IR 05000219/2013007
| ML13325A089 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 11/19/2013 |
| From: | Krohn P G Engineering Region 1 Branch 2 |
| To: | Pacilio M J Exelon Nuclear |
| Krohn P G | |
| References | |
| IR-13-007 | |
| Download: ML13325A089 (30) | |
Text
November 19, 2013
Mr. Michael Chief Nuclear Officer and Senior Vice President Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT: OYSTER CREEK GENERATING STATION NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION REPORT 05000219/2013007
Dear Mr. Pacilio:
On September 23, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed the onsite portion of an inspection at the Oyster Creek Generating Station. Inspection activities continued remotely from the NRC office until October 9, 2013. Additional onsite inspection activities were completed on October 23 and 24, 2013. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 24, 2013, with Mr. R. Peak, Oyster Creek Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and he conditions of your license. In conducting the inspection, the team examined the adequacy of selected components and operator actions to mitigate postulated transients, initiating events, and design basis accidents. The inspection involved field walkdowns, examination of selected procedures, calculations and records, and interviews with station personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings were identified. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (will be available electronically for the public inspection in the NRC Public Docket Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/ Paul G. Krohn, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-219 License No. DPR-16 Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 05000219/2013007 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ
ML13325A089 SUNSI Review Non-Sensitive Publicly Available OFFICE RI/DRS RI/DRP RI/DRS NAME SPindale/SP GHunegs/GH PKrohn/PK DATE 11/14/13 11/18/13 11/20/13 i Enclosure U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I Docket No.: 50-219 License No.: DPR-16 Report No.: 05000219/2013007 Licensee: Exelon Nuclear Facility: Oyster Creek Generating Station Location: Forked River, New Jersey Dates: September 9 to October 24, 2013 Inspectors: S. Pindale, Senior Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS) Team Leader J. Schoppy, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS D. Kern, Senior Reactor Inspector, DRS J. Patel, Reactor Inspector, DRS C. Baron, NRC Mechanical Contractor G. Nicely, NRC Electrical Contractor Approved by: Paul G. Krohn, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety ii Table of Contents
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
......................................................................................................... iii
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
........................................................................................................... 1 1R21 Component Design Bases Inspection
OTHER ACTIVITIES
..........................................................................................................15
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems .............................................................15 4OA6 Meetings, including Exit ........................................................................................15
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
.................................................................................................. A-1
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED ....................................................... A-1
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
...................................................................................... A-2
LIST OF ACRONYMS
.......................................................................................................... A-10
iii
- OF [[]]
- LLC (Exelon) Oyster Creek Generating Station; Component Design Bases Inspection. The report covers the Component Design Bases Inspection conducted by a team of four
- NRC contractors. commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-Revision 4, dated December 2006. No findings were identified.
- REPORT [[]]
- SAFETY Cornerstone: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity 1R21 Component Design Bases Inspection (
- IP 71111.21) .1 Inspection Sample Selection Process The team selected risk significant components for review using information contained in the Oyster Creek Generating Station Probabilistic Risk Assessment and the
- U.S. [[Additionally, the Oyster Creek Generating Station Significance Determination Process analysis was referenced in the selection of potential components for review. In general, the selection process focused on components that had a Risk Achievement Worth factor greater than 1.3 or a Risk Reduction Worth factor greater than 1.005. The team also selected components based on previously identified industry operating experience issues and the component contribution to the large early release frequency (]]
- LERF [[) was also considered. The components selected were located within both safety-related and non-safety related systems, and included a variety of components such as pumps, breakers, heat exchangers, electrical buses, transformers, and valves. The team initially compiled a list of components based on the risk factors previously mentioned. Additionally, the team reviewed the previous component design bases inspection reports (05000219/2007006 and 05000219/2010008) and those components previously inspected. The team then performed a margin assessment to narrow the focus of the inspection to 17 components and 4 operating experience samples. Two components were selected because they were containment-related structures, systems, and components (SSC) and were considered for]]
- LERF [[implications. evaluation of possible low design margin included consideration of original design issues, margin reductions due to modifications, or margin reductions identified as a result of material condition/equipment reliability issues. The assessment also included items such as failed performance test results, corrective action history, repeated maintenance, maintenance rule (a) (1) status, operability reviews for degraded conditions,]]
- NRC [[resident inspector insights, system health reports, and industry operating experience (OE). Finally, consideration was given to the uniqueness and complexity of the design and the available defense-in-depth margins. The inspection performed by the team was conducted in accordance with]]
- NRC [[Inspection Procedure 71111.21. This inspection effort included walkdowns of selected components, interviews with operators, system and design engineers, and reviews of associated design documents and calculations to assess the adequacy of the components to meet the design and licensing basis. A summary of the reviews performed for each component and]]
OE sample are discussed in the subsequent sections of this report. Documents reviewed for this inspection are listed in the Attachment.
.2 Results of Detailed Reviews .2.1 Results of Detailed Component Reviews (17 samples) .2.1.1 Station Ba a. Inspection Scope vital station battery to evaluate whether it could perform its design basis function to provide direct current (DC) power to connected loads during battery calculations to verify that the sizing of the battery would satisfy the requirements of the safety-related and risk significant
- DC [[loads, and that the minimum possible voltage was taken into account. In particular, the review focused on verifying that the battery was adequately sized to supply the (Vdc) system during postulated transient and accident scenarios. The team reviewed the postulated scenarios, battery sizing calculations, and voltage drop calculations to ensure that adequate voltage would remain available for the individual loads required to operate during the scenario durations. battery charger sizing calculation was reviewed to verify consistency with the design and licensing bases. The team reviewed the]]
- DC protective coordination study to verify that adequate protection existed for postulated faults in the
- DC system. Additionally, a walkdown was performed to evaluate the material condition of the battery. The team reviewed battery surveillance test procedures and results to evaluate whether test acceptance criteria specified in technical specifications (
- TS [[) and appropriate standards were satisfied. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents and system health reports to evaluate whether there were any adverse operating trends and to assess Exelon's ability to evaluate and correct problems. b. Findings No findings were identified. .2.1.2 Vital]]
- DC [[-B a. Inspection Scope itchgear bus (DC-B) to evaluate whether it was capable of meeting its design bases. The team reviewed the design and operation of the switchgear bus and associated distribution panels. This review evaluated whether the loading of the]]
- DC [[bus was within equipment ratings and whether the bus could perform its design basis function to reliably power the associated loads under worst case conditions. Specifically, the team reviewed calculations and drawings, including voltage drop calculations, short circuit analyses, and load study profiles to evaluate the adequacy of design assumptions. The team also reviewed]]
DC overcurrent protective coordination studies to evaluate whether there was adequate protection for postulated faults in the DC system.
The team interviewed system and design engineers and walked down the 125 Vdc bus and distribution panels to independently assess its material condition and to evaluate whether the system alignment and operating environment were consistent with design basis assumptions. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents and system health reports to evaluate whether there were any adverse operating trends, and to assess Exelon's ability to evaluate and correct problems. b. Findings No findings were identified. .2.1.3 Emergency Diesel Generator,
- EDG [[-2 and Output Breaker, 1D a. Inspection Scope The team inspected EDG-2, one of the two emergency diesel generators (EDGs), to determine if it was capable of supporting its design basis functions. The team reviewed the one-line diagrams and the vendor nameplate rating data for the]]
- EDG [[loading study to ensure it was consistent with limiting design basis loading conditions under postulated accident conditions. In addition, the team reviewed the brake horsepower basis for selected pump motors to ensure loads were adequately considered in the loading study and that equipment qualification for selected motors adequately addressed design basis loading conditions. The team reviewed calculations, operating procedures, and technical evaluations to verify that steady-state and transient loading were within design capabilities, adequate voltage would be present to start and operate connected loads, and operation at maximum allowed frequency would be within the design capabilities. The team reviewed the]]
- EDG load sequence time delay setpoints, calibration intervals, and results of the last calibration to evaluate whether the results were consistent with the design requirements.
- EDG output breaker to evaluate the material condition and the operating environment for indications of degradation of equipment. The inspectors reviewed protection, coordination, and short-circuit calculations to verify that the
- EDG [[was adequately protected with properly set protective devices during test mode and emergency operations under worst case fault conditions. The team's review included the interfaces and interlocks associated with the associated 4160 Vac Emergency Switchgear Bus 1D, including voltage protection schemes that initiated connection to the]]
EDG. Additionally, the team reviewed the 125 Vdc voltage calculations to evaluate whether adequate voltage would be available to the breaker control circuit components and the breaker spring charging motor so that the EDG supply breaker would open and close as required. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents and system health reports to evaluate whether there were any adverse operating trends and to assess Exelon's ability to evaluate and correct problems.
b. Findings No findings were identified. .2.1.4 4160V Emergency Switchgear Bus, 1D a. Inspection Scope The team inspected the 4160 Vac bus 1D to determine if it was capable of operating during design basis events. The team reviewed selected calculations for electrical distribution system load flow/voltage drop, degraded voltage protection, short circuit, and electrical protection and coordination. The adequacy of design assumptions and calculations was reviewed to verify that bus capacity would not be exceeded and bus voltages would remain above minimum acceptable values under design basis conditions. The switchgear protective device settings and breaker ratings were reviewed to ensure that selective coordination was adequate for protection of connected equipment during worst case short circuit conditions. The team also reviewed the automatic and manual transfer schemes between alternate offsite sources and the
- EDG [[to verify design basis assumptions. The team verified that degraded and loss of voltage relays were set in accordance with calculations, and that associated calibration procedures were consistent with calculation assumptions, associated time delays, and setpoint accuracy calculations. In addition, the latest surveillance results were reviewed to ensure the appropriate acceptance criteria were satisfied. The team evaluated selected portions of response to]]
- NRC Generic Letter 2006-associated instrumentation/alarms to evaluate whether setpoint values were consistent with the design. The inspectors of voltage relay setpoint, as listed in
- TS 2.3.P, was non-conservative relative to the actual relay setpoint in the field; which was documented in Issue Report (
IR) 1575724. To ensure that breakers were maintained in accordance with industry and vendor recommendations, the team reviewed the preventive maintenance inspection and testing procedures. The team reviewed selected operating procedures for normal, abnormal, and emergency conditions to ensure the procedure instructions were consistent with design assumptions. The 125 Vdc voltage calculations were reviewed to ensure adequate voltage would be available for the breaker closure and opening control circuit components and the breaker spring charging motors. The team performed a visual, non-intrusive inspection of observable portions of the safety-related 4160 Vac switchgear to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents and system health reports to evaluate whether there were any adverse operating trends and to assess Exelon's ability to evaluate and correct problems. b. Findings No findings were identified.
.2.1.5 Motor Control Center,
- 1AB [[2 a. Inspection Scope The team inspected motor control center (MCC) 1AB2 to determine if it could perform its design basis functions. The team reviewed selected calculations for electrical distribution system load flow/voltage drop, short-circuit, and electrical protection and coordination to evaluate whether the design of the]]
- MCC [[was consistent with design and license bases. The adequacy of design assumptions and calculations was reviewed to verify that bus and circuit breaker capacity would not be exceeded, and bus voltages would remain above minimum acceptable values under design basis conditions. The]]
- MCC [[protective device settings and breaker ratings were reviewed to ensure that selective coordination was adequate for protection of connected equipment during worst-case short-circuit conditions. To ensure that breakers were maintained in accordance with industry and vendor recommendations, the team reviewed the vendor manuals, preventive maintenance inspection and testing procedures. A review of maintenance history was performed to evaluate whether there were recurring issues and to assess the reliability of the]]
- MCC breaker trip units to ensure the results were consistent with design basis requirements. The team performed a visual, non-intrusive inspection of observable portions of the safety-related
- MCC [[to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and the potential vulnerability to hazards. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents and system health reports to evaluate whether there were any adverse operating trends and to assess Exelon's ability to evaluate and correct problems. b. Findings No findings were identified. .2.1.6 480 Volt Room Ventilation System Fans a. Inspection Scope The team inspected the 480 Vac room ventilation system (fans]]
FN-56-4, FN-56-7, FN-56-8, SF-1-21, and EF-1-21) to determine if they were capable of meeting their design basis functions. Specifically, the team evaluated whether the fan capacities were sufficient to provide adequate flow for heat removal from safety-related components during postulated design basis events. The team reviewed design documents and drawings in order to determine the minimum fan flow requirements required to provide adequate heat removal. The team reviewed associated ventilation system operating procedures and alarm response procedures to verify system operating instructions were consistent with the design. The team also reviewed inspection and testing procedures to evaluate whether appropriate maintenance activities were being performed; and reviewed past test results to determine if the fans were capable of removing the required heat load. The team conducted a walkdown of the fans and associated ventilation
equipment and interviewed engineers regarding the maintenance and operation of the fans, filters, dampers, and associated air flow recirculation controllers in order to assess the material condition of the system. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents and system health reports to evaluate whether there were any adverse operating trends and to assess Exelon's ability to evaluate and correct problems. b. Findings No findings were identified. .2.1.7 Isolation Condenser Condensate Return Valve, V-14-34 a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed the isolation condenser condensate return valve, V-14-34, to evaluate whether it was capable of meeting its design basis functions of: (1) opening during transient conditions to assist in the removal of decay heat when the reactor vessel is isolated from the main condenser; and (2) closing in the event of an isolation condenser steam or condensate line break outside of primary containment. The team reviewed the
- IST ) basis document to identify the performance requirements for the valve. The team reviewed periodic motor-operated valve (MOV) diagnostic test results and stroke-timing test data to verify acceptance criteria were met. The team evaluated whether the
- MOV [[safety functions, performance capability, and design margins were adequately monitored Additionally, the team reviewed vendor manuals and calibration records for the instruments that provide actuation signals to open or close V-14-34 to verify the instruments were properly maintained to support valve actuation in accordance with the plant design. The team verified that the]]
- MOV valve analysis used the maximum differential pressure expected across the valve during worst case operating conditions. The team reviewed the calculations for the degraded voltage at the
- MOV [[torque calculations. The team reviewed the calculations that established control circuit voltage drop, short circuit, and protection/coordination, including thermal overload sizing and application. The design, operation, and maintenance of the valve were discussed with engineers to evaluate performance history, maintenance, and overall health. The team also conducted a walkdown of the valve and associated equipment to assess the material condition of the equipment and to determine if the installed configuration was consistent with the plant drawings, procedures, and the design bases. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents to evaluate whether there were any adverse trends associated with the valves 2.1.8 Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank, T-39-2 a. Inspection Scope The team inspected the]]
- EDG fuel oil storage tank (T-39-2) to determine if it was capable of meeting its design basis function to provide the required quantity of fuel oil for the
- EDG [[to perform their design function for the first three days of a design basis event. The team reviewed the design, testing, inspection, and operation of the tank (and associated tank level instruments) to evaluate whether the tank could perform its design basis function as the fuel oil source for the EDGs. The team reviewed design calculations, drawings, and vendor specifications (including tank sizing and level uncertainty analysis, and pump vortex calculations) to evaluate the adequacy of design assumptions and operating limits. Seismic design documentation was reviewed to evaluate whether tank design assumptions were consistent with limiting seismic conditions. The team also reviewed fuel oil analysis standards, sampling procedures, sampling trend data, and procedures for filling T-39-2 to verify appropriate controls were in place to maintain appropriate fuel oil quality to support reliable]]
- EDG "operation. The team interviewed system and design engineers, reviewed instrument test records, and tank inspection results to evaluate whether maintenance and testing was adequate to ensure reliable operation. Additionally, the team evaluated whether those activities were performed in accordance with regulatory requirements, industry standards, and vendor recommendations. The team conducted a walkdown of the tank area to independently assess the material condition of the tank and associated instrumentation. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents and system health reports to evaluate whether there were any adverse operating trends and to assess Exelon's ability to evaluate and correct problems. b. Findings No findings were identified. .2.1.9 Core Spray System Injection Valve, V-20-41 a. Inspection Scope The team inspected core spray system injection valve, V-20-41, to determine if the valve was capable of performing its design basis function. Specifically, the team evaluated whether the normally closed valve, when opened, would provide an adequate flow path from the core spray system to the [[system" contains a listed "[" character as part of the property label and has therefore been classified as invalid.. The team reviewed the]]
- IST basis document to identify the performance requirements for the valve. The team reviewed periodic
- MOV diagnostic test results and stroke-timing test data to verify acceptance criteria were met. The team evaluated whether the
- MOV safety functions, performance capability, torque switch configuration, and design margins were adequately monitored and maintained in accordance with Exelonweak link calculations to ensure the ability of the
- MOV to remain structurally functional while stroking under design basis operating conditions. The team verified that the
MOV valve analysis used the maximum differential pressure expected across the valve during worst case operating conditions. Additionally, the motor data, degraded voltage conditions, and voltage drop calculation results were reviewed to verify that the MOV would have sufficient voltage and power available to perform its function at degraded voltage conditions.
The team reviewed the periodic testing automatic and manual functions, as well as interlocks, to verify its performance under accident conditions. The team reviewed the calculations that established control circuit voltage drop, short circuit, and protection/coordination, including thermal overload sizing and application. The design, operation, and maintenance of the valve were discussed with the system engineer to evaluate the valves performance history, maintenance, and overall health. The team also conducted a walkdown of the valve and associated equipment to assess the material condition of the equipment and to evaluate whether the installed configuration was consistent with the plant drawings, procedures, and the design bases. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents to evaluate whether there were any adverse trends associated with the valves and to assess b. Findings No findings were identified. .2.1.10 Isolation Condenser ,
- NE [[-01B a. Inspection Scope The team inspected the 'B' isolation condenser (lC) to determine if it was capable of performing its design basis function as a standby, high pressure system of decay heat removal when the reactor is isolated from the main condenser. The team reviewed applicable portions of the UFSAR, the]]
- IC [[and associated support systems. The team reviewed associated design calculations to assess shell inventory requirements, level instrument accuracy, environmental qualification requirements, and isolation valve stroke times. The team reviewed surveillance test results and performed system walkdowns to verify that critical process parameters were maintained within design-specified ranges. The team reviewed]]
- IC [[shell makeup surveillances and verified valve alignment in the field to ensure that the alternate water sources would remain available during postulated accident conditions. Based on steam inlet thermocouple readings and shell temperature indication, the team independently assessed the steam/condensate interface level over time as a qualitative measure of the potential thermal cyclic stress on the upper tubes in each bundle. The team reviewed the shell side chemistry sampling results and the shell temperature and level trends over time to assess the structural integrity of the tubes (primary containment interface). The team reviewed design modification documents to evaluate whether the changes adversely impacted the]]
- IC [[design and licensing bases. The team performed a walkdown of the demineralized water makeup tank, air accumulators, cross-tie isolation valves, and associated piping to verify that the as-installed configuration aligned with the design. The team reviewed the]]
- IC maintenance history and system performance trending data to verify that Exelon reliably maintained the
- IC system design, testing, operation, and performance with engineers to evaluate whether the system performed as designed. Additionally, the team walked down both
AC) electrical
distribution panels, accessible portions of steam inlet and condensate return piping, and accessible portions of the makeup water systems to assess the material condition and configuration control of these
- SSC [[. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents and system health reports to evaluate whether there were any adverse operating trends and to assess Exelon's ability to evaluate and correct problems. b. Findings No findings were identified. .2.1.11 Isolation Condenser Makeup a. Inspection Scope The team inspected the various methods by which the shell side of the]]
- IC [[can be provided with makeup water. The makeup is normally provided by the demineralized water transfer system or the condensate transfer system; and emergency makeup can be provided by the fire suppression and core spray systems. The team reviewed operating procedures associated with the makeup paths and verified that active valves were subject to periodic maintenance to ensure their availability. The team reviewed an analysis of the flow from the fire suppression pump to the]]
IC to verify its capacity. The team also performed walkdowns of equipment associated with the IC makeup. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents and system health reports to evaluate whether there were any adverse operating trends and to assess Exelon's ability to evaluate and correct problems. b. Findings No findings were identified. .2.1.12 No. 1 Diesel Fire Pump, P-9-102A a. Inspection Scope The team inspected the No. 1 diesel fire pump (P-9-102A) to determine if it was capable of meeting its design basis function to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition in the event of a fire. The fire water system can be cross-tied to the isolation condenser makeup and core spray systems of each unit to provide an alternate source of water. The team evaluated whether the pump capacity was sufficient to provide adequate flow to the safety-related components supplied by the system during postulated events. The team also reviewed calculations associated with net positive suction head to ensure that the pump could successfully operate under the most limiting conditions. The team reviewed drawings, calculations, hydraulic analyses, and procedures to ensure consistency with the design and licensing bases. The team also reviewed completed pump surveillance tests to ensure pump performance and procedure acceptance criteria were consistent with system flow calculations. The team walked down the fire pump and accessible portions of the system and reviewed the
10 maintenance records to assess Exelon's configuration control, operating environment of corrective action documents and system health reports to evaluate whether there were any adverse operating trends and to assess Exelon's ability to evaluate and correct problems. b. Findings No findings were identified. .2.1.13 Emergency Service Water Pump, 1-4 (P-3-3D) a. Inspection Scope The team inspected emergency service water (ESW) pump 1-4 to evaluate whether it was capable of performing its design basis function to provide adequate cooling flow to transfer heat loads from the containment spray (CS) system to the ultimate heat sink. The team reviewed applicable portions of the
- UFSAR [[, TSs, system design basis documents (DBDs), and drawings to identify the design basis requirements for the pump. The team evaluated whether the pump capacity was sufficient to provide adequate flow through the CS/ESW heat exchangers (HXs) during postulated design basis accidents. The team reviewed design calculations to assess available pump net positive suction head, worst case pump run-out conditions, and to evaluate the capability of the pump to provide the required flow to the CS/ESW HXs. The team reviewed]]
- IST [[results to evaluate whether the testing was adequate to detect degrading pump performance. Specifically, the team reviewed pump data trends for vibration, pump differential pressure, and flow rate test results to verify acceptance criteria were met and acceptance limits were adequate. The team reviewed]]
ESW flow and/or system operating characteristics to ensure that Exelon properly evaluated the changes. Additionally, the team reviewed calculations associated with voltage drop, ampacity, protection and coordination, brake horsepower requirements, and short circuit for the ESW pump motor power supply and feeder cable to verify that Exelon appropriately translated the design bases and assumptions into the calculations. The team interviewed the system engineer and performed several walkdowns of the pump to evaluate its material condition and assess the pump's operating environment. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents and system health reports to evaluate whether there were any adverse operating trends and to assess Exelon's ability to evaluate and correct problems. b. Findings No findings were identified.
11 .2.1.14 Containment Spray/Emergency Service Water Heat Exchanger, H-21-1D a. Inspection Scope The team inspected
- HX H-21-1D to evaluate its ability to meet its design basis heat removal requirement in response to transient and accident events. There are four
- ESW system. The team reviewed applicable portions of the UFSAR, TSs, system DBD, and drawings to identify the design basis requirements for the CS/ESW
- HX. The team verified that Exelon properly translated design input into system procedures and tests. The team reviewed completed thermal performance tests,
- HX [[operability and to ensure that Exelon appropriately addressed potential adverse trends or conditions. The team reviewed the maintenance history, design changes, issue reports (IRs), calculations, design specifications, drawings and surveillance tests to ensure that the]]
- HX [[condition and heat removal capability were consistent with accident analyses assumptions. The team reviewed associated operating, abnormal, and emergency procedures to ensure consistency with the licensing and design bases. The team also performed walkdowns of accessible areas to assess the]]
- HX [[material condition and control. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents and system health reports to evaluate whether there were any adverse operating trends and to assess Exelon's ability to evaluate and correct problems. b. Findings No findings were identified. .2.1.15 Cooling Water Intake a. Inspection Scope The team inspected the cooling water intake to evaluate whether it could fulfill its design basis function of supplying cooling water to safety-related and non-safety-related systems during normal and accident conditions. The team reviewed applicable portions of the UFSAR, the TSs, DBDs, and calculations to identify the design basis functions for the service water and]]
- ESW intake. The team reviewed operating procedures, local and remote instrumentation, operating logs, and
IRs to verify that Exelon adequately maintained the intake and to ensure the availability of cooling water to the supplied systems in the event of a high or low water level condition at the inlet canal. Additionally, the team performed several walkdowns of accessible intake areas under various conditions (time of day, rain, and moderate wind) to assess configuration control and the material condition of the associated risk-significant SSCs. The team also reviewed periodic inspection reports and independently viewed underwater inspection videos to assess the material condition of inaccessible intake areas. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents to evaluate whether there were any adverse trends associated with the intake area components and to assess Exelon's capability to evaluate and correct problems.
2 b. Findings No findings were identified. .2.1.16 Containment Hardened Vent Path a. Inspection Scope The containment hardened vent path was reviewed to verify its ability to operate if called upon in the emergency operating procedures (EOPs). The hardened vent system (HVS) was installed as a result of the
- HVS was designed to permit a manual, controlled depressurization of primary containment via the torus during severe accident sequences that involve loss of decay heat removal capability. The
- HVS also provides a secondary path for venting the drywell when the torus vent path is unavailable. The team reviewed applicable portions of the
- HVS installation specifications, and calculations to identify the design basis functions for the hardened vent path. The team reviewed the corrective and preventive maintenance history, design changes,
- HVS valves to ensure that they were capable of performing their specified functions. The team also verified that Exelon properly translated design requirements and operational limits into operating instructions and
EOPs. The team also performed several walkdowns of accessible areas (including control room instrumentation) to assess Exelon configuration control, the material condition (including aging management), the operating environment, and potential external hazards. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents and system health reports to evaluate whether there were any adverse operating trends and to assess Exelon's ability to evaluate and correct problems. b. Findings No findings were identified. .2.1.17 Drywell To Torus Vacuum Breaker, V-26-9 a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed drywell-to-torus vacuum breaker, V-26-9, to evaluate its ability to meet the design basis requirement to prevent suppression pool water from backing up into the drywell during various reactor coolant and suppression system condensation modes, and to limit negative pressure differentials on the drywell in conjunction with the torus vacuum relief system. The team reviewed applicable portions of the UFSAR, TSs, the primary containment DBD, and calculations to identify the design basis functions for the drywell-to-torus vacuum breakers. The team verified that Exelon properly translated design inputs into system procedures and surveillance tests, and reviewed completed tests to verify vacuum breaker operability. The team performed a walkdown of all 14 drywell-to-torus vacuum breakers configuration control, the material condition, the operating environment, and potential external hazards. In particular, the
13 team walked down the vacuum breaker surrounding area in the torus room to ensure non-seismic structures and equipment (including a seismic
- II anti-falldown cantilever crane modification) would not become a seismic missile or adversely affect existing seismic I
- SSC [[during a postulated safe shutdown earthquake. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents and system health reports to evaluate whether there were any adverse operating trends and to assess Exelon's ability to evaluate and correct problems. b. Findings No findings were identified. .2.2 Review of Industry Operating Experience and Generic Issues (4 samples) The team reviewed selected]]
- OE issues for applicability at the Oyster Creek Generating Station. The team performed a detailed review of the
- OE issues listed below to evaluate whether Exelon had appropriately assessed potential applicability to site equipment and initiated corrective actions when necessary. .2.2.1
- NRC Information Notice 2010-27: Ventilation System Preventive Maintenance and Design Issues a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed
- NRC Information Notice (IN) 2010-27, Ventilation System Preventive Maintenance and Design Issues, as documented in Operating Experience Evaluation #1166034-07 in order to evaluate response to the operating experience. The
- IN to alert licensees of recently identified ventilation system preventive maintenance and design issues. The team reviewed Exelonof the potential impact of the identified issues to determine if the issues in the
- IN [[were directly applicable to Oyster Creek. The team reviewed design drawings for the control room ventilation control logic to assess system response to ventilation system and control room smoke detector actuation. The team selected a sample of preventive maintenance (]]
PM) activities associated with several ventilation system components to evaluate whether the existing PM program was being implemented consistent with industry operating experience and vendor recommendations. Finally, the team interviewed responsible engineers and walked down specific ventilation system components and controls to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards. b. Findings No findings were identified.
14 .2.2.2
- NRC Information Notice 2012-06: Ineffective Use of Vendor Technical Recommendations a. Inspection Scope The team inspected eview of
- NRC [[]]
- IN [[2012-Ineffective Use of Vendor Technical Recommendations. operating experience involving ineffective use of vendor technical recommendations indicated that many of these events potentially allowed latent failures to exist undetected and become an underlying cause of risk-significant initiating events. Ineffective use of vendor technical recommendations can cause or contribute to operational transients, scrams, and component failures. The team reviewed Exelonof the potential impact of the identified issues to if the issues in the]]
- IN were directly applicable to Oyster Creek, and that appropriate corrective actions were taken, if applicable. b. Findings No findings were identified. .2.2.3
- NRC Information Notice 2012-14: Motor-Operated Valve Inoperable Due to Stem-Disc Separation a. Inspection Scope
- NRC [[]]
- MOV that failed at the connection between the valve stem and disc. The team reviewed Exelon's evaluation and follow-up actions to address the latent causal factors and lessons learned from the industry event. Exelon initiated
- MOV Program at Oyster Creek. The team reviewed the recommendations of the Maintenance Rule Expert Panel regarding the possible inclusion of these valves in the
- MOV Program. The team also reviewed Exelon's action item to add stem/disc integrity criteria and evaluation processes to their
- NRC Information Notice 2011-12: Reactor Trips Resulting from Water Intrusion into Electrical Equipment a. Inspection Scope
- NRC [[]]
IN 2011-from Water Intrusion into Electrical Equipment,issued IN 2011-12 to inform licensees about recent events involving water intrusion into
15 electrical equipment that resulted in reactor trips. The team performed several walkdowns, including a rainy day walkdown, of electrical buses and
- SSC , and to included the main control room, the upper and lower cable spreading rooms, the vital and non-vital 4160 Vac switchgear rooms, the A and B 480 Vac switchgear rooms, the A/B/C battery rooms, the reactor and turbine building MCCs, and the
- EDG , relay and control panels, and battery compartments). b. Findings No findings were identified. 4.
- OTHER [[]]
ACTIVITIES 4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (IP 71152) a. Inspection Scope The team reviewed a sample of problems that Exelon identified and entered into their corrective action program. The team reviewed these issues to evaluate whether Exelon had an appropriate threshold for identifying issues and to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions. In addition, corrective action documents written on issues identified during the inspection were reviewed to evaluate adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problem into the corrective action program. The corrective action documents that were sampled and reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment. b. Findings No findings were identified. 4OA6 Meetings, including Exit On October 24, 2013, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Peak, Oyster Creek Plant Manager, and other members of Exelon staff. The team verified that none of the information in this report is proprietary. Attachment: Supplemental Information
Attachment
- KEY [[]]
- POINTS [[]]
- OF [[]]
- I. [[Abelev, System Manager A. Agarwal, Design Engineer C. Coyle, System Manager R. Csillagm, Manager, Mechanical Design M. Dicko, Design Engineer R. Martinez, Mechanical Design T. Nickerson, Mechanical Design S. Olatujoye, System Manager P. Procacci, Electrical Design C. Ricketts, System Manager T. Ruggiero, Mechanical Design S. Schwartz, System Manager J. Tabone,]]
- G. Test, Chemistry Technician H. Tritt, Engineering Manager G. Voishnis, Senior Reactor Operator R. Wiebenga, Senior Chemist
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- CLOSED [[]]
AND DISCUSSED Opened/Closed None. Discussed None.
Attachment
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Calculations: 3731-29-E003, Heat Losses Estimate for 480 Vac Switchgear Rooms A and B, Revision 1 3731-71-11-002, Appendix R - Shell Makeup Valve Accumulator Volume, Revision 1 C-1302-153-5320-075, Lifting Devices in Torus Vacuum Breaker Areas, Revision 0 C-1302-211-5320-012,]]
- OC Emergency Condenser Steam Flow Analysis, Revision 1 C-1302-211-E540-104, Thrust Calculation for Isolation Condenser Valves, Revision 0 C-1302-212-5310-087, Core Spray Temperature Switch Setpoints, Revision 0 C-1302-241-5450-073, Acceptable
- CS [[Heat Exchanger Fouling Resistance, Revision 0a C-1302-241-E120-078, CS/ESW Heat Exchanger Performance Evaluation, Revision 1 C-1302-241-E540-096, CS/ESW System Hydraulic Models, Revision 2 C-1302-242-5360-012, Accumulator Sizing for V-23-13, 14, 15 & 16, Revision 1 C-1302-242-5360-014, Maximum Containment Pressure during Purge Operation, Revision 1 C-1302-243-5310-047, 18-inch Torus-to-Drywell Vacuum Breaker - Verification of Test Procedure 604.4.016, Revision 0 C-1302-243-5450-062, Containment Vent Valve Cycles at Beyond DBA, Revision 0 C-1302-243-E170-087, Wetwell to Drywell Vacuum Breaker Sizing, Revision 4 C-1302-424-5360-003, Condensate Inventory for Heat Removal During SBO, Revision 2 C-1302-424-5360-004,]]
- MOV Cycle Frequency, Revision 0 C-1302-700-5350-003, 4160Vac Class 1E Protective Device Setpoints, Revision 6 C-1302-700-5350-012, Short Circuit Study, Revision 3 C-1302-700-5350-021, Protective Relays 4.16
- NSR [[]]
- GL [[]]
- DC [[]]
- CCVD Calculation, Revision 2 C-1302-735-5350-006, 125 Vdc A/B Battery Charger Breakers Settings, Revision 0 C-1302-735-5350-008,
OC zing Calculation, Revision 1 C-1302-735-E510-035, 125 Vdc System Short Circuit Study, Revision 0 C-1302-741-5350-001, Loading of EDG, Unit Substations, 4.16kV Buses 1A/1B, Revision 11 C-1302-741-E310-014, Voltage Analysis for EDG Control Circuits, Revision 0 C-1302-811-5320-003, Fire Protection System Hydraulic Analysis, Revision 0 C-1302-811-5320-005, Fire Protection System Hydraulic Analysis, Revision 0 C-1302-811-5360-004, Diesel Fire Pump Flow to Core Spray, Revision 1
Attachment C-1302-811-E310-043, Fire Protection Hydraulic Model Margin Analysis, Revision 0 C-1302-822-5320-037, Hardened Vent Isolation Valves (V-23-13/16), Revision 0 C-1302-822-5360-036, Isolation Valves Opening for 1% Decay Heat Venting, Revision 0 C-1302-822-5450-059, Impact of
- OC [[]]
- ESW [[]]
- MOV Data Sheet for V-20-41, Revision 3 Completed Surveillance and Modification Acceptance Testing: 1R24
- CW Pump Bay Inspection Video, performed November 2012 1R24 Intake South Underdeck Inspection Video, performed 10/26/12 - 11/6/12 2400-
- SMM [[-3228.05, Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker Inspection/Repair, performed 11/19/12 604.1.005, Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker, Surveillance/LS Calibration, performed 11/8/12 604.4.016, Torus to Drywell Vacuum Breaker IST, performed 2/14/13, 5/14/13, and 8/14/13 607.4.005, CS/ESW System 2 Pump Operability and Comprehensive/Pre-service/Post- Maintenance IST, performed 10/13/11 & 3/2/13 607.4.014, CS/ESW System 1 Pump Operability,]]
- CS "Pump Trip, performed 12/20/12 607.4.017, CS/ESW System 2 Pump Operability and Quarterly IST, performed 4/23/13 & 8/2/13 609.4.001, Isolation Condenser Valve Operability and IST, performed 11/18/12 609.4.001, Isolation Condenser Valve Operability and IST, performed 10/1/13 610.4.021, [[system" contains a listed "[" character as part of the property label and has therefore been classified as invalid. System 1 Pump Operability and Quarterly IST, performed 5/15/13 610.4.022, Core Spray System 2 Pump Operability and Quarterly IST, performed 5/24/13 634.2.002, Main Station Battery Weekly Surveillance, performed 8/13/13 634.2.003 Main Station Battery Quarterly Surveillance, performed 12/11/12, 3/12/13, & 6/11/13 634.2.011 Main Station Battery Monthly Surveillance, performed 7/9/13 and 8/6/13 634.2.201, Main Station B Battery Discharge Test, performed 10/30/06 634.2.201, Main Station B Battery Discharge Test, performed 11/28/10 634.2.207, Main Station B Battery Service Test, performed 11/7/08 and 11/4/12 645.4.012, Fire Pump Test, performed 12/3/07, 12/30/10, 11/10/11, 12/28/11, and 2/27/13 655.5.001, Torus to Drywell Vacuum Relief Valve Leak Rate Test, performed 11/29/12 655.5.006, Local Leak Rate Tests, performed 11/13/12 678.4.001, Primary Containment Isolation Valve Operability and IST, performed 7/8/09 - 5/28/13 681.4.004, Technical Specification Log Sheet, performed 8/28/13 - 9/3/13 A2156649, Intake Structure Underwater Inspection - South, performed 11/12/12 A2237871,]]
- NRC [[]]
- GL 88-14 Air Operator Inspection/Accumulator Leak Test, performed 6/16/11 A2287113, Inspect Intake Canal Diversion Bridge, performed 11/17/12 Emergency Service Water Pump P-3-3D
ER-AA-340-1002, CS System 2 Heat Exchanger Inspection Report, performed 4/26/12 Job Order No. 36099, Hardened Vent Mechanical Ramp-up, performed 7/29/92 - 2/7/93 Job Order No. 36100, General Hydro/Service Leak Test/Pneumatic Test, performed 12/22/92 Job Order No. 36100, Hardened Vent Mechanical Tie-in, performed 12/16/92 - 2/6/93
Attachment V-14-0031,
MOV Post-test Data Review Worksheet, performed 10/27/12 V-20-41, Performance Trend Data, 5/21/13 Corrective Action Reports: 0581523 0590987 0602654 0605048 0613061 0615021 0617538 0631071 0637092 0637125 0642467 0646207 0656323 0672992 0674439 0674465 0679413 0706779 0706781 0708301 0717437 0717927 0725751 0726021 0734262 0735127 0806738 0827590 0833488 0838100 0841357 0851311 0956348 0964281 0976405 0976462 0998603 0999003 1000236 1012123 1012256 1013712 1042440 1053710 1061416 1065668 1099012 1112329 1145338 1145393 1162136 1163587 1166220 1166228 1187888 1201621 1215193 1216739 1252288 1254030 1261553 1275077 1278641 1300666 1313817 1320175 1320176 1359061 1431895 1436679 1437147 1439625 1439643 1441513 1456302 1457671 1476373 1480658 1481205 1481553 1481670 1481710 1482207 1490523 1492013 1495758 1496686 1508260 1509180 1509373 1511147 1511332 1514591 1520551 1520966 1532756 1536752 1541256 1542615 1546148 1549650 1552486 1552944 1556402 1556431* 1556433* 1556435* 1556866* 1556927* 1556974* 1556987* 1556990* 1557090* 1557215 1557614* 1557729* 1557742* 1557808* 1558096* 1558124* 1558199* 1558205* 1558218* 1558224* 1558246* 1558251* 1558280* 1558344* 1558348* 1558655* 1558676* 1559023 1559197* 1559246 1559362* 1559366* 1559396* 1559486 1559903* 1559915 1560284* 1560287* 1560436* 1560508* 1561053* 1561056* 1562550 1562655* 1562968* 1562971* 1563467 1563475* 1563509* 1563519* 1563637* 1563886* 1563955* 1563963* 1563993* 1564058* 1564160* 1564384 1564392* 1564416* 1564417* 1564537* 1564564* 1564581 1564586* 1566227* 1566627* 1568022* 1568661* 1568723* 1568781* 1569037*
Attachment 1569256* 1569261* 1569264* 1569266* 1569431* 1569910* 1569928* 1569956* 1575724* 2057072 *NRC identified during this inspection. Drawings and Wiring Diagrams: 15050.68-EE-13, Control Room
- HVAC "System 3D-243-37-1001, Vacuum Breakers Cantilever Jib Cranes W/Tro of the Torus, Revision 0 3D-822-22-001, Sht. 7, Hardened Vent Mod Yard Piping, Revision 1 [[SSC" contains a listed "[" character as part of the property label and has therefore been classified as invalid.0,]]
- MCC [[]]
- BR -2015, Main Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System, Revision 43 BV-M0320, Office Building 480 Vac Switchgear Room Ventilation, Revision 4 DJP-3D-531-22- DJP-3D-532-22- DJP-3D-532-22-. 6 ft., Revision
- MCC 1AB2 Unit D02, Revision 21 GE223R0173 Sht. 24, Core Spray System Electrical Elementary Diagram, Revision
- NU 5060E6003 Sht. 4, Core Spray/RBCCW Drywell Isolation Elect Elementary, Revision 16 OC-12020, Sht. 2, Control Room
SN 13432.19-1, Nitrogen Supply System Flow Diagram, Revision 33
Attachment Engineering Evaluations: 1145338-07, Molded Case Circuit Breaker with
- UV Fitted Device Electrical Loading, Revision 1 2-33-114-5-1, Foster Wheeler Report - Emergency Dump Condenser, 3/11/65 303-93, Diesel Hot Engine Restart at Minimum Battery Voltage, Revision 0 970328-03,
- PM "for Accumulator Decay Surveillance Evaluation, 4/25/13 EC-362860, Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel Fuel Evaluation, 10/6/06 [[engineering change" contains a listed "[" character as part of the property label and has therefore been classified as invalid., Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel Fuel Evaluation, 2/16/07]]
- ECR [[OC-08-00222, Revise Diesels Fuel Oil Calculations, Revision 0 GENE-B13-01805-77, Evaluation of Condensate Induced Water Hammer, 9/96 MDD-OC-212B DIVI, Modification for Core Spray System Upgrade, Revision 0 MDD-OC-212B DIVII, Modification for Core Spray System Upgrade, Revision 0 MDD-OC-822A Div. I, Div. I Modification Design for]]
- OC [[Hardened Vent System, Revision 1 NEDE-24802, Mark I Wetwell-to-Drywell Vacuum Breaker Functional Requirements, April 1980 OC-MM-402990-012, Mini-Mod for Lifting Devices in Torus Vacuum Breaker Areas, Revision 0 OC-MM-403011-001, Mini-Mod for Core Spray Recirculation Line Upgrade, Revision]]
- 0 P.E. File No. 244-90, Moving and/or Lengthening the Intake Canal Grass Diverter, 6/11/90 R0805387-28, P-3-3D
- MIDAS Data Sheet, Revision 5 Licensing and Design Basis Documentation: 1940-00-20133, Response to Request for Additional Information
- NRC [[]]
- NRC [[]]
- NRC [[]]
- NRC [[]]
- GL 96-05, 2/15/01 OC-IS-402968-001, Installation Specification for Hardened Vent Modification, Revision
- 2 OCNGS [[]]
UFSAR, Chapter 8 Electrical Power, Revision 14 Oyster Creek Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 18
Attachment
- NRC [[]]
- NRC [[]]
- SL -9361, Containment Spray Heat Exchanger Specification Sheet, Revision 4 Miscellaneous Documents: 0047655, Receipt Inspection Report (ESW Pump
- NDE Data Report, 1/14/09 2621-PGD-2621, Containment Atmosphere Control, Revision 11 6231-PGD-2685, B.5.b and
- BOM [[-OC-000221-201, Vacuum Breakers Cantilever Jib Cranes with Trolleys Platform Thru G, Construction Bill of Materials, Revision 0 Emergency Service Water Pump 1-4 Lower Bearing Condition Report, 3/20/13 Emergency Service Water Pump 1-4 Upper Bearing Condition Report, 3/20/13]]
- EPRI [[]]
- 1991 EPRI [[]]
- DC Motor Performance Methodology Offsite Voltage Analysis for Conditions Expected for Summer 2013, 11/29/12 Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
- NRC Generic Letter 88-14 Air Operator/Accumulator Test, 7/16/13 Predicting Capabilities and Stroke Time in
GL96-05 Gate Valve, Revision 3 Weld Map No. 3B-822-WM-008, Hardened Vent Pipe Weld Record Sheet, 1/20/93
Attachment Procedures: 2400-SME-3915.01, Motor Control Center Preventive Maintenance, Revision 15 2400-SME-3915.03, 4160 Vac Breaker Preventive Maintenance, Revision 10 307, Isolation Condenser System, Revision 122 308, Emergency Core Cooling System Operation, Revision 92 310, Containment Spray System Operation, Revision 105 312.9, Primary Containment Control, Revision 58 322, Service Water System, Revision 82 326, Chlorination System, Revision 100 327.1, Fuel Oil Receipt and Handling Procedure, Revision 56 331.1, Control Room and Old Cable Spreading Room
- HVAC [[System, Revision 39 333, Plant Fire Protection System, Revision 114 337, 4160V Electrical System, Revision 96 341, Emergency Diesel Generator Operation, Revision 104 609.4.001, Isolation Condenser Valve Operability and Inservice Test, Revision 77 609.4.007, Fire Water Makeup to Isolation Condensers]]
- IST [[, Revision 20 610.4.021, Core Spray System 1 Pump Operability and Quarterly In-Service Test, Revision 13 636.4.001, Diesel Generator No. 1 Automatic Actuation Test, Revision 16 644.3.004, Condensate Storage Tank Level Indicator LI-424-993 Calibration, Revision 3 645.4.012, Fire Pump Functional Test, Revision 11 655.5.006, Local Leak Rate Tests, Revision]]
- ABN "32, Abnormal Intake Level, Revision 24 CY-OC-120-1107, Fuel Oil System Sample and Analysis Schedule, Revision 16 CY-OC-120-540, Plant Oil Sampling, Revision 6 EDMG-SPX9, Manually Opening Containment Vent Valves in a B.5.b Event, Revision 2 EMG-SP25, Initiation of the Containment Spray System in the Torus Cooling Mode, Revision 0 EMG-SP35, Venting the Torus via the Hardened Vent, Revision 2 EMG-SP36, Venting the Drywell via the [[Topic" contains a listed "[" character as part of the property label and has therefore been classified as invalid., Revision 1 EMG-SP5, Fire Water Injection for]]
- ER "-AA-200, Preventive Maintenance Program, Revision 0 ER-AA-340-1002, Service Water Heat Exchanger Inspection Guide, Revision 5 ER-OC-380, Oyster Creek Primary Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, Revision 5 [[procedure" contains a listed "[" character as part of the property label and has therefore been classified as invalid.,]]
- MA -AA-716-021, Rigging and Lifting Program, Revision 22 MA-AA-716-230-1001, Oil Analysis Interpretation Guideline, Revision 16 MA-AB-725-111,
- GE "4 kV Magne-Blast Vertical Circuit Breakers, Revision 5 OP-AA-115-101, Operator Aid Postings, Revision 2 PES-P-006, Diesel Fuel Oil, Revision 10 RAP-B3d, Keep Fill Trouble, Revision 1 RAP-C8b, Cond Area Temp HI, Revision 2 [[procedure" contains a listed "[" character as part of the property label and has therefore been classified as invalid.,]]
SAM-3200.02, Containment and Radioactivity Release Control, Revision 0 SAM-3200.03, Combustible Gas Control, Revision 0
Attachment System Health Reports: 125 Vdc Station
- DC System, Q2-2013 4160 Vac Distribution System, Q2-2013 480 Vac Distribution System, Q2-2013 Containment Spray System, Q2-2013 Core Spray/
- ADS [[, Q2-2013 Emergency Isolation Condenser, Q2-2013 Emergency Service Water System, Q2-2013 Fire Protection Suppression System, Q2-2013 Main Office Building HVAC, Q2-2013 Vendor/Technical Manuals: PC-138051, S-2299-43 Emergency Service Water Pump Curve, Revision 1 VM-OC-0008,]]
- KV Circuit Breakers, Revision 12 VM-OC-0134, Anchor Darling Valves Operating & Maintenance Instruction Manual, Revision 13 VM-OC-0173, Maintenance Instructions for Torus/DW Vacuum Breakers, Revision 6 VM-OC-0285,
DPIS, Revision 5 VM-OC-0547, Buffalo Force Centrifugal Fans, Revision 5 VM-OC-0703, Emergency Service Water (ESW) Pump Maintenance Manual, Revision 7 VM-OC-0726, Barry Blower Centrifugal Fans, Revision 1 Work Orders: A2156649 A2192987 A2288496 R0800275 R0803679 R2060823 R2012251 R2224057 R2104763 R2172500 R2060032 R2226119 R0803340 R2084384 R2085442 R2085557 R2102191 R2124062 R2164399 R2164566 R2173542 R2178148 R2179823 R2180585 R2183968 R2184450 R2186748 R2187378 R2187382 R2195490 R2197931 R2197934 R2199210 R2201410 R2202339 R2202977 R2203939 R2205941 R2205942 R2208462 R2209013 R2210539 R2212251 R2212254 R2218200 R2218652 R2220343 R2221620 R2222454 R2224616 R2224744 R2224997 R2225023 R2225288 R2227224 R0807414 R2143553 R2163090 R2171785 R2171888 R2171994 R2182886 R220235
Attachment
- LIST [[]]
- IN [[[NRC] Information Notice]]
- NRC [[]]