ML111800021

From kanterella
Revision as of 14:57, 10 July 2019 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Jump to navigation Jump to search

Issuance of Amendment No. 234, Revise License Condition and Approval of Cyber Security Plan and Associated Implementation Schedule
ML111800021
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 07/20/2011
From: Kalyanam N
Plant Licensing Branch IV
To:
Entergy Operations
Kalyanam N, NRR/DORL/LPL4, 415-1480
References
TAC ME4271
Download: ML111800021 (23)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED NUCLEAR REGULATORY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 July 20, 2011 Vice President, Operations Entergy Operations, Inc. Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 17265 River Road Killona, LA 70057-3093 WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 -ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE: APPROVAL OF CYBER SECURITY PLAN (TAC NO. ME4271)

Dear Sir or Madam:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 234 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-38 for the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. This amendment consists of changes to the facility operating license in response to your application dated July 15, 2010, as supplemented by letters dated September 27 and November 30, 2010, and February 15 and April 4, 2011. The amendment approves the cyber security plan and associated implementation schedule, and revises Paragraph 2.E of Facility Operating License No. NPF-38 to provide a license condition to require the licensee to fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Cyber Security Plan. A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed.

The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice. Sincerely, N. Kalyanam, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-382

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 234 to NPF-38 2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv UNITED NUCLEAR REGULATORY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555*0001 ENTERGY OPERATIONS, DOCKET NO. WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING Amendment No. 234 License No. NPF-38 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that: The application for amendment by Entergy Operations, Inc. (EOI), dated July 15, 2010, as supplemented by letters dated September 27 and November 30,2010, and February 15 and April 4, 2011, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ij) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

Enclosure 1

-Accordingly, the license is amended as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and Paragraph 2.C.2 of Facility Operating License No. NPF-38 is hereby amended to read as follows: 2. Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 234, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. EOI shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan. In addition, Paragraph 2.E of Facility Operating License No. NPF-38 is hereby amended to add the following paragraph:

EOI shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission-approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p).

The EOI CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 234. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

The implementation of the cyber security plan (CSP), including the key intermediate milestone dates and the full implementation date, shall be in accordance with the implementation schedule submitted by the licensee on April 4, 2011, and approved by the NRC staff with this license amendment.

All subsequent changes to the NRC-approved CSP implementation schedule will require prior NRC approval pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90. FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1\ t', , LllcCv L VJ CG .y\ J Michael T. Markley, Chief Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Facility Operating License No. NPF-38 and Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

July 20, 2011 ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DOCKET NO. Replace the following pages of the Facility Operating License and Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. Facility Operating License REMOVE INSERT

-or indirectly any control over (i) the facility, (ii) power or energy produced by the facility, or (iii) the licensees of the facility.

Further, any rights acquired under this authorization may be exercised only in compliance with and subject to the requirements and restrictions of this operating license, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the NRC's regulations.

For purposes of this condition, the limitations of 10 CFR 50.81, as now in effect and as they may be subsequently amended, are fully applicable to the equity investors and any successors in interest to the equity investors, as long as the license for the facility remains in effect. Entergy Louisiana, LLC (or its designee) to notify the NRC in writing prior to any change in (i) the terms or conditions of any lease agreements executed as part of the above authorized financial transactions, (ii) any facility operating agreement involving a licensee that is in effect now or will be in effect in the future, or (iii) the existing property insurance coverages for the facility, that would materially alter the representations and conditions, set forth in the staffs Safety Evaluation enclosed to the NRC letter dated September 18, 1989. In addition, Entergy Louisiana, LLC or its designee is required to notify the NRC of any action by equity investors or successors in interest to Entergy Louisiana, LLC that may have an effect on the operation of the facility. This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations and orders of the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions specified or incorporated below: Maximum Power Level EOI is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3716 megawatts thermal (100% power) in accordance with the conditions specified herein. Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 234, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license. EOI shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan. AMENDMENT NO. 234

-The first performance of SR 6.5.17, in accordance with Specification 6.5.17.c.(i), shall be within the specified Frequency of 6 years, plus the 18-month allowance of SR 4.0.2, as measured from April 17, 2004, the date of the most recent successful tracer gas test, as stated in the October 8, 2004 letter response to Generic Letter 2003-01, or within the next 18 months if the time period since the most recent successful tracer gas test is greater than 6 years. The first performance of the periodic assessment of CRE habitability, Specification 6.5.17.c.(ii), shall be within 3 years, plus the 9-month allowance of SR 4.0.2, as measured from April 17, 2004, the date of the most recent successful tracer gas test, as stated in the October 8, 2004 letter response to Generic Letter 2003-01, or within the next 9 months if the time period since the most recent successful tracer gas test is greater than 3 years. The first performance of the periodic measurement of CRE pressure, Specification 6.5.17 .d, shall be within 18 months, plus the 138 days allowed by SR 4.0.2, as measured from August 13, 2008, the date of the most recent successful pressure measurement test, or within 138 days if not performed previously. The facility requires an exemption from certain requirements of Appendices E and J to 10 CFR Part 50. These exemptions are described in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation's Safety Evaluation Report, Supplement No. 10 (Section 6.1.2) and Supplement NO.8 (Section 6.2.6), respectively.

These exemptions are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security and are otherwise in the public interest.

These exemptions are, therefore, hereby granted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12. With the granting of these exemptions, the facility will operate, to the extent authorized herein, in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission. EOI shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved physical security, training and qualification, and safeguards contingency plans including amendments made pursuant to provisions of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p).

The plan, which contains Safeguards Information protected under 10 CFR 73.21, is entitled: "Physical Security, Safeguards Contingency and Training & Qualification Plan," and was submitted on October 4,2004. EOI shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p).

The EOI CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 234. AMENDMENT NO. 171,218,234 Revised by letter dated July 26, 2007 UNITED NUCLEAR REGULATORY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 234 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-38 ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 DOCKET NO. 50-382

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated July 15, 2010, as supplemented by letters dated September 27 and November 30, 2010, and February 15 and April 4, 2011 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Nos. ML102000415, ML102710121, ML103350177, ML110470182, and ML110950122, respectively), Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee), submitted a license amendment request for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3). Included in that license amendment request was a request for approval of the licensee's Cyber Security Plan (CSP) and Implementation Schedule, as required by Section 73.54, "Protection of Digital Computer and Communication Systems and Networks," of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR). The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff provided the licensee requests for additional information (RAls) regarding the staff's concerns with the CSP. By letter dated February 15, 2011, the licensee submitted its response to these RAls. Additionally, on April 4, 2011, the licensee supplemented its CSP to address: 1) scope of systems in response to the October 21,2010, Commission decision (Reference 1); 2) records retention; and 3) implementation schedule.

The licensee submitted the CSP incorporating all of the changes and/or additional information as referenced in the RAI responses.

Portions of the letters dated July 15, 2010, and February 15 and April 4, 2011, contain sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (security-related) and, accordingly, those portions are withheld from public disclosure.

The supplemental letters dated September 27 and November 30, 2010, and February 15 and April 4, 2011, provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the NRC staffs original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register on October 12, 2010 (75 FR 62598). The amendment would approve the CSP and associated implementation schedule, and revise Paragraph 2.E of Facility Operating License No. NPF-38 for Waterford 3 to provide a license Enclosure 2

-2 condition to require the licensee to fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the NRC-approved Cyber Security Plan. The proposed amendment is consistent with Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 08-09, Revision 6, "Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors."

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

2.1 General Requirements Consistent with 10 CFR 73.54(a), the licensee must provide high assurance that digital computer and communication systems, and networks are adequately protected against cyber attacks, up to and including the design basis threat (DBT), as described in 10 CFR 73.1. The licensee shall protect digital computer and communication systems and networks associated with: (i) safety-related and important-to-safety functions; (ii) security functions; (iii) emergency preparedness functions, including offsite communications; and (iv) support systems and equipment which, if compromised, would adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness (SSEP) functions.

The rule specifies that digital computer and communication systems and networks associated with these functions must be protected from cyber attacks that would adversely impact the integrity or confidentiality of data and software; deny access to systems, services, or data; or provide an adverse impact to the operations of systems, networks, and associated equipment.

In the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) COMWCO-10-0001, "Regulation of Cyber Security at Nuclear Power Plants," dated October 21,2010 (Reference 1), the Commission stated that the NRC's cyber security rule at 10 CFR 73.54 should be interpreted to include structures, systems, and components (SSCs) in the balance of plant (BOP) that have a nexus to radiological health and safety. The NRC staff determined that SSCs in the BOP that have a nexus to radiological health and safety are those that could directly or indirectly affect reactivity of a nuclear power plant (NPP), and are therefore within the scope of importanHo-safety functions described in 10 CFR 73.54(a)(1).

2.2 Elements of a CSP As stated in 10 CFR 73.54(e), the licensee must establish, implement, and maintain a CSP that satisfies the Cyber Security Program requirements of this regulation.

In addition, the CSP must describe how the licensee will implement the requirements of the regulation and must account for the site-specific conditions that affect implementation.

One method of complying with this regulation is to describe within the CSP how the licensee will achieve high assurance that all SSEP functions are protected from cyber attacks. 2.3 Regulatory Guide 5.71 and NEI 08-09, Revision 6 NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.71, "Cyber Security Programs for Nuclear Facilities" (Reference 2), describes a regulatory position that promotes a defensive strategy consisting of a defensive architecture and a set of security controls based on standards provided in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-53, "Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations," and NIST SP 800-82, "Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security," dated September 29,2008. NIST SP 800-53 and NIST SP 800-82 are based on well-understood cyber threats, risks, and

-3 vulnerabilities, coupled with equally well-understood countermeasures and protective techniques.

RG 5.71 divides the above-noted security controls into three broad categories:

technical, operational, and management.

RG 5.71 provides a framework to aid in the identification of those digital assets that licensees must protect from cyber attacks. These identified digital assets are referred to as "critical digital assets" (CDAs). Licensees should address the potential cyber security risks to CDAs by applying the defensive architecture and addressing the collection of security controls identified in RG 5.71. RG 5.71 includes a CSP template that provides one method for preparing an acceptable CSP. The organization of RG 5.71 reflects the steps necessary to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54. Section C.3 of RG 5.71 describes an acceptable method for implementing the security controls, as detailed in Appendix B, "Technical Controls," and Appendix C, "Operational and Management Controls.".

Section C.4 of RG 5.71 discusses the need to maintain the established cyber security program, including comprehensive monitoring of the CDAs and the effectiveness of their security protection measures, ensuring that changes to the CDAs or the environment are controlled, coordinated, and periodically reviewed for continued protection from cyber attacks. Section C.5 of RG 5.71 provides licensees and applicants with guidance for retaining records associated with their cyber security programs.

Appendix A to RG 5.71 provides a template for a generic cyber security plan which licensees may use to comply with the licensing requirements of 10 CFR 73.54. Appendices Band C provide an acceptable set of security controls, which are based on well-understood threats, vulnerabilities, and attacks, coupled with equally well-understood and vetted countermeasures and protective techniques.

NEI 08-09, Revision 6, closely maps with RG 5.71; Appendix A of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, contains a cyber security plan template that is comparable to Appendix A of RG 5.71. Appendix D of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, contains technical cyber security controls that are comparable to Appendix B of RG 5.71. Appendix E of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, contains operational and management cyber security controls that are comparable to Appendix C of RG 5.71. In its letter to NEI dated May 5, 2010 (Reference 3), the NRC stated that the licensees may use the template in NEI 08-09, Revision 6 (Reference 4), to prepare an acceptable esp, with the exception of the definition of "cyber attack." The NRC staff subsequently reviewed and approved by letter dated June 7,2010 (Reference 5), a definition for "cyber attack" to be used in submissions based on NEI 08-09, Revision 6. The licensee submitted a CSP for Waterford 3 that was based on the template provided in NEI 08-09, Revision 6, and included a definition of cyber attack acceptable to the NRC staff in Enclosure 1 of the licensee's letter dated July 15, 2010. Additionally, the licensee submitted a supplement to its CSP on April 4, 2011, to include information on SSCs in the BOP that, if compromised, could affect NPP reactivity.

RG 5.71 and NEI 08-09, Revision 6, are comparable documents; both are based on essentially the same general approach and the same set of technical, operational, and management security controls.

The CSP submitted by the licensee was reviewed against the corresponding sections in RG 5.71.

-4 TECHNICAL EVALUATION The NRC staff performed a technical evaluation of the licensee's submittal.

The licensee's submittal, with the exception of deviations described in Section 4.0, generally conformed to the guidance in NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which was found to be acceptable by the NRC staff and comparable to RG 5.71 to satisfy the requirements contained in 10 CFR 73.54. The staff reviewed the licensee's submittal against the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54 following the guidance contained in RG 5.71. The NRC staff's evaluation of each section of the licensee's submittal is discussed below. Scope and Purpose The licensee's CSP establishes a means to achieve high assurance that digital computer and communication systems and networks associated with the following functions are adequately protected against cyber attacks up to and including the DBT: Safety-related and important-to-safety functions; Security functions; Emergency preparedness functions, including offsite communications; and Support systems and equipment which, if compromised, would adversely impact SSEP functions.

The CSP submitted by the licensee describes achievement of high assurance of adequate protection of systems associated with the above functions from cyber attacks by: Implementing and documenting the "baseline" security controls as described in Section 3.1.6 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.3 described in RG 5.71; and Implementing and documenting a Cyber Security Program to maintain the established cyber security controls through a comprehensive life cycle approach as described in Section 4 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Appendix A, Section A.2.1 of RG 5.71. Thus, the licensee's CSP, as originally submitted, is comparable to the CSP in NEI-08-09, Revision 6. However, in its submittal dated April 4, 2011, the licensee clarified its original submission and indicated that the scope of systems includes those BOP SSCs that have an impact on NPP reactivity if compromised.

This is in response to and consistent with SRM COMWCO-10-0001, in which the Commission stated that the NRC's cyber security rule at 10 CFR 73.54 should be interpreted to include SSCs in the BOP that have a nexus to radiological health and safety. The NRC staff determined that those systems that have a nexus to radiological health and safety are those that could directly or indirectly affect reactivity of an NPP, and are therefore within the scope of important-to-safety functions described in 10 CFR 73.54(a)(1).

-5 The licensee substituted "emergency planning" functions for "emergency preparedness" functions.

Paragraph 73.54{a)(1) of 10 CFR required that, "The licensee shall protect digital computer and communication systems and networks associated with ... (iii) Emergency preparedness functions, and (iv) Support systems and equipment which, if compromised, would adversely impact safety, security, or emergency preparedness functions." The requirements of 10 CFR 73.54(a)(1) do not address protection of digital assets, computers or communication systems that provide "emergency planning" functions.

The NRC asked for clarification on the use of the term "emergency planning" functions.

The licensee responded by modifying the original statement in Section 2.1 (Scope and Purpose) of the CSP. The updated CSP correctly refers to the need to protect against cyber attack systems that perform "emergency preparedness" functions.

The NRC staff reviewed the CSP and the supplemental information submitted by the licensee and found no deviation from Regulatory Position C.3.3 in RG 5.71 and Appendix A, Section A.2.1 of RG 5.71. The NRC staff concludes that the licensee established adequate measures to implement and document the Cyber Security Program, including baseline security controls.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's CSP adequately establishes the CSP, including baseline security controls. Analyzing Digital Computer Systems and Networks and Applying Cyber Security Controls The licensee's CSP describes that the Cyber Security Program is established, implemented, and maintained as described in Section 3.1 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1 described in RG 5.71 to: Analyze digital computer and communications systems and networks, and Identify those assets that must be protected against cyber attacks to satisfy 10 CFR 73.54(a).

The CSP submitted by the licensee describes how the cyber security controls in Appendices 0 and E of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which are comparable to Appendices Band C in RG 5.71, are addressed to protect COAs from cyber attacks. This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1 in RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's CSP adequately addresses security controls. Cyber Security Assessment and Authorization The licensee provided information addressing the creation of a formal, documented, cyber security assessment and authorization policy. This included a description concerning the creation of a formal, documented procedure comparable to Section 3.1.1 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6.

-6 The NRC staff concludes that the licensee established adequate measures to define and address the purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, and coordination, and facilitates the implementation of the cyber security assessment and authorization policy. The NRC staff reviewed the above information and found no deviation from Section 3.1.1 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.1 and Appendix A, Section A.3.1.1 of RG 5.71. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the CSP submitted by the licensee adequately established controls to develop, disseminate, and periodically update the cyber security assessment and authorization policy and implementing procedure.

3.4 Cyber Security Assessment Team The Cyber Security Assessment Team (CSAT) responsibilities include conducting the cyber security assessment, documenting key findings during the assessment, and evaluating assumptions and conclusions about cyber security threats. The CSP submitted by the licensee outlines the requirements, roles, and responsibilities of the CSAT comparable to Section 3.1.2 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6. It also describes that the CSAT has the authority to conduct an independent assessment.

The Waterford 3 CSP describes that the CSAT will consist of individuals with knowledge about information and digital systems technology; NPP operations, engineering, and plant technical specifications; and physical security and emergency preparedness systems and programs.

The CSAT description in the CSP is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.2 in RG 5.71. The CSP submitted by the licensee lists the roles and responsibilities for the CSAT which included performing and overseeing the cyber security assessment process; documenting key observations; evaluating information about cyber security threats and vulnerabilities; confirming information obtained during tabletop reviews, walk-downs, or electronic validation of CDAs; and identifying potential new cyber security controls.

This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.2 in RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the CSP submitted by the licensee adequately establishes the requirements, roles, and responsibilities of the CSAT. 3.5 Identification of CDAs The CSP submitted by the licensee describes that the licensee will identify and document CDAs and critical systems (CSs), including a general description, the overall function, the overall consequences if a compromise were to occur, and the security functional requirements or specifications as described in Section 3.1.3 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.3 of RG 5.71. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the CSP submitted by the licensee adequately describes the process to identify CDAs.

-7 3.6 Examination of Cyber Security Practices The licensee's submitted CSP describes how the CSAT will examine and document the existing cyber security policies, procedures, and practices; existing cyber security controls; detailed descriptions of network and communication architectures (or network/communication architecture drawings);

information on security devices; and any other information that may be helpful during the cyber security assessment process as described in Section 3.1.4 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.2 of RG 5.71. The examinations will include an analysis of the effectiveness of the existing Cyber Security Program and cyber security controls.

The CSAT will document the collected cyber security information and the results of their examination of the collected information.

This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.2 in RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the CSP submitted by the licensee adequately describes the examination of cyber security practices.

3.7 Tabletop Reviews and Validation Testing The CSP submitted by the licensee describes tabletop reviews and validation testing, which confirm the direct and indirect connectivity of each COA and identify direct and indirect pathways to CDAs. The CSP states that validation testing will be performed electronically or by physical walkdowns.

The licensee's plan for tabletop reviews and validation testing is comparable to Section 3.1.5 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.4 of RG 5.71. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the CSP submitted by the licensee adequately describes tabletop reviews and validation testing. 3.8 Mitigation of Vulnerabilities and Application of Cyber Security Controls The CSP submitted by the licensee describes the use of information collected during the cyber security assessment process (e.g., disposition of cyber security controls, defensive models, defensive strategy measures, site and corporate network architectures) to implement security controls in accordance with Section 3.1.6 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.3 and Appendix A.3.1.6 to RG 5.71. The Waterford 3 CSP describes the process that will be applied in cases where security controls cannot be implemented.

The CSP submitted by the licensee notes that before the licensee can implement security controls on a COA, it will assess the potential for adverse impact in accordance with Section 3.1.6 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.3 of RG 5.71. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the CSP submitted by the licensee adequately describes mitigation of vulnerabilities and application of security controls.

-3.9 Incorporating the Cyber Security Program into the Physical Protection Program The CSP submitted by the licensee states that the Cyber Security Program will be reviewed as a component of the Physical Security Program in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(m).

This is comparable to Section 4.1 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.4 of RG 5.71. This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Appendix A, Section A.3.2 in RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the CSP submitted by the licensee adequately describes review of the CSP as a component of the physical security program. 3.10 Cyber Security Controls The CSP submitted by the licensee describes how the technical, operational, and management cyber security controls contained in Appendices 0 and E of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, that are comparable to Appendices Band C in RG 5.71, are evaluated and dispositioned based on specific conditions during all phases of the Cyber Security Program. The Waterford 3 CSP describes that many security controls have actions that are required to be performed on specific frequencies and that the frequency of a security control is satisfied if the action is performed within 1.25 times the frequency specified in the control, as applied, and as measured from the previous performance of the action as described in Section 4.2 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the CSP submitted by the licensee adequately describes implementation of cyber security controls.

3.11 Defense-in-Depth Protective Strategies The CSP submitted by the licensee describes the implementation of defensive strategies that ensure the capability to detect, respond to, and recover from a cyber attack. The CSP specifies that the defensive strategies consist of security controls, defense-in-depth measures, and the defensive architecture.

The submitted CSP notes that the defensive architecture establishes the logical and physical boundaries to control the data transfer between these boundaries.

The licensee established defense-in-depth strategies by: implementing and documenting a defensive architecture as described in Section 4.3 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.2 in RG 5.71; a physical security program, including physical barriers; the operational and management controls described in Appendix E of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Appendix C to RG 5.71; and the technical controls described in Appendix 0 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Appendix B to RG 5.71. The CSP describes the defense-in-depth architecture as predicated on isolation of CDAs within levels 2, 3, and 4. Furthermore, data flows from lower levels to higher levels are described as being severely curtailed due to the implementation of appropriately configured firewalls, intrusion detection systems, air-gaps, or deterministic one-way isolation devices such as data-diodes or hardware virtual private networks (VPNs). The NRC staff's understanding of the

-hardware VPN is that it is a device that has security enhancement features, but is vulnerable to unauthorized intrusions in a like manner as traditional VPN software.

Since the licensee proposed these devices as equally effective in isolating CDAs and CSs from cyber attack as other deterministic methods, the NRC staff requested further explanation on the characteristics, features and effectiveness of the hardware VPN. The licensee responded by removing hardware VPN as an option from the updated CSP that it submitted on April 4, 2011. As noted in Section 3.1 of this safety evaluation, "Scope and Purpose," the licensee substituted "Emergency Plan" functions for "Emergency Preparedness" functions (as defined in 10 CFR 73.54(a)(1))

in references to CDAs and CSs that would be protected via the submitted defense-in-depth architecture.

On page 12 of the CSP, the licensee describes the implementation model for the defense-in-depth architecture, and characterizes the several types of CDAs that are protected within the proposed layers. It notes in the third bullet that the "CDAs ... that perform security or support Emergency Plan functions

... " and in the fourth bullet that, "CDAs ... that perform or support Emergency Plan Functions

... " The NRC staff requested an explanation of the functions that are comprised under the term "Emergency Plan" and further requested that the licensee explain how the CDAs and CSs that perform "Emergency Preparedness" were protected under the submitted defense-in-depth architecture, as required by 10 CFR 73.54(a)(1).

The licensee responded by removing references to "Emergency Planning" and "Emergency Plan," replacing these terms with "Emergency Preparedness" in the submittal of its updated CSP on April 4, 2011. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the CSP submitted by the licensee adequately describes implementation of defense-in-depth protective strategies.

3.12 Ongoing Monitoring and Assessment The CSP submitted by the licensee describes how ongoing monitoring of cyber security controls to support CDAs is implemented comparable to Appendix E of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Positions C.4.1 and CA.2 of RG 5.71. The ongoing monitoring program includes configuration management and change control; cyber security impact analysis of changes and changed environments; ongoing assessments of cyber security controls; effectiveness analysis (to monitor and confirm that the cyber security controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and achieving the desired outcome) and vulnerability scans to identify new vulnerabilities that could affect the security posture of CDAs. This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Regulatory Positions C.4.1 and C.4.2 of RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the CSP submitted by the licensee adequately describes ongoing monitoring and assessment.

3.13 Modification of Digital Assets The CSP submitted by the licensee describes how cyber security controls are established, implemented, and maintained to protect CDAs. These security controls ensure that modifications to CDAs are evaluated before implementation, the cyber security performance objectives are maintained, and acquired CDAs have cyber security requirements in place to achieve the site's Cyber Security Program objectives.

This is comparable to Section 4.5 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Appendix A, Sections A.4.2.5 and A.4.2.6 of RG 5.71. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the CSP submitted by the licensee adequately describes modification of digital assets. 3.14 Attack Mitigation and Incident Response The CSP submitted by the licensee describes the process to ensure that SSEP functions are not adversely impacted due to cyber attacks in accordance with Section 4.6 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Appendix C, Section C.8 of RG 5.71. The CSP includes a discussion about creating incident response policy and procedures, and addresses training, testing and drills, incident handling, incident monitoring, and incident response assistance.

It also describes identification, detection, response, containment, eradication, and recovery activities comparable to Section 4.6 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6. This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Appendix C, Section C.8 of RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the CSP submitted by the licensee adequately describes attack mitigation and incident response.

3.15 Cyber Security Contingency Plan CSP submitted by the licensee describes creation of a Cyber Security Contingency Plan and policy that protects CDAs from the adverse impacts of a cyber attack described in Section 4.7 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.3.2.7 and Appendix C.9 of RG 5.71. The licensee describes the Cyber Security Contingency Plan that would include the response to events. The plan includes procedures for operating CDAs in a contingency, roles and responsibilities of responders, processes and procedures for backup and storage of information, logic diagrams of network connectivity, current configuration information, and personnel lists for authorized access to CDAs. This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.3.2.7 of RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the CSP submitted by the licensee adequately describes the cyber security contingency plan. 3.16 Cyber Security Training and Awareness The CSP submitted by the licensee describes a program that establishes the training requirements necessary for the licensee's personnel and contractors to perform their aSSigned duties and responsibilities in implementing the Cyber Security Program in accordance with Section 4.8 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.3.2.8 of RG5.71.

-11 The Waterford 3 CSP states that individuals will be trained with a level of cyber security knowledge commensurate with their assigned responsibilities in order to provide high assurance that individuals are able to perform their job functions in accordance with Appendix E of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.3.2.8 of RG 5.71 and describes three levels of training:

awareness training, technical training, and specialized cyber security training.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the CSP submitted by the licensee adequately describes the cyber security training and awareness.

3.17 Evaluate and Manage Cyber Risk The CSP submitted by the licensee describes how cyber risk is evaluated and managed utilizing site programs and procedures comparable to Section 4.9 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.4 and Appendix C, Section C.13 of RG 5.71. The CSP describes the Threat and Vulnerability Program, Risk Mitigation, Operational Experience Program; and the Corrective Action Program and how each will be used to evaluate and manage risk. This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Regulatory Position C.4 and Appendix C, Section C.13 of RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the CSP submitted by the licensee adequately describes evaluation and management of cyber risk. 3.18 Policies and Implementing Procedures The CSP submitted by the licensee describes development and implementation of policies and procedures to meet security control objectives in accordance with Section 4.10 of NEt 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.5 and Appendix A, Section A.3.3 of RG 5.71. This includes the process to document, review, approve, issue, use, and revise policies and procedures.

The CSP also describes the licensee's procedures to establish specific responsibilities for positions described in Section 4.11 of NEI 08-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Appendix C, Section C.10.10 of RG 5.71. This section of the CSP submitted by the licensee is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.5, Appendix A, Section A.3.3, and Appendix C, Section C.10.10 of RG 5.71 without deviation.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the CSP submitted by the licensee adequately describes cyber security policies and implementing procedures.

3.19 Roles and Responsibilities The CSP submitted by the licensee describes the roles and responsibilities for the qualified and experienced personnel, including the Cyber Security Program Sponsor, the Cyber Security Program Manager, Cyber Security Specialists, the Cyber Security Incident Response Team

-12 (CSIRT), and other positions as needed. The CSIRT initiates in accordance with the Incident Response Plan and initiates emergency action when required to safeguard CDAs from cyber security compromise and to assist with the eventual recovery of compromised systems. Implementing procedures establish roles and responsibilities for each of the cyber security roles in accordance with Section 4.11 of NEI OB-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.3.1.2, Appendix A, Section A.3.1.2, and Appendix C, Section C.10.10 of RG 5.71. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the CSP submitted by the licensee adequately describes cyber security roles and responsibilities.

3.20 Cyber Security Program Review The CSP submitted by the licensee describes how the Cyber Security Program establishes the necessary procedures to implement reviews of applicable program elements in accordance with Section 4.12 of NEI OB-09, Revision 6, which is comparable to Regulatory Position C.4.3 and Appendix A, Section A.4.3 of RG 5.71. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the CSP submitted by the licensee adequately describes the Cyber Security Program review. 3.21 Document Control and Records Retention and Handling The CSP submitted by the licensee describes that the licensee has established the necessary measures and governing procedures to ensure that sufficient records of items and activities affecting cyber security are developed, reviewed, approved, issued, used, and revised to reflect completed work. The CSP describes that superseded portions of certain records will be retained for at least 3 years after the record is superseded, while audit records will be retained for no less than 12 months in accordance with Section 4.13 of NEI OB-09, Revision 6. However, this guidance provided by industry to licensees did not fully comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54. In its letter dated February 2B, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110600204), NEI sent to the NRC the proposed language for licensees' use to respond to the generic records retention issue, to which the NRC had no technical objection (

Reference:

Letter from NRC dated March 1,2011, ADAMS Accession No. ML110490337).

The proposed language clarified the requirement by providing examples (without providing an all-inclusive list) of the records and supporting technical documentation that are needed to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54. All records will be retained until the Commission terminates the license, and the licensee shall maintain superseded portions of these records for at least 3 years after the record is superseded, unless otherwise specified by the Commission.

By retaining accurate and complete records and technical documentation until the license is terminated, inspectors, auditors, or assessors will have the ability to evaluate incidents, events, and other activities that are related to any of the cyber security elements described, referenced, and contained within the licensee's NRC-approved CSP. It will also allow the licensee to maintain the ability to detect and respond to cyber attacks in a timely manner, in the case of an event. In its letter dated April 4, 2011, the licensee responded to the records retention issue using the language proposed by NEI in its letter dated February 2B, 2011.

Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the language the licensee proposes to adopt provides for adequate records retention and will support the licensee's ability to detect and respond to cyber attacks. The NRC staff further concludes that this section is comparable to Regulatory Position C.5 and Appendix A. Section A.5 of RG 5.71 without deviation. Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the Waterford 3 CSP adequately describes cyber security document control and records retention and handling. Implementation Schedule The CSP submitted by the licensee provides a proposed implementation schedule for the Cyber Security Program. In a letter dated February 28, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110600206), NEI sent to the NRC a template for licensees to use to submit their CSP implementation schedules, to which the NRC had no technical objection (

Reference:

Letter from NRC dated March 1, 2011, ADAMS Accession No. ML110070348).

These key milestones include: Establish the CSA T; Identify CSs and CDAs; Install a deterministic one-way device between lower level devices and higher level devices; Implement the security control "Access Control For Portable And Mobile Devices"; Implement observation and identification of obvious cyber related tampering to existing insider mitigation rounds by incorporating the appropriate elements; Identify, document, and implement cyber security controls as per "Mitigation of Vulnerabilities and Application of Cyber Security Controls" for CDAs that could adversely impact the design function of physical security target set equipment; and Commence ongoing monitoring and assessment activities for those target set CDAs whose security controls have been implemented.

In its letter dated April 4, 2011, the licensee provided a revised implementation schedule using the NEI template.

The NRC staff considers this April 4, 2011, supplement the approved schedule as required by 10 CFR 73.54. Based on the Waterford 3 schedule ensuring timely implementation of those protective measures that provide a higher degree of protection against radiological sabotage, the NRC staff concludes that the Cyber Security Program implementation schedule is satisfactory.

The NRC staff acknowledges that, in its submittal dated April 4, 2011, the licensee proposed several CSP milestone implementation dates as regulatory commitments.

The NRC staff does not regard the CSP milestone implementation dates as regulatory commitments that can be changed unilaterally by the licensee, particularly in light of the regulatory requirement at

-10 CFR 73.54, that "[iJmplementation of the licensee's cyber security program must be consistent with the approved schedule." As the NRC staff explained in its letter to all operating reactor licensees dated May 9,2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110980538), the implementation of the plan, including the key intermediate milestone dates and the full implementation date, shall be in accordance with the implementation schedule submitted by the licensee and approved by the NRC. All subsequent changes to the NRC-approved CSP implementation schedule thus will require prior NRC approval pursuant in 10 CFR 50.90. However, as stated in the NRC staff's letter to all operating reactor licensees dated May 9, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML110980538), subsequent changes to the NRC-approved CSP implementation schedule will require prior NRC approval pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90. 3.23 Revision to License Condition 2.E By letter dated July 15, 2010, the licensee proposed to add a paragraph to Paragraph 2.E of Facility Operating License No. NPF-38 for Waterford 3 to provide a license condition to require the licensee to fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the NRC-approved CSP. The NRC staff modified the proposed wording of the license condition described in the licensee's submittal dated July 15, 2010, and the licensee agreed with the revised license condition proposed by the NRC staff. The following paragraph is added to Paragraph 2.E of Facility Operating License No. NPF-38 for Waterford 3: EOI shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved cyber security plan (CSP), including changes made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.54(p).

The EOI CSP was approved by License Amendment No. 234. Based on the information in Section 3.0 of this safety evaluation and the modified license condition described above, the NRC concludes this is acceptable.

4.0 DIFFERENCES FROM NEI 08-09, REVISION 6 The NRC staff notes the following additional differences between the licensee's submission and NEI 08-09, Revision 6:

  • In Section 3.1, "Scope and Purpose," the licensee clarified the definition of important-to-safety functions, consistent with SRM-COMWCO-10-0001.
  • In Section 3.21, "Document Control and Records Retention and Handling," the licensee clarified the definition of records and supporting documentation that will be retained to conform to the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54.
  • In Section 3.22, "Implementation Schedule," the licensee submitted a revised implementation schedule, specifying the interim milestones and the final implementation date, including supporting rationale.

-The NRC staff concludes these deviations are acceptable as discussed in the respective sections of this safety evaluation.

5.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Louisiana State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment.

The State official had no comments.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding published in the Federal Register on October 12, 2010 (75 FR 62598). Also, the amendment relates to safeguards matters and does not involve any significant construction impacts and relate to changes in recordkeeping, reporting, or administrative procedures or requirements.

Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9), (10), and (12). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

7.0 CONCLUSION

The NRC staff's review and evaluation of the licensee's CSP was conducted using the staff positions established in the relevant sections of RG 5.71. Based on the NRC staff's review, the NRC concludes that the licensee addressed the relevant information necessary to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.54,10 CFR 73.55(a)(1), 10 CFR 73.55(b)(8), and 10 CFR 73.55(m), as applicable, and that the licensee's Cyber Security Program provides high assurance that digital computer and communication systems and networks associated with the following are adequately protected against cyber attacks, up to and including the DBT as described in 10 CFR 73.1. This includes protecting digital computer and communication systems and networks associated with: (i) safety-related and important-to-safety functions; (ii) security functions; (iii) emergency preparedness functions, including offsite communications; and (iv) support systems and equipment which, if compromised, would adversely impact SSEP functions.

Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the information contained in this CSP is acceptable and upon successful implementation of this program, operation of Waterford 3 will not be inimical to the common defense and security.

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

-16 REFERENCES Vietti-Cook, A. L., memorandum to R W. Borchardt, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Staff Requirements

-COMWCO-10-000

-Regulation of Cyber Security at Nuclear Power Plants," dated October 21, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML102940009). U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 5.71, "Cyber Security Programs for Nuclear Facilities," dated January 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML090340159). Correia, R, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to Jack Roe, Nuclear Energy Institute, "Nuclear Energy Institute 08-09, 'Cyber Security Plan Template; Revision 6,'" dated May 5,2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101190371). Roe, J., Nuclear Energy Institute, letter to Scott Morris, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "NEI 08-09, Revision 6, 'Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors; April 2010,'" dated April 28, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101180434). Correia, R, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to Christopher E. Earls, Nuclear Energy Institute, "Nuclear Energy Institute 08-09, 'Cyber Security Plan Template; Rev. 6,'" dated June 7,2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101550052).

Principal Contributor:

Joseph Green July 20, 2011 July 20, 2011 Vice President, Operations Entergy Operations, Inc. Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 17265 River Road Killona, LA 70057-3093 WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 -ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT RE: APPROVAL OF CYBER SECURITY PLAN (TAC NO. ME4271)

Dear Sir or Madam:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 234 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-38 for the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. This amendment consists of changes to the facility operating license in response to your application dated July 15, 2010, as supplemented by letters dated September 27 and November 30,2010, and February 15 and April 4, 2011. The amendment approves the cyber security plan and associated implementation schedule, and revises Paragraph 2.E of Facility Operating License No. NPF-38 to provide a license condition to require the licensee to fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Cyber Security Plan. A copy of our related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed.

The Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commission's next biweekly Federal Register notice. Sincerely, IRAI N. Kalyanam, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch IV Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-382

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 234 to NPF-38 2. Safety Evaluation cc w/encls: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC LPLIV Reading RidsAcrsAcnw

_MaiICTR Resource RidsNsirDsp Resource RidsNrrDorlDpr Resource RidsNrrDorlLpl4 Resource RidsNrrPMWaterford Resource RidsNrrLAJBurkhardt Resource RidsOgcRp Resource RidsRgn4MailCenter Resource JGreen, NSIR/DSP PPederson, NSIR/DSP/ISCPB ADAMS Accession No' ML111800021

.. *SE memo dated OFFICE NRRlLPL4/PM NRR/LPL4/LA NSIRIDSP/lSCPB/BC OGC NLO NRR/LPL4/BC NRR/LPL41PM NAME NKalyanam JBurkhardt CErlanger*

AJones MMarkley (AWang I for) NKalyanam DATE 7/19/11 7/1111 6/20/11 7115111 7120111 7/20111 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML111800021&oldid=1775654"