IR 05000400/2007002
| ML071200367 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 04/30/2007 |
| From: | Randy Musser NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4 |
| To: | Duncan R Carolina Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| IR-07-002 | |
| Download: ML071200367 (20) | |
Text
April 30, 2007Carolina Power and Light CompanyATTN:Mr. Robert J. Duncan, IIVice President - Harris PlantShearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant P. O. Box 165, Mail Code: Zone 1 New Hill, North Carolina 27562-0165SUBJECT:SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATEDINSPECTION REPORT 05000400/2007002
Dear Mr. Duncan:
On March 31, 2007, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection atyour Shearon Harris reactor facility. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents theinspection findings, which were discussed on April 11, 2007 with you and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified by the NRC.However, two licensee identified violations, which were determined to be of very low safety significance, are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because of their very low safety significance and because they are entered into your corrective action program. If you contest these non-cited violations, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, UnitedStates Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Shearon Harris facility.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and itsenclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public DocumentRoom or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) components of NRC's document system 2(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/Randall A. Musser, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket No.:50-400License No.:NPF-63
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 05000400/2007002 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
_________________________OFFICERII:DRPRII:DRPRII:DRPSIGNATURESONPBO by emailMFK1 by emailNAMESNinhPO'BryanMKingDATE04/26/200704/27/200704/27/20075/ /20075/ /20075/ /20075/ /2007 E-MAIL COPY? YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO
REGION IIDocket No:50-400License No:NPF-63 Report No:05000400/2007002 Licensee:Carolina Power and Light Company Facility:Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Location:5413 Shearon Harris RoadNew Hill, NC 27562Dates:January 1 through March 31, 2007 Inspectors:P. O'Bryan, Senior Resident InspectorM. King, Resident InspectorApproved by:R. Musser, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
- January 1, 2007 - March 31, 2007; Shearon Harris Nuclear PowerPlant, Unit 1; Routine Integrated Report.
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.A.Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings None.
B.Licensee-Identified Violations
Violations of very low safety significance, which were identified by the licensee havebeen reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program. These violations and corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 40A7 of this report.
Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status The unit began the inspection period at full rated thermal power, and operated at full power forthe entire inspection period.1.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity1R04Equipment Alignment
a. Inspection Scope
Partial System Walkdowns:The inspectors performed the following three partial system walkdowns, while theindicated structures, systems and components (SSCs) were out-of-service (OOS) for maintenance and testing:*B residual heat removal system with A residual heat removal system out-of-service on January 10, 2007.*A emergency diesel generator with B emergency diesel generator out-of-serviceon January 19, 2007.*A essential services chilled water chiller with B essential services chilled waterchiller out-of-service on February 14, 2007.To evaluate the operability of the selected trains or systems under these conditions, theinspectors reviewed valve and power alignments by comparing observed positions of valves, switches, and electrical power breakers to the procedures and drawings listed in the Attachment.Complete System Walkdown:The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the alignment and condition of theinstrument air system. To determine the proper system alignment, the inspectors reviewed the procedures, drawings, and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) sections listed in the Attachment. The inspectors walked down the system, to verify that the existing alignment of thesystem was consistent with the correct alignment. Items reviewed during the walkdown included the following:*Valves are correctly positioned and do not exhibit leakage that would impact thefunction(s) of any given valve.*Electrical power is available as required.
4Enclosure*Major system components are correctly labeled, lubricated, cooled, ventilated,etc.*Hangers and supports are correctly installed and functional.
- Essential support systems are operational.
- Ancillary equipment or debris does not interfere with system performance.
- Tagging clearances are appropriate.
- Valves are locked as required by the licensee's locked valve program.The inspectors reviewed the documents listed in the Attachment, to verify that the abilityof the system to perform its function could not be affected by outstanding design issues, temporary modifications, operator workarounds, adverse conditions, and other system-related issues tracked by the Engineering Department.The inspectors reviewed the following ARs associated with this area to verify that thelicensee identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions:*AR 103051, Single Point Failure of Instrument Air Dryer.*AR 154069, Missing Valve in IA Lineup Previously Identified.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
a. Inspection Scope
For the twenty-four areas identified below, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's controlof transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures, to verify that those items were consistent with final safety analysis report (FSAR) Section 9.5.1, FireProtection System, and FSAR Appendix 9.5.A, Fire Hazards
Analysis.
The inspectorswalked down accessible portions of each area and reviewed results from relatedsurveillance tests, to verify that conditions in these areas were consistent withdescriptions of the applicable FSAR sections.
Documents reviewed are listed in theAttachment. *261' level of the reactor auxiliary building including zones 1-A-4-CHLR and 1-A-4-COR (2 areas)*A emergency diesel generator rooms including zones 1-D-1-DGA-RM, 1-D-3-DGA-ES, 1-D-DTA, 1-D-1-DGA-ASU, 1-D-1-DGA-ER, and 1-D-3-DGA-HVR (6 areas)*emergency service water intake structure including zones 12-I-ESWPA, 12-I-ESWPA-BAL, 12-I-ESWPB, 12-I-ESWPB-BAL, and 5-S-BAL (5 areas)*emergency diesel generator fuel oil storage enclosure including zones 1-O-PB,1-O-PA, an 5-O-BAL (3 areas)5Enclosure*236' level of the reactor auxiliary building including zones 1-A-3-PB/1-A-3-TA, 1-A-34-RHRA, 1-A-34-RHRB, 1-A-BAL-G, and 1-A-BAL-H (5 areas)*236' level of the reactor auxiliary building including zones 1-A-3-MP, 1-A-3-COR,and 1-A-3-COME (3 areas)The inspectors reviewed the following ARs associated with this area to verify that thelicensee identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions:*AR 224571, Fire Watch Observation.*AR 226459, Logic Flaw in SSD Reporting of New Manual Actions.
- AR 227744, Transient Combustable Material Not Permitted.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
External FloodingThe inspectors walked down the diesel generator and reactor auxiliary buildings, whichcontain risk-significant SSCs and are susceptible to flooding from external sources. The inspectors verified that the area configurations, features, and equipment functions were consistent with the descriptions and assumptions used in FSAR section 2.4.10, Flood Protection Requirements, and in the supporting basis documents listed in the
. The inspectors reviewed the operator actions credited in the analysis, to verify that the desired results could be achieved using the plant procedures listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
On March 19, 2007, the inspectors observed/completed licensed-operator performanceduring requalification simulator training for crew C, to verify that operator performance was consistent with expected operator performance, as described in Exercise Guide DSS-011. This training tested the operators' ability to place the plant in a safe condition following a loss of coolant accident. The inspectors focused on clarity and formality of communication, the use of procedures, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics and supervisory oversight.
6EnclosureThe inspectors observed the post-exercise critique to verify that the licensee hadidentified deficiencies and discrepancies that occurred during the simulator training.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed four degraded SSC/function performance problems orconditions listed below to verify the licensee's handling of these performance problems or conditions in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, and 10CFR50.65, Maintenance Rule. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.*Failure of valve 1SW-1208, service water control valve to B train essentialservices chiller.*Failure of the B essential services chilled water chiller.
- Degraded thrust bearing on the C charging and safety injection pump.
- Surveillance failures of the A train sequencer.The inspectors focused on the following attributes:
- Appropriate work practices,*Identifying and addressing common cause failures,
- Scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b),
- Characterizing reliability issues (performance),
- Charging unavailability (performance),
- Trending key parameters (condition monitoring),
- 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification and reclassification, and
- Appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs/functions classified (a)(2)and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs/functions classified (a)(1).The inspectors reviewed the following ARs associated with this area to verify that the licensee identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions:*AR 216877, 1SW-1208, B-SB WC-2 TCV Failed Open.*AR 221640, B ESCW High Chill Water Temperature.
- AR 222825, 1CS-CSIPC, Outboard Thrust Bearing Damage.
- AR 226035, A Sequencer Maintenance Rule Unavailability Margin.
- AR 225697, Sequencer Train A Wiring Discrepancies.
- AR 225025, Sequencer A UR2/SA Failure to Initiate Load Banks 3, 4, 6, and 7.
- AR 220923, Loose Terminal Lugs on UR1 Relay, A Train Sequencer.
- AR 224317, A-SA Sequencer Declared Inoperable.
- AR 220768, A Train Sequencer Load Block 1 Failure.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's risk assessments and the risk managementactions for the plant configurations associated with the four activities listed below. The inspectors verified that the licensee performed adequate risk assessments, and implemented appropriate risk management actions when required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). For emergent work, the inspectors also verified that any increase in risk was promptly assessed, and that the appropriate risk management actions were promptly implemented.*Tornado watch issued on January 6, 2007. *Winter weather advisory with planned maintenance on the B train emergencydiesel generator on January 18, 2007.*Failed A sequencer on January 30, 2007.
- Maintenance on B emergency diesel generator with B reactor makeup pump outof service on February 16, 2007.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed five operability determinations addressed in the ARs listed below. The inspectors assessed the accuracy of the evaluations, the use and control ofany necessary compensatory measures, and compliance with the TS
. The inspectorsverified that the operability determinations were made as specified by Procedure OPS-NGGC-1305, "Operability Determinations." The inspectors compared the justifications made in the determination to the requirements from the TS, the FSAR, and associated design-basis documents, to verify that operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available, such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred:*AR 218793, M&TE Gauge Found Out of Calibration.*AR 219477, B EDG Test Postponed Due to Excessive ECP Relay Vibrations.
- AR 216433, Non-Q Parts Install in Q-Class A Instruments.
- AR 220768, A Sequencer Load Block 1 Failure During EPT-033.
- AR 222825, 1CS-CSIPC, Outboard Thrust Bearing Damage.
8EnclosureThe inspectors reviewed the following ARs associated with this area to verify that the licensee identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions:*AR 124482, Incorrect Q-Class for FT-0652SW & FT-0653SW.*AR 222825, C CSIP Bearing Damage.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
For the five post-maintenance tests listed below, the inspectors witnessed the testand/or reviewed the test data, to verify that test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety function(s) described in the FSAR and TS. The tests included the following:*OST-1008, RHR Pump Operability Quarterly Interval Modes 1-2-3 and OST-1804, RHR Remote Position Indication and Timing Test 18 Month Interval Modes 5,6, after repairing actuator for 1RH-20 on January 10, 2007.*OST-1215, Emergency Service Water System Operability Train B QuarterlyInterval Modes 1-2-3-4, after conducting maintenance on 1SC-37 on January 17, 2007.*OST-1008, RHR Pump Operability Quarterly Interval Modes 1-2-3 afterconducting maintenance on valve 1SI-326 on January 8, 2007.*OPT-1512, Essential Chilled Water Turbopaks Units QuarterlyInspection/Checks Modes 1-6, after conducting repairs on February 7, 2007.*EPT-033, Emergency Safeguards Sequencer System Test Train A, afterconducting wiring repairs on March 19, 2007.The inspectors reviewed ARs, associated with this area, to verify that the licenseeidentified and implemented appropriate corrective actions:*AR 221640, B ESCW High Chill Water Temperature.*AR 220768, A Sequencer Load Block 1 Failure During EPT-33.
- AR 220923, Loose Terminal Lugs on UR1 Relay on A Sequencer Cabinet.
- AR 224317, A-SA Sequencer Declared Inoperable.
- AR 225025, Sequencer A UR2/SA Failure to Initiate LBS 3,4,6 and 7.
- AR 225697, Sequencer Train A Wiring Discrepancies.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
9Enclosure1R22Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
For the five surveillance tests identified below, the inspectors witnessed testing and/orreviewed test data, to verify that the systems, structures, and components involved in these tests satisfied the requirements described in the TS and the FSAR, and that the tests demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their intended safety functions.*OP-155, Diesel Generator Emergency Power System on January 19, 2007.**OST-1011, Auxiliary Feedwater System Operability Test Monthly Interval Mode1-4 on January 22, 2007.*OST-1124, Train B 6.9 KV Emergency Bus Undervoltage Trip Actuating DeviceOperational Test and Contact Check Modes 1-6 on January 23, 2007.*OST-1094, Sequencer Block Circuit and Containment Fan Cooler Testing TrainA Quarterly Interval All Modes on March 7, 2007.*EST-201, ASME System Pressure Tests on March 25, 2007.*This procedure included inservice testing requirements.
The inspectors reviewed the following ARs associated with this area to verify that thelicensee identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions.*AR 168811, Near Miss on 1AF-129 Post Maintenance Testing.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness1EP6Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill conducted on January 30,2007 to verify licensee self-assessment of classification, notification, and protectiveaction recommendation development in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix E.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
10Enclosure4.OTHER ACTIVITIES4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Routine Review of ARsTo aid in the identification of repetitive equipment failures or specific humanperformance issues for followup, the inspectors performed frequent screenings of items
entered into the CAP. The review was accomplished by reviewing daily AR reports.
.2 Annual Sample Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected AR 79228 for detailed review. This AR was associated with the corrective action for a fire that developed in the motor-driven fire pump as a result of a failure in 6.9kV rated cabling. This AR included corrective action that is relevant to all 6.9kV rated cables. The inspectors reviewed this report to verify that the licensee identified the full extent of the issue, performed an appropriate evaluation, and specified and prioritized appropriate corrective actions. The inspectors evaluated the report against the requirements of the licensee's corrective action program as delineated in corporate procedure CAP-NGGC-0200, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
b. Observations and Findings
No findings of significance were identified. 4OA6Meetings, Including ExitOn April 11 , 2007, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr.Duncan and other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietaryinformation was not provided or examined during the inspection.4OA7Licensee-Identified ViolationsThe following violations of very low safety significance (Green) were identified by thelicensee and are violations of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as NCVs.* Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures be established,implemented and maintained covering the procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. That appendix discusses Administrative Procedures for Shift and Relief Turnover
- (1g) and Administrative Procedures for Log Entries, Record Retention, and Review Procedures (1h). Contrary to the above, on February 5, 2007, the licensee failed 11Enclosureto implement established administrative procedures resulting in an 18 hour2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> delayin declaring the B train of WC-2A essential services chiller inoperable. This failure to implement established administrative procedures is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program (AR 221803221803. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not represent a loss of system safety function, the single train of the ESCW system affected did not lose functionality for greater than the TS allowed outage time, and the finding was not potentially risk-significant due to external events.*Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures be established,implemented and maintained covering procedures for fire protection program implementation. Contrary to this requirement, the licensee did not follow fire program implementation procedure FPP-013, Fire Protection - Minimum Requirements, Mitigating Actions and Surveillance Requirements when an hourly fire watch was not established for fire barrier deficiencies. Two examples of this deficiency were identified. The first example was inadequate protection of cables in the turbine building which could lead to the loss of power to valve 1CS-231. This failure to implement fire protection program procedures is of very low safety significance because it represents a low degradation of the systems required to reach safe shutdown. The second example was inadequate protection of cables which could lead to the loss of power to B Train ESW Traveling Screens, suction strainers, and screen wash. This failure to implement fire protection program procedures is of very low safety significance because the configuration of the cable run exposed by the lack of fire watch represents a low degradation of the barrier for systems required to reach safe shutdown. These failures to implement established fire protection program procedures are of very low safety significance and have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program (AR 226458226458and AR 227885227885. ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee personnel
- D. Alexander, Superintendent, Environmental and Chemistry
- C. Burton, Director, Site Operations
- D. Corlett, Supervisor - Licensing/Regulatory Programs
- R. Duncan, Vice President Harris Plant
- M. Findlay, Superintendent, Security
- W. Gurganious, Training Manager
- K. Henderson, Maintenance Manager
- C. Kamiliaris, Manager - Nuclear Assessment Manager
- E. McCartney, Plant General Manager
- T. Natale, Manager - Site Support Services
- S. O'Connor, Manager - Engineering
- J. Pierce, Supervisor - Nuclear Assessment
- T. Pilo, Supervisor - Emergency Preparedness
- G. Simmons, Superintendent - Radiation Control
- J. Warner, Manager - Operations
- E. Wills, Manager - Outage and Scheduling
NRC personnel
- R. Musser, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened None.Closed None..
Attachment
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R04: Equipment AlignmentPartial System WalkdownResidual heat removal system: *Procedure
- OP-111, Residual Heat Removal System