared both pumps inoperable
and took the unit to cold shutdown.On August 25, 1992, the licensee opened the B SI pump recirculation
line and removed a single piece of white plastic, about the size of a nickel, from the inline orifice.Previously, on July 8, 1992, the licensee had declared the B SI pump inoperable
after a quarterly
inservice
inspection
surveillance
test found that it was producing
a recirculation
flow of 11.4 Liters [3 gallons] per minute, rather than the required 132.5 Liters [35 gallons] per minute. On July 9, 1992, the licensee shut down the plant to determine
the cause of the low flow.The licensee removed the recirculation
line for the B SI pump and found that debris was obstructing
the inline orifice.9212170209 Pyt I ( /'a q9A Ac s e 0C20 28 IN 92-85 December 23, 1992 On July 12, 1992, after flushing the B SI pump and verifying
that recirculation
flows for both SI pumps were acceptable, the licensee returned the unit to service. The licensee also tested all other ECCS pumps that could have had contact with foreign material.
The licensee believed, prior to plant startup, that all debris had been removed.Point Beach Unit 2 On September
28, 1992, the Wisconsin
Electric Power Company (the licensee)performed
an ASME Section XI quarterly
test of containment
spray pumps and valves. During the test, the licensee noted that the discharge
pressure for the A train containment
spray pump was zero and that the pump was making an abnormal noise. The test was stopped and the pump was declared inoperable.
Upon disassembly
of the pump, a foam rubber plug was found blocking the impeller suction. The licensee removed the plug and retested the pump. The test was successfully
completed
and the pump was declared operable.Discussion
The licensee at H. B. Robinson determined
that the foreign material found in the SI system was a plastic material that had been used during a modification
of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system performed
in March through June 1992. The plastic material is manufactured
by DuPont and the trade name is Delrin-AF.
At the time of the RHR modification, the plastic material had been cut into-four
23=centimeter
[9-inch]-diameter,-circular
pieces for use-as weld purge dams. However, after completing
the modification, the licensee did not account for two of the four pieces. Delrin-AF
decomposes
at RCS system conditions
because of reaction with the water and thermal degradation.
The licensee suspected
that the purge dam pieces broke,. entered the RHR piping after breaking, and migrated into the refueling
water storage tank (RWST) and SI header during initial cavity draindown.
The licensee sent divers with cameras into the RWST to inspect for the plastic. The divers found three fragments
of Delrin-AF
plastic and also other pieces of miscellaneous
debris. The location and size of the recovered Delrin-AF
material agrees with the material migration
theory since all of the pieces were larger than those recovered
from the B SI pump in July and August.The licensee inspected
orifices for the SI pump minimum flow recirculation
lines and also visually inspected
piping, tanks, and components
to find and remove any foreign material.
Also, the licensee evaluated
the potential effect on other ECCS equipment
and concluded
that the ECCS equipment
would continue to be operable and reliable.a
IN 92-85 December 23, 1992 The licensee for Point Beach Unit 2 reviewed plant records and determined
that the plug was most likely left in the piping after modifications
were made to install full flow test lines in the RHR, containment
spray and safety injection
systems, during the 1991 refueling
outage. The NRC reviewed the event and determined
that one train of the safety injection
system piping was rendered inoperable
in the recirculation
mode because of the presence of the plug. This condition
had continued
for about a year and was caused by inadequate
controls during the system modifications
made in the previous outage.The presence of small debris may not be detected by operational
or post modification
testing since blockages
may not appear immediately.
However, small debris may migrate into areas with smaller cross sections where the debris could collect and cause blockage after extended operation.
These examples illustrate
the consequences
of failure to ensure accountability
of all materials
that are used when safety systems are opened and to perform cleanliness
checks of all affected areas prior to system closure.Related Generic Communication
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information
Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris In Containment
Emergency
Sumps and Incorrect
Screen Configurations," which addressed
problems that could result from debris in containment
emergency sumps.This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.rnan K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contact: Eric Benner, NRR (301) 504-1171 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices
z-4 V a 0 z 0 V-v z C D -->n-_ _z 11 0-4U cmm U1 0 Cfl Ca/z Attachment
IN 92-85 December 23, 1992 Page I of 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
NOTICES Information
Notice No. Subject 92-84 Release of Patients Treated with Temporary Implants 88-23, Potential
for Gas Supp. 4 Binding of High-Pres- sure Safety Injection Pumps during A Design Basis Accident 92-83 Thrust Limits for Limitorque
Actuators and Potential
Over-stressing
of Motor-Operated Valves 92-82 Results of Thermo-Lag
330-1 Combustibility
Testing 92-81 Potential
Deficiency
of Electrical
Cables with Bonded Hypalon Jackets 92-80 Results of Thermo-Lag
330-1 Combustibility
Testing 92-79 Non-Power
Reactor Emergency
Event Response 92-78 Piston to Cylinder Liner Tin Smearing on Cooper-Bessemer
KSV Diesel Engines Vate of Issuance Issued to 12/17/92 All Nuclear Regulatory
Comnission
Medical (Licensees.
12/18/92 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors 12/17/92 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors 12/15/92 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors 12/11/92 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.12/07/92 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.12/01/92 All holders of OLs or CPs(for test and research reactors.11/30/92 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.DL -Operating
License CP -Construction
Permit
'U IN 92-XX December xx, 1992 The licensee for Point Beach Unit 2 reviewed plant records and determined
that the plug was most likely left in the piping after modifications
were made to install full flow test lines-in the residual heat removal (RHR), containment
spray and safety injection
systems, during the 1991 refueling
outage. The NRC reviewed the event and determined
that one train of the safety injection system piping was rendered inoperable
in the recirculation
mode because of the presence of the plug. The NRC issued a Notice of Violation
and Proposed Imposition
of Civil Penalty in the amount of $75,000. This violation, which was classified
at Severity Level III, continued
for about a year and was caused by inadequate
controls during the system modifications
made in the previous outage.The presence of small debris may not be detected by operational
or post modification
testing since blockages
may not appear immediately.
However, small debris may migrate into areas with smaller cross sections where the debris could collect and cause blockage after extended operation.
Whenever safety systems are opened, it is important
to ensure accountability
of any materials
that are used and to perform cleanliness
checks of all affected areas prior to system closure.Related Generic Communication
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information
Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris In Containment
Emergency
Sumps and Incorrect
Screen Configurations," which addressed
problems that could result from debris in containment
emergency sumps.This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contact: Eric Benner, NRR (301) 504-1171 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
OEAB:DORS
ASC/OEAB:DORS
ADM:RPB PM:PD2-1:DRPE
DGarcia* AGautam* JMain* BMozafari*
10/07/92 10/14/92 09/28/92 10/13/92 C/SRXB:DSSA
C/OEAB:DORS
OGCB:DORS
OE C/OGCB:DORS
D/DORS RJones* AChaffee*
JBirmingham , Lieberman*
GMarcus BGrimes 10/08/92 11/09/92 12////92 ~/ ' 2/09/92 12/1 i/927 12/ /92 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DMG\INDEBRIS.DMG
4 I' J K)IN 92-XX December xx, 1992 The licensee for Point Beach Unit 2 reviewed plant records and determined
that the plug was most likely left in the piping after modifications
were made to install full flow test lines in the residual heat removal (RHR), containment
spray and safety injection
systems, during the 1991 refueling
outage. The NRC reviewed the event and determined
that one train of the safety injection system piping was rendered inoperable
in the recirculation
mode because of the presence of the plug. The NRC is issuing a Notice of Violation
and Proposed Imposition
of Civil Penalty in the amount of $75,000. This violation, which has been classified
at Severity Level III, continued
for about a year and was caused by inadequate
controls during the system modifications
made in the previous outage.The presence of small debris may not be detected by operational
or post modification
testing since blockages
may not appear immediately.
However, small debris may migrate into areas with smaller cross sections where the debris could collect and cause blockage after extended operation.
Whenever safety systems are opened, it is important
to ensure accountability
of any materials
that are used and to perform cleanliness
checks of all affected areas prior to system closure.Related Generic Communication
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information
Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris In Containment
Emergency
Sumps and Incorrect
Screen Configurations," which addressed
problems that could result from debris in containment
emergency sumps.This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contact: Eric Benner, NRR (301) 504-1171 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
OEAB:DORS
ASC/OEAB:DORS
ADM:RPB PM:PD2-1:DRPE
DGarcia* AGautam* JMain* BMozafari*
10/07/92 10/14/92 09/28/92 10/13/92 C/SRXB:DSSA
C/OEAB:DORS
OGCB:DORS
OE AzK C/OGCB:DORS
RJones* AChaffee*
JBirmingham
JLieberman
GMarcus 10/08/92 11/09/92 12/ /92 12/f /92 12/ /92 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DMG\INDEBRIS.DMG
D/DORS BGrimes 12/ /92 I I IN 92-XX December xx, 1992 pieces of miscellaneous
debris. The location and size of the recovered Delrin-AF
material agrees with the material migration
theory since all of the pieces were larger than those recovered
from the B SI pump in July and August.The licensee inspected
orifices for the SI pump minimum flow recirculation
lines, and visually inspected
piping, tanks, and components
to find and remove any foreign material.
Also, the licensee evaluated
the potential
effect on other ECCS equipment
and concluded
that the ECCS equipment
would continue to be operable and reliable.7-1- t-The staff notes thatl$resence
of small debris may not be detected by operational
or post-modification
testing since blockages
may not appear immediately.
However, small debris may migrate into areas with smaller cross sections where the debris can collect and cause blockage after extended operation.
Whenever safety systems are opened, it is important
to ensure accountability
of any materials
that are used and to perform'cleanliness
checks of all affected areas prior to system closure.Related Generic Communication
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information
Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris In Containment
Emergency
Sumps and Incorrect
Screen Configurations," which addressed
problems that could result from debris in containment
emergency sumps.This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
cor Attachment:
- SEE PREVIOUS OEAB:DORS DGarcia*10/07/92 C/SRXB:DSSA
RJones*10/08/92 DOCUMENT NAME itact: Eric Benner, NRR (301) 504-1171 List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices CONCURRENCE
ASC/OEAB:DORS
ADM:RPB PM:PD2-1:DRPE
AGautam* JMain* BMozafari*
10/14/92 09/28/92 10/13/92 C/OEAB:DORS
OGCB:DORS
OE C/OGC AChaffee*
JBirmingham*
JLieberman*
GMarc 11/09/92 12/11/92 12/09/92 12/11 E: G:\DMG\INDEBRIS.DMG
B:DORS us*/92 D/DORS BGrimes 12/ /92
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
OEAB:DORS DGarcia*10/07/92 ASC/OEAB:DORS
AGautam*10/14/92 ADM:RPB JMain*09/28/92 PM:PD2-1:DRPE
BMozafari*
10/13/92 C/SRXB:DSSA
RJones*10/08/92 DOCUMENT NAME: C/OEAB:DORS
C/OGCB:DORS
AChaffee*
GMarcus 11/09/92 / /92 G:\DMG\INDEBRIS.DMG
D/DORS BGrimes/ /92 IN 92-XX November xx, 1992 Related Generic Communication
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information
Notice (IN) 89-77, 'Debris In Containment
Emergency
Sumps and Incorrect
Screen Configurations," in which it discussed
problems that could result from debris found in containment
emergency
sumps.This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts: D. Garcia, NRR (301) 504-1170 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
OEAB:DORS DGarcia*10/07/92 ASC/OEAB:DORS
AGautam*10/14/92 ADM:RPB JMain*09/28/92 PM:PD2-1:DRPE
BMozafari*
10/13/92 C/SRXB:DSSA
RJones*10/08/92 C/OE f DORS AChaffee Il /.ci/92 C/OGCB:DORS
GMarcus/ /92 I D/DORS BGrimes/ /92 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DMG\INDEBRIS.DMC
IN 92-XX October xx, 1992 Related Generic Communication
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information
Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris In Containment
Emergency
Sumps and Incorrect
Screen Configurations," in which it discussed
problems that could result from debris found in containment
emergency
sumps.This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts: D. Garcia, NRR (301) 504-1170 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
OEAB:DORS DGarcia*10/07/92 ASC/OEAB:DgRS
/cLAGautamOC
/6 //~/ 92 ADM:RPB JMain*09/28/92 PM:PD2-1:DRPE
BMozafari*
10/13/92 C/SRXB:DSSA
RJones*10/08/92 C/OEAB:DORS
AChaffee/ /92 C/OGCB:DORS
GMarcus/ /92 D/DORS BGrimes/ /92 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DEBRIS.DMG
IN 92-XX October xx, 1992 Related Generic Communication
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information
Notice (IN) 89-77, 'Debris In Containment
Emergency
Sumps and Incorrect
Screen Configurations,'
in which it discussed
problems that could result from debris found in containment
emergency
sumps.This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts: Denise M. Garcia, NRR (301) 504-1170 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS 0 : RS ,92 C/ SA RJon'es/0 /1(/92 CONCURRENCE
ASC/OEAB:DORS
AGautam/ /92 C/OEAB:DORS
AChaffee/ /92 ADM:RPB JMain*09/28/92 C/OGCB:DORS
GMarcus/ /92 PM:PD2-1 :DRP fl,_fv, BMozafari/0//13/92 D/DORS BGrimes/ /92 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DEBRIS.DMG
This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contacts: Denise M. Garcia, NRR (301) 504-1171 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices OEAB:DOEA DGarcia/ /92 SC/OEAB:DOEA
AGautam/ /92 ADM:RPB JMain Q h 9/ 2J /f2 PM:PD2-1:DRPE
BMozafari/ /92 C/SRXB:DST
RJones/ /92 C/OEAB:DOEA
AChaffee/ /92 C/OGCB:DOEA
GMarcus/ /92 D/DOEA CRossi/ /92 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\DEBRIS.DMG
K-)UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 December 23, 1992 NRC INFORMATION
NOTICE 92-85: POTENTIAL
FAILURES OF EMERGENCY
CORE COOLING SYSTEMS CAUSED BY FOREIGN MATERIAL BLOCKAGE
Addressees
All holders of operating
licenses or construction
permits for nuclear power reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice to alert addressees
to the potential
failure of emergency
core cooling systems (ECCS) caused by foreign material blockage.
It is expected that recipients
will review the information
for applicability
to their facilities
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
However, suggestions
contained
in this information
notice are not NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
of Circumstances
H. B. Robinson Unit 2 On August 23, 1992, while the H. B. Robinson Nuclear Plant was in mode 4, hot shutdown, plant personnel
were performing
an operations
surveillance
test of the B safety injection (SI) pump. This test found that the recirculation
flow was 20 percent lower than it had been when it was last measured on July 12, 1992. Prompted by the resident inspector, the Carolina Power and Light Company (the licensee)
retested this pump on August 24, 1992, and found no recirculation
flow. The licensee also tested the A SI pump and found the recirculation
flow was 10 percent lower than when it was last measured.
The licensee declared both pumps inoperable
and took the unit to cold shutdown.On August 25, 1992, the licensee opened the B SI pump recirculation
line and removed a single piece of white plastic, about the size of a nickel, from the inline orifice.Previously, on July 8, 1992, the licensee had declared the B SI pump inoperable
after a quarterly
inservice
inspection
surveillance
test found that it was producing
a recirculation
flow of 11.4 Liters [3 gallons] per minute, rather than the required 132.5 Liters [35 gallons] per minute. On July 9, 1992, the licensee shut down the plant to determine
the cause of the low flow.The licensee removed the recirculation
line for the B SI pump and found that debris was obstructing
the inline orifice.9212 0209
<-2 <off92-85 December 23, 1992 On July 12, 1992, after flushing the B SI pump and verifying
that recirculation
flows for both SI pumps were acceptable, the licensee returned the unit to service. The licensee also tested all other ECCS pumps that could have had contact with foreign material.
The licensee believed, prior to plant startup, that all debris had been removed.Point Beach Unit 2 On September
28, 1992, the Wisconsin
Electric Power Company (the licensee)performed
an ASME Section XI quarterly
test of containment
spray pumps and valves. During the test, the licensee noted that the discharge
pressure for the A train containment
spray pump was zero and that the pump was making an abnormal noise. The test was stopped and the pump was declared inoperable.
Upon disassembly
of the pump, a foam rubber plug was found blocking the impeller suction. The licensee removed the plug and retested the pump. The test was successfully
completed
and the pump was declared operable.Discussion
The licensee at H. B. Robinson determined
that the foreign material found in the SI system was a plastic material that had been used during a modification
of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system performed
in March through June 1992. The plastic material is manufactured
by DuPont and the trade name is Delrin-AF.
At the time of the RHR modification, the plastic material had been cut into four 23-centimeter
(9-inch] diameter, circular pieces for use as weld purge dams. However, after completing
the modification, the licensee did not account for two of the four pieces. Delrin-AF
decomposes
at RCS system conditions
because of reaction with the water and thermal degradation.
The licensee suspected
that the purge dam pieces broke, entered the RHR piping after breaking, and migrated into the refueling
water storage tank (RWST) and SI header during initial cavity draindown.
The licensee sent divers with cameras into the RWST to inspect for the plastic. The divers found three fragments
of Delrin-AF
plastic and also other pieces of miscellaneous
debris. The location and size of the recovered Delrin-AF
material agrees with the material migration
theory since all of the pieces were larger than those recovered
from the B SI pump in July and August.The licensee inspected
orifices for the SI pump minimum flow recirculation
lines and also visually inspected
piping, tanks, and components
to find and remove any foreign material.
Also, the licensee evaluated
the potential effect on other ECCS equipment
and concluded
that the ECCS equipment
would continue to be operable and reliable.
IN 92-85 December 23, 1992 The licensee for Point Beach Unit 2 reviewed plant records and determined
that the plug was most likely left in the piping after modifications
were made to install full flow test lines in the RHR, containment
spray and safety injection
systems, during the 1991 refueling
outage. The NRC reviewed the event and determined
that one train of the safety injection
system piping was rendered inoperable
in the recirculation
mode because of the presence of the plug. This condition
had continued
for about a year and was caused by inadequate
controls during the system modifications
made in the previous outage.The presence of small debris may not be detected by operational
or post modification
testing since blockages
may not appear immediately.
However, small debris may migrate into areas with smaller cross sections where the debris could collect and cause blockage after extended operation.
These examples illustrate
the consequences
of failure to ensure accountability
of all materials
that are used when safety systems are opened and to perform cleanliness
checks of all affected areas prior to system closure.Related Generic Communication
On November 21, 1989, the NRC issued Information
Notice (IN) 89-77, "Debris In Containment
Emergency
Sumps and Incorrect
Screen Configurations," which addressed
problems that could result from debris in containment
emergency sumps.This information
notice requires no specific action or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.rnan K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical
contact: Eric Benner, NRR (301) 504-1171 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Notices
l I 1 K" K-, I Attachment
IN 92-85 December 23, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
NOTICES Information
Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 92-84 88-23, Supp. 4 92-83 92-82 92-81 92-80 Release of Patients Treated with Temporary Implants Potential
for Gas Binding of High-Pres- sure Safety Injection Pumps during A Design Basis Accident Thrust Limits for Limitorque
Actuators and Potential
Over-stressing
of Motor-Operated Valves Results of Thermo-Lag
330-1 Combustibility
Testing Potential
Deficiency
of Electrical
Cables with Bonded Hypalon Jackets Results of Thermo-Lag
330-1 Combustibility
Testing Non-Power
Reactor Emergency
Event Response Piston to Cylinder Liner Tin Smearing on Cooper-Bessemer
KSV Diesel Engines 12/17/92 12/18/92 12/17/92 12/15/92 12/11/92 12/07/92 12/01/92 11/30/92 All Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Medical Licensees.
All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for test and research reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.92-79 92-78 OL = Operating
License CP = Construction
Permit