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COL Appendix C, ITAAC
	ML17088A321
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C-1APPENDIX C TURKEY P OINT UNI T INSPECTIONS, TESTS, ANALYSES, AND ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA Table of Contents

1.0 Introduction

................................................................................................................ C-32 1.1 Definitions

............................................................................................................... C-32 1.2 General Provisions

.................................................................................................. C-35 1.3 Figure Legend

......................................................................................................... C-38 1.4 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

........................................................................ C-42 2.0 System Based Design Descriptions and ITAAC

.......................................................... C-48 2.1 Reactor....................................................................................................................... C-48 2.1.1 Fuel Handling and Refueling System

................................................................... C-48 2.1.01.01 ........................................................................................................................ C-49 2.1.01.02 ........................................................................................................................ C-49 2.1.01.03 ........................................................................................................................ C-49 2.1.01.04 ........................................................................................................................ C-49 2.1.01.05 ........................................................................................................................ C-49 2.1.01.06.i

...................................................................................................................... C-49 2.1.01.06.ii

..................................................................................................................... C-49 2.1.01.07.i

...................................................................................................................... C-49 2.1.01.07.ii

..................................................................................................................... C-49 2.1.01.07.iii

.................................................................................................................... C-50 2.1.01.07.iv

.................................................................................................................... C-50 2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System

...................................................................................... C-52 2.1.02.01 ........................................................................................................................ C-63 2.1.02.02a

...................................................................................................................... C-63 2.1.02.02b

...................................................................................................................... C-63 2.1.02.03a

...................................................................................................................... C-63 2.1.02.03b ...................................................................................................................... C-63 2.1.02.04a

...................................................................................................................... C-64 2.1.02.04b

...................................................................................................................... C-64 2.1.02.05a.i

.................................................................................................................... C-64 C-2 2.1.02.05a.ii

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C-64 2.1.02.05a.iii

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C-64 2.1.02.05b

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C-64 2.1.02.06 ................................................................................................

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C-65 2.1.02.07a.i

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C-65 2.1.02.07a.ii

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C-65 2.1.02.07b

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C-65 2.1.02.07c

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C-66 2.1.02.08a.i

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C-66 2.1.02.08a.ii

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C-66 2.1.02.08b

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C-66 2.1.02.08c

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C-66 2.1.02.08d.i

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C-67 2.1.02.08d.ii

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C-67 2.1.02.08d.iii

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C-67 2.1.02.08d.i v ................................

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C-68 2.1.02.08d.v

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C-68 2.1.02.08d.vi

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C-68 2.1.02.08d.vii

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C-68 2.1.02.08d.v iii................................

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C-68 2.1.02.08e

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C-68 2.1.02.09a

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C-68 2.1.02.09b.i

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C-69 2.1.02.09b.ii

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C-69 2.1.02.09c

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C-69 2.1.02.10 ................................

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C-69 2.1.02.11a.i

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C-69 2.1.02.11a.ii

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C-69 2.1.02.11b.i

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C-69 2.1.02.11b.ii

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C-69 2.1.02.11b.i ii ................................

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C-70 2.1.02.11c.i

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C-70 2.1.02.11c.ii

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C-70 2.1.02.12a.i

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C-70 C-3 2.1.02.12a.ii

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C-70 2.1.02.12a.iii

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C-70 2.1.02.12a.iv

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C-71 2.1.02.12a.v

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C-71 2.1.02.12a.vi

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C-71 2.1.02.12a.vii

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C-71 2.1.02.12a.viii

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C-71 2.1.02.12a.ix

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C-71 2.1.02.12b

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C-71 2.1.02.13a

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C-71 2.1.02.13b

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C-72 2.1.02.13c

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C-72 2.1.02.14 ................................

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C-72 2.1.02.15 ................................

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C-72 2.1.3 Reactor System

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... C-76 2.1.03.01 ................................

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C-80 2.1.03.02a

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C-80 2.1.03.02b

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C-80 2.1.03.02c

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C-80 2.1.03.03 ................................

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C-80 2.1.03.04 ................................

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C-80 2.1.03.05 ................................

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C-80 2.1.03.06.i

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C-81 2.1.03.06.ii

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C-81 2.1.03.06.iii

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C-81 2.1.03.07.i

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C-81 2.1.03.07.ii

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C-81 2.1.03.08 ................................

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C-81 2.1.03.09a.i

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C-82 2.1.03.09a.ii

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C-82 2.1.03.09b

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C-82 2.1.03.09c

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C-82 2.1.03.10 ................................

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C-82 2.1.03.11 ................................

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C-82 C-4 2.1.03.12 ................................

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C-83 2.1.03.13 ................................

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C-83 2.1.03.14 ................................

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C-83 2.2 Nuclear Safety Systems

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C-90 2.2.1 Containment System

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C-90 2.2.01.01 ................................................................................................

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C-100 2.2.01.02a

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C-100 2.2.01.02b

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C-100 2.2.01.03a

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C-100 2.2.01.03b

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C-100 2.2.01.04a.i

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C-100 2.2.01.04a.ii

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C-100 2.2.01.04b

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C-101 2.2.01.05.i

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C-101 2.2.01.05.ii

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C-101 2.2.01.05.iii

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C-101 2.2.01.06a.i

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C-101 2.2.01.06a.ii

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C-1 02 2.2.01.06b

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C-102 2.2.01.06c

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C-102 2.2.01.06d.i

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C-102 2.2.01.06d.ii

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C-102 2.2.01.07.i

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C-103 2.2.01.07.ii

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C-103 2.2.01.08 ................................

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C-103 2.2.01.09 ................................

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C-104 2.2.01.10a

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C-104 2.2.01.10b

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C-104 2.2.01.10c

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C-104 2.2.01.11a.i

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C-104 2.2.01.11a.i i ................................

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C-104 2.2.01.11a.iii

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C-104 2.2.01.11a.iv

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C-105 2.2.01.11b

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C-105 C-5 2.2.2 Passive Containment Cooling System

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C-107 2.2.02.01 ................................

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C-113 2.2.02.02a

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C-113 2.2.02.02b

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C-113 2.2.02.03a

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C-113 2.2.02.03b

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C-113 2.2.02.04a

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C-113 2.2.02.04b

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C-113 2.2.02.05a.i

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C-114 2.2.02.05a.ii

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C-114 2.2.02.05a.i ii ................................

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C-114 2.2.02.05b

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C-114 2.2.02.05c

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C-114 2.2.02.06a.i

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C-114 2.2.02.06a.i i ................................

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C-115 2.2.02.06b

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C-115 2.2.02.06c

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C-115 2.2.02.07a.i

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C-115 2.2.02.07a.i i ................................

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C-115 2.2.02.07a.iii

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C-116 2.2.02.07b.i

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C-116 2.2.02.07b.ii

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C-116 2.2.02.07b.i ii ................................

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C-116 2.2.02.07c

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C-117 2.2.02.07d

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C-117 2.2.02.07e.i

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C-117 2.2.02.07e.ii

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C-117 2.2.02.07f.i

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C-117 2.2.02.07f.ii

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C-117 2.2.02.08a

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C-117 2.2.02.08b

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C-117 2.2.02.08c

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C-118 2.2.02.09 ................................................................................................

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C-118 2.2.02.10a

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C-118 C-6 2.2.02.10b

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C-118 2.2.02.10c

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C-118 2.2.02.11a.i

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C-118 2.2.02.11a.i i ................................

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C-118 2.2.02.11a.iii

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C-118 2.2.02.11b

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C-119 2.2.3 Passive Core Cooling System

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C-121 2.2.03.01 ................................................................................................

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C-134 2.2.03.02a

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C-134 2.2.03.02b

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C-134 2.2.03.03a

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C-134 2.2.03.03b

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C-134 2.2.03.04a

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C-134 2.2.03.04b

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C-134 2.2.03.05a.i

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C-135 2.2.03.05a.i i ................................

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C-135 2.2.03.05a.iii

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C-135 2.2.03.05b

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C-135 2.2.03.06 ................................

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C-136 2.2.03.07a.i

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C-136 2.2.03.07a.ii

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C-136 2.2.03.07b

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C-136 2.2.03.07c

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C-136 2.2.03.08a

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C-137 2.2.03.08b.01

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C-137 2.2.03.08b.0 2 ................................

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C-137 2.2.03.08c.i.01

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C-137 2.2.03.08c.i.02

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C-138 2.2.03.08c.i.03

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C-138 2.2.03.08c.i.04 ................................................................................................

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C-139 2.2.03.08c.ii

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C-139 2.2.03.08c.iii

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C-139 2.2.03.08c.iv.01

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C-139 2.2.03.08c.iv.02 ................................

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C-139 C-7 2.2.03.08c.iv.03

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C-14 0 2.2.03.08c.iv.04

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C-140 2.2.03.08c.v.01

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C-140 2.2.03.08c.v.02 ................................

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C-140 2.2.03.08c.vi.01

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C-140 2.2.03.08c.vi.02

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C-140 2.2.03.08c.vi.03

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C-140 2.2.03.08c.vii

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C-141 2.2.03.08c.viii

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C-141 2.2.03.08c.ix

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C-142 2.2.03.08c.x

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C-143 2.2.03.08c.x i ................................

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C-144 2.2.03.08c.xii

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C-144 2.2.03.08c.xiii

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C-144 2.2.03.08c.xiv................................

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C-144 2.2.03.08d

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C-144 2.2.03.09a.i

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C-144 2.2.03.09a.ii

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C-145 2.2.03.09a.i ii ................................

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C-145 2.2.03.09b

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C-145 2.2.03.09c

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C-145 2.2.03.10 ................................

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C-145 2.2.03.11a.i

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C-145 2.2.03.11a.ii

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C-145 2.2.03.11b.i

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C-146 2.2.03.11b.ii

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C-146 2.2.03.11b.i ii ................................

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C-146 2.2.03.11c.i

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C-146 2.2.03.11c.ii

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C-146 2.2.03.12a.i

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C-146 2.2.03.12a.ii

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C-146 2.2.03.12a.iv

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C-146 2.2.03.12b

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C-147 2.2.03.13 ................................

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C-147 C-8 2.2.4 Steam Generator System

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C-151 2.2.04.01 ................................

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C-164 2.2.04.02a

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C-164 2.2.04.02b

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C-164 2.2.04.03a

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C-164 2.2.04.03b

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C-164 2.2.04.04a

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C-164 2.2.04.04b

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C-164 2.2.04.05a.i

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C-165 2.2.04.05a.ii

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C-165 2.2.04.05a.i ii ................................

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C-165 2.2.04.05b

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C-165 2.2.04.06 ................................

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C-165 2.2.04.07a.i

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C-166 2.2.04.07a.i i ................................

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C-166 2.2.04.07b

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C-166 2.2.04.07c

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C-166 2.2.04.08a.i

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C-166 2.2.04.08a.i i ................................

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C-166 2.2.04.08b.i

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C-167 2.2.04.08b.ii

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C-167 2.2.04.08c

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C-167 2.2.04.09a.i

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C-167 2.2.04.09a.ii

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C-167 2.2.04.09b.i

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C-167 2.2.04.09b.ii

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C-167 2.2.04.10 ................................

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C-167 2.2.04.11a

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C-168 2.2.04.11b.i

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C-168 2.2.04.11b.i i ................................

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C-168 2.2.04.12a.i

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C-168 2.2.04.12a.ii

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C-168 2.2.04.12a.iii

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C-168 2.2.04.12b

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C-168 C-9 2.2.5 Main Control Room Emergency Habitability System

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C-173 2.2.05.01 ................................

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C-181 2.2.05.02a

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C-182 2.2.05.02b

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C-182 2.2.05.03a

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C-182 2.2.05.03b

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C-182 2.2.05.04a

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C-182 2.2.05.04b

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C-182 2.2.05.05a.i

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C-182 2.2.05.05a.ii

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C-183 2.2.05.05a.i ii ................................

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C-183 2.2.05.05b

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C-183 2.2.05.06a

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C-183 2.2.05.06b

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C-183 2.2.05.07a.i

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C-183 2.2.05.07a.ii

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C-183 2.2.05.07a.iii

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C-183 2.2.05.07b.i

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C-184 2.2.05.07b.ii

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C-184 2.2.05.07c

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C-184 2.2.05.07d

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C-184 C.2.2.05.07e

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C-184 2.2.05.08 ................................

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C-185 2.2.05.09a

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C-185 2.2.05.09b

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C-185 2.2.05.10 ................................

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C-185 2.2.05.11 ................................

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C-185 2.2.05.12 ................................

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C-185 2.3 Auxiliary Systems

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..... C-188 2.3.1 Component Cooling Water System

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C-190 2.3.01.02 ................................

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C-190 2.3.01.03.i

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C-190 2.3.01.03.ii

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C-190 C-10 2.3.01.04 ................................

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C-190 2.3.01.05 ................................

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C-190 2.3.2 Chemical and Volume Control System

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C-192 2.3.02.01 ................................

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C-199 2.3.02.02a

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C-199 2.3.02.02b

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C-200 2.3.02.03a

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C-200 2.3.02.03b

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C-200 2.3.02.04a

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C-200 2.3.02.04b

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C-200 2.3.02.05.i

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C-200 2.3.02.05.ii

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C-200 2.3.02.05.iii

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C-201 2.3.02.06a.i

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C-201 2.3.02.06a.ii

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C-201 2.3.02.06b

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C-201 2.3.02.06c

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C-201 2.3.02.07a

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C-201 2.3.02.07b

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C-202 2.3.02.07c

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C-202 2.3.02.08a.i

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C-202 2.3.02.08a.i i ................................

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C-202 2.3.02.08a.iii

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C-202 2.3.02.08b

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C-202 2.3.02.09 ................................

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C-202 2.3.02.10a

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C-203 2.3.02.10b.i

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C-203 2.3.02.10b.ii

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C-203 2.3.02.11a.i

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C-203 2.3.02.11a.ii

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C-203 2.3.02.11a.iii

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C-203 2.3.02.11a.iv

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C-203 2.3.02.11b

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C-204 2.3.02.12a

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C-204 C-11 2.3.02.12b

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................................................................

....................

C-204 2.3.02.13 ................................

................................................................

......................

C-204 2.3.02.14 ................................

................................................................

......................

C-204 2.3.3 Standby Diesel Fuel Oil System

................................

........................................ C-207 2.3.03.01 ................................

................................................................

......................

C-208 2.3.03.02 ................................

................................................................

......................

C-208 2.3.03.03a

................................................................................................

....................

C-208 2.3.03.03b

................................

................................................................

....................

C-208 2.3.03.03c

................................

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....................

C-208 2.3.03.03d

................................

................................................................

....................

C-208 2.3.03.04 ................................................................................................

......................

C-208 2.3.03.05 ................................................................................................

......................

C-208 2.3.4 Fire Protection System

................................

......................................................

C-211 2.3.04.01 ................................................................................................

......................

C-212 2.3.04.02.i

................................

................................................................

....................

C-212 2.3.04.02.ii

................................

................................................................

...................

C-212 2.3.04.03 ................................

................................................................

......................

C-212 2.3.04.04.i

................................

................................................................

....................

C-212 2.3.04.04.ii

................................

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...................

C-212 2.3.04.05 ................................

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......................

C-212 2.3.04.06 ................................

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......................

C-212 2.3.04.07 ................................

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......................

C-212 2.3.04.08 ................................

................................................................

......................

C-213 2.3.04.09 ................................

................................................................

......................

C-213 2.3.04.10 ................................

................................................................

......................

C-213 2.3.04.11 ................................

................................................................

......................

C-213 2.3.5 Mechanical Handling System

............................................................................

C-217 2.3.05.01 ................................

................................................................

......................

C-218 2.3.05.02.i

................................

................................................................

....................

C-218 2.3.05.02.ii

................................

................................................................

...................

C-218 2.3.05.02.iii

................................................................................................

..................

C-218 2.3.05.03a.i

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..................

C-218 2.3.05.03a.ii

................................................................................................

.................

C-218 2.3.05.03a.iii

................................................................................................

................

C-218 C-12 2.3.05.03b.i ................................................................................................

..................

C-219 2.3.05.03b.ii

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.................

C-2 19 2.3.05.03b.iii

................................................................................................

................

C-219 2.3.05.03c.i

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..................

C-219 2.3.05.03c.i i ................................

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.................

C-219 2.3.05.03d.i

................................

................................................................

..................

C-219 2.3.05.03d.ii

................................

................................................................

.................

C-220 2.3.05.04 ................................

................................................................

......................

C-220 2.3.6 Normal Residual Heat Removal System

................................

............................

C-221 2.3.06.01 ................................................................................................

......................

C-229 2.3.06.02a

................................

................................................................

....................

C-229 2.3.06.02b

................................

................................................................

....................

C-229 2.3.06.03a

................................

................................................................

....................

C-229 2.3.06.03b

................................

................................................................

....................

C-230 2.3.06.04a

................................

................................................................

....................

C-230 2.3.06.04b

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................................................................

....................

C-230 2.3.06.05a.i

................................

................................................................

..................

C-230 2.3.06.05a.ii

................................

................................................................

.................

C-230 2.3.06.05a.iii

................................

................................................................

................

C-230 2.3.06.05b

................................

................................................................

....................

C-231 2.3.06.06 ................................

................................................................

......................

C-231 2.3.06.07a.i

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..................

C-231 2.3.06.07a.ii

................................

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.................

C-231 2.3.06.07b

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....................

C-231 2.3.06.07c

................................

................................................................

....................

C-232 2.3.06.08a

................................

................................................................

....................

C-232 2.3.06.08b

................................

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....................

C-232 2.3.06.09a.i

................................

................................................................

..................

C-232 2.3.06.09a.ii

................................

................................................................

.................

C-232 2.3.06.09b.i

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..................

C-232 2.3.06.09b.i i ................................

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.................

C-233 2.3.06.09b.iii

................................

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................

C-233 2.3.06.09b.iv

................................

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................

C-233 2.3.06.09b.v

................................

................................................................

.................

C-233 C-13 2.3.06.09c

................................

................................................................

....................

C-233 2.3.06.09d

................................................................................................

....................

C-233 2.3.06.10 ................................

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......................

C-233 2.3.06.11a

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....................

C-234 2.3.06.11b

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....................

C-234 2.3.06.12a.i

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..................

C-234 2.3.06.12a.ii

................................

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.................

C-234 2.3.06.12a.iii

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................

C-234 2.3.06.12a.iv ................................

................................................................

................

C-234 2.3.06.12b

................................

................................................................

....................

C-234 2.3.06.13 ................................................................................................

......................

C-234 2.3.06.14 ................................................................................................

......................

C-235 2.3.7 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System

....................................................................... C-237 2.3.07.01 ................................................................................................

......................

C-242 2.3.07.02a

................................

................................................................

....................

C-242 2.3.07.02b

................................

................................................................

....................

C-242 2.3.07.03 ................................

................................................................

......................

C-242 2.3.07.04 ................................

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......................

C-242 2.3.07.05.i

................................

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....................

C-242 2.3.07.05.ii

................................

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...................

C-242 2.3.07.05.iii

................................

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..................

C-243 2.3.07.06a

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....................

C-243 2.3.07.06b

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....................

C-243 2.3.07.07a

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....................

C-243 2.3.07.07b.i

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..................

C-243 2.3.07.07b.ii

................................

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.................

C-243 2.3.07.07b.i ii ................................

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................

C-243 2.3.07.07b.iv

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................

C-243 2.3.07.07b.v

................................................................................................

.................

C-244 2.3.07.07b.vi

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................

C-244 2.3.07.07c

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....................

C-244 2.3.07.08.i

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....................

C-244 2.3.07.08.ii

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...................

C-244 2.3.07.09 ................................

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......................

C-244 C-14 2.3.07.10 ................................

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......................

C-244 2.3.07.11 ................................

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......................

C-244 2.3.8 Service Water System

................................

.......................................................

C-247 2.3.08.01 ................................

................................................................

......................

C-248 2.3.08.02.i

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....................

C-248 2.3.08.02.ii

................................

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...................

C-249 2.3.08.02.iii

................................

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..................

C-249 2.3.08.03 ................................

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......................

C-249 2.3.08.04 ................................................................................................

......................

C-249 2.3.9 Containment Hydrogen Control System

................................

............................

C-251 2.3.09.01 ................................................................................................

......................

C-254 2.3.09.02a

................................

................................................................

....................

C-254 2.3.09.02b

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....................

C-255 2.3.09.03.i

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....................

C-255 2.3.09.03.ii

................................

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...................

C-255 C.2.3.09.03.iii

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...............

C-255 2.3.09.03.iv

................................

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..................

C-255 2.3.09.04a

................................

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....................

C-255 2.3.09.04b

................................

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....................

C-25 6 2.3.09.05 ................................

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......................

C-256 2.3.10 Liquid Radwaste System

................................

...................................................

C-257 2.3.10.01 ................................

................................................................

......................

C-260 2.3.10.02a

................................................................................................

....................

C-260 2.3.10.02b

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....................

C-260 2.3.10.03a

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....................

C-261 2.3.10.03b

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....................

C-261 2.3.10.04a

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....................

C-261 2.3.10.04b

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....................

C-261 2.3.10.05a.i

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..................

C-261 2.3.10.05a.ii

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.................

C-261 2.3.10.05a.iii

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................

C-261 2.3.10.05b

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....................

C-262 2.3.10.06a

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....................

C-262 2.3.10.06b

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....................

C-262 C-15 2.3.10.07a.i

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..................

C-262 2.3.10.07a.ii

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.................

C-262 2.3.10.07b

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....................

C-262 2.3.10.08 ................................

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......................

C-262 2.3.10.09 ................................

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......................

C-262 2.3.10.10 ................................

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......................

C-263 2.3.11 Gaseous Radwaste System

................................

..............................................

C-265 2.3.11.01 ................................

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......................

C-265 2.3.11.02.i

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....................

C-266 2.3.11.02.ii

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...................

C-266 2.3.11.02.iii

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..................

C-266 2.3.11.03a

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....................

C-266 2.3.11.03b

................................

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....................

C-266 2.3.11.03c

................................

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....................

C-266 2.3.12 Solid Radwaste System

................................

.....................................................

C-269 2.3.12.01 ................................................................................................

......................

C-269 2.3.12.02 ................................

................................................................

......................

C-269 2.3.13 Primary Sampling System

................................

.................................................

C-270 2.3.13.01 ................................

................................................................

......................

C-273 2.3.13.02 ................................

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......................

C-273 2.3.13.03 ................................

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......................

C-273 2.3.13.04 ................................

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......................

C-273 2.3.13.05.i

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....................

C-273 2.3.13.05.ii

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...................

C-273 2.3.13.05.iii

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..................

C-274 2.3.13.06a.i

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..................

C-274 2.3.13.06a.ii

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.................

C-274 2.3.13.06b

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....................

C-274 2.3.13.06c

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....................

C-274 2.3.13.07 ................................................................................................

......................

C-274 2.3.13.08 ................................................................................................

......................

C-275 2.3.13.09 ................................................................................................

......................

C-275 2.3.13.10a

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....................

C-275 2.3.13.10b

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....................

C-275 C-16 2.3.13.11a

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....................

C-275 2.3.13.11b

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....................

C-275 2.3.13.12 ................................

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......................

C-275 2.3.14 Demineralized Water Transfer and Storage System

................................

..........

C-277 2.3.14.01 ................................

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......................

C-278 2.3.14.02 ................................

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......................

C-278 2.3.14.03 ................................

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......................

C-278 2.3.14.04 ................................

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......................

C-278 2.3.15 Compressed and Instrument Air System

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...........................

C-279 2.3.15.01 ................................................................................................

......................

C-280 2.3.15.02 ................................................................................................

......................

C-280 2.3.15.03 ................................................................................................

......................

C-280 2.3.16 Potable Water System

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C-281 2.3.17 Waste Water System

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.........................................................

C-281 2.3.18 Plant Gas System

..............................................................................................

C-281 2.3.19 Communication System

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.....................................................

C-281 2.3.19.01a

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....................

C-282 2.3.19.01b

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....................

C-282 2.3.19.02a

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....................

C-282 2.3.19.02b

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....................

C-282 2.3.20 Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System

................................

................

C-283 2.3.21 Secondary Sampling System

.............................................................................

C-283 2.3.22 Containment Leak Rate Test System

................................

C-283 2.3.23 This section intentionally blank

................................

..........................................

C-283 2.3.24 Demineralized Water Treatment System

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...........................

C-283 2.3.25 Gravity and Roof Drain Collection System

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.........................

C-283 2.3.26 This section intentionally blank

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..........................................

C-283 2.3.27 Sanitary Drainage System

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.................................................

C-283 2.3.28 Turbine Island Vents, Drains, and Relief System

................................

...............

C-283 2.3.29 Radioactive Waste Drain System ................................

...................................... C-284 2.3.29.01 ................................

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......................

C-285 2.3.29.02 ................................

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......................

C-285 2.3.29.03 ................................

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C-285 2.3.29.04 ................................

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......................

C-285 C-17 2.3.30 Storm Drain System ..........................................................................................

C-287 2.3.31 Raw Water System

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............................................................

C-287 2.3.32 Yard Fire Water System

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....................................................

C-287 2.4 Steam and Power Conversion Systems

................................

.................................... C-288 2.4.1 Main and Startup Feedwater System

................................................................

. C-288 2.4.01.01 ................................

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......................

C-289 2.4.01.02 ................................

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......................

C-289 2.4.01.03 ................................

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......................

C-289 2.4.01.04 ................................................................................................

......................

C-289 2.4.2 Main Turbine System................................

.........................................................

C-291 2.4.02.01 ................................................................................................

......................

C-291 2.4.02.02a

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....................

C-291 2.4.02.02b

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....................

C-291 2.4.02.02c

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C-291 2.4.02.03.i

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C-291 2.4.02.03.ii

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...................

C-292 2.4.02.03.iii

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..................

C-292 2.4.3 Main Steam System

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..........................................................

C-293 2.4.4 Steam Generator Blowdown System

................................

. C-293 2.4.5 Condenser Air Removal System

................................

........................................ C-293 2.4.6 Condensate System

................................

..........................................................

C-294 2.4.06.01 ................................

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......................

C-294 2.4.06.02 ................................

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......................

C-294 2.4.7 Circulating Water System

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..................................................

C-296 2.4.8 Auxiliary Steam Supply System

................................

......................................... C-296 2.4.9 Condenser Tube Cleaning System

.................................................................... C-296 2.4.10 Turbine Island Chemical Feed System

................................

..............................

C-296 2.4.11 Condensate Polishing System

...........................................................................

C-296 2.4.12 Gland Seal System

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............................................................

C-296 2.4.13 Generator Hydrogen and CO2 System

................................

..............................

C-296 2.4.14 Heater Drain System

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C-296 2.4.15 Hydrogen Seal Oil System

................................

................................................

C-296 2.4.16 Main Turbine and Generator Lube Oil System

...................................................

C-296 C-18 2.5 Instrumentation and Control Systems

................................

....................................... C-297 2.5.1 Diverse Actuation System

.................................................................................

C-297 2.5.01.01 ................................

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......................

C-300 2.5.01.02a

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....................

C-300 2.5.01.02b

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....................

C-300 2.5.01.02c.i

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..................

C-300 2.5.01.02c.ii

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.................

C-300 2.5.01.02d

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....................

C-300 2.5.01.03a

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C-301 2.5.01.03b

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C-301 2.5.01.03c

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C-301 2.5.01.03d

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C-301 2.5.01.03e

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C-301 2.5.01.03f

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C-301 2.5.01.03g

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C-302 2.5.01.03h

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C-302 2.5.01.04 ................................

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C-302 2.5.01.05 ................................

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......................

C-302 2.5.2 Protection and Safety Monitoring System

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..........................

C-304 2.5.02.01 ................................

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......................

C-311 2.5.02.02.i

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C-312 2.5.02.02.ii

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...................

C-312 2.5.02.02.iii

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C-312 2.5.02.03 ................................

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C-312 2.5.02.04 ................................

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C-312 2.5.02.05a

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C-313 2.5.02.05b

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C-313 2.5.02.06a.i

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C-313 2.5.02.06a.ii

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C-313 2.5.02.06b

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C-313 2.5.02.06c.i

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C-313 2.5.02.06c.ii

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C-314 2.5.02.07a

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C-314 2.5.02.07b

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C-314 C-19 2.5.02.07c

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C-314 2.5.02.07d

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C-314 2.5.02.07e

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C-314 2.5.02.08a.i

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C-314 2.5.02.08a.i i ................................

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C-315 2.5.02.08a.iii

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C-315 2.5.02.08b.i

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C-315 2.5.02.08b.ii

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C-315 2.5.02.08c

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C-315 2.5.02.09a

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C-316 2.5.02.09b

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C-316 2.5.02.09c

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C-316 2.5.02.09d

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C-316 2.5.02.10 ................................................................................................

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C-316 2.5.02.11 ................................................................................................

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C-317 2.5.02.12 ................................................................................................

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C-318 2.5.02.13 ................................

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C-319 2.5.02.14 ................................

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C-319 2.5.3 Plant Control System

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.........................................................

C-322 2.5.03.01 ................................

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......................

C-322 2.5.03.02 ................................

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......................

C-3 22 2.5.4 Data Display and Processing System

................................

C-323 2.5.04.01 ................................

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......................

C-326 2.5.04.02.i

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....................

C-326 2.5.04.02.ii

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...................

C-326 2.5.04.02.iii

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C-326 2.5.04.03 ................................

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C-326 C.2.5.04.04a

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C-327 C.2.5.04.04b

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C-327 C.2.5.04.04c

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................

C-327 2.5.5 In-Core Instrumentation System

........................................................................ C-328 2.5.05.01 ................................................................................................

......................

C-329 2.5.05.02.i

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....................

C-329 2.5.05.02.ii

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...................

C-329 C-20 2.5.05.02.iii

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..................

C-329 2.5.05.03a.i

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C-329 2.5.05.03a.i i ................................

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.................

C-330 2.5.05.03b

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....................

C-330 2.5.05.03c

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....................

C-330 2.5.05.04 ................................

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......................

C-330 2.5.6 Special Monitoring System

................................

................................................

C-331 2.5.06.01 ................................

................................................................

......................

C-331 2.5.06.02 ................................................................................................

......................

C-331 2.5.7 Operation and Control Centers System

................................

.............................

C-332 2.5.8 Radiation Monitoring System

................................

.............................................

C-332 2.5.9 Seismic Monitoring System

................................

...............................................

C-332 2.5.09.01 ................................................................................................

......................

C-332 2.5.09.02 ................................................................................................

......................

C-333 2.5.09.03 ................................................................................................

......................

C-333 2.5.10 Main Turbine Control and Diagnostic System

................................

....................

C-334 2.5.11 Meteorological and Environmental Monitoring System

................................

...... C-334 2.5.12 Closed Circuit TV System

................................

..................................................

C-334 2.6 Electrical Power Systems

................................

.........................................................

C-335 2.6.1 Main ac Power System

......................................................................................

C-335 2.6.01.01 ................................

................................................................

......................

C-340 2.6.01.02.i

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....................

C-340 2.6.01.02.ii

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...................

C-340 2.6.01.02.iii

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..................

C-340 2.6.01.03a

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....................

C-340 2.6.01.03b

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....................

C-340 2.6.01.04a

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C-340 2.6.01.04b

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....................

C-340 2.6.01.04c

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....................

C-341 2.6.01.04d

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....................

C-341 2.6.01.04e

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....................

C-341 2.6.01.04f

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.....................

C-341 2.6.01.05 ................................

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......................

C-341 2.6.01.06 ................................

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......................

C-341 C-21 2.6.2 Non-Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System

.............................

C-347 2.6.02.01 ................................

................................................................

......................

C-347 2.6.02.02a

................................................................................................

....................

C-347 2.6.02.02b

................................................................................................

....................

C-347 2.6.02.02c

................................................................................................

....................

C-348 2.6.3 Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System

................................

..... C-351 2.6.03.01 ................................

................................................................

......................

C-356 2.6.03.02.i

................................

................................................................

....................

C-356 2.6.03.02.ii

................................................................................................

...................

C-356 2.6.03.02.iii

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................................................................

..................

C-357 2.6.03.03 ................................................................................................

......................

C-357 2.6.03.04a

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C-357 2.6.03.04b

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C-357 2.6.03.04c

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C-357 2.6.03.04d

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C-358 2.6.03.04e

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C-358 2.6.03.04f

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C-358 2.6.03.04g

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C-358 2.6.03.04h

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C-359 2.6.03.04i

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C-359 2.6.03.05a

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C-359 2.6.03.05b

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C-359 2.6.03.05c

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C-359 2.6.03.05d.i

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C-359 2.6.03.05d.ii

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C-359 2.6.03.06 ................................

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C-360 2.6.03.07 ................................

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C-360 2.6.03.08 ................................

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C-360 2.6.03.09 ................................

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C-360 2.6.03.10 ................................

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C-361 2.6.03.11 ................................

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C-361 2.6.4 Onsite Standby Power System

................................

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C-368 2.6.04.01 ................................

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C-369 2.6.04.02a

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C-369 C-22 2.6.04.02b

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C-369 2.6.04.02c

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C-369 2.6.04.03 ................................

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C-369 2.6.04.04 ................................

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C-36 9 2.6.5 Lighting System

................................................................................................

. C-371 2.6.05.01 ................................

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C-372 2.6.05.02.i

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C-372 2.6.05.02.ii

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C-372 2.6.05.03.i

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C-372 2.6.05.03.ii

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C-372 2.6.05.04 ................................................................................................

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C-372 2.6.05.05.i

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C-373 2.6.05.05.ii

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C-373 2.6.05.06.i

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C-373 2.6.05.06.ii

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C-373 2.6.6 Grounding and Lightning Protection System

................................

......................

C-374 2.6.06.01.i

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C-375 2.6.06.01.ii

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C-375 2.6.06.01.iii

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C-376 2.6.06.01.iv

................................

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C-376 2.6.7 Special Process Heat Tracing System

................................

...............................

C-377 2.6.8 Cathodic Protection System

..............................................................................

C-377 2.6.9 Plant Security System

................................

.......................................................

C-377 2.6.09.01 ................................

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C-378 2.6.09.03 ................................

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C-379 2.6.09.04 ................................

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C-379 2.6.09.05a

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C-379 2.6.09.05b

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C-379 2.6.09.05c

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C-379 2.6.09.06 ................................

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C-380 2.6.09.07a

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C-380 2.6.09.07b

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C-380 2.6.09.08 ................................

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C-380 2.6.09.09 ................................

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C-380 C-23 2.6.09.13a

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C-380 2.6.09.13b

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C-380 2.6.09.13c

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C-381 2.6.09.15a

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C-381 2.6.09.15b

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C-381 2.6.09.16 ................................

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C-381 C.2.6.9 Physical Security

................................

...........................................................

C-382 C.2.6.09.01

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C-382 C.2.6.09.02

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C-382 C.2.6.09.03a

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C-382 C.2.6.09.03b

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C-382 C.2.6.09.04a

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C-383 C.2.6.09.04b

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C-383 C.2.6.09.05a

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C-383 C.2.6.09.05b

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C-383 C.2.6.09.06

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C-383 C.2.6.09.07

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C-383 C.2.6.09.08a

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C-384 C.2.6.09.08b

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C-384 C.2.6.09.09

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C-384 2.6.10 Main Generation System

................................

...................................................

C-385 2.6.11 Excitation and Voltage Regulation System

................................

........................

C-385 C.2.6.12 Transmission Switchyard and Offsite Power System

................................

..... C-385 C.2.6.12.01

................................................................................................

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C-385 C.2.6.12.02

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C-385 C.2.6.12.03

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C-385 C.2.6.12.04

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C-385 C.2.6.12.05

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C-386 C.2.6.12.06

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C-386 C.2.6.12.07.i

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C-387 C.2.6.12.07.ii

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C-388 2.6.13 Offsite Retail Power System

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.................................................

C-388 2.7 HVAC Systems

................................................................................................

......... C-389 2.7.1 Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System

................................

.............

C-389 C-24 2.7.01.01 ................................

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......................

C-394 2.7.01.02a

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C-394 2.7.01.02b

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C-394 2.7.01.03a

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C-394 2.7.01.03b

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C-395 2.7.01.04a

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C-395 2.7.01.04b

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C-395 2.7.01.05.i

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C-395 2.7.01.05.ii

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C-395 2.7.01.05.ii i ................................

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C-395 2.7.01.06a

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C-395 2.7.01.06b

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C-396 2.7.01.07 ................................................................................................

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C-396 2.7.01.08a

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C-396 2.7.01.08b

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C-396 2.7.01.08c

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C-396 2.7.01.08d

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C-396 2.7.01.09 ................................

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C-396 2.7.01.10a

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C-396 2.7.01.10b

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C-396 2.7.01.11 ................................

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C-396 2.7.01.12 ................................

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C-397 2.7.01.13 ................................

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C-397 2.7.01.14 ................................

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C-397 2.7.2 Central Chilled Water System

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C-401 2.7.02.01 ................................

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C-403 2.7.02.02 ................................

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C-403 2.7.02.03a

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C-403 2.7.02.03b

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C-403 2.7.02.04 ................................

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C-403 2.7.02.05 ................................

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C-403 2.7.3 Annex/Auxiliary Building Nonradioactive Ventilation System

.............................

C-407 2.7.03.01 ................................

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C-408 2.7.03.02a

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C-408 C-25 2.7.03.02b

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C-408 2.7.03.03 ................................

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C-408 2.7.03.04 ................................

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C-408 2.7.4 Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System

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C-412 2.7.04.01 ................................

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C-413 2.7.04.02a

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C-413 2.7.04.02b

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C-413 2.7.04.02c

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C-413 2.7.04.03 ................................................................................................

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C-413 2.7.04.04 ................................................................................................

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C-413 2.7.5 Radiologically Controlled Area Ventilation System

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C-417 2.7.05.01 ................................................................................................

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C-418 2.7.05.02.i

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C-418 2.7.05.02.ii

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C-418 2.7.05.02.iii

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C-418 2.7.05.03 ................................................................................................

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C-418 2.7.6 Containment Air Filtration System

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..................................... C-420 2.7.06.01 ................................

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C-421 2.7.06.02.i

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C-421 2.7.06.02.ii

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C-421 2.7.06.03.i

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C-421 2.7.06.03.ii

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C-421 2.7.06.03.iii

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C-421 2.7.06.04 ................................

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C-421 2.7.06.05 ................................

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C-421 2.7.7 Containment Recirculation Cooling System

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C-424 2.7.07.01 ................................

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C-424 2.7.07.02 ................................

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C-424 2.7.8 Radwaste Building HVAC System

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..................................... C-425 2.7.9 Turbine Island Building Ventilation System

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C-425 2.7.10 Health Physics and Hot Machine Shop HVAC System

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...... C-425 2.7.11 Hot Water Heating System

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C-425 3.0 Non-System Based Design Descriptions and ITAAC

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C-426 3.1 Emergency Response Facilities

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C-426 C-26 3.1.00.01 ................................

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C-426 3.1.00.02 ................................

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C-426 3.1.00.03 ................................

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C-426 3.1.00.04 ................................

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C-426 3.1.00.05 ................................

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C-427 3.1.00.06 ................................

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C-427 3.2 Human Factors Engineering

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C-427 3.2.00.01a

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C-429 3.2.00.01b

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C-429 3.2.00.01c.i

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C-429 3.2.00.01c.ii

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C-430 3.2.00.01d

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C-430 3.2.00.01e

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C-430 3.2.00.02 ................................................................................................

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C-431 3.2.00.03.i

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C-431 3.2.00.03.ii

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C-431 3.2.00.03.iii

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C-431 3.2.00.03.iv

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C-431 3.2.00.03.v

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C-431 3.2.00.04 ................................

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C-431 3.2.00.05 ................................

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C-431 3.2.00.06.i

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C-431 3.2.00.06.ii

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C-431 3.2.00.06.iii

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C-432 3.2.00.07 ................................

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C-432 3.2.00.08 ................................

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C-432 3.2.00.09 ................................

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C-432 3.3 Buildings ................................................................................................

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C-434 3.3.00.01 ................................

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C-449 3.3.00.02a.i.a

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C-449 3.3.00.02a.i.b

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C-449 3.3.00.02a.i.c

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C-450 3.3.00.02a.i.d

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C-450 3.3.00.02a.ii.a ................................

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C-450 C-27 3.3.00.02a.ii.b

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C-450 3.3.00.02a.ii.c

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C-451 3.3.00.02a.ii.d

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C-451 3.3.00.02a.ii.e

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C-451 3.3.00.02a.ii.f

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C-4 51 3.3.00.02b

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C-451 3.3.00.02c

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C-451 3.3.00.02d

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C-452 3.3.00.02e

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C-452 3.3.00.02f

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C-452 3.3.00.02g

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C-452 3.3.00.02h

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C-452 3.3.00.03a

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C-453 3.3.00.03b

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C-453 3.3.00.03c

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C-453 3.3.00.03d

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C-453 3.3.00.04a

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C-454 3.3.00.04b

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C-454 3.3.00.04c

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C-454 3.3.00.05a

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C-454 3.3.00.05b

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C-454 3.3.00.05c

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C-455 3.3.00.06a

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C-455 3.3.00.06b

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C-455 3.3.00.07aa

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C-455 3.3.00.07ab

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C-455 3.3.00.07ac

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C-456 3.3.00.07ba

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C-456 3.3.00.07bb

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C-456 3.3.00.07bc

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C-456 3.3.00.07c.i.a

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C-457 3.3.00.07c.i.b

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C-457 3.3.00.07c.ii.a

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C-457 3.3.00.07c.ii.b ................................

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C-457 C-283.3.00.07d.i

.................................................................................................................. C-457 3.3.00.07d.ii.a

.............................................................................................................. C-458 3.3.00.07d.ii.b

.............................................................................................................. C-459 3.3.00.07d.ii.c .............................................................................................................. C-460 3.3.00.07d.iii.a

............................................................................................................. C-461 3.3.00.07d.iii.b

............................................................................................................. C-461 3.3.00.07d.iii.c

.............................................................................................................. C-461 3.3.00.07d.iv.a

............................................................................................................. C-462 3.3.00.07d.iv.b

............................................................................................................. C-462 3.3.00.07d.iv.c

............................................................................................................. C-463 3.3.00.07d.v.a

.............................................................................................................. C-463 3.3.00.07d.v.b

.............................................................................................................. C-464 3.3.00.07d.v.c

.............................................................................................................. C-464 3.3.00.07e

.................................................................................................................... C-464 3.3.00.08 ...................................................................................................................... C-465 3.3.00.09 ...................................................................................................................... C-465 3.3.00.10.i

.................................................................................................................... C-465 3.3.00.10.ii

................................................................................................................... C-465 3.3.00.10.iii .................................................................................................................. C-466 3.3.00.12 ...................................................................................................................... C-466 3.3.00.13 ...................................................................................................................... C-466 3.3.00.14 ...................................................................................................................... C-466 3.3.00.16 ...................................................................................................................... C-467 3.3.00.17 ...................................................................................................................... C-467 3.4 Initial Test Program

.................................................................................................. C-469 3.5 Radiation Monitoring................................................................................................. C-469 3.5.00.01.i .................................................................................................................... C-473 3.5.00.01.ii

................................................................................................................... C-473 3.5.00.01.iii

.................................................................................................................. C-473 3.5.00.02.i

.................................................................................................................... C-473 3.5.00.02.ii

................................................................................................................... C-473 3.5.00.03 ...................................................................................................................... C-473 3.5.00.04 ...................................................................................................................... C-474 3.5.00.05 ...................................................................................................................... C-474 C-293.5.00.06 ...................................................................................................................... C-474 3.5.00.07 ...................................................................................................................... C-474 3.5.00.08 ...................................................................................................................... C-474 3.6 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak Detection

................................................ C-476 3.6.00.01.i

.................................................................................................................... C-476 3.6.00.01.ii

................................................................................................................... C-476 3.6.00.01.iii

.................................................................................................................. C-477 3.6.00.01.iv

.................................................................................................................. C-477 3.6.00.01.v

................................................................................................................... C-477 3.6.00.01.vi

.................................................................................................................. C-477 3.6.00.01.vii

................................................................................................................. C-477 3.7 Design Reliability Assurance Program

...................................................................... C-478 3.7.00.01 ...................................................................................................................... C-484 C.3.8 Emergency Planning ITAAC

................................................................................. C-485 C.3.8.1.1 Emergency Classification System

....................................................... C-485 C.3.8.01.01.01

............................................................................................................. C-485 C.3.8.01.01.02

............................................................................................................. C-485 C.3.8.1.2 Notification Methods and Procedures

................................................. C-486 C.3.8.01.02.01

............................................................................................................. C-486 C.3.8.01.02.02 ............................................................................................................. C-486 C.3.8.01.02.03

............................................................................................................. C-486 C.3.8.1.3 Emergency Communications

............................................................... C-48 7 C.3.8.01.03.01

............................................................................................................. C-487 C.3.8.01.03.02

............................................................................................................. C-487 C.3.8.1.4 Public Education and Information

....................................................... C-488 C.3.8.01.04.01

............................................................................................................. C-488 C.3.8.1.5 Emergency Facilities and Equipment

.................................................. C-488 C.3.8.01.05.01.01

........................................................................................................ C-488 C.3.8.01.05.01.02

........................................................................................................ C-488 C.3.8.01.05.01.03

........................................................................................................ C-488 C.3.8.01.05.01.04

........................................................................................................ C-489 C.3.8.01.05.01.05

........................................................................................................ C-489 C.3.8.01.05.01.06

........................................................................................................ C-489 C.3.8.01.05.01.07

........................................................................................................ C-489 C-30C.3.8.01.05.01.08

........................................................................................................ C-489 C.3.8.01.05.02.01

........................................................................................................ C-490 C.3.8.01.05.02.02

........................................................................................................ C-490 C.3.8.01.05.02.03

........................................................................................................ C-490 C.3.8.1.6Accident Assessment

......................................................................... C-490 C.3.8.01.06.01

............................................................................................................. C-490 C.3.8.01.06.02

............................................................................................................. C-491 C.3.8.01.06.03 ............................................................................................................. C-491 C.3.8.01.06.04

............................................................................................................. C-491 C.3.8.01.06.05

............................................................................................................. C-491 C.3.8.01.06.06

............................................................................................................. C-491 C.3.8.01.06.07 ............................................................................................................. C-491 C.3.8.01.06.08

............................................................................................................. C-492 C.3.8.01.06.09

............................................................................................................. C-492 C.3.8.1.7 Protective Response

............................................................................ C-493 C.3.8.01.07.01

............................................................................................................. C-493 C.3.8.1.8Exercises and Drills

............................................................................ C-494 C.3.8.01.08.01.01

........................................................................................................ C-494 C.3.8.01.08.01.02

........................................................................................................ C-501 C.3.8.01.08.01.03

........................................................................................................ C-502 C.3.8.1.9 Implementing Procedures

.................................................................... C-502 C.3.8.01.09.01

............................................................................................................. C-502 C.3.8.2 Pipe Rupture Hazard Analysis

.......................................................................

C-5 C.3.8.02.01 ..................................................................................................................

C-5 C.3.8.3 Piping De sign................................................................................................. C-5 C.3.8.03.01 ..................................................................................................................

C-5 C.3.8.4 Waterproof M embrane ...................................................................................

C-5 C.3.8.04.01 ..................................................................................................................

C-5 C.3.8.5 Concrete Fi ll ..................................................................................................

C-5 C.3.8.05.01 ..................................................................................................................

C-5 C.3.8.05.02a

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C-5 C.3.8.05.02b

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C-5 C.3.8.6 Seismic Ca tegory I S tructure Foundat i on Grouting ........................................

C-5 C.3.8.06.01.i

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C-5 C-31 C.3.8.06.01.ii................................................................................................................

C-5 Attachment 1 .......................................................................................................................

C-5 C-32 1.0 Introduction

1.1 Definitions

The following definitions apply to terms used in the design descriptions and associated inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC).

Acceptance Criteria means the performance, physical condition, or analysis result for a structure, system, or component that demonstrates that the design or program commitment is met. Analysis means a calculation, mathematical computation, or engineering or technical evaluation. Engineering or technical evaluations could include, but are not limited to, comparisons with operating experience or design of similar structures, systems, or components.

As-built means the physical properties of a structure, system, or component following the completion of its installation or construction activities at its final location at the plant site. In cases where it is technically justifiable, determination of physical properties of the as

-built structure, system, or component may be based on measurements, inspections, or tests that occur prior to installation, provided that subsequent fabrication, handling, installation, and testing does not alter the properties.

Column Line is the designation applied to a plant reference grid used to define the location of building walls and columns. Column lines may not represent the center line of walls and columns. Design Commitment means that portion of the design description that is verified by ITAAC.

Design Description means that portion of the design that is certified.

Design Plant Grade means the elevation of the soil around the nuclear island assumed in the design of the AP1000, i.e., floor elevation 100'

-0". Division (for electrical systems or electrical equipment) is the designation applied to a given safety-related system or set of components that is physically, electrically, and functionally independent from other redundant sets of components.

Floor Elevation is the designation applied to name a floor. The actual elevation may vary due to floor slope and layout requirements.

Functional Arrangement (for a system) means the physical arrangement of systems and components to provide the service for which the system is intended, and which is described in the system design description.

Inspect or Inspection means visual observations, physical examinations, or reviews of records based on visual observation or physical examination that compare a) the structure, system, or component condition to one or more design commitments or b) the program implementation C-33elements to one or more program commitments, as applicable. Examples include walkdowns, configuration checks, measurements of dimensions, or nondestructive examinations.

Inspect for Retrievability of a display means to visually observe that the specified information appears on a monitor when summoned by the operator.

ITAAC Number is a unique number based on three character strings. The first string represents the source of the ITAAC where a C or E denotes the ITAAC source is from the combined license or early site permit respectively. No alpha character denotes the ITAAC source is from the design control document (DCD). The second string represents the chapter, section, and subsection where the ITAAC table is located within the source document and contains three or more numbers separated by decimals. If the source document is not numbered, the string is based on the ITAAC table number within this appendix. The third string identifies the location of the ITAAC within the table and will vary in length and composition based on the source table numbering convention.

L a is the maximum allowable containment leakage as defined in 10 CFR 50 Appendix J.

Physical Arrangement (for a structure) means the arrangement of the building features (e.g., floors, ceilings, walls, and basemat) and of the structures, systems, and components within, which are described in the building design description.

Program Commitment means that portion of the program description that is verified by ITAAC. The bracketed, alphanumerical designations included in the emergency planning ITAAC identify the evaluation criteria (i.e., program elements) from NUREG

-0654/FEMA-REP-1 Planning Standards that were used to develop the specific generic ITAAC in NUREG

-0800, Table 14.3.10-1. Qualified for Harsh Environment means that equipment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of its safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function. These environmental conditions include applicable time

-dependent temperature and pressure profiles, humidity, chemical effects, radiation, aging, submergence, and their synergistic effects which have a significant effect on the equipment performance. Equipment identified in the Design Description as being Qualified for Harsh Environment includes the:

a)equipment itself b)sensors, switches and lubricants that are an integral part of the equipment c)electr ical components connected to the equipment (wiring, cabling and terminations)Items b and c are Qualified for Harsh Environment only when they are necessary to support operation of the equipment to meet its safety

-related function listed in the Design Description table and to the extent such equipment is located in a harsh environment during or following a design basis accident.

Sensor means a transmitter, resistance temperature detector, thermocouple or other transducer, plus associated cables, connectors, preamplifiers, reference junction boxes, or other signal C-34 processing equipment that is located in the immediate proximity of the sensor and subject to the same environmental conditions.

Site Grade means the as

-built elevation of the soil to the west side of the nuclear island. Adjacent buildings are located on the other sides of the nuclear island.

Tag Number in the ITAACs represents the complete tag number or a portion of the tag number used to identify the actual hardware (or associated software). For instrumentation, the tag number identified in the ITAACs does not include the type of instrument (for example, the Containment Exhaust Fan A Flow Sensor, VFS

-11A, does not include the designators FE [flow element] or FT [flow transmitter], which would appear on the actual hardware or in the associated software). This is because the designator VFS

-11A and the equipment description are sufficient to uniquely identify the channel associated with the designated instrument function, and this method of identification eliminates the need to list every portion of the instrumentation channel required to perform the function. In most cases, the channel number includes physical hardware. There are, however, a few places where the channel number represents only a calculation in software. In those cases, the channel data can be displayed. In many instances, the word "sensor" is used in the equipment description to identify that the item is an instrument.

Test means the actuation, operation, or establishment of specified conditions to evaluate the performance or integrity of as

-built structures, systems, or components, unless explicitly stated otherwise.

Transfer Open (Closed) means to move from a closed (open) position to an open (closed) position. Type Test means a test on one or more sample components of the same type and manufacturer to qualify other components of the same type and manufacturer. A type test is not necessarily a test of the as

-built structures, systems, or components.

UA of a heat exchanger means the product of the heat transfer coefficient and the surface area.

C-351.2 General Provisions The following general provisions are applicable to the design descriptions and associated ITAAC. Treatment of Individual Items The absence of any discussion or depiction of an item in the design description or accompanying figures shall not be construed as prohibiting a licensee from utilizing such an item, unless it would prevent an item from performing its safety functions as discussed or depicted in the design description or accompanying figures.

If an inspections, tests, or analyses (ITA) requirement does not specify the temperature or other conditions under which a test must be run, then the test conditions are not constrained.

When the term "operate," "operates," or "operation" is used with respect to an item discussed in the acceptance criteria, it refers to the actuation and running of the item. When the term "exist,"

"exists," or "existence" is used with respect to an item discussed in the acceptance criteria, it means that the item is present and meets the design commitment.

Implementation of ITAAC The ITAAC are provided in tables with the following three

-column format:

Design (or Program)

Inspections, Acceptance Commitment Tests, Analyses Criteria Each design or program commitment in the left

-hand column of the ITAAC tables has an associated ITA requirement specified in the middle column of the tables.

The identification of a separate ITA entry for each design or program commitment shall not be construed to require that separate inspections, tests, or analyses must be performed for each design or program commitment. Instead, the activities associated with more than one ITA entry may be combined, and a single inspection, test, or analysis may be sufficient to implement mor e than one ITA entry.

An ITA may be performed by the licensee of the plant or by its authorized vendors, contractors, or consultants. Furthermore, an ITA may be performed by more than a single individual or group, may be implemented through discrete activities separated by time, and may be performed at any time prior to fuel load (including before issuance of the combined license for those ITAACs that do not necessarily pertain to as

-installed equipment). Additionally, an ITA may be performed as part of the activities that are required to be performed under 10 CFR Part 50 (including, for example, the quality assurance (QA) program required under Appendix B to Part 50); therefore, an ITA need not be performed as a separate or discrete activity.

C-36 Many of the acceptance criteria include the words "A report exists and concludes that-" When these words are used, it indicates that the ITAAC for that design commitment will be met when it is confirmed that appropriate documentation exists and the documentation shows that the design commitment is met. Appropriate documentation can be a single document or a collection of documents that show that the stated acceptance criteria are met. Examples of appropriate documentation include design reports, test reports, inspection reports, analysis reports, evaluation reports, design and manufacturing procedures, certified data sheets, commercial dedication procedures and records, quality assurance records, calculation notes, and equipment qualification data packages. For plants at sites which are qualified using the hard rock high frequency (HRHF) ground motion response spectra (GMRS), high frequency seismic screening and qualification testing required as a result of the evaluation of potential high frequency sensitive components is included in the equipment qualification data packages.

Many entries in the ITA column of the ITAAC tables include the words "Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying-" When these words are used it indicates that the ITA is tests, type tests, analyses, or a combination of tests, type tests, and analyses and a report will be produced documenting the results.

This report will be available to inspectors.

Many ITAAC are only a reference to another ITAAC location, either a section, subsection, or ITAAC table entry (for example, "See ITAAC Table -"). A reference to another ITAAC location is always in both the ITA and acceptance criteria columns for a design commitment. This reference is an indication that the ITA and acceptance criteria for that design commitment are satisfied when the referenced ITA are completed and the acceptance criteria for the referenced sections, subsections, or table entries are satisfied. If a complete section is referenced, this indicates that all the ITA and acceptance criteria in that section must be met before the referencing design commitment is satisfied.

Discussion of Matters Related to Operations In some cases, the design descriptions in this document refer to matters that relate to operation, such as normal valve or breaker alignment during normal operation modes. Such discussions are provided solely to place the design description provisions in context (for example, to explain automatic features for opening or closing valves or breakers upon off-normal conditions). Such discussions shall not be construed as requiring operators during operation to take any particular action (for example, to maintain valves or breakers in a particular position during normal operation).

Interpretation of Figures In many but not all cases, the design descriptions in Section 2 include one or more figures. The figures may represent a functional diagram, general structural representation, or another general illustration. For instrumentation and control (I&C) systems, figures may also represent aspects of the relevant logic of the system or part of the system. Unless specified explicitly, the figures are not indicative of the scale, location, dimensions, shape, or spatial relationships of as

-built structures, systems, and components. In particular, the as

-built attributes of structures, C-37 systems, and components may vary from the attributes depicted on the figures, provided that those safety functions discussed in the design description pertaining to the figure are not adversely affected.

C-38 1.3 Figure Legend The conventions used in this section are for figures described in the design description. The figure legend is provided for information.

C-39 C-40 C-41 MISCELLANEOUS A component that is part of the system functional arrangement shown on the figure and is included in the design commitments for the system.

A component that is part of the system functional arrangement shown on the figure.

A system or component of another system that is not part of the system functional arrangement shown on the figure.

A functional connection to another system that is not part of the system functional arrangement shown on the figure.

ASME CODE CLASS BREAK An ASME Code class break is identified by a single line to the designated location for the class break, as shown in the example below (see note 1).

NOTES: 1. The header, "ASME Code Section III Class," must appear at least once on each figure on which ASME class breaks are shown, but need not appear at every class break shown on a figure.

Indicates Non

-ASME Code Section III

C-42 1.4 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations The acronyms presented in this section are provided for information.

ac Alternating Current AC Acceptance Criteria ADS Automatic Depressurization System A HU Air Handling Units ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable ANS Alert and Notification System ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers atm Atmosphere BTU British Thermal Unit CAS Compressed and Instrument Air System CAV Cumulative Absolute Velocity cc Cubic Centimeter CCS Component Cooling Water System CDE Committed Dose Equivalent CDS Condensate System cfm Cubic Feet per Minute CFR Code of Federal Regulations Ci Curie CIM Component Interface Module CMT Core Makeup Tank CNS Containment System COL Combined Operating License/Combined License cpm Counts Per Minute CR Control Room CRDM Control Rod Drive Mechanism CSA Control Support Area CST Condensate Storage Tank CVS Chemical and Volume Control System CWS Circulating Water System DAS Diverse Actuation System DB T Design Basis Threat dc Direct Current DC D Design Control Document DDS Data Display and Processing System

C-43 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations (cont.)

DOS Standby Diesel Fuel Oil System D-RAP Design Reliability Assurance Program DTS Demineralized Water Treatment System DVI Direct Vessel Injection DWS Demineralized Water Transfer and Storage System EAL Emergency Action Level EBF Eccentrically Braced Framing ECS Main ac Power System EDS Non-Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System EFS Communication System EGS Grounding and Lightning Protection System EIP Emergency Implementing Procedure El. Elevation ELS Plant Lighting System EMI Electromagnetic Interference EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EP A Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ER DS Emergency Response Data System ERO Emergency Response Organization ESD Electrostatic Discharge F Fahrenheit FE Flow Element FHM Fuel Handling Machine FHS Fuel Handling and Refueling System FPS Fire Protection System ft Feet FT Flow Transmitter FTS Fuel Transfer System FWS Main and Startup Feedwater System GRMS Ground Motion Response Spectra gpm Gallons per Minute GRCA Grey Rod Cluster Assemblies GS U Generator Stepup Transformer

C-44 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations (cont.)

HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air HFE Human Factors Engineering HL Hot Leg hr Hour HRHF Hard Rock High frequency HSI Human-System Interface HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning HX Heat Exchanger Hz Hertz I&C Instrumentation and Control IDS Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System IIS In-core Instrumentation System in Inches I&C Instrumentation and Control IRC Inside Reactor Containment IRWST In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank ITA Inspections, Tests, Analyses ITAAC Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria JIC Joint Information Center KI Potassium Iodide kW Kilowatt lb/hr Pounds per Hour LBB Leak Before Break LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LTOP Low Temperature Overpressure Protection m Meters MBtu Million British Thermal Units MCC Motor Control Center MCR Main Control Room MHS Mechanical Handling System MOV Motor-operated Valve MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve MSS Main Steam System MTS Main Turbine System MW Megawatt MWe Megawatt Electric

C-45 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations (cont.)

MWt Megawatt Thermal NI Nuclear Island NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S.

OCS Operation and Control Centers System ORC Outside Reactor Containment OSC Operations Support Center PAG Protective Action Guide PAR Protective Action Recommendation PCCAWST Passive Containment Cooling Ancillary Water Storage Tank PCCWST Passive Containment Cooling Water Storage Tank PCS Passive Containment Cooling System PGS Plant Gas System pH Potential of Hydrogen PLS Plant Control System PMS Protection and Safety Monitoring System PORV Power-operated Relief Valve PRHR Passive Residual Heat Removal psia Pounds per Square Inch Absolute psig Pounds per Square Inch Gauge PSS Primary Sampling System pu Per Unit PWS Potable Water System PXS Passive Core Cooling System QA Quality Assurance R/hr Roentgen per Hour RAP Reliability Assurance Program RAT Reserve Auxiliary Transformer RC Reinforced Concrete RCCA Rod Cluster Control Assembly RCDT Reactor Coolant Drain Tank RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System RFI Radio Frequency Interference RM Refueling Machine RMS Radiation Monitoring System

C-46 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations (cont.)

RNS Normal Residual Heat Removal System RP Radiation Protection RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel RSR Remote Shutdown Room RSW Remote Shutdown Workstation RTD Resistance Temperature Detector RXS Reactor System RV Reactor Vessel SC Steel and Concrete scf Standard Cubic Feet scfm Standard Cubic Feet per Minute SDS Sanitary Drainage System SFHT Spent Fuel Handling Tool SFP Spent Fuel Pool SFS Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System SG Steam Generator SGS Steam Generator System SJS Seismic Monitoring System SMS Special Monitoring System SSCs Structures, Systems, and Components SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake SWC Surge Withstand Capability SWS Service Water System TEDE Total Effective Dose Equivalent TSC Technical Support Center UAT Unit Auxiliary Transformer UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply V Volt VAS Radiologically Controlled Area Ventilation System VBS Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System VCS Containment Recirculation Cooling System Vdc Direct Current Voltage VES Main Control Room Emergency Habitability System VFS Containment Air Filtration System VHS Health Physics and Hot Machine Shop Areas VLS Containment Hydrogen Control System

C-47 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations (cont.)

VRS Radwaste Building HVAC System VWS Central Chilled Water System VXS Annex/Auxiliary Building Nonradioactive Ventilation System VZS Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System wg Water Gauge WGS Gaseous Radwaste System WLS Liquid Radwaste System WSS Solid Radwaste System WWS Waste Water System WRS Radioactive Waste Drain System ZOI Zone of Influence ZOS Onsite Standby Power System

C-48 2.0 System Based Design Descriptions and ITAAC

2.1 Reactor

2.1.1 Fuel Handling and Refueling System Design Description The fuel handling and refueling system (FHS) transfers fuel assemblies and core components during fueling operations and stores new and spent fuel assemblies in the new and spent fuel storage racks. The refueling machine (RM) and the fuel transfer tube are operated during refueling mode. The fuel handling machine (FHM) is operated during normal modes of plant operation, including startup, power operation, cooldown, shutdown and refueling.

The component locations of the FHS are as shown in Table 2.1.1

-2. 1. The functional arrangement of the FHS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.1.1. 2. The FHS has the RM, the FHM, and the new and spent fuel storage racks.

3. The FHS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the fuel transfer tube penetrating containment.

4. The RM and FHM/spent fuel handling tool (SFHT) gripper assemblies are designed to prevent opening while the weight of the fuel assembly is suspended from the grippers.

5. The lift height of the RM mast and FHM hoist(s) is limited such that the minimum required depth of water shielding is maintained.

6. The RM and FHM are designed to maintain their load carrying and structural integrity functions during a safe shutdown earthquake.

7. The new and spent fuel storage racks maintain the effective neutron multiplication factor required by 10 CFR 50.68 limits during normal operation, design basis seismic events, and design basis dropped spent fuel assembly accidents over the spent fuel storage racks.

C-49 Table 2.1.1

-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1 2.1.01.01 1. The functional arrangement of the FHS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.1.1. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built FHS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.1.1.

2 2.1.01.02 2. The FHS has the refueling machine (RM), the fuel handling machine (FHM),

and the new and spent fuel storage racks.

Inspection of the system will be performed.

The FHS has the RM, the FHM, and the new and spent fuel storage racks.

3 2.1.01.03 3. The FHS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the fuel transfer tube penetrating containment.

See ITAAC Table 2.2.1

-3, items 1 and 7.

See ITAAC Table 2.2.1

-3, items 1 and 7.

4 2.1.01.04 4. The RM and FHM/spent fuel handling tool (SFHT) gripper assemblies are designed to prevent opening while the weight of the fuel assembly is suspended from the grippers.

The RM and FHM/SFHT gripper assemblies will be tested by operating the open controls of the gripper while suspending a dummy fuel assembly. The RM and FHM/SFHT gripper assemblies will not open while suspending a dummy test assembly.

5 2.1.01.05 5. The lift height of the RM mast and FHM hoist(s) is limited such that the minimum required depth of water shielding is maintained.

The RM and FHM will be tested by attempting to raise a dummy fuel assembly.

The bottom of the dummy fuel assembly cannot be raised to within 24 ft, 6 in.

of the operating deck floor.

6 2.1.01.06.i

6. The RM and FHM are designed to maintain their load carrying and structural integrity functions during a safe shutdown earthquake.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the RM and FHM are located on the nuclear island.

i) The RM and FHM are located on the nuclear island. 7 2.1.01.06.ii

6. The RM and FHM are designed to maintain their load carrying and structural integrity functions during a safe shutdown earthquake.

ii) Type test, analysis, or a combination of type tests and analyses of the RM and FHM will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the RM and FHM can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of load carrying or structural integrity functions.

8 2.1.01.07.i

7. The new and spent fuel storage racks maintain the effective neutron multiplication factor required by 10 CFR 50.68 limits during normal operation, design basis seismic events, and design basis dropped spent fuel assembly accidents over the spent fuel storage racks

. i) Analyses will be performed to calculate the effective neutron multiplication factor in the new and spent fuel storage racks during normal conditions.

i) The calculated effective neutron multiplication factor for the new and spent fuel storage racks meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68 (1) limits under normal conditions.

9 2.1.01.07.ii

7. The new and spent fuel storage racks maintain the effective neutron multiplication factor required by 10 CFR 50.68 limits during normal operation, ii) Inspection will be performed to verify that the new and spent fuel storage ii) The new and spent fuel storage racks are located on the nuclear island.

C-50 Table 2.1.1

-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria design basis seismic events, and design basis dropped spent fuel assembly accidents over the spent fuel storage racks. racks are located on the nuclear island.

10 2.1.01.07.iii

7. The new and spent fuel storage racks maintain the effective neutron multiplication factor required by 10 CFR 50.68 limits during normal operation, design basis seismic events, and design basis dropped spent fuel assembly accidents over the spent fuel storage racks

. iii) Seismic analysis of the new and spent fuel storage racks will be performed.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the new and spent fuel racks can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads and maintain the calculated effective neutron multiplication factor required by 10 CFR 50.68 (1) limits. 11 2.1.01.07.iv

7. The new and spent fuel storage racks maintain the effective neutron multiplication factor required by 10 CFR 50.68 limits during normal operation, design basis seismic events, and design basis dropped spent fuel assembly accidents over the spent fuel storage racks

. iv) Analysis of the new and spent fuel storage racks under design basis dropped spent fuel assembly loads will be performed.

iv) A report exists and concludes that the new and spent fuel racks can withstand design basis dropped spent fuel assembly loads and maintain the calculated effective neutron multiplication factor required by 10 CFR 50.68 (1) limits. Note: 1. The requirements of 10 CFR 50.68 are summarized as follows:

For new fuel storage racks:

- The effective neutron multiplication factor (K

-effective) must not exceed 0.95 when flooded with unborated water and

- K-effective must not exceed 0.98 with optimum moderator conditions.

For spent fuel storage racks:

- If methodology does not take credit for soluble boron:

K-effective must not exceed 0.95 when flooded with unborated water.

- Or if methodology takes credit for soluble boron:

K-effective must not exceed 0.95 when flooded with borated water and K-effective must remain below 1.0 when flooded with unborated water.

C-51 Table 2.1.1

-2 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Refueling Machine FHS-FH-01 Containment Fuel Handling Machine FHS-FH-02 Auxiliary Building Spent Fuel Storage Racks FHS-FS-02 Auxiliary Building New Fuel Storage Racks FHS-FS-01 Auxiliary Building Fuel Transfer Tube FHS-FT-01 Auxiliary Building/Containment

C-52 2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System Design Description The reactor coolant system (RCS) removes heat from the reactor core and transfers it to the secondary side of the steam generators for power generation. The RCS contains two vertical

U-tube steam generators, four sealless reactor coolant pumps (RCPs), and one pressurizer.

The RCS is as shown in Figure 2.1.2

-1 and the component locations of the RCS are as shown in Table 2.1.2-5.

1. The functional arrangement of the RCS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.1.2.

2. a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2

-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2

-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

3. a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.1.2

-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

4. a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2

-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

5. a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2

-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.1.2

-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

6. Each of the as

-built lines identified in Table 2.1.2

-2 as designed for leak before break (LBB) meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.

7. a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

C-53 b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.1.2

-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

c) Separation is provided between RCS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1 E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable.

8. The RCS provides the following safety

-related functions:

a) The pressurizer safety valves provide overpressure protection in accordance with Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

b) The reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) have a rotating inertia to provide RCS flow coastdown on loss of power to the pumps.

c) Each RCP flywheel assembly can withstand a design overspeed condition.

d) The RCS provides automatic depressurization during design basis events.

e) The RCS provides emergency letdown during design basis events.

9. The RCS provides the following nonsafety

-related functions:

a) The RCS provides circulation of coolant to remove heat from the core.

b) The RCS provides the means to control system pressure.

c) The pressurizer heaters trip after a signal is generated by the PMS.

10. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.1.2

-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR). 11. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 to perform active functions.

b) The valves identified in Table 2.1.2

-1 as having protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

c) The valves identified in Table 2.1.2

-1 as having diverse actuation system (DAS) control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from DAS.

12. a) The valves identified in Table 2.1.2

-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.1.2

-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

13. a) Controls exist in the MCR to trip the RCPs.

b) The RCPs trip after receiving a signal from the PMS.

c) The RCPs trip after receiving a signal from the DAS.

C-54 14. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.1.2-3 to perform the listed function.

15. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.1.2

-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.1.2

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/ DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Steam Generator 1 RCS-MB-01 Yes Yes - -/- - - - - Steam Generator 2 RCS-MB-02 Yes Yes - -/- - - - - RCP 1A RCS-MP-01A Yes Yes - No/No No Yes/Yes (pump trip) No - RCP 1B RCS-MP-01B Yes Yes - No/No No Yes/Yes (pump trip) No - RCP 2A RCS-MP-02A Yes Yes - No/No No Yes/Yes (pump trip) No - RCP 2B RCS-MP-02B Yes Yes - No/No No Yes/Yes (pump trip) No - Pressurizer RCS-MV-02 Yes Yes - No/No (heaters)

- Yes/No (heater trip) No - Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Sparger A PXS-MW-01A Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - - ADS Sparger B PXS-MW-01B Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - - Pressurizer Safety Valve RCS-PL-V005A Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - Pressurizer Safety Valve RCS-PL-V005B Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - First-stage ADS Motor-operated Valve (MOV) RCS-PL-V001A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is C-55 Table 2.1.2

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/ DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position First-stage ADS MOV RCS-PL-V001B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is Second-stage ADS MOV RCS-PL-V002A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is Second-stage ADS MOV RCS-PL-V002B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is Third-stage ADS MOV RCS-PL-V003A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is Third-stage ADS MOV RCS-PL-V003B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is Fourth-stage ADS Squib Valve RCS-PL-V004A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is Fourth-stage ADS Squib Valve RCS-PL-V004B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is Fourth-stage ADS Squib Valve RCS-PL-V004C Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is Fourth-stage ADS Squib Valve RCS-PL-V004D Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is ADS Discharge Header A Vacuum Relief Valve RCS-PL-V010A Yes Yes No Yes/Yes No No/No Transfer Open - ADS Discharge Header B Vacuum Relief Valve RCS-PL-V010B Yes Yes No Yes/Yes No No/No Transfer Open - First-stage ADS Isolation MOV RCS-PL-V011A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is First-stage ADS Isolation MOV RCS-PL-V011B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is Second-stage ADS Isolation MOV RCS-PL-V012A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is Second-stage ADS Isolation MOV RCS-PL-V012B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is Third-stage ADS Isolation MOV RCS-PL-V013A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is Third-stage ADS Isolation MOV RCS-PL-V013B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is Fourth-stage ADS MOV RCS-PL-V014A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/No None As Is Fourth-stage ADS MOV RCS-PL-V014B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/No None As Is C-56 Table 2.1.2

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/ DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Fourth-stage ADS MOV RCS-PL-V014C Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/No None As Is Fourth-stage ADS MOV RCS-PL-V014D Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/No None As Is Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve RCS-PL-V150A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/No Transfer Open Closed Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve RCS-PL-V150B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/No Transfer Open Closed Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve RCS-PL-V150C Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/No Transfer Open Closed Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve RCS-PL-V150D Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/No Transfer Open Closed RCS Hot Leg 1 Flow Sensor RCS-101A - Yes - Yes/No No -/- - - RCS Hot Leg 1 Flow Sensor RCS-101B - Yes - Yes/No No -/- - - RCS Hot Leg 1 Flow Sensor RCS-101C - Yes - Yes/No No -/- - - RCS Hot Leg 1 Flow Sensor RCS-101D - Yes - Yes/No No -/- - - RCS Hot Leg 2 Flow Sensor RCS-102A - Yes - Yes/No No -/- - - RCS Hot Leg 2 Flow Sensor RCS-102B - Yes - Yes/No No -/- - - RCS Hot Leg 2 Flow Sensor RCS-102C - Yes - Yes/No No -/- - - RCS Hot Leg 2 Flow Sensor RCS-102D - Yes - Yes/No No -/- - - RCS Cold Leg 1A Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS-121A - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCS Cold Leg 1B Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS-121B - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCS Cold Leg 1B Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS-121C - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCS Cold Leg 1A Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS-121D - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

C-57 Table 2.1.2

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/ DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position RCS Cold Leg 2B Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS-122A - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCS Cold Leg 2A Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS-122B - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCS Cold Leg 2A Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS-122C - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCS Cold Leg 2B Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS-122D - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCS Cold Leg 1A Dual Range Temperature Sensor RCS-125A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes (Wide Range) -/- - - RCS Cold Leg 2A Dual Range Temperature Sensor RCS-125B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes (Wide Range) -/- - - RCS Cold Leg 1B Dual Range Temperature Sensor RCS-125C - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes (Wide Range -/- - - RCS Cold Leg 2B Dual Range Temperature Sensor RCS-125D - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes (Wide Range) -/- - - RCS Hot Leg 1 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS-131A - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCS Hot Leg 2 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS-131B - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCS Hot Leg 1 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS-131C - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCS Hot Leg 2 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS-131D - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCS Hot Leg 1 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS-132A - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCS Hot Leg 2 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS-132B - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCS Hot Leg 1 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS-132C - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

C-58Table 2.1.2-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/ DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position RCS Hot Leg 2 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS-132D - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCS Hot Leg 1 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS-133A - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCS Hot Leg 2 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS-133B - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCS Hot Leg 1 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS-133C - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCS Hot Leg 2 Narrow Range Temperature Sensor RCS-133D - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCS Hot Leg 1 Wide Range Temperature Sensor RCS-135A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - RCS Hot Leg 2 Wide Range Temperature Sensor RCS-135B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - RCS Wide Range Pressure Sensor RCS-140A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - RCS Wide Range Pressure Sensor RCS-140B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - RCS Wide Range Pressure Sensor RCS-140C - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - RCS Wide Range Pressure Sensor RCS-140D - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - RCS Hot Leg 1 Level Sensor RCS-160A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - RCS Hot Leg 2 Level Sensor RCS-160B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - Passive Residual Heat Removal (PRHR) Return Line Temperature Sensor RCS-161 - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - Pressurizer Pressure Sensor RCS-191A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - Pressurizer Pressure Sensor RCS-191B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - Pressurizer Pressure Sensor RCS-191C - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- --

C-59 Table 2.1.2

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/ DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Pressurizer Pressure Sensor RCS-191D - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - Pressurizer Level Reference Leg Temperature Sensor RCS-193A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - Pressurizer Level Reference Leg Temperature Sensor RCS-193B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - Pressurizer Level Reference Leg Temperature Sensor RCS-193C - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - Pressurizer Level Reference Leg Temperature Sensor RCS-193D - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - Pressurizer Level Sensor RCS-195A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - Pressurizer Level Sensor RCS-195B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - Pressurizer Level Sensor RCS-195C - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - Pressurizer Level Sensor RCS-195D - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - RCP 1A Bearing Water Temperature Sensor RCS-211A - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCP 1A Bearing Water Temperature Sensor RCS-211B - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCP 1A Bearing Water Temperature Sensor RCS-211C - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCP 1A Bearing Water Temperature Sensor RCS-211D - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCP 1B Bearing Water Temperature Sensor RCS-212A - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCP 1B Bearing Water Temperature Sensor RCS-212B - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCP 1B Bearing Water

Temperature Sensor RCS-212C - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCP 1B Bearing Water Temperature Sensor RCS-212D - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - -

C-60 Table 2.1.2

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/ DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position RCP 2A Bearing Water Temperature Sensor RCS-213A - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCP 2A Bearing Water Temperature Sensor RCS-213B - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCP 2A Bearing Water Temperature Sensor RCS-213C - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCP 2A Bearing Water Temperature Sensor RCS-213D - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCP 2B Bearing Water Temperature Sensor RCS-214A - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCP 2B Bearing Water Temperature Sensor RCS-214B - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCP 2B Bearing Water Temperature Sensor RCS-214C - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCP 2B Bearing Water Temperature Sensor RCS-214D - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCP 1A Pump Speed Sensor RCS-281 - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCP 1B Pump Speed Sensor RCS-282 - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCP 2A Pump Speed Sensor RCS-283 - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - RCP 2B Pump Speed Sensor RCS-284 - Yes - Yes/Yes No -/- - - Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

Table 2.1.2

-2 Line Name Line Number ASME Code Section III Leak Before Break Functional Capability Required Hot Legs RCS-L 001 A RCS-L001B Yes Yes Yes Cold Legs RCS-L 002 A RCS-L 002 B RCS-L 002 C RCS-L002D Yes Yes Yes C-61 Table 2.1.2

-2 Line Name Line Number ASME Code Section III Leak Before Break Functional Capability Required Pressurizer Surge Line RCS-L003 Yes Yes Yes ADS Inlet Headers RCS-L 004A/B RCS-L 006A/B RCS-L 030A/B RCS-L020A/B Yes Yes Yes Safety Valve Inlet Piping RCS-L 005 A RCS-L005B Yes Yes Yes Safety Valve Discharge Piping RCS-L 050A/B RCS-L051A/B Yes No Yes ADS First-stage Valve Inlet Piping RCS-L 010A/B RCS-L011A/B Yes No Yes ADS Second

-stage Valve Inlet Piping RCS-L 021A/B RCS-L022A/B Yes Yes No Yes ADS Third-stage Valve Inlet Piping RCS-L 131 RCS-L 031A/B RCS-L032A/B Yes Yes Yes No Yes ADS Outlet Piping RCS-L 012A/B RCS-L 023A/B RCS-L 033A/B RCS-L 061A/B RCS-L 063A/B RCS-L 064A/B RCS-L 200 RCS-L 069A/B RCS-L 240A/B PXS-L130A/B Yes No Yes ADS Fourth

-stage Inlet Piping RCS-L 133A/B RCS-L 135A/B RCS-L 136A/B RCS-L137A/B Yes Yes Yes Pressurizer Spray Piping RCS-L 106 RCS-L110A/B RCS-L 212A/B RCS-L 213 RCS-L215 Yes No No RNS Suction Piping RCS-L 139 RCS-L140 Yes Yes No CVS Purification Piping RCS-L 111 RCS-L112 Yes No No C-62 Table 2.1.2

-3 Equipment Tag No. Display Control Function RCP 1A Breaker (Status)

ECS-ES-31 Yes - RCP 1A Breaker (Status)

ECS-ES-32 Yes - RCP 1B Breaker (Status)

ECS-ES-41 Yes - RCP 1B Breaker (Status)

ECS-ES-42 Yes - RCP 2A Breaker (Status)

ECS-ES-51 Yes - RCP 2A Breaker (Status)

ECS-ES-52 Yes - RCP 2B Breaker (Status)

ECS-ES-61 Yes - RCP 2B Breaker (Status) ECS-ES-62 Yes - Pressurizer Heaters RCS-EH-03 Yes On/Off Pressurizer Heaters RCS-EH-04A Yes On/Off Pressurizer Heaters RCS-EH-04B Yes On/Off Pressurizer Heaters RCS-EH-04C Yes On/Off Pressurizer Heaters RCS-EH-04D Yes On/Off Fourth-stage ADS Squib Valve (Position Indication)

RCS-PL-V004A Yes - Fourth-stage ADS Squib Valve (Position Indication)

RCS-PL-V004B Yes - Fourth-stage ADS Squib Valve (Position Indication)

RCS-PL-V004C Yes - Fourth-stage ADS Squib Valve (Position Indication)

RCS-PL-V004D Yes - Pressurizer Safety Valve (Position Indication)

RCS-PL-V005A Yes - Pressurizer Safety Valve (Position Indication)

RCS-PL-V005B Yes - Pressurizer Spray Valve (Position Indication)

RCS-PL-V110A Yes - Pressurizer Spray Valve (Position Indication)

RCS-PL-V110B Yes - Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve (Position Indication)

RCS-PL-V150A Yes - Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve (Position Indication)

RCS-PL-V150B Yes -

C-63 Table 2.1.2

-3 Equipment Tag No. Display Control Function Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve (Position Indication)

RCS-PL-V150C Yes - Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve (Position Indication)

RCS-PL-V150D Yes - Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 12 2.1.02.01 1. The functional arrangement of the RCS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.1.2. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built RCS conforms with the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.1.2.

13 2.1.02.02a 2.a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports.

The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as

-built components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III. 14 2.1.02.02b 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping as documented in the ASME design reports.

The ASME code Section III design reports exist for the as

-built piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III. 15 2.1.02.03a 3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of the as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III. A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

16 2.1.02.03b 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.1.2

-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of the as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section

III. A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

C-64 Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 17 2.1.02.04a 4.a) The components identified in Table 2.1.2

-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressur e boundary integrity at their design pressure. A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.

A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

18 2.1.02.04b 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure. A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.

A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the piping identified in Table 2.1.2-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

19 2.1.02.05a.i 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment and valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

20 2.1.02.05a.ii 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. 21 2.1.02.05a.iii 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

22 2.1.02.05b 5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.1.2

-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.

A report exists and concludes that each of the as

-built lines identified in Table 2.1.2-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.

C-65 Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 23 2.1.02.06 6. Each of the as

-built lines identified in Table 2.1.2

-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.

Inspection will be performed for the existence of an LBB evaluation report or an evaluation report on the protection from dynamic effects of a pipe break.

Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings, contains the design descriptions and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture. An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as

-built RCS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided.

24 2.1.02.07a.i 7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.

i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function

. 25 2.1.02.07a.ii 7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

ii) Inspection will be performed of the as

-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses. 26 2.1.02.0 7b 7.b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.1.2

-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division. Testing will be performed on the RCS by providing a simulated test signal in each Class 1E division.

A simulated test signal exists at the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.2-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

C-66 Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 27 2.1.02.07c 7.c) Separation is provided between RCS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. 28 2.1.02.08a.i 8.a) The pressurizer safety valves provide overpressure protection in accordance with Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. i) Inspections will be conducted to confirm that the value of the vendor code plate rating is greater than or equal to system relief requirements.

i) The sum of the rated capacities recorded on the valve ASME Code plates of the safety valves exceeds 1,500,000 lb/hr.

29 2.1.02.08a.ii 8.a) The pressurizer safety valves provide overpressure protection in accordance with Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. ii) Testing and analysis in accordance with ASME Code Section III will be performed to determine set pressure.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the safety valves set pressure is 2485 psig + 25 psi 30 2.1.02.08b 8.b) The RCPs have a rotating inertia to provide RCS flow coastdown on loss of power to the pumps.

A test will be performed to determine the pump flow coastdown curve.

The pump flow coastdown will provide RCS flows greater than or equal to the flow shown in Figure 2.1.2

-2, "Flow Transient for Four Cold Legs in Operation, Four Pumps Coasting Down."

31 2.1.02.08c 8.c) Each RCP flywheel assembly can withstand a design overspeed condition.

Shop testing of each RCP flywheel assembly will be performed at the vendor facility at overspeed conditions.

Each RCP flywheel assembly has passed an overspeed condition of no less than 125%

of operating speed.

C-67 Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 32 2.1.02.08d.i 8.d) The RCS provides automatic depressurization during design basis events. i) A low pressure flow test and associated analysis will be conducted to determine the total piping flow resistance of each ADS valve group connected to the pressurizer (i.e., ADS Stages 1-3) from the pressurizer through the outlet of the downstream ADS control valves. The reactor coolant system will be at cold conditions with the pressurizer full of water. The normal residual heat removal pumps will be used to provide injection flow into the RCS discharging through the ADS valves. Inspections and associated analysis of the piping flow paths from the discharge of the ADS valve groups connected to the pressurizer (i.e., ADS Stages 1-3) to the spargers will be conducted to verify the line routings are consistent with the line routings used for design flow resistance calculations.

i) The calculated ADS piping flow resistance from the pressurizer through the sparger with all valves of each ADS group open is

< 2.91 E-6 ft/gpm 2. 33 2.1.02.08d.ii 8.d) The RCS provides automatic depressurization during design basis events. ii) Inspections and associated analysis of each fourth

-stage ADS valve group (four valves and associated piping connected to each hot leg) will be conducted to verify the line routing is consistent with the line routing used for design flow resistance calculations.

ii) The calculated flow resistance for each group of fourth-stage ADS valves and piping with all valves open is:

Loop 1: < 1.70x10-7 ft/gpm 2 Loop 2: < 1.57x10-7 ft/gpm 2 34 2.1.02.08d.iii 8.d) The RCS provides automatic depressurization during design basis events. iii) Inspections of each fourth

-stage ADS valve will be conducted to determine the flow area through each valve.

iii) The flow area through each fourth-stage ADS valve is

> 67 in 2.

C-68 Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 35 2.1.02.08d.iv 8.d) The RCS provides automatic depressurization during design basis events. iv) Type tests and analysis will be performed to determine the effective flow area through each stage 1,2,3 ADS valve.

iv) A report exists and concludes that the effective flow area through each stage 1 ADS valve

> 4.6 in 2 and each stage 2,3 ADS valve is

> 21 in 2. 36 2.1.02.08d.v 8.d) The RCS provides automatic depressurization during design basis events. v) Inspections of the elevation of the ADS stage 4 valve discharge will be conducted.

v) The minimum elevation of the bottom inside surface of the outlet of these valves is greater than plant elevation 110 feet.

37 2.1.02.08d.vi 8.d) The RCS provides automatic depressurization during design basis events. vi) Inspections of the ADS stage 4 valve discharge will be conducted.

vi) The discharge of the ADS stage 4 valves is directed into the steam generator compartments.

38 2.1.02.08d.vii 8.d) The RCS provides automatic depressurization during design basis events. vii) Inspection of each ADS sparger will be conducted to determine the flow area through the sparger holes.

vii) The flow area through the holes in each ADS sparger is

> 274 in 2. 39 2.1.02.08d.viii 8.d) The RCS provides automatic depressurization during design basis events. viii) Inspection of the elevation of each ADS sparger will be conducted.

viii) The centerline of the connection of the sparger arms to the sparger hub is

< 11.5 feet below the IRWST overflow level. 40 2.1.02.08e 8.e) The RCS provides emergency letdown during design basis events.

Inspections of the reactor vessel head vent valves and inlet and outlet piping will be conducted.

A report exists and concludes that the capacity of the reactor vessel head vent is sufficient to pass not less than 8.2 lbm/sec at 1250 psia in the RCS.

41 2.1.02.09a 9.a) The RCS provides circulation of coolant to remove heat from the core.

Testing and analysis to measure RCS flow with four reactor coolant pumps operating at no

-load RCS pressure and temperature conditions will be performed.

Analyses will be performed to convert the measured pre

-fuel load flow to post

-fuel load flow with 10-percent steam generator tube plugging.

The calculated post

-fuel load RCS flow rate is

> 301,670 gpm.

C-69 Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 42 2.1.02.09b.i 9.b) The RCS provides the means to control system pressure.

i) Inspections will be performed to verify the rated capacity of pressurizer heater backup groups A and B. . i) Pressurizer heater backup groups A and B each has a rated capacity of at least 168 kW. 43 2.1.02.09b.ii 9.b) The RCS provides the means to control system pressure.

ii) Tests will be performed to verify that the pressurizer spray valves can open and close when operated from the MCR. ii) Controls in the MCR operate to cause the pressurizer spray valves to open and close.

44 2.1.02.09c 9.c) The pressurizer heaters trip after

a signal is generated by the PMS.

Testing will be performed to confirm trip of the pressurizer heaters identified in Table 2.1.2-3. The pressurizer heaters identified in Table 2.1.2-3 trip after a signal is generated by the PMS. 45 2.1.02.10 10. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.1.2

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the safety

-related displays in the MCR.

Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.1.2

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

46 2.1.02.11a.i 11.a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.1.2

-1 to perform active functions.

i) Testing will be performed on the squib valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 using controls in the MCR without stroking the valve.

i) Controls in the MCR operate to cause a signal at the squib valve electrical leads which is capable of actuating the squib valve.

47 2.1.02.11a.ii 11.a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.1.2

-1 to perform active functions.

ii) Stroke testing will be performed on the other remotely operated valves listed in Table 2.1.2-1 using controls in the MCR.

ii) Controls in the MCR operate to cause the remotely operated valves (other than squib valves) to perform active functions.

48 2.1.02.11b.i 11.b) The valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as having PMS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

i) Testing will be performed on the squib valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 using real or simulated signals into the PMS without stroking the valve. i) The squib valves receive a signal at the valve electrical leads that is capable of actuating the squib valve.

49 2.1.02.11b.ii 11.b) The valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as having PMS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

ii) Testing will be performed on the other remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 using real or simulated signals into the PMS.

ii) The other remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.1.2

-1 as having PMS control perform the active function identified in the table after receiving a signal from PMS.

C-70 Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 50 2.1.02.11b.iii 11.b) The valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as having PMS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

iii) Testing will be performed to demonstrate that remotely operated RCS valves RCS-V001A/B, V002A/B, V003A/B, V011A/B, V012A/B, V013A/B open within the required response times. iii) These valves open within the following times after receipt of an actuation signal:

V 001A/B < 40 sec V 002A/B,V 003A/B < 100 sec V011A/B < 30 sec V 012A/B,V 013A/B < 60 sec 51 2.1.02.11c.i 11.c) The valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as having DAS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from DAS.

i) Testing will be performed on the squib valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 using real or simulated signals into the DAS without stroking the valve. i) The squib valves receive a signal at the valve electrical leads that is capable of actuating the squib valve 52 2.1.02.11c.ii 11.c) The valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 as having DAS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from DAS.

ii) Testing will be performed on the other remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 using real or simulated signals into the DAS.

ii) The other remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.1.2

-1 as having DAS control perform the active function identified in the table after receiving a signal from DAS. 53 2.1.02.12a.i 12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

i) Tests or type tests of motor

-operated valves will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions.

i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor

-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.1.2-1 under design conditions.

54 2.1.02.12a.ii 12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built motor

-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests. 55 2.1.02.12a.iii 12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

iii) Tests of the motor

-operated valves will be performed under pre

-operational flow, differential pressure and temperature conditions.

iii) Each motor

-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.1.2

-1 under pre

-operational test conditions.

C-71 Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 56 2.1.02.12a.iv 12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

iv) Tests or type tests of squib valves will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions.

iv) A test report exists and concludes that each squib valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.1.2

-1 under design conditions.

57 2.1.02.12a.v 12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

v) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built squib valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.

v) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built squib valves are bounded by the tests or type tests. 58 2.1.02.12a.vi 12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

vi) See item 8.d.i in this table.

The ADS stage 1

-3 valve flow resistances are verified to be consistent with the ADS stage 1-3 path flow resistances

. 59 2.1.02.12a.vii 12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

vii) See item 8.d.ii in this table. vii) See item 8.d.ii in this table. The ADS stage 4 valve flow resistances are verified to be consistent with the ADS stage 4 path flow resistances.

60 2.1.02.12a.viii 12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

viii) See item 8.d.iii in this table. viii) See item 8.d.iii in this table. 61 2.1.02.12a.ix 12.a) The automatic depressurization valves identified in Table 2.1.2-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

ix) See item 8.d.iv in this table. ix) See item 8.d.iv in this table. 62 2.1.02.12b 12.b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.1.2

-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

Testing of the remotely operated valves will be performed under the conditions of loss of motive powe r. Upon loss of motive power, each remotely operated valve identified in Table 2.1.2

-1 assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.

63 2.1.02.13a 13.a) Controls exist in the MCR to trip the RCPs.

Testing will be performed on the RCPs using controls in the MCR. Controls in the MCR operate to trip the RCPs.

C-72 Table 2.1.2-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 64 2.1.02.13b 13.b) The RCPs trip after receiving a signal from the PMS.

Testing will be performed using real or simulated signals into the PMS.

The RCPs trip after receiving a signal from the PMS. 65 2.1.02.13c 13.c) The RCPs trip after receiving a signal from the DAS.

Testing will be performed using real or simulated signals into the DAS.

The RCPs trip after receiving a signal from the DAS.

66 2.1.02.14 14. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.1.2-3 to perform the listed function. Testing will be performed on the components in Table 2.1.2

-3 using controls in the MCR.

Controls in the MCR operate to cause the components listed in Table 2.1.2-3 to perform the listed functions.

67 2.1.02.15 15. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.1.2-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the RCS parameters in the MCR.

The displays identified in Table 2.1.2-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.1.2

-5 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Steam Generator 1 RCS-MB-01 Containment Steam Generator 2 RCS-MB-02 Containment Reactor Coolant Pump 1A RCS-MP-01A Containment Reactor Coolant Pump 1B RCS-MP-01B Containment Reactor Coolant Pump 2A RCS-MP-02A Containment Reactor Coolant Pump 2B RCS-MP-02B Containment Pressurizer RCS-MV-02 Containment ADS Sparger A PXS-MW-01A Containment ADS Sparger B PXS-MW-01B Containment

C-73 Figure 2.1.2-1 (Sheet 1 of 2) Reactor Coolant System

C-74 Figure 2.1.2-1 (Sheet 2 of 2) Reactor Coolant System

C-75 Figure 2.1.2

-2 Flow Transient for Four Cold Legs in Operation, Four Pumps Coasting Down

C-76 2.1.3 Reactor System Design Description The reactor system (RXS) generates heat by a controlled nuclear reaction and transfers the heat generated to the reactor coolant, provides a barrier that prevents the release of fission products to the atmosphere and a means to insert negative reactivity into the reactor core and to shutdown the reactor core.

The reactor core contains a matrix of fuel rods assembled into fuel assemblies using structural elements. Rod cluster control assemblies (RCCAs) are positioned and held within the fuel assemblies by control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs). The CRDMs unlatch upon termination of electrical power to the CRDM thereby releasing the RCCAs. The fuel assemblies and RCCAs are designed in accordance with the principal design requirements.

The RXS is operated during normal modes of plant operation, including startup, power operation, cooldown, shutdown and refueling.

The component locations of the RXS are as shown in Table 2.1.3

-3. 1. The functional arrangement of the RXS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.1.3. 2. a) The reactor upper internals rod guide arrangement is as shown in Figure 2.1.3

-1. b) The rod cluster control and drive rod arrangement is as shown in Figure 2.1.3

-2. c) The reactor vessel arrangement is as shown in Figure 2.1.3

-3. 3. The components identified in Table 2.1.3

-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

4. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

5. The pressure boundary components (reactor vessel [RV], control rod drive mechanisms [CRDMs], and incore instrument QuickLoc assemblies) identified in Table 2.1.3

-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

6. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3

-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

7. The reactor internals will withstand the effects of flow induced vibration.

8. The reactor vessel direct injection nozzle limits the blowdown of the reactor coolant system (RCS) following the break of a direct vessel injection line.

9. a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.3

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

C-77 b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.1.3

-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

c) Separation is provided between RXS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1 E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable.

10. The reactor lower internals assembly is equipped with holders for at least eight capsules for storing material surveillance specimens.

11. The reactor pressure vessel (RPV) beltline material has a Charpy upper

-shelf energy of no less than 75 ft-lb. 12. Safety-related displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).

13. The fuel assemblies and rod cluster control assemblies intended for initial core load and listed in Table 2.1.3-1 have been designed and constructed in accordance with the principal design requirements. 14. A top-of-the-head visual inspection, including 360 degrees around each reactor vessel head penetration nozzle, can be performed.

C-78 Table 2.1.3

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Classification Seismic Cat. I Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir.

Safety-Related Display RV RXS-MV-01 Yes Yes - - Reactor Upper Internals Assembly RXS-MI-01 Yes Yes - - Reactor Lower Internals Assembly RXS-MI-02 Yes Yes - - Fuel Assemblies (157 locations)

RXS-FA-A07/A08/A09/B05/B06/B07/B08/ B09/B10/B11/C04/C05/C06/C07/C08/C09/C10/C11/C12/D03/D04/D05/D06/D07/D08/D09/

D10/D11/D12/D13/E02/E03/E04/E05/E06/E07/

E08/E09/E10/E11/E12/E13/E14/F02/F03/F04/

F05/F06/F07/F08/F09/F10/F11/F12/F13/F14/

G01/G02/G03/G04/G05/G06/G07/G08/G09/

G10/G11/G12/G13/G14/G15/H01/H02/H03/ H04/H05/H06/H07/H08/H09/H10/H11/H12/

H13/H14/H15/J01/J02/J03/J04/J05/J06/J07/J08/

J09/J10/J11/J12/J13/J14/J15/K02/K03/K04/

K05/K06/K07/K08/K09/K10/K11/K12/K13/

K14/L02/L03/L04/L05/L06/L07/L08/L09/L10/

L11/L12/L13/L14/M03/M04/M05/M06/M07/

M08/M09/M10/M11/M12/M13/N04/N05/N06/N07/N08/N09/N10/N11/N12/P05/P06/P07/P08/

P09/P10/P11/ R07/R08/R09 No (1) Yes - - Rod Cluster Control Assemblies (RCCAs) (minimum 53 locations)

RXS-FR-B06/B10/C05/C07/C09/C11/D06/ D08/D10/E03/E05/E07/E09/E11/E13/F02/F04/

F12/F14/G03/G05/G07/G09/G11/G13/H04/

H08/H12/J03/J05/J07/J09/J11/J13/K02/K04/

K12/K14/L03/L05/L07/L09/L11/L13/M06/

M08/M10/N05/N07/N09/N11/P06/P10 No (1) Yes - - Gray Rod Cluster Assemblies (GRCAs) (16 locations)

RXS-FG-B08/D04/D12/F06/F08/F10/H02/H06/ H10/H14/K06/K08/K10/M04/M12/P08 No (1) Yes - -

C-79 Table 2.1.3

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Classification Seismic Cat. I Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir.

Safety-Related Display Control Rod Drive Mechanisms (CRDMs) (69 Locations)

RXS-MV-11B06/11B08/11B10/11C05/11C07/ 11C09/11C11/11D04/11D06/11D08/11D10/

11D12/11E03/11E05/11E07/11E09/11E11/

11E13/11F02/11F04/11F06/11F08/11F10/ 11F12/11F14/11G03/11G05/11G07/11G09/

11G11/11G13/11H02/11H04/11H06/11H08/

11H10/11H12/11H14/11J03/11J05/11J07/

11J09/11J11/11J13/11K02/11K04/11K06/ 11K08/11K10/11K12/11K14/11L03/11L05/ 11L07/11L09/11L11/11L13/11M04/11M06/

11M08/11M10/11M12/11N05/11N07/11N09/ 11N11/11P06/11P08/11P10 Yes Yes No/No No Incore Instrument QuickLoc Assemblies (8 Locations)

RXS-MY-Y11 through Y18 Yes Yes - - Source Range Detectors (4)

RXS-JE-NE001A/NE001B/NE001C/NE001D

- Yes Yes/Yes No Intermediate Range Detectors (4) RXS-JE-NE002A/NE002B/NE002C/NE002D

- Yes Yes/Yes Yes Power Range Detectors

- Lower (4) RXS-JE-NE003A/NE003B/NE003C/NE003D

- Yes Yes/Yes No Power Range Detectors

- Upper (4) RXS-JE-NE004A/NE004B/NE004C/NE004D

- Yes Yes/Yes No Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

1. Fuel assemblies are designed using ASME Section III as a general guide.

C-80 Table 2.1.3

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 68 2.1.03.01 1. The functional arrangement of the RXS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.1.3. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built RXS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.1.3.

69 2.1.03.02a 2.a) The reactor upper internals rod guide arrangement is as shown in Figure 2.1.3

-1. Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built RXS will accommodate the fuel assembly and control rod drive mechanism pattern shown in Figure 2.1.3

-1. 70 2.1.03.02b 2.b) The control assemblies (rod cluster and gray rod) and drive rod arrangement is as shown in Figure 2.1.3-2. Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.

The as-built RXS will accommodate the control assemblies (rod cluster and gray rod) and drive rod arrangement shown in Figure 2.1.3-2. 71 2.1.03.02c 2.c) The reactor vessel arrangement is as shown in Figure 2.1.3

-3. Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built RXS will accommodate the reactor vessel arrangement shown in Figure 2.1.3-3. 72 2.1.03.03 3. The components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports.

The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the

as-built components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III.

73 2.1.03.04 4. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.

A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

74 2.1.03.05 5. The pressure boundary components (RV, CRDMs, and incore instrument QuickLoc assemblies) identified in Table 2.1.3-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components of the RXS required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.

A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the pressure boundary components (RV, CRDMs, and incore instrument QuickLoc assemblies) conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

C-81 Table 2.1.3

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 75 2.1.03.06.i

6. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 is located on the Nuclear Island

. 76 2.1.03.06.ii

6. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

77 2.1.03.06.iii

6. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

78 2.1.03.07.i

7. The reactor internals will withstand the effects of flow induced vibration.

i) A vibration type test will be conducted on the (first unit) reactor internals representative of AP1000.

i) A report exists and concludes that the (first unit) reactor internals have no observable damage or loose parts as a result of the vibration type test.

79 2.1.03.07.ii

7. The reactor internals will withstand the effects of flow induced vibration.

ii) A pre

-test inspection, a flow test and a post

-test inspection will be conducted on the as-built reactor internals.

ii) The as

-built reactor internals have no observable damage or loose parts.

80 2.1.03.08 8. The reactor vessel direct vessel injection nozzle limits the blowdown of the RCS following the break of a direct vessel injection line.

An inspection will be conducted to verify the flow area of the flow limiting venturi within each direct vessel injection nozzle.

The throat area of the direct vessel injection line nozzle flow limiting venturi is less than or equal to 12.57 in

2.

C-82 Table 2.1.3

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 81 2.1.03.09a.i 9.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.3

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

i) Type tests, analysis, or a combination of type tests and analysis will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.

i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.3

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

82 2.1.03.09a.ii 9.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.3

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

ii) Inspection will be performed of the as

-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment ii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.1.3

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

83 2.1.03.09b 9.b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.1.3

-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

Testing will be performed by providing simulated tes t signals in each Class 1E division. A simulated test signal exists for Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.1.3

-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

84 2.1.03.09c 9.c) Separation is provided between RXS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable.

See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. 85 2.1.03.10 10. The reactor lower internals assembly is equipped with holders for at least eight capsules for storing material surveillance specimens.

Inspection of the reactor lower internals assembly for the presence of capsules will be performed.

At least eight capsules are in the reactor lower internals assembly. 86 2.1.03.11 11. The RPV beltline material has a Charpy upper-shelf energy of no less than 75 ft-lb. Manufacturing tests of the Charpy V-Notch specimen of the RPV beltline material will be performed.

A report exists and concludes that the initial RPV beltline Charpy upper

-shelf energy is no less than 75 ft-lb.

C-83 Table 2.1.3

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 87 2.1.03.12 12. Safety

-related displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.1.3-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the safety

-related displays in the MCR.

Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.1

.3-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. 88 2.1.03.13 13. The fuel assemblies and rod cluster control assemblies intended for initial core load and listed in Table 2.1.3

-1 have been designed and constructed in accordance with the established design requirements.

An analysis is performed of the reactor core design.

A report exists and concludes that the fuel assemblies and rod cluster control assemblies intended for the initial core load and listed in Table 2.1.3

-1 have been designed and constructed in accordance with the principal design requirements.

89 2.1.03.14 14. A top

-of-the-head visual inspection, including 360 degrees around each reactor vessel head penetration nozzle, can be performed.

A preservice visual examination of the reactor vessel head top surface and penetration nozzles will be performed.

A report exists that documents the results of the top-of-the-head visual inspection, including 360 degrees around each reactor vessel head penetration nozzle.

C-84 Table 2.1.3

-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location RV RXS-MV-01 Containment Reactor Upper Internals Assembly RXS-MI-01 Containment Reactor Lower Internals Assembly RXS-MI-02 Containment Fuel Assemblies (157 locations)

RXS-FA-A07/A08/A09/B05/ B06/B07/B08/B09/B10/B11/ C04/C05/C06/C07/C08/C09/

C10/C11/C12/D03/D04/D05/

D06/D07/D08/D09/D10/D11/

D12/D13/E02/E03/E04/E05/

E06/E07/E08/E09/E10/E11/E12/

E13/E14/F02/F03/F04/F05/F06/F07/F08/F09/F10/F11/F12/F13/F14/G01/G02/G03/G04/G05/

G06/G07/G08/G09/G10/G11/

G12/G13/G14/G15/H01/H02/

H03/H04/H05/H06/H07/H08/

H09/H10/H11/H12/H13/H14/

H15/J01/J02/J03/J04/J05/J06/

J07/J08/J09/J10/J11/J12/J13/

J14/J15/K02/K03/K04/K05/

K06/K07/K08/K09/K10/K11/ K12/K13/K14/L02/L03/L04/ L05/L06/L07/L08/L09/L10/L11/

L12/L13/L14/M03/M04/M05/

M06/M07/M08/M09/M10/M11/M12/M13/N04/N05/N06/N07/

N08/N09/N10/N11/N12/P05/ P06/P07/P08/P09/P10/P11/R07/

R08/R09 Containment (located in auxiliary building prior to fuel loading)

Rod Cluster Control Assemblies (RCCAs) (minimum 53 locations)

RXS-FR-B06/B10/C05/C07/ C09/C11/D06/D08/D10/E03/

E05/E07/E09/E11/E13/F02/F04/

F12/F14/G03/G05/G07/G09/

G11/G13/H04/H08/H12/J03/

J05/J07/J09/J11/J13/K02/K04/

K12/K14/L03/L05/L07/L09/

L11/L13/M06/M08/M10/N05/

N07/N09/N11/P06/P10 Containment (located in auxiliary building prior to fuel loading)

Gray Rod Cluster Assemblies (GRCAs) (16 locations)

RXS-FG-B08/D04/D12/F06/ F08/F10/H02/H06/H10/H14/

K06/K08/K10/M04/M12/P08 Containment (located in auxiliary building prior to fuel loading)

C-85 Table 2.1.3

-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Control Rod Drive Mechanisms (CRDMs) (69 Locations) RXS-MV-11B06/11B08/ 11B10/11C05/11C07/11C09/ 11C11/11D04/11D06/11D08/

11D10/11D12/11E03/11E05/

11E07/11E09/11E11/11E13/

11F02/11F04/11F06/11F08/

11F10/11F12/11F14/11G03/

11G05/11G07/11G09/11G11/

11G13/11H02/11H04/11H06/

11H08/11H10/11H12/11H14/

11J03/11J05/11J07/11J09/11J11/

11J13/11K02/11K04/11K06/

11K08/11K10/11K12/11K14/ 11L03/11L05/11L07/11L09/ 11L11/11L13/11M04/11M06/

11M08/11M10/11M12/11N05/

11N07/11N09/11N11/11P06/

11P08/11P10 Containment Incore Instrument QuickLoc Assemblies (8 Locations)

RXS-MY-Y11 through Y18 Containment Source Range Detectors (4)

RXS-JE-NE001A/NE001B/ NE001C/NE001D Containment Intermediate Range Detectors (4) RXS-JE-NE002A/NE002B/ NE002C/NE002D Containment Power Range Detectors

- Lower (4)

RXS-JE-NE003A/NE003B/ NE003C/NE003D Containment Power Range Detectors

- Upper (4) RXS-JE-NE004A/NE004B/ NE004C/NE004D Containment

C-86 Table 2.1.3-4 Key Dimensions and Acceptable Variations of the Reactor Vessel and Internals (Figure 2.1.3.2 and Figure 2.1.3

-3) Description Dimension or Elevation (inches) Nominal Value (inches) Acceptable Variation (inches) RV inside diameter at beltline (inside cladding)

A 159.0 +1.0/-1.0 RV wall thickness at beltline (without cladding)

B 8.4 +1.0/-0.12 RV wall thickness at bottom head (without cladding)

C 6.0 +1.0/-0.12 RV inlet nozzle inside diameter at safe end D 22.0 +0.35/-0.10 RV outlet nozzle inside diameter at safe end E 31.0 +0.35/-0.10 Elevation from RV mating surface to centerline of inlet nozzle F 62.5 +0.25/-0.25 Elevation from RV mating surface to centerline of outlet nozzle G 80.0 +0.25/-0.25 Elevation from RV mating surface to centerline of direct vessel injection nozzle H 100.0 +0.25/-0.25 Elevation from RV mating surface to inside of RV bottom head (inside cladding) I 397.59 +1.0/-0.50 Elevation from RV mating surface to top of lower core support plate J 327.3 +0.50/-0.50 Separation distance between bottom of upper core plate and top of lower core support with RV head in place K 189.8 +0.20/0.20

C-87 Figure 2.1.3-1 Reactor Upper Internals Rod Guide Arrangement

C-88 Figure 2.1.3-2 Rod Cluster Control and Drive Rod Arrangement

C-89 Figure 2.1.3-3 Reactor Vessel Arrangement

C-90 2.2 Nuclear Safety Systems

2.2.1 Containment

System Design Description The containment system (CNS) is the collection of boundaries that separates the containment atmosphere from the outside environment during design basis accidents.

The CNS is as shown in Figure 2.2.1

-1 and the component locations of the CNS are as shown in Tabl e 2.2.1-4. 1. The functional arrangement of the CNS and associated systems is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.2.1.

2. a) The components identified in Table 2.2.1

-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.1

-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

3. a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.1

-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.1

-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

4. a) The components identified in Table 2.2.1

-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.1

-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.1

-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function.

6. a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.1

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.1

-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division. c) Separation is provided between CNS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1 E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable.

d) The non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of containment pressure boundary integrity.

C-91 7. The CNS provides the safety

-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere.

8. Containment electrical penetration assemblies are protected against currents that are greater than the continuous ratings.

9. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.2.1-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR). 10. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause those remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 to perform active functions.

b) The valves identified in Table 2.2.1

-1 as having protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform an active function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

c) The valves identified in Table 2.2.1

-1 as having diverse actuation system (DAS) control perform an active function after receiving a signal from the DAS

. 11. a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.2.1

-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.1

-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

C-92 Table 2.2.1

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Service Air Supply Outside Containment Isolation Valve Service Air Supply Inside Containment Isolation Check Valve CAS-PL-V204 CAS-PL-V205 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No -/- -/- No No -/- -/- None Transfer Closed - - Instrument Air Supply Outside Containment Isolation Valve Instrument Air Supply Inside Containment Isolation Check Valve CAS-PL-V014 CAS-PL-V015 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes/No

-/- Yes (Valve Position) - Yes/No

-/- Transfer Closed Transfer Closed Closed

- Component Cooling Water System (CCS) Containment Isolation Motor

-operated Valve (MOV) - Inlet Line Outside Reactor Containment (ORC)

CCS Containment Isolation Check Valve

- Inlet Line Inside Reactor Containment (IRC)

CCS-PL-V200 CCS-PL-V201 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes/No -/- Yes (Valve Position) No Yes/No -/- Transfer Closed Transfer Closed As Is - CCS Containment Isolation MOV

- Outlet Line IRC CCS Containment Isolation MOV

- Outlet Line ORC CCS Containment Isolation Relief Valve - Outlet Line IRC CCS-PL-V207 CCS-PL-V208 CCS-PL-220 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes/Yes Yes/No -/- Yes (Valve Position) Yes (Valve Position) No Yes/No Yes/No -/- Transfer Closed Transfer Closed Transfer Closed/ Transfer Open As Is As Is -

C-93 Table 2.2.1

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Demineralized Water Supply Containment Isolation Valve ORC Demineralized Water Supply Containment Isolation Check Valve IRC DWS-PL-V244 DWS-PL-V245 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No -/-

-/- No No -/-

-/- None Transfer Closed -

- Fuel Transfer Tube FHS-FT-001 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - - Fuel Transfer Tube Isolation Valve FHS-PL-V001 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- Transfer Closed - Fire Water Containment Supply Isolation Valve

- Outside Fire Water Containment Isolation Supply Check Valve

- Inside FPS-PL-V050 FPS-PL-V052 Yes Yes Yes Yes No No -/- -/- No No -/- -/- None Transfer Closed - - Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (SFS) Discharge Line Containment Isolation Check Valve - IRC SFS Discharge Line Containment Isolation MOV

- ORC SFS-PL-V037 SFS-PL-V038 Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes -/- Yes/No No Yes (Valve Position) -/- Yes/No Transfer Closed Transfer Closed - As Is SFS Suction Line Containment Isolation MOV

- IRC SFS Suction Line Containment Isolation MOV

- ORC SFS Suction Line Containment Isolation Relief Valve

- IRC SFS-PL-V034 SFS-PL-V035 SFS-PL-V067 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes/Yes Yes/No -/- Yes (Valve Position) Yes (Valve Position) No Yes/No Yes/No -/- Transfer Closed Transfer Closed Transfer Closed/ Transfer Open As Is As Is -

C-94 Table 2.2.1

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Containment Purge Inlet Containment Isolation Valve

- ORC Containment Purge Inlet Containment Isolation Valve

- IRC VFS-PL-V003 VFS-PL-V004 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes (Valve Position) Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Transfer Closed Transfer Closed Closed Closed Integrated Leak Rate Testing Vent Discharge Containment Isolation Valve

- ORC Containment Purge Discharge Containment Isolation Valve

- IRC Containment Purge Discharge Containment Isolation Valve

- ORC VFS-PL-V008 VFS-PL-V009 VFS-PL-V010 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes -/- Yes/Yes Yes/No No Yes (Valve Position) Yes (Valve Position) -/-

Yes/Yes Yes/Yes None Transfer Closed Transfer Closed -

Closed Closed C-95 Table 2.2.1

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Vacuum Relief Containment Isolation A

- ORC Vacuum Relief Containment Isolation B

- ORC Vacuum Relief Containment Isolation Check Valve A

- IRC Vacuum Relief Containment Isolation Check Valve B

- IRC VFS-PL-V800A VFS-PL-V800B VFS-PL-V803A VFS-PL-V803B Yes Yes

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

No No Yes/No Yes/No

-/- -/- Yes (Valve Position) Yes (Valve Position) No No Yes/No Yes/No

-/- -/- Transfer Closed/ Transfer Open Transfer Closed/ Transfer Open Transfer Closed/ Transfer Open Transfer Closed/ Transfer Open As Is As Is -

- Fan Coolers Return Containment Isolation Valve

- IRC Fan Coolers Return Containment Isolation Valve

- ORC Fan Coolers Return Containment Isolation Relief Valve

- IRC VWS-PL-V082 VWS-PL-V086 VWS-PL-V080 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes/Yes Yes/No -/- Yes (Valve Position) Yes (Valve Position) No Yes/No Yes/No -/- Transfer Closed Transfer Closed Transfer Closed/ Transfer Open Closed Closed -

C-96 Table 2.2.1

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Fan Coolers Supply Containment Isolation Valve

- ORC Fan Coolers Supply Containment Isolation Check Valve

- IRC VWS-PL-V058 VWS-PL-V062 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes/No

-/- Yes (Valve Position) No Yes/No

-/- Transfer Closed Transfer Closed Closed

- Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT) Gas Outlet Containment Isolation Valve

- IRC RCDT Gas Outlet Containment Isolation Valve - ORC WLS-PL-V067 WLS-PL-V068 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position) Yes (Valve Position) Yes/No Yes/No Transfer Closed Transfer Closed Closed Closed Sump Discharge Containment Isolation Valve

- IRC Sump Discharge Containment Isolation Valve

- ORC Sump Discharge Containment Isolation Relief Valve

- IRC WLS-PL-V055 WLS-PL-V057 WLS-PL-V058 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes/Yes Yes/No -/- Yes (Valve Position) Yes (Valve Position) No Yes/Yes Yes/Yes -/- Transfer Closed Transfer Closed Transfer Closed/ Transfer Open Closed Closed - Spare Penetration CNS-PY-C01 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - - Spare Penetration CNS-PY-C02 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - - Spare Penetration CNS-PY-C03 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - - Main Equipment Hatch CNS-MY-Y01 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - - Maintenance Hatch CNS-MY-Y02 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - - Personnel Hatch CNS-MY-Y03 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - - Personnel Hatch CNS-MY-Y04 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - -

C-97 Table 2.2.1

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Containment Vessel CNS-MV-01 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P03 DAS-EY-P03Z Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P01 ECS-EY-P01X Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P02 ECS-EY-P02X Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P06 ECS-EY-P06Y Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P09 ECS-EY-P09W Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P10 ECS-EY-P10W Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P11 IDSA-EY-P11Z Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P12 IDSA-EY-P12Y Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P13 IDSA-EY-P13Y Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P14 IDSD-EY-P14Z Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P15 IDSD-EY-P15Y Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P16 IDSD-EY-P16Y Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P18 ECS-EY-P18X Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P21 EDS-EY-P21Z Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P22 ECS-EY-P22X Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P23 ECS-EY-P23X Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P24 ECS-EY-P24 Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P25 ECS-EY-P25W Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P26 ECS-EY-P26W Yes Yes - No/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P27 IDSC-EY-P27Z Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P28 IDSC-EY-P28Y Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - -

C-98 Table 2.2.1

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Electrical Penetration P29 IDSC-EY-P29Y Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P30 IDSB-EY-P30Z Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P31 IDSB-EY-P31Y Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - - Electrical Penetration P32 IDSB-EY-P32Y Yes Yes - Yes/Yes - -/- - - Instrument Penetration P46 PCS-PY-C01 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - - Instrument Penetration P47 PCS-PY-C02 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - - Instrument Penetration P48 PCS-PY-C03 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - - Instrument Penetration P49 PCS-PY-C04 Yes Yes - -/- - -/- - - Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-99 Table 2.2.1

-2 Line Name Line Number ASME Code Section III Instrument Air In CAS-PL-L015 Yes Service Air In CAS-PL-L204 Yes Component Cooling Water Supply to Containment CCS-PL-L201 Yes Component Cooling Water Outlet from Containment CCS-PL-L207 Yes Demineralized Water In DWS-PL-L245, L230 Yes Fire Protection Supply to Containment FPS-PL-L107 Yes Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Discharge SFS-PL-L017 Yes Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Suction from Containment SFS-PL-L038 Yes Containment Purge Inlet to Containment VFS-PL-L104, L105, L106 Yes Containment Purge Discharge from Containment VFS-PL-L203, L204, L205, L800, L801A/B, L803, L804, L805A/B Yes Fan Cooler Supply Line to Containment VWS-PL-L032 Yes Fan Cooler Return Line from Containment V WS-PL-L055 Yes RCDT Gas Out WLS-PL-L022 Yes Waste Sump Out WLS-PL-L073 Yes C-100 Table 2.2.1

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 90 2.2.01.01 1. The functional arrangement of the CNS and associated systems is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.2.1. Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built CNS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.2.1.

91 2.2.01.02a 2.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports.

The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the

as-built components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III./

92 2.2.01.02b 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping as documented in the ASME design reports.

The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the

as-built piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III. 93 2.2.01.03a 3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of the as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section

III. A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

94 2.2.01.03b 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.1

-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of the as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section

III. A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

95 2.2.01.04a.i 4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

i) A hydrostatic or pressure test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be tested. i) A report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

96 2.2.01.04a.ii 4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

ii) Impact testing will be performed on the containment and pressure

-retaining penetration materials in accordance with the ASME Code Section III, Subsection NE, to confirm the fracture toughness of the materials.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the

containment and pressure

-retaining penetration materials conform with fracture toughness requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

C-101 Table 2.2.1

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 97 2.2.01.04b 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure. A hydrostatic or pressure test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be pressure tested.

A report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the piping identified in Table 2.2.1-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

98 2.2.01.05.i

5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function. i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment and valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. 99 2.2.01.05.ii

5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function.

100 2.2.01.05.

iii 5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of structural integrity and safety function.

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

iii) The as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

101 2.2.01.06a.i 6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.1

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.

i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.1

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

C-102 Table 2.2.1

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 102 2.2.01.06a.ii 6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.1

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

ii) Inspection will be performed of the as

-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

103 2.2.01.06b 6.b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.1

-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

Testing will be performed by providing a simulated test signal in each Class 1E division. A simulated test signal exists at the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.1-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

104 2.2.01.06c 6.c) Separation is provided between CNS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable.

See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. 105 2.2.01.06d.i 6.d) The non

-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of containment pressure boundary integrity.

i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on non-Class 1E electrical penetrations located in a harsh environment.

i) A report exists and concludes that the non

-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of containment pressure boundary integrity.

106 2.2.01.06d.ii 6.d) The non

-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of containment pressure boundary integrity.

ii) Inspection will be performed of the as

-built non-Class 1E electrical penetrations located in a harsh environment.

ii) A report exists and concludes that th e as-built non-Class 1E electrical penetrations identified in Table 2.2.1

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

C-103 Table 2.2.1

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 107 2.2.01.07.i

7. The CNS provides the safety

-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere.

i) A containment integrated leak rate test will be performed.

i) The leakage rate from containment for the integrated leak rate test is less than L

a. 108 2.2.01.07.ii

7. The CNS provides the safety

-related function of containment isolation for containment boundary integrity and provides a barrier against the release of fission products to the atmosphere.

ii) Testing will be performed to demonstrate that remotely operated containment isolation valves close within the required response times.

ii) The containment purge isolation valves (VFS

-PL-V 003 , -V 004 , -V009, and

-V010) close within

20 seconds, containment vacuum relief isolation valves (VFS

-PL-V 800A and -V 800B) close within 30 seconds, SGS valves SGS-PL-V 040A/B and SGS-PL-V 057A/B are covered in subsection 2.2.4 , Table 2.2.4-4 (item 11.b.ii) and all other containment isolation valves close within 60 seconds upon receipt of an actuation signal.

109 2.2.01.08 8. Containment electrical penetration assemblies are protected against currents that are greater than the continuous ratings.

An analysis for the as

-built containment electrical penetration assemblies will be performed to demonstrate (1) that the maximum current of the circuits does not exceed the continuous rating of the containment electrical penetration assembly, or (2) that the circuits have redundant protection devices in series and that the redundant current protection devices are coordinated with the containment electrical penetration assembly's rated short circuit thermal capacity data and prevent current from exceeding the continuous current rating of the containment electrical penetration assembly.

Analysis exists for the as

-built containment electrical penetration assemblies and concludes that the penetrations are protected against currents which are greater than their continuous ratings.

C-104 Table 2.2.1

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 110 2.2.01.09 9. Safety

-related displays identified in Table 2.2.1

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the safety

-related displays in the MCR.

Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.2.1

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. 111 2.2.01.10a 10.a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause those remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.1

-1 to perform active functions.

Stroke testing will be performed on remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.1

-1 using the controls in the MCR.

Controls in the MCR operate to cause remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 to perform active safety functions.

112 2.2.01.10b 10.b) The valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as having PMS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

Testing will be performed on remotely operated valves listed in Table 2.2.1

-1 using real or simulated signals into the PMS. The remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as having PMS control perform the active function identified in the table after receiving a signal from PMS.

113 2.2.01.10c 10.c) The valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as having DAS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from DAS. Testing will be performed on remotely operated valves listed in Table 2.2.1

-1 using real or simulated signals into the DAS. The remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 as having DAS control perform the active function identified in the table after receiving a signal from DAS.

114 2.2.01.11a.i 11.a) The motor

-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

i) Tests or type tests of motor-operated valves will be performed to demonstrate the capability of each valve to operate under design conditions.

i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor

-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.1

-1 under design conditions.

115 2.2.01.11a.ii 11.a) The motor

-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built motor

-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests. 116 2.2.01.11a.iii 11.a) The motor

-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

iii) Tests of the motor

-operated valves will be performed under preoperational flow, differential pressure, and temperature conditions.

iii) Each motor

-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.1

-1 under pre-operational test conditions.

C-105 Table 2.2.1

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 117 2.2.01.11a.iv 11.a) The motor

-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

iv) Exercise testing of the check valves with active safety functions identified in Table 2.2.1-1 will be performed under preoperational test pressure, temperature and fluid flow conditions.

iv) Each check valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.1-1. 118 2.2.01.11b 11.b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.1-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

Testing of the remotely operated valves will be performed under the conditions of loss of motive powe r. After loss of motive power, each remotely operated valve identified in Table 2.2.1-1 assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.

Table 2.2.1

-4 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Containment Vessel CNS-MV-01 Shield Building

C-106

Figure 2.2.1

-1 Containment System

C-107 2.2.2 Passive Containment Cooling System Design Description The passive containment cooling system (PCS) removes heat from the containment during design basis events.

The PCS is as shown in Figure 2.2.2

-1 and the component locations of the PCS are as shown in Table 2.2.2-4. 1. The functional arrangement of the PCS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.2.2. 2. a) The components identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) The pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2

-2 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

3. a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) Pressure boundary welds in the pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2

-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

4. a) The components identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

b) The pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2

-2 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

5. a) The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

b) Each of the pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2

-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

c) The passive containment cooling ancillary water storage tank (PCCAWST) can withstand a seismic event.

6. a) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

c) Separation is provided between PCS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1 E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable. 7. The PCS performs the following safety

-related functions:

C-108 a) The PCS delivers water from the PCCWST to the outside, top of the containment vessel.

b) The PCS wets the outside surface of the containment vessel. The inside and outside of the containment vessel above the operating deck are coated with an inorganic zinc coating. c) The PCS provides air flow over the outside of the containment vessel by a natural circulation air flow path from the air inlets to the air discharge structure.

d) The PCS drains the excess water from the outside of the containment vessel through the two upper annulus drains.

e) The PCS provides a flow path for long

-term water makeup to the passive containment cooling water storage tank (PCCWST).

f) The PCS provides a flow path for long

-term water makeup from the PCCWST to the spent fuel pool.

8. The PCS performs the following nonsafety

-related functions:

a) The PCCAWST contains an inventory of cooling water sufficient for PCS containment cooling from hour 72 through day 7.

b) The PCS delivers water from the PCCAWST to the PCCWST and spent fuel pool simultaneously.

c) The PCCWST includes a water inventory for the fire protection system.

9. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR). 10. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 to perform active functions.

b) The valves identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 as having protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

c) The valves identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 as having diverse actuation system (DAS) control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the DAS.

11. a) The motor-operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

C-109 Table 2.2.2

-1 Component Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/ DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position PCCWST PCS-MT-01 No Yes - - - - - - Water Distribution Bucket PCS-MT-03 No Yes - - - - - - Water Distribution Wiers PCS-MT-04 No Yes - - - - - - PCCWST Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V001A Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position) Yes/Yes Transfer Open Open PCCWST Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V001B Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position) Yes/Yes Transfer Open Open PCCWST Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V001C Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position) Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is PCCWST Isolation Block MOV PCS-PL-V002A Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position) Yes/No Transfer Open As Is PCCWST Isolation Block MOV PCS-PL-V002B Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position) Yes/No Transfer Open As Is PCCWST Isolation Block MOV PCS-PL-V002C Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position) Yes/No Transfer Open As Is PCS Recirculation Return Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V023 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer Close - PCCWST Supply to Fire Protection System Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V005 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer Close - PCS Makeup to SFS Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V009 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer Open/ Transfer Close -

C-110 Table 2.2.2

-1 Component Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/ DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Water Makeup Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V044 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer Open - Water Bucket Makeup Line Drain Valve PCS-PL-V015 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer Close - Water Bucket Makeup Line Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V020 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer Open - PCCWST Long

-Term Makeup Line Check Valve PCS-PL-V039 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer Open - PCCWST Long

-Term Makeup Drain Isolation PCS-PL-V042 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer Close - PCS Discharge to SFS Pool Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V045 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer Open - Recirc Header Discharge to PCCWST Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V046 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer Close - PCCWST Drain Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V049 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer Close - Recirc Header Discharge to SFS Pool Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V050 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer Open/Close

- PCCWST Discharge to SFS Pool Isolation Valve PCS-PL-V051 Yes Yes - -/No No - Transfer Open/Close

- PCS Water Delivery Flow Sensor PCS-001 No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - - PCS Water Delivery Flow Sensor PCS-002 No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - - PCS Water Delivery Flow Sensor PCS-003 No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - - PCS Water Delivery Flow Sensor PCS-004 No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

C-111 Table 2.2.2

-1 Component Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/ DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Containment Pressure Sensor PCS-005 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - Containment Pressure Sensor PCS-006 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - Containment Pressure Sensor PCS-007 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - Containment Pressure Sensor PCS-008 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - PCCWST Water Level Sensor PCS-010 No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - - PCCWST Water Level Sensor PCS-011 No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - - High-range Containment Pressure Sensor PCS-012 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - High-range Containment Pressure Sensor PCS-013 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - High-range Containment Pressure Sensor PCS-014 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-112 Table 2.2.2

-2 Pipeline Name Line Number ASME Code Section III Functional Capability Required PCCWST Discharge Lines PCS-PL-L001A/B/C/D Yes Yes PCCWST Discharge Cross

-connect Line PCS-PL-L002 Yes Yes PCCWST Discharge Header Lines PCS-PL-L 003A/B PCS-PL-L005 Yes Yes Post-72-hour Supply Line Connection PCS-PL-L 051 PCS-PL-L 054 PCS-PL-L065 Yes Yes Post-72-hour Containment Cooling Makeup From Supply Line Connections PCS-PL-L 004 PCS-PL-L 007 PCS-PL-L 008 PCS-PL-L 023 PCS-PL-L050 Yes Yes Post-72-hour SFS Makeup From PCCWST PCS-PL-L011 PCS-PL-L 017 PCS-PL-L 018 PCS-PL-L 030* PCS-PL-L 073 Yes Yes Post-72-hour SFS Makeup From Supply Line Connection PCS-PL-L 025 PCS-PL-L 029 PCS-PL-L 030* PCS-PL-L 048 PCS-PL-L049 Yes Yes Note:

Line PCS-PL-L030 is a common makeup line from both sources.

C-113 Table 2.2.2

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 119 2.2.02.01 1. The functional arrangement of the PCS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.2.2. Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built PCS conforms to the functional arrangement as described in the Desig n Description of this Section 2.2.2.

120 2.2.02.02a 2.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports. The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as

-built components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code Section III.

121 2.2.02.02b 2.b) The pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping as documented in the ASME design reports.

The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as

-built piping identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III. 122 2.2.02.03a 3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of the as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.

A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non

-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

123 2.2.02.03b 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in the pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2

-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of the as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.

A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non

-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

124 2.2.02.04a 4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested. A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

125 2.2.02.04b 4.b) The pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.

A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic tes t of the piping identified in Table 2.2.2-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

C-114 Table 2.2.2

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 126 2.2.02.05a.i 5.a) The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I components and valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.

127 2.2.02.05a.ii 5.a) The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I components will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I components can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

128 2.2.02.05a.iii 5.a) The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.2.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built components including anchorage are seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

iii) The report exists and concludes that the as

-built components including anchorage are seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

129 2.2.02.05b 5.b) Each of the pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2

-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report concluding that the as

-built pipelines meet the requirements for functional capability.

A report exists and concludes that each of the as

-built pipelines identified in Table 2.2.2

-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.

1 30 2.2.02.05c 5.c) The PCCAWST can withstand a seismic event.

Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built PCCAWST and its anchorage are designed using seismic Category II methods and criteria. A report exists and concludes that the as-built PCCAWST and its anchorage are designed using seismic Category II methods and criteria. 131 2.2.02.06a.i 6.a) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

i) Type tests or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E components located in a harsh environment.

i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

C-115 Table 2.2.2

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 132 2.2.02.06a.ii 6.a) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E components and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built Class 1E components and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

133 2.2.02.06b 6.b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

Testing will be performed by providing a simulated test signal in each Class 1E division.

A simulated test signal exists at the Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

134 2.2.02.06c 6.c) Separation is provided between PCS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.

See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.

135 2.2.02.07a.i 7.a) The PCS delivers water from the PCCWST to the outside, top of the containment vessel. i) Testing will be performed to measure the PCCWST delivery rate from each one of the three parallel flow paths.

i) When tested, each one of the three flow paths delivers water at greater than or equal to:

- 469.1 gpm at a PCCWST water level of 27.4 ft + 0.2, - 0.0 ft above the tank floor

- 226.6 gpm when the PCCWST water level uncovers the first (i.e. tallest) standpipe

- 176.3 gpm when the PCCWST water level uncovers the second tallest standpipe

- 144.2 gpm when the PCCWST water level uncovers the third tallest standpipe 136 2.2.02.07a.ii 7.a) The PCS delivers water from the PCCWST to the outside, top of the containment vessel. ii) Testing and or analysis will be performed to demonstrate the PCCWST inventory provides 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months of adequate water flow.

ii) When tested and/or analyzed with all flow paths delivering and an initial water level at 27.4 + 0.2 , - 0.00 ft, the PCCWST water inventory provides greater than or equal to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months of flow, and the flow rate at 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months is greater than or equal to 100.7 gpm.

C-116 Table 2.2.2

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 137 2.2.02.07a.iii 7.a) The PCS delivers water from the PCCWST to the outside, top of the containment vessel. iii) Inspection will be performed to determine the PCCWST standpipes elevations.

iii) The elevations of the standpipes above the tank floor are: - 16.8 ft +/- 0.2 ft

- 20.3 ft +/- 0.2 ft

- 24.1 ft +/- 0.2 ft 138 2.2.02.07b.i 7.b) The PCS wets the outside surface of the containment vessel. The inside and the outside of the containment vessel above the operating deck are coated with an inorganic zinc material.

i) Testing will be performed to measure the outside wetted surface of the containment vessel with one of the three parallel flow paths delivering water to the top of the containment vessel.

i) A report exists and concludes that when the water in the PCCWST uncovers the standpipes at the following levels, the water delivered by one of the three parallel flow paths to the containment shell provides coverage measured at the spring line that is equal to or greater than the stated coverages.

- 24.1 +/- 0.2 ft above the tank floor; at least 90% of the perimeter is wetted.

- 20.3 +/- 0.2 ft above the tank floor; at least 72.9% of the perimeter is wetted.

- 16.8 +/- 0.2 ft above the tank floor; at least 59.6

% of the perimeter is wetted.

139 2.2.02.07b.ii 7.b) The PCS wets the outside surface of the containment vessel. The inside and the outside of the containment vessel above the operating deck are coated with an inorganic zinc material.

ii) Inspection of the containment vessel exterior coating will be conducted.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the containment vessel exterior surface is coated with an inorganic zinc coating above elevation 135'-3". 140 2.2.02.07b.iii 7.b) The PCS wets the outside surface of the containment vessel. The inside and the outside of the containment vessel above the operating deck are coated with an inorganic zinc material.

iii) Inspection of the containment vessel interior coating will be conducted.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the containment vessel interior surface is coated with an inorganic zinc coating above 7' above the operating deck.

C-117 Table 2.2.2

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 141 2.2.02.07c 7.c) The PCS provides air flow over the outside of the containment vessel by a natural circulation air flow path from the air inlets to the air discharge structure.

Inspections of the air flow path segments will be performed.

Flow paths exist at each of the following locations:

- Air inlets

- Base of the outer annulus

- Base of the inner annulus

- Discharge structure 142 2.2.02.07d 7.d) The PCS drains the excess water from the outside of the containment vessel through the two upper annulus drains.

Testing will be performed to verify the upper annulus drain flow performance.

With a water level within the upper annulus 10" + 1" above the annulus drain inlet, the flow rate through each drain is greater than or equal to 525 gpm.

143 2.2.02.07e.i 7.e) The PCS provides a flow path for long

-term water makeup to the PCCWST.

i) See item 1 in this table.

144 2.2.02.07e.ii 7.e) The PCS provides a flow path for long

-term water makeup to the PCCWST.

ii) Testing will be performed to measure the delivery rate from the long-term makeup connection to the PCCWST. ii) With a water supply connected to the PCS long

-term makeup connection, each PCS recirculation pump delivers greater than or equal to 100 gpm when tested separately.

145 2.2.02.07f.i 7.f) The PCS provides a flow path for long

-term water makeup from the PCCWST to the spent fuel pool.

i) Testing will be performed to measure the delivery rate from the PCCWST to the spent fuel pool.

i) With the PCCWST water level at 27.4 ft + 0.2, - 0.0 ft above the bottom of the tank, the flow path from the PCCWST to the spent fuel pool delivers greater than or equal to 118 gpm. 146 2.2.02.07f.ii 7.f) The PCS provides a flow path for long

-term water makeup from the PCCWST to the spent fuel pool.

ii) Inspection of the PCCWST will be performed.

ii) The volume of the PCCWST is greater than 756,700 gallons.

147 2.2.02.08a 8.a) The PCCAWST contains an inventory of cooling water sufficient for PCS containment cooling from hour 72 through day 7. Inspection of the PCCAWST will be performed.

The volume of the PCCAWST is greater than 780,000 gallons.

148 2.2.02.08b 8.b) The PCS delivers water from the PCCAWST to the PCCWST and spent fuel pool simultaneously.

Testing will be performed to measure the delivery rate from the PCCAWST to the PCCWST and spent fuel pool simultaneously.

With PCCASWST aligned to the suction of the recirculation pumps, each pump delivers greater than or equal to 100 gpm to the PCCWST and 35 gpm to the spent fuel pool simultaneously when each pump is tested separately.

C-118 Table 2.2.2

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 149 2.2.02.08c 8.c) The PCCWST includes a water inventory for the fire protection system.

See ITAAC Table 2.3.4

-2, items 1 and 2. See ITAAC Table 2.3.4

-2, items 1 and 2. 150 2.2.02.09 9. Safety

-related displays identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the safety

-related displays in the MCR.

Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

151 2.2.02.10a 10.a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 to perform active functions.

Stroke testing will be performed on the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 using the controls in the MCR.

Controls in the MCR operate to cause remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 to perform active functions.

152 2.2.02.10b 10.b) The valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as having PMS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

Testing will be performed on the remotely operated valves in Table 2.2.2-1 using real or simulated signals into the PMS.

The remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as having PMS control perform the active function identified in the table after receiving a signal from the PMS. 153 2.2.02.10c 10.c) The valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as having DAS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the DAS.

Testing will be performed on the remotely operated valves listed in Table 2.2.2

-1 using real or simulated signals into the DAS.

The remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 as having DAS control perform the active function identified in the table after receiving a signal from the DAS. 154 2.2.02.11a.i 11.a) The motor

-operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table. i) Tests or type tests of motor

-operated valves will be performed to demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions.

i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor

-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.2

-1 under design conditions.

155 2.2.02.11a.ii 11.a) The motor

-operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table. ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the capability of the

as-built motor

-operated valves bound the tested conditions.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the capability of the as

-built motor-operated valves bound the tested conditions.

156 2.2.02.11a.iii 11.a) The motor

-operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table. iii) Tests of the motor

-operated valves will be performed under preoperational flow, differential pressure, and temperature conditions.

iii) Each motor

-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.2

-1 under preoperational test conditions.

C-119 Table 2.2.2

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 157 2.2.02.11b 11.b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

Testing of the remotely operated valves will be performed under the conditions of loss of motive power. After loss of motive power, each remotely operated valve identified in Table 2.2.2

-1 assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.

Table 2.2.2

-4 Component Name Tag No. Component Location PCCWST PCS-MT-01 Shield Building PCCAWST PCS-MT-05 Yard Recirculation Pump A PCS-MP-01A Auxiliary Building Recirculation Pump B PCS-MP-01B Auxiliary Building

C-120 Figure 2.2.2

-1 Passive Containment Cooling System C-121 2.2.3 Passive Core Cooling System Design Description The passive core cooling system (PXS) provides emergency core cooling during design basis events. The PXS is as shown in Figure 2.2.3

-1 and the component locations of the PXS are as shown in Table 2.2.3-5. 1. The functional arrangement of the PXS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.2.3.

2. a) The components identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.3

-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

3. a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.3

-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

4. a) The components identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.3

-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

5. a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.2.3

-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

6. Each of the as

-built lines identified in Table 2.2.

3-2 as designed for leak before break (LBB) meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.

7. a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.3-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

c) Separation is provided between PXS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1 E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable.

8. The PXS provides the following safety

-related functions:

C-122 a) The PXS provides containment isolation of the PXS lines penetrating the containment.

b) The PRHR HX provides core decay heat removal during design basis events.

c) The CMTs, accumulators, in

-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) and containment recirculation provide reactor coolant system (RCS) makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

d) The PXS provides pH adjustment of water flooding the containment following design basis accidents.

9. The PXS has the following features:

a) The PXS provides a function to cool the outside of the reactor vessel during a severe accident. b) The accumulator discharge check valves (PXS

-PL-V028A/B and V029A/B) are of a different check valve type than the CMT discharge check valves (PXS

-PL-V016A/B and V017A/B). c) The equipment listed in Table 2.2.3

-6 has sufficient thermal lag to withstand the effects of identified hydrogen burns associated with severe accidents.

10. Safety-related displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 can be retrieved in the main control ro om (MCR). 11. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 to perform their active function(s).

b) The valves identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 as having protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform their active function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

c) The valves identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 as having diverse actuation system (DAS) control perform their active function after receiving a signal from the DAS.

12. a) The squib valves and check valves identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

13. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.2.

3-3 can be retrieved in the MCR C-123 Table 2.2.3

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/ DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger (PRHR HX) PXS-ME-01 Yes Yes - - / - - - / - - - Accumulator Tank A PXS-MT-01A Yes Yes - - / - - - / - - - Accumulator Tank B PXS-MT-01B Yes Yes - - / - - - / - - - Core Makeup Tank (CMT)

A PXS-MT-02A Yes Yes - - / - - - / - - - CMT B PXS-MT-02B Yes Yes - - / - - - / - - - IRWST PXS-MT-03 No Yes - - / - - - / - - - IRWST Screen A PXS-MY-Y01A No Yes - - / - - - / - - - IRWST Screen B PXS-MY-Y01B No Yes - - / - - - / - - - IRWST Screen C PXS-MY-Y01C No Yes - - / - - - / - - - Containment Recirculation Screen A PXS-MY-Y02A No Yes - - / - - - / - - - Containment Recirculation Screen B PXS-MY-Y02B No Yes - - / - - - / - - - pH Adjustment Basket 3A PXS-MY-Y03A No Yes - - / - - - / - - - pH Adjustment Basket 3B PXS-MY-Y03B No Yes - - / - - - / - - - pH Adjustment Basket 4A PXS-MY-Y04A No Yes - / - - / - pH Adjustment Basket 4B PXS-MY-Y04B No Yes - / - - / - Downspout Screen 1A PXS-MY-Y81 No Yes - - / - - - / - - - Downspout Screen 1B PXS-MY-Y82 No Yes - - / - - - / - - - Downspout Screen 1C PXS-MY-Y83 No Yes - - / - - - / - - - Downspout Screen 1D PXS-MY-Y84 No Yes - - / - - - / - - - Downspout Screen 2A PXS-MY-Y85 No Yes - - / - - - / - - - Downspout Screen 2B PXS-MY-Y86 No Yes - - / - - - / - - -

C-124 Table 2.2.3

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/ DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Downspout Screen 2C PXS-MY-Y87 No Yes - - / - - - / - - - Downspout Screen 2D PXS-MY-Y88 No Yes - - / - - - / - - - CMT A Inlet Isolation Motor-operated Valve PXS-PL-V002A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Position)

Yes/No None As Is CMT B Inlet Isolation Motor

-operated Valve PXS-PL-V002B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Position)

Yes/No None As Is CMT A Discharge Isolation Valve PXS-PL-V014A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Position)

Yes/Yes Transfer Open Open CMT B Discharge Isolation Valve PXS-PL-V014B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Position)

Yes/Yes Transfer Open Open CMT A Discharge Isolation Valve PXS-PL-V015A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Position)

Yes/Yes Transfer Open Open CMT B Discharge Isolation Valve PXS-PL-V015B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Position)

Yes/Yes Transfer Open Open CMT A Discharge Check Valve PXS-PL-V016A Yes Yes No - / - No - / - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - CMT B Discharge Check Valve PXS-PL-V016B Yes Yes No - / - No - / - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - CMT A Discharge Check Valve PXS-PL-V017A Yes Yes No - / - No - / - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed -

C-125 Table 2.2.3

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/ DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position CMT B Discharge Check Valve PXS-PL-V017B Yes Yes No - / - No - / - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - Accumulator A Pressure Relief Valve PXS-PL-V022A Yes Yes No - / - No - / - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - Accumulator B Pressure Relief Valve PXS-PL-V022B Yes Yes No - / - No - / - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - Accumulator A Discharge Isolation Valve PXS-PL-V027A Yes Yes Yes - / - Yes - /No None As Is Accumulator B Discharge Isolation Valve PXS-PL-V027B Yes Yes Yes - / - Yes - /No None As Is Accumulator A Discharge Check Valve PXS-PL-V028A Yes Yes No - / - No - / - Transfer Open/ Close - Accumulator B Discharge Check Valve PXS-PL-V028B Yes Yes No - / - No - / - Transfer Open/ Close - Accumulator A Discharge Check Valve PXS-PL-V029A Yes Yes No - / - No - / - Transfer Open/ Close - Accumulator B Discharge Check Valve PXS-PL-V029B Yes Yes No - / - No - / - Transfer Open/ Close -

C-126 Table 2.2.3

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/ DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Nitrogen Supply Containment Isolation Valve PXS-PL-V042 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (position)

Yes/No Transfer Closed Close Nitrogen Supply Containment Isolation Check Valve PXS-PL-V043 Yes Yes No - / - No - / - Transfer Closed - PRHR HX Inlet Isolation Motor-operated Valve PXS-PL-V101 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (position)

Yes/No None As Is PRHR HX Control Valve PXS-PL-V108A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Position)

Yes/Yes Transfer Open Open PRHR HX Control Valve PXS-PL-V108B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Position)

Yes/Yes Transfer Open Open Containment Recirculation A Isolation Motor

-operated Valve PXS-PL-V117A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (position)

Yes/Yes None As Is Containment Recirculation B Isolation Motor

-operated Valve PXS-PL-V117B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (position)

Yes/Yes None As Is Containment Recirculation A Squib Valve PXS-PL-V118A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Position)

Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is Containment Recirculation B Squib Valve PXS-PL-V118B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Position)

Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is Containment Recirculation A Check Valve PXS-PL-V119A Yes Yes No - / - No - / - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed -

C-127 Table 2.2.3

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/ DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Containment Recirculation B Check Valve PXS-PL-V119B Yes Yes No - / - No - / - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - Containment Recirculation A Squib Valve PXS-PL-V120A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Position)

Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is Containment Recirculation B Squib Valve PXS-PL-V120B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Position)

Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is IRWST Injection A Check Valve PXS-PL-V122A Yes Yes No - / - No - / - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - IRWST Injection B Check Valve PXS-PL-V122B Yes Yes No - / - No - / - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - IRWST Injection A Squib Valve PXS-PL-V123A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Position)

Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is IRWST Injection B Squib Valve PXS-PL-V123B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Position)

Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is IRWST Injection A Check Valve PXS-PL-V124A Yes Yes No - / - No - / - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - IRWST Injection B

Check Valve PXS-PL-V124B Yes Yes No - / - No - / - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed -

C-128 Table 2.2.3

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/ DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position IRWST Injection A Squib Valve PXS-PL-V125A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Position)

Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is IRWST Injection B Squib Valve PXS-PL-V125B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Position)

Yes/Yes Transfer Open As Is IRWST Gutter Isolation Valve PXS-PL-V130A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Position)

Yes/Yes Transfer Closed Closed IRWST Gutter Isolation Valve PXS-PL-V130B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Position)

Yes/Yes Transfer Closed Closed CMT A Level Sensor PXS-011A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - / - - - CMT A Level Sensor PXS-011B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - / - - - CMT A Level Sensor PXS-011C - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - / - - - CMT A Level Sensor PXS-011D - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - / - - - CMT B Level Sensor PXS-012A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - CMT B Level Sensor PXS-012B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - CMT B Level Sensor PXS-012C - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - CMT B Level Sensor PXS-012D - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - CMT A Level Sensor PXS-013A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - CMT A Level Sensor PXS-013B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - CMT A Level Sensor PXS-013C - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - CMT A Level Sensor PXS-013D - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - CMT B Level Sensor PXS-014A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - / - - - CMT B Level Sensor PXS-014B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - / - - - CMT B Level Sensor PXS-014C - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - / - - -

C-129 Table 2.2.3

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/ DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position CMT B Level Sensor PXS-014D - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - / - - - IRWST Level Sensor PXS-045 - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - / - - - IRWST Level Sensor PXS-046 - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - / - - - IRWST Level Sensor PXS-047 - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - / - - - IRWST Level Sensor PXS-048 - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - / - - - PRHR HX Flow Sensor PXS-049A - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - / - - - PRHR HX Flow Sensor PXS-049B - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - / - - - Containment Flood

-up Level Sensor PXS-050 - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - Containment Flood

-up Level Sensor PXS-051 - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - Containment Flood

-up Level Sensor PXS-052 - Yes - Yes/Yes Yes -/- - - RNS Suction Leak Test Valve PXS-PL-V208A Yes Yes No - / - No -/- - - Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-130 Table 2.2.3

-2 Line Name Line Number ASME Code Section III Leak Before Break Functional Capability Required PRHR HX inlet line from hot leg and outlet line to steam generator channel head RCS-L 134, PXS-L 102, PXS-L 103 , PXS-L 104A, PXS-L 104B, PXS-L 105 , RCS-L113 Yes Yes Yes PXS-L107 Yes Yes No CMT A inlet line from cold leg C and outlet line to reactor vessel direct vessel injection (DVI) nozzle A RCS-L118A, PXS-L 007A, PXS-L 015A, PXS-L016A, PXS

-L017A, PXS

-L018A, PXS-L020A, PXS

-L021A Yes Yes Yes PXS-L019A, PXS

-L070A Yes Yes No CMT B inlet line from cold leg D and outlet line to reactor vessel DVI nozzle B RCS-L118B, PXS-L 007B, PXS-L 015B, PXS-L016B, PXS-L017B, PXS

-L018B, PXS-L020B, PXS

-L021B Yes Yes Yes PXS-L019B, PXS

-L070B Yes Yes No Accumulator A discharge line to DVI line A PXS-L025A, PXS

-L027A, PXS

-L029A Yes Yes Yes Accumulator B discharge line to DVI line B PXS-L025B, PXS

-L027B, PXS

-L029B Yes Yes Yes IRWST injection line A to DVI line A PXS-L125A, PXS

-L127A Yes Yes Yes PXS-L123A, PXS

-L124A, PXS

-L118A, PXS-L117A, PXS

-L116A, PXS

-L112A Yes No Yes IRWST injection line B to DVI line B PXS-L125B, PXS

-L127B Yes Yes Yes PXS-L123B, PXS

-L124B, PXS-L118B, PXS-L117B, PXS

-L116B, PXS

-L114B, PXS-L112B, PXS

-L120 Yes No Yes IRWST screen cross

-connect line PXS-L180A, PXS

-L180B Yes No Yes Containment recirculation line A PXS-L113A, PXS

-L131A, PXS

-L132A Yes No Yes C-131 Table 2.2.3

-2 Line Name Line Number ASME Code Section III Leak Before Break Functional Capability Required Containment recirculation line B PXS-L113B, PXS

-L131B, PXS

-L132B Yes No Yes IRWST gutter drain line PXS-L142A, PXS

-L142B Yes No Yes PXS-L141A, PXS

-L141B Yes No No Downspout drain lines from polar crane girder and internal stiffener to collection box A PXS-L301A, PXS

-L302A, PXS

-L303A, PXS-L304A, PXS

-L305A, PXS

-L306A, PXS-L307A, PXS

-L308A, PXS

-L309A, PXS-L310A Yes No Yes Downspout drain lines from polar crane girder and internal stiffener to collection box B PXS-L301B, PXS

-L302B, PXS

-L303B, PXS-L304B, PXS

-L305B, PXS

-L306B, PXS-L307B, PXS-L308B, PXS

-L309B, PXS-L310B Yes No Yes C-132 Table 2.2.3

-3 Equipment Tag No. Display Control Function CMT A Discharge Isolation Valve (Position)

PXS-PL-V014A Yes (Position)

- CMT B Discharge Isolation Valve (Position)

PXS-PL-V014B Yes (Position)

- CMT A Discharge Isolation Valve (Position)

PXS-PL-V015A Yes (Position)

- CMT B Discharge Isolation Valve (Position)

PXS-PL-V015B Yes (Position)

- Accumulator A Nitrogen Vent Valve (Position)

PXS-PL-V021A Yes (Position)

- Accumulator B Nitrogen Vent Valve (Position)

PXS-PL-V021B Yes (Position)

- Accumulator A Discharge Isolation Valve (Position)

PXS-PL-V027A Yes (Position)

- Accumulator B Discharge Isolation Valve (Position)

PXS-PL-V027B Yes (Position)

- PRHR HX Control Valve (Positio n) PXS-PL-V108A Yes (Position)

- PRHR HX Control Valve (Position)

PXS-PL-V108B Yes (Position)

- Containment Recirculation A Isolation Valve PXS-PL-V017A Yes (Position)

- Containment Recirculation B Isolation Valve PXS-PL-V017B Yes (Position)

- Containment Recirculation A Isolation Valve (Position)

PXS-PL-V118A Yes (Position)

- Containment Recirculation B Isolation Valve (Position)

PXS-PL-V118B Yes (Position)

- Containment Recirculation A Isolation Valve (Position)

PXS-PL-V120A Yes (Position)

- Containment Recirculation B Isolation Valve (Position)

PXS-PL-V120B Yes (Position)

- IRWST Line A Isolation Valve (Position)

PXS-PL-V121A Yes (Position)

- IRWST Line B Isolation Valve (Position)

PXS-PL-V121B Yes (Position)

- IRWST Injection A Isolation Squib (Position)

PXS-PL-V123A Yes (Position)

- IRWST Injection B Isolation Squib (Position)

PXS-PL-V123B Yes (Position)

- IRWST Injection A Isolation Squib (Position)

PXS-PL-V125A Yes (Position)

- IRWST Injection B Isolation Squib (Position)

PXS-PL-V125B Yes (Position)

-

C-133 Table 2.2.3

-3 Equipment Tag No. Display Control Function IRWST Gutter Bypass Isolation Valve (Position)

PXS-PL-V130A Yes (Position)

- IRWST Gutter Bypass Isolation Valve (Position)

PXS-PL-V130B Yes (Position)

- Accumulator A Level Sensor PXS-JE-L021 Yes - Accumulator B Level Sensor PXS-JE-L022 Yes - Accumulator A Level Sensor PXS-JE-L023 Yes - Accumulator B Level Sensor PXS-JE-L024 Yes - PRHR HX Inlet Temperature Sensor PXS-JE-T064 Yes - IRWST Surface Temperature Sensor PXS-JE-T041 Yes - IRWST Surface Temperature Sensor PXS-JE-T042 Yes - IRWST Bottom Temperature Sensor PXS-JE-T043 Yes - IRWST Bottom Temperature Sensor PXS-JE-T044 Yes - Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-134 Table 2.2.3

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 158 2.2.03.01 1. The functional arrangement of the PXS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.2.3. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built PXS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.2.3.

159 2.2.03.02a 2.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports. The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the

as-built components identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code Section III. 160 2.2.03.02b 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping as documented in the ASME design reports. The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the

as-built piping identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III. 161 2.2.03.03a 3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of the as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III. A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

162 2.2.03.03b 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of the as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III. A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

163 2.2.03.04a 4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested. A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

164 2.2.03.04b 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.

A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the piping identified in Table 2.2.3-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section

III.

C-135 Table 2.2.3

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 165 2.2.03.05a.i 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment and valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

166 2.2.03.05a.ii 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function. For the PXS containment recirculation and IRWST screens, a report exists and concludes that the screens can withstand seismic dynamic loads and also post

-accident operating loads, including head loss and debris weights. 167 2.2.03.05a.iii 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions. For the PXS containment recirculation and IRWST screens, a report exists and concludes that the

as-built screens including their anchorage are bounded by the seismic loads and also post

-accident operating loads, including head loss and debris weights. 168 2.2.03.05b 5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.2.3

-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

Inspection will be performed verifying that the as

-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.

A report exists and conclude s that each of the as

-built lines identified in Table 2.2.3

-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.

C-136 Table 2.2.3

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 169 2.2.03.06 6. Each of the as

-built lines identified in Table 2.2.3

-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line. Inspection will be performed for the existence of an LBB evaluation report or an evaluation report on the protection from dynamic effects of a pipe break. Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings, contains the design descriptions and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.

An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as

-built RCS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided. 170 2.2.03.07a.i 7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.

i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

171 2.2.03.07a.ii 7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses. 172 2.2.03.07b 7.b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.3-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

Testing will be performed by providing a simulated test signal in each Class 1E division.

A simulated test signal exists at the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.3-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal. 173 2.2.03.07c 7.c) Separation is provided between PXS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.

C-137 Table 2.2.3

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 174 2.2.03.08a 8.a) The PXS provides containment isolation of the PXS lines penetrating the containment.

See ITAAC Table 2.2.1

-3, items 1 and 7. See ITAAC Table 2.2.1

-3, items 1 and 7.

175 2.2.03.08b.01 8.b) The PXS provides core decay heat removal during design basis events. 1. A heat removal performance test and analysis of the PRHR HX will be performed to determine the heat transfer from the HX. For the test, the reactor coolant hot leg temperature will 540°F with the reactor coolant pumps stopped.

The IRWST water level for the test will be above the top of the HX. The IRWST water temperature is not specified for the test. The test will continue until the hot leg temperature decreases below 420°F.

1. A report exists and concludes that the PRHR HX heat transfer rate with the design basis number of PRHR HX tubes plugged is:

1.78 x 10 8 Btu/hr with 520°F HL Temp and 80°F IRWST temperatures.

1.11 x 10 8 Btu/hr with 420°F HL Temp and 80°F IRWST temperatures.

176 2.2.03.08b.02 8.b) The PXS provides core decay heat removal during design basis events. 2. Inspection of the elevation of the PRHR HX will be conducted.

2. The elevation of the centerline of the HX's upper channel head is greater than the HL centerline by at least 26.3 ft. 177 2.2.03.08c.i.01 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

i) A low-pressure injection test and analysis for each CMT, each accumulator, each IRWST injection line, and each containment recirculation line will be conducted. Each test is initiated by opening isolation valve(s) in the line being tested.

Test fixtures may be used to simulate squib valves.

1. CMTs: Each CMT will be initially filled with water. All valves in these

lines will be open during the test.

i) The injection line flow resistance from each source is as follows:

1. CMTs: The calculated flow resistance between each CMT and the reactor vessel is

-5 ft/gpm 2 and -5 ft/gpm 2.

C-138 Table 2.2.3

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 178 2.2.03.08c.i.02 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

i) A low-pressure injection test and analysis for each CMT, each accumulator, each IRWST injection line, and each containment recirculation line will be conducted. Each test is initiated by opening isolation valve(s) in the line being tested.

Test fixtures may be used to simulate squib valves.

2. Accumulators:

Each accumulator will be partially filled with water and pressurized with nitrogen. All valves in these lines will be open during the test. Sufficient flow will be provided to fully open the check valves.

i) The injection line flow resistance from each source is as follows:

2. Accumulators:

The calculated flow resistance between each accumulator and the reactor vessel is 1.47 x 10-5 ft/gpm 2 and 1.83 x 10-5 ft/gpm 2. 179 2.2.03.08c.i.03 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

i) A low-pressure injection test and analysis for each CMT, each accumulator, each IRWST injection line, and each containment recirculation line will be conducted. Each test is initiated by opening isolation valve(s) in the line being tested.

Test fixtures may be used to simulate squib valves.

3. IRWST Injection:

The IRWST will be partially filled with water. All valves in these lines will be open during the test. Sufficient flow will be provided to fully open the check valves. i) The injection line flow resistance from each source is as follows:

3. IRWST Injection:

The calculated flow resistance for each IRWST injection line between the IRWST and the reactor vessel is:

5.53 x 10-6 ft/gpm 2 9.20x10-6 ft/gpm 2 and Line B:6.21 x 10-6 ft/gpm 2 and 1.03 x 10-5 ft/gpm 2.

C-139 Table 2.2.3

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 180 2.2.03.08c.i.04 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

i) A low-pressure injection test and analysis for each CMT, each accumulator, each IRWST injection line, and each containment recirculation line will be conducted. Each test is initiated by opening isolation valve(s) in the line being tested.

Test fixtures may be used to simulate squib valves.

4. Containment Recirculation:

A temporary water supply will be connected to the recirculation lines. All valves in these lines will be open during the test.

Sufficient flow will be provided to fully open the check valves.

i) The injection line flow resistance from each source is as follows:

4. Containment Recirculation:

The calculated flow resistance

for each containment recirculation line between the containment and the reactor vessel is:

1.11 x 10-5 ft/gpm 2 and Line B: 1.04 x 10-5 ft/gpm 2. 181 2.2.03.08c.ii 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

ii) A low

-pressure test and analysis will be conducted for each CMT to determine piping flow resistance from the cold leg to the CMT. The test will be performed by filling the CMT via the cold leg balance line by operating the normal residual heat removal pumps.

ii) The flow resistance from the cold leg to the CMT is

-6 ft/gpm 2. 182 2.2.03.08c.iii 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

iii) Inspections of the routing of the following pipe lines will be conducted:

- CMT inlet line, cold leg to high point

- PRHR HX inlet line, hot leg to high point iii) These lines have no downward sloping sections between the connection to the RCS and the high point of the line. 183 2.2.03.08c.iv.01 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

iv) Inspections of the elevation of the following pipe lines will be conducted:

1. IRWST injection lines; IRWST connection to DVI nozzles iv) The maximum elevation of the top inside surface of these lines is less than the elevation of:

1. IRWST bottom inside surface 184 2.2.03.08c.iv.02 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

iv) Inspections of the elevation of the following pipe lines will be conducted:

2. Containment recirculation lines; containment to IRWST lines iv) The maximum elevation of the top inside surface of these lines is less than the elevation of:

2. IRWST bottom inside surface C-140 Table 2.2.3

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 185 2.2.03.08c.iv.03 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

iv) Inspections of the elevation of the following pipe lines will be conducted:

3. CMT discharge lines to DVI connection iv) The maximum elevation of the top inside surface of these lines is less than the elevation of:

3. CMT bottom inside surface 186 2.2.03.08c.iv.04 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

iv) Inspections of the elevation of the following pipe lines will be conducted:

4. PRHR HX outlet line to SG connection iv) The maximum elevation of the top inside surface of these lines is less than the elevation of:

4. PRHR HX lower channel head top inside surface 187 2.2.03.08c.v.01 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

v) Inspections of the elevation of the following tanks will be conducted:

1. CMTs v) The elevation of the bottom inside tank surface is higher than the direct vessel injection nozzle centerline by the following:

1. 188 2.2.03.08c.v.02 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

v) Inspections of the elevation of the following tanks will be conducted:

2. IRWST v) The elevation of the bottom inside tank surface is higher than the direct vessel injection nozzle centerline by the following:

2. 189 2.2.03.08c.vi.01 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

vi) Inspections of each of the following tanks will be conducted:

1. CMTs vi) The calculated volume of each of the following tanks is as follows:

1. 3 190 2.2.03.08c.vi.02 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

vi) Inspections of each of the following tanks will be conducted:

2. Accumulators vi) The calculated volume of each of the following tanks is as follows:

2. 3 191 2.2.03.08c.vi.03 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

vi) Inspections of each of the following tanks will be conducted:

3.- IRWST vi) The calculated volume of each of the following tanks is as follows: 3. IRWST > 73,900 ft 3 between the tank outlet connection and the tank overflow C-141 Table 2.2.3

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 192 2.2.03.08c.vii 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

vii) Inspection of the as

-built components will be conducted for plates located above the containment recirculation screens. vii) Plates located above each containment recirculation screen are no more than 1 ft above the top of the screen and extend out at least 10 ft perpendicular to and at least

7 ft to the side of the screen surface. 193 2.2.03.08c.viii 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

viii) Inspections of the IRWST and containment recirculation screens will be conducted. The inspections will include measurements of the pockets and the number of pockets used in each screen. The pocket frontal face area is based on a width times a height. The width is the distance between pocket centerlines for pockets located beside each other. The height is the distance between pocket centerlines for pockets located above each other. The pocket screen area is the total area of perforated plate inside each pocket; this area will be determined by inspection of the screen manufacturing drawings.

viii) The screens utilize pockets with a frontal face 2 and a screen 2 per pocket. IRWST Screens A and B each have a sufficient number of pockets to provide 2, a 500 ft 2 , and a screen mesh size of 0.0625 inch. IRWST Screen C has a sufficient number of pockets to provide a frontal 2, a screen 2, and a 0.0625 inch. Each containment recirculation screen has a sufficient number of pockets to provide a frontal face area 105 ft 2, a screen surface area 2500 ft 2, and a screen mesh 0.0625 inch.

A debris curb exists in front of the containment recirculation screens which is

> 2 ft above the loop compartment floor.

The bottoms of the IRWST above the bottom of the IRWST.

C-142 Table 2.2.3

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 194 2.2.03.08c.ix 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

ix) Inspections will be conducted of the insulation used inside the containment on the ASME Class 1 lines, reactor vessel, reactor coolant pumps, pressurizer and steam generators.

Inspections will be conducted of other insulation used inside the containment within the zone of influence (ZOI).

Inspection will be conducted of other insulation below the maximum flood level of a design basis loss

-of-coolant accident (LOCA). ix) The type of insulation used on these lines and equipment is a metal reflective type or a suitable equivalent.

If an insulation other tha n metal reflective insulation is used, a report must exist and conclude that the insulation is a suitable equivalent.

The type of insulation used on these lines and equipment is a metal reflective type or a suitable equivalent.

If an insulation other than metal reflective insulation is used, a report must exist and conclude that the insulation is a suitable equivalent.

The type of insulation used on these lines is metal reflective insulation, jacketed fiberglass, or a suitable equivalent.

If an insulation other than metal reflective or jacketed fiberglass insulation is used, a report must exist and conclude that the insulation is a suitable equivalent.

C-143 Table 2.2.3

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 195 2.2.03.08c.x 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events. x) Inspections will be conducted of the as-built nonsafety

-related coatings or of plant records of the nonsafety

-related coatings used inside containment on walls, floors, ceilings, and structural steel except in the CVS room. Inspections will be conducted of the as

-built non-safety-related coatings or of plant records of the non

-safety-related coatings used on components below the maximum flood level of a design basis LOCA or located above the maximum flood level and not inside cabinets or enclosures. Inspections will be conducted on caulking, tags, and signs used inside containment below the maximum flood level of a design basis LOCA or located above the maximum flood level and not inside cabinets or enclosures.

Inspections will be conducted of ventilation filters and fiber

-producing fire barriers used inside containment within the ZOI or below the maximum flood level of a design basis LOCA. x) A report exists and concludes that the coatings used on these surfaces have a dry film density of 100 lb/ft 3. If a coating is used that has a lower dry film density, a report must exist and conclude that the coating will not transport. A report exists and concludes that inorganic zinc coatings used on these surfaces are Safety

- Service Level I.

A report exists and concludes that tags and signs used in these locations are made of steel or another metal with a

3. In addition, a report exists and concludes that caulking used in these locations or coatings used on these signs or tags have a dry film density of 100 lb/ft 3. If a material is used that has a lower density, a report must exist and conclude that there is insufficient water flow to transport lightweight caulking, signs, or tags.

A report exists and concludes that the ventilation filters and fire barriers in these locations 100 lb/ft 3.

C-144 Table 2.2.3

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 196 2.2.03.08c.xi 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

xi) Inspection of the as

-built CMT inlet diffuser will be conducted.

xi) The CMT inlet diffuser 165 in 2. 197 2.2.03.08c.xii 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

xii) Inspections will be conducted of the CMT level sensors (PSX

-11A/B/D/C, - 12A/B/C/D, - 13A/B/C/D, - 14A/B/C/D) upper level tap lines. xii) Each upper level tap line

degrees from the centerline of the connection to the CMT to the centerline of the connection to the standpip

e. 198 2.2.03.08c.xiii 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

xiii) Inspections will be conducted of the surfaces in the vicinity of the containment recirculation screens. The surfaces in the vicinity of the containment recirculation screens are the surfaces located above the bottom of the recirculation screens up to and including the bottom surface of the plate discussed in Table 2.2.3-4, item 8.c.vii, out at least 10 feet perpendicular to and at least 7 feet perpendicular to the side of the screen face.

xiii) These surfaces are stainless steel.

199 2.2.03.08c.xiv 8.c) The PXS provides RCS makeup, boration, and safety injection during design basis events.

xiv) Inspections will be conducted of the exposed surfaces of the source range, intermediate range, and power range detectors.

xiv) These surfaces are made of stainless steel or titanium.

200 2.2.03.08d 8.d) The PXS provides pH adjustment of water flooding the containment following design basis accidents.

Inspections of the pH adjustment baskets will be conducted.

pH adjustment baskets exist, with a total calculated volume 560 ft 3. The pH baskets are located below plant elevation 107 ft, 2 in. 201 2.2.03.09a.i 9.a) The PXS provides a function to cool the outside of the reactor vessel during a severe accident.

i) A flow test and analysis for each IRWST drain line to the containment will be conducted.

The test is initiated by opening isolation valves in each line.

Test fixtures may be used to simulate squib valves.

i) The calculated flow resistance for each IRWST drain line between the IRWST and the containment is 4.07 x 10-6 ft/gpm 2.

C-145 Table 2.2.3

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 202 2.2.03.09a.ii 9.a) The PXS provides a function to cool the outside of the reactor vessel during a severe accident.

ii) Inspections of the as

-built reactor vessel insulation will be performed.

ii) The combined total flow area of the water inlets is not less than 6 ft 2. The combined total flow area of the steam outlet(s) is not less than 12 f t 2. A report exists and concludes that the minimum flow area between the vessel insulation and reactor vessel for the flow path that vents steam is not less than 12 ft 2 considering the maximum deflection of the vessel insulation with a static pressure of 12.95 ft of water.

203 2.2.03.09a.iii 9.a) The PXS provides a function to cool the outside of the reactor vessel during a severe accident.

iii) Inspections will be conducted of the flow path(s) from the loop compartments to the reactor vessel cavity.

iii) A flow path with a flow area not less than 6 ft 2 exists from the loop compartment to the reactor vessel cavity.

204 2.2.03.09b 9.b) The accumulator discharge check valves (PXS

-PL-V028A/B and V029A/B) are of a different check valve type than the CMT discharge check valves (PXS

-PL-V016A/B and V017A/B). An inspection of the accumulator and CMT discharge check valves is performed.

The accumulator discharge check valves are of a different check valve type than the CMT discharge check valves.

205 2.2.03.09c 9.c) The equipment listed in Table 2.2.3-6 has sufficient thermal lag to withstand the effects of identified hydrogen burns associated with severe accidents.

Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed to determine the thermal lag of this equipment.

A report exists and concludes that the thermal lag of this equipment is greater than the value required.

206 2.2.03.10 10. Safety-related displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.2.3-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for the retrievability of the safety

-related displays in the MCR.

Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

207 2.2.03.11a.i 11.a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 to perform their active function(s).

i) Testing will be performed on the squib valves identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 using controls in the MCR, without stroking the valve. i) Controls in the MCR operate to cause a signal at the squib valve electrical leads that is capable of actuating the squib valve.

208 2.2.03.11a.ii 11.a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 to perform their active function(s).

ii) Stroke testing will be performed on remotely operated valves other than squib valves identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 using the controls in the MCR.

ii) Controls in the MCR operate to cause remotely operated valves other than squib valves to perform their active functions.

C-146 Table 2.2.3

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 209 2.2.03.11b.i 11.b) The valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as having PMS control perform their active function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

i) Testing will be performed on the squib valves identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 using real or simulated signals into the PMS without stroking the valve.

i) Squib valves receive an electrical signal at the valve electrical leads that is capable of actuating the valve after a signal is input to the PMS.

210 2.2.03.11b.ii 11.b) The valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as having PMS control perform their active function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

ii) Testing will be performed on the remotely operated valves other than squib valves identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 using real or simulated signals into the PMS.

ii) Remotely operated valves other than squib valves perform the active function identified in the table after a signal is input to the PMS.

211 2.2.03.11b.iii 11.b) The valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as having PMS control perform their active function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

iii) Testing will be performed to demonstrate that remotely operated PXS isolation valves PXS-V014A/B, V015A/B, V108A/B open within the required response times.

iii) These valves open within

20 seconds after receipt of an actuation signal.

212 2.2.03.11c.i 11.c) The valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as having DAS control perform their active function after receiving a signal from the DAS.

i) Testing will be performed on the squib valves identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 using real or simulated signals into the DAS without stroking the valve.

i) Squib valves receive an electrical signal at the valve electrical leads that is capable of actuating the valve after a signal is input to the DAS.

213 2.2.03.11c.ii 11.c) The valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 as having DAS control perform their active function after receiving a signal from the DAS.

ii) Testing will be performed on the remotely operated valves other than squib valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 using real or simulated signals into the DAS.

ii) Remotely operated valves other than squib valves perform the active function identified in Table 2.2.3-1 after a signal is input to the DAS. 214 2.2.03.12a.i 12.a) The squib valves and check valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

i) Tests or type tests of squib valves will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design condition. i) A test report exists and concludes that each squib valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.3-1 under design conditions.

215 2.2.03.12a.ii 12.a) The squib valves and check valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built squib valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built squib valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.

216 2.2.03.12a.iv 12.a) The squib valves and check valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

iv) Exercise testing of the check valves with active safety functions identified in Table 2.2.3-1 will be performed under preoperational test pressure, temperature, and fluid flow conditions.

iv) Each check valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.3-1 C-147 Table 2.2.3

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 217 2.2.03.12b 12.b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.3-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

Testing of the remotely operated valves will be performed under the conditions of loss of motive power. After loss of motive power, each remotely operated valve identified in Table 2.2.3

-1 assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.

218 2.2.03.13 13. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.2.3-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the displays identified in Table 2.2.3

-3 in the MCR. Displays identified in Table 2.2.3-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.2.3

-5 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger (PRHR HX) PXS-ME-01 Containment Building Accumulator Tank A PXS-MT-01A Containment Building Accumulator Tank B PXS-MT-01B Containment Building Core Makeup Tank (CMT) A PXS-MT-02A Containment Building CMT B PXS-MT-02B Containment Building IRWST PXS-MT-03 Containment Building IRWST Screen A PXS-MY-Y01A Containment Building IRWST Screen B PXS-MY-Y01B Containment Building IRWST Screen C PXS-MY-Y01C Containment Building Containment Recirculation Screen A PXS-MY-Y02A Containment Building Containment Recirculation Screen B PXS-MY-Y02B Containment Building pH Adjustment Basket 3A PXS-MY-Y03A Containment Building pH Adjustment Basket 3B PXS-MY-Y03B Containment Building pH Adjustment Basket 4A PXS-MY-Y04A Containment Building pH Adjustment Basket 4B PXS-MY-Y04B Containment Building

C-148 Table 2.2.3

-6 Equipment Tag No. Function Hot Leg Sample Isolation Valves PSS-PL-V001A/B Transfer open Liquid Sample Line Containment Isolation Valves IRC PSS-PL-V010A/B Transfer open Containment Pressure Sensors PCS-012, 013, 014 Sense pressure RCS Wide Range Pressure Sensors RCS-191A, B, C, D Sense pressure SG1 Wide Range Level Sensors SGS-011, 012, 015, 016 Sense level SG2 Wide Range Level Sensors SGS-013, 014, 017, 018 Sense level Hydrogen Monitors VLS-001, 002, 003 Sense concentration Hydrogen Igniters VLS-EH-01 through 64 Ignite hydrogen Containment Electrical Penetrations P01, P02, P03, P06, P09, P10, P11, P12, P13, P14, P15, P16, P18, P21, P22, P23, P24, P25, P26, P27, P28, P29, P30, P31, P32 Maintain containment boundary C-149 Figure 2.2.3

-1 (Sheet 1 of 2)

Passive Core Cooling System

C-150

Figure 2.2.3

-1 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Passive Core Cooling System

C-151 2.2.4 Steam Generator System Design Description The steam generator system (SGS) and portions of the main and startup feedwater system (FWS) transport and control feedwater from the condensate system to the steam generators during normal operation. The SGS and portions of the main steam system (MSS) and turbine system (MTS) transport and control steam from the steam generators to the turbine generator during normal operations. These systems also isolate the steam generators from the turbine generator and the condensate system during design basis accidents.

The SGS is as shown in Figure 2.2.4

-1, sheets 1 and 2, and portions of the FWS, MSS, and MTS are as shown in Figure 2.2.4

-1, sheet 3, and the locations of the components in these systems is as shown in Table 2.2.4-5. 1. The functional arrangement of the SGS and portions of the FWS, MSS, and MTS are as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.2.4.

2. a) The components identified in Table 2.2.4

-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements

. b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.4

-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

3. a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.4

-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.4

-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

4. a) The components identified in Table 2.2.4

-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.4

-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

5. a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.4

-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.2.4

-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

6. Each of the as

-built lines identified in Table 2.2.4

-2 as designed for leak before break (LBB) meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.

7. a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.4

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

C-152 b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.4

-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

c) Separation is provided between SGS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1 E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable.

8. The SGS provides the following safety

-related functions:

a) The SGS provides a heat sink for the reactor coolant system (RCS) and provides overpressure protection.

b) During design basis events, the SGS limits steam generator blowdown and feedwater flow to the steam generator.

c) The SGS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the SGS lines penetrating the containment. The inside containment isolation function (isolating the RCS and containment atmosphere from the environment) is provided by the steam generator, tubes, and SGS lines inside containment while isolation outside containment is provided by manual and automatic valves.

9. The SGS provides the following nonsafety

-related functions:

a) Components within the main steam system, main and startup feedwater system, and the main turbine system identified in Table 2.2.4

-3 provide backup isolation of the SGS to limit steam generator blowdown and feedwater flow to the steam generator.

b) During shutdown operations, the SGS removes decay heat by delivery of startup feedwater to the steam generator and venting of steam from the steam generators to the atmosphere.

10. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.2.4

-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR). 11. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.4-1 to perform active functions.

b) The valves identified in Table 2.2.4

-1 as having PMS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from PMS.

12. a) The motor-operated valves identified in Table 2.2.4

-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.4

-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

C-153 Table 2.2.4

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir.

Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Main Steam Safety Valve SG01 SGS-PL-V030A Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - Main Steam Safety Valve SG02 SGS-PL-V030B Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - Main Steam Safety Valve SG01 SGS-PL-V031A Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - Main Steam Safety Valve SG02 SGS-PL-V031B Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - Main Steam Safety Valve SG01 SGS-PL-V032A Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - Main Steam Safety Valve SG02 SGS-PL-V032B Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - Main Steam Safety Valve SG01 SGS-PL-V033A Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed -

C-154 Table 2.2.4

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir.

Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Main Steam Safety Valve SG02 SGS-PL-V033B Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - Main Steam Safety Valve SG01 SGS-PL-V034A Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - Main Steam Safety Valve SG02 SGS-PL-V034B Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - Main Steam Safety Valve SG01 SGS-PL-V035A Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - Main Steam Safety Valve SG02 SGS-PL-V035B Yes Yes - -/- No - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - Power-operated Relief Valve Block Motor-operated Valve Steam Generator 01 SGS-PL-V027A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed As Is Power-operated Relief Valve Block Motor-operated Valve Steam Generator 02 SGS-PL-V027B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed As Is Steam Line Condensate Drain Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V036A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed Closed C-155 Table 2.2.4

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir.

Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Steam Line Condensate Drain Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V036B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed Closed Main Steam Line Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V040A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed As Is Main Steam Line Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V040B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed As Is Steam Line Condensate Drain Control Valve SGS-PL-V086A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes No Yes Transfer Closed Closed Steam Line Condensate Drain Control Valve SGS-PL-V086B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes No Yes Transfer Closed Closed Main Feedwater Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V057A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed As Is Main Feedwater Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V057B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed As Is Startup Feedwater Isolation Motor

-operated Valve SGS-PL-V067A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed As Is Startup Feedwater Isolation Motor

-operated Valve SGS-PL-V067B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed As Is Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V074A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed Closed C-156 Table 2.2.4

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir.

Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V074B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed Closed Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V075A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes No Yes Transfer Closed Closed Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V075B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes No Yes Transfer Closed Closed Power-operated Relief Valve SGS-PL-V233A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed Closed Power-operated Relief Valve SGS-PL-V233B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass Isolation SGS-PL-V240A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed Closed Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass Isolation SGS-PL-V240B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed Closed Main Feedwater Control Valve SGS-PL-V250A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed Closed Main Feedwater Control Valve SGS-PL-V250B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed Closed Startup Feedwater Control Valve SGS-PL-V255A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed Closed C-157 Table 2.2.4

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir.

Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Startup Feedwater Control Valve SGS-PL-V255B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed Closed Steam Generator 1 Narrow Range Level Sensor SGS-001 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - Steam Generator 1 Narrow Range Level Sensor SGS-002 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - Steam Generator 1 Narrow Range Level Sensor SGS-003 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - Steam Generator 1 Narrow Range Level Sensor SGS-004 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - Steam Generator 2 Narrow Range Level Sensor SGS-005 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - Steam Generator 2 Narrow Range Level Sensor SGS-006 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - Steam Generator 2 Narrow Range Level Sensor SGS-007 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - Steam Generator 2 Narrow Range Level Sensor SGS-008 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

C-158 Table 2.2.4

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir.

Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Steam Generator 1 Wide Range Level Sensor SGS-011 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - Steam Generator 1 Wide Range Level Sensor SGS-012 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - Steam Generator 2 Wide Range Level Sensor SGS-013 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - Steam Generator 2 Wide Range Level Sensor SGS-014 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - Steam Generator 1 Wide Range Level Sensor SGS-015 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - Steam Generator 1 Wide Range Level Sensor SGS-016 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - Steam Generator 2 Wide Range Level Sensor SGS-017 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - Steam Generator 2 Wide Range Level Sensor SGS-018 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - Main Steam Line Steam Generator 1 Pressure Sensor SGS-030 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - -

C-159 Table 2.2.4

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir.

Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Main Steam Line Steam Generator 1 Pressure Sensor SGS-031 No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - - Main Steam Line Steam Generator 1 Pressure Sensor SGS-032 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - Main Steam Line Steam Generator 1 Pressure Sensor SGS-033 No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - - Main Steam Line Steam Generator 2 Pressure Sensor SGS-034 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - Main Steam Line Steam Generator 2 Pressure Sensor SGS-035 No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - - Main Steam Line Steam Generator 2 Pressure Sensor SGS-036 No Yes - Yes/Yes Yes - - - Main Steam Line Steam Generator 2 Pressure Sensor SGS-037 No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - - Steam Generator 1 Startup Feedwater Flow Sensor SGS-55A No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - - Steam Generator 1 Startup Feedwater Flow Sensor SGS-55B No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

C-160 Table 2.2.4

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir.

Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Steam Generator 2 Startup Feedwater Flow Sensor SGS-56A No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - - Steam Generator 2 Startup Feedwater Flow Sensor SGS-56B No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - - Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-161 Table 2.2.4

-2 Line Name Line Number ASME Code Section III Leak Before Break Functional Capability Required Main Feedwater Line SGS-PL-L002A, L002B Yes No No Main Feedwater Line SGS-PL-L003A, L003B Yes No No Startup Feedwater Line SGS-PL-L004A, L004B Yes No No Startup Feedwater Line SGS-PL-L005A, L005B Yes No No Main Steam Line (within containment)

SGS-PL-L006A, L006B Yes Yes Yes Main Steam Line (outside of containment)

SGS-PL-L006A, L006B Yes No Yes Main Steam Line SGS-PL-L007A, L007B Yes No No Safety Valve Inlet Line SGS-PL-L015A, L015B, L015C, L015D, L015E, L015F, L015G, L015H, L015J, L015K, L015L, L015M Yes No Yes Safety Valve Discharge Line SGS-PL-L018A, L018B, L018C, L018D, L018E, L018F, L018G, L018H, L018J, L018K, L018L, L018M Yes No Yes Power-operated Relief Block Valve Inlet Line SGS-PL-L024A, L024B Yes No No Power-operated Relief Valve Inlet Line SGS-PL-L014A, L014B Yes No No Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass Inlet Line SGS-PL-L022A, L022B Yes No No Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass Outlet Line SGS-PL-L023A, L023B Yes No No C-162 Table 2.2.4

-2 Line Name Line Number ASME Code Section III Leak Before Break Functional Capability Required Main Steam Condensate Drain Line SGS-PL-L021A, L021B Yes No No Steam Generator Blowdown Line SGS-PL-L009A, L009B Yes No No Steam Generator Blowdown Line SGS-PL-L027A, L027B Yes No No Steam Generator Blowdown Line SGS-PL-L010A, L010B Yes No No Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-163 Table 2.2.4

-3 Equipment Name Tag No. Control Function Turbine Stop Valve MTS-PL-V001A Close Turbine Stop Valve MTS-PL-V001B Close Turbine Control Valve MTS-PL-V002A Close Turbine Control Valve MTS-PL-V002B Close Turbine Stop Valve MTS-PL-V003A Close Turbine Stop Valve MTS-PL-V003B Close Turbine Control Valve MTS-PL-V004A Close Turbine Control Valve MTS-PL-V004B Close Turbine Bypass Control Valve MSS-PL-V001 Close Turbine Bypass Control Valve MSS-PL-V002 Close Turbine Bypass Control Valve MSS-PL-V003 Close Turbine Bypass Control Valve MSS-PL-V004 Close Turbine Bypass Control Valve MSS-PL-V005 Close Turbine Bypass Control Valve MSS-PL-V006 Close Moisture Separator Reheater 2nd Stage Steam Isolation Valve MSS-PL-V015A Close Moisture Separator Reheater 2nd Stage Steam Isolation Valve MSS-PL-V015B Close Main Feedwater Pump FWS-MP-02A Trip Main Feedwater Pump FWS-MP-02B Trip Main Feedwater Pump FWS-MP-02C Trip Startup Feedwater Pump FWS-MP-03A Trip Startup Feedwater Pump FWS-MP-03B Trip C-164 Table 2.2.4-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 219 2.2.04.01 1. The functional arrangement of the SGS and portions of the FWS, MSS, and MTS are as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.2.4. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built SGS and portions of the FWS, MSS, and MTS conform with the functional arrangement as defined in the Design Description of this Section 2.2.4.

220 2.2.04.02a 2.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.4

-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports. The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the

as-built components identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as ASME Code Section III. 221 2.2.04.02b 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping as documented in the ASME design reports. The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as

-built piping identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III. 222 2.2.04.03a 3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of the as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III. A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non

-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

223 2.2.04.03b 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of the as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III. A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non

-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

224 2.2.04.04a 4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.4

-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested. A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

225 2.2.04.04b 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.

A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the piping identified in Table 2.2.4-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

C-165 Table 2.2.4-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 226 2.2.04.05a.i 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 is located on the Nuclear Islan

d. 227 2.2.04.05a.ii 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. 228 2.2.04.05a.iii 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

229 2.2.04.05b 5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.2.4

-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report concluding that the as

-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.

A report exists and concludes that each of the as

-built lines identified in Table 2.2.4

-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.

230 2.2.04.06 6. Each of the as

-built lines identified in Table 2.2.4

-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.

Inspection will be performed for the existence of an LBB evaluation report or an evaluation report on the protection from effects of a pipe break. Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings, contains the design descriptions and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture. An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as

-built RCS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided.

C-166 Table 2.2.4-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 231 2.2.04.07a.i 7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.4

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.

i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E

equipment identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

232 2.2.04.07a.ii 7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.4

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.2.4

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses. 233 2.2.04.07b 7.b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.4-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

Testing will be performed by providing a simulated test signal in each Class 1E division.

A simulated test signal exists at the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.4

-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal. 234 2.2.04.07c 7.c) Separation is provided between SGS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. 235 2.2.04.08a.i 8.a) The SGS provides a heat sink for the RCS and provides overpressure protection in accordance with Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

i) Inspections will be conducted to confirm that the value of the vendor code plate rating of the steam generator safety valves is greater than or equal to system relief requirements.

i) The sum of the rated capacities recorded on the valve vendor code plates of the steam generator safety valves exceeds 8,240,000 lb/hr per steam generator.

236 2.2.04.08a.ii 8.a) The SGS provides a heat sink for the RCS and provides overpressure protection in accordance with Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

ii) Testing and analyses in accordance with ASME Code Section III will be performed to determine set pressure.

ii) A report exists to indicate the set pressure of the valves is less than 1305 psig.

C-167 Table 2.2.4-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 237 2.2.04.08b.i 8.b) During design basis events, the SGS limits steam generator blowdown and feedwater flow to the steam generator.

i) Testing will be performed to confirm isolation of the main feedwater, startup feedwater, blowdown, and main steam lines. See item 11 in this table. See item 11 in this table.

238 2.2.04.08b.ii 8.b) During design basis events, the SGS limits steam generator blowdown and feedwater flow to the steam generator.

ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report confirming that the area of the flow limiting orifice within the SG main steam outlet nozzle will limit releases to the containment.

ii) A report exists to indicate the installed flow limiting orifice within the SG main steam line discharge nozzle does not exceed 1.4 sq. ft.

239 2.2.04.08c 8.c) The SGS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the SGS lines penetrating the containment.

See ITAAC Table 2.2.1

-3, item 7. See ITAAC Table 2.2.1

-3, item 7. 240 2.2.04.09a.i 9.a) Components within the main steam system, main and startup feedwater system, and the main turbine system identified in Table 2.2.4-3 provide backup isolation of the SGS to limit steam generator blowdown and feedwater flow to the steam generator.

i) Testing will be performed to confirm closure of the valves identified in Table 2.2.4-3. i) The valves identified in Table 2.2.4-3 close after a signal is generated by the PMS. 241 2.2.04.09a.ii 9.a) Components within the main steam system, main and startup feedwater system, and the main turbine system identified in Table 2.2.4-3 provide backup isolation of the SGS to limit steam generator blowdown and feedwater flow to the steam generator.

ii) Testing will be performed to confirm the trip of the pumps identified in Table 2.2.4-3. ii) The pumps identified in Table 2.2.4-3 trip after a signal is generated by the PMS.

242 2.2.04.09b.i 9.b) During shutdown operations, the SGS removes decay heat by delivery of startup feedwater to the steam generator and venting of steam from the steam generators to the atmosphere.

i) Tests will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the startup feedwater system to provide feedwater to the steam generators.

i) See ITAAC Table 2.4.1-2, Item 2. 243 2.2.04.09b.ii 9.b) During shutdown operations, the SGS removes decay heat by delivery of startup feedwater to the steam generator and venting of steam from the steam generators to the atmosphere.

ii) Type tests and/or analyses will be performed to demonstrate the ability of the power

-operated relief valves to discharge steam from the steam generators to the atmosphere.

ii) A report exists and concludes that each power

-operated relief valve will relieve greater than 300,000 lb/hr at 1106 psia +/-10 psi. 244 2.2.04.10 10. Safety

-related displays identified in Table 2.2.4

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the safety

-related displays in the MCR.

Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.2.4

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-168 Table 2.2.4-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 245 2.2.04.11a 11.a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.4

-1 to perform active functions.

Stroke testing will be performed on the remotely operated valves listed in Table 2.2.4-1 using controls in the MCR.

Controls in the MCR operate to cause the remotely operated valves to perform active safety functions.

246 2.2.04.11b.i 11.b) The valves identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as having PMS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from PMS.

i) Testing will be performed on the remotely operated valves listed in Table 2.2.4

-1 using real or simulated signals into the PMS. i) The remotely

-operated valves identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as having PMS control perform the active function identified in the table after receiving a signal from the PMS. 247 2.2.04.11b.ii 11.b) The valves identified in Table 2.2.4-1 as having PMS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from PMS.

ii) Testing will be performed to demonstrate that remotely operated SGS isolation valves SGS-V027A/B, V040A/B, V057A/B, V250A/B close within the required response times. ii) These valves close within the following times after receipt of an actuation signal:

V 027A/B < 44sec V 040A/B, V057A/B < 5 sec V 250A/B < 5 sec 248 2.2.04.12a.i 12.a) The motor-operated valves identified in Table 2.2.4

-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

i) Tests or type tests of motor

-operated valves will be performed to demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions.

i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor

-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.4-1 under design conditions.

249 2.2.04.12a.ii 12.a) The motor

-operated valves identified in Table 2.2.4

-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built motor

-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests. 250 2.2.04.12a.iii 12.a) The motor

-operated valves identified in Table 2.2.4

-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

iii) Tests of the motor

-operated valves will be performed under pre-operational flow, differential pressure, and temperature conditions.

iii) Each motor

-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.2.4

-1 under pre

-operational test conditions.

251 2.2.04.12b 12.b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.4-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

Testing of the remotely operated valves will be performed under the conditions of loss of motive power. After loss of motive power, each remotely operated valve identified in Table 2.2.4-1 assumes the indicated loss of motive power position. Motive power to SGS-PL-V 040A/B and SGS-PL-V057A/B is electric power to the actuator from plant services.

C-169 Table 2.2.4

-5 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Main Steam Line Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V040A Auxiliary Building Main Steam Line Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V040B Auxiliary Building Main Feedwater Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V057A Auxiliary Building Main Feedwater Isolation Valve SGS-PL-V057B Auxiliary Building Main Feedwater Control Valve SGS-PL-V250A Auxiliary Building Main Feedwater Control Valve SGS-PL-V250B Auxiliary Building Turbine Stop Valves MTS-PL-V 001 A MTS-PL-V 001 B MTS-PL-V003A MTS-PL-V003B Turbine Building Turbine Control Valves MTS-PL-V 002 A MTS-PL-V 002 B MTS-PL-V 004 A MTS-PL-V004B Turbine Building Main Feedwater Pumps FWS-MP-02 A FWS-MP-02 B FWS-MP-02C Turbine Building Feedwater Booster Pumps FWS-MP-01 A FWS-MP-01 B FWS-MP-01C Turbine Building

C-170 Figure 2.2.4

-1 (Sheet 1 of 3)

Steam Generator System

C-171 Figure 2.2.4

-1 (Sheet 2 of 3)

Steam Generator System

C-172 Figure 2.2.4

-1 (Sheet 3 of 3)

Steam Generator System

C-173 2.2.5 Main Control Room Emergency Habitability System Design Description The main control room emergency habitability system (VES) provides a supply of breathable air for the main control room (MCR) occupants and maintains the MCR at a positive pressure with respect to the surrounding areas whenever ac power is not available to operate the nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system (VBS) or high radioactivity is detected in the MCR air supply. (See Section 3.5 for Radiation Monitoring). The VES also limits the heatup of the MCR, the 1E instrumentation and control (I&C) equipment rooms, and the Class 1E dc equipment rooms by using the heat capacity of surrounding structures.

The VES is as shown in Figure 2.2.5

-1 and the component locations of the VES are as shown in Table 2.2.5-6. 1. The functional arrangement of the VES is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.2.5. 2. a) The components identified in Table 2.2.5

-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.5

-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

3. a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.5

-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements. b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.5

-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

4. a) The components identified in Table 2.2.5

-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.5

-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

5. a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.5

-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.2.5

-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

6. a) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.5

-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

b) Separation is provided between VES Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1 E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable.

7. The VES provides the following safety-related functions:

C-174 a) The VES provides a 72

-hour supply of breathable quality air for the occupants of the MCR. b) The VES maintains the MCR pressure boundary at a positive pressure with respect to the surrounding areas. There is a discharge of air through the MCR vestibule.

c) The heat loads within the MCR, the I&C equipment rooms, and the Class 1E dc equipment rooms are within design basis assumptions to limit the heatup of the rooms identified in Table 2.2.5

-4. d) The system provides a passive recirculation flow of MCR air to maintain main control room dose rates below an acceptable level during VES operation.

e) The system provides shielding below the VES filter that is sufficient to ensure main control room doses are below an acceptable level during VES operation. 8. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.2.5

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

9. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause those remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.5-1 to perform their active functions.

b) The valves identified in Table 2.2.5

-1 as having protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform their active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

10. After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.5

-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

11. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.2.5

-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

12. The background noise level in the MCR does not exceed 65 dB(A) at the operator workstations when the VES is operating.

C-175 Table 2.2.5

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Emergency Air Storage Tank 01 VES-MT-01 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 02 VES-MT-02 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 03 VES-MT-03 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 04 VES-MT-04 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 05 VES-MT-05 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 06 VES-MT-06 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 07 VES-MT-07 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 08 VES-MT-08 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 09 VES-MT-09 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 10 VES-MT-10 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 11 VES-MT-11 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 12 VES-MT-12 No Yes - -/- - - - -

C-176 Table 2.2.5

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Emergency Air Storage Tank 13 VES-MT-13 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 14 VES-MT-14 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 15 VES-MT-15 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 16 VES-MT-16 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 17 VES-MT-17 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 18 VES-MT-18 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 19 VES-MT-19 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 20 VES-MT-20 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 21 VES-MT-21 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 22 VES-MT-22 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 23 VES-MT-23 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 24 VES-MT-24 No Yes - -/- - - - -

C-177 Table 2.2.5

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Emergency Air Storage Tank 25 VES-MT-25 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 26 VES-MT-26 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 27 VES-MT-27 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 28 VES-MT-28 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 29 VES-MT-29 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 30 VES-MT-30 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 31 VES-MT-31 No Yes - -/- - - - - Emergency Air Storage Tank 32 VES-MT-32 No Yes - -/- - - - - Air Delivery Alternate Isolation Valve VES-PL-V001 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Open - Eductor Flow Path Isolation Valve VES-PL-V045 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Close - Eductor Bypass Isolation Valve VES-PL-V046 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Open - Pressure Regulating Valve A VES-PL-V002A Yes Yes No -/- No - Throttle Flow -

C-178 Table 2.2.5

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Pressure Regulating Valve B VES-PL-V002B Yes Yes No -/- No - Throttle Flow - MCR Air Delivery Isolation Valve A VES-PL-V005A Yes Yes Yes Yes/No No Yes Transfer Open Open MCR Air Delivery Isolation Valve B VES-PL-V005B Yes Yes Yes Yes/No No Yes Transfer Open Open Temporary Instrument Isolation Valve A VES-PL-V018 Yes Yes No -/- No No Transfer Open - Temporary Instrument Isolation Valve B VES-PL-V019 Yes Yes No -/- No No Transfer Open - MCR Pressure Relief Isolation Valve A VES-PL-V022A Yes Yes Yes Yes/No No Yes Transfer Open Open MCR Pressure Relief Isolation Valve B VES-PL-V022B Yes Yes Yes Yes/No No Yes Transfer Open Open Air Tank Safety Relief Valve A VES-PL-V040A Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Open - Air Tank Safety Relief Valve B VES-PL-V040B Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Open - Air Tank Safety Relief Valve C VES-PL-V040C Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Open - Air Tank Safety Relief Valve D VES-PL-V040D Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Open - Main Air Flow Path Isolation Valve VES-PL-V044 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Close -

C-179 Table 2.2.5

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position MCR Air Filtration Line Eductor VES-PY-N01 Yes Yes - - - - - - MCR Air Filtration Line Charcoal Filter VES-MY-F01 No Yes - - - - - - MCR Air Filtration Line HEPA Filter VES-MY-F02 No Yes - - - - - - MCR Air Filtration Line Postfilter VES-MY-F03 No Yes - - - - - - MCR Filter Shielding 12401-NS-01 No Yes - - - - - - MCR Gravity Relief Dampers VES-MD-D001A No Yes - - - - - - MCR Gravity Relief Dampers VES-MD-D001B No Yes - - - - - - MCR Air Filtration Line Supply Damper VES-MD-D002 No Yes - - - - - - MCR Air Filtration Line Supply Damper VES-MD-D003 No Yes - - - - - - MCR Air Filtration Line Silencer VES-MY-Y01 No Yes - - - - - - MCR Air Filtration Line Silencer VES-MY-Y02 No Yes - - - - - - MCR Air Delivery Line Flow Sensor VES-003A No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - -

C-180 Table 2.2.5

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position MCR Air Delivery Line Flow Sensor VES-003B No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - - MCR Differential Pressure Sensor A VES-004A No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - - MCR Differential Pressure Sensor B VES-004B No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - - Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-181 Table 2.2.5

-2 Line Name Line Number ASME Code Section III Functional Capability Required MCR Relief Line VES-PL-022A Yes Yes MCR Relief Line VES-PL-022B Yes Yes Table 2.2.5

-3 Equipment Tag No. Display Air Storage Tank Pressure VES-001A Yes Air Storage Tank Pressure VES-001B Yes Table 2.2.5

-4 Room Name Room Numbers Heat Load 0 to 24 Hours (Btu/s) Heat Load 24 to 72 Hours (Btu/s) MCR Envelope 12401 26.1 (hour 0 through 0.5) 15.6 (hour 0.5 through 3.5) 5.8 (hour 3.5 through 24) 2.9 I&C Rooms 12301, 12305 8.8 0 I&C Rooms 12302, 12304 13.0 4.2 dc Equipment Rooms 12201, 12205 3.7 (hour 0 through 1) 2.4 (hour 2 through 24) 0 dc Equipment Rooms 12203, 12207 5.8 (hour 0 through 1) 4.5 (hour 2 through 24)

2.0 Table

2.2.5

-5 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 252 2.2.05.01 1. The functional arrangement of the VES is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.2.5. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built VES conforms with the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.2.5.

C-182 Table 2.2.5

-5 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 253 2.2.05.02a 2.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.5

-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports. The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as

-built components identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as ASME Code Section III.

254 2.2.05.02b 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping as documented in the ASME design reports. The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as

-built piping identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III.

255 2.2.05.03a 3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of the as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.

A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

256 2.2.05.03b 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.2.5

-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of the as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.

A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

257 2.2.05.04a 4.a) The components identified in Table 2.2.5

-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested. A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

258 2.2.05.04b 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.

A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the piping identified in Table 2.2.5-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III. 259 2.2.05.05a.i 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment and valves identified in Table 2.2.5

-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

C-183 Table 2.2.5

-5 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 260 2.2.05.05a.ii 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. 261 2.2.05.05a.iii 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.2.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

262 2.2.05.05b 5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.2.5

-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.

A report exists and concludes that each of the as

-built lines identified in Table 2.2.5

-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.

263 2.2.05.06a 6.a) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.2.5

-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

Testing will be performed by providing a simulated test signal in each Class 1E division.

A simulated test signal exists at the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.2.5

-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal. 264 2.2.05.06b 6.b) Separation is provided between VES Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. 265 2.2.05.07a.i 7.a) The VES provides a 72

-hour supply of breathable quality air for the occupants of the MCR.

i) Testing will be performed to confirm that the required amount of air flow is delivered to the MCR. i) The air flow rate from the VES is at least 60 scfm and not more than 70 scfm. 266 2.2.05.07a.ii 7.a) The VES provides a 72

-hour supply of breathable quality air for the occupants of the MCR.

ii) Analysis of storage capacity will be performed based on manufacturers data.

ii) The calculated storage capacity is greater than or equal to 327,574 scf. 267 2.2.05.07a.iii 7.a) The VES provides a 72

-hour supply of breathable quality air for the occupants of the MCR.

iii) MCR air samples will be taken during VES testing and analyzed for quality.

iii) The MCR air is of breathable quality.

C-184 Table 2.2.5

-5 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 268 2.2.05.07b.i 7.b) The VES maintains the MCR pressure boundary at a positive pressure with respect to the surrounding areas.

i) Testing will be performed with VES flow rate between 60 and 70 scfm to confirm that the MCR is capable of maintaining the required pressurization of the pressure boundary.

i) The MCR pressure boundary is pressurized to greater than or equal to 1/8

-in. water gauge with respect to the surrounding area.

269 2.2.05.07b.ii 7.b) The VES maintains the MCR pressure boundary at a positive pressure with respect to the surrounding areas.

ii) Air leakage into the MCR will be measured during VES testing using a tracer gas.

ii) Air leakage into the MCR is less than or equal to 10 cfm.

270 2.2.05.07c 7.c) The heat loads within the MCR, the I&C equipment rooms, and the Class 1E dc equipment rooms are within design basis assumptions to limit the heatup of the rooms identified in Table 2.2.5-4. An analysis will be performed to determine that the heat loads from as-built equipment within the rooms identified in Table 2.2.5-4 are less than or equal to the design basis assumptions.

A report exists and concludes that: the heat loads within rooms identified in Table 2.2.5-4 are less than or equal to the specified values or that an analysis report exists that

concludes: - The temperature and humidity in the MCR remain within limits for reliable human performance for the

72-hour period.

- The maximum temperature for the 72

-hour period for the I&C rooms is less than or equal to 120°F.

- The maximum temperature for the 72-hour period for the Class 1E dc equipment rooms is less than or equal to 120°F. 271 2.2.05.07d 7d) The system provides a passive recirculation flow of MCR air to maintain main control room dose rates below an acceptable level during VES operation.

Testing will be performed to confirm that the required amount of air flow circulates through the MCR passive filtration system, The air flow rate at the outlet of the MCR passive filtration system is at least 600 cfm greater than the flow measured by VES

-003A/B. 272 C.2.2.05.07e 7e) Shielding below the VES Filter is capable of providing attenuation that is sufficient to ensure main control room doses are below an acceptable level during VES operation.

Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built shielding meets the requirements for functional capability.

A report exists and concludes that the as

-built shielding identified in Table 2.2.5

-1 meets the functional requirements and exists below the filtration unit, and within its vertical projection.

C-185 Table 2.2.5

-5 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 273 2.2.05.08 8. Safety

-related displays identified in Table 2.2.5

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the safety

-related displays in the MCR.

Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.2.5

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

274 2.2.05.09a 9.a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.5

-1 to perform their active functions.

Stroke testing will be performed on remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.5

-1 using the controls in the MCR.

Controls in the MCR operate to cause remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.5-1 to perform their active safety functions.

275 2.2.05.09b 9.b) The valves identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as having PMS control perform their active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

Testing will be performed on remotely operated valves listed in Table 2.2.5

-1 using real or simulated signals into the PMS.

The remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.5-1 as having PMS control perform the active safety function identified in the table after receiving a signal from the PMS. 276 2.2.05.10 10. After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.2.5

-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

Testing of the remotely operated valves will be performed under the conditions of loss of motive power. After loss of motive power, each remotely operated valve identified in Table 2.2.5-1 assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.

277 2.2.05.11 11. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.2.5-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the parameters in the MCR.

The displays identified in Table 2.2.5-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

278 2.2.05.12 12. The background noise level in the MCR does not exceed 65 dB(A) at the operator workstations when VES is operating.

The as-built VES will be operated, and background noise levels in the MRC will be measured at the operator work stations with the plant not operating.

The background noise level in the MCR does not exceed 65 dB(A) at the operator work stations when the VES is operating.

Table 2.2.5

-6 Component Name Tag Number Component Location Emergency Air Storage Tank 01 VES-MT-01 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 02 VES-MT-02 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 03 VES-MT-03 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 04 VES-MT-04 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 05 VES-MT-05 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 06 VES-MT-06 Auxiliary Building

C-186 Table 2.2.5

-6 Component Name Tag Number Component Location Emergency Air Storage Tank 07 VES-MT-07 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 08 VES-MT-08 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 09 VES-MT-09 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 10 VES-MT-10 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 11 VES-MT-11 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 12 VES-MT-12 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 13 VES-MT-13 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 14 VES-MT-14 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 15 VES-MT-15 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 16 VES-MT-16 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 17 VES-MT-17 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 18 VES-MT-18 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 19 VES-MT-19 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 20 VES-MT-20 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 21 VES-MT-21 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 22 VES-MT-22 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 23 VES-MT-23 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 24 VES-MT-24 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 25 VES-MT-25 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 26 VES-MT-26 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 27 VES-MT-27 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 28 VES-MT-28 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 29 VES-MT-29 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 30 VES-MT-30 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 31 VES-MT-31 Auxiliary Building Emergency Air Storage Tank 32 VES-MT-32 Auxiliary Building

C-187 Figure 2.2.5

-1 Main Control Room Emergency Habitability System C-188 2.3 Auxiliary Systems

2.3.1 Component

Cooling Water System Design Description The component cooling water system (CCS) removes heat from various plant components and transfers this heat to the service water system (SWS) during normal modes of plant operation including power generation, shutdown and refueling. The CCS has two pumps and two heat exchangers.

The CCS is as shown in Figure 2.3.1

-1 and the CCS component locations are as shown in Table 2.3.1-3. 1. The functional arrangement of the CCS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.1. 2. The CCS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the CCS lines penetrating the containment.

3. The CCS provides the nonsafety

-related functions of transferring heat from the norma l residual heat removal system (RNS) during shutdown and the spent fuel pool cooling system during all modes of operation to the SWS.

4. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to cause the pumps identified in Table 2.3.1

-1 to perform the listed functions.

5. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.1

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-1 89 Table 2.3.1

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function CCS Pump A CCS-MP-01A Yes (Run Status)

Start CCS Pump B CCS-MP-01B Yes (Run Status)

Start CCS Discharge Header Flow Sensor CCS-101 Yes - CCS to Normal Residual Heat Removal System Heat Exchanger (RNS HX) A Flow Sensor CCS-301 Yes - CCS to RNS HX B Flow Sensor CCS-302 Yes - CCS to Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (SFS) HX A Flow Sensor CCS-341 Yes - CCS to SFS HX B Flow Sensor CCS-342 Yes - CCS Surge Tank Level Sensor A CCS-130 Yes - CCS Surge Tank Level Sensor B CCS-131 Yes - CCS Heat Exchanger Inlet Temperature Sensor CCS-121 Yes - CCS Heat Exchanger Outlet Temperature Sensor CCS-122 Yes - CCS Flow to Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 1A Valve (Position Indicator)

CCS-PL-V256A Yes - CCS Flow to RCP 1B Valve (Position Indicator)

CCS-PL-V256B Yes - CCS Flow to RCP 2A Valve (Position Indicator)

CCS-PL-V256C Yes - CCS Flow to RCP 2B Valve (Position Indicator)

CCS-PL-V256D Yes - Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-190 Table 2.3.1

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 27 9 2.3.01.01 1. The functional arrangement of the CCS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.3.1. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built CCS conforms with the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of thi s

Section 2.3.1. 280 2.3.01.02 2. The CCS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the CCS lines penetrating the containment.

See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7. See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7. 281 2.3.01.03.i

3. The CCS provides the nonsafety-related functions of transferring heat from the RNS during shutdown and the spent fuel pool cooling system during all modes of operation to the SWS.

i) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report that determines the heat transfer capability of the CCS heat exchangers.

i) A report exists and concludes that the UA of each CCS heat exchanger is greater than or equal to 14.0 million Btu/hr-°F. 282 2.3.01.03.ii

3. The CCS provides the nonsafety

-

related functions of transferring heat from the RNS during shutdown and the spent fuel pool cooling system during all modes of operation to the SWS.

ii) Testing will be performed to confirm that the CCS can provide cooling water to the RNS HXs while providing cooling water to the SFS HXs.

ii) Each pump of the CCS can provide at least 2685 gpm of cooling water to one RNS HX and at least 1200 gpm of cooling water to one SFS HX while providing at least

4415 gpm to other users of cooling water. 283 2.3.01.04 4. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the pumps identified in Table 2.3.1-1 to perform the listed functions.

Testing will be performed to actuate the pumps identified in Table 2.3.1-1 using controls in the MCR. Controls in the MCR operate to cause pumps listed in Table 2.3.1-1 to perform the listed functions.

284 2.3.01.05 5. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.1

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the parameters in the MCR.

Displays identified in Table 2.3.1-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Table 2.3.1

-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location CCS Pump A CCS-MP-01A Turbine Building CCS Pump B CCS-MP-01B Turbine Building CCS Heat Exchanger A CCS-ME-01A Turbine Building CCS Heat Exchanger B CCS-ME-01B Turbine Building C-191 Figure 2.3.1

-1 Component Cooling Water System

C-192 2.3.2 Chemical and Volume Control System Design Description The chemical and volume control system (CVS) provides reactor coolant system (RCS) purification, RCS inventory control and makeup, chemical shim and chemical control, oxygen control, and auxiliary pressurizer spray. The CVS performs these functions during normal modes of operation including power generation and shutdown.

The CVS is as shown in Figure 2.3.2

-1 and the component locations of the CVS are as shown in Table 2.3.2-5. 1. The functional arrangement of the CVS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.2. 2. a) The components identified in Table 2.3.2

-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.2

-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

3. a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.2

-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.3.2

-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

4. a) The components identified in Table 2.3

.2-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.2

-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.2

-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

6. a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.3.2

-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

c) Separation is provided between CVS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1 E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable.

7. The CVS provides the following safety

-related functions:

a) The CVS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the CVS lines penetrating th e containment.

C-193 b) The CVS provides termination of an inadvertent RCS boron dilution by isolating demineralized water from the RCS.

c) The CVS provides isolation of makeup to the RCS.

8. The CVS provides the following nonsafety

-related functions:

a) The CVS provides makeup water to the RCS.

b) The CVS provides the pressurizer auxiliary spray.

9. Safety-related displays in Table 2.3.2

-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR). 10. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in

Table 2.3.2-1 to perform active functions

. b) The valves identified in Table 2.3.2

-1 as having protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

11. a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.3.2

-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

b) After a loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position. 12. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the pumps identified in Table 2.3.2

-3 to perform the listed function.

b) The pumps identified in Table 2.3.2

-3 start after receiving a signal from the PLS.

13. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.

2-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

14. The nonsafety

-related piping located inside containment and designated as reactor coolant pressure boundary, as identified in Table 2.3.2

-2 (pipe lines with "No" in the ASME Code column), has been designed to withstand a seismic design basis event and maintain structural integrity.

C-194 Table 2.3.2

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1 E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position RCS Purification Motor

-operated Isolation Valve CVS-PL-V001 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed As Is RCS Purification Motor

-operated Isolation Valve CVS-PL-V002 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed As Is RCS Purification Motor

-operated Isolation Valve CVS-PL-V003 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed As Is CVS Resin Flush Line Containment Isolation Valve CVS-PL-V040 Yes Yes No - / - - - - - CVS Resin Flush Line Containment Isolation Valve CVS-PL-V041 Yes Yes No - / - - - - - CVS Demineralizer Resin Flush Line Containment Isolation Thermal Relief Valve CVS-PL-V042 Yes Yes No - / - - - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - CVS Letdown Containment Isolation Valve CVS-PL-V045 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed Closed CVS Letdown Containment Isolation Valve CVS-PL-V047 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed Closed C-195 Table 2.3.2

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1 E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position CVS Letdown Line Containment Isolation Thermal Relief Valve CVS-PL-V058 Yes Yes No - / - - - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - CVS Purification Return Line Pressure Boundary Check Valve CVS-PL-V080 Yes Yes No - / - - - Transfer Closed - CVS Purification Return Line Pressure Boundary Isolation Check Valve CVS-PL-V081 Yes Yes No - / - No - Transfer Closed - CVS Purification Return Line Pressure Boundary Check Valve CVS-PL-V082 Yes Yes No - / - - - Transfer Closed - CVS Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray Line Pressure Boundary Valve CVS-PL-V084 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed Closed CVS Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray Line Pressure Boundary Check Valve CVS-PL-V085 Yes Yes No Yes/Yes - - Transfer Closed - CVS Makeup Line Containment Isolation Motor

-operated Valve CVS-PL-V090 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed As Is CVS Makeup Line Containment Isolation Motor

-operated Valve CVS-PL-V091 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed As Is C-196 Table 2.3.2

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1 E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position CVS Hydrogen Addition Line Containment Isolation Valve CVS-PL-V092 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed Closed CVS Hydrogen Addition Line Containment Isolation Check Valve CVS-PL-V094 Yes Yes No - / - - - Transfer Closed - CVS Makeup Line Containment Isolation Thermal Relief Valve CVS-PL-V100 Yes Yes No - / - - - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - CVS Demineralized Water Isolation Valve CVS-PL-V136A Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed Closed CVS Demineralized Water Isolation Valve CVS-PL-V136B Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed Closed Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-197 Table 2.3.2

-2 Line Name Line Number ASME Code Section III CVS Purification Line L 001 L040 Yes Yes CVS Resin Flush Containment Penetration Line L026 Yes CVS Purification Line Return L038 Yes CVS Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Connection L 070 L071 Yes Yes CVS Letdown Containment Penetration Line L051 Yes CVS Makeup Containment Penetration Line L053 Yes CVS Hydrogen Addition Containment Penetration Line L061 Yes CVS Supply Line to Regenerative Heat Exchanger L002 No CVS Return Line from Regenerative Heat Exchanger L 018 L 036 L073 No Yes No CVS Line from Regenerative Heat Exchanger to Letdown Heat Exchanger L003 No CVS Lines from Letdown Heat Exchanger to Demin. Tanks L 004 L 005 L072 No No No CVS Lines from Demin Tanks to RC Filters and Connected Lines L006 (1) L007 (1) L010 (1) L011 (1) L 012 L015 (1) L016 (1) L 020 L 021 L 022 L023 (1) L024 (1) L 029 L037 No No No No No No No No No No No No No No CVS Lines from RC Filters to Regenerative Heat Exchanger L 030 L 031 L 034 L050 No No No No CVS Resin Fill Lines to Demin. Tanks L008 (1) L013 (1) L025 (1) No No No C-198 Note: 1. Special seismic requirements include only the portion of piping normally exposed to RCS pressure. Piping beyond the first normally closed isolation valve is evaluated as seismic Category II piping extending to either an interface anchor, a rigid support following a six

-way anchor, or the last seismic support of a rigidly supported region of the piping system as necessary to satisfy analysis requirements for piping connected to seismic Category I piping systems.

C-199 Table 2.3.2

-3 Equipment Tag No. Display Control Function CVS Makeup Pump A CVS-MP-01A Yes (Run Status)

Start CVS Makeup Pump B CVS-MP-01B Yes (Run Status)

Start Purification Flow Sensor CVS-001 Yes - Purification Return Flow Sensor CVS-025 Yes - CVS Purification Return Line (Position Indicator)

CVS-PL-V081 Yes - Auxiliary Spray Line Isolation Valve (Position Indicator)

CVS-PL-V084 Yes - Boric Acid Storage Tank Level Sensor CVS-109 Yes - Boric Acid Flow Sensor CVS-115 Yes - Makeup Blend Valve (Position Indicator)

CVS-PL-V115 Yes - CVS Demineralized Water Isolation Valve (Position Indicator)

CVS-PL-136A Yes - CVS Demineralized Water Isolation Valve (Position Indicator)

CVS-PL-136B Yes - Makeup Pump Discharge Flow Sensor CVS-157 Yes - Makeup Flow Control Valve (Position Indicator)

CVS-PL-V157 Yes - Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

Table 2.3.2

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 28 5 2.3.02.01 1. The functional arrangement of the CVS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.3.2. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built CVS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.2. 286 2.3.02.02a 2.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.2

-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports. The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as

-built components identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as ASME Code Section III.

C-200 Table 2.3.2

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 287 2.3.02.02b 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping as documented in the ASME design reports. The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as

-built piping identified in Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III. 288 2.3.02.03a 3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of the as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.

A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

289 2.3.02.03b 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.3.2

-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of the as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.

A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

290 2.3.02.04a 4.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.2

-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested. A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

291 2.3.02.04b 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.

A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the piping identified in Table 2.3.2-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III. 292 2.3.02.05.i

5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

293 2.3.02.05.ii

5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic

Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function.

C-201 Table 2.3.2

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 294 2.3.02.05.iii

5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

295 2.3.02.06a.i 6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.2

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.

i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following

a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

296 2.3.02.06a.ii 6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.2

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses. 297 2.3.02.06b 6.b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.3.2

-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

Testing will be performed on the CVS by providing a simulated test signal in each Class 1E division. A simulated test signal exists at the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.2

-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal. 298 2.3.02.06c 6.c) Separation is provided between CVS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. 299 2.3.02.07a 7.a) The CVS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the CVS lines penetrating the containment.

See ITAAC Table 2.2.1

-3, item 7. See ITAAC Table 2.2.1

-3, item 7.

C-202 Table 2.3.2

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 300 2.3.02.07b 7.b) The CVS provides termination of an inadvertent RCS boron dilution by isolating demineralized water from the RCS. See item 10b in this table.

See item 10b in this table.

301 2.3.02.07c 7.c) The CVS provides isolation of makeup to the RCS.

See item 10b in this table.

302 2.3.02.08a.i 8.a) The CVS provides makeup water to the RCS.

i) Testing will be performed by aligning a flow path from each CVS makeup pump, actuating makeup flow to the RCS at pressure greater than or equal to

2000 psia, and measuring the flow rate in the makeup pum p discharge line with each pump suction aligned to the boric acid storage tank.

i) Each CVS makeup pump provides a flow rate of greater than or equal to 100 gpm. 303 2.3.02.08a.ii 8.a) The CVS provides makeup water to the RCS.

ii) Inspection of the boric acid storage tank volume will be performed.

ii) The volume in the boric acid storage tank is at least 70,000 gallons between the tank outlet connection and the tank overflow.

304 2.3.02.08a.iii 8.a) The CVS provides makeup water to the RCS.

iii) Testing will be performed to measure the delivery rate from the DWS to the RCS. Both CVS makeup pumps will be operating and the RCS pressure will be below 6 psig.

iii) The total CVS makeup flow to the RCS is less than or equal to 200 gpm. 305 2.3.02.08b 8.b) The CVS provides the pressurizer auxiliary spray.

Testing will be performed by aligning a flow path from each CVS makeup pump to the pressurizer auxiliary spray and measuring the flow rate in the makeup pump discharge line with each pump suction aligned to the boric acid storage tank and with RCS pressure greater than or equal to 2000 psia. Each CVS makeup pump provides spray flow to the pressurizer.

306 2.3.02.09 9. Safety

-related displays identified in Table 2.3.2

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the safety

-related displays in the MCR.

Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.3.2

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-203 Table 2.3.2

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 307 2.3.02.10a 10.a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.2

-1 to perform active functions.

Stroke testing will be performed on the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.2

-1 using the controls in the MCR.

Controls in the MCR operate to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 to perform active functions.

308 2.3.02.10b.i 10.b) The valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as having PMS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

i) Testing will be performed using real or simulated signals into the PMS.

i) The valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as having PMS control perform the active function identified in the table after receiving a signal from the PMS. 309 2.3.02.10b.ii 10.b) The valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 as having PMS control perform an active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

ii) Testing will be performed to demonstrate that the remotely operated CVS isolation valves CVS-V090, V091, V136A/B close within the required response time.

ii) These valves close within the following times after receipt of an actuation signal:

V 090 , V 091 < 30 sec V 136A/B < 20 sec 310 2.3.02.11a.i 11.a) The motor

-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

i) Tests or type tests of motor-operated valves will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions.

i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.3.2-1 under design conditions.

311 2.3.02.11a.ii 11.a) The motor

-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built motor

-operated valves are bounded by the tested conditions.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tests or type tests. 312 2.3.02.11a.iii 11.a) The motor

-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

iii) Tests of the motor

-operated valves will be performed under pre-operational flow, differential pressure, and temperature conditions.

iii) Each motor

-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.3.2

-1 under pre-operational test conditions.

313 2.3.02.11a.iv 11.a) The motor

-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.3.2-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

iv) Exercise testing of the check valves with active safety functions identified in Table 2.3.2-1 will be performed under pre-operational test pressure, temperature and fluid flow conditions.

iv) Each check valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.3.2-1.

C-204 Table 2.3.2

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 314 2.3.02.11b 11.b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.2

-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

Testing of the remotely operated valves will be performed under the conditions of loss of motive power. Upon loss of motive power, each remotely operated valve identified in Table 2.3.2

-1 assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.

315 2.3.02.12a 12.a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the pumps identified in Table 2.3.2-3 to perform the listed function. Testing will be performed to actuate the pumps identified in Table 2.3.2

-3 using controls in the MCR. Controls in the MCR cause pumps identified in Table 2.3.2-3 to perform the listed function.

316 2.3.02.12b 12.b) The pumps identified in Table 2.3.2-3 start after receiving a signal from the PLS.

Testing will be performed to confirm starting of the pumps identified in Table 2.3.2

-3. The pumps identified in Table 2.3.2-3 start after a signal is generated by the PLS. 317 2.3.02.13 13. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.2-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the displays identified in Table 2.3.2

-3 in the MCR. Displays identified in Table 2.3.2-3 can be retrieved in the MCR. 318 2.3.02.14 14. The nonsafety

-related piping located inside containment and designated as reactor coolant pressure boundary, as identified in Table 2.3.2-2, has been designed to withstand a seismic design basis event and maintain structural integrity.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the CVS Seismic Analysis Report.

The CVS Seismic Analysis Reports exist for the non

-safety related piping located inside containment and designated as reactor coolant pressure boundary as identified in Table 2.3.2

-2.

C-205 Table 2.3.2

-5 Component Name Tag No. Component Location CVS Makeup Pump A CVS-MP-01A Auxiliary Building CVS Makeup Pump B CVS-MP-01B Auxiliary Building Boric Acid Storage Tank CVS-MT-01 Yard Regenerative Heat Exchanger CVS-ME-01 Containment Letdown Heat Exchanger CVS-ME-02 Containment Mixed Bed Demineralizer A CVS-MV-01A Containment Mixed Bed Demineralizer B CVS-MV-01B Containment Cation Bed Demineralizer CVS-MV-02 Containment Reactor Coolant Filter A CVS-MV-03A Containment Reactor Coolant Filter B CVS-MV-03B Containment

C-206 Figure 2.3.2

-1 Chemical and Volume Control System

C-207 2.3.3 Standby Diesel Fuel Oil System Design Description The standby diesel fuel oil system (DOS) supplies diesel fuel oil for the onsite standby power system. The diesel fuel oil is supplied by two above

-ground fuel oil storage tanks. The DOS also provides fuel oil for the ancillary diesel generators. A single fuel oil storage tank services both ancillary diesel generators. The DOS is as shown in Figure 2.3.3

-1 and the component locations of the DOS are as shown in Table 2.3.3-3. 1. The functional arrangement of the DOS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.3. 2. The ancillary diesel generator fuel tank can withstand a seismic event.

3. The DOS provides the following nonsafety

-related functions:

a) Each fuel oil storage tank provides for at least 7 days of continuous operation of the associated standby diesel generator.

b) Each fuel oil day tank provides for at least four hours of continuous operation of the associated standby diesel engine generator.

c) The fuel oil flow rate to the day tank of each standby diesel generator provides for continuous operation of the associated diesel generator.

d) The ancillary diesel generator fuel tank is sized to supply power to long

-term safety

-related post

-accident monitoring loads and control room lighting through a regulating transformer and one PCS recirculation pump for a period of 4 days.

4. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to cause the components identified in Table 2.3.3-1 to perform the listed function.

5. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.3

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.3.3

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function Diesel Fuel Oil Pump 1A (Motor)

DOS-MP-01A Yes (Run Status)

Start Diesel Fuel Oil Pump 1B (Motor)

DOS-MP-01B Yes (Run Status)

Start Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Day Tank A Level DOS-016A Yes - Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Day Tank B Level DOS-016B Yes - Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-208 Table 2.3.3

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 31 9 2.3.03.01 1. The functional arrangement of the DOS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.3.3. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built DOS conforms with the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.3. 320 2.3.03.02 2. The ancillary diesel generator fuel tank can withstand a seismic event.

Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built ancillary diesel generator fuel tank and its anchorage are designed using seismic Category II methods and criteria.

A report exists and concludes that the as

-built ancillary diesel generator fuel tank and its anchorage are designed using seismic Category II methods and criteria.

321 2.3.03.03a 3.a) Each fuel oil storage tank provides for at least 7 days of continuous operation of the associated standby diesel generator.

Inspection of each fuel oil storage tank will be performed.

The volume of each fuel oil storage tank available to the standby diesel generator is greater than or equal to 55,000 gallons. 322 2.3.03.03b 3.b) Each fuel oil storage day tank provides for at least 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months of operation of the associated standby diesel generator.

Inspection of the fuel oil day tank will be performed.

The volume of each fuel oil day tank is greater than or equal to 1300 gallon s. 323 2.3.03.03c 3.c) The fuel oil flow rate to the day tank of each standby diesel generator provides for continuous operation of the associated diesel generator.

Testing will be performed to determine the flow rate.

The flow rate delivered to each day tank is 8 gpm or greater. 324 2.3.03.03d 3.d) The ancillary diesel generator fuel tank is sized to supply power to long

-term safety

-related post accident monitoring loads and control room lighting through a regulating transformer and one PCS recirculation pump for four days.

Inspection of the ancillary diesel generator fuel tank will be performed.

The volume of the ancillary diesel generator fuel tank is greater than or equal to 650 gallons. 325 2.3.03.04 4. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.3.3-1 to perform the listed function.

Testing will be performed on the components in Table 2.3.3

-1 using controls in the MCR.

Controls in the MCR operate to cause the components listed in Table 2.3.3-1 to perform the listed functions.

326 2.3.03.05 5. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.3

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of parameters in the MCR. The displays identified in Table 2.3.3-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-209 Table 2.3.3

-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Diesel Oil Transfer Package A DOS-MS-01A Yard Diesel Oil Transfer Package B DOS-MS-01B Yard Fuel Oil Storage Tank A DOS-MT-01A Yard Fuel Oil Storage Tank B DOS-MT-01B Yard Diesel Generator A Fuel Oil Day Tank DOS-MT-02A Diesel Building Diesel Generator B Fuel Oil Day Tank DOS-MT-02B Diesel Building Ancillary Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank DOS-MT-03 Annex Building

C-210 Figure 2.3.3

-1 Standby Diesel Fuel Oil System

C-211 2.3.4 Fire Protection System Design Description The fire protection system (FPS) detects and suppresses fires in the plant. The FPS consists of water distribution systems, automatic and manual suppression systems, a fire detection and alarm system, and portable fire extinguishers. The FPS provides fire protection for the nuclear island, the annex building, the turbine building, the radwaste building and the diesel generator building. The FPS is as shown in Figure 2.3.4

-1 and the component locations of the FPS are as shown in Table 2.3.4-3. 1. The functional arrangement of the FPS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.4. 2. The FPS piping identified in Table 2.3.4

-4 remains functional following a safe shutdown earthquake.

3. The FPS provides the safety-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the FPS line penetrating the containment.

4. The FPS provides for manual fire fighting capability in plant areas containing safety

-related equipment.

5. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.4

-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).

6. The FPS provides nonsafety

-related containment spray for severe accident management.

7. The FPS provides two fire water storage tanks, each capable of holding at least 300,000 gallons of water. 8. Two FPS fire pumps provide at least 2000 gpm each at a total head of at least 300 ft.

9. The fuel tank for the diesel

-driven fire pump is capable of holding at least 240 gallons.

10. Individual fire detectors provide fire detection capability and can be used to initiate fire alarms in areas containing safety

-related equipment.

11. The FPS seismic standpipe subsystem can be supplied from the FPS fire main by opening the normally closed cross

-connect valve to the FPS plant fire main.

Table 2.3.4

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function Motor-driven Fire Pump FPS-MP-01A Yes (Run Status)

Start Diesel-driven Fire Pump FPS-MP-01B Yes (Run Status)

Start Jockey Pump FPS-MP-02 Yes (Run Status)

Start C-212Table 2.3.4-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 327 2.3.0 4.01 1.The functional arrangement of theFPS is as described in the DesignDescription of this Section 2.3.4.Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built FPS conforms with the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.4. 328 2.3.04.02.i 2.The FPS piping identified i n Table 2.3.4-4 remains functionalfollowing a safe shutdown earthquake.

i)Inspection will be performedto verify that the piping identified in Table 2.3.4-4 islocated on the Nuclear Island.i)The piping identified in Table 2.3.4-4 is located onthe Nuclear Island.

329 2.3.04.02.ii 2.The FPS piping identified inTable 2.3.4-4 remains functionalfollowing a safe shutdown earthquake.

ii)A reconciliation analysisusing the as

-designed and as

-built piping information will beperformed, or an analysis of th e as-built piping will beperformed.

ii)The a s-built piping stressreport exists and concludes that the piping remains functional following a safe shutdown earthquake.

330 2.3.04.03 3.The FPS provides the safety

-relatedfunction of preserving containmentintegrity by isolation of the FPS line penetrating the containment.See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7. See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.

331 2.3.04.04.i 4.The FPS provides for manual fir e fighting capability in plant areascontaining safety

-related equipment.i)Inspection of the passivecontainment cooling system (PCS) storage tank will be performed.i)The volume of the PCStank above the standpipefeeding the FPS and below the overflow is at least 18,000 gal.332 2.3.04.04.ii 4.The FPS provides for manual firefighting capability in plant areascontaining safety

-related equipment.

ii)Testing will be performed bymeasuring the water flow rate asit is simultaneously dischargedfrom the two highest fire

-hosestations and when the water forthe fire is supplied from the P CSstorage tank.

ii)Water is simultaneouslydischarged from each of th e two highest fire

-hose station s in plant areas containingsafety-related equipment a t not less than 75 gpm.

333 2.3.04.05 5.Displays of the parameters identifiedin Table 2.3.4

-1 can be retrieved in th e M CR.Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the parameters in the MCR.

The displays identified in Table 2.3.4-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

334 2.3.04.06 6.The FPS provides nonsafety

-relatedcontainment spray for severe accident management.Inspection of the containment spray headers will be performed.

The FPS has spray headers and nozzles as follows:

At least 44 nozzles at plant elevation of at least 260 feet, and 24 nozzles at plant elevation of at least 275 feet. 335 2.3.04.07 7.The FPS provides two fire waterstorage tanks, each capable of holdingat least 300,000 gallons of water.Inspection of each fire water storage tank will be performed.

The volume of each fire water storage tank supplying the FPS is at least 300,000 gallons.

C-213 Table 2.3.4

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 336 2.3.04.08 8. Two FPS fire pumps provide at least 2000 gpm each at a total head of at least 300 ft. Testing and/or analysis of each fire pump will be performed.

The tests and/or analysis concludes that each fire pump provides a flow rate of at least 2000 gpm at a total head of at least 300 ft.

337 2.3.04.09 9. The fuel tank for the diesel

-driven fire pump is capable of holding at least 240 gallons.

Inspection of the diesel

-driven fire pump fuel tank will be performed.

The volume of the diesel driven fire pump fuel tank is at least 240 gallons. 338 2.3.04.10 10. Individual fire detectors provide fire detection capability and can be used to initiate fire alarms in areas containing safety-related equipment.

Testing will be performed on the

as-built individual fire detectors in the fire areas identified in subsection 3.3, Table 3.3-3. (Individual fire detectors will be tested using simulated fire conditions.)

The tested individual fire detectors respond to simulated fire conditions. 339 2.3.04.11 11. The FPS seismic standpipe subsystem can be supplied from the FPS fire main by opening the normally closed cross

-connect valve to the FPS plant fire main.

Inspection for the existence of a cross-connect valve from the FPS seismic standpipe subsystem to FPS plant fire main will be performed.

Valve FPS-PL-V101 exists and can connect the FPS seismic standpipe subsystem to the FPS plant fire main.

Table 2.3.4

-3 Component Name Tag No. Location Motor-driven Fire Pump FPS-MP-01A Turbine Building Diesel-driven Fire Pump FPS-MP-01B Yard Jockey Pump FPS-MP-02 Turbine Building Primary Fire Water Tank FPS-MT-01A Yard Secondary Fire Water/Clearwell Storage Tank FPS-MT-01B Yard Fire Pump Diesel Fuel Day Tank FPS-MT-02 Yard C-214 Table 2.3.4-4 FPS Piping Which Must Remain Functional Following a Safe Shutdown Earthquake L049 L114 L142 L188 L090A L115 L143 L189 L090B L116 L144 L190 L091A L117 L145 L191 L091B L118 L146 L192 L091C L119 L147 L193 L092A L120 L148 L194 L092B L121 L149 L195 L092C L122 L150 L196 L093 L123 L151 L197 L094 L124 L152 L198 L095 L125 L153 L199 L096 L126 L154 L301 L102 L127 L155 L701 L103 L128 L156 L702 L105 L129 L159 L703 L106 L130 L180 L704 L107 L131 L181 L705 L108 L132 L182 L706 L109 L133A L183 L707 L110 L133B L184 L708 L111 L133C L185 L709 L112 L140 L186 L113 L141 L187 C-215 Figure 2.3.4

-1 (Sheet 1 of 2)

Fire Protection System

C-216 Figure 2.3.4

-1 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Fire Protection System

C-217 2.3.5 Mechanical Handling System Design Description The mechanical handling system (MHS) provides for lifting heavy loads. The MHS equipment can be operated during shutdown and refueling.

The component locations of the MHS are as shown in Table 2.3.5

-3. 1. The functional arrangement of the MHS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.5. 2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.5

-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

3. The MHS components listed below are single failure proof: a) Polar crane b) Cask handling crane c) Equipment hatch hoist d) Maintenance hatch hoist

4. The cask handling crane cannot move over the spent fuel pool.

Table 2.3.5

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Seismic Cat. I Class 1 E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir.

Safety Function Containment Polar Crane MHS-MH-01 Yes No/No Avoid uncontrolled lowering of heavy load.

Cask Handling Crane MHS-MH-02 Yes No/No Avoid uncontrolled lowering of heavy load.

Equipment Hatch Hoist MHS-MH-05 Yes No/No Avoid uncontrolled lowering of heavy load.

Maintenance Hatch Hoist MHS-MH-06 Yes No/No Avoid uncontrolled lowering of heavy load.

C-218 Table 2.3.5

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 340 2.3.05.01 1. The functional arrangement of the MHS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.3.5. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built MHS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.5.

341 2.3.05.02.i

2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismi c Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.5

-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

342 2.3.05.02.ii

2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. 343 2.3.05.02.iii

2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

344 2.3.05.03a.i 3.a) The polar crane is single failure proof. i) Validation of double design factors is provided for hooks where used as load bearing components. Validation of redundant factors is provided for load bearing components such as: Hoisting ropes Sheaves Equalizer assembly Holding brakes i) A report exists and concludes that the polar crane is single failure proof. A certificate of conformance from the vendor exists and concludes that the polar crane is single failure proof.

345 2.3.05.03a.ii 3.a) The polar crane is single failure proof. ii) Testing of the polar crane is performed.

ii) The polar crane shall be static-load tested to 125% of the rated load. 346 2.3.05.03a.iii 3.a) The polar crane is single failure proof. iii) Testing of the polar crane is performed.

iii) The polar crane shall lift a test load that is 100% of the rated load. Then it shall lower, stop, and hold the test load.

C-219 Table 2.3.5

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 347 2.3.05.03b.i 3.b) The cask handling crane is single failure proof.

i) Validation of double design factors is provided for hooks where used as load bearing components. Validation of redundant factors is provided for load bearing components such as: Hoisting ropes Sheaves Equalizer assembly Holding brakes i) A report exists and concludes that the cask handling crane is single failure proof. A certificate of conformance from the vendor exists and concludes that the cask handling crane is single failure proof. 348 2.3.05.03b.ii 3.b) The cask handling crane is single failure proof.

ii) Testing of the cask handling crane is performed.

ii) The cask handling crane shall be static load tested to 125% of the rated load.

349 2.3.05.03b.iii 3.b) The cask handling crane is single failure proof.

iii) Testing of the cask handling crane is performed.

iii) The cask handling crane shall lift a test load that is 100% of the rated load. Then it shall lower, stop, and hold the test load.

350 2.3.05.03c.i 3.c) The equipment hatch hoist is single failure proof.

i) Validation of double design factors is provided for hooks where used as load bearing components. Validation of redundant factors is provided for load bearing components such as: Hoisting ropes Sheaves Equalizer assembly Holding brakes i) A report exists and concludes that the equipment hatch hoist is single failure proof. A certificate of conformance from the vendor exists and concludes that the equipment hatch hoist is single failure proof.

351 2.3.05.03c.ii 3.c) The equipment hatch hoist is single failure proof.

ii) Testing of the equipment hatch hoist is performed.

ii) The equipment hatch hoist holding mechanism shall stop and hold the hatch.

352 2.3.05.03d.i 3.d) The maintenance hatch hoist is single failure proof.

i) Validation of double design factors is provided for hooks where used as load bearing components. Validation of redundant factors is provided for load bearing components such as: Hoisting ropes Sheaves Equalizer assembly Holding brakes i) A report exists and concludes that the maintenance hatch hoist is single failure proof. A certificate of conformance from the vendor exists and concludes that the maintenance hatch hoist is single failure proof.

C-220 Table 2.3.5

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 353 2.3.05.03d.ii 3.d) The maintenance hatch hoist is single failure proof.

ii) Testing of the maintenance hatch hoist is performed.

ii) The maintenance hatch hoist holding mechanism shall stop and hold the hatch.

354 2.3.05.04 4. The cask handling crane cannot move over the spent fuel pool.

Testing of the cask handling crane is performed.

The cask handling crane does not move over the spent fuel pool. Table 2.3.5

-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Containment Polar Crane MHS-MH-01 Containment Cask Handling Crane MHS-MH-02 Auxiliary Building Equipment Hatch Hoist MHS-MH-05 Containment Maintenance Hatch Hoist MHS-MH-06 Containment

C-221 2.3.6 Normal Residual Heat Removal System Design Description The normal residual heat removal system (RNS) removes heat from the core and reactor coolant system (RCS) and provides RCS low temperature over

-pressure (LTOP) protection at reduced RCS pressure and temperature conditions after shutdown. The RNS also provides a means for cooling the in

-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) during normal plant operation.

The RNS is as shown in Figure 2.3.6

-1 and the RNS component locations are as shown in Table 2.3.6-5. 1. The functional arrangement of the RNS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.6. 2. a) The components identified in Table 2.3.6

-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.6

-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

3. a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.6

-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.3.6

-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

4. a) The components identified in Table 2.3.6

-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.6

-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

5. a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.6

-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.3.6

-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

6. Each of the as

-built lines identified in Table 2.3.6

-2 as designed for leak before break (LBB) meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.

7. a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.6

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.3.6

-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

C-222 c) Separation is provided between RNS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1 E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable.

8. The RNS provides the following safety

-related functions:

a) The RNS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the RNS lines penetrating the containment.

b) The RNS provides a flow path for long

-term, post

-accident makeup to the RCS.

9. The RNS provides the following nonsafety

-related functions:

a) The RNS provides low temperature overpressure protection (LTOP) for the RCS during shutdown operations.

b) The RNS provides heat removal from the reactor coolant during shutdown operations.

c) The RNS provides low pressure makeup flow from the SFS cask loading pit to the RCS for scenarios following actuation of the automatic depressurization system (ADS).

d) The RNS provides heat removal from the in

-containment refueling water storage tank.

10. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.3.6

-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR). 11. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause those remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.6-1 to perform active functions.

b) The valves identified in Table 2.3.6

-1 as having protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform active safety functions after receiving a signal from the PMS.

12. a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.3.6

-1 perform an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.6

-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

13. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the pumps identified in Table 2.3.6

-3 to perform the listed function. 14. Displays of the RNS parameters identified in Table 2.3.6

-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-223 Table 2.3.6

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position RNS Pump A (Pressure Boundary) RNS-MP-01A Yes Yes - -/- - - No - RNS Pump B (Pressure Boundary) RNS-MP-01B Yes Yes - -/- - - No - RNS Heat Exchanger A (Tube Side) RNS-ME-01A Yes Yes - -/- - - - - RNS Heat Exchanger B (Tube Side) RNS-ME-01B Yes Yes - -/- - - - - RCS Inner Hot Leg Suction Motor-operated Isolation Valve RNS-PL-V001A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed As Is RCS Inner Hot Leg Suction Motor-operated Isolation Valve RNS-PL-V001B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed As Is RCS Outer Hot Leg Suction Motor-operated Isolation Valve RNS-PL-V002A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed As Is RCS Outer Hot Leg Suction Motor-operated Isolation Valve RNS-PL-V002B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed As Is RCS Pressure Boundary Thermal Relief Check Valve RNS-PL-V003A Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed -

C-224 Table 2.3.6

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position RCS Pressure Boundary Thermal Relief Check Valve RNS-PL-V003B Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - RNS Discharge Motor

-operated Containment Isolation Valve RNS-PL-V011 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed As Is RNS Discharge Containment Isolation Test Connection RNS-PL-V012 Yes Yes No -/- No No Transfer Open - RNS Discharge Header Containment Isolation Check Valve RNS-PL-V013 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - RNS Discharge RCS Pressure Boundary Check Valve RNS-PL-V015A Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - RNS Discharge RCS Pressure Boundary Check Valve RNS-PL-V015B Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - RNS Discharge RCS Pressure Boundary Check Valve RNS-PL-V017A Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed -

C-225 Table 2.3.6

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position RNS Discharge RCS Pressure Boundary Check Valve RNS-PL-V017B Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - RNS Hot Leg Suction Pressure Relief Valve RNS-PL-V021 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - RNS Suction Header Motor-operated Containment Isolation Valve RNS-PL-V022 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed As Is RNS Suction from IRWST Motor-operated Isolation Valve RNS-PL-V023 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed As Is RNS Discharge to IRWST Motor-operated Isolation Valve RNS-PL-V024 Yes Yes Yes -/- No No No As Is RNS Discharge Header Relief Valve RNS-PL-V045 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Open/ Transfer Closed - RNS Suction from Cask Loading Pit Motor-operated Isolation Valve RNS-PL-V055 Yes Yes Yes No/No No No No As Is RNS Suction from Cask Loading Pit Check Valve RNS-PL-V056 Yes Yes No -/- No - No -

C-226 Table 2.3.6

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position RNS Pump Miniflow Air-Operated Isolation Valve RNS-PL-V057A Yes Yes Yes No/No No No No Open RNS Pump Miniflow Air-Operated Isolation Valve RNS-PL-V057B Yes Yes Yes No/No No No No Open RNS Return from Chemical and Volume Control System (CVS)

Containment Isolation Valve RNS-PL-V061 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position) Yes Transfer Closed Closed Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

Table 2.3.6

-2 Line Name Line No. ASME Code Section III Leak Before Break Functional Capability Required RNS Suction Lines, from the RCS Hot Leg Connection to the RCS Side of Valves RNS PL-V 001A and RNS-PL-V001B RNS-L 001 RNS-L 002 A RNS-L002B Yes Yes No RNS Suction Lines, from the RCS Pressure Boundary Valves, RNS

-PL-V001A and RNS

-PL-V001B, to the RNS pumps RNS-L 004 A RNS-L 004 B RNS-L 005 RNS-L 006 RNS-L 007 A RNS-L 007 B RNS-L 009 A RNS-L009B Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No No No No RNS Suction Line from CVS RNS-L061 Yes No No RNS Suction Line from IRWST RNS-L029 Yes No No C-227 Table 2.3.6

-2 Line Name Line No. ASME Code Section III Leak Before Break Functional Capability Required RNS Suction Line LTOP Relief RNS-L040 Yes No Yes RNS Discharge Lines, from the RNS Pumps to the RNS Heat Exchangers RNS

-ME-01A and RNS-ME-01B RNS-L011 A RNS-L011B Yes No Yes RNS Discharge Lines, from RNS Heat Exchanger RNS-ME-01A to Containment Isolation Valve RNS-PL-V011 RNS-L 012 A RNS-L014 Yes No Yes RNS Discharge Line, from RNS Heat Exchanger RNS-ME-01B to Common Discharge Header RNS-DBC-L014 RNS-L012B Yes No Yes RNS Discharge Lines, Containment Isolation Valve RNS-PL-V011 to Containment Isolation Valve RNS-PL-V013 RNS-L016 Yes No Yes RNS Suction Line from Cask Loading Pit RNS-L065 Yes No No RNS Discharge Lines, from Containment Isolation Valve RNS-PL-V013 to RCS Pressure Boundary Isolation Valves RNS

-PL-V015A and RNS

-PL-V015B RNS-L 017 RNS-L 018 A RNS-L018B Yes No Yes RNS Discharge Lines, from Direct Vessel Injection (DVI) Line RNS

-BBC-L018A to Passive Core Cooling System (PXS) IRWST Return Isolation Valve RNS-PL-V024 RNS-L020 Yes No No RNS Discharge Lines, from RCS Pressure Boundary Isolation Valves RNS

-PL-V015A and RNS

-PL-V015B to Reactor Vessel DVI Nozzles RNS-L 019 A RNS-L019B Yes No Yes RNS Heat Exchanger Bypass RNS-L 008 A RNS-L008B Yes No No RNS Suction from Spent Fuel Pool RNS-L052 Yes No No C-228 Table 2.3.6

-2 Line Name Line No. ASME Code Section III Leak Before Break Functional Capability Required RNS Pump Miniflow Return RNS-L 030 A RNS-L030B Yes No No RNS Discharge to Spent Fuel Pool RNS-L051 Yes No No RNS Discharge to CVS Purification RNS-L021 Yes No No C-229 Table 2.3.6

-3 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function RNS Pump 1A (Motor)

RNS-MP-01A Yes (Run Status)

Start RNS Pump 1B (Motor)

RNS-MP-01B Yes (Run Status)

Start RNS Flow Sensor RNS-01A Yes - RNS Flow Sensor RNS-01B Yes - RNS Suction from Cask Loading Pit Isolation Valve (Position Indicator)

RNS-PL-V055 Yes - RNS Pump Miniflow Isolation Valve (Position Indicator)

RNS-PL-V057A Yes - RNS Pump Miniflow Isolation Valve (Position Indicator)

RNS-PL-V057B Yes - Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

Table 2.3.6-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 355 2.3.06.01 1. The functional arrangement of the RNS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.3.6. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built RNS conforms with the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.6.

356 2.3.06.02a 2.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.6

-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports. The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as

-built components identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as ASME Code Section III. 357 2.3.06.02b 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping as documented in the ASME design reports. The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as

-built piping identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III.

358 2.3.06.03a 3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of the as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III. A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

C-230 Table 2.3.6-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 359 2.3.06.03b 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.3.6

-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of the as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.

A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

360 2.3.06.04a 4.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.6

-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested. A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

361 2.3.06.04b 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.

A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the piping identified in Table 2.3.6-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III. 362 2.3.06.05a.i 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

363 2.3.06.05a.ii 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. 364 2.3.06.05a.iii 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

C-231 Table 2.3.6-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 365 2.3.06.05b 5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.3.6

-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.

A report exists and concludes that each of the as

-built lines identified in Table 2.3.6

-2 for which functional capability is required meets the requirements for functional capability.

366 2.3.06.06 6. Each of the as

-built lines identified in Table 2.3.6

-2 as designed for LBB meets the LBB criteria, or an evaluation is performed of the protection from the dynamic effects of a rupture of the line.

Inspection will be performed for the existence of an LBB evaluation report or an evaluation report on the protection from dynamic effects of a pipe break. Section 3.3, Nuclear Island Buildings, contains the design descriptions and inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for protection from the dynamic effects of pipe rupture.

An LBB evaluation report exists and concludes that the LBB acceptance criteria are met by the as

-built RCS piping and piping materials, or a pipe break evaluation report exists and concludes that protection from the dynamic effects of a line break is provided. 367 2.3.06.07a.i 7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.3.6

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.

i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

368 2.3.06.07a.ii 7.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.3.6

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses. 369 2.3.06.07b 7.b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.3.6

-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

Testing will be performed on the RNS by providing a simulated test signal in each Class 1E division. A simulated test signal exists at the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.6

-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

C-232 Table 2.3.6-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 370 2.3.06.07c 7.c) Separation is provided between RNS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. 371 2.3.06.08a 8.a) The RNS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the RNS lines penetrating the containment.

See ITAAC Table 2.2.1

-3, item 7. See ITAAC Table 2.2.1

-3, item 7. 372 2.3.06.08b 8.b) The RNS provides a flow path for long-term, post

-accident makeup to the RCS. See item 1 in this table.

See item 1 in this table.

373 2.3.06.09a.i 9.a) The RNS provides LTOP for the RCS during shutdown operations.

i) Inspections will be conducted on the low temperature overpressure protection relief valve to confirm that the capacity of the vendor code plate rating is greater than or equal to system relief requirements.

i) The rated capacity recorded on the valve vendor code plate is not less than the flow required to provide low

-temperature overpressure protection for the RCS, a s determined by the LTOPS evaluation based on the pressure-temperature curves developed for the as

-procured reactor vessel material.

374 2.3.06.09a.ii 9.a) The RNS provides LTOP for the RCS during shutdown operations.

ii) Testing and analysis in accordance with the ASME Code Section III will be performed to determine set pressure.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the relief valve opens at a pressure not greater than the set pressure required to provide low

-temperature overpressure protection for the RCS, as determined by the LTOPS evaluation based on the pressure

-temperature curves developed for the as

-procured reactor vessel material. 375 2.3.06.09b.i 9.b) The RNS provides heat removal from the reactor coolant during shutdown operations.

i) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report that determines the heat removal capability of the RNS heat exchangers.

i) A report exists and concludes that the product of the overall heat transfer coefficient and the effective heat transfer area, UA, of each RNS heat exchanger is greater than or equal to 2.2 million Btu/hr-°F.

C-233 Table 2.3.6-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 376 2.3.06.09b.ii 9.b) The RNS provides heat removal from the reactor coolant during shutdown operations.

ii) Testing will be performed to confirm that the RNS can provide flow through the RNS heat exchangers when the pump suction is aligned to the RCS hot leg and the discharge is aligned to both PXS DVI lines with the RCS at atmospheric pressure.

ii) Each RNS pump provides at least 1400 gpm net flow to the RCS when the hot leg water level is at an elevation 15.5 inches +/- 2 inches above the bottom of the hot leg.

377 2.3.06.09b.iii 9.b) The RNS provides heat removal from the reactor coolant during shutdown operations.

iii) Inspection will be performed of the reactor coolant loop piping. iii) The RCS cold legs piping centerline is 17.5 inches +/- 2 inches above the hot legs piping centerline.

378 2.3.06.09b.iv 9.b) The RNS provides heat removal from the reactor coolant during shutdown operations.

iv) Inspection will be performed of the RNS pump suction piping.

iv) The RNS pump suction piping from the hot leg to the pump suction piping low point does not form a local high point (defined as an upward slope with a vertical rise greater than 3 inches).

379 2.3.06.09b.v 9.b) The RNS provides heat removal from the reactor coolant during shutdown operations.

v) Inspection will be performed of the RNS pump suction nozzle connection to the RCS hot leg.

v) The RNS suction line connection to the RCS is constructed from 20-inch Schedule 140 pipe.

380 2.3.06.09c 9.c) The RNS provides low pressure makeup flow from the cask loading pit to the RCS for scenarios following actuation of the ADS.

Testing will be performed to confirm that the RNS can provide low pressure makeup flow from the cask loading pit to the RCS when the pump suction is aligned to the cask loading pit and the discharge is aligned to both PXS DVI lines with RCS at atmospheric pressure.

Each RNS pump provides at least 1100 gpm net flow to the RCS when the water level above the bottom of the cask loading pit is 1 foot

+/- 6 inches. 381 2.3.06.09d 9.d) The RNS provides heat removal from the in

-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST).

Testing will be performed to confirm that the RNS can provide flow through the RNS heat exchangers when the pump suction is aligned to the IRWST and the discharge is aligned to the IRWST.

Two operating RNS pumps provide at least 2000 gpm to the IRWST.

382 2.3.06.10 10. Safety

-related displays identified in Table 2.3.6-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the safety

-related displays in the MCR.

Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.3.6

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-234 Table 2.3.6-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 383 2.3.06.11a 11.a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause those remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.6

-1 to perform active functions.

Stroke testing will be performed on the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.6

-1 using the controls in the MCR.

Controls in the MCR operate to cause those remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.6

-1 to perform active functions.

384 2.3.06.11b 11.b) The valves identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as having PMS control perform active safety functions after receiving a signal from the PMS.

Testing will be performed using real or simulated signals into the PMS. The valves identified in Table 2.3.6-1 as having PMS control perform the active function identified in the table after receiving a signal from the PMS. 385 2.3.06.12a.i 12.a) The motor-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.3.6-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

i) Tests or type tests of motor-operated valves will be performed that demonstrate the capability of the valve to operate under its design conditions.

i) A test report exists and concludes that each motor

-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.3.6-1 under design conditions.

386 2.3.06.12a.ii 12.a) The motor

-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.3.6-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built motor

-operated valves are bounded by the tested conditions.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built motor-operated valves are bounded by the tested conditions.

387 2.3.06.12a.iii 12.a) The motor

-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.3.6-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

iii) Tests of the motor

-operated valves will be performed under preoperational flow, differential pressure and temperature conditions.

iii) Each motor

-operated valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.3.6-1 under preoperational test conditions.

388 2.3.06.12a.iv 12.a) The motor

-operated and check valves identified in Table 2.3.6-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

iv) Exercise testing of the check valves active safety functions identified in Table 2.3.6

-1 will be performed under preoperational test pressure, temperature and fluid flow conditions.

iv) Each check valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.3.6-1. 389 2.3.06.12b 12.b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.6

-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

Testing of the remotely operated valves will be performed under the conditions of loss of motive power. Upon loss of motive power, each remotely operated valve identified in Table 2.3.6

-1 assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.

390 2.3.06.13 13. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the pumps identified in Table 2.3.6-3 to perform the listed function.

Testing will be performed to actuate the pumps identified in Table 2.3.6

-3 using controls in the MCR. Controls in the MCR cause pumps identified in Table 2.3.6-3 to perform the listed action.

C-235 Table 2.3.6-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 391 2.3.06.14 14. Displays of the RNS parameters identified in Table 2.3.6-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Inspection will be performed for retrievability in the MCR of the displays identified in Table 2.3.6-3. Displays of the RNS parameters identified in Table 2.3.6-3 are retrieved in the MCR. Table 2.3.6

-5 Component Name Tag No. Component Location RNS Pump A RNS-MP-01A Auxiliary Building RNS Pump B RNS-MP-01B Auxiliary Building RNS Heat Exchanger A RNS-ME-01A Auxiliary Building RNS Heat Exchanger B RNS-ME-01B Auxiliary Building

C-236 Figure 2.3.6

-1 Normal Residual Heat Removal System

C-237 2.3.7 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Design Description The spent fuel pool cooling system (SFS) removes decay heat from spent fuel by transferring heat from the water in the spent fuel pool to the component cooling water system during normal modes of operation. The SFS purifies the water in the spent fuel pool, fuel transfer canal, and in-containment refueling water storage tank during normal modes of operation. Following events such as earthquakes, or fires, if the normal heat removal method is not available, decay heat is removed from spent fuel by boiling water in the pool. In the event of long

-term station blackout, makeup water is supplied to the spent fuel pool from onsite storage tanks.

The SFS is as shown in Figure 2.3.7

-1 and the component locations of the SFS are as shown in Table 2.3.7-5. 1. The functional arrangement of the SFS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.7. 2. a) The components identified in Table 2.3.7

-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) The piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7

-2 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

3. Pressure boundary welds in piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7

-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

4. The piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7

-2 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

5. The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.3.7

-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

6. a) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.3.7

-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

b) Separation is provided between SFS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1 E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable.

7. The SFS performs the following safety

-related functions:

a) The SFS preserves containment integrity by isolating the SFS piping lines penetrating the containment. b) The SFS provides spent fuel cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent fuel pool water and makeup water from on

-site water storage tanks.

c) The SFS provides check valves in the drain line from the refueling cavity to prevent flooding of the refueling cavity during containment flooding.

8. The SFS provides the nonsafety

-related function of removing spent fuel decay heat using pumped flow through a heat exchanger.

C-238 9. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.3.7

-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR). 10. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the pumps identified in Table 2.3.7

-3 to perform their listed functions.

11.Displays of the SFS parameters identified in Table 2.3.7

-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-239 Table 2.3.7

-1 Component Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat 1 Remotely Operated Valve Class 1 E/ Qual for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Spent Fuel Pool Level Sensor SFS-019A No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - - Spent Fuel Pool Level Sensor SFS-019B No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - - Spent Fuel Pool Level Sensor SFS-019C No Yes - Yes/No Yes - - - Refueling Cavity Drain to SGS Compartment Isolation Valve SFS-PL-V031 Yes Yes No -/- Yes - - - Refueling Cavity to SFS Pump Suction Isolation Valve SFS-PL-V032 Yes Yes No -/- No - - - Refueling Cavity Drain to Containment Sump Isolation Valve SFS-PL-V033 Yes Yes No -/- Yes - - - IRWST to SFS Pump Suction Line Isolation Valve SFS-PL-V039 Yes Yes No -/- No - - - Fuel Transfer Canal to SFS Pump Suction Iso. Valve SFS-PL-V040 Yes Yes No -/- No - - - Cask Loading Pit to SFS Pump Suction Isolation Valve SFS-PL-V041 Yes Yes No -/- No - - - Cask Loading Pit to SFS Pump Suction Isolation Valve SFS-PL-V042 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Closed -

C-240 Table 2.3.7

-1 Component Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat 1 Remotely Operated Valve Class 1 E/ Qual for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position SFS Pump Discharge Line to Cask Loading Pit Isolation Valve SFS-PL-V045 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Closed - Cask Loading Pit to WLS Isolation Valve SFS-PL-V049 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Closed - Spent Fuel Pool to Cask Washdown Pit Isolation Valve SFS-PL-V066 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Open - Cask Washdown Pit Drain Isolation Valve SFS-PL-V068 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Open - Refueling Cavity Drain Line Check Valve SFS-PL-V071 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Open Transfer Closed - Refueling Cavity Drain Line Check Valve SFS-PL-V072 Yes Yes No -/- No - Transfer Open Transfer Closed - SFS Containment Floodup Isolation Valve SFS-PL-V075 Yes Yes No -/- Yes - - - Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-241 Table 2.3.7

-2 Piping Line Name Line Number ASME Code Section III Spent Fuel Pool to RNS Pump Suction L014 Yes Cask Loading Pit to RNS Pump Suction L015 Yes Refueling Cavity Drain L033 Yes PXS IRWST to SFS Pump Suction L035 Yes Refueling Cavity Skimmer to SFS Pump Suction L036 Yes Refueling Cavity Drain L037 Yes Refueling Cavity Drain L044 Yes Fuel Transfer Canal Drain L047 Yes Cask Washdown Pit Drain L068 Yes Cask Loading Pit Drain L043 Yes Cask Pit Transfer Branch Line L045 Yes Refueling Cavity Drain L030 Yes Refueling Cavity Drain L040 Yes Spent Fuel Pool Drain L066 Yes Cask Loading Pit to WLS L067 Yes RNS Return to Spent Fuel Pool L100 Yes SFS Containment Floodup Line L120 Yes Table 2.3.7

-3 Component Name Tag No. Display Control Function SFS Pump 1A SFS-MP-01A Yes (Run Status) Start SFS Pump 1B SFS-MP-01B Yes (Run Status)

Start SFS Flow Sensor SFS-13A Yes - SFS Flow Sensor SFS-13B Yes - Spent Fuel Pool Temperature Sensor SFS-018 Yes - Cask Loading Pit Level Sensor SFS-022 Yes - Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-242 Table 2.3.7

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 392 2.3.07.01 1. The functional arrangement of the SFS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.3.7. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built SFS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.7.

393 2.3.07.02a 2.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.7

-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the ASME as

-built components as documented in the ASME design reports.

The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as

-built components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 as ASME Code Section III.

394 2.3.07.02b 2.b) The piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping lines as documented in the ASME design reports. The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III.

395 2.3.07.03 3. Pressure boundary welds in piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of the as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.

A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non

-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

396 2.3.07.04 4. The piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping lines required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested. A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the piping lines identified in Table 2.3.7-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

397 2.3.07.05.i

5. The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety functions.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 are located on the Nuclear Islan

d. i) The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 are located on the Nuclear Island.

398 2.3.07.05.ii

5. The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety functions. ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

C-243 Table 2.3.7

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 399 2.3.07.05.iii

5. The seismic Category I components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety functions.

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

400 2.3.07.06a 6.a) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

Testing will be performed on the SFS by providing a simulated test signal in each Class 1E division. A simulated test signal exists at the Class 1E components identified in Table 2.3.7-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal. 401 2.3.07.06b 6.b) Separation is provided between SFS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. 402 2.3.07.07a 7.a) The SFS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the SFS lines penetrating the containment.

See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7. See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7. 403 2.3.07.07b.i 7.b) The SFS provides spent fuel cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent fuel pool water and makeup water from on-site storage tanks.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the spent fuel pool includes a sufficient volume of water. i) The volume of the spent fuel pool and fuel transfer canal above the fuel and to the elevation 6 feet below the operating deck is greater than or equal to 129,500 gallons. 404 2.3.07.07b.ii 7.b) The SFS provides spent fuel cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent fuel pool water and makeup water from on-site storage tanks.

ii) Inspection will be performed to verify the cask washdown pit includes sufficient volume of water. ii) The water volume of the cask washdown pit is greater than or equal to 30,900 gallons. 405 2.3.07.07b.iii 7.b) The SFS provides spent fuel cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent fuel pool water and makeup water from

on-site storage tanks.

iii) A safety

-related flow path exists from the cask washdown pit to the spent fuel pool.

iii) See item 1 of this table.

406 2.3.07.07b.iv 7.b) The SFS provides spent fuel cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent fuel pool water and makeup water from

on-site storage tanks.

iv) See ITAAC Table 2.2.2-3, item 7.f for inspection, testing, and acceptance criteria for the makeup water supply from the passive containment cooling system (PCS) water storage tank to the spent fuel pool.

iv) See ITAAC Table 2.2.2-3, item 7.f for inspection, testing, and acceptance criteria for the makeup water supply from the PCS water storage tank to the spent fuel pool.

C-244 Table 2.3.7

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 407 2.3.07.07b.v 7.b) The SFS provides spent fuel cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent fuel pool water and makeup water from

on-site storage tanks.

v) Inspection will be performed to verify that the passive containment cooling system water storage tank includes a sufficient volume of water.

v) See ITAAC Table 2.2.2-3, item 7.f for the volume of the passive containment cooling system water storage tank.

408 2.3.07.07b.vi 7.b) The SFS provides spent fuel cooling for 7 days by boiling the spent fuel pool water and makeup water from

on-site storage tanks.

vi) See ITAAC Table 2.2.2-3, items 8.a and 8.b for inspection, testing, and acceptance criteria to verify that the passive containment cooling system ancillary water storage tank includes a sufficient volume of water. vi) See ITAAC Table 2.2.2-3, items 8.a and 8.b for inspection, testing, and acceptance criteria for the volume of the passive containment cooling system ancillary water storage tank.

409 2.3.07.07c 7c) The SFS provides check valves in the drain line from the refueling cavity to prevent flooding of the refueling cavity during containment flooding.

Exercise testing of the check valves with active safety-functions identified in Table 2.3.7-1 will be performed under pre-operational test pressure, temperature and flow conditions.

Each check valve changes position as indicated on Table 2.3.7-1. 410 2.3.07.08.i

8. The SFS provides the nonsafety

-related function of removing spent fuel decay heat using pumped flow through a heat exchanger.

i) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report that determines the heat removal capability of the SFS heat exchangers.

i) A report exists and concludes that the heat transfer characteristic, UA, of each SFS heat exchanger is greater than or equal to 2.2 million Btu/hr

-°F. 411 2.3.07.08.ii

8. The SFS provides the nonsafety

-related function of removing spent fuel decay heat using pumped flow through a heat exchanger.

ii) Testing will be performed to confirm that each SFS pump provides flow through its heat exchanger when taking suction from the SFP and returning flow to the SFP.

ii) Each SFS pump produces at least 900 gpm through its heat exchanger. 412 2.3.07.09 9. Safety

-related displays identified in Table 2.3.7-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the safety

-related displays in the MCR.

Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.3.7

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

413 2.3.07.10 10. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the pumps identified in Table 2.3.7-3 to perform their listed functions.

Testing will be performed to actuate the pumps identified in Table 2.3.7-3 using controls in the MCR. Controls in the MCR cause pumps identified in Table 2.3.7-3 to perform the listed functions.

414 2.3.07.11 11. Displays of the SFS parameters identified in Table 2.3.7-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Inspection will be performed for retrievability in the MCR of the displays identified in Table 2.3.7-3. Displays of the SFS parameters identified in Table 2.3.7-3 are retrieved in the MCR.

C-245 Table 2.3.7

-5 Component Name Tag No. Component Location SFS Pump A SFS-MP-01A Auxiliary Building SFS Pump B SFS-MP-01B Auxiliary Building SFS Heat Exchanger A SFS-ME-01A Auxiliary Building SFS Heat Exchanger B SFS-ME-01B Auxiliary Building

C-246 Figure 2.3.7

-1 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System

C-247 2.3.8 Service Water System Design Description The service water system (SWS) transfers heat from the component cooling water heat exchangers to the atmosphere. The SWS operates during normal modes of plant operation, including startup, power operation (full and partial loads), cooldown, shutdown, and refueling.

The SWS is as shown in Figure 2.3.8

-1 and the component locations of the SWS are as shown Table 2.3.8-3. 1. The functional arrangement of the SWS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.8. 2. The SWS provides the nonsafety

-related function of transferring heat from the component cooling water system (CCS) to the surrounding atmosphere to support plant shutdown and spent fuel pool cooling.

3. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to cause the components identified in Table 2.3.8-1 to perform the listed function.

4. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.8

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-248 Table 2.3.8

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function Service Water Pump A (Motor)

SWS-MP-01A Yes (Run Status)

Start Service Water Pump B (Motor) SWS-MP-01B Yes (Run Status)

Start Service Water Cooling Tower Fan A (Motor)

SWS-MA-01A Yes (Run Status)

Start Service Water Cooling Tower Fan B (Motor)

SWS-MA-01B Yes (Run Status)

Start Service Water Pump 1A Flow Sensor SWS-004A Yes - Service Water Pump 1B Flow Sensor SWS-004B Yes - Service Water Pump A Discharge Valve SWS-PL-V002A Yes (Valve Position)

Open Service Water Pump B Discharge Valve SWS-PL-V002B Yes (Valve Position)

Open Service Water Pump A Discharge Temperature Sensor SWS-005A Yes - Service Water Pump B Discharge Temperature Sensor SWS-005B Yes - Service Water Cooling Tower Basin Level SWS-009 Yes - Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

Table 2.3.8

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 415 2.3.08.01 1. The functional arrangement of the SWS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.3.8. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built SWS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.8.

416 2.3.08.02.i

2. The SWS provides the nonsafety

-related function of transferring heat from the component cooling water system to the surrounding atmosphere to support plant shutdown and spent fuel pool cooling.

i) Testing will be performed to confirm that the SWS can provide cooling water to the CCS heat exchangers.

i) Each SWS pump can provide at least 10,000 gpm of cooling water through its CCS heat exchanger.

C-249 Table 2.3.8

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 417 2.3.08.02.ii

2. The SWS provides the nonsafety

-related function of transferring heat from the component cooling water system to the surrounding atmosphere to support plant shutdown and spent fuel pool cooling.

ii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report that determines the heat transfer capability of each cooling tower cell. ii) A report exists and concludes that the heat transfer rate of each cooling tower cell is greater than or equal to 170 million Btu/hr at a 80.1°F ambient wet bulb temperature and a cold water temperature of 90°F.

418 2.3.08.02.iii

2. The SWS provides the nonsafety

-related function of transferring heat from the component cooling water system to the surrounding atmosphere to support plant shutdown and spent fuel pool cooling.

iii) Testing will be performed to confirm that the SWS cooling tower basin has adequate reserve volume. iii) The SWS tower basin contains a usable volume of at least 230,000 gallons at the basin low level alarm setpoint.

419 2.3.08.03 3. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.3.8-1 to perform the listed function.

Testing will be performed on the components in Table 2.3.8

-1 using controls in the MCR.

Controls in the MCR operate to cause the components listed in Table 2.3.8-1 to perform the listed functions.

420 2.3.08.04 4. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.8

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of parameters in the MCR. The displays identified in Table 2.3.8-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.3.8

-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Service Water Pump A SWS-MP-01A Turbine Building or yard Service Water Pump B SWS-MP-01B Turbine Building or yard Service Water Cooling Tower SWS-ME-01 Yard C-250 Figure 2.3.8

-1 Service Water System

C-251 2.3.9 Containment Hydrogen Control System Design Description The containment hydrogen control system (VLS) limits hydrogen gas concentration in containment during accidents.

The VLS has catalytic hydrogen recombiners (VLS

-MY-E01A and VLS

-MY-E01B) that are located inside containment. The VLS has hydrogen igniters located as shown on Table 2.3.9-2. 1. The functional arrangement of the VLS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.9. 2. a) The hydrogen monitors identified in Table 2.3.9

-1 are powered by the non

-Class 1E dc and UPS system.

b) The components identified in Table 2.3.9

-2 are powered from their respective non

-Class 1E power group.

3. The VLS provides the non-safety related function to control the containment hydrogen concentration for beyond design basis accidents.

4. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.3.9

-2 to perform the listed function.

b) The components identified in Table 2.3.9

-2 perform the listed function after receiving a manual signal from the diverse actuation system (DAS).

5. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.9

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.3.9

-1 Equipment Tag No. Display Containment Hydrogen Monitor VLS-001 Yes Containment Hydrogen Monitor VLS-002 Yes Containment Hydrogen Monitor VLS-003 Yes C-252 Table 2.3.9

-2 Equipment Name Tag Number Function Power Group Number Location Room No. Hydrogen Igniter 01 VLS-EH-01 Energize 1 Tunnel connection loop compartments 11204 Hydrogen Igniter 02 VLS-EH-02 Energize 2 Tunnel connection loop compartments 11204 Hydrogen Igniter 03 VLS-EH-03 Energize 1 Tunnel connection loop compartments 11204 Hydrogen Igniter 04 VLS-EH-04 Energize 2 Tunnel connection loop compartments 11204 Hydrogen Igniter 05 VLS-EH-05 Energize 1 Loop compartment 02 11402 Hydrogen Igniter 06 VLS-EH-06 Energize 2 Loop compartment 02 11502 Hydrogen Igniter 07 VLS-EH-07 Energize 2 Loop compartment 02 11402 Hydrogen Igniter 08 VLS-EH-08 Energize 1 Loop compartment 02 11502 Hydrogen Igniter 09 VLS-EH-09 Energize 1 In-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) 11305 Hydrogen Igniter 10 VLS-EH-10 Energize 2 IRWST 11305 Hydrogen Igniter 11 VLS-EH-11 Energize 2 Loop compartment 01 11401 Hydrogen Igniter 12 VLS-EH-12 Energize 1 Loop compartment 01 11501 Hydrogen Igniter 13 VLS-EH-13 Energize 1 Loop compartment 01 11401 Hydrogen Igniter 14 VLS-EH-14 Energize 2 Loop compartment 01 11501 Hydrogen Igniter 15 VLS-EH-15 Energize 2 IRWST 11305 Hydrogen Igniter 16 VLS-EH-16 Energize 1 IRWST 11305 Hydrogen Igniter 17 VLS-EH-17 Energize 2 Northeast valve room 11207 Hydrogen Igniter 18 VLS-EH-18 Energize 1 Northeast accumulator room 11207 Hydrogen Igniter 19 VLS-EH-19 Energize 2 East valve room 11208 Hydrogen Igniter 20 VLS-EH-20 Energize 2 Southeast accumulator room 11206 Hydrogen Igniter 21 VLS-EH-21 Energize 1 Southeast valve room 11206 Hydrogen Igniter 22 VLS-EH-22 Energize 1 Lower compartment area (core makeup tank [CMT] and valve area) 11400 Hydrogen Igniter 23 VLS-EH-23 Energize 2 Lower compartment area (CMT and valve area) 11400 Hydrogen Igniter 24 VLS-EH-24 Energize 2 Lower compartment area (CMT and valve area) 11400 Hydrogen Igniter 25 VLS-EH-25 Energize 2 Lower compartment area (CMT and valve area) 11400 C-253 Table 2.3.9

-2 Equipment Name Tag Number Function Power Group Number Location Room No. Hydrogen Igniter 26 VLS-EH-26 Energize 2 Lower compartment area (CMT and valve area) 11400 Hydrogen Igniter 27 VLS-EH-27 Energize 1 Lower compartment area (CMT and valve area) 11400 Hydrogen Igniter 28 VLS-EH-28 Energize 1 Lower compartment area (CMT and valve area) 11400 Hydrogen Igniter 29 VLS-EH-29 Energize 1 Lower compartment area (CMT and valve area) 11400 Hydrogen Igniter 30 VLS-EH-30 Energize 2 Lower compartment area (CMT and valve area) 11400 Hydrogen Igniter 31 VLS-EH-31 Energize 1 Lower compartment area (CMT and valve area) 11400 Hydrogen Igniter 32 VLS-EH-32 Energize 1 Lower compartment area (CMT and valve area) 11400 Hydrogen Igniter 33 VLS-EH-33 Energize 2 North CVS equipment room 11209 Hydrogen Igniter 34 VLS-EH-34 Energize 1 North CVS equipment room 11209 Hydrogen Igniter 35 VLS-EH-35 Energize 1 IRWST 11305 Hydrogen Igniter 36 VLS-EH-36 Energize 2 IRWST 11305 Hydrogen Igniter 37 VLS-EH-37 Energize 1 IRWST 11305 Hydrogen Igniter 38 VLS-EH-38 Energize 2 IRWST 11305 Hydrogen Igniter 39 VLS-EH-39 Energize 1 Upper compartment lower region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 40 VLS-EH-40 Energize 2 Upper compartment lower region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 41 VLS-EH-41 Energize 2 Upper compartment lower region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 42 VLS-EH-42 Energize 1 Upper compartment lower region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 43 VLS-EH-43 Energize 1 Upper compartment lower region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 44 VLS-EH-44 Energize 1 Upper compartment lower region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 45 VLS-EH-45 Energize 2 Upper compartment lower region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 46 VLS-EH-46 Energize 2 Upper compartment lower region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 47 VLS-EH-47 Energize 1 Upper compartment lower region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 48 VLS-EH-48 Energize 2 Upper compartment lower region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 49 VLS-EH-49 Energize 1 Pressurizer compartment 11503 Hydrogen Igniter 50 VLS-EH-50 Energize 2 Pressurizer compartment 11503 C-254 Table 2.3.9

-2 Equipment Name Tag Number Function Power Group Number Location Room No. Hydrogen Igniter 51 VLS-EH-51 Energize 1 Upper compartment mid

-region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 52 VLS-EH-52 Energize 2 Upper compartment mid

-region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 53 VLS-EH-53 Energize 2 Upper compartment mid

-region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 54 VLS-EH-54 Energize 1 Upper compartment mid

-region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 55 VLS-EH-55 Energize 1 Refueling cavity 11504 Hydrogen Igniter 56 VLS-EH-56 Energize 2 Refueling cavity 11504 Hydrogen Igniter 57 VLS-EH-57 Energize 2 Refueling cavity 11504 Hydrogen Igniter 58 VLS-EH-58 Energize 1 Refueling cavity 11504 Hydrogen Igniter 59 VLS-EH-59 Energize 2 Pressurizer compartment 11503 Hydrogen Igniter 60 VLS-EH-60 Energize 1 Pressurizer compartment 11503 Hydrogen Igniter 61 VLS-EH-61 Energize 1 Upper compartment

-upper region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 62 VLS-EH-62 Energize 2 Upper compartment

-upper region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 63 VLS-EH-63 Energize 1 Upper compartment

-upper region 11500 Hydrogen Igniter 64 VLS-EH-64 Energize 2 Upper compartment

-upper region 11500 Table 2.3.9

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 421 2.3.09.01 1. The functional arrangement of the VLS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.3.9. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built VLS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.9.

422 2.3.09.02a 2.a) The hydrogen monitors identified in Table 2.3.9

-1 are powered by the non-Class 1E dc and UPS system.

Testing will be performed by providing a simulated test signal in each power group of the non-Class 1E dc and UPS system. A simulated test signal exists at the hydrogen monitors identified in Table 2.3.9-1 when the non

-Class 1E dc and UPS system is provided the test signal.

C-255 Table 2.3.9

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 423 2.3.09.02b 2.b) The components identified in Table 2.3.9

-2 are powered from their respective non

-Class 1E power group.

Testing will be performed by providing a simulated test signal in each non

-Class 1E power group. A simulated test signal exists at the equipment identified in Table 2.3.9-2 when the assigned non

-Class 1E power group is provided the test signal. 424 2.3.09.03.i

3. The VLS provides the nonsafety

-related function to control the containment hydrogen concentration for beyond design basis accidents.

i) Inspection for the number of igniters will be performed.

i) At least 64 hydrogen igniters are provided inside containment at the locations specified in Table 2.3.9-2. 425 2.3.09.03.ii

3. The VLS provides the nonsafety

-related function to control the containment hydrogen concentration for beyond design basis accidents.

ii) Operability testing will be performed on the igniters.

ii) The surface temperature of the igniter exceeds 1700°F.

426 C.2.3.09.03.iii

3. The VLS provides the nonsafety

-related function to control the containment hydrogen concentration for beyond design basis accidents.

iii) An inspection of the as

-built containment internal structures will be performed.

iii) The equipment access opening and CMT

-A opening constitute at least 98% of vent paths within Room 11206 that vent to Room 11300. The minimum distance between the equipment access opening and containment shell is at least 24.3 feet. The minimum distance between the CMT

-A opening and the containment shell is at least 9.4 feet. The CMT-B opening constitutes at least 98% of vent paths within Room 11207 that vent to Room 11300 and is a minimum distance of 24.6 feet away from the containment shell. Other openings through the ceilings of these rooms must be at least 3 feet from the containment shell.

427 2.3.09.03.iv

3. The VLS provides the nonsafety

-related function to control the containment hydrogen concentration for beyond design basis accidents.

iv) An inspection will be performed of the as

-built IRWST vents that are located in the roof of the IRWST along the side of the IRWST next to the containment shell.

iv) The discharge from each of these IRWST vents is oriented generally away from the containment shell.

428 2.3.09.04a 4.a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.3.9-2 to perform the listed function.

Testing will be performed on the igniters using the controls in the MCR. Controls in the MCR operate to energize the igniters.

C-256 Table 2.3.9

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 429 2.3.09.04b 4.b) The components identified in Table 2.3.9

-2 perform the listed function after receiving manual a signal from DAS. Testing will be performed on the igniters using the DAS controls.

The igniters energize after receiving a signal from DAS.

430 2.3.09.05 5. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.9

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the displays identified in Table 2.3.9-1 in the MCR. Displays identified in Table 2.3.9-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-257 2.3.10 Liquid Radwaste System Design Description The liquid radwaste system (WLS) receives, stores, processes, samples and monitors the discharge of radioactive wastewater.

The WLS has components which receive and store radioactive or potentially radioactive liquid waste. These are the reactor coolant drain tank, the containment sump, the effluent holdup tanks and the waste holdup tanks. The WLS components store and process the waste during normal operation and during anticipated operational occurrences. Monitoring of the liquid waste is performed prior to discharge.

The WLS is as shown in Figure 2.3.10-1 and the component locations of the WLS are as shown in Table 2.3.10-5. 1. The functional arrangement of the WLS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.10. 2. a) The components identified in Table 2.3.10

-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.10

-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

3. a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.10

-1 as ASME C ode Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.3.10

-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

4. a) The components identified in Table 2.3.10

-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.10

-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

5. a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.10

-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.3.10

-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

6. The WLS provides the following safety

-related functions:

a) The WLS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the WLS lines penetrating the containment.

b) Check valves in drain lines to the containment sump limit cross flooding of compartments.

7. The WLS provides the nonsafety

-related functions of:

C-258 a) Detecting leaks within containment to the containment sump.

b) Controlling releases of radioactive materials in liquid effluents.

8. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to cause the remotely operated valve identified in Table 2.3.10-3 to perform its active function.

9. The check valves identified in Table 2.3.10

-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

10. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.10

-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-259 Table 2.3.10

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1 E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Active Function WLS Containment Sump Level Sensor WLS-LT-034 No Yes No No/No No - WLS Containment Sump Level Sensor WLS-LT-035 No Yes No No/No No - WLS Containment Sump Level Sensor WLS-LT-036 No Yes No No/No No - WLS Drain from Passive Core Cooling System (PXS) Compartment A (Room 11206) Check Valve WLS-PL-V071B Yes Yes No -/- No Transfer Closed WLS Drain from PXS Compartment A (Room 11206) Check Valve WLS-PL-V072B Yes Yes No -/- No Transfer Closed WLS Drain from PXS Compartment B (Room 11207) Check Valve WLS-PL-V071C Yes Yes No -/- No Transfer Closed WLS Drain from PXS Compartment B (Room 11207) Check Valve WLS-PL-V072C Yes Yes No -/- No Transfer Closed WLS Drain from Chemical and Volume Control System (CVS) Compartment (Room 11209) Check Valve WLS-PL-V071A Yes Yes No -/- No Transfer Closed WLS Drain from CVS Compartment (Room 11209) Check Valve WLS-PL-V072A Yes Yes No -/- No Transfer Closed Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-260 Table 2.3.10

-2 Line Name Line No. ASME Section III Functional Capability Required WLS Drain from PXS Compartment A WLS-PL-L 062 WLS-PL-L078 Yes Yes WLS Drain from PXS Compartment B WLS-PL-L 063 WLS-PL-L079 Yes Yes WLS Drain from CVS Compartment WLS-PL-L 061 WSL-PL-L 077 WLS-PL-L020 Yes Yes Table 2.3.10

-3 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function WLS Effluent Discharge Isolation Valve WLS-PL-V223 - Close Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Level WLS-JE-LT002 Yes - Letdown Flow from CVS to WLS WLS-JE-FT020 Yes - Table 2.3.10-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 431 2.3.10.01 1. The functional arrangement of the WLS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.10. Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built WLS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.10.

432 2.3.10.02a 2.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.10

-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports. The ASME Code Section III design report exists for the as built components identified in Table 2.3.10-1 as ASME Code Section III. 433 2.3.10.02b 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built piping as documented in the ASME design reports. The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as

-built piping identified in Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III.

C-261 Table 2.3.10-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 434 2.3.10.03a 3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.10-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of the as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.

A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

435 2.3.10.03b 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.3.10

-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements

. Inspection of the as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.

A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non

-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds. 436 2.3.10.04a 4.a) The components identified in Table 2.3.10

-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested. A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.3.10-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

437 2.3.10.04b 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

A hydrostatic test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested.

A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the piping identified in Table 2.3.10-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III. 438 2.3.10.05a.i 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.10-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.10-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.10-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

439 2.3.10.05a.ii 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.10-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. 440 2.3.10.05a.iii 5.a) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.10-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the a s-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

C-262 Table 2.3.10-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 441 2.3.10.05b 5.b) Each of the lines identified in Table 2.3.10

-2 for which functional capability is required is designed to withstand combined normal and seismic design basis loads without a loss of its functional capability.

Inspection will be performed fo r

the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built piping meets the requirements for functional capability.

A report exists and concludes that each of the as

-built lines identified in Table 2.3.10

-2 for which functional capability is required meets th e requirements for functional capability.

442 2.3.10.06a 6.a) The WLS preserves containment integrity by isolation of the WLS lines penetrating the containment.

See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7. See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7. 443 2.3.10.06b 6.b) Check valves in drain lines to the containment sump limit cross flooding of compartments.

Refer to item 9 in this table.

444 2.3.10.07a.i 7.a) The WLS provides the nonsafety

-related function of detecting leaks within containment to the containment sump. i) Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the displays of containment sump level channels WLS

-LT-034, WLS-LT-035, and WLS

-LT-036 in the MCR.

i) Nonsafety

-related displays of WLS containment sump level channels WLS

-LT-034 , WLS-LT-035, and WLS-LT-036 can be retrieved in the MCR.

445 2.3.10.07a.ii 7.a) The WLS provides the nonsafety

-related function of detecting leaks within containment to the containment sump. ii) Testing will be performed by adding water to the sump and observing display of sump level.

ii) A report exists and concludes that sump level channels WLS

-LT-034, WLS-LT-035, and WLS-LT-036 can detect a change of 1.75 +/- 0.1 inches.

446 2.3.10.07b 7.b) The WLS provides the nonsafety-related function of controlling releases of radioactive materials in liquid effluents.

Tests will be performed to confirm that a simulated high radiation signal from the discharge radiation monitor, WLS-RE-229, causes the discharge isolation valv e WLS-PL-V223 to close.

A simulated high radiation signal causes the discharge control isolation valve WLS-PL-V223 to close.

447 2.3.10.08 8. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valve identified in Table 2.3.10

-3 to perform its active function. Stroke testing will be performed on the remotely operated valve listed in Table 2.3.10

-3 using controls in the MCR.

Controls in the MCR operate to cause the remotely operated valve to perform its active function. 448 2.3.10.09 9. The check valves identified in Table 2.3.10-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

Exercise testing of the check valves with active safety functions identified in Table 2.3.10-1 will be performed under pre-operational test pressure, temperature and flow conditions.

Each check valve changes position as indicated on Table 2.3.10-1.

C-263 Table 2.3.10-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 449 2.3.10.10 10. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.10

-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the displays identified in Table 2.3.10

-3 in the MCR. Displays identified in Table 2.3.10-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.3.10-5 Component Name Tag No. Component Location WLS Reactor Coolant Drain Tank WLS-MT-01 Containment WLS Containment Sump WLS-MT-02 Containment WLS Degasifier Column WLS-MV-01 Auxiliary Building WLS Effluent Holdup Tanks WLS-MT-05 A WLS-MT-05B Auxiliary Building WLS Waste Holdup Tanks WLS-MT-06 A WLS-MT-06B Auxiliary Building WLS Waste Pre-Filter WLS-MV-06 Auxiliary Building WLS Ion Exchangers WLS-MV-03 WLS-MV-04 A WLS-MV-04 B WLS-MV-04C Auxiliary Building WLS Waste After

-Filter WLS-MV-07 Auxiliary Building WLS Monitor Tanks WLS-MT-07 A WLS-MT-07 B WLS-MT-07C Auxiliary Building WLS-MT-07 D WLS-MT-07 E WLS-MT-07F Radwaste Building

C-264 Figure 2.3.10

-1 Liquid Radwaste System

C-265 2.3.11 Gaseous Radwaste System Design Description The gaseous radwaste system (WGS) receives, processes, and discharges the radioactive waste gases received within acceptable off

-site release limits during normal modes of plant operation including power generation, shutdown and refueling.

The WGS is as shown in Figure 2.3.11-1 and the component locations of the WGS are as shown in Table 2.3.11-3. 1. The functional arrangement of the WGS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.11. 2. The equipment identified in Table 2.3.11-1 can withstand the appropriate seismic design basis loads without loss of its structural integrity function.

3. The WGS provides the nonsafety

-related functions of:

a. Processing radioactive gases prior to discharge.

b. Controlling the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents.

c. The WGS is purged with nitrogen on indication of high oxygen levels in the system.

Table 2.3.11-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Seismic Category I WGS Activated Carbon Delay Bed A WGS-MV-02A No (1) WGS Activated Carbon Delay Bed B WGS-MV-02B No (1) WGS Discharge Isolation Valve WGS-PL-V051 No Note: 1. The WGS activated carbon delay beds (WGS-MV-02A and B) are designed to one

-half SSE. Table 2.3.11

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 450 2.3.11.01 1. The functional arrangement of the WGS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.11. Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built WGS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.11.

C-266 Table 2.3.11

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 451 2.3.11.02.i

2. The equipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its structural integrity function.

i) Inspection will be performed

to verify that the equipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The equipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 is located on the Nuclear Island. 452 2.3.11.02.ii

2. The equipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its structural integrity function.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismically designed equipment will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismically designed equipment can withstand appropriate seismic design basis loads without loss of its structural integrity function. 453 2.3.11.02.iii

2. The equipment identified as having seismic design requirements in Table 2.3.11-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its structural integrity function.

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

454 2.3.11.03a 3.a) The WGS provides the nonsafety

-related function of processing radioactive gases prior to discharge.

Inspection will be performed to verify the contained volume of each of the activated carbon delay beds, WGS

-MV 02A and WGS-MV02B. A report exists and concludes that the contained volume in each of the activated carbon delay beds, WGS

-MV 02A and WGS-MV02B, is at least 80 ft 3. 455 2.3.11.03b 3.b) The WGS provides the nonsafety

-related function of controlling the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents.

Tests will be performed to confirm that the presence of a simulated high radiation signal from the discharge radiation monitor, WGS

-017, causes the discharge control isolation valve WGS-PL-V051 to close.

A simulated high radiation signal causes the discharge control isolation valve WGS-PL-V051 to close.

456 2.3.11.03c 3.c) The WGS is purged with nitrogen on indication of high oxygen levels in the system.

Tests will be performed to confirm that the presence of a simulated high oxygen level signal from the oxygen monitors (WGS-025A, -025B) causes the nitrogen purge valve (WGS-PL-V 002) to open and the WLS degasifier vacuum pumps (WLS-MP-03A, -03B) to stop.

A simulated high oxygen level signal causes the nitrogen purge valve (WGS

-PL-V002) to open and the WLS degasifier vacuum pumps (WLS-MP-03A, -03B) to stop.

C-267 Table 2.3.11

-3 Equipment Name Tag No. Component Location WGS Gas Cooler WGS-ME-01 Auxiliary Building WGS Moisture Separator WGS-MV-03 Auxiliary Building WGS Activated Carbon Delay Bed A WGS-MV-02A Auxiliary Building WGS Activated Carbon Delay Bed B WGS-MV-02B Auxiliary Building

C-268 Figure 2.3.11

-1 Gaseous Radwaste System

C-269 2.3.12 Solid Radwaste System Design Description The solid radwaste system (WSS) receives, collects, and stores the solid radioactive wastes received prior to their processing and packaging by mobile equipment for shipment off

-site. The component locations of the WSS are as shown in Table 2.3.12

-2. 1. The functional arrangement of the WSS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.12. 2. The WSS provides the nonsafety

-related function of storing radioactive spent resins prior to processing or shipment.

Table 2.3.12

-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 457 2.3.12.01 1. The functional arrangement of the WSS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.12. Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built WSS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.12.

458 2.3.12.02 2. The WSS provides the nonsafety

-related function of storing radioactive solids prior to processing or shipment.

Inspection will be performed to verify that the volume of each of the spent resin tanks, WSS-MV 01A and WSS-MV01B, is at least 250 ft

3. A report exists and concludes that the volume of each of the spent resin tanks, WSS

-MV 01A and WSS-MV01B, is at least 250 ft

3. Table 2.3.12

-2 Component Name Tag No. Component Location WSS Spent Resin Tank A WSS-MV-01A Auxiliary Building WSS Spent Resin Tank B WSS-MV-01B Auxiliary Building

C-270 2.3.13 Primary Sampling System Design Description The primary sampling system collects samples of fluids in the reactor coolant system (RCS) and the containment atmosphere during normal operations.

The PSS is as shown in Figure 2.3.13

-1. The PSS Grab Sampling Unit (PSS

-MS-01) is located in the Auxiliary Building.

1. The functional arrangement of the PSS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.13. 2. The components identified in Table 2.3.13

-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

3. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.13

-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

4. The components identified in Table 2.3.13

-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.13

-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

6. a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.1 3-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of their safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.

b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.3.13

-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

c) Separation is provided between PSS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1 E divisions and non

-Class 1E divisions.

7. The PSS provides the safety

-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the PSS lines penetrating the containment.

8. The PSS provides the nonsafety

-related function of providing the capability of obtaining reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples.

9. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.3.13

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

10. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause those remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.13-1 to perform active functions.

b) The valves identified in Table 2.3.1 3-1 as having protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform an active function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

11. a) The check valve identified in Table 2.3.13

-1 perform an active safety

-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

C-271 b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.13

-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

12. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the valves identified in Table 2.3.13-2 to perform the listed function.

C-272 Table 2.3.13

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/DAS Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position Liquid Sample Line Containment Isolation Valve Outside Reactor Containment (ORC)

PSS-PL-V011 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position) Yes/No Transfer Closed Closed Liquid Sample Line Containment Isolation Valve Inside Reactor Containment (IRC)

PSS-PL-V010A Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/No Transfer Closed Closed Liquid Sample Line Containment Isolation Valve IRC PSS-PL-V010B Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/No Transfer Closed Closed Containment Air Sample Containment Isolation Valve IRC PSS-PL-V008 Yes Yes Yes Yes/Yes Yes (Valve Position) Yes/No Transfer Closed Closed Air Sample Line Containment Isolation Valve ORC PSS-PL-V046 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position) Yes/No Transfer Closed Closed Sample Return Line Containment Isolation Valve ORC PSS-PL-V023 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position) Yes/No Transfer Closed Closed Sample Return Containment Isolation Check Valve IRC PSS-PL-V024 Yes Yes No -/- No -/- Transfer Closed Closed Note: A dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-273 Table 2.3.13

-2 Equipment Name Tag No. Control Function Hot Leg 1 Sample Isolation Valve PSS-PL-V001A Transfer Open/Transfer Closed Hot Leg 2 Sample Isolation Valve PSS-PL-V001B Transfer Open/Transfer Closed Table 2.3.13

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 459 2.3.13.01 1. The functional arrangement of the PSS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.13. Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built PSS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.13.

460 2.3.13.02 2. The components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports. The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as-built components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III.

461 2.3.13.03 3. Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of the as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.

A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for non-destructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

462 2.3.13.04 4. The components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

A hydrostatic test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be hydrostatically tested. A report exists and concludes that the results of the hydrostatic test of the components identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

463 2.3.13.05.i

5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.13-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment and valves identified in Table 2.3.13

-1 are located on the Nuclear Island. i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.13-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

464 2.3.13.05.ii

5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.13-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its safety function.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

C-27 4 Table 2.3.13

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 465 2.3.13.05.iii

5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.3.13-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of its safety function.

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a repor t verifying that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions. 466 2.3.13.06a.i 6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.3.13

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of their safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.

i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.

i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of its safety function for the time required to perform the safety function. 467 2.3.13.06a.ii 6.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Tables 2.3.13

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of their safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.

ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses. 468 2.3.13.06b 6.b) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.3.13

-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

Testing will be performed on the PSS by providing a simulated test signal in each Class 1E division. A simulated test signal exists at the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.3.13

-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal. 469 2.3.13.06c 6.c) Separation is provided between PSS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E divisions.

See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. 470 2.3.13.07 7. The PSS provides the safety

- related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the PSS lines penetrating the containment.

See ITAAC Table 2.2.1

-3, item 7. See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, item 7.

C-275 Table 2.3.13

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 471 2.3.13.08 8. The PSS provides the nonsafety

-related function of providing the capability of obtaining reactor coolant and containment atmosphere samples.

Testing will be performed to obtain samples of the reactor coolant and containment atmosphere.

A sample is drawn from the reactor coolant and the containment atmosphere.

472 2.3.13.09 9. Safety

-related displays identified in Table 2.3.13

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the safety

-related displays in the MCR.

The safety

-related displays identified in Table 2.3.13

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

473 2.3.13.10a 10.a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause those remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.13

-1 to perform active functions.

Stroke testing will be performed on the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.13

-1 using the controls in the MCR.

Controls in the MCR operate to cause those remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.13

-1 to perform active functions.

474 2.3.13.10b 10.b) The valves identified in Table 2.3.13-1 as having PMS control perform an active function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

Testing will be performed on remotely operated valves listed in Table 2.3.13

-1 using real or simulated signals into the PMS.

The remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.13

-1 as having PMS control perform the active function identified in the table after receiving a signal from the PMS.

475 2.3.13.11a 11.a) The check valve identified in Table 2.3.13

-1 performs an active safety-related function to change position as indicated in the table.

Exercise testing of the check valve with an active safety function identified in Table 2.3.13-1 will be performed under preoperational test pressure, temperature, and fluid flow conditions.

The check valve changes position as indicated in Table 2.3.13-1. 476 2.3.13.11b 11.b) After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.3.13

-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

Testing of the remotely operated valves will be performed under the conditions of loss of motive power. After loss of motive power, each remotely operated valve identified in Table 2.3.13

-1 assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.

477 2.3.13.12 12. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the valves identified in Table 2.3.13-2 to perform the listed function.

Testing will be performed on the components in Table 2.3.13-2 using controls in the MCR.

Controls in the MCR cause valves identified in Table 2.3.13-2 to perform the listed functions.

C-276 Figure 2.3.13

-1 Primary Sampling System

C-277 2.3.14 Demineralized Water Transfer and Storage System Design Description The demineralized water transfer and storage system (DWS) receives water from the demineralized water treatment system (DTS), and provides a reservoir of demineralized water to supply the condensate storage tank and for distribution throughout the plant. Demineralized water is processed in the DWS to remove dissolved oxygen. In addition to supplying water for makeup of systems which require pure water, the demineralized water is used to sluice spent radioactive resins from the ion exchange vessels in the chemical and volume control system (CVS), the spent fuel pool cooling system (SFS), and the liquid radwaste system (WLS) to the solid radwaste system (WSS).

The component locations of the DWS are as shown in Table 2.3.14

-3. 1. The functional arrangement of the DWS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.14. 2. The DWS provides the safety

-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the DWS lines penetrating the containment.

3. The DWS condensate storage tank (CST) provides the nonsafety

-related function of water supply to the FWS startup feedwater pumps.

4. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.14

-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).

Table 2.3.14

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function Condensate Storage Tank Water Level DWS-006 Yes - Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-278 Table 2.3.14

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 478 2.3.14.01 1. The functional arrangement of the DWS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.14. Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built DWS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.14.

479 2.3.14.02 2. The DWS provides the safety

-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the DWS lines penetrating the containment.

See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7. See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7. 480 2.3.14.03 3. The DWS CST provides the nonsafety-related function of water supply to the FWS startup feedwater tanks. Inspection of the DWS CST will be performed.

The volume of the CST between the tank overflow and the startup feedwater pumps supply connection is greater than or equal to 325,000 gallons. 481 2.3.14.04 4. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.14

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability or parameters in the MCR. The displays identified in Table 2.3.14-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.3.14

-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Demineralizer Water Storage Tank Degasification System Package DWS-MS-01 Annex Building Condensate Storage Tank Degasification System Package DWS-MS-02 Turbine Building Demineralized Water Storage Tank DWS-MT-01 Yard Condensate Storage Tank DWS-MT-02 Yard C-279 2.3.15 Compressed and Instrument Air System Design Description The compressed and instrument air system (CAS) consists of three subsystems: instrument air, service air, and high

-pressure air. The instrument air subsystem supplies compressed air for air-operated valves and dampers. The service air subsystem supplies compressed air at outlets throughout the plant to power air

-operated tools and is used as a motive force for air

-powered pumps. The service air subsystem is also utilized as a supply source for breathing air. The high-pressure air subsystem supplies air to the main control room emergency habitability system (VES), the generator breaker package, and fire fighting apparatus recharge station.

The CAS is required for normal operation and startup of the plant.

The component locations of the CAS are as shown in Table 2.3.15

-3. 1. The functional arrangement of the CAS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.15. 2. The CAS provides the safety

-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the CAS lines penetrating the containment.

3. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.15

-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).

Table 2.3.15

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function Instrument Air Pressure CAS-011 Yes - Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-280 Table 2.3.15

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 482 2.3.15.01 1. The functional arrangement of the CAS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.15. Inspection of the as-built system will be performed.

The as-built CAS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.15.

483 2.3.15.02 2. The CAS provides the safety

-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the CAS lines penetrating the containment.

See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7. See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7.

484 2.3.15.03 3. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.3.15

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of parameters in the MCR. The displays identified in Table 2.3.15-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.3.15

-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Instrument Air Compressor Package A CAS-MS-01A Turbine Building Instrument Air Compressor Package B CAS-MS-01B Turbine Building Instrument Air Dryer Package A CAS-MS-02A Turbine Building Instrument Air Dryer Package B CAS-MS-02B Turbine Building Service Air Compressor Package A CAS-MS-03A Turbine Building Service Air Compressor Package B CAS-MS-03B Turbine Building Service Air Dryer Package A CAS-MS-04A Turbine Building Service Air Dryer Package B CAS-MS-04B Turbine Building High Pressure Air Compressor and Filter Package CAS-MS-05 Turbine Building Instrument Air Receiver A CAS-MT-01A Turbine Building Instrument Air Receiver B CAS-MT-01B Turbine Building Service Air Receiver CAS-MT-02 Turbine Building

C-281 2.3.16 Potable Water System No entry for this system.

2.3.17 Waste Water System No entry for this system.

2.3.18 Plant Gas System No entry. Covered in Section 3.3, Buildings.

2.3.19 Communication System Design Description The communication system (EFS) provides intraplant communications during normal, maintenance, transient, fire, and accident conditions, including loss of offsite power.

1. a) The EFS has handsets, amplifiers, loudspeakers, and siren tone generators connected as a telephone/page system.

b) The EFS has sound

-powered equipment connected as a system.

2. The EFS provides the following nonsafety-related functions:

a) The EFS telephone/page system provides intraplant, station

-to-station communications and area broadcasting between the main control room (MCR) and the locations listed in Table 2.3.19

-1. b) The EFS provides sound

-powered communications between the MCR, the remote shutdown workstation (RSW), the Division A, B, C, D dc equipment rooms (Rooms 12201/12203/12205/12207), the Division A, B, C, D I&C rooms (Rooms 12301/12302/12304/12305), and the diesel generator building (Rooms 60310/60320) without external power.

C-282 Table 2.3.19

-1 Telephone/Page System Equipment Location Fuel Handling Area 12562 Division A, B, C, D dc Equipment Rooms 12201/12203/12205/12207 Division A, B, C, D I&C Rooms 12301/12302/12304/12305 Maintenance Floor Staging Area 12351 Containment Maintenance Floor 11300 Containment Operating Deck 11500 Table 2.3.19

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 485 2.3.19.01a 1.a) The EFS has handsets, amplifiers, loudspeakers, and siren tone generators connected as a telephone/page system.

Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built EFS has handsets, amplifiers, loudspeakers, and siren tone generators connected as a telephone/page system. 486 2.3.19.01b 1.b) The EFS has sound

-powered equipment connected as a system.

Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built EFS has sound

-powered equipment connected as a system.

487 2.3.19.02a 2.a) The EFS telephone/page system provides intraplant, station

-to-station communications and area broadcasting between the MCR and the locations listed in Table 2.3.19-1. An inspection and test will be performed on the telephone/page communication equipment.

Telephone/page equipment is installed and voice transmission and reception from the MCR are accomplished.

488 2.3.19.02b 2.b) EFS provides sound

-powered communications between the MCR, the RSW, the Division A, B, C, D dc equipment rooms (Rooms 12201/12203/12205/ 12207), the Division A, B, C, D I&C rooms (Rooms 12301/12302/ 12304/12305),

and the diesel generator building (Rooms 60310/60320) without external power. An inspection and test will be performed of the sound

-powered communication equipment.

Sound-powered equipment is installed and voice transmission and reception are accomplished.

C-283 2.3.20 Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water System No entry for this system.

2.3.21 Secondary Sampling System No entry for this system.

2.3.22 Containment Leak Rate Test System No entry. Covered in Section 2.2.1, Containment System.

2.3.23 This section intentionally blank 2.3.24 Demineralized Water Treatment System No entry for this system.

2.3.25 Gravity and Roof Drain Collection System No entry for this system.

2.3.26 This section intentionally blank 2.3.27 Sanitary Drainage System No entry for this system.

2.3.28 Turbine Island Vents, Drains, and Relief System No entry for this system.

C-284 2.3.29 Radioactive Waste Drain System Design Description The radioactive waste drain system (WRS) collects radioactive and potentially radioactive liquid wastes from equipment and floor drains during normal operation, startup, shutdown, and refueling. The liquid wastes are then transferred to appropriate processing and disposal systems. Nonradioactive wastes are collected by the waste water system (WWS). The WRS is as shown in Figure 2.3.29-1. 1. The functional arrangement of the WRS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.29. 2. The WRS collects liquid wastes from the equipment and floor drainage of the radioactive portions of the auxiliary building, annex building, and radwaste building and directs these wastes to a WRS sump or WLS waste holdup tanks located in the auxiliary building.

3. The WRS collects chemical wastes from the auxiliary building chemical laboratory drains and the decontamination solution drains in the annex building and directs these wastes to the chemical waste tank of the liquid radwaste system.

4. The WWS stops the discharge from the turbine building sump upon detection of high radiation in the discharge stream to the oil separator.

C-285 Table 2.3.29

-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 489 2.3.29.01 1. The functional arrangement of the WRS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.29. Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built WRS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.3.29.

490 2.3.29.02 2. The WRS collects liquid wastes from the equipment and floor drainage of the radioactive portions of the auxiliary building, annex building, and radwaste building and directs these wastes to a WRS sump or WLS waste holdup tanks located in the auxiliary building.

A test is performed by pouring water into the equipment and floor drains in the radioactive portions of the auxiliary building, annex building, and radwaste building.

The water poured into these drains is collected either in the auxiliary building radioactive drains sump or the WLS waste holdup tanks.

491 2.3.29.03 3. The WRS collects chemical wastes from the auxiliary building chemical laboratory drains and the decontamination solution drains in the annex building and directs these wastes to the chemical waste tank of the liquid radwaste system.

A test is performed by pouring water into the auxiliary building chemical laboratory and the decontamination solution drains in the annex building.

The water poured into these drains is collected in the chemical waste tank of the liquid radwaste system.

492 2.3.29.04 4. The WWS stops the discharge from the turbine building sump upon detection of high radiation in the discharge stream to the oil separator.

Tests will be performed to confirm that a simulated high radiation signal from the turbine building sump discharge radiation monitor, WWS

-021 causes the sump pumps (WWS-MP-01A and B) to stop operating, stopping the spread of radiation outside of the turbine building. A simulated high radiation signal causes the turbine building sump pumps (WWS-MP-01A and B) to stop operating, stopping the spread of radiation outside of the turbine building.

C-286 Figure 2.3.29

-1 Radioactive Waste Drain System C-287 2.3.30 Storm Drain System No entry for this system.

2.3.31 Raw Water System No entry for this system.

2.3.32 Yard Fire Water System No entry for this system.

C-288 2.4 Steam and Power Conversion Systems 2.4.1 Main and Startup Feedwater System See Section 2.2.4 for information on the main feedwater system.

Design Description The startup feedwater system supplies feedwater to the steam generators during plant startup, hot standby and shutdown conditions, and during transients in the event of main feedwater system unavailability.

1. The functional arrangement of the startup feedwater system is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.4.1.

2. The FWS provides the following nonsafety

-related functions:

The FWS provides startup feedwater flow from the condensate storage tank (CST) to the steam generator system (SGS) for heat removal from the RCS.

3. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to cause the components identified in Table 2.4.1-1 to perform the listed function.

4. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.4.1

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.4.1

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function Startup Feedwater Pump A (Motor)

FWS-MP-03A Yes (Run Status)

Start Startup Feedwater Pump B (Motor)

FWS-MP-03B Yes (Run Status)

Start Startup Feedwater Pump A Isolation Valve FWS-PL-V013A Yes (Valve Position)

Open Startup Feedwater Pump B Isolation Valve FWS-PL-V013B Yes (Valve Position)

Open C-289 Table 2.4.1

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 493 2.4.01.01 1. The functional arrangement of the startup feedwater system is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.4.1.

Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built startup feedwater system conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.4.1. 494 2.4.01.02 2. The FWS provides startup feedwater flow from the CST to the SGS for heat removal from the RCS. Testing will be performed to confirm that each of the startup feedwater pumps can provide water from the CST to both steam generators.

Each FWS startup feedwater pump provides a flow rate greater than or equal to

260 gpm to each steam generator system at a steam generator secondary side pressure of at least 1106 psia.

495 2.4.01.03 3. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.4.1-1 to perform the listed function. Testing will be performed on the components in Table 2.4.1-1 using controls in the MCR.

Controls in the MCR operate to cause the components listed in Table 2.4.1

-1 to perform the listed functions.

496 2.4.01.04 4. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.4.1

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of parameters in the MCR. The displays identified in Table 2.4.1-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.4.1

-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Startup Feedwater Pump A FWS-MP-03A Turbine Building Startup Feedwater Pump B FWS-MP-03B Turbine Building

C-290 Figure 2.4.1

-1 Main and Startup Feedwater System

C-291 2.4.2 Main Turbine System Design Description The main turbine system (MTS) is designed for electric power production consistent with the capability of the reactor and the reactor coolant system.

The component locations of the MTS are as shown in Table 2.4.2

-2. 1. The functional arrangement of the MTS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.4.2. 2. a) Controls exist in the MCR to trip the main turbine

-generator.

b) The main turbine

-generator trips after receiving a signal from the PMS.

c) The main turbine

-generator trips after receiving a signal from the DAS.

3. The overspeed trips for the AP1000 turbine are set for 110% and 111% (+/-1% each). Each trip is initiated electrically in separate systems. The trip signals from the two turbine electrical overspeed protection trip systems are isolated from, and independent of, each other.

Table 2.4.2

-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 497 2.4.02.01 1. The functional arrangement of the MTS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.4.2. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built MTS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.4.2. 498 2.4.02.02a 2.a) Controls exist in the MCR to trip the main turbine

-generator.

Testing will be performed on the main turbine

-generator using controls in the MCR.

Controls in the MCR operate to trip the main turbine

-generator.

499 2.4.02.02b 2.b) The main turbine

-generator trips after receiving a signal from the PMS.

Testing will be performed using real or simulated signals into the PMS. The main turbine

-generator trips after receiving a signal from the PMS.

500 2.4.02.02c 2.c) The main turbine

-generator trips after receiving a signal from the DAS.

Testing will be performed using real or simulated signals into the DAS. The main turbine

-generator trips after receiving a signal from the DAS.

501 2.4.02.03.i

3) The trip signals from the two turbine electrical overspeed protection trip systems are isolated from, and independent of, each other.

i) The system design will be reviewed. i) The system design review shows that the trip signals of the two electrical overspeed protection trip systems are isolated from, and independent of, each other.

C-292 Table 2.4.2

-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 502 2.4.02.03.ii

3) The trip signals from the two turbine electrical overspeed protection trip systems are isolated from, and independent of, each other.

ii) Testing of the as

-built system will be performed using simulated signals from the turbine speed sensors.

ii) The main turbine

-generator trips after overspeed signals are received from the speed sensors of the 110%

emergency electrical overspeed trip system, and the main turbine

-generator trips after overspeed signals are received from the speed sensors of the 111% backup electrical overspeed trip system. 5 03 2.4.02.03.iii

3) The trip signals from the two turbine electrical overspeed protection trip systems are isolated from, and independent of, each other.

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the two turbine electrical overspeed protection systems have diverse hardware and software/firmware.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the two electrical overspeed protection systems have diverse hardware and software/firmware.

Table 2.4.2

-2 Component Name Tag No. Component Location HP Turbine MTS-MG-01 Turbine Building LP Turbine A MTS-MG-02A Turbine Building LP Turbine B MTS-MG-02B Turbine Building LP Turbine C MTS-MG-02C Turbine Building Gland Steam Condenser GSS-ME-01 Turbine Building Gland Condenser Vapor Exhauster 1A GSS-MA-01A Turbine Building Gland Condenser Vapor Exhauster 1B GSS-MA-01B Turbine Building Electrical Overspeed Trip Device

-- Turbine Building Emergency Electrical Overspeed Trip Device -- Turbine Building

C-293 2.4.3 Main Steam System No entry. Covered in Section 2.2.4, Steam Generator System.

2.4.4 Steam

Generator Blowdown System No entry. Containment isolation function covered in Section 2.2.1, Containment System and 2.2.4, Steam Generator System.

No entry. Steam generator isolation function covered in Section 2.2.4, Steam Generator System. 2.4.5 Condenser Air Removal System No entry. Covered in Section 3.5, Radiation Monitoring.

(Note: Monitor is TDS

-RE001.)

C-294 2.4.6 Condensate System Design Description The condensate system (CDS) provides feedwater at the required temperature, pressure, and flow rate to the deaerator. Condensate is pumped from the main condenser hotwell by the condensate pumps and passes through the low

-pressure feedwater heaters to the deaerator. The circulating water system (CWS) removes heat from the condenser and is site specific starting from the interface at the locations where the CWS piping enters and exits the turbine building. The CDS operates during plant startup and power operations (full and part loads). The component locations of the CDS are as shown in Table 2.4.6

-3. 1. The functional arrangement of the CDS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.4.6. 2. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.4.6

-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).

Table 2.4.6

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Condenser Backpressure CDS-056A Yes Condenser Backpressure CDS-056B Yes Condenser Backpressure CDS-056C Yes Table 2.4.6

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 504 2.4.06.01 1. The functional arrangement of the CDS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.4.6. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built CDS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of Section 2.4.6. 505 2.4.06.02 2. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.4.6-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the parameters in the MCR.

The displays identified in Table 2.4.6-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-295 Table 2.4.6

-3 Component Name Component Location Low Pressure Feedwater Heaters Turbine Building Deaerator Feedwater Heater and Storage Tank Turbine Building Main Condenser Shell A Turbine Building Main Condenser Shell B Turbine Building Main Condenser Shell C Turbine Building Condensate Pump A Turbine Building Condensate Pump B Turbine Building Condensate Pump C Turbine Building C-296 2.4.7 Circulating Water System No entry for this system.

2.4.8 Auxiliary

Steam Supply System No entry for this system.

2.4.9 Condenser

Tube Cleaning System No entry for this system.

2.4.10 Turbine Island Chemical Feed System No entry for this system. 2.4.11 Condensate Polishing System No entry for this system.

2.4.12 Gland Seal System No entry. Covered in Section 2.4.2, Main Turbine System.

2.4.13 Generator Hydrogen and CO2 System No entry for this system.

2.4.14 Heater Drain System No entry for this system.

2.4.15 Hydrogen Seal Oil System No entry for this system.

2.4.16 Main Turbine and Generator Lube Oil System No entry for this system.

C-297 2.5 Instrumentation and Control Systems

2.5.1 Diverse

Actuation System Design Description The diverse actuation system (DAS) initiates reactor trip, actuates selected functions, and provides plant information to the operator.

The component locations of the DAS are as shown in Table 2.5.1

-5. 1. The functional arrangement of the DAS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.1. 2. The DAS provides the following nonsafety

-related functions:

a) The DAS provides an automatic reactor trip on low wide

-range steam generator water level, or on low pressurizer water level, or on high hot leg temperature, separate from the PMS. b) The DAS provides automatic actuation of selected functions, as identified in Table 2.5.1-1, separate from the PMS.

c) The DAS provides manual initiation of reactor trip and selected functions, as identified in Table 2.5.1-2, separate from the PMS. These manual initiation functions are implemented in a manner that bypasses the control room multiplexers, if any; the PMS cabinets; and the signal processing equipment of the DAS.

d) The DAS provides main control room (MCR) displays of selected plant parameters, as identified in Table 2.5.1-3, separate from the PMS.

3. The DAS has the following features:

a) The signal processing hardware of the DAS uses input modules, output modules, and microprocessor or special purpose logic processor boards that are different than those used in the PMS.

b) The display hardware of the DAS uses a different display device than that used in the PMS. c) Software diversity between DAS and PMS will be achieved through the use of different algorithms, logic, program architecture, executable operating system, and executable software/logic.

d) The DAS has electrical surge withstand capability (SWC), and can withstand the electromagnetic interference (EMI), radio frequency (RFI), and electrostatic discharge (ESD) conditions that exist where the DAS equipment is located in the plant.

e) The sensors identified on Table 2.5.1

-3 are used for DAS input and are separate from those being used by the PMS and plant control system.

f) The DAS is powered by non

-Class 1E uninterruptible power supplies that are independent and separate from the power supplies which power the PMS.

C-298 g) The DAS signal processing cabinets are provided with the capability for channel testing without actuating the controlled components.

h) The DAS equipment can withstand the room ambient temperature and humidity conditions that will exist at the plant locations in which the DAS equipment is installed at the times for which the DAS is designed to be operational.

4. The DAS hardware and any software are developed using a planned design process which provides for specific design documentation and reviews during the following life cycle stages: a) Development phase for hardware and any software b) System test phase c) Installation phase The planned design process also provides for the use of commercial off-the-shelf hardware and software.

5. The DAS manual actuation of ADS, IRWST injection, and containment recirculation can be executed correctly and reliably.

Table 2.5.1-1 Functions Automatically Actuated by the DAS

1. Reactor and Turbine Trip on Low Wide-range Steam Generator Water Level or Low Pressurizer Water Level or High Hot Leg Temperature

2. Passive Residual Heat Removal (PRHR) Actuation and In

-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) Gutter Isolation on Low Wide

-range Steam Generator Water Level or on High Hot Leg Temperature

3. Core Makeup Tank (CMT) Actuation and Trip All Reactor Coolant Pumps on Low Wide

-Range Steam Generator Water Level or Low Pressurizer Water Level

4. Isolation of Selected Containment Penetrations and Initiation of Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS) on High Containment Temperature

C-299 Table 2.5.1-2 Functions Manually Actuated by the DAS

1. Reactor and Turbine Trip

2. PRHR Actuation and IRWST Gutter Isolation

3. CMT Actuation and Trip All Reactor Coolant Pumps 4. First-stage Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Valve Actuation

5. Second-stage ADS Valve Actuation

6. Third-stage ADS Valve Actuation

7. Fourth-stage ADS Valve Actuation

8. PCS Actuation

9. Isolation of Selected Containment Penetrations

10. Containment Hydrogen Ignitor Actuation

11. IRWST Injection Actuation

12. Containment Recirculation Actuation

13. Actuate IRWST Drain to Containment Table 2.5.1-3 DAS Sensors and Displays Equipment Name Tag Number Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Hot Leg Temperature RCS-300A RCS Hot Leg Temperature RCS-300B Steam Generator 1 Wide

-range Level SGS-044 Steam Generator 1 Wide

-range Level SGS-045 Steam Generator 2 Wide

-range Level SGS-046 Steam Generator 2 Wide

-range Level SGS-047 Pressurizer Water Level RCS-305A Pressurizer Water Level RCS-305B Containment Temperature VCS-053A Containment Temperature VCS-053B Core Exit Temperature IIS-009 Core Exit Temperature IIS-013 Core Exit Temperature IIS-030 Core Exit Temperature IIS-034 Rod Control Motor Generator Voltage PLS-ET001 Rod Control Motor Generator Voltage PLS-ET002 C-300 Table 2.5.1

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 50 6 2.5.01.01 1. The functional arrangement of the DAS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.1.

Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built DAS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.1.

507 2.5.01.02a 2.a) The DAS provides an automatic reactor trip on low wide

-range steam generator water level, or on low pressurizer water level, or on high hot leg temperature, separate from the PMS. Electrical power to the PMS equipment will be disconnected and an operational test of the as

-built DAS will be performed using real or simulated test signals. The field breakers of the control rod motor

-generator sets open after the test signal reaches the specified limit.

508 2.5.01.02b 2.b) The DAS provides automatic actuation of selected functions, as identified in Table 2.5.1

-1, separate from the PMS.

Electrical power to the PMS equipment will be disconnected and an operational test of the as

-built DAS will be performed using real or simulated test signals. Appropriate DAS output signals are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit.

509 2.5.01.02c.i 2.c) The DAS provides manual initiation of reactor trip, and selected functions, as identified in Table 2.5.1

-2, separate from the PMS. These manual initiation functions are implemented in a manner that bypasses the control room multiplexers, if any; the PMS cabinets; and the signal processing equipment of the DAS.

Electrical power to the control room multiplexers, if any, and PMS equipment will be disconnected and the outputs from the DAS signal processing equipment will be disabled. While in this configuration, an operational test of the as

-built system will be performed using the DAS manual actuation controls. i) The field breakers of the control rod motor

-generator sets open after reactor and turbine trip manual initiation controls are actuated.

510 2.5.01.02c.ii 2.c) The DAS provides manual initiation of reactor trip, and selected functions, as identified in Table 2.5.1

-2, separate from the PMS. These manual initiation functions are implemented in a manner that bypasses the control room multiplexers, if any; the PMS cabinets; and the signal processing equipment of the DAS.

Electrical power to the control room multiplexers, if any, and PMS equipment will be disconnected and the outputs from the DAS signal processing equipment will be disabled.

While in this configuration, an operational test of the as

-built system will be performed using the DAS manual actuation controls. ii) DAS output signals are generated for the selected functions, as identified in Table 2.5.1

-2, after manual initiation controls are actuated. 511 2.5.01.02d 2.d) The DAS provides MCR displays of selected plant parameters, as identified in Table 2.5.1

-3, separate from the PMS.

Electrical power to the PMS equipment will be disconnected and inspection will be performed for retrievability of the selected plant parameters in the MCR.

The selected plant parameters

can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-301 Table 2.5.1

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 512 2.5.01.03a 3.a) The signal processing hardware of the DAS uses input modules, output modules, and microprocessor or special purpose logic processor boards that are different than those used in the PMS.

Inspection of the as-built DAS and PMS signal processing hardware will be performed.

The DAS signal processing equipment uses input modules, output modules, and micro-processor or special purpose logic processor boards that are different than those used in the PMS. The difference may be a different design, use of different component types, or different manufacturers.

513 2.5.01.03b 3.b) The display hardware of the DAS uses a different display device than that used in the PMS.

Inspection of the as

-built DAS and PMS display hardware will be performed.

The DAS display hardware is different than the display hardware used in the PMS. The difference may be a different design, use of different component types, or different manufacturers.

514 2.5.01.03c 3.c) Software diversity between the DAS and PMS will be achieved through the use of different algorithms, logic, program architecture, executable operating system, and executable software/logic.

Inspection of the DAS and PMS design documentation will be performed.

Any DAS algorithms, logic, program architecture, executable operating systems, and executable software/logic are different than those used in the PMS.

515 2.5.01.03d 3.d) The DAS has electrical surge withstand capability (SWC), and can withstand the electromagnetic interference (EMI), radio frequency (RFI), and electrostatic discharge (ESD) conditions that exist where the DAS equipment is located in the plant. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment.

A report exists and concludes that the DAS equipment can withstand the SWC, EMI, RFI and ESD conditions that exist where the DAS equipment is located in the plant.

516 2.5.01.03e 3.e) The sensors identified on Table 2.5.1-3 are used for DAS input and are separate from those being used by th e PMS and plant control system.

Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The sensors identified on Table 2.5.1

-3 are used by DAS and are separate from those being used by the PMS and plant control system.

517 2.5.01.03f 3.f) The DAS is powered by non

-Class 1E uninterruptible power supplies that are independent and separate from the power supplies which power the PMS.

Electrical power to the PMS equipment will be disconnected. While in this configuration, a test will be performed by providing simulated test signals in the non

-Class 1E uninterruptible power supplies.

A simulated test signal exists at the DAS equipment when the assigned non

-Class 1E uninterruptible power supply is provided the test signal.

C-302 Table 2.5.1

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 518 2.5.01.03g 3.g) The DAS signal processing cabinets are provided with the capability for channel testing without actuating the controlled components.

Channel tests will be performed on the as built system.

The capability exists for testing individual DAS channels without propagating an actuation signal to a DAS controlled component.

519 2.5.01.03h 3.h) The DAS equipment can withstand the room ambient temperature and humidity conditions that will exist at the plant locations in which the DAS equipment is installed at the times for which the DAS is designed to be operational.

Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment.

A report exists and concludes that the DAS equipment can withstand the room ambien t temperature and humidity conditions that will exist at the plant locations in which the DAS equipment is installed at the times for which the DAS is designed to be operational.

520 2.5.01.04 4. The DAS hardware and any software are developed using a planned design process which provides for specific design documentation and reviews during the following life cycle stages:

a) Development phase for hardware and any software b) System test phase c) Installation phase The planned design process also provides for the use of commercial off

-t he-shelf hardware and software.

Inspection will be performed of the process used to design the hardware and any software.

A report exists and concludes that the process defines the organizational responsibilities, activities, and configuration management controls for the following:

a) Documentation and revie w of hardware and any software.

b) Performance of tests and the documentation of test results during the system test phase. c) Performance of tests and inspections during the installation phase.

The process also defines requirements for the use of commercial off

-t he-shelf hardware and software.

521 2.5.01.05 5. The DAS manual actuation of ADS, IRWST injection, and containment recirculation can be executed correctly and reliably. See ITAAC Table 3.2-1, item 1.

See ITAAC 3.2-1, item 1.

C-303 Table 2.5.1

-5 Component Name Tag No. Component Location DAS Processor Cabinet 1 DAS-JD-001 Annex Building DAS Processor Cabinet 2 DAS-JD-002 Annex Building DAS Squib Valve Control Cabinet DAS-JD-003 Auxiliary Building DAS Instrument Cabinet DAS-JD-004 Auxiliary Building

C-304 2.5.2 Protection and Safety Monitoring System Design Description The protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) initiates reactor trip and actuation of engineered safety features in response to plant conditions monitored by process instrumentation and provides safety

-related displays. The PMS has the equipment identified in Table 2.5.2

-1. The PMS has four divisions of Reactor Trip and Engineered Safety Features Actuation, and two divisions of safety

-related post

-accident parameter displays. The functional arrangement of the PMS is depicted in Figure 2.5.2-1 and the component locations of the PMS are as shown in Table 2.5.2

-9. 1. The functional arrangement of the PMS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.2. 2. The seismic Category I equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

3. The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, has electrical surge withstand capability (SWC), and can withstand the electromagnetic interference (EMI), radio frequency interference (RFI), and electrostatic discharge (ESD) conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

4. The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2

-1, can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

5. a) The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, is powered from its respective Class 1E division. b) Separation is provided between PMS Class 1 E divisions, and between Class 1 E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable. 6. The PMS provides the following safety

-related functions:

a) The PMS initiates an automatic reactor trip, as identified in Table 2.5.2-2, when plant process signals reach specified limits.

b) The PMS initiates automatic actuation of engineered safety features, as identified in Table 2.5.2-3, when plant process signals reach specified limits.

c) The PMS provides manual initiation of reactor trip and selected engineered safety features as identified in Table 2.5.2-4. 7. The PMS provides the following nonsafety

-related functions:

a) The PMS provides process signals to the plant control system (PLS) through isolation devices.

C-305 b) The PMS provides process signals to the data display and processing system (DDS) through isolation devices.

c) Data communication between safety and nonsafety systems does not inhibit the performance of the safety function.

d) The PMS ensures that the automatic safety function and the Class 1E manual controls both have priority over the non

-Class 1E soft controls.

e) The PMS receives signals from non

-safety equipment that provides interlocks for PMS test functions through isolation devices.

8. The PMS, in conjunction with the operator workstations, provides the following functions:

a) The PMS provides for the minimum inventory of displays, visual alerts, and fixed position controls, as identified in Table 2.5.2

-5. The plant parameters listed with a "Yes" in the "Display" column and visual alerts listed with a "Yes" in the "Alert" column can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR). The fixed position controls listed with a "Yes" in the "Control" column are provided in the MCR.

b) The PMS provides for the transfer of control capability from the MCR to the remote shutdown workstation (RSW) using multiple transfer switches. Each individual transfer switch is associated with only a single safety

-related group or with nonsafety

-related control capability.

c) Displays of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers can be retrieved in the MCR. 9. a) The PMS automatically removes blocks of reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation when the plant approaches conditions for which the associated function is designed to provide protection. These blocks are identified in Table 2.5.2-6. b) The PMS two

-out-of-four initiation logic reverts to a two

-out-of-three coincidence logic if one of the four channels is bypassed. All bypassed channels are alarmed in the MCR.

c) The PMS does not allow simultaneous bypass of two redundant channels.

d) The PMS provides the interlock functions identified in Table 2.5.2-7. 10. Setpoints are determined using a methodology which accounts for loop inaccuracies, response testing, and maintenance or replacement of instrumentation.

11. The PMS hardware and software is developed using a planned design process which provides for specific design documentation and reviews during the following life cycle stages: a) Design requirements phase, may be referred to as conceptual or project definition phase (Complete) b) System definition phase c) Hardware and software development phase, consisting of hardware and software design and implementation

C-306 d) System integration and test phase e) Installation phase

12. The PMS software is designed, tested, installed, and maintained using a process which incorporates a graded approach according to the relative importance of the software to safety and specifies requirements for:

a) Software management including documentation requirements, standards, review requirements, and procedures for problem reporting and corrective action.

b) Software configuration management including historical records of software and control of software changes.

c) Verification and validation including requirements for reviewer independence.

13. The use of commercial grade hardware and software items in the PMS is accomplished through a process that specifies requirements for:

a) Review of supplier design control, configuration management, problem reporting, and change control.

b) Review of product performance.

c) Receipt acceptance of the commercial grade item.

d) Final acceptance based on equipment qualification and software validation in the integrated system.

14. The Component Interface Module (CIM) is developed using a planned design process which provides for specific design documentation and reviews.

C-307 Table 2.5.2-1 PMS Equipment Name and Classification Equipment Name Seismic Cat.

I Class 1E Qual. for Harsh Envir.

PMS Cabinets, Division A Yes Yes No PMS Cabinets, Division B Yes Yes No PMS Cabinets, Division C Yes Yes No PMS Cabinets, Division D Yes Yes No Reactor Trip Switchgear, Division A Yes Yes No Reactor Trip Switchgear, Division B Yes Yes No Reactor Trip Switchgear, Division C Yes Yes No Reactor Trip Switchgear, Division D Yes Yes No MCR/RSW Transfer Panels Yes Yes No MCR Safety

-related Display, Division B Yes Yes No MCR Safety

-related Display, Division C Yes Yes No MCR Safety

-related Controls Yes Yes No Table 2.5.2-2 PMS Automatic Reactor Trips Source Range High Neutron Flux Reactor Trip Intermediate Range High Neutron Flux Reactor Trip Power Range High Neutron Flux (Low Setpoint) Trip Power Range High Neutron Flux (High Setpoint) Trip

Power Range High Positive Flux Rate Trip

Reactor Coolant Pump High Bearing Water Temperature Trip Overtemperature Delta

-T Trip Overpower Delta

-T Trip Pressurizer Low Pressure Trip Pressurizer High Pressure Trip Pressurizer High Water Level Trip Low Reactor Coolant Flow Trip Low Reactor Coolant Pump Speed Trip Low Steam Generator Water Level Trip High-2 Steam Generator Water Level Trip Automatic or Manual Safeguards Actuation Trip Automatic or Manual Depressurization System Actuation Trip Automatic or Manual Core Makeup Tank (CMT) Injection Trip Passive Residual Heat Removal (PRHR) Actuation Reactor Trip

C-308 Table 2.5.2-3 PMS Automatically Actuated Engineered Safety Features Safeguards Actuation Containment Isolation Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Actuation Main Feedwater Isolation Reactor Coolant Pump Trip CMT Injection Turbine Trip (Isolated signal to nonsafety equipment)

Steam Line Isolation Steam Generator Relief Isolation Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Passive Containment Cooling Actuation Startup Feedwater Isolation Passive Residual Heat Removal (PRHR) Heat Exchanger Alignment Block of Boron Dilution Chemical and Volume Control System (CVS) Makeup Line Isolation Steam Dump Block (Isolated signal to nonsafety equipment)

MCR Isolation

, Air Supply Initiation, and Electrical Load De

-energization Auxiliary Spray and Letdown Purification Line Isolation Containment Air Filtration System Isolation Normal Residual Heat Removal Isolation Refueling Cavity Isolation In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) Injection IRWST Containment Recirculation CVS Letdown Isolation Pressurizer Heater Block (Isolated signal to nonsafety equipment)

Containment Vacuum Relief Table 2.5.2-4 PMS Manually Actuated Functions Reactor Trip Safeguards Actuation Containment Isolation Depressurization System Stages 1, 2, and 3 Actuation Depressurization System Stage 4 Actuation Feedwater Isolation Core Makeup Tank Injection Actuation Steam Line Isolation Passive Containment Cooling Actuation Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Alignment IRWST Injection Containment Recirculation Actuation MCR Isolation , Air Supply Initiation and Electrical Load De

-energization Steam Generator Relief Isolation Chemical and Volume Control System Isolation Normal Residual Heat Removal System Isolation Containment Vacuum Relief

C-309 Table 2.5.2

-5 Minimum Inventory of Displays, Alerts, and Fixed Position Controls in the MCR Description Control Display Alert (1) Neutron Flux

- Yes Yes Neutron Flux Doubling(2) - No Yes Startup Rate

- Yes Yes Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure

- Yes Yes Wide-range Hot Leg Temperature

- Yes No Wide-range Cold Leg Temperature

- Yes Yes RCS Cooldown Rate Compared to the Limit Based on RCS Pressure - Yes Yes Wide-range Cold Leg Temperature Compared to the Limit Based on RCS Pressure

- Yes Yes Change of RCS Temperature by more than 5°F in the last

10 minutes - No Yes Containment Water Level

- Yes Yes Containment Pressure

- Yes Yes Pressurizer Water Level

- Yes Yes Pressurizer Water Level Trend

- Yes No Pressurizer Reference Leg Temperature

- Yes No Reactor Vessel

-Hot Leg Water Level

- Yes Yes Pressurizer Pressure

- Yes No Core Exit Temperature

- Yes Yes RCS Subcooling

- Yes Yes RCS Cold Overpressure Limit

- Yes Yes IRWST Water Level

- Yes Yes PRHR Flow - Yes Yes PRHR Outlet Temperature

- Yes Yes Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

1. These parameters are used to generate visual alerts that identify challenges to the critical safety functions. For the main control room, the visual alerts are embedded in the safety

-related displays as visual signals.

C-310 Table 2.5.2-5 (cont.) Minimum Inventory of Displays, Alerts, and Fixed Position Controls in the MCR Description Control Display Alert (1) Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS) Storage Tank Water Level

- Yes No PCS Cooling Flow

- Yes No IRWST to Normal Residual Heat Removal System (RNS)

Suction Valve Status (2) - Yes Yes Remotely Operated Containment Isolation Valve Status (2) - Yes No Containment Area High

-range Radiation Level

- Yes Yes Containment Pressure (Extended Range)

- Yes No CMT Level - Yes No Manual Reactor Trip (also initiates turbine trip)

Yes - - Manual Safeguards Actuation Yes - - Manual CMT Actuation Yes - - Manual MCR Emergency Habitability System Actuation Yes - - Manual ADS Stages 1, 2, and 3 Actuation Yes - - Manual ADS Stage 4 Actuation Yes - - Manual PRHR Actuation Yes - - Manual Containment Cooling Actuation Yes - - Manual IRWST Injection Actuation Yes - - Manual Containment Recirculation Actuation Yes - - Manual Containment Isolation Yes - - Manual Main Steam Line Isolation Yes - - Manual Feedwater Isolation Yes - - Manual Containment Hydrogen Igniter (Nonsafety

-related) Yes - - Manual Containment Vacuum Relief Yes Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

2. These instruments are not required after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

C-311 Table 2.5.2-6 PMS Blocks Reactor Trip Functions:

Source Range High Neutron Flux Reactor Trip Intermediate Range High Neutron Flux Reactor Trip Power Range High Neutron Flux (Low Setpoint) Trip

Pressurizer Low Pressure Trip Pressurizer High Water Level Trip Low Reactor Coolant Flow Trip Low Reactor Coolant Pump Speed Trip High Steam Generator Water Level Trip

Engineered Safety Features:

Automatic Safeguards Containment Isolation Main Feedwater Isolation Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Core Makeup Tank Injection Steam Line Isolation Startup Feedwater Isolation Block of Boron Dilution Chemical and Volume Control System Isolation Chemical and Volume Control System Letdown Isolation Steam Dump Block

Auxiliary Spray and Letdown Purification Line Isolation Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Alignment Normal Residual Heat Removal System Isolation Table 2.5.2-7 PMS Interlocks RNS Suction Valves PRHR Heat Exchanger Inlet Isolation Valve CMT Cold Leg Balance Line Isolation Valves Containment Vacuum Relief Isolation Valves Table 2.5.

2-8 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 522 2.5.02.01 1. The functional arrangement of the PMS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.5.2. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built PMS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.2.

C-312 Table 2.5.

2-8 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 523 2.5.02.02.i

2. The seismic Category I equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

524 2.5.02.02.ii

2. The seismic Category I equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis

loads without loss of safety function. 525 2.5.02.02.iii

2. The seismic Category I equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

526 2.5.02.03 3. The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2

-1, has electrical surge withstand capability (SWC), and can withstand the electromagnetic interference (EMI), radio frequency interference (RFI), and electrostatic discharge (ESD) conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the equipment.

A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 can withstand the SWC, EMI, RFI, and ESD conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety

function for the time required to perform the safety function.

527 2.5.02.04 4. The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2

-1, can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2

-1. A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2

-1 can withstand the room ambient temperature, humidity, pressure, and mechanical vibration conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

C-313 Table 2.5.

2-8 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 528 2.5.02.05a 5.a) The Class 1E equipment, identified in Table 2.5.2-1, is powered from its respective Class 1E division.

Tests will be performed by providing a simulated test signal in each Class 1E division.

A simulated test signal exists at the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.2-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal. 529 2.5.02.05b 5.b) Separation is provided between PMS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, items 7.d and 7.e.

See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, items 7.d and 7.e.

530 2.5.02.06a.i 6.a) The PMS initiates an automatic reactor trip, as identified in Table 2.5.2-2, when plant process signals reach specified limits.

An operational test of the as

-built PMS will be performed using real or simulated test signals. i) The reactor trip switchgear opens after the test signal reaches the specified limit.

This only needs to be verified for one automatic reactor trip function. 531 2.5.02.06a.ii 6.a) The PMS initiates an automatic reactor trip, as identified in Table 2.5.2-2, when plant process signals reach specified limits.

An operational test of the as-built PMS will be performed using real or simulated test signals. ii) PMS output signals to the reactor trip switchgear are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit. This needs to be verified for each automatic reactor trip

function. 532 2.5.02.06b 6.b) The PMS initiates automatic actuation of engineered safety features, as identified in Table 2.5.2-3, when plant process signals reach specified limits. An operational test of the as

-built PMS will be performed using real or simulated test signals. Appropriate PMS output signals are generated after the test signal reaches the specified limit. These output signals remain following removal of the test signal.

Tests from the actuation signal to the actuated device(s) are performed as part of the system-related inspection, test, analysis, and acceptance criteria. 533 2.5.02.06c.i 6.c) The PMS provides manual initiation of reactor trip and selected engineered safety features as identified in Table 2.5.2-4. An operational test of the as-built PMS will be performed using the PMS manual actuation controls. i) The reactor trip switchgear opens after manual reactor trip controls are actuated.

C-314 Table 2.5.

2-8 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 534 2.5.02.06c.ii 6.c) The PMS provides manual initiation of reactor trip and selected engineered safety features as identified in Table 2.5.2-4. An operational test of the as

-built PMS will be performed using the PMS manual actuation controls. ii) PMS output signals are generated for reactor trip and selected engineered safety features as identified in Table 2.5.2-4 after the manual initiation controls are actuated. 535 2.5.02.07a 7.a) The PMS provides process signals to the PLS through isolation devices.

Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of the isolation devices will be performed.

A report exists and concludes that the isolation devices prevent credible faults from propagating into the PMS.

536 2.5.02.07b 7.b) The PMS provides process signals to the DDS through isolation devices.

Type tests, analyses, or a

combination of type tests and analyses of the isolation devices will be performed.

A report exists and concludes that the isolation devices prevent credible faults from propagating into the PMS.

537 2.5.02.07c 7.c) Data communication between safety and nonsafety systems does not inhibit the performance of the safety function. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of the PMS gateways will be performed.

A report exists and concludes that data communication between safety and nonsafety systems does not inhibit the performance of the safety function. 538 2.5.02.07d 7.d) The PMS ensures that the automatic safety function and the Class 1E manual controls both have priority over the non

-Class 1E soft controls. Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of the PMS manual control circuits and algorithms will be performed.

A report exists and concludes that the automatic safety function and the Class 1E manual controls both have priority over the non

-Class 1E soft controls.

539 2.5.02.07e 7.e) The PMS receives signals from non-safety equipment that provides interlocks for PMS test functions through isolation devices.

Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of the isolation devices will be performed.

A report exists and concludes that the isolation devices prevent credible faults from propagating into the PMS.

540 2.5.02.08a.i 8.a) The PMS provides for the minimum inventory of displays, visual alerts, and fixed position controls, as identified in Table 2.5.2-5. The plant parameters listed with a "Yes" in the "Display" column and visual alerts listed with a "Yes" in the "Alert" column can be retrieved in the MCR.

The fixed position controls listed with a "Yes" in the "Control" column ar e provided in the MCR.

i) An inspection will be performed for retrievability of plant parameters in the MCR.

i) The plant parameters listed in Table 2.5.2

-5 with a "Yes" in the "Display" column, can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-315 Table 2.5.

2-8 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 541 2.5.02.08a.ii 8.a) The PMS provides for the minimum inventory of displays, visual alerts, and fixed position controls, as identified in Table 2.5.2-5. The plant parameters listed with a "Yes" in the "Display" column and visual alerts listed with a "Yes" in the "Alert" column can be retrieved in the MCR. The fixed position controls listed with a "Yes" in the "Control" column are provided in the MCR.

ii) An inspection and test will be performed to verify that the plant parameters are used to generate visual alerts that identify challenges to critical safety functions.

ii) The plant parameters listed in Table 2.5.2

-5 with a "Yes" in the "Alert" column are used to generate visual alerts that identify challenges to critical safety functions. The visual alerts actuate in accordance

with their correct logic and values. 542 2.5.02.08a.iii 8.a) The PMS provides for the minimum inventory of displays, visual alerts, and fixed position controls, as identified in Table 2.5.2-5. The plant parameters listed with a "Yes" in the "Display" column and visual alerts listed with a "Yes" in the "Alert" column can be retrieved in the MCR.

The fixed position controls listed with a "Yes" in the "Control" column are provided in the MCR.

iii) An operational test of the as-built system will be performed using each MCR fixed position control.

iii) For each test of an as

-built fixed position control listed in Table 2.5.2-5 with a "Yes" in the "Control" column, an actuation signal is generated. Tests from the actuation signal to the actuated device(s) are performed as part of the system-related inspection, test, analysis and acceptance criteria. 543 2.5.02.08b.i 8.b) The PMS provides for the transfer of control capability from the MCR to the RSW using multiple transfer switches. Each individual transfer switch is associated with only a single safety-related group or with nonsafety

-related control capability.

i) An inspection will be performed to verify that a transfer switch exists for each safety-related division and the nonsafety-related control capability. i) A transfer switch exists for each safety

-related division and the nonsafety

-related control capability.

544 2.5.02.08b.ii 8.b) The PMS provides for the transfer of control capability from the MCR to the RSW using multiple transfer switches. Each individual transfer switch is associated with only a single safety-related group or with nonsafety

-related control capability.

ii) An operational test of the as

-built system will be performed to demonstrate the transfer of control capability from the MCR to the RSW.

ii) Actuation of each transfer switch results in an alarm in the MCR and RSW, the activation of operator control capability from the RSW, and the deactivation of operator control capability from the MCR for the associated safety-related division and nonsafety-related control capability.

545 2.5.02.08c 8.c) Displays of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers can be retrieved in the MCR.

Inspection will be performed for retrievability of displays of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers in the MCR.

Displays of the open/closed status of the reactor trip breakers can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-316 Table 2.5.

2-8 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 5 46 2.5.02.09a 9.a) The PMS automatically removes blocks of reactor trip and engineered safety features actuation when the plant approaches conditions for which the associated function is designed to provide protection. These blocks are identified in Table 2.5.2-6. An operational test of the as

-built PMS will be performed using real or simulated test signals. The PMS blocks are automatically removed when the test signal reaches the specified limit.

547 2.5.02.09b 9.b) The PMS two

-out-of-four initiation logic reverts to a two

-out-of-three coincidence logic if one of the four channels is bypassed. All bypassed channels are alarmed in the MCR.

An operational test of the as

-built PMS will be performed.

The PMS two

-out-of-four initiation logic reverts to a two-out-of-three coincidence logic if one of the four channels is bypassed. All bypassed channels are alarmed in the MCR.

548 2.5.02.09c 9.c) The PMS does not allow simultaneous bypass of two redundant channels. An operational test of the as

-built PMS will be performed.

With one channel in bypass, an attempt will be made to place a redundant channel in bypass.

The redundant channel cannot be placed in bypass.

549 2.5.02.09d 9.d) The PMS provides the interlock functions identified in Table 2.5.2-7. An operational test of the as

-built PMS will be performed using real or simulated test signals. Appropriate PMS output signals are generated as the interlock conditions are changed. 550 2.5.02.10 10. Setpoints are determined using a methodology which accounts for loop inaccuracies, response testing, and maintenance or replacement of instrumentation.

Inspection will be performed for a document that describes the methodology and input parameters used to determine the PMS setpoints.

A report exists and concludes that the PMS setpoints are determined using a methodology which accounts for loop inaccuracies, response testing, and maintenance or replacement of instrumentation.

C-317 Table 2.5.

2-8 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 551 2.5.02.11 11. The PMS hardware and software is developed using a planned design process which provides for specific design documentation and reviews during the following life cycle stages:

a) Not used b) System definition phase c) Hardware and software development phase, consisting of hardware and software design and implementation d) System integration and test phase e) Installation phase Inspection will be performed of the process used to design the

hardware and software.

A report exists and concludes that the process defines the organizational responsibilities, activities, and configuration management controls for the following:

a) Not used.

b) Specification of functional requirements.

c) Documentation and review of hardware and software.

d) Performance of system tests and the documentation of system test results, including a response time test performed under maximum CPU loading to demonstrate that the PMS can fulfill its response time

criteria. e) Performance of installation tests and inspections.

C-318 Table 2.5.

2-8 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 552 2.5.02.12 12. The PMS software is designed, tested, installed, and maintained using a process which incorporates a graded approach according to the relative importance of the software to safety and specifies requirements for:

a) Software management including documentation requirements, standards, review requirements, and procedures for problem reporting and corrective action. b) Software configuration management including historical records of software and control of software changes.

c) Verification and validation including requirements for reviewer independence.

Inspection will be performed of the process used to design, test, install, and maintain the PMS software. A report exists and concludes that the process establishes a method for classifying the PMS software elements according to their relative importance to safety and specifies requirements for software assigned to each safety classification. The report also concludes that requirements are provided for the following software development functions:

a) Software management including documentation requirements, standards, review requirements, and procedures for problem reporting and corrective action. Software management requirements may be documented in the software quality assurance plan, software management plan, software development plan, software safety plan, and software operation and maintenance plan; or these requirements may be combined into a single software management plan. b) Software configuration management including historical records of software and control of software changes. Software configuration management requirements are provided in the software configuration management plan.

c) Verification and validation including requirements for reviewer independence.

Verification and validation requirements are provided in the verification and validation plan.

C-319 Table 2.5.

2-8 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 553 2.5.02.13 13. The use of commercial grade computer hardware and software items in the PMS is accomplished through a process that specifies requirements for:

a) Review of supplier design control, configuration management, problem reporting, and change control.

b) Review of product performance.

c) Receipt acceptance of the commercial grade item.

d) Acceptance based on equipment qualification and software validation in the integrated system.

Inspection will be performed of the process defined to use commercial grade components in the application.

A report exists and concludes that the process has requirements for:

a) Review of supplier design control, configuration management, problem reporting, and change control.

b) Review of product performance.

c) Receipt acceptance of the commercial grade item.

d) Acceptance based on equipment qualification and software validation in the integrated system.

554 2.5.02.14 14. The Component Interface Module

(CIM) is developed using a planned design process which provides for specific design documentation and reviews.

{Design Acceptance Criteria}

An inspection and or an audit will be performed of the processes used to design the hardware, development software, qualification and testing. A report exists and concludes that CIM meets the below listed life cycle stages.

Life cycle stages:

a. Design requirements phase, may be referred to as conceptual or project definition phase

b. System definition phase

c. Hardware and software development phase, consisting of hardware and software design and implementation

d. System integration and test phase

e. Installation phase C-320 Table 2.5.2

-9 Component Name Component Location PMS Cabinets, Division A Auxiliary Building PMS Cabinets, Division B Auxiliary Building PMS Cabinets, Division C Auxiliary Building PMS Cabinets, Division D Auxiliary Building Reactor Trip Switchgear, Division A Auxiliary Building Reactor Trip Switchgear, Division B Auxiliary Building Reactor Trip Switchgear, Division C Auxiliary Building Reactor Trip Switchgear, Division D Auxiliary Building MCR/RSW Transfer Panels Auxiliary Building MCR Safety-related Displays Auxiliary Building MCR Safety

-related Controls Auxiliary Building

C-321 Figure 2.5.2

-1 Protection and Safety Monitoring System

C-322 2.5.3 Plant Control System Design Description The plant control system (PLS) provides for automatic and manual control of nonsafety

-related plant components during normal and emergency plant operations. The PLS has distributed controllers and operator controls interconnected by computer data links or data highways.

1. The functional arrangement of the PLS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.3. 2. The PLS provides control interfaces for the control functions listed in Table 2.5.3

-1. Table 2.5.3-1 Control Functions Supported by the PLS

1. Reactor Power

2. Reactor Rod Position 3. Pressurizer Pressure

4. Pressurizer Water Level

5. Steam Generator Feedwater

6. Steam Dump

7. Rapid Power Reduction Table 2.5.3

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 55 5 2.5.03.01 1. The functional arrangement of the PLS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.3. Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built PLS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.3. 556 2.5.03.02 2. The PLS provides control interfaces for the control functions listed in Table 2.5.3-1. An operational test of the system will be performed using simulated input signals. System outputs or component operations will be monitored to determine the operability of the control functions.

The PLS provides control interfaces for the control functions listed in Table 2.5.3

-1.

C-323 2.5.4 Data Display and Processing System Design Description The data display and processing system (DDS) provides nonsafety

-related alarms and displays, analysis of plant data, plant data logging and historical storage and retrieval, and operational support for plant personnel. The DDS has distributed computer processors and video display units to support the data processing and display functions.

1. The functional arrangement of the DDS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.4. 2. The DDS, in conjunction with the operator workstations, provides the following function:

The DDS provides for the minimum inventory of displays, visual alerts, and fixed position controls, as identified in Table 2.5.4

-1. The plant parameters listed with a "Yes" in the "Display" column and visual alerts listed with a "Yes" in the "Alert" column can be retrieved at the remote shutdown workstation (RSW). The controls listed with a "Yes" in the "Control" column are provided at the RSW.

3. The DDS provides information pertinent to the status of the protection and safety monitoring system. 4. The plant operating instrumentation installed for feedwater flow measurement is one that has been specifically approved by the NRC; the power calorimetric uncertainty calculation includes uncertainties for the associated instrumentation based on an NRC approved methodology; and the calculated calorimetric values are bounded by the uncertainty value assumed for the initial reactor power in the safety analysis.

C-324 Table 2.5.4-1 Minimum Inventory of Controls, Displays, and Alerts at the RSW Description Control Display Alert (1) Neutron Flux

- Yes Yes Neutron Flux Doubling

- No Yes Startup Rate

- Yes Yes Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure

- Yes Yes Wide-range Hot Leg Temperature

- Yes No Wide-range Cold Leg Temperature

- Yes Yes RCS Cooldown Rate Compared to the Limit Based on RCS Pressure - Yes Yes Wide-range Cold Leg Temperature Compared to the Limit Based on RCS Pressure

- Yes Yes Change of RCS Temperature by more than 5°F in the last 10 minutes - No Yes Containment Water Level

- Yes Yes Containment Pressure

- Yes Yes Pressurizer Water Level

- Yes Yes Pressurizer Water Level Trend

- Yes No Pressurizer Reference Leg Temperature

- Yes No Reactor Vessel

-Hot Leg Water Level

- Yes Yes Pressurizer Pressure

- Yes No Core Exit Temperature

- Yes Yes RCS Subcooling

- Yes Yes RCS Cold Overpressure Limit

- Yes Yes In-containment Refueling Water Storage Tank (IRWST) Water Level

- Yes Yes Passive Residual Heat Removal (PRHR) Flow

- Yes Yes Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

1. These parameters are used to generate visual alerts that identify challenges to the critical safety functions. For the RSW, the visual alerts are embedded in the nonsafety

-related displays as visual signals.

C-325 Table 2.5.4-1 (cont.) Minimum Inventory of Controls, Displays, and Alerts at the RSW Description Control Display Alert (1) PRHR Outlet Temperature

- Yes Yes Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS) Storage Tank Water Level

- Yes No PCS Cooling Flow

- Yes No IRWST to Normal Residual Heat Removal System (RNS) Suction Valve Status

- Yes Yes Remotely Operated Containment Isolation Valve Status

- Yes No Containment Area High

-range Radiation Level

- Yes Yes Containment Pressure (Extended Range)

- Yes No Core Makeup Tank (CMT) Level - Yes No Manual Reactor Trip (also initiates turbine trip)

Yes - - Manual Safeguards Actuation Yes - - Manual CMT Actuation Yes - - Manual Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Stages 1, 2, and 3 Actuation Yes - - Manual ADS Stage 4 Actuation Yes - - Manual PRHR Actuation Yes - - Manual Containment Cooling Actuation Yes - - Manual IRWST Injection Actuation Yes - - Manual Containment Recirculation Actuation Yes - - Manual Containment Isolation Yes - - Manual Main Steam Line Isolation Yes - - Manual Feedwater Isolation Yes - - Manual Containment Hydrogen Igniter (Nonsafety

-related) Yes - - Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

1. These parameters are used to generate visual alerts that identify challenges to the critical safety functions. For the RSW, the visual alerts are embedded in the nonsafety

-related displays as visual signals.

C-326 Table 2.5.4

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 557 2.5.04.01 1. The functional arrangement of the DDS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.4.

Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built DDS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.4.

558 2.5.04.02.i

2. The DDS provides for the minimum inventory of displays, visual alerts, and fixed position controls, as identified in Table 2.5.4-1. The plant parameters listed with a "Yes" in the "Display" column and visual alerts listed with a "Yes" in the "Alert" column can be retrieved at the RSW.

The controls listed with a "Yes" in the "Control" column are provided at the RSW. i) An inspection will be performed for retrievability of plant parameters at the RSW.

i) The plant parameters listed in Table 2.5.4

-1 with a "Yes" in the "Display" column can be retrieved at the RSW.

559 2.5.04.02.ii

2. The DDS provides for the minimum inventory of displays, visual alerts, and fixed position controls, as identified in Table 2.5.4-1. The plant parameters listed with a "Yes" in the "Display" column and visual alerts listed with a "Yes" in the "Alert" column can be retrieved at the RSW.

The controls listed with a "Yes" in the "Control" column are provided at the RSW. ii) An inspection and test will be performed to verify that the plant parameters are used to generate visual alerts that identify challenges to critical safety functions.

ii) The plant parameters listed in Table 2.5.4

-1 with a "Yes" in the "Alert" column are used to generate visual alerts that identify challenges to critical safety functions.

The visual alerts actuate in accordance with their logic and values.

560 2.5.04.02.iii

2. The DDS provides for the minimum inventory of displays, visual alerts, and fixed position controls, as identified in Table 2.5.4-1. The plant parameters listed with a "Yes" in the "Display" column and visual alerts listed with a "Yes" in the "Alert" column can be retrieved at the RSW.

The controls listed with a "Yes" in the "Control" column are provided at the RSW. iii) An operational test of the as

-built system will be performed using each RSW control.

iii) For each test of a control listed in Table 2.5.4

-1 with a "Yes" in the "Control" column, an actuation signal is generated.

Tests from the actuation signal to the actuated device(s) are performed as part of the system

-related inspection, test, analysis and acceptance criteria.

561 2.5.04.03 3. The DDS provides information pertinent to the status of the protection and safety monitoring system.

Tests of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built system provides displays of the bypassed and operable status of the protection and safety monitoring system.

C-327 Table 2.5.4

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 562 C.2.5.04.04a

4. The plant calorimetric uncertainty and plant instrumentation performance is bounded by the 1% calorimetric uncertainty value assumed for the initial reactor power in the safety analysis.

Inspection will be performed of the plant operating instrumentation installed for feedwater flow measurement, its associated power calorimetric uncertainty calculation, and the calculated calorimetric values.

a) The as-built system takes input for feedwater flow measurement from a Caldon [Cameron] LEFM CheckPlusŽ System; 563 C.2.5.04.04b

4. The plant calorimetric uncertainty and plant instrumentation performance is bounded by the 1% calorimetric uncertainty value assumed for the initial reactor power in the safety analysis.

Inspection will be performed of the plant operating instrumentation installed for feedwater flow measurement, its associated power calorimetric uncertainty calculation, and the calculated calorimetric values.

b) The power calorimetric uncertainty calculation documented for that instrumentation is based on an accepted Westinghouse methodology and the uncertainty values for that instrumentation are not lower than those for the actual installed instrumentation; and 564 C.2.5.04.04c

4. The plant calorimetric uncertainty and plant instrumentation performance is bounded by the 1% calorimetric uncertainty value assumed for the initial reactor power in the safety analysis.

Inspection will be performed of the plant operating instrumentation installed for feedwater flow measurement, its associated power calorimetric uncertainty calculation, and the calculated calorimetric values.

c) The calculated calorimetric power uncertainty measurement values are bounded by the 1% uncertainty value assumed for the initial reactor power in the safety analysis.

C-328 2.5.5 In-Core Instrumentation System Design Description The in-core instrumentation system (IIS) provides safety

-related core exit thermocouple signals to the protection and safety monitoring system (PMS). The IIS also provides nonsafety

-related core exit thermocouple signals to the diverse actuation system (DAS). The core exit thermocouples are housed in the core instrument assemblies. Multiple core instrument assemblies are used to provide radial coverage of the core. At least three core instrument assemblies are provided in each core quadrant. 1. The functional arrangement of the IIS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.5. 2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.5

-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

3. a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.5

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.

b) The Class 1E cables between the Incore Thermocouple elements and the connector boxes located on the integrated head package have sheaths.

c) For cables other than those covered by 3.b, separation is provided between IIS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable.

4. Safety-related displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.5.5

-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).

Table 2.5.5

-1 Equipment Name Seismic Cat. I ASME Code Classification Class 1E Qual. for Harsh Envir.

Safety-Related Display Incore Thimble Assemblies (at least three assemblies in each core quadrant)

Yes - Yes (1) Yes (1) Core Exit Temperature (1) Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

1. Only applies to the safety-related assemblies. There are at least two safety

-related assemblies in each core quadrant.

C-329 Table 2.5.

5-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 565 2.5.05.01 1. The functional arrangement of the IIS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.5.5. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built IIS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design

Description of this Section 2.5.5. 566 2.5.05.02.i

2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

567 2.5.05.02.ii

2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function.

568 2.5.05.02.iii

2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis dynamic loads without loss of safety function.

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the as-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

569 2.5.05.03a.i 3.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.5

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.

i) Type tests, analysis, or a combination of type tests and analysis will be performed o n Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.

i) A report exists and concludes that the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment. This equipment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

C-330 Table 2.5.

5-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 570 2.5.05.03a.ii 3.a) The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.5.5

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function, for the time required to perform the safety function.

ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 2.5.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses. 571 2.5.05.03b 3.b) The Class 1E cables between the Incore Thermocouple elements and the connector boxes located on the integrated head package have sheaths.

Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built Class 1E cables between the Incore Thermocouple elements and the connector boxes located on the integrated head package have sheaths.

572 2.5.05.03c 3.c) For cables other than those covered by 3.b, separation is provided between IIS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable.

See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. 573 2.5.05.04 4. Safety-related displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.5.5-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the safety

-related displays in the MCR.

Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.5.5

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-331 2.5.6 Special Monitoring System Design Description The special monitoring system (SMS) monitors the reactor coolant system (RCS) for the occurrence of impacts characteristic of metallic loose parts. Metal impact monitoring sensors are provided to monitor the RCS at the upper and lower head region of the reactor pressure vessel, and at the reactor coolant inlet region of each steam generator.

1. The functional arrangement of the SMS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.6. 2. Data obtained from the metal impact monitoring sensors can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).

Table 2.5.6

-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 57 4 2.5.06.01 1. The functional arrangement of the SMS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.5.6. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built SMS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.6.

575 2.5.06.02 2. Data obtained from the metal impact monitoring sensors can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of data from the metal impact monitoring sensors in the MCR. Data obtained from the metal impact monitoring sensors can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-332 2.5.7 Operation and Control Centers System Design Description The operation and control centers system (OCS) is developed and implemented based upon a human factors engineering (HFE) program. The human system interface (HSI) scope includes the design of the OCS and each of the HSI resources. For the purposes of the HFE program, the OCS includes the main control room, remote shutdown workstation, the local control stations, and the associated workstations for each of these centers. Implementation of the HFE program involves the completion of the human factors engineering analyses and plans described in Tier 1 Material Section 3.2, Human Factors Engineering.

2.5.8 Radiation

Monitoring System No entry. Radiation monitoring function covered in Section 3.5, Radiation Monitoring.

2.5.9 Seismic

Monitoring System Design Description The seismic monitoring system (SJS) provides for the collection of seismic data in digital format, analysis of seismic data, notification of the operator if the ground motion exceeds a threshold value, and notification of the operator (after analysis of data) that a predetermined cumulative absolute velocity (CAV) has been exceeded. The SJS has at least four triaxial acceleration sensor units and a time

-history analyzer and recording system. The time

-history analyzer and recording system are located in the auxiliary building.

1. The functional arrangement of the SJS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.9. 2. The SJS can compute CAV and the 5 percent of critical damping response spectrum for frequencies between 1 and 10 Hertz.

3. The SJS has a dynamic range of 0.001g to 1.0g and a frequency range of 0.2 to 50 Hertz.

Table 2.5.9-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 57 6 2.5.09.01 1. The functional arrangement of the SJS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.9. Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built SJS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.5.9.

C-333 Table 2.5.9-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 57 7 2.5.09.02 2. The SJS can compute CAV and the 5 percent of critical damping response spectrum for frequencies between 1 and

10 Hz. Type tests using simulated input signals, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses, of the SJS time

-history analyzer and recording system will be performed.

A report exists and concludes that the SJS time

-history analyzer and recording system can record data at a sampling rate of at least 200 samples per second, that the pre

-event recording time is adjustable from less than or equal to

1.2 seconds

to greater than or equal to 15.0 seconds, and that the initiation value is adjustable from less than or equal to 0.002g to greater than or equal to 0.02g.

57 8 2.5.09.03 3. The SJS has a dynamic range of 0.001g to 1.0g and a frequency range of 0.2 to 50 Hertz.

Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses, of the SJS triaxial acceleration sensors will be performed.

A report exists and concludes that the SJS triaxial acceleration sensors have a dynamic range of at least 0.001g to 1.0g and a frequency range of at least 0.2 to 50 Hertz.

C-334 2.5.10 Main Turbine Control and Diagnostic System No entry. Covered in Section 2.4.2, Main Turbine System.

2.5.11 Meteorological and Environmental Monitoring System No entry for this system.

2.5.12 Closed Circuit TV System No entry for this system.

C-335 2.6 Electrical Power Systems 2.6.1 Main ac Power System Design Description The main ac power system (ECS) provides electrical ac power to nonsafety

-related loads and non-Class 1E power to the Class 1E battery chargers and regulating transformers during normal and off-normal conditions.

The ECS is as shown in Figures 2.6.1

-1 and the component locations of the ECS are as shown in Table 2.6.1-5. 1. The functional arrangement of the ECS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.1. 2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.1

-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

3. a) The Class 1E breaker control power for the equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

b) Separation is provided between ECS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1 E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable.

4. The ECS provides the following nonsafety

-related functions:

a) The ECS provides the capability for distributing non

-Class 1E ac power from onsite sources (ZOS) to nonsafety

-related loads listed in Table 2.6.1

-2. b) The 6900 Vac circuit breakers in switchgear ECS

-ES-1 and ECS-ES-2 open after receiving a signal from the onsite standby power system.

c) Each standby diesel generator 6900 Vac circuit breaker closes after receiving a signal from the onsite standby power system.

d) Each ancillary diesel generator unit is sized to supply power to long

-term safety

-related post-accident monitoring loads and control room lighting and ventilation through a regulating transformer; and for one passive containment cooling system (PCS) recirculation pump.

e) The ECS provides two loss

-of-voltage signals to the onsite standby power system (ZOS), one for each diesel

-backed 6900 Vac switchgear bus. f) The ECS provides a reverse-power trip of the generator circuit breaker which is blocked for at least 15 seconds following a turbine trip.

5. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to cause the circuit breakers identified in Table 2.6.1-3 to perform the listed functions.

6. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.6.1

-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-336 Table 2.6.1

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Seismic Category I Class 1 E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir.

Safety-Related Display Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-31 Yes Yes/No (Trip open only)

No RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-32 Yes Yes/No (Trip open only)

No RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-41 Yes Yes/No (Trip open only)

No RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-42 Yes Yes/No (Trip open only)

No RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-51 Yes Yes/No (Trip open only)

No RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-52 Yes Yes/No (Trip open only)

No RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-61 Yes Yes/No (Trip open only)

No RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-62 Yes Yes/No (Trip open only)

No C-337 Table 2.6.1-2 Load Description Power Source Load Center Transformers EK

-11, EK-12, EK-13, EK-14 ZOS-MG-02A Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure A Electric Unit Heater ZOS-MG-02A Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure A Fan ZOS-MG-02A Class 1E Division A Regulating Transformer ZOS-MG-02A Class 1E Division C Regulating Transformer ZOS-MG-02A Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 1A ZOS-MG-02A Diesel Generator Room A Building Standby Exhaust Fans 1A and 2A ZOS-MG-02A Diesel Generator Service Module A Air Handling Unit (AHU) 01A Fan ZOS-MG-02A Startup Feedwater Pump A ZOS-MG-02A Service Water Pump A ZOS-MG-02A Service Water Cooling Tower Fan A ZOS-MG-02A MCR/Control Support Area (CSA) AHU A Supply and Return Fans ZOS-MG-02A Divisions A/C Class 1E Electrical Room AHU A Supply and Return Fans ZOS-MG-02A Divisions B/D Class 1E Electrical Room AHU D Supply and Return Fans ZOS-MG-02A Air-cooled Chiller Pump 2 ZOS-MG-02A Component Cooling Water Pump 1A ZOS-MG-02A Air-cooled Chiller 2 ZOS-MG-02A Chemical and Volume Control System (CVS) Makeup Pump 1A ZOS-MG-02A CVS Pump Room Unit Cooler Fan A ZOS-MG-02A Normal Residual Heat Removal System (RNS) Pump 1A ZOS-MG-02A RNS Pump Room Unit Cooler Fan A ZOS-MG-02A Equipment Room AHU Supply and Return Fans VXS

-MA-01A/02A ZOS-MG-02A Switchgear Room A AHU Supply and Return Fans VXS

-MA-05A/06A ZOS-MG-02A Non-1E Battery Charger EDS1

-DC-1 ZOS-MG-02A Non-1E Battery Room A Exhaust Fan ZOS-MG-02A Non-1E Battery Charger EDS3

-DC-1 ZOS-MG-02A C-338 Table 2.6.1

-2 (cont.) Load Description Power Source Class 1E Division A Battery Charger 1 (24

-hour) ZOS-MG-02A Class 1E Division C Battery Charger 1 (24

-hour) ZOS-MG-02A Class 1E Division C Battery Charger 2 (72

-hour) ZOS-MG-02A Divisions A/C Class 1E Battery Room Exhaust Fan A ZOS-MG-02A Supplemental Air Filtration Unit Fan A ZOS-MG-02A Backup Group 4A Pressurizer Heaters ZOS-MG-02A Spent Fuel Cooling Pump 1A ZOS-MG-02A Load Center Transformers EK

-21, EK-22, EK-23, EK-24 ZOS-MG-02B Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure B Electric Unit Heater ZOS-MG-02B Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure B Fan ZOS-MG-02B Class 1E Division B Regulating Transformer ZOS-MG-02B Class 1E Division D Regulating Transformer ZOS-MG-02B Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 1B ZOS-MG-02B Diesel Generator Room B Building Standby Exhaust Fans 1B and 2B ZOS-MG-02B Diesel Generator Service Module B AHU 01B Fan ZOS-MG-02B Startup Feedwater Pump B ZOS-MG-02B Service Water Pump B ZOS-MG-02B Service Water Cooling Tower Fan B ZOS-MG-02B MCR/CSA AHU B Supply and Return Fans ZOS-MG-02B Divisions B/D Class 1E Electrical Room AHU B Supply and Return Fans ZOS-MG-02B Divisions A/C Class 1E Electrical Room AHU C Supply and Return Fans ZOS-MG-02B Air-cooled Chiller Pump 3 ZOS-MG-02B Component Cooling Water Pump 1B ZOS-MG-02B Air-cooled Chiller 3 ZOS-MG-02B CVS Makeup Pump 1B ZOS-MG-02B CVS Pump Room Unit Cooler Fan B ZOS-MG-02B RNS Pump 1B ZOS-MG-02B RNS Pump Room Unit Cooler Fan B ZOS-MG-02B Equipment Room B AHU Supply and Return Fans VXS

-MA-01B/02B ZOS-MG-02B C-339 Table 2.6.1

-2 (cont.) Load Description Power Source Switchgear Room B AHU Supply and Return Fans VXS

-MA-05B/06B ZOS-MG-02B Non-1E Battery Charger EDS2

-DC-1 ZOS-MG-02B Non-1E Battery Charger EDS4

-DC-1 ZOS-MG-02B Non-1E Battery Room B Exhaust Fan ZOS-MG-02B Class 1E Division B Battery Charger 1 (24

-hour) ZOS-MG-02B Class 1E Division B Battery Charger 2 (72

-hour) ZOS-MG-02B Class 1E Division D Battery Charger 1 (24

-hour) ZOS-MG-02B Divisions B/D Class 1E Battery Room Exhaust Fan B ZOS-MG-02B Supplemental Air Filtration Unit Fan B ZOS-MG-02B Backup Group 4B Pressurizer Heaters ZOS-MG-02B Spent Fuel Cooling Pump 1B ZOS-MG-02B Table 2.6.1

-3 Equipment Tag No. Display Control Function 6900 V Switchgear Bus 1 ECS-ES-1 Yes (Bus voltage, breaker position for all breakers on bus)

Yes (Breaker open/close) 6900 V Switchgear Bus 2 ECS-ES-2 Yes (Bus voltage, breaker position for all breakers on bus)

Yes (Breaker open/close)

Unit Auxiliary Transformer A ZAS-ET-2A Yes (Secondary Voltage)

No Unit Auxiliary Transformer B ZAS-ET-2B Yes (Secondary Voltage)

No Reserve Auxiliary Transformer A ZAS-ET-4A Yes (Secondary Voltage)

No Reserve Auxiliary Transformer B ZAS-ET-4B Yes (Secondary Voltage)

No C-340 Table 2.6.1

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 579 2.6.01.01 1. The functional arrangement of the ECS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.1. Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built ECS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.1. 580 2.6.01.02.i

2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

581 2.6.01.02.ii

2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. 582 2.6.01.02.iii

2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

583 2.6.01.03a 3.a) The Cla ss 1E breaker control power for the equipment identified in Table 2.6.1-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

Testing will be performed on the ECS by providing a simulated test signal in each Class 1E division. A simulated test signal exists at the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.6.1

-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal. 584 2.6.01.03b 3.b) Separation is provided between ECS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. 585 2.6.01.04a 4.a) The ECS provides the capability for distributing non

-Class 1E ac power from onsite sources (ZOS) to nonsafety

-related loads listed in Table 2.6.1

-2. Tests will be performed using a test signal to confirm that an electrical path exists for each selected load listed in Table 2.6.1-2 from an ECS

-ES-1 or ECS-ES-2 bus. Each test may be a single test or a series of over-lapping tests.

A test signal exists at the terminals of each selected load. 586 2.6.01.04b 4.b) The 6900 Vac circuit breakers in switchgear ECS

-ES-1 and ECS-ES-2 open after receiving a signal from the onsite standby power load system.

See ITAAC Table 2.6.4

-1, item 2.a. See ITAAC Table 2.6.4-1, item 2.a.

C-341 Table 2.6.1

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 587 2.6.01.04c 4.c) Each standby diesel generator 6900 Vac circuit breaker closes after receiving a signal from the onsite standby power system.

Testing will be performed using real or simulated signals from the standby diesel load system.

Each standby diesel generator 6900 Vac circuit breaker closes after receiving a signal from the standby diesel system. 588 2.6.01.04d 4.d) Each ancillary diesel generator unit is sized to supply power to long

-term safety

-related post

-accident monitoring loads and control room lighting and ventilation through a regulating transformer; and for one PCS recirculation pump.

Each ancillary diesel generator will be operated with fuel supplied from the ancillary diesel generator fuel tank and with a load of 35 kW or greate r and a power factor between 0.9 and 1.0 for a time period required to reach engine temperature equilibrium plus 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months . Each diesel generator provides power to the load with a generator terminal voltage of

480 +/- 10% volts and a frequency of 60 +/- 5% Hz.

589 2.6.01.04e 4.e) The ECS provides two loss

-of-voltage signals to the onsite standby power system (ZOS), one for each diesel-backed 6900 Vac switchgear bus.

Tests on the as

-built ECS system will be conducted by simulating a loss-of-voltage condition o n each diesel

-backed 6900 Vac switchgear bus.

A loss-of-voltage signal is generated when the loss

-of-voltage condition is simulated.

590 2.6.01.04f 4.f) The ECS provides a reverse

-power trip of the generator circuit breaker which is blocked for at least 15 seconds following a turbine trip.

Tests on the as

-built ECS system will be conducted by simulating a turbine trip signal followed by a simulated reverse

-power condition. The generator circuit breaker trip signal will be monitored.

The generator circuit breaker trip signal does not occur until at least 15 seconds after the simulated turbine trip.

591 2.6.01.05 5. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the circuit breakers identified in Table 2.6.1-3 to perform the listed functions.

Tests will be performed to verify that controls in the MCR can operate the circuit breakers identified in Table 2.6.1-3. Controls in the MCR cause the circuit breakers identified in Table 2.6.1-3 to operate.

592 2.6.01.06 6. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.6.1

-3 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the displays identified in Table 2.6.1

-3 in the MCR. Displays identified in Table 2.6.1-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-342 Table 2.6.1

-5 Component Name Tag No. Component Location RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-31 Auxiliary Building RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-32 Auxiliary Building RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-41 Auxiliary Building RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-42 Auxiliary Building RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-51 Auxiliary Building RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-52 Auxiliary Building RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-61 Auxiliary Building RCP Circuit Breaker ECS-ES-62 Auxiliary Building 6900 V Switchgear Bus 1 ECS-ES-1 Annex Building 6900 V Switchgear Bus 2 ECS-ES-2 Annex Building 6900 V Switchgear Bus 3 ECS-ES-3 Turbine Building 6900 V Switchgear Bus 4 ECS-ES-4 Turbine Building 6900 V Switchgear Bus 5 ECS-ES-5 Turbine Building 6900 V Switchgear Bus 6 ECS-ES-6 Turbine Building Main Generator ZAS-MG-01 Turbine Building Generator Circuit Breaker ZAS-ES-01 Turbine Building Main Step-up Transformer ZAS-ET-1A Yard Main Step-up Transformer ZAS-ET-1B Yard Main Step-up Transformer ZAS-ET-1C Yard Unit Auxiliary Transformer A ZAS-ET-2A Yard Unit Auxiliary Transformer B ZAS-ET-2B Yard Reserve Auxiliary Transformer A ZAS-ET-4A Yard Reserve Auxiliary Transformer B ZAS-ET-4B Yard Ancillary Diesel Generator #1 ECS-MG-01 Annex Building Ancillary Diesel Generator #2 ECS-MG-02 Annex Building Ancillary Diesel Generator Distribution Panel 1 ECS-ED-01 Annex Building Ancillary Diesel Generator Distribution Panel 1 ECS-ED-02 Annex Building

C-343 Figure 2.6.1

-1 (Sheet 1 of 4)

Main ac Power Syste m

C-344 Figure 2.6.1

-1 (Sheet 2 of 4)

Main ac Power System

C-345 Figure 2.6.1

-1 (Sheet 3 of 4)

Main ac Power System

C-346 Figure 2.6.1

-1 (Sheet 4 of 4)

Main ac Power System

C-347 2.6.2 Non-Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System Design Description The non-Class 1E dc and uninterruptible power supply system (EDS) provides dc and uninterruptible ac electrical power to nonsafety

-related loads during normal and off

-normal conditions.

The EDS is as shown in Figure 2.6.2

-1 and the component locations of the EDS are as shown in Table 2.6.2-2. 1. The functional arrangement of the EDS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.2. 2. The EDS provides the following nonsafety

-related functions:

a) Each EDS load group 1, 2, 3, and 4 battery charger supplies the corresponding dc switchboard bus load while maintaining t he corresponding battery charged.

b) Each EDS load group 1, 2, 3, and 4 battery supplies the corresponding dc switchboard bus load for a period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months without recharging.

c) Each EDS load group 1, 2, 3, and 4 inverter supplies the corresponding ac load.

Table 2.6.2-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 593 2.6.02.01 1. The functional arrangement of the EDS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.2. Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built EDS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.2.

594 2.6.02.02a 2.a) Each EDS load group 1, 2, 3, and 4 battery charger supplies the corresponding dc switchboard bus load while maintaining the corresponding battery charged.

Testing of each as

-built battery charger will be performed by applying a simulated or real load, or a combination of simulated or real loads.

Each battery charger provides an output current of at least

550 amps with an output voltage in the range 105 to

140 V. 595 2.6.02.02b 2.b) Each EDS load group 1, 2, 3, and 4 battery supplies the corresponding dc switchboard bus load for a period of

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months without recharging.

Testing of each as

-built battery will be performed by applying a simulated or real load, or a combination of simulated or real loads. The test will be conducted on a battery that has been fully charged and has been connected to a battery charger maintained at 135

+/- 1 V for a period of no less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months prior to the test.

The battery terminal voltage is greater than or equal to 105 V after a period of no less than

2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , with an equivalent load greater than 500 amps.

C-348 Table 2.6.2-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 596 2.6.02.02c 2.c) Each EDS load group 1, 2, 3, and 4 inverter supplies the corresponding ac load. Testing of each as

-built inverter will be performed by applying a simulated or real load, or a combination of simulated or real loads, equivalent to a resistiv e load greater than 35 kW.

Each inverter provides a line

-to-line output voltage of 208 +/- 2% V at a frequency of 60 +/- 0.5% Hz.

Table 2.6.2

-2 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Load Group 1 Battery EDS1-DB-1 Annex Building Load Group 2 Battery EDS2-DB-1 Annex Building Load Group 3 Battery EDS3-DB-1 Annex Building Load Group 4 Battery EDS4-DB-1 Annex Building Load Group 1 Battery Charger EDS1-DC-1 Annex Building Load Group 2 Battery Charger EDS2-DC-1 Annex Building Load Group 3 Battery Charger EDS3-DC-1 Annex Building Load Group 4 Battery Charger EDS4-DC-1 Annex Building Load Group 1 125 Vdc Switchboard EDS1-DS-1 Annex Building Load Group 1 125 Vdc Switchboard EDS1-DS-11 Annex Building Load Group 2 125 Vdc Switchboard EDS2-DS-1 Annex Building Load Group 2 125 Vdc Switchboard EDS2-DS-11 Annex Building Load Group 3 125 Vdc Switchboard EDS3-DS-1 Annex Building Load Group 3 125 Vdc Switchboard EDS3-DS-11 Annex Building Load Group 4 125 Vdc Switchboard EDS4-DS-1 Annex Building Load Group 4 125 Vdc Switchboard EDS4-DS-11 Annex Building Load Group 1 Inverter EDS1-DU-1 Annex Building Load Group 2 Inverter EDS2-DU-1 Annex Building Load Group 3 Inverter EDS3-DU-1 Annex Building Load Group 4 Inverter EDS4-DU-1 Annex Building

C-349 Figure 2.6.2

-1 (Sheet 1 of 2)

Non-Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System

C-350 Figure 2.6.2

-1 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Non-Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System

C-351 2.6.3 Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System Design Description The Class 1E dc and uninterruptible power supply system (IDS) provides dc and uninterruptible ac electrical power for safety

-related equipment during normal and off

-normal conditions.

The IDS is as shown in Figure 2.6.3

-1 and the component locations of the IDS are as shown in Table 2.6.3-4. 1. The functional arrangement of the IDS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.3. 2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.3

-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

3. Separation is provided between Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cables.

4. The IDS provides the following safety

-related functions:

a) The IDS provides electrical independence between the Class 1E divisions.

b) The IDS provides electrical isolation between the non

-Class 1E ac power system and the non-Class 1E lighting in the MCR.

c) Each IDS 24

-hour battery bank supplies a dc switchboard bus load for a period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months without recharging.

d) Each IDS 72

-hour battery bank supplies a dc switchboard bus load for a period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months without recharging.

e) The IDS spare battery bank supplies a dc load equal to or greater than the most severe switchboard bus load for the required period without recharging.

f) Each IDS 24-hour inverter supplies its ac load.

g) Each IDS 72

-hour inverter supplies its ac load.

h) Each IDS 24

-hour battery charger provides the protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) with two loss

-of-ac input voltage signals.

i) The IDS supplies an operating voltage at the terminals of the Class 1E motor

-operated valves identified in subsections 2.1.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.2.4, 2.3.2, and 2.3.6 that is greater than or equal to the minimum specified voltage.

5. The IDS provides the following nonsafety

-related functions: a) Each IDS 24

-hour battery charger supplies a dc switchboard bus load while maintaining the corresponding battery charged.

b) Each IDS 72

-hour battery charger supplies a dc switchboard bus load while maintaining the corresponding battery charged.

c) Each IDS regulating transformer supplies an ac load when powered from the 480 V motor control center (MCC).

C-352 d) The IDS Divisions B and C regulating transformers supply their post

-72 hour ac loads when powered from an ancillary diesel generator.

6. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.6.3

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

7. The IDS dc battery fuses and battery charger circuit breakers, and dc distribution panels, MCCs, and their circuit breakers and fuses, are sized to supply their load requirements.

8. Circuit breakers and fuses in IDS battery, battery charger, dc distribution panel, and MCC circuits are rated to interrupt fault currents.

9. The IDS batteries, battery chargers, dc distribution panels, and MCCs are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.

10. The IDS electrical distribution system cables are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.

11. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.6.3

-2 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.6.3

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Seismic Cat. I Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir.

Safety-Related Display Division A 250 Vdc 24-Hour Battery Bank IDSA-DB-1 Yes Yes/No No Division B 250 Vdc 24-Hour Battery Bank 1 IDSB-DB-1 Yes Yes/No No Division B 250 Vdc 72-Hour Battery Bank 2 IDSB-DB-2 Yes Yes/No No Division C 250 Vdc 24-Hour Battery Bank 1 IDSC-DB-1 Yes Yes/No No Division C 250 Vdc 72-Hour Battery Bank 2 IDSC-DB-2 Yes Yes/No No Division D 250 Vdc 24-Hour Battery Bank IDSD-DB-1 Yes Yes/No No Spare 250 Vdc Battery Bank IDSS-DB-1 Yes Yes/No No Division A 24

-Hour Battery Charger 1 IDSA-DC-1 Yes Yes/No No Division B 24

-Hour Battery Charger 1 IDSB-DC-1 Yes Yes/No No Division B 72

-Hour Battery Charger 2 IDSB-DC-2 Yes Yes/No No Division C 24

-Hour Battery Charger 1 IDSC-DC-1 Yes Yes/No No Division C 72

-Hour Battery Charger 2 IDSC-DC-2 Yes Yes/No No Division D 24

-Hour Battery Charger 1 IDSD-DC-1 Yes Yes/No No Spare Battery Charger 1 IDSS-DC-1 Yes Yes/No No Division A 250 Vdc Distribution Panel IDSA-DD-1 Yes Yes/No No Division B 250 Vdc Distribution Panel IDSB-DD-1 Yes Yes/No No Division C 250 Vdc Distribution Panel IDSC-DD-1 Yes Yes/No No C-353 Table 2.6.3

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Seismic Cat. I Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir.

Safety-Related Display Division D 250 Vdc Distribution Panel IDSD-DD-1 Yes Yes/No No Division A 120 Vac Distribution Panel 1 IDSA-EA-1 Yes Yes/No No Division A 120 Vac Distribution Panel 2 IDSA-EA-2 Yes Yes/No No Division B 120 Vac Distribution Panel 1 IDSB-EA-1 Yes Yes/No No Division B 120 Vac Distribution Panel 2 IDSB-EA-2 Yes Yes/No No Division B 120 Vac Distribution Panel 3 IDSB-EA-3 Yes Yes/No No Division C 120 Vac Distribution Panel 1 IDSC-EA-1 Yes Yes/No No Division C 120 Vac Distribution Panel 2 IDSC-EA-2 Yes Yes/No No Division C 120 Vac Distribution Panel 3 IDSC-EA-3 Yes Yes/No No Division D 120 Vac Distribution Panel 1 IDSD-EA-1 Yes Yes/No No Division D 120 Vac Distribution Panel 2 IDSD-EA-2 Yes Yes/No No Division A Fuse Panel 4 IDSA-EA-4 Yes Yes/No No Division B Fuse Panel 4 IDSB-EA-4 Yes Yes/No No Division B Fuse Panel 5 IDSB-EA-5 Yes Yes/No No Division B Fuse Panel 6 IDSB-EA-6 Yes Yes/No No Division C Fuse Panel 4 IDSC-EA-4 Yes Yes/No No Division C Fuse Panel 5 IDSC-EA-5 Yes Yes/No No Division C Fuse Panel 6 IDSC-EA-6 Yes Yes/No No Division D Fuse Panel 4 IDSD-EA-4 Yes Yes/No No Division A Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSA-DF-1 Yes Yes/No No Division B Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSB-DF-1 Yes Yes/No No Division B Fused Transfer Switch Box 2 IDSB-DF-2 Yes Yes/No No Division C Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSC-DF-1 Yes Yes/No No Division C Fused Transfer Switch Box 2 IDSC-DF-2 Yes Yes/No No Division D Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSD-DF-1 Yes Yes/No No Spare Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSS-DF-1 Yes Yes/No No Spare Battery 125/250 Vdc Disconnect Switch IDSS-SW-1 Yes Yes/No No Division A 250 Vdc MCC IDSA-DK-1 Yes Yes/No No C-354 Table 2.6.3

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Seismic Cat. I Class 1E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir.

Safety-Related Display Division B 250 Vdc MCC IDSB-DK-1 Yes Yes/No No Division C 250 Vdc MCC IDSC-DK-1 Yes Yes/No No Division D 250 Vdc MCC IDSD-DK-1 Yes Yes/No No Division A 250 Vdc Switchboard 1 IDSA-DS-1 Yes Yes/No Yes (Bus Voltage) Division B 250 Vdc Switchboard 1 IDSB-DS-1 Yes Yes/No Yes (Bus Voltage) Division B 250 Vdc Switchboard 2 IDSB-DS-2 Yes Yes/No Yes (Bus Voltage) Division C 250 Vdc Switchboard 1 IDSC-DS-1 Yes Yes/No Yes (Bus Voltage) Division C 250 Vdc Switchboard 2 IDSC-DS-2 Yes Yes/No Yes (Bus Voltage) Division D 250 Vdc Switchboard 1 IDSD-DS-1 Yes Yes/No Yes (Bus Voltage) Division A Regulating Transformer IDSA-DT-1 Yes Yes/No No Division B Regulating Transformer IDSB-DT-1 Yes Yes/No No Division C Regulating Transformer IDSC-DT-1 Yes Yes/No No Division D Regulating Transformer IDSD-DT-1 Yes Yes/No No Division A 24

-Hour Inverter 1 IDSA-DU-1 Yes Yes/No No Division B 24

-Hour Inverter 1 IDSB-DU-1 Yes Yes/No No Division B 72

-Hour Inverter 2 IDSB-DU-2 Yes Yes/No No Division C 24

-Hour Inverter 1 IDSC-DU-1 Yes Yes/No No Division C 72

-Hour Inverter 2 IDSC-DU-2 Yes Yes/No No Division D 24

-Hour Inverter 1 IDSD-DU-1 Yes Yes/No No Spare Termination Box 2 IDSS-DF-2 Yes Yes/No No Spare Termination Box 3 IDSS-DF-3 Yes Yes/No No Spare Termination Box 4 IDSS-DF-4 Yes Yes/No No Spare Termination Box 5 IDSS-DF-5 Yes Yes/No No Spare Termination Box 6 IDSS-DF-6 Yes Yes/No No C-355 Table 2.6.3-2 Equipment Tag No. Display/Status Indication Division A Battery Monitor IDSA-DV-1 Yes (Battery Ground Detection, Battery High Discharge Rate)

Division B 24

-Hour Battery Monitor IDSB-DV-1 Yes (Battery Ground Detection, Battery High Discharge Rate)

Division B 72

-Hour Battery Monitor IDSB-DV-2 Yes (Battery Ground Detection, Battery High Discharge Rate)

Division C 24

-Hour Battery Monitor IDSC-DV-1 Yes (Battery Ground Detection, Battery High Discharge Rate)

Division C 72

-Hour Battery Monitor IDSC-DV-2 Yes (Battery Ground Detection, Battery High Discharge Rate)

Division D Battery Monitor IDSD-DV-1 Yes (Battery Ground Detection, Battery High Discharge Rate)

Division A Fused Transfer Switch Box IDSA-DF-1 Yes (Battery Current, Battery Disconnect Switch Position)

Division B 24

-Hour Fused Transfer Switch Box IDSB-DF-1 Yes (Battery Current, Battery Disconnect Switch Position)

Division B 72

-Hour Fused Transfer Switch Box IDSB-DF-2 Yes (Battery Current, Battery Disconnect Switch Position)

Division C 24

-Hour Fused Transfer Switch Box IDSC-DF-1 Yes (Battery Current, Battery Disconnect Switch Position)

Division C 72

-Hour Fused Transfer Switch Box IDSC-DF-2 Yes (Battery Current, Battery Disconnect Switch Position)

Division D Fused Transfer Switch Box IDSD-DF-1 Yes (Battery Current, Battery Disconnect Switch Position)

Division A Battery Charger IDSA-DC-1 Yes (Charger Output Current, Charger Trouble (1))

C-356 Table 2.6.3-2 Equipment Tag No. Display/Status Indication Division B 24

-Hour Battery Charger IDSB-DC-1 Yes (Charger Output Current, Charger Trouble (1)) Division B 72

-Hour Battery Charger IDSB-DC-2 Yes (Charger Output Current, Charger Trouble (1)) Division C 24

-Hour Battery Charger IDSC-DC-1 Yes (Charger Output Current, Charger Trouble (1)) Division C 72

-Hour Battery Charger IDSC-DC-2 Yes (Charger Output Current, Charger Trouble (1)) Division D Battery Charger IDSD-DC-1 Yes (Charger Output Current, Charger Trouble (1)) Note: (1) Battery charger trouble includes charger dc output under/over voltage Table 2.6.3

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 597 2.6.03.01 1. The functional arrangement of the IDS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.6.3. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built IDS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.3.

598 2.6.03.02.i

2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.3-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.3-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

599 2.6.03.02.ii

2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

C-357 Table 2.6.3

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 600 2.6.03.02.iii

2. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.6.3-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

601 2.6.03.03 3. Separation is provided between Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cables. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. 602 2.6.03.04a 4.a) The IDS provides electrical independence between the Class 1E divisions.

Testing will be performed on the IDS by providing a simulated test signal in each Class 1E division. A simulated test signal exists at the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.6.3

-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal. 603 2.6.03.04b 4.b) The IDS provides electrical isolation between the non

-Class 1E ac power system and the non-Class 1E lighting in the MCR.

Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of the isolation devices will be performed.

A report exists and concludes that the battery chargers, regulating transformers, and isolation fuses prevent credible faults from propagating into the IDS.

604 2.6.03.04c 4.c) Each IDS 24

-hour battery bank supplies a dc switchboard bus load for a period of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months without recharging.

Testing of each 24-hour as-built battery bank will be performed by applying a simulated or real load, or a combination of simulated or real loads which envelope the battery bank design duty cycle. The test will be conducted on a battery bank that has been fully charged and has been connected to a battery charger maintained at 270+/-2 V for a period of no less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months prior to the test.

The battery terminal voltage is greater than or equal to 210 V after a period of no less than

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months with an equivalent load that equals or exceeds the battery bank design duty cycle capacity.

C-358 Table 2.6.3

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 605 2.6.03.04d 4.d) Each IDS 72

-hour battery bank supplies a dc switchboard bus load for a period of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months without recharging.

Testing of each 72-hour as-built battery bank will be performed by applying a simulated or real load, or a combination of simulated or real loads which envelope the battery bank design duty cycle. The test will be conducted on a battery bank that has been fully charged and has been connected to a battery charger maintained at 270+/-2 V for a period of no less than

24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months prior to the test.

The battery terminal voltage is greater than or equal to 210 V after a period of no less than

72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months with an equivalent load that equals or exceeds the battery bank design duty cycle capacity. 606 2.6.03.04e 4.e) The IDS spare battery bank supplies a dc load equal to or greater than the most severe switchboard bus load for the required period without recharging.

Testing of the as

-built spare battery bank will be performed by applying a simulated or real load, or a combination of simulated or real loads which envelope the most severe of the division batteries design duty cycle. The test will be conducted on a battery bank that has been fully charged and has been connected to a battery charger maintained at 270+/-2 V for a period of no less tha n 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months prior to the test.

The battery terminal voltage is greater than or equal to 210 V after a period with a load and duration that equals or exceeds the most severe battery bank design duty cycle capacity. 607 2.6.03.04f 4.f) Each IDS 24

-hour inverter supplies its ac load.

Testing of each 24

-hour as-built inverter will be performed by applying a simulated or real load, or a combination of simulated or real loads, equivalent to a resistive load greater than 12 kW. The inverter input voltage will be no more than 210 Vdc during the test.

Each 24-hour inverter supplies a line-to-line output voltage of 208 +/- 2% V at a frequency of 60 +/- 0.5% Hz. 608 2.6.03.04g 4.g) Each IDS 72

-hour inverter supplies its ac load.

Testing of each 72

-hour as-built inverter will be performed by applying a simulated or real load, or a combination of simulated or real loads, equivalent to a resistive load greater than 7 kW. The inverter input voltage will be no more than 210 Vdc during the test.

Each 72-hour inverter supplies a line-to-line output voltage of 208 +/- 2% V at a frequency of 60 +/- 0.5% Hz.

C-359 Table 2.6.3

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 609 2.6.03.04h 4.h) Each IDS 24

-hour battery charger provides the PMS with two loss

-of-ac input voltage signals.

Testing will be performed by simulating a loss of input voltage to each 24

-hour battery charger.

Two PMS input signals exist from each 24

-hour battery charger indicating loss of ac input voltage when the loss

-of-input voltage condition is simulated.

610 2.6.03.04i 4.i) The IDS supplies an operating voltage at the terminals of the Class 1E motor operated valves identified in subsections 2.1.2, 2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.2.4, 2.3.2, and 2.3.6 that is greater than or equal to the minimum specified voltage. Testing will be performed by stroking each specified motor

-operated valve and measuring the terminal voltage at the motor starter input terminals with the motor operating. The battery terminal voltage will be no more than 210 Vdc during the test.

The motor starter input terminal voltage is greater than or equal 200 Vdc with the motor operating.

611 2.6.03.05a 5.a) Each IDS 24

-hour battery charger supplies a dc switchboard bus load while maintaining the corresponding battery charged.

Testing of each as

-built 24-hour battery charger will be performed by applying a simulated or real load, or a combination of simulated or real loads. Each 24-hour battery charger provides an output current of at least 150 A with an output voltage in the range 210 to 280 V. 612 2.6.03.05b 5.b) Each IDS 72

-hour battery charger supplies a dc switchboard bus load while maintaining the corresponding battery charged.

Testing of each 72

-hour as-built battery charger will be performed by applying a simulated or real load, or a combination of simulated or real loads. Each 72-hour battery charger provides an output current of at least 125 A with an output voltage in the range 210 to 280 V. 613 2.6.03.05c 5.c) Each IDS regulating transformer supplies an ac load when powered from the 480 V MCC. Testing of each as

-built regulating transformer will be performed by applying a simulated or real load, or a combination of simulated or real loads, equivalent to a resistive load greater than 30 kW when powered from the 480 V MCC. Each regulating transformer supplies a line

-to-line output voltage of 208 +/- 2% V. 614 2.6.03.05d.i 5.d) The IDS Divisions B and C regulating transformers supply their post-72-hour ac loads when powered from an ancillary diesel generator.

Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

i) Ancillary diesel generator 1

is electrically connected to regulating transformer IDSC-DT-1 615 2.6.03.05d.ii 5.d) The IDS Divisions B and C regulating transformers supply their post-72-hour ac loads when powered from an ancillary diesel generator.

Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

ii) Ancillary diesel generator 2 is electrically connected to regulating transformer IDSB-DT-1.

C-360 Table 2.6.3

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 616 2.6.03.06 6. Safety

-related displays identified in Table 2.6.3

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the safety

-related displays in the MCR.

Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.6.3

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

617 2.6.03.07 7. The IDS dc battery fuses and battery charger circuit breakers, and dc distribution panels, MCCs, and their circuit breakers and fuses, are sized to supply their load requirements.

Analyses for the as

-built IDS dc electrical distribution system to determine the capacities of the battery fuses and battery charger circuit breakers, and dc distribution panels, MCCs, and their circuit breakers and fuses, will be performed.

Analyses for the as

-built IDS dc electrical distribution system exist and conclude that the capacities of as

-built IDS battery fuses and battery charger circuit breakers, and dc distribution panels, MCCs, and their circuit breakers and fuses, as determined by their nameplate ratings, exceed their analyzed load requirements.

618 2.6.03.08 8. Circuit breakers and fuses in IDS battery, battery charger, dc distribution panel, and MCC circuits are rated to interrupt fault currents.

Analyses for the as

-built IDS dc electrical distribution system to determine fault currents will be performed.

Analyses for the as

-built IDS dc electrical distribution system exist and conclude that the analyzed fault currents do not exceed the interrupt capacity of circuit breakers and fuses in the battery, battery charger, dc distribution panel, and MCC circuits, as determined by their nameplate ratings. 619 2.6.03.09 9. The IDS batteries, battery chargers, dc distribution panels, and MCCs are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.

Analyses for the as

-built IDS dc electrical distribution system to determine fault currents will be performed.

Analyses for the as-built IDS dc electrical distribution system exist and conclude that the fault current capacities of as-built IDS batteries, battery chargers, dc distribution panels, and MCCs, as determined by manufacturer's ratings, exceed their analyzed fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source as determined by the circuit interrupting device coordination analyses.

C-361 Table 2.6.3

-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 620 2.6.03.10 10. The IDS electrical distribution system cables are rated to withstand fault currents for the time required to clear the fault from its power source.

Analyses for the as

-built IDS dc electrical distribution system to determine fault currents will be performed.

Analyses for the as

-built IDS dc electrical distribution system exist and conclude that the IDS dc electrical distribution system cables will withstand the analyzed fault currents, as determined by manufacturer's ratings, for the time required to clear the fault from its power source as determined by the circuit interrupting device coordination analyses. 621 2.6.03.11 11. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.6.3-2 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the displays identified in Table 2.6.3-2 in the MCR. Displays identified in Table 2.6.3-2 can be retrieved in the MCR. Table 2.6.3

-4 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Division A 250 Vdc 24

-Hour Battery Bank IDSA-DB-1 Auxiliary Building Division B 250 Vdc 24

-Hour Battery Bank 1 IDSB-DB-1 Auxiliary Building Division B 250 Vdc 72

-Hour Battery Bank 2 IDSB-DB-2 Auxiliary Building Division C 250 Vdc 24

-Hour Battery Bank 1 IDSC-DB-1 Auxiliary Building Division C 250 Vdc 72

-Hour Battery Bank 2 IDSC-DB-2 Auxiliary Building Division D 250 Vdc 24

-Hour Battery Bank IDSD-DB-1 Auxiliary Building Spare 125 Vdc Battery Bank IDSS-DB-1 Auxiliary Building Division A 24

-Hour Battery Charger 1 IDSA-DC-1 Auxiliary Building Division B 24

-Hour Battery Charger 1 IDSB-DC-1 Auxiliary Building Division B 72

-Hour Battery Charger 2 IDSB-DC-2 Auxiliary Building Division C 24

-Hour Battery Charger 1 IDSC-DC-1 Auxiliary Building Division C 72

-Hour Battery Charger 2 IDSC-DC-2 Auxiliary Building Division D 24

-Hour Battery Charger 1 IDSD-DC-1 Auxiliary Building Spare Battery Charger 1 IDSS-DC-1 Auxiliary Building Division A 250 Vdc Distribution Panel IDSA-DD-1 Auxiliary Building

C-362 Table 2.6.3

-4 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Division B 250 Vdc Distribution Panel IDSB-DD-1 Auxiliary Building Division C 250 Vdc Distribution Panel IDSC-DD-2 Auxiliary Building Division D 250 Vdc Distribution Panel IDSD-DD-1 Auxiliary Building Division A 120 Vac Distribution Panel 1 IDSA-EA-1 Auxiliary Building Division A 120 Vac Distribution Panel 2 IDSA-EA-2 Auxiliary Building Division B 120 Vac Distribution Panel 1 IDSB-EA-1 Auxiliary Building Division B 120 Vac Distribution Panel 2 IDSB-EA-2 Auxiliary Building Division B 120 Vac Distribution Panel 3 IDSB-EA-3 Auxiliary Building Division C 120 Vac Distribution Panel 1 IDSC-EA-1 Auxiliary Building Division C 120 Vac Distribution Panel 2 IDSC-EA-2 Auxiliary Building Division C 120 Vac Distribution Panel 3 IDSC-EA-3 Auxiliary Building Division D 120 Vac Distribution Panel 1 IDSD-EA-1 Auxiliary Building Division D 120 Vac Distribution Panel 2 IDSD-EA-2 Auxiliary Building Division A Fuse Panel 4 IDSA-EA-4 Auxiliary Building Division B Fuse Panel 4 IDSB-EA-4 Auxiliary Building Division B Fuse Panel 5 IDSB-EA-5 Auxiliary Building Division B Fuse Panel 6 IDSB-EA-6 Auxiliary Building Division C Fuse Panel 4 IDSC-EA-4 Auxiliary Building Division C Fuse Panel 5 IDSC-EA-5 Auxiliary Building Division C Fuse Panel 6 IDSC-EA-6 Auxiliary Building Division D Fuse Panel 4 IDSD-EA-4 Auxiliary Building Division A Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSA-DF-1 Auxiliary Building Division B Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSB-DF-1 Auxiliary Building Division B Fused Transfer Switch Box 2 IDSB-DF-2 Auxiliary Building Division C Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSC-DF-1 Auxiliary Building Division C Fused Transfer Switch Box 2 IDSC-DF-2 Auxiliary Building Division D Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSD-DF-1 Auxiliary Building Spare Fused Transfer Switch Box 1 IDSS-DF-1 Auxiliary Building Spare Battery 125/240 Vdc Disconnect Switch IDSS-SW-1 Auxiliary Building Division A 250 Vdc MCC IDSA-DK-1 Auxiliary Building

C-363 Table 2.6.3

-4 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Division B 250 Vdc MCC IDSB-DK-1 Auxiliary Building Division C 250 Vdc MCC IDSC-DK-1 Auxiliary Building Division D 250 Vdc MCC IDSD-DK-1 Auxiliary Building Division A 250 Vdc Switchboard 1 IDSA-DS-1 Auxiliary Building Division B 250 Vdc Switchboard 1 IDSB-DS-1 Auxiliary Building Division B 250 Vdc Switchboard 2 IDSB-DS-2 Auxiliary Building Division C 250 Vdc Switchboard 1 IDSC-DS-1 Auxiliary Building Division C 250 Vdc Switchboard 2 IDSC-DS-2 Auxiliary Building Division D 250 Vdc Switchboard 1 IDSD-DS-1 Auxiliary Building Division A Regulating Transformer IDSA-DT-1 Auxiliary Building Division B Regulating Transformer IDSB-DT-1 Auxiliary Building Division C Regulating Transformer IDSC-DT-1 Auxiliary Building Division D Regulating Transformer IDSD-DT-1 Auxiliary Building Division A 24

-Hour Inverter 1 IDSA-DU-1 Auxiliary Building Division B 24

-Hour Inverter 1 IDSB-DU-1 Auxiliary Building Division B 72

-Hour Inverter 2 IDSB-DU-2 Auxiliary Building Division C 24

-Hour Inverter 1 IDSC-DU-1 Auxiliary Building Division C 72

-Hour Inverter 2 IDSC-DU-2 Auxiliary Building Division D 24

-Hour Inverter 1 IDSD-DU-1 Auxiliary Building Spare Termination Box 2 IDSS-DF-2 Auxiliary Building Spare Termination Box 3 IDSS-DF-3 Auxiliary Building Spare Termination Box 4 IDSS-DF-4 Auxiliary Building Spare Termination Box 5 IDSS-DF-5 Auxiliary Building Spare Termination Box 6 IDSS-DF-6 Auxiliary Building

C-364 Figure 2.6.3

-1 (Sheet 1 of 4)

Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System (Division A)

C-365 Figure 2.6.3

-1 (Sheet 2 of 4)

Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System (Division B)

C-366 Figure 2.6.3

-1 (Sheet 3 of 4)

Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System (Division C)

C-367 Figure 2.6.3

-1 (Sheet 4 of 4

) Class 1E dc and Uninterruptible Power Supply System (Division D)

C-368 2.6.4 Onsite Standby Power System Design Description The onsite standby power system (ZOS) provides backup ac electrical power for nonsafety

-related loads during normal and off

-normal conditions.

The ZOS has two standby diesel generator units and the component locations of the ZOS are as shown in Table 2.6.4

-2. The centerline of the diesel engine exhaust gas discharge is located more than twenty (20) feet higher than that of the combustion air intake.

1. The functional arrangement of the ZOS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.4. 2. The ZOS provides the following nonsafety

-related functions:

a) On loss of power to a 6900 volt diesel

-backed bus, the associated diesel generator automatically starts and produces ac power at rated voltage and frequency. The source circuit breakers and bus load circuit breakers are opened, and the generator is connected to the bus.

b) Each diesel generator unit is sized to supply power to the selected nonsafety

-related electrical components.

c) Automatic-sequence loads are sequentially loaded on the associated buses.

3. Displays of diesel generator status (running/not running) and electrical output power (watts) can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).

4. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop each diesel generator.

C-369 Table 2.6.4

-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 622 2.6.04.01 1. The functional arrangement of the ZOS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.6.4. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built ZOS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.4.

623 2.6.04.02a 2.a) On loss of power to a 6900 volt diesel-backed bus, the associated diesel generator automatically starts and produces ac power at rated voltage and frequency. The source circuit breakers and bus load circuit breakers are opened, and the generator is connected to the bus. Tests on the as

-built ZOS system will be conducted by providing a simulated loss

-of-voltage signal. The starting air supply receiver will not be replenished during the test. Each as-built diesel generator automatically starts on receiving a simulated loss

-of-voltage signal and attains a voltage of 6900

+ 10% V and frequency 60

+ 5% Hz after the start signal is initiated and opens ac power system breakers on the associated

6900 V bus. 624 2.6.04.02b 2.b) Each diesel generator unit is sized to supply power to the selected nonsafety-related electrical components.

Each diesel generator will be operated with a load of 4000 kW or greater and a power factor between 0.9 and 1.0 for a time period required to reach engine temperature equilibrium plus 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months . Each diesel generator provides power to the load with a generator terminal voltage of 6900 +/- 10%

V and a frequency of 60

+ 5% Hz. 625 2.6.04.02c 2.c) Automatic

-sequence loads are sequentially loaded on the associated buses. An actual or simulated signal is initiated to start the load sequencer operation. Output signals will be monitored to determine the operability of the load sequencer. Time measurements are taken to determine the load stepping intervals.

The load sequencer initiates a closure signal within

+/-5 seconds of the set intervals to connect the loads.

626 2.6.04.03 3. Displays of diesel generator status (running/not running) and electrical output power (watts) can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the displays in the MCR. Displays of diesel generator status and electrical output power can be retrieved in the MCR. 627 2.6.04.04 4. Controls exist in the MCR to start and stop each diesel generator.

A test will be performed to verify that controls in the MCR can start and stop each diesel generator.

Controls in the MCR operate to start and stop each diesel generator.

C-370 Table 2.6.4

-2 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Onsite Diesel Generator A Package ZOS-MS-05A Diesel Generator Building Onsite Diesel Generator B Package ZOS-MS-05B Diesel Generator Building

C-371 2.6.5 Lighting System Design Description The lighting system (ELS) provides the normal and emergency lighting in the main control room (MCR) and at the remote shutdown workstation (RSW).

1. The functional arrangement of the ELS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.5. 2. The ELS has six groups of emergency lighting fixtures located in the MCR and at the RSW. Each group is powered by one of the Class 1E inverters. The ELS has four groups of panel lighting fixtures located on or near safety panels in the MCR. Each group is powered by one of the Class 1E inverters in Divisions B and C (one 24-hour and o ne 72-hour inverter in each Division).

3. The lighting fixtures located in the MCR utilize seismic supports.

4. The panel lighting circuits are classified as associated and treated as Class 1E. These lighting circuits are routed with the Divisions B and C Class 1E circuits. Separation is provided between ELS associated divisions and between associated divisions and non

-Class 1E cable. 5. The normal lighting can provide 50 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations in the MCR and at the RSW.

6. The emergency lighting can provide 10 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations in the MCR and at the RSW.

C-372 Table 2.6.5

-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 628 2.6.05.01 1. The functional arrangement of the ELS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.6.5. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built ELS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.6.5.

629 2.6.05.02.i

2. The ELS has six groups of emergency lighting fixtures located in the MCR and at the RSW. Each group is powered by one of the Class 1E inverters. The ELS has four groups of panel lighting fixtures located on or near safety panels in the MCR. Each group is powered by one of the Class 1E inverters in Divisions B and C (one 24-hour and one 72-hour inverter in each Division).

i) Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

i) The as-built ELS has six groups of emergency lighting fixtures located in the MCR and at the RSW. The ELS has four groups of panel lighting fixtures located on or near safety panels in the MCR.

630 2.6.05.02.ii

2. The ELS has six groups of emergency lighting fixtures located in the MCR and at the RSW. Each group is powered by one of the Class 1E inverters. The ELS has four groups of panel lighting fixtures located on or near safety panels in the MCR. Each group is powered by one of the Class 1E inverters in Divisions B and C (one 24-hour and one 72-hour inverter in each Division).

ii) Testing of the as

-built system will be performed using one Class 1E inverter at a time.

ii) Each of the six as

-built emergency lighting groups is supplied power from its

respective Class 1E inverter and each of the four as

-built panel lighting groups is supplied power from its respective Class 1E inverter.

631 2.6.05.03.i

3. The lighting fixtures located in the MCR utilize seismic supports.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the lighting fixtures located in the MCR are located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The lighting fixtures located in the MCR are located on the Nuclear Island.

632 2.6.05.03.ii

3. The lighting fixtures located in the MCR utilize seismic supports. ii) Analysis of seismic supports will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic supports can withstand seismic design basis loads.

633 2.6.05.04 4. The panel lighting circuits are classified as associated and treated as Class 1E. These lighting circuits are routed with the Divisions B and C Class 1E circuits. Separation is provided between ELS associated divisions and between associated divisions and non

-Class 1E cable. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d.

C-373 Table 2.6.5

-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 634 2.6.05.05.i

5. The normal lighting can provide 50 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations in the MCR and at the RSW. i) Testing of the as

-built normal lighting in the MCR will be performed.

i) When adjusted for maximum illumination and powered by the main ac power system, the normal lighting in the MCR provides at least

50 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations.

635 2.6.05.05.ii

5. The normal lighting can provide 50 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations in the MCR and at the RSW. ii) Testing of the as

-built normal lighting at the RSW will be performed.

ii) When adjusted for maximum illumination and powered by the main ac power system, the normal lighting in the RSW provides at least 50 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations.

636 2.6.05.06.i

6. The emergency lighting can provide 10 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations in the MCR and at the RSW. i) Testing of the as

-built emergency lighting in the MCR will be performed.

i) When adjusted for maximum illumination and powered by the six Class 1E inverters, the emergency lighting in the MCR provides at least 10 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations.

637 2.6.05.06.ii

6. The emergency lighting can provide 10 foot candles at the safety panel and at the workstations in the MCR and at the RSW. ii) Testing of the as

-built emergency lighting at the RSW will be performed.

ii) When adjusted for maximum illumination and powered by the six Class 1E inverters, the emergency lighting provides at least 10 foot candles at the RSW.

C-374 2.6.6 Grounding and Lightning Protection System Design Description The grounding and lightning protection system (EGS) provides electrical grounding for instrumentation grounding, equipment grounding, and lightning protection during normal and off

-normal conditions.

1. The EGS provides an electrical grounding system for: (1) instrument/computer grounding; (2) electrical system grounding of the neutral points of the main generator, main step

-up transformers, auxiliary transformers, load center transformers, and onsite standby diesel generators; and (3) equipment grounding of equipment enclosures, metal structures, metallic tanks, ground bus of switchgear assemblies, load centers, motor control centers, and control cabinets. Lightning protection is provided for exposed structures and buildings housing safety

-related and fire protection equipment. Each grounding system and lightning protection system is grounded to the station grounding grid.

C-375 Table 2.6.6

-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 638 2.6.06.01.i

1. The EGS provides an electrical grounding system for:

(1) instrument/computer grounding; (2) electrical system grounding of the neutral points of the main generator, main step-up transformers, auxiliary transformers, load center transformers, auxiliary and onsite standby diesel generators; and (3) equipment grounding of equipment enclosures, metal structures, metallic tanks, ground bus of switchgear assemblies, load centers, motor control centers, and control cabinets. Lightning protection is provided for exposed structures and buildings housing safety

-related and fire protection equipment. Each grounding system and lighting protection system is grounded to the station grounding grid.

i) An inspection for the instrument/computer grounding system connection to the station grounding grid will be performed.

i) A connection exists between the instrument/computer grounding system and the station grounding grid.

639 2.6.06.01.ii

1. The EGS provides an electrical grounding system for: (1) instrument/computer grounding; (2) electrical system grounding of the neutral points of the main generator, main step-up transformers, auxiliary transformers, load center transformers, auxiliary and onsite standby diesel generators; and (3) equipment grounding of equipment enclosures, metal structures, metallic tanks, ground bus of switchgear assemblies, load centers, motor control centers, and control cabinets. Lightning protection is provided for exposed structures and buildings housing safety

-related and fire protection equipment. Each grounding system and lighting protection system is grounded to the station grounding grid.

ii) An inspection for the electrical system grounding connection to the station grounding grid will be performed.

ii) A connection exists between the electrical system grounding and the station grounding grid.

C-376 Table 2.6.6

-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 640 2.6.06.01.iii

1. The EGS provides an electrical grounding system for:

(1) instrument/computer grounding; (2) electrical system grounding of the neutral points of the main generator, main step-up transformers, auxiliary transformers, load center transformers, auxiliary and onsite standby diesel generators; and (3) equipment grounding of equipment enclosures, metal structures, metallic tanks, ground bus of switchgear assemblies, load centers, motor control centers, and control cabinets. Lightning protection is provided for exposed structures and buildings housing safety

-related and fire protection equipment. Each grounding system and lighting protection system is grounded to the station grounding grid.

iii) An inspection for the equipment grounding system connection to the station grounding grid will be performed.

iii) A connection exists between the equipment grounding system and the station grounding grid.

641 2.6.06.01.iv

1. The EGS provides an electrical grounding system for: (1) instrument/computer grounding; (2) electrical system grounding of the neutral points of the main generator, main step-up transformers, auxiliary transformers, load center transformers, auxiliary and onsite standby diesel generators; and (3) equipment grounding of equipment enclosures, metal structures, metallic tanks, ground bus of switchgear assemblies, load centers, motor control centers, and control cabinets. Lightning protection is provided for exposed structures and buildings housing safety

-related and fire protection equipment. Each grounding system and lighting protection system is grounded to the station grounding grid.

iv) An inspection for the lightning protection system connection to the station grounding grid will be performed.

iv) A connection exists between the lighting protection system and the station grounding grid.

C-377 2.6.7 Special Process Heat Tracing System No entry for this system.

2.6.8 Cathodic

Protection System No entry. 2.6.9 Plant Security System Design Description The physical security system provides physical features to detect, delay, assist response to, and defend against the design basis threat (DBT) for radiological sabotage. The physical security system consists of physical barriers and an intrusion detection system. The details of the physical security system are categorized as Safeguards Information. The physical security system provides protection for vital equipment and plant personnel.

1. The external walls, doors, ceiling, and floors in the main control room, the central alarm station, and the secondary alarm station are bullet

-resistant to at least Underwriters Laboratory Ballistic Standard 752, level 4.

2. Not used. 3. Secondary security power supply system for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communications equipment is located within a vital area.

4. Vital areas are locked and alarmed with active intrusion detection systems that annunciate in the central and secondary alarm stations upon intrusion into a vital area.

5. a) Security alarm annunciation and video assessment information is displayed concurrently in the central alarm station and the secondary alarm station, and the video image recording with real time playback capability can provide assessment of activities before and after each alarm annunciation within the perimeter barrier.

b) The central and secondary alarm stations are located inside the protected area, and the interior of each alarm station is not visible from the perimeter of the protected area.

c) The central and secondary alarm stations are designed and equipped such that, in the event of a single act, in accordance with the design basis threat of radiological sabotage, the design enables the survivability of equipment needed to maintain the functional capability of either alarm station to detect and assess alarms and communicate with onsite and offsite response personnel.

6. The vehicle barrier system is installed and located at the necessary stand

-off distance to protect against the DBT vehicle bombs.

7. a) Vital equipment is located only within a vital area.

b) Access to vital equipment requires passage through the vital area barrier

.

C-378 8. Isolation zones and exterior areas within the protected area are provided with illumination to permit observation of abnormal presence or activity of persons or vehicles.

9. Emergency exits through the vital area boundaries are locked, alarmed, and equipped with a crash bar to allow for emergency egress

. 10. Not used. 11. Not used. 12. Not used. 13. a) The central and secondary alarm stations have conventional (landline) telephone service with the main control room and local law enforcement authorities.

b) The central and secondary alarm stations are capable of continuous communications with security personnel. c) Non-portable communication equipment in the central and secondary alarm stations remains operable from an independent power source in the event of loss of normal power.

14. Not used. 15. a) Security alarm devices including transmission lines to annunciators are tamper indicating and self-checking (e.g., an automatic indication is provided when failure of the alarm system or a component occurs, or when on standby power). Alarm annunciation shall indicate the type of alarm (e.g., intrusion alarms and emergency exit alarm) and location.

b) Intrusion detection and assessment systems concurrently provide visual displays and audible annunciation of alarms in the central and secondary alarm station.

16. Equipment exists to record onsite security alarm annunciation, including the location of the alarm, false alarm, alarm check, and tamper indication; and the type of alarm, location, alarm circuit, date, and time.

Table 2.6.9-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 642 2.6.09.01 1. The external walls, doors, ceiling, and floors in the main control room, the central alarm station, and the secondary alarm station are bullet resistant to at least Underwriters Laboratory Ballistic Standard 752, level 4.

See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 14.

2. Not used C-379 Table 2.6.9-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 643 2.6.09.03 3. Secondary security power supply system for alarm annunciator equipment and non

-portable communications equipment is located within the vital area.

See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 16.

See ITAACTable 3.3-6, item 16.

644 2.6.09.04 4. Vital areas are locked and alarmed with active intrusion detection systems that annunciate in the central and secondary alarm stations upon intrusion into a vital area.

See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 17.

645 2.6.09.05a 5.a) Security alarm annunciation and video assessment information is displayed concurrently in the central alarm station and the secondary alarm station, and the video image recording with real time playback capability can provide assessment of activities before and after each alarm annunciation within the perimeter area barrier.

Test, inspection, or a combination

of test and inspections of the installed systems will be performed.

Security alarm annunciation and video assessment information is displayed concurrently in the central alarm station and the secondary alarm station, and the video image recording with real

time playback capability provides assessment of activities before and after alarm annunciation within the perimeter barrier.

646 2.6.09.05b 5.b) The central and secondary alarm stations are located inside the protected area and the interior of each alarm station is not visible from the perimeter of the protected area.

Inspections of the central and secondary alarm stations will be performed.

The central and secondary alarm stations are located inside the protected area and the interior of each alarm station is not visible from the perimeter of the protected area. 647 2.6.09.05c 5.c) The central and secondary alarm stations are designed and equipped such that, in the event of a single act, in accordance with the design basis threat of radiological sabotage, the design enables the survivability of equipment needed to maintain the functional capability of either alarm station to detect and assess alarms and communicate with onsite and offsite response personnel.

Inspections and/or analysis of the central and secondary alarm station will be performed.

The central and secondary alarm stations are designed and equipped such that, in the event of a single act, in accordance with the design basis threat of radiological sabotage, equipment needed to maintain the functional capability of either alarm station to detect and assess alarms and communicate with onsite and offsite response personnel exists.

C-380 Table 2.6.9-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 648 2.6.09.06 6. The vehicle barrier system is installed and located at the necessary stand

-off distance to protect against the DBT vehicle bombs. Inspections and analysis will be performed for the vehicle barrier system. The vehicle barrier system will protect against the DBT vehicle bombs based upon the stand

-off distance of the system.

649 2.6.09.07a 7.a) Vital equipment is located only within a vital area.

Inspection will be performed to confirm that vital equipment is located within a vital area.

All vital equipment is located only within a vital area.

650 2.6.09.07b 7.b) Access to vital equipment requires passage through the vital area barrier.

Inspection will be performed to confirm that access to vital equipment requires passage through the vital area barrier.

Vital equipment is located within a protected area such that access to vital equipment requires passage through the vital area barrier.

651 2.6.09.08 8. Isolation zones and exterior areas within the protected area are provided with illumination to permit observation of abnormal presence or activity of persons or vehicles. Inspection of the illumination in the isolation zones and external areas of the protected area will be performed.

The illumination in isolation zones and exterior areas within the protected area is 0.2 foot candles measured horizontally at ground level or, alternatively, sufficient to permit observation.

652 2.6.09.09 9. Emergency exits through the vital area boundaries are locked, alarmed, and equipped with a crash bar to allow for emergency egress. Test, inspection, or a combination of tests and inspections of the emergency exits through the vital area boundaries will be performed.

The emergency exits through the vital area boundaries are locked, alarmed, and equipped with a crash bar to allow for emergency egress. 10. Not used

11. Not used

12. Not used 653 2.6.09.1 3a 13.a) The central and secondary alarm stations have conventional (landline) telephone service with the main control room and local law enforcement authorities.

Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests and inspections of the central and secondary alarm stations' conventional telephone services will be performed.

The central and secondary alarm stations are equipped with conventional (landline) telephone service with the main control room and local law enforcement authorities.

654 2.6.09.13b 13.b) The central and secondary alarm stations are capable of continuous communication with security personnel.

Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests and inspections of the central and secondary alarm stations' continuous communication capabilities will be performed.

The central and secondary alarm stations are equipped with the capability to continuously communicate with security officers, watchmen, armed response individuals, or any security personnel that have responsibilities during a

contingency event.

C-381 Table 2.6.9-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 655 2.6.09.13c 13.c) Non

-portable communication equipment in the central and secondary alarm stations remains operable from an independent power source in the event of loss of normal power. Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests and inspections of the non

-portable communications equipment will be performed.

Non-portable communication devices (including conventional telephone systems) in the central and secondary alarm stations are wired to an independent power supply that enables the system to remain operable in the event of loss of normal power.

14. Not used.

65 6 2.6.09.15a 15.a) Security alarm devices, including transmission lines to annunciators, are tamper indicating and self

-checking (e.g., an automatic indication is provided when failure of the alarm system or a component occurs, or when on standby power). Alarm annunciation shall indicate the type of alarm (e.g., intrusion alarms and emergency exit alarm) and location. A test will be performed to verify that security alarms, including transmission lines to annunciators, are tamper indicating and self-checking (e.g., an automatic indication is provided when failure of the alarm system or a component occurs, or when on standby power) and that alarm annunciation indicates the type of alarm (e.g., intrusion alarms and emergency exit alarms) and location. A report exists and concludes that security alarm devices, including transmission lines to annunciators, are tamper indicating and self-checking (e.g., an automatic indication is provided when failure of the alarm system or a component occurs, or when the system is on standby power) and that alarm annunciation indicates the type of alarm (e.g., intrusion alarms and emergency exit alarms) and location.

657 2.6.09.15b 15.b) Intrusion detection and assessment systems concurrently provide visual displays and audible annunciation of alarms in the central and secondary alarm stations.

Tests will be performed on intrusion detection and assessment equipment.

The intrusion detection system concurrently provides visual displays and audible annunciations of alarms in both the central and secondary alarm stations.

658 2.6.09.16 16. Equipment exists to record onsite security alarm annunciation, including the location of the alarm, false alarm, alarm check, and tamper indication; and the type of alarm, location, alarm circuit, date, and time. Test, analysis, or a combination of test and analysis will be performed to ensure that equipment is capable of recording each onsite security alarm annunciation, including the location of the alarm, false alarm, alarm check, and tamper indication; and the type of alarm, location, alarm circuit, date, and time. A report exists and concludes that equipment is capable of recording each onsite security alarm annunciation, including the location of the alarm, false alarm, alarm check, and tamper indication; and the type of alarm, location, alarm circuit, date, and time.

C-382 C.2.6.9 Physical Security Table C.2.6.9-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 659 C.2.6.09.01 1. The external walls, doors, ceiling, and floors in the location within which the last access control function for access to the protected area is performed are bullet

-resistant to at least Underwriters Laboratory Ballistic Standard 752, level

4. Type test, analysis, or a combination of type test and analysis will be performed for the external walls, doors, ceilings, and floors in the location within which the last access control function for access to the protected area is performed.

The external walls, doors, ceilings, and floors in the location within which the last access control function for access to the protected area is performed are bullet

-resistant to at least Underwriters Laboratory Ballistic Standard 752, level

4. 660 C.2.6.09.02 2. Physical barriers for the protected area perimeter are not part of vital area barriers.

An inspection of the protected area perimeter barrier will be performed.

Physical barriers at the perimeter of the protected area are separated from any other barrier designated as a vital area barrier.

661 C.2.6.09.03a 3.a) Isolation zones exist in outdoor areas adjacent to the physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area that allows 20 feet of observation on either side of the barrier. Where permanent buildings do not allow a 20 foot observation distance on the inside of the protected area, the building walls are immediately adjacent to, or an integral part of, the protected area barrier. Inspections will be performed of the isolation zones in outdoor areas adjacent to the physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area.

Isolation zones exist in outdoor areas adjacent to the physical barrier at the perimeter of the protected area and allow 20 feet of observation and assessment of the activities of people on either side of the barrier.

Where permanent buildings do not allow a 20

-foot observation and assessment distance on the inside of the protected area, the building walls are immediately adjacent to, or an integral part of, the protected area barrier and the 20

-foot observation and assessment distance does not apply.

662 C.2.6.09.03b 3.b) The isolation zones are monitored with intrusion detection equipment that provides the capability to detect and assess unauthorized persons.

Inspections will be performed of the intrusion detection equipment within the isolation zones. The isolation zones are equipped with intrusion detection equipment that provides the capability to detect and assess unauthorized persons.

C-383 Table C.2.6.9-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 663 C.2.6.09.04a 4. The intrusion detection and assessment equipment at the protected area perimeter:

a) detects penetration or attempted penetration of the protected area barrier and concurrently alarms in both the Central Alarm Station and Secondary Alarm Station; Tests, inspections or a combination of tests and inspections of the intrusion detection and assessment equipment at the protected area perimeter and its uninterruptible power supply will be performed.

The intrusion detection and assessment equipment at the protected area perimeter:

a) detects penetration or attempted penetration of the protected area barrier and concurrently alarms in the Central Alarm Station and Secondary Alarm Station; 664 C.2.6.09.04b 4. The intrusion detection and assessment equipment at the protected area perimeter:

b) remains operable from an uninterruptible power supply in the event of the loss of normal power. Tests, inspections or a combination of tests and inspections of the intrusion detection and assessment equipment at the protected area perimeter and its uninterruptible power supply will be performed.

The intrusion detection and assessment equipment at the protected area perimete r: b) remains operable from an uninterruptible power supply in the event of the loss of normal power.

66 5 C.2.6.09.05a 5. Access control points are established to: a) control personnel and vehicle access into the protected area.

Tests, inspections, or combination of tests and inspections of installed systems and equipment at the access control points to the protected area will be performed.

The access control points for the protected area:

a) are configured to control personnel and vehicle access. 666 C.2.6.09.05b 5. Access control points are established to:

b) detect firearms, explosives, and incendiary devices at the protected area personnel access points. Tests, inspections, or combination of tests and inspections of installed systems and equipment at the access control points to the protected area will be performed.

The access control points for the protected area:

b) include detection equipment that is capable of detecting firearms, incendiary devices, and explosives at the protecte d area personnel access points. 667 C.2.6.09.06 6. An access control system with numbered picture badges is installed for use by individuals who are authorized access to protected areas and vital areas without escort.

A test of the access control system with numbered picture badges will be performed.

The access authorization system with numbered picture badges can identify and authorize protected area and vital area access only to those personnel with unescorted access authorization.

668 C.2.6.09.07 7. Access to vital equipment physical barriers requires passage through the protected area perimeter barrier. Inspection will be performed to confirm that access to vital equipment physical barriers requires passage through the protected area perimeter barrier.

Vital equipment is located within a protected area such that access to vital equipment physical barriers requires passage through the protected area perimeter barrier.

C-384 Table C.2.6.9-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 669 C.2.6.09.08a 8.a) Penetrations through the protected area barrier are secured and monitored.

Inspections will be performed of penetrations through the protected area barrier.

Penetrations and openings through the protected area barrier are secured and monitored.

670 C.2.6.09.08b 8.b) Unattended openings (such as underground pathways) that intersect the protected area boundary or vital area boundary will be protected by a physical barrier and monitored by intrusion detection equipment or provided surveillance at a frequency sufficient to detect exploitation.

Inspections will be performed of unattended openings that intersect the protected area boundary or vital area boundary.

Unattended openings (such as underground pathways) that intersect the protected area boundary or vital area boundary are protected by a physical barrier and monitored by intrusion detection equipment or provided surveillance at a frequency sufficient to detect exploitation.

671 C.2.6.09.09 9. Emergency exits through the protected area perimeter are alarmed and secured with locking devices to allow for emergency egress.

Tests, inspections, or a combination of tests and inspections of emergency exits through the protected area perimeter will be performed.

Emergency exits through the protected area perimeter are alarmed and secured by locking devices that allow prompt egress during an emergency.

C-385 2.6.10 Main Generation System No entry. Covered in Section 2.6.1, Main ac Power System.

2.6.11 Excitation and Voltage Regulation System No entry for this system.

C.2.6.12 Transmission Switchyard and Offsite Power System Table C.2.6.1 2-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 672 C.2.6.12.01 1. A minimum of one offsite circuit supplies electric power from the transmission network to the interface with the onsite alternating current (ac) power system.

Inspections of the as

-built offsite circuit will be performed.

At least one offsite circuit is provided from the transmission switchyard interface to the interface with the onsite ac power system.

673 C.2.6.12.02 2. Each offsite power circuit interfacing with the onsite ac power system is adequately rated to supply assumed loads during normal, abnormal and accident conditions.

Analyses of the offsite power system will be performed to evaluate the as

-built ratings of each offsite circuit interfacing with the onsite ac power system against the load assumptions.

A report exists and concludes that each as-built offsite circuit is rated to supply the load assumptions during normal, abnormal and accident conditions.

674 C.2.6.12.03 3. During steady state operation, each offsite power source is capable of supplying required voltage to the interface with the onsite ac power system that will support operation of assumed loads during normal, abnormal and accident conditions.

Analyses of the as

-built offsite circuit will be performed to evaluate the capability of each offsite circuit to supply the voltage requirements at the interface with the onsite ac power system.

A report exists and concludes that during steady state operation each as

-built offsite circuit is capable of supplying the voltage at the interface with the onsite ac power system that will support operation of assumed loads during normal, abnormal and accident conditions.

675 C.2.6.12.04 4. During steady state operation, each offsite circuit is capable of supplying required frequency to the interface with the onsite ac power system that will support operation of assumed loads during normal, abnormal and accident conditions.

Analyses of the as

-built offsite circuit will be performed to evaluate the capability of each offsite circuit to supply the frequency requirements at the interface with the onsite ac power system.

A report exists and concludes that during steady state operation each as

-built offsite circuit is capable of supplying the frequency at the interface with onsite ac power system that will support operation of assumed loads during normal, abnormal and accident conditions.

C-386 Table C.2.6.1 2-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 676 C.2.6.12.05 5. The fault current contribution of each offsite circuit is compatible with the interrupting capability of the onsite short circuit interrupting devices.

Analyses of the as

-built offsite circuit will be performed to evaluate the fault current contribution of each offsite circuit at the interface with the onsite ac power system.

A report exists and concludes the short circuit contribution of each as

-built offsite circuit at the interface with the onsite ac power system is compatible with the interrupting capability of the onsite fault current interrupting devices.

677 C.2.6.12.06 6. The reactor coolant pumps continue to receive power from either the main generator or the grid for a minimum of

3 seconds following a turbine trip.

Analyses of the as

-built offsite power system will be performed to confirm that power will be available to the reactor coolant pumps for a minimum of

3 seconds following a turbine trip when the buses powering the reactor coolant pumps are aligned to either the unit auxiliary transformers (UATs) or the reserve auxiliary transformers (RATs).

A report exists and concludes that voltage at the high

-side of the generator stepup transformer (GSU), and the RATs, does not drop more than 0.15 per unit (pu) from the pre-trip steady

-state voltage for a minimum of

3 seconds following a turbine trip when the buses powering the reactor coolant pumps are aligned to either the UATs or the RATs.

C-387 Table C.2.6.1 2-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 678 C.2.6.12.07.i

7) The credited GDC 17 off

-site power source is monitored by an open phase condition monitoring system that can detect the following at the high voltage terminals of the transformer connecting to the off

-site source, over the full range of transformer loading from no load to full load:

(1) loss of one of the three phases of the offsite power source

a. with a high impedance ground fault condition, or

b. without a high impedance ground fault condition; or (2) loss of two of the three phases of the offsite power source

a. with a high impedance ground fault condition, or

b. without a high impedance ground fault condition.

Upon detection of any condition described above, the system will actuate an alarm in the main control room.

i) Analysis shall be used to determine the required alarm set points for the open phase condition monitoring system to indicate the presence of open phase conditions described in the design commitment.

i) Alarm set points for the open phase condition monitoring system to indicate the presence of open phase conditions as described in the design commitment have been determined by analysis.

C-388 Table C.2.6.1 2-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 6 79 C.2.6.12.07.ii

7) The credited GDC 17 off

-site power source is monitored by an open phase condition monitoring system that can detect the following at the high voltage terminals of the transformer connecting to the off

-site source, over the full range of transformer loading from no load to full load:

(1) loss of one of the three phases of the offsite power source

a. with a high impedance ground fault condition, or

b. without a high impedance ground fault condition; or (2) loss of two of the three phases of the offsite power source

a. with a high impedance ground fault condition, or

b. without a high impedance ground fault condition.

Upon detection of any condition described above, the system will actuate an alarm in the main control room.

ii) Testing of the credited GDC-17 off-site power source open phase condition monitoring system will be performed using simulated signals to verify that the as-built open phase condition monitoring system detects open phase conditions described in the design commitment and at the established set points actuates an alarm in the main control room.

ii) Testing demonstrates the credited GDC 17 off

-site power source open phase condition monitoring system detects open phase conditions described in the design commitment and at the established set points actuates an alarm in the main control room. 2.6.13 Offsite Retail Power System No entry for this system.

C-389 2.7 HVAC Systems

2.7.1 Nuclear

Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System Design Description The nuclear island nonradioactive ventilation system (VBS) serves the main control room (MCR), control support area (CSA), Class 1E dc equipment rooms, Class 1E instrumentation and control (I&C) rooms, Class 1E electrical penetration rooms, Class 1E battery rooms, remote shutdown room (RSR), reactor coolant pump trip switchgear rooms, adjacent corridors, and passive containment cooling system (PCS) valve room during normal plant operation. The VBS consists of the following independent subsystems: the main control room/control support area HVAC subsystem, the class 1E electrical room HVAC subsystem, and the passive containment cooling system valve room heating and ventilation subsystem. The VBS provides heating, ventilation, and cooling to the areas served when ac power is available. The system provides breathable air to the control room and maintains the main control room and control support area areas at a slightly positive pressure with respect to the adjacent rooms and outside environment during normal operations. The VBS monitors the main control room supply air for radioactive particulate and iodine concentrations and provides filtration of main control room/control support area air during conditions of abnormal (high) airborne radioactivity. In addition, the VBS isolates the HVAC penetrations in the main control room boundary on "High-2" particulate or iodine radioactivity in the main control room supply air duct or on a loss of ac power for more than 10 minutes. The Sanitary Drainage System (SDS) also isolates a penetration in the main control room boundary on "High-2" particulate or iodine radioactivity in the main control room supply air duct or on a loss of ac power for more than 10 minutes. Additional penetrations from the SDS and Potable Water System (PWS) into the main control room boundary are maintained leak tight using a loop seal in the piping, and the Waste Water System (WWS) is isolated using a normally closed safety related manual isolation valve. These features support operation of the main control room emergency habitability system (VES), and have been included in Tables 2.7.1-1 and 2.7.1

-2. The VBS is as shown in Figure 2.7.1

-1 and the component locations of the VBS are as shown in Table 2.7.1-5. 1. The functional arrangement of the VBS is as described in the Design Description of this subsection 2.7.1. 2. a) The components identified in Table 2.7.1

-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.7.1

-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirement

s. 3. a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.7.1

-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.7.1

-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

C-390 4. a) The components identified in Table 2.7.1

-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure.

b) The piping identified in Table 2.7.1

-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1

-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

6. a) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.7.1

-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

b) Separation is provided between VBS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable.

7. The VBS and SDS provide the safety

-related function to isolate the pipes that penetrate the MCR pressure boundary.

8. The VBS provides the following nonsafety

-related functions:

a) The VBS provides cooling to the MCR, CSA, RSR, and Class 1E electrical rooms.

b) The VBS provides ventilation cooling to the Class 1E battery rooms.

c) The VBS maintains MCR and CSA habitability when radioactivity is detected.

d) The VBS provides ventilation cooling via the ancillary equipment in Table 2.7.1

-3 to the MCR and the division B&C Class 1E I&C rooms.

9. Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.7.1

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

10. a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.7.1-1 to perform their active functions.

b) The valves identified in Table 2.7.1

-1 as having protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) control perform their active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS. 11. After loss of motive power, the valves identified in Table 2.7.1

-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

12. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.7.1

-3 to perform th e listed function.

13. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.7.1

-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

14. The background noise level in the MCR and RSR does not exceed 65 dB(A) when the VBS is operating.

C-391 Table 2.7.1

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1 E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/DAS (1) Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position MCR Supply Air Isolation Valve VBS-PL-V186 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position) Yes/No Transfer Closed As Is MCR Supply Air Isolation Valve VBS-PL-V187 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position)

Yes/No Transfer Closed As Is MCR Return Air Isolation Valve VBS-PL-V188 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position)

Yes/No Transfer Closed As Is MCR Return Air Isolation Valve VBS-PL-V189 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position)

Yes/No Transfer Closed As Is MCR Exhaust Air Isolation Valve VBS-PL-V190 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position)

Yes/No Transfer Closed As Is MCR Exhaust Air Isolation Valve VBS-PL-V191 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position)

Yes/No Transfer Closed As Is PWS MCR Isolation Valve PWS-PL-V418 Yes Yes No -/- No No Transfer Closed - PWS MCR Isolation Valve PWS-PL-V420 Yes Yes No -/- No No Transfer Closed - PWS MCR Vacuum Relief PWS-PL-V498 Yes Yes No -/- No No Transfer Open - MCR SDS (Vent) Isolation Valve SDS-PL-V001 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position)

Yes/No Transfer Closed As Is MCR SDS (Vent) Isolation Valve SDS-PL-V002 Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes (Valve Position)

Yes/No Transfer Closed As Is C-392 Table 2.7.1

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. ASME Code Section III Seismic Cat. I Remotely Operated Valve Class 1 E/ Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Control PMS/DAS (1) Active Function Loss of Motive Power Position MCR WWS Isolation Valve WWS-PL-V506 Yes Yes No - No No - - 1. DAS = diverse actuation system

C-393 Table 2.7.1

-2 Line Name Line Number ASME Code Section III Leak Before Break Functional Capability Required Main Control Room Supply VBS-L311 Yes No No Main Control Room Exhaust VBS-L312 Yes No No Main Control Room Toilet Exhaust VBS-L313 Yes No No Main Control Room Sanitary Vent Line SDS-PL-L035 Yes No No Main Control Room Sanitary Drain Line SDS-PL-L030 Yes No No Main Control Room Water Line PWS-PL-L319 Yes No No Main Control Room Water Line PWS-PL-L320 Yes No No Main Control Room Waste Water Line WWS-PL-L808 Yes No No Main Control Room Water Line WWS-PL-L851 Yes No No Table 2.7.1

-3 Equipment Tag No. Display Control Function Supplemental Air Filtration Unit Fan A VBS-MA-03A Yes (Run Status)

Start Supplemental Air Filtration Unit Fan B VBS-MA-03B Yes (Run Status)

Start MCR/CSA Supply Air Handling Units (AHU) A Fans VBS-MA-01 A VBS-MA-02A Yes (Run Status)

Start MCR/CSA Supply AHU B Fans VBS-MA-01 B VBS-MA-02B Yes (Run Status)

Start Division "A" and "C" Class 1E Electrical Room AHU A Fans VBS-MA-05 A VBS-MA-06A Yes (Run Status)

Start Division "A" and "C" Class 1E Electrical Room AHU C Fans VBS-MA-05 C VBS-MA-06C Yes (Run Status)

Start Division "B" and "D" Class 1E Electrical Room AHU B Fans VBS-MA-05 B VBS-MA-06B Yes (Run Status)

Start C-394 Table 2.7.1

-3 Equipment Tag No. Display Control Function Division "B" and "D" Class 1E Electrical Room AHU D Fans VBS-MA-05 D VBS-MA-06D Yes (Run Status)

Start Division "A" and "C" Class 1E Battery Room Exhaust Fans VBS-MA-07 A VBS-MA-07C Yes (Run Status)

Start Division "B" and "D" Class 1E Battery Room Exhaust Fans VBS-MA-07 B VBS-MA-07D Yes (Run Status)

Start MCR Ancillary Fans VBS-MA-10 A VBS-MA-10B No Run Division B Room Ancillary Fan VBS-MA-11 No Run Division C Room Ancillary Fan VBS-MA-12 No Run Table 2.7.1

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 680 2.7.01.01 1. The functional arrangement of the VBS is as described in the Design Description of this subsection

2.7.1 Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built VBS conforms with the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of this subsection 2.7.1. 681 2.7.01.02a 2.a) The components identified in Table 2.7.1

-1 as ASME Code Section III are designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports. The ASME Code Section III design reports exist for the as

-built components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III.

682 2.7.01.02b 2.b) The piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III is designed and constructed in accordance with ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection will be conducted of the as-built components as documented in the ASME design reports. The ASME code Section III design reports exist for the

as-built piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III. 683 2.7.01.03a 3.a) Pressure boundary welds in components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of the as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.

A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for nondestructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

C-395 Table 2.7.1

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 684 2.7.01.03b 3.b) Pressure boundary welds in piping identified in Table 2.7.1

-2 as ASME Code Section III meet ASME Code Section III requirements.

Inspection of the as

-built pressure boundary welds will be performed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III.

A report exists and concludes that the ASME Code Section III requirements are met for nondestructive examination of pressure boundary welds.

685 2.7.01.04a 4.a) The components identified in Table 2.7.1

-1 as ASME Code Section III retain their pressure boundary integrity at their design pressure. A pressure test will be performed on the components required by the ASME Code Section III to be pressure tested.

A report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the components identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

686 2.7.01.04b 4.b) The piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III retains its pressure boundary integrity at its design pressure.

A pressure test will be performed on the piping required by the ASME Code Section III to be pressure tested.

A report exists and concludes that the results of the pressure test of the piping identified in Table 2.7.1-2 as ASME Code Section III conform with the requirements of the ASME Code Section III.

687 2.7.01.05.i

5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

688 2.7.01.05.ii

5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. 689 2.7.01.05.iii

5. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 2.7.1-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismicall y bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

690 2.7.01.06a 6.a) The Class 1E components identified in Table 2.7.1

-1 are powered from their respective Class 1E division.

Testing will be performed on the VBS by providing a simulated test signal in each Class 1E division. A simulated test signal exists at the Class 1E equipment identified in Table 2.7.1

-1 when the assigned Class 1E division is provided the test signal.

C-396 Table 2.7.1

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 691 2.7.01.06b 6.b) Separation is provided between VBS Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d. 692 2.7.01.07 7. The VBS and SDS provide the safety-related function to isolate the pipe that penetrates the MCR pressure boundary. See item 10.b in this table.

See item 10.b in this table.

693 2.7.01.08a 8.a) The VBS provides cooling to the MCR, CSA, RSR, and Class 1E electrical rooms.

See item 12 in this table.

694 2.7.01.08b 8.b) The VBS provides ventilation cooling to the Class 1E battery rooms.

See item 12 in this table.

695 2.7.01.08c 8.c) The VBS maintains MCR and CSA habitability when radioactivity is detected. See item 12 in this table.

See item 12 in this table.

696 2.7.01.08d 8.d) The VBS provides ventilation cooling via the ancillary equipment in Table 2.7.1-3 to the MCR and the division B&C Class 1E I&C rooms.

Testing will be performed on the components in Table 2.7.1

-3. The fans start and run.

697 2.7.01.09 9. Safety

-related displays identified in Table 2.7.1

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the safety

-related displays in the MCR.

Safety-related displays identified in Table 2.7.1

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR

. 698 2.7.01.10a 10.a) Controls exist in the MCR to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.7.1-1 to perform their active functions.

Stroke testing will be performed on the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.7.1

-1 using the controls in the MCR.

Controls in the MCR operate to cause the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.7.1-1 to perform their active functions.

699 2.7.01.10b 10.b) The valves identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as having PMS control perform their active safety function after receiving a signal from the PMS.

Testing will be performed using real or simulated signals into the PMS. The valves identified in Table 2.7.1-1 as having PMS control perform their active safety function after receiving a signal from PMS. 700 2.7.01.11 11. After loss of motive power, the remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.7.1-1 assume the indicated loss of motive power position.

Testing of the remotely operated valves will be performed under the conditions of loss of motive power. Upon loss of motive power, each remotely operated valves identified in Table 2.7.1-1 assumes the indicated loss of motive power position.

C-397 Table 2.7.1

-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 701 2.7.01.12 12. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.7.1-3 to perform the listed function.

Testing will be performed on the components in Table 2.7.1

-3 using controls in the MCR.

Controls in the MCR operate to cause the components listed in Table 2.7.1

-3 to perform the listed functions.

702 2.7.01.13 13. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.7.1

-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the parameters in the MCR.

The displays identified in Table 2.7.1-3 can be retrieved in the MCR.

703 2.7.01.14 14. The background noise level in the MCR and RSR does not exceed

65 dB(A) when the VBS is operating.

The as-built VBS will be operated, and background noise levels in the MCR and RSR will be measured.

The background noise level in the MCR and RSR does not exceed 65 dB(A) when the VBS is operating.

C-398 Table 2.7.1

-5 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Supplemental Air Filtration Unit A VBS-MS-01A Auxiliary Building Supplemental Air Filtration Unit B VBS-MS-01B Auxiliary Building MCR/CSA Supply Air Handling Unit A VBS-MS-02A Auxiliary Building MCR/CSA Supply Air Handling Unit B VBS-MS-02B Annex Building Division "A" and "C" Class 1E Electrical Room AHU A VBS-MS-03A Auxiliary Building Division "A" and "C" Class 1E Electrical Room AHU C VBS-MS-03C Auxiliary Building Division "B" and "D" Class 1E Electrical Room AHU B VBS-MS-03B Auxiliary Building Division "B" and "D" Class 1E Electrical Room AHU D VBS-MS-03D Auxiliary Building MCR Toilet Exhaust Fan VBS-MA-04 Auxiliary Building Division "A&C" Class 1E Battery Room Exhaust Fan VBS-MA-07A Auxiliary Building Division "A&C" Class 1E Battery Room Exhaust Fan VBS-MA-07C Auxiliary Building Division "B&D" Class 1E Battery Room Exhaust Fan VBS-MA-07B Auxiliary Building Division "B&D" Class 1E Battery Room Exhaust Fan VBS-MA-07D Auxiliary Building PCS Valve Room Vent Fan VBS-MA-08 Containment Shield Building CSA Toilet Exhaust Fan VBS-MA-09 Annex Building MCR Ancillary Fan A VBS-MA-10A Auxiliary Building MCR Ancillary Fan B VBS-MA-10B Auxiliary Building Division B Ancillary Fan VBS-MA-11 Auxiliary Building Division C Ancillary Fan VBS-MA-12 Auxiliary Building

C-399 Figure 2.7.1

-1 (Sheet 1 of 2)

Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System

C-400 Figure 2.7.1

-1 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System

C-401 2.7.2 Central Chilled Water System Design Description The plant heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems require chilled water as a cooling medium to satisfy the ambient air temperature requirements for the plant. The central chilled water system (VWS) supplies chilled water to the HVAC systems and is functional during reactor full

-power and shutdown operation. The VWS also provides chilled water to selected process systems.

The VWS is as shown in Figure 2.7.2-1 and the component locations of the VWS are as shown Table 2.7.2-3. 1. The functional arrangement of the VWS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.2. 2. The VWS provides the safety

-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the VWS lines penetrating the containment.

3. The VWS provides the following nonsafety

-related functions:

a) The VWS provides chilled water to the supply air handling units serving the MCR, the Class 1E electrical rooms, and the unit coolers serving the RNS and CVS pump rooms.

b) The VWS air

-cooled chillers transfer heat from the VWS to the surrounding atmosphere.

4. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.7.2

-1 to perform the listed function.

5. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.7.2

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-402 Table 2.7.2

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function Air-cooled Chiller VWS-MS-02 Yes (Run Status)

Start Air-cooled Chiller VWS-MS-03 Yes (Run Status)

Start Air-cooled Chiller Pump VWS-MP-02 Yes (Run Status)

Start Air-cooled Chiller Pump VWS-MP-03 Yes (Run Status)

Start CVS Pump Room Unit Cooler Fan A VAS-MA-07A Yes (Run Status)

Start CVS Pump Room Unit Cooler Fan B VAS-MA-07B Yes (Run Status)

Start RNS Pump Room Unit Cooler Fan A VAS-MA-08A Yes (Run Status)

Start RNS Pump Room Unit Cooler Fan B VAS-MA-08B Yes (Run Status)

Start Air-cooled Chiller Water Valve VWS-PL-V210 Yes (Position Status) Open Air-cooled Chiller Water Valve VWS-PL-V253 Yes (Position Status) Open C-403 Table 2.7.2

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 704 2.7.02.01 1. The functional arrangement of the VWS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.2. Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built VWS conforms with the functional arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.2. 705 2.7.02.02 2. The applicable portions of the VWS provide the safety-related function of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the VWS lines penetrating the containment.

See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7. See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7. 706 2.7.02.03a 3.a) The VWS provides chilled water to the supply air handling units serving the MCR, the Class 1E electrical rooms, and the unit coolers serving the RNS and CVS pump rooms.

Testing will be performed by measuring the flow rates to the chilled water cooling coils.

The water flow to each cooling coil equals or exceeds the following:

Coil Flow (gpm)

VBS MY C 01A/B 138 VBS MY C 02A/C 108 VBS MY C 02B/D 84 VAS MY C 07A/B 24 VAS MY C 12A/B 15 VAS MY C 06A/B 15 707 2.7.02.03b 3.b) The VWS air

-cooled chillers transfer heat from the VWS to the surrounding atmosphere.

Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report that determines the heat transfer capability of each air

-cooled chiller. A report exists and concludes that the heat transfer rate of each air-cooled chiller is greater than or equal to 230 tons. 708 2.7.02.04 4. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.7.2-1 to perform the listed function.

Testing will be performed on the components in Table 2.7.2

-1 using controls in the MCR.

Controls in the MCR operate to cause the components listed in Table 2.7.2-1 to perform the listed functions.

709 2.7.02.05 5. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.7.2

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of parameters in the MCR. The displays identified in Table 2.7.2-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-404 Table 2.7.2

-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Water Chiller Pump A VWS-MP-01A Turbine Building Water Chiller Pump B VWS-MP-01B Turbine Building Air Cooled Chiller Pump 2 VWS-MP-02 Auxiliary Building Air Cooled Chiller Pump 3 VWS-MP-03 Auxiliary Building Water Chiller A VWS-MS-01A Turbine Building Water Chiller B VWS-MS-01B Turbine Building Air Cooled Chiller 2 VWS-MS-02 Auxiliary Building Air Cooled Chiller 3 VWS-MS-03 Auxiliary Building

C-405 Figure 2.7.2

-1 (Sheet 1 of 2)

Central Chilled Water System

C-406 Figure 2.7.2

-1 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Central Chilled Water System

C-407 2.7.3 Annex/Auxiliary Building Nonradioactive Ventilation System Design Description The annex/auxiliary buildings nonradioactive HVAC system (VXS) serves the nonradioactive personnel and equipment areas, electrical equipment rooms, clean corridors, the ancillary diesel generator room and demineralized water deoxygenating room in the annex building, and the main steam isolation valve compartments, reactor trip switchgear rooms, and piping and electrical penetration areas in the auxiliary building. The VXS consists of the following independent subsystems: the general area HVAC subsystem, the switchgear room HVAC subsystem, the equipment room HVAC subsystem, the MSIV compartment HVAC subsystem, the mechanical equipment areas HVAC subsystem and the valve/piping penetration room HVAC subsystem.

The VXS is as shown in Figure 2.7.3

-1 and the component locations of the VXS are as shown in Table 2.7.3-3. 1. The functional arrangement of the VXS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.3. 2. The VXS provides the following nonsafety

-related functions:

a) The VXS provides cooling to the electrical switchgear, the battery charger, and the annex building nonradioactive air handling equipment rooms.

b) The VXS provides ventilation cooling to the electrical switchgear, the battery charger, and the annex building nonradioactive air handling equipment rooms when the ZOS operates during a loss of offsite power coincident with loss of chilled water.

3. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to cause the components identified in Table 2.7.3-1 to perform the listed function.

4. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.7.3

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.7.3

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function Switchgear Room Air Handling Units (AHU) A Fans VXS-MA-05A VXS-MA-06A Yes (Run Status)

Start Switchgear Room AHU B Fans VXS-MA-05B VXS-MA-06B Yes (Run Status)

Start Equipment Room AHU A Fans VXS-MA-01A VXS-MA-02A Yes (Run Status)

Start Equipment Room AHU B Fans VXS-MA-01B VXS-MA-02B Yes (Run Status)

Start C-408 Table 2.7.3

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 710 2.7.03.01 1. The functional arrangement of the VXS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.7.3. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built VXS conforms with the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.3. 711 2.7.03.02a 2.a) The VXS provides cooling to the electrical switchgear, the battery charger, and the annex building nonradioactive air handling equipment rooms when the ZOS operates and chilled water is available.

See item 3 in this table.

712 2.7.03.02b 2.b) The VXS provides ventilation cooling to the electrical switchgear, the battery charger, and the annex building nonradioactive air handling equipment rooms when the ZOS operates during a loss of offsite power coincident with loss of chilled water.

See item 3 in this table.

713 2.7.03.03 3. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.7.3-1 to perform the listed function. Testing will be performed on the components in Table 2.7.3

-1 using controls in the MCR.

Controls in the MCR operate to cause the components listed in Table 2.7.3-1 to perform the listed functions.

714 2.7.03.04 4. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.7.3

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the parameters in the MCR.

The displays identified in Table 2.7.3-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-409 Table 2.7.3

-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Annex Building General Area AHU A VXS-MS-01A Annex Building Annex Building General Area AHU B VXS-MS-01B Annex Building Annex Building Equipment Room AHU A VXS-MS-02A Annex Building Annex Building Equipment Room AHU B VXS-MS-02B Annex Building MSIV Compartment A AHU

-A VXS-MS-04A Auxiliary Building MSIV Compartment B AHU

-B VXS-MS-04B Auxiliary Building MSIV Compartment B AHU

-C VXS-MS-04C Auxiliary Building MSIV Compartment A AHU-D VXS-MS-04D Auxiliary Building Switchgear Room AHU A VXS-MS-05A Annex Building Switchgear Room AHU B VXS-MS-05B Annex Building Mechanical Equipment Area AHU Unit A VXS-MS-07A Annex Building Mechanical Equipment Area AHU Unit B VXS-MS-07B Annex Building Valve/Piping Penetration Room AHU A VXS-MS-08A Auxiliary Building Valve/Piping Penetration Room AHU B VXS-MS-08B Auxiliary Building Battery Room #1 Exhaust Fan VXS-MA-09A Annex Building Battery Room #2 Exhaust Fan VXS-MA-09B Annex Building Toilet Exhaust Fan VXS-MA-13 Annex Building Annex Building Nonradioactive Air Handling Equipment Room Unit Heater A VXS-MY-W01A Annex Building Annex Building Nonradioactive Air Handling Equipment Room Unit Heater B VXS-MY-W01B Annex Building Annex Building Nonradioactive Air Handling Equipment Room Unit Heater C VXS-MY-W01C Annex Building

C-410 Figure 2.7.3

-1 (Sheet 1 of 2)

Annex/Auxiliary Building Nonradioactive Ventilation System

C-411 Figure 2.7.3

-1 (Sheet 2 of 2)

Annex/Auxiliary Building Nonradioactive Ventilation System

C-412 2.7.4 Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System Design Description The diesel generator building ventilation system (VZS) provides ventilation cooling of the diesel generator building for the onsite standby power system. The VZS also provides heating and ventilation within the diesel oil transfer module enclosure. The VZS consists of the following subsystems: the normal diesel building heating and ventilation subsystem, the standby diesel building exhaust ventilation subsystem, the fuel oil day tank vault exhaust subsystem and the diesel oil transfer module enclosures ventilation and heating subsystem.

The VZS is as shown in Figure 2.7.4

-1 and the component locations of the VZS are as shown in Table 2.7.4-3. 1. The functional arrangement of the VZS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.4. 2. The VZS provides the following nonsafety

-related functions:

a) The VZS provides ventilation cooling to the diesel generator rooms when the diesel generators are operating. b) The VZS provides ventilation cooling to the electrical equipment service modules when the diesel generators are operating.

c) The VZS provides normal heating and ventilation to the diesel oil transfer module enclosure.

3. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to cause the components identified in Table 2.7.4-1 to perform the listed functions.

4. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.7.4

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.7.4

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function Diesel Generator Room A Standby Exhaust Fans VZS-MY-V01A VZS-MY-V02A Yes (Run Status)

Start Diesel Generator Room B Standby Exhaust Fans VZS-MY-V01B VZS-MY-V02B Yes (Run Status)

Start Service Module A Air Handling Units (AHU) Supply Fan VZS-MA-01A Yes (Run Status)

Start Service Module B AHU Supply Fan VZS-MA-01B Yes (Run Status)

Start Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure A Exhaust Fan VZS-MY-V03A Yes (Run Status)

Start C-413 Table 2.7.4

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Control Function Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure A Electric Unit Heater VZS-MY-U03A Yes (Run Status) Energize Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure B Exhaust Fan VZS-MY-V03B Yes (Run Status)

Start Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure B Electric Unit Heater VZS-MY-U03B Yes (Run Status)

Energize Table 2.7.4

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 715 2.7.04.01 1. The functional arrangement of the VZS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.4.

Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built VZS conforms with the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.4. 716 2.7.04.02a 2.a) The VZS provides ventilation cooling to the diesel generator rooms when the diesel generators are operating.

See item 3 in this table.

717 2.7.04.02b 2.b) The VZS provides ventilation cooling to the electrical equipment service modules when the diesel generators are operating.

See item 3 in this table.

718 2.7.04.02c 2.c) The VZS provides normal heating and ventilation to the diesel oil transfer module enclosure.

See item 3 in this table.

719 2.7.04.03 3. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.7.4-1 to perform the listed function. Testing will be performed on the components in Table 2.7.4

-1 using controls in the MCR.

Controls in the MCR operate to cause the components listed in Table 2.7.4

-1 to perform the listed functions.

720 2.7.04.04 4. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.7.4

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the parameters in the MCR.

The displays identified in Table 2.7.4-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-414 Table 2.7.4

-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Service Module AHU A VZS-MS-01A Diesel-Generator Building Service Module AHU B VZS-MS-01B Diesel-Generator Building Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure A Unit Heater VZS-MY-U03A Yard Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure B Unit Heater VZS-MY-U03B Yard D/G Building Standby Exhaust Fan 1A VZS-MY-V01A Diesel-Generator Building D/G Building Standby Exhaust Fan 1B VZS-MY-V01B Diesel-Generator Building D/G Building Standby Exhaust Fan 2A VZS-MY-V02A Diesel-Generator Building D/G Building Standby Exhaust Fan 2B VZS-MY-V02B Diesel-Generator Building Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure A Exhaust Fan VZS-MY-V03A Yard Diesel Oil Transfer Module Enclosure B Exhaust Fan VZS-MY-V03B Yard Fuel Oil Day Tank Vault Exhaust Fan VZS-MA-02A Diesel-Generator Building Fuel Oil Day Tank Vault Exhaust Fan VZS-MA-02B Diesel-Generator Building

C-415 Figure 2.7.4-1 (Sheet 1 of 2) Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System

C-416 Figure 2.7.4

-1 (Sheet 2 of 2) Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System

C-417 2.7.5 Radiologically Controlled Area Ventilation System Design Description The radiologically controlled area ventilation system (VAS) serves the fuel handling area of the auxiliary building, and the radiologically controlled portions of the auxiliary and annex buildings, except for the health physics and hot machine shop areas, which are provided with a separate ventilation system (VHS). The VAS consists of two subsystems: the auxiliary/annex building ventilation subsystem and the fuel handling area ventilation subsystem. The subsystems provide ventilation to maintain occupied areas, and access and equipment areas within their design temperature range. They provide outside air for plant personnel and prevent the unmonitored release of airborne radioactivity to the atmosphere or adjacent plant areas. The VAS automatically isolates selected building areas by closing the supply and exhaust duct isolation dampers and starts the containment air filtration system (VFS) when high airborne radioactivity in the exhaust air duct or high ambient pressure differential is detected.

The component locations of the VAS are as shown in Table 2.7.5

-3. 1. The functional arrangement of the VAS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.5. 2. The VAS maintains each building area at a slightly negative pressure relative to the atmosphere or adjacent clean plant areas.

3. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.7.5

-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR). Table 2.7.5

-1 Equipment Tag No. Display Control Function Annex Building Pressure Differential Indicator VAS-032 Yes - Auxiliary Building Pressure Differential Indicator VAS-033 Yes - Fuel Handling Area Pressure Differential Indicator VAS-030 Yes - Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-418 Table 2.7.5

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 721 2.7.05.01 1. The functional arrangement of the VAS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.5.

Inspection of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built VAS conforms with the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.5. 722 2.7.05.02.i

2. The VAS maintains each building area at a slightly negative pressure relative to the atmosphere or adjacent clean plant areas.

i) Testing will be performed to confirm that the VAS maintains each building at a slightly negative pressure when operating all VAS supply AHUs and all VAS exhaust fans.

i) The time average pressure differential in the served areas of the annex, fuel handling and radiologically controlled auxiliary buildings as measured by each of the instruments identified in Table 2.7.5-1 is negative. 723 2.7.05.02.ii

2. The VAS maintains each building area at a slightly negative pressure relative to the atmosphere or adjacent clean plant areas.

ii) Testing will be performed to confirm the ventilation flow rate through the auxiliary building fuel handling area when operating all VAS supply AHUs and all VAS exhaust fans.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the calculated exhaust flow rate based on the measured flow rates is greater than or equal to 15,300 cfm.

724 2.7.05.02.iii

2. The VAS maintains each building area at a slightly negative pressure relative to the atmosphere or adjacent clean plant areas.

iii) Testing will be performed to confirm the auxiliary building radiologically controlled area ventilation flow rate when

operating all VAS supply AHUs and all VAS exhaust fans.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the calculated exhaust flow rate based on the measured flow rates is greater than or equal to 22,500 cfm.

725 2.7.05.03 3. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.7.5

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the parameters in the MCR.

The displays identified in Table 2.7.5-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-419 Table 2.7.5

-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Auxiliary/Annex Building Supply AHU A VAS-MS-01A Annex Building Auxiliary/Annex Building Supply AHU B VAS-MS-01B Annex Building Fuel Handling Area Supply AHU A VAS-MS-02A Annex Building Fuel Handling Area Supply AHU B VAS-MS-02B Annex Building CVS Pump Room Unit Cooler A VAS-MS-05A Auxiliary Building CVS Pump Room Unit Cooler B VAS-MS-05B Auxiliary Building RNS Pump Room Unit Cooler A VAS-MS-06A Auxiliary Building RNS Pump Room Unit Cooler B VAS-MS-06B Auxiliary Building Auxiliary/Annex Building Exhaust Fan A VAS-MA-02A Auxiliary Building Auxiliary/Annex Building Exhaust Fan B VAS-MA-02B Auxiliary Building Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Fan A VAS-MA-06A Auxiliary Building Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Fan B VAS-MA-06B Auxiliary Building

C-420 2.7.6 Containment Air Filtration System Design Description The containment air filtration system (VFS) provides intermittent flow of outdoor air to purge and filter the containment atmosphere of airborne radioactivity during normal plant operation, and continuous flow during hot or cold plant shutdown conditions to reduce airborne radioactivity levels for personnel access. The VFS can also provide filtered exhaust for the radiologically controlled area ventilation system (VAS) during abnormal conditions.

The VFS is as shown in Figure 2.7.6

-1 and the component locations of the VFS are as shown in Table 2.7.6-3. 1. The functional arrangement of the VFS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.6. 2. The VFS provides the safety

-related functions of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the VFS lines penetrating containment and providing vacuum relief for the containment vessel.

3. The VFS provides the intermittent flow of outdoor air to purge the containment atmosphere during normal plant operation, and continuous flow during hot or cold plant shutdown conditions.

4. Controls exist in the main control room (MCR) to cause the components identified in Table 2.7.6-1 to perform the listed function.

5. Displays of the parameters in Table 2.7.6

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

Table 2.7.6

-1 Equipment Tag No. Display Control Function Containment Air Handling Units (AHU) Supply Fan A VFS-MA-01A Yes (Run Status)

Start Containment AHU Supply Fan B VFS-MA-01B Yes (Run Status)

Start Containment AHU Supply Fan A Flow Sensor VFS-012A Yes - Containment AHU Supply Fan B Flow Sensor VFS-012B Yes - Containment Exhaust Fan A VFS-MA-02A Yes (Run Status)

Start Containment Exhaust Fan B VFS-MA-02B Yes (Run Status)

Start Containment Exhaust Fan A Flow Sensor VFS-011A Yes - Containment Exhaust Fan B Flow Sensor VFS-011B Yes -

C-421 Table 2.7.6

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 726 2.7.06.01 1. The functional arrangement of the VFS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.7.6. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built VFS conforms with the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.6

. 727 2.7.06.02.i

2. The VFS provides the safety

-related functions of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the VFS lines penetrating containment and providing vacuum relief for the containment vessel. i) See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7. i) See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, items 1 and 7. 728 2.7.06.02.ii

2. The VFS provides the safety

-related functions of preserving containment integrity by isolation of the VFS lines penetrating containment and providing vacuum relief for the containment vessel. ii) Testing will be performed to demonstrate that remotely operated containment vacuum relief isolation valves open within the required response time. ii) The containment vacuum relief isolation valves (VFS-PL-V800A and VFS-PL-V800B) open within 30 seconds. 729 2.7.06.03.i

3. The VFS provides the intermittent flow of outdoor air to purge the containment atmosphere during normal plant operation, and continuous flow during hot or cold plant shutdown conditions.

i) Testing will be performed to confirm that containment supply AHU fan A when operated with containment exhaust fan A provides a flow of outdoor air.

i) The flow rate measured at each fan is greater than or equal to 3,600 scfm. 730 2.7.06.03.ii

3. The VFS provides the intermittent

flow of outdoor air to purge the containment atmosphere during normal plant operation, and continuous flow during hot or cold plant shutdown conditions.

ii) Testing will be performed to confirm that containment supply AHU fan B when operated with containment exhaust fan B provides a flow of outdoor air.

ii) The flow rate measured at each fan is greater than or equal to 3,600 scfm. 731 2.7.06.03.iii

3. The VFS provides the intermittent flow of outdoor air to purge the containment atmosphere during normal plant operation, and continuous flow during hot or cold plant shutdown conditions.

iii) Inspection will be conducted of the containment purge discharge line (VFS

-L204) penetrating the containment.

iii) The nominal line size is 36 in. 732 2.7.06.04 4. Controls exist in the MCR to cause the components identified in Table 2.7.6-1 to perform the listed function. Testing will be performed on the components in Table 2.7.6

-1 using controls in the MCR.

Controls in the MCR operate to cause the components liste d

in Table 2.7.6

-1 to perform the listed functions.

733 2.7.06.05 5. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.7.6

-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the parameters in the MCR.

The displays identified in Table 2.7.6-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

C-422 Table 2.7.6

-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Containment Air Filtration Supply AHU A VFS-MS-01A Annex Building Containment Air Filtration Supply AHU B VFS-MS-01B Annex Building Containment Air Filtration Exhaust Unit A VFS-MS-02A Annex Building Containment Air Filtration Exhaust Unit B VFS-MS-02B Annex Building

C-423 Figure 2.7.6

-1 Containment Air Filtration System

C-424 2.7.7 Containment Recirculation Cooling System Design Description The containment recirculation cooling system (VCS) controls the containment air temperature and humidity during normal operation, refueling and shutdown.

The locations of the VCS are as shown in Table 2.7.7

-3. 1. The functional arrangement of the VCS is as described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.7. 2. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.7.7

-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR).

Table 2.7.7

-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Display Containment Temperature Channel VCS-061 Yes Containment Fan Cooler Fan VCS-MA-01 A VCS-MA-01 C VCS-MA-01 B VCS-MA-01D Yes (Run Status)

Yes (Run Status)

Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

Table 2.7.7

-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 734 2.7.0 7.01 1. The functional arrangement of the VCS is as described in the Design Description of this Section

2.7.7. Inspection

of the as

-built system will be performed.

The as-built VCS conforms with the functional arrangement described in the Design Description of this Section 2.7.7.

735 2.7.0 7.02 2. Displays of the parameters identified in Table 2.7.7-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the parameters in the MCR.

The displays identified in Table 2.7.7-1 are retrieved in the MCR.

C-425 Table 2.7.7

-3 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Reactor Containment Recirculation Fan Coil Unit Assembly A VCS-MS-01A Containment Reactor Containment Recirculation Fan Coil Unit Assembly B VCS-MS-01B Containment

2.7.8 Radwaste

Building HVAC System No ITAAC for this system.

2.7.9 Turbine

Island Building Ventilation System No entry for this system.

2.7.10 Health Physics and Hot Machine Shop HVAC System No ITAAC for this system.

2.7.11 Hot Water Heating System No entry for this system.

C-426 3.0 Non-System Based Design Descriptions and ITAAC

3.1 Emergency

Response Facilities Design Description The technical support center (TSC) is a facility from which management and technical support is provided to main control room (MCR) personnel during emergency conditions. The operations support center (OSC) provides an assembly area where operations support personnel report in an emergency. The control support area (CSA) is an area nearby the main control room from which support can be provided to the main control room.

1. The TSC has floor space of at least 75 ft 2 per person for a minimum of 25 persons.

2. The TSC has voice communication equipment for communication with the MCR, emergency operations facility, OSC, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 3. The plant parameters listed in Table 2.5.4

-1, minimum inventory table, in subsection 2.5.4, Data Display and Processing System (DDS), with a "Yes" in the "Display" column, can be retrieved in the TSC.

4. The OSC has voice communication equipment for communication with the MCR and TSC. 5. The TSC and OSC are in different locations.

6. The CSA provides a habitable workspace environment.

Table 3.1-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 736 3.1.00.01 1. The TSC has floor space of at least 75 f t 2 per person for a minimum of 25 persons.

An inspection will be performed of the TSC floor space.

The TSC has at least 1875 ft 2 of floor space.

737 3.1.00.02 2. The TSC has voice communication equipment for communication with the MCR, emergency operations facility, OSC, and the NRC.

An inspection and test will be performed of the TSC voice communication equipment.

Communications equipment is installed, and voice transmission and reception are accomplished.

738 3.1.00.03 3. The plant parameters listed in Table 2.5.4

-1, minimum inventory table, in subsection 2.5.4, DDS, with a "Yes" in the "Display" column, can be retrieved in the TSC. An inspection will be performed for retrievability of the plant parameters in the TSC.

The plant parameters listed in Table 2.5.4

-1, minimum inventory table, in subsection 2.5.4, DDS, with a "Yes" in the "Display" column, can be retrieved in the TSC.

739 3.1.00.04 4. The OSC has voice communication equipment for communication with the MCR and TSC. Inspection will be performed of the OSC voice communication equipment.

Communications equipment is installed, and voice transmission and reception are accomplished.

C-427 Table 3.1-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 740 3.1.00.05 5. The TSC and OSC are in different locations.

An inspection will be performed of the location of the TSC and OSC. The TSC and OSC are in different locations.

741 3.1.00.06 6. The CSA provides a habitable workspace environment.

See ITAAC Table 2.7.1-4, items 1, 8.a), 8.c), 12, and 13, Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System.

3.2 Human

Factors Engineering Design Description The AP1000 human

-system interface (HSI) will be developed and implemented based upon a human factors engineering (HFE) program. Figure 3.2

-1 illustrates the HFE program elements. The HSI scope includes the design of the operation and control centers system (OCS) and each of the HSI resources. For the purposes of the HFE program, the OCS includes the main control room (MCR), the remote shutdown workstation (RSW), the local control stations, and the associated workstations for each of these centers. The HSI resources include the wall panel information system, alarm system, plant information system (nonsafety

-related displays), qualified data processing system (safety-related displays), and soft and dedicated controls. Minimum inventories of controls, displays, and visual alerts are specified as part of the HSI for the MCR and the RSW.

The MCR provides a facility and resources for the safe control and operation of the plant. The MCR includes a minimum inventory of displays, visual alerts and fixed

-position controls. Refer to item 8.a and Table 2.5.2

-5 of subsection 2.5.2 for this minimum inventory.

The remote shutdown room (RSR) provides a facility and resources to establish and maintain safe shutdown conditions for the plant from a location outside of the MCR. The RSW includes a minimum inventory of displays, controls, and visual alerts. Refer to item 2 and Table 2.5.4

-1 of subsection 2.5.4 for this minimum inventory. As stated in item 8.b of subsection 2.5.2, the protection and safety monitoring system (PMS) provides for the transfer of control capability from the MCR to the RSW.

The mission of local control stations is to provide the resources, outside of the MCR, for operations personnel to perform monitoring and control activities.

Implementation of the HFE program includes activity 1 below. The MCR includes design features specified by items 2 through 4 below. The RSW includes the design features specified by items 5 through 8 below. Local control stations include the design feature of item 9.

1. The HFE program verification and validation implementation plans are developed in accordance with the programmatic level description of the AP1000 human factors verification and validation plan. The implementation plans establish the methods for C-428 conducting evaluations of the integrated HSI design. The development of the HFE verification and validation plans are complete. The following documents were developed:

a) HSI task support verification

- APP-OCS-GEH-220, "AP1000 Human Factors Engineering Task Support Verification Plan," Westinghouse Electric Company LLC b) HFE design verification

- APP-OCS-GEH-120, "AP1000 Human Factors Engineering Design Verification Plan," Westinghouse Electric Company LLC c) Integrated system validation

- APP-OCS-GEH-320, "AP1000 Human Factors Engineering Integrated System Validation Plan," Westinghouse Electric Company LLC d) Issue resolution verification

- APP-OCS-GEH-420, "AP1000 Human Factors Engineering Discrepancy Resolution Process," Westinghouse Electric Company LLC e) Plant HFE/HSI (as designed at the time of plant startup) verification

- APP-OCS-GEH-520, "AP1000 Plant Startup Human Factors Engineering Verification Plan," Westinghouse Electric Company LLC

2. The MCR includes reactor operator workstations, supervisor workstation(s), safety

-related displays, and safety

-related controls.

3. The MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by MCR operators.

4. The HSI resources available to the MCR operators include the alarm system, plant information system (nonsafety

-related displays), wall panel information system, nonsafety

-related controls (soft and dedicated), and computerized procedure system.

5. The RSW includes reactor operator workstation(s) from which licensed operators perform remote shutdown operations.

6. The RSR provides a suitable workspace environment, separate from the MCR, for use by the RSW operators.

7. The HSI resources available at the RSW include the alarm system displays, the plant

information system, and the controls.

8. The RSW and the available HSI permit execution of tasks by licensed operators to establish and maintain safe shutdown.

9. The capability to access displays and controls is provided (controls as assigned by the MCR operators) for local control and monitoring from selected locations throughout the plant.

C-429 Table 3.2.

-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 742 3.2.00.01a

1. The HFE verification and validation program is performed in accordance with the HFE verification and validation implementation plan and includes the following activities:

a) HSI Task support verification a) An evaluation of the implementation of the HSI task support verification will be performed.

a) A report exists and concludes that: Task support verification was conducted in conformance with the implementation plan and includes verification that the information and controls provided by the HSI match the display and control requirements generated by the function-based task analyses and the operational sequence analyses. 743 3.2.00.01b

1. The HFE verification and validation program is performed in accordance with the HFE verification and validation implementation plan and includes the following activities:

b) HFE design verification b) An evaluation of the implementation of the HFE design verification will be performed.

b) A report exists and concludes that: HFE design verification was conducted in conformance with the implementation plan and includes verification that the HSI design is consistent with the AP1000 specific design guidelines (compiled as specified in the third acceptance criteria of design commitment 3) developed for each HSI resour ce. 744 3.2.00.01c.i

1. The HFE verification and validation program is performed in accordance with the HFE verification and validation implementation plan and includes the following activities:

c) Integrated system validation c) (i) An evaluation of the implementation of the integrated system validation will be performed.

c) (i) A report exists and concludes that: The test scenarios listed in the implementation plan for integrated system validation were executed in conformance with the plan and note d human deficiencies were addressed.

C-430 Table 3.2.

-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 745 3.2.00.01c.ii

1. The HFE verification and validation program is performed in accordance with the HFE verification and validation implementation plan and includes the following activities:

c) Integrated system validation c) (ii) Tests and analyses of the following plant evolutions and transients, using a facility that physically represents the MCR configuration and dynamically represents the MCR HSI and the operating characteristics and responses of the AP1000 design, will be performed:

- Normal plant heatup and startup to 100% power

- Normal plant shutdown and cooldown to cold shutdown

- Transients: reactor trip and turbine trip

- Accidents:

- Small-break LOCA

- Large-break LOCA

- Steam line break

- Feedwater line break

- Steam generator tube rupture c) (ii) A report exists and concludes that: The test and analysis results demonstrate that the MCR operators can perform the following:

- Heat up and start up the plant to 100% power

- Shut down and cool down the plant to cold shutdow n - Bring the plant to safe shutdown following the specified transients

- Bring the plant to a safe, stable state following the specified accidents 746 3.2.00.01d

1. The HFE verification and validation program is performed in accordance with the HFE verification and validation implementation plan and includes the following activities:

d) Issue resolution verification d) An evaluation of the implementation of the HFE design issue resolution verification will be performed.

d) A report exists and concludes that: HFE design issue resolution verification was conducted in conformance with the implementation plan and includes verification that human factors issues documented in the design issues tracking system have been addressed in the final design. 747 3.2.00.01e

1. The HFE verification and validation program is performed in accordance with the HFE verification and validation implementation plan and includes the following activities:

e) Plant HFE/HSI (as designed at the time of plant startup) verification e) An evaluation of the implementation of the plant HFE/HSI (as designed at the time of plant startup) verification will be performed.

e) A report exists and concludes that: The plant HFE/HSI, as designed at the time of plant startup, is consistent with the HFE/HSI verified in 1.a) through 1.d).

C-431 Table 3.2.

-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 748 3.2.00.02 2. The MCR includes reactor operator workstations, supervisor workstation(s),

safety-related displays, and safety

-related controls.

An inspection of the MCR workstations and control panels will be performed.

The MCR includes reactor operator workstations, supervisor workstation(s),

safety-related displays, and safety-related controls.

749 3.2.00.03.i

3. The MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators.

i) See subsection 2.7.1, Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System.

750 3.2.00.03.ii

3. The MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators.

ii) See subsection 2.2.5, MCR Emergency Habitability System.

ii) See subsection 2.2.5, MCR Emergency Habitability System. 751 3.2.00.03.iii

3. The MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators.

iii) See subsection 2.6.3, Class 1E dc and UPS System.

iii) See subsection 2.6.3, Class 1E dc and UPS system.

752 3.2.00.03.iv

3. The MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators.

iv) See subsection 2.6.5, Lighting System.

753 3.2.00.03.v

3. The MCR provides a suitable workspace environment for use by the MCR operators.

v) See subsection 2.3.19, Communication System.

754 3.2.00.04 4. The HSI resources available to the MCR operators include the alarm system, plant information system (nonsafety

-related displays), wall panel information system, nonsafety

-related controls (soft and dedicated), and computerized procedure system.

An inspection of the HSI resources available in the MCR for the MCR operators will be performed.

The HSI (at the time of plant startup) includes an alarm system, plant information system (nonsafety

-related displays), wall panel information system, nonsafety-related controls (soft and dedicated), and computerized procedure system. 755 3.2.00.05 5. The RSW includes reactor operator workstation(s) from which licensed operators perform remote shutdown operations.

An inspection of the RSW will be performed.

The RSW includes reactor operator workstation(s).

756 3.2.00.06.i

6. The RSR provides a suitable workspace environment, separate from the MCR, for use by the RSW operators.

i) See subsection 2.7.1, Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System.

757 3.2.00.06.ii

6. The RSR provides a suitable workspace environment, separate from the MCR, for use by the RSW operators.

ii) See subsection 2.6.5, Lighting System.

C-432 Table 3.2.

-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 758 3.2.00.06.iii

6. The RSR provides a suitable workspace environment, separate from the MCR, for use by the RSW operators.

iii) See subsection 2.3.19, Communication System.

759 3.2.00.07 7. The HSI resources available at the RSW include the alarm system displays, the plant information system, and the controls. An inspection of the HSI resources available at the RSW will be performed.

The as-built HSI at the RSW includes the alarm system displays, the plant information system, and the controls.

760 3.2.00.08 8. The RSW and the available HSI permit execution of tasks by licensed operators to establish and maintain safe shutdown. Test and analysis, using a workstation that physically represents the RSW and dynamically represents the RSW HSI and the operating characteristics and responses of the AP1000, will be performed.

A report exists and concludes that the test and analysis results demonstrate that licensed operators can achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions from the RSW.

761 3.2.00.09 9. The capability to access displays and controls is provided (controls as assigned by the MCR operators) for local control and monitoring from selected locations throughout the plant.

An inspection of the local control and monitoring capability is provided.

The capability for local control and monitoring from selected locations throughout the plant exists.

C-433 Figure 3.2

-1 Human Factors Engineering (HFE)

Design and Implementation Process AnalysisDesignV&VOperationPlanningHuman Factors Engineering (HFE)Design and Implementation ProcessHFE ProgramManagementOperatingExperienceTaskAnalysisHuman ReliabilityAnalysisStaffingReviewRequirementsFunctionalAnalysis andFunctionalAllocationInterfaceDesignProcedureDevelopmentTrainingDevelopmentVerification andValidationDesignImplementationHumanPerformanceMonitoring C-434 3.3 Buildings Design Description The nuclear island structures include the containment (the steel containment vessel and the containment internal structure) and the shield and auxiliary buildings. The containment, shield and auxiliary buildings are structurally integrated on a common basemat which is embedded below the finished plant grade level. The containment vessel is a cylindrical welded steel vessel with elliptical upper and lower heads, supported by embedding a lower segment between the containment internal structures concrete and the basemat concrete. The containment internal structure is reinforced concrete with structural modules used for some walls and floors. The shield building cylinder is a composite steel and concrete (SC) structure except for the portion surrounded by the auxiliary building, which is reinforced concrete (RC). The shield building, in conjunction with the internal structures of the containment building, provides shielding for the reactor coolant system and the other radioactive systems and components housed in the containment. The shield building roof is a reinforced concrete structure containing an integral, steel lined passive containment cooling water storage tank. The auxiliary building is reinforced concrete and houses the safety-related mechanical and electrical equipment located outside the containment and shield buildings.

The portion of the annex building adjacent to the nuclear island is a structural steel and reinforced concrete seismic Category II structure and houses the control support area, non

-1E electrical equipment, and hot machine shop.

The radwaste building is a steel framed structure and houses the low level waste processing and storage.

The turbine building is a non

-safety related structure that houses the main turbine generator and the power conversion cycle equipment and auxiliaries. There is no safety

-related equipment in the turbine building. The turbine building is located on a separate foundation. The turbine building structure is adjacent to the nuclear island structures consisting of the auxiliary building to the south and the annex building to the south and east. The turbine building consists of two separate superstructures, the first bay and the main area, both supported on a common reinforced concrete basemat. The first bay, next to the auxiliary building, consists of a combination of reinforced concrete walls and steel framing with reinforced concrete and steel grated floors. It is classified as a seismic Category II structure due to its immediate proximity to the auxiliary building. The main area of the turbine building, immediately to the north of the first bay, is a steel framed building with reinforced concrete and steel grated floors. It is classified as

a non-seismic structure. The non

-seismic portion of the turbine building is designed with eccentrically braced framing (EBF).

The diesel generator building is a non

-safety related structure that houses the two standby diesel engine powered generators and the power conversion cycle equipment and auxiliaries. There is no safety

-related equipment in the diesel generator building. The diesel generator building is located on a separate foundation at a distance from the nuclear island structures.

The plant gas system (PGS) provides hydrogen, carbon dioxide, and nitrogen gases to the plant systems as required. The component locations of the PGS are located in the yard areas.

C-435 1. The physical arrangement of the nuclear island structures, the annex building, and the turbine building is as described in the Design Description of this Section 3.3, and as shown on Figures 3.3-1 through 3.3-14. The physical arrangement of the radwaste building and the diesel generator building is as described in the Design Description of this Section 3.3.

2. a) The nuclear island structures, including the critical sections listed in Table 3.3

-7, are seismic Category I and are designed and constructed to withstand design basis loads, as specified in the Design Description, without loss of structural integrity and the safet y-related functions. The design bases loads are those loads associated with:

Normal plant operation (including dead loads, live loads, lateral earth pressure loads, and equipment loads, including hydrodynamic loads, temperature and equipment vibration);

External events (including rain, snow, flood, tornado, tornado generated missiles and earthquake); and Internal events (including flood, pipe rupture, equipment failure, and equipment failure generated missiles).

b) Site grade level is located relative to floor elevation - per Table 3.3-5. Floor elevation - c) The containment and its penetrations are designed and constructed to ASME Code Section III, Class MC.(1) d) The containment and its penetrations retain their pressure boundary integrity associated with the design pressure.

e) The containment and its penetrations maintain the containment leakage rate less than the maximum allowable leakage rate associated with the peak containment pressure for the design basis accident.

f) The key dimensions of the nuclear island structures are as defined on Table 3.3

-5. g) The containment vessel greater than 7 feet above the operating deck provides a heat transfer surface. A free volume exists inside the containment shell above the operating deck. h) The containment free volume below elevation provides containment floodup during a postulated loss

-of-coolant accident.

3. Walls and floors of the nuclear island structures as defined on Table 3.3

-1, except for designed openings and penetrations, provide shielding during normal operations.

4. a) Walls and floors of the annex building as defined on Table 3.3

-1, except for designed openings and penetrations, provide shielding during normal operations.

b) The walls on the outside of the waste accumulation room in the radwaste building provide shielding from accumulated waste.

1. Containment isolation devices are addressed in subsection 2.2.1, Containment System.

C-436 c) The walls on the outside of the packaged waste storage room in the radwaste building provide shielding from stored waste.

5. a) Exterior walls and the basemat of the nuclear island have a water barrier up to site grade. b) The boundaries between mechanical equipment rooms and the electrical and instrumentation and control (I&C) equipment rooms of the auxiliary building as identified in Table 3.3

-2 are designed to prevent flooding of rooms that contain safety

-related equipment up to the maximum flood level for each room defined in Table 3.3

-2. c) The boundaries between the following rooms, which contain safety

-related equipment

- passive core cooling system (PXS) valve/accumulator room A (11205), PXS valve/accumulator room B (11207), and chemical and volume system (CVS) room (11209) - are designed to prevent flooding between these rooms.

6. a) The radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building between floor elevations - and -radwaste system (WLS) storage tanks. The available room volumes of the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building between floor elevations - and - exceeds the volume of the liquid radwaste storage tanks (WLS

-MT-05A, MT-05B, MT-06A, MT-06B, MT-07A, MT-07B, MT-07C, MT-11). b) The radwaste building packaged waste storage room has a volume greater than or equal to 1293 cubic feet.

7. a) Class 1E electrical cables, fiber optic cables associated with only one division, and raceways are identified according to applicable color

-coded Class 1E divisions.

b) Class 1E divisional electrical cables and communication cables associated with only one division are routed in their respective divisional raceways.

c) Separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions in accordance with the fire areas as identified in Table 3.3

-3. d) Physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cables.

e) Class 1E communication cables which interconnect two divisions are routed and separated such that the Protection and Safety Monitoring System voting logic is not defeated by the loss of any single raceway or fire area. 8. Systems, structures, and components identified as essential targets are protected from the dynamic and environmental effects of postulated pipe ruptures.

9. The reactor cavity sump has a minimum concrete thickness as shown on Table 3.3

-5 between the bottom of the sump and the steel containment.

10. The shield building roof and the passive containment cooling system (PCS) storage tank support and retain the PCS water. The passive containment cooling system tank has a stainless steel liner which provides a barrier on the inside surfaces of the tank. Leak chase channels are provided over the tank boundary liner welds.

C-437 11. Deleted. 12. The extended turbine generator axis intersects the shield building.

13. Separation is provided between the structural elements of the turbine, annex, and radwaste buildings and the nuclear island structure. This separation permits horizontal motion of the buildings in a safe shutdown earthquake without impact between structural elements of the buildings.

14. The external walls, doors, ceiling, and floors in the main control room, the central alarm station, and the secondary alarm station are bullet

-resistant to at least Underwriters Laboratory Ballistic Standard 752, level 4.

15. Deleted. 16. Secondary security power supply system for alarm annunciator equipment and non

-portable communications equipment is located within a vital area.

17. Vital areas are locked and alarmed with active intrusion detection systems that annunciate in the central and secondary alarm stations upon intrusion into a vital area.

18. Deleted.

C-438 Table 3.3-1 Definition of Wall Thicknesses for Nuclear Island Buildings, Turbine Building, and Annex Building (1) Wall or Section Description Column Lines Floor Elevation or Elevation Range Concrete Thickness (2)(3)(4)(5)

Applicable Radiation Shielding Wall (Yes/No) Containment Building Internal Structure Shield Wall between Reactor Vessel Cavity and RCDT Room E-W wall parallel with column line 7 From 71'-6" to 83'-0" 3'-0" Yes West Reactor Vessel Cavity Wall N-S wall parallel with column line N From 83'-0" to 98'-0" 7'-6" Yes North Reactor Vessel Cavity Wall E-W wall parallel with column line 7 From 83'-0" to 98'-0" 9'-0" Yes East Reactor Vessel Cavity Wall N-S wall parallel with column line N From 83'-0" to 98'-0" 7'-6" Yes West Refueling Cavity Wall N-S wall parallel with column line N From 98'-0" to 135'

-3" 4'-0" Yes North Refueling Cavity Wall E-W wall parallel with column line 7 From 98'-0" to 135'

-3" 4'-0" Yes East Refueling Cavity Wall N-S wall parallel with column line N From 98'-0" to 135'

-3" 4'-0" Yes South Refueling Cavity Wall E-W wall parallel with column line 7 From 98'-0" to 135'

-3" 4'-0" Yes South wall of west steam generator compartment Not Applicable From 103'-0" to 153'

-0" 2'-6" Yes West wall of west steam generator compartment Not Applicable From 103'-0" to 153'

-0" 2'-6" Yes North wall of west steam generator compartment Not Applicable From 103'-0" to 153'

-0" 2'-6" Yes South wall of pressurizer compartment Not Applicable From 103'-0" to 153'

-6" 2'-6" Yes West wall of pressurizer compartment Not Applicable From 107'-2" to 160'

-0" 2'-6" Yes North wall of pressurizer compartment Not Applicable From 107'-2" to 160'

-0" 2'-6" Yes East wall of pressurizer compartment Not Applicable From 118'-6" to 160'

-0" 2'-6" Yes North-east wall of in

-containment refueling water storage tank Parallel to column line N From 103'-0" to 135'

-3" 2'-6" No West wall of in

-containment refueling water storage tank Not applicable From 103'-0" to 135'

-3" 5/8" steel plate with stiffeners No South wall of east steam generator compartment Not Applicable From 87'-6" to 153'

-0" 2'-6" Yes 1. The column lines and floor elevations are identified and included on Figures 3.3

-1 through 3.3-13. 2. These wall (and floor) thicknesses have a construction tolerance of

+ 1 inch, except for exterior walls below grade where the tolerance is +12 inches, - 1 inch. 3. For walls that are part of structural modules, the concrete thickness also includes the steel face plates.

4. For floors with steel surface plates, the concrete thickness also includes the plate thickness.

5. Where a wall (or a floor) has openings, the concrete thickness does not apply at the opening.

6. The elevation ranges for the shield building items are rounded to the nearest inch.

C-439 Table 3.3-1 (cont.) Definition of Wall Thicknesses for Nuclear Island Buildings, Turbine Building, and Annex Building (1) Wall or Section Description Column Lines Floor Elevation or Elevation Range Concrete Thickness (2)(3) Applicable Radiation Shielding Wall (Yes/No) East wall of east steam generator compartment Not Applicable From 94'-0" to 153'

-0" 2'-6" Yes North wall of east steam generator compartment Not Applicable From 87'-6" to 153'

-0" 2'-6" Yes Shield Building (6) Shield Building Cylinder Not Applicable From 100'-0" to 248-6" 3'-0" (including 3/4 inch thick min. steel plate liner on each face on portion not protected by auxiliary building)

Yes Air Inlet Not Applicable From 248'-6" to 251'-6" From 251'-6" to 254'

-6" From 254'-6" to 266'-4" 3'-0" (including 3/4 inch thick min. steel plate liner on each face) 3'-0" to 4'-6" (including 1 inch thick steel plate liner on each face) 4'-6" (including 1 inch thick min. steel plate liner on each face)

Yes Yes Yes Tension Ring Not Applicable From 266'-4" to 271'-6" (at top of plate) 4'-6" (including 1-1/2 inch thick steel plate liner on each face) Yes Conical Roof Not Applicable From 271'-6" to 293'-9" 3'-0" (including 1/2 inch thick min. steel plate liner on bottom face), outside of PCS tank exterior wall Yes PCS Tank External Cylindrical Wall Not Applicable From 293'-9" to 328'

-9" 2'-0" Yes PCS Tank Internal Cylindrical Wall Not Applicable From 309'-4" to 329'

-0" 1'-6" Yes PCS Tank Roof Not Applicable 328'-9" (Lowest) 329'

-0" (Highest) 1'-3" No C-440 Table 3.3-1 (cont.) Definition of Wall Thicknesses for Nuclear Island Buildings, Turbine Building, and Annex Building (1) Wall or Section Description Column Lines Floor Elevation or Elevation Range Concrete Thickness (2)(3) Applicable Radiation Shielding Wall (Yes/No) Nuclear Island Basemat Below shield building From 60'-6" to containment vessel or 82'-6" 6'-0" to 22'-0" (varies)

No Auxiliary Building Walls/Floors Radiologically Controlled Column Line 1 wall From I to N From 66'-6" to 100'

-0" 3'-0" No Column Line 1 wall From I to 5'

-6" east of L

-2 From 100'-0" to 180'

-0" 2'-3" Yes Column Line 1 wall From 5'-6" east of L

-2 to N From 100'-0" to 125'

-0" 3'-0" Yes Column Line 1 wall From 5'-6" east of L

-2 to N From 125'-0" to 180'

-0" 2'-3" Yes Column Line 2 wall From I to K

-2 From 66'-6" to 135'

-3" 2'-6" Yes Column Line 2 wall From K-2 to L-2 From 66'-6" to 135'

-3" 5'-0" Yes Column Line 2 wall From L-2 to N From 98'-1" to 135'

-3" 2'-6" Yes Column Line 2 wall From I to J

-1 From 135'-3" to 153'

-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line 3 wall From J-1 to J-2 From 66'-6" to 82'-6" 2'-6" Yes Column Line 3 wall From J-1 to J-2 From 100'-0" to 135'

-3" 2'-6" Yes Column Line 3 wall From J-2 to K-2 From 66'-6" to 135'

-3" 2'-6" Yes Column Line 3 wall From K-2 to L-2 From 66'-6" to 92'-8 1/2" 2'-6" Yes Column Line 4 wall From I to J

-1 From 66'-6" to 153'

-0" 2'-6" Yes Column Line 4 wall From J-1 to J-2 From 66'-6" to 92'-6" 2'-6" Yes Column Line 4 wall From J-1 to J-2 From 107'-2" to 135'

-3" 2'-6" Yes Column Line 4 wall From J-2 to K-2 From 66'-6" to 135'

-3" 2'-6" Yes Column Line 4 wall From I to intersection with shield building wall From 135'-3" to 180'

-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line 5 wall From I to shield building; with opening east of J

-1 (below 107'

-2" floor). From 66'-6" to 160'

-6" 2'-0" Yes Column Line 7.1 wall From I to 8' east of J

-1 From 66'-6" to 82'-6" 2'-0" Yes Column Line 7.2 wall From I to 5'

-6"east of J

-1 From 66'-6" to 100'-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line I wall From 1 to 7.3 From 66'-6" to 100'

-0" 3'-0" No Column Line I wall From 1 to 4 From 100'-0" to 180'

-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line I wall From 4 to 5 From 100'-0" to 160'

-6" 2'-0" No C-441 Table 3.3-1 (cont.) Definition of Wall Thicknesses for Nuclear Island Buildings, Turbine Building, and Annex Building (1) Wall or Section Description Column Lines Floor Elevation or Elevation Range Concrete Thickness (2)(3) Applicable Radiation Shielding Wall (Yes/No) Column Line J

-1 wall From 1 to 2 From 82'-6" to 100'

-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line J

-1 wall From 2 to 4 From 66'-6" to 135'

-3" 2'-6" Yes Column Line J

-1 wall From 2 to 4 From 135'-3" to 153'

-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line J

-1 wall From 4 to shield building From 66'-6" to 107'

-2" 2'-0" Yes Column Line J-2 wall From 2 to 4 From 66'-6" to 135'

-3" 2'-6" Yes Column Line J

-2 wall From 4 to intersection with shield building wall From 66'-6" to 135'

-3" 2'-0" Yes Column Line K

-2 wall From 2 to 4 From 66'-6" to 135'

-3" 4'-9" Yes Column Line L

-2 wall From 2 to 4 From 66'-6" to 135'

-3" 4'-0" Yes Column Line N wall From 1 to 2 From 66'-6" to 100'

-0" 3'-0" No Column Line N wall From 1 to 12'

-9" north of 1 From 100'-0" to 125'

-0" 3'-9" No Column Line N wall From 1 to 12'

-9" north of 1 From 125'-0" to 135'

-0" 2'-0" No Column Line N wall From 12'-9" north of 1 to 2 From 100'-0" to 118'

-2 1/2" 3'-0" No Column Line N wall From 12'-9" north of 1 to 2 From 118'-2 1/2" to 135'

-3" 2'-0" No Column Line N wall From 1 to 2 From 118'-2 1/2" to 135'

-3" 2'-0" Yes Column Line N wall From 2 to 4 From 66'-6" to 98'-1" 3'-0" No Column Line N wall From 2 to 4 From 98'-1" to 135'

-3" 5'-6" Yes Column Line N wall From 1 to 4 From 135'-3" to 180'

-0" 2'-0" Yes Labyrinth Wall between Col. Line 3 and 4 and J

-1 to 7'-3" from J-2 Not Applicable From 82'-6" to 92'-6" 2'-6" Yes N-S Shield Wall (low wall)

Between K-2 and L-2 extending from column line 1 north From 100'-0" to 107'

-2" 2'-6" Yes N-S Shield Wall Between K-2 and L-2 extending from column line 1 north From 100'-0" to 125'-0" 2'-3" Yes E-W Shield Wall Between 1 and 2 extending from column line N east From 100'-0" to 125'

-0" 2'-9" Yes Auxiliary Area Basemat From 1-7.3 and I-N, excluding shield building From 60'-6" to 66'-6" 6'-0" No Floor From 1 to 2 and I to N 82'-6" 2'-0" Yes Floor From 2 to 4 and J

-1 to J-2 82'-6" 2'-0" Yes C-442 Table 3.3-1 (cont.) Definition of Wall Thicknesses for Nuclear Island Buildings, Turbine Building, and Annex Building (1) Wall or Section Description Column Lines Floor Elevation or Elevation Range Concrete Thickness (2)(3) Applicable Radiation Shielding Wall (Yes/No) Floor From 4 to 5 and J

-1 to J-2 82'-6" 0'-9" Yes Pipe Chase Floor From 2 to 5 and J

-1 to J-2 92'-6" 2'-0" Yes Floor From 2 to 3 and J

-2 to K-2 90'-3" 3'-0" Yes Floor From 3 to 4 and J

-2 to K-2 92'-6" 2'-0" Yes Floor From 4 to 7.3 and I to J

-1 82'-6" 2'-0" Yes Floor From 1 to 2 and I to N 100'-0" 3'-0" Yes Floor From 2 to 4 and K

-2 to L-2 92'-8 1/2" 3'-2 1/2" Yes Floor From I to J

-2 and 4 to intersecting vertical wall before column line 5 107'-2" 2'-0" Yes Floor From I to shield building wall and from intersecting vertical wall before column line 5 to column line 5 105'-0" 0'-9" Yes Floor From 1 to 10'

-0" north of 1 and L

-2 to N 125'-0" 3'-0" Yes Floor From 10'-0" north of 1 to 2 and L-2 to N 118'-2 1/2" 2'-0" Yes Floor From 3 to 4 and J

-2 to K-2 117'-6" 2'-0" Yes Floor From 2 to 4 and I to J

-1 153'-0" 0'-9" Yes Roof From 1 to 4 and I to N 180'-0" 1'-3" Yes Floor From 4 to short of column line 5 and from I to intersection with shield building wall 135'-5" 0'-9" Yes Floor From short of column line 5 to column line 5 and from I to intersection with shield building wall 133'-0" 0'-9" Yes Auxiliary Building Walls/Floors Non

-Radiologically Controlled Column Line 11 wall From I to Q From 66'-6" to 100'

-0" 3'-0" No Column Line 11 wall From I to Q From 100'-0" to 117'

-6" 2'-0" Yes Column Line 11 wall From I to L From 117'-6" to 153'

-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line 11 wall From L to M From 117'-6" to 135'

-3" 4'-0" Yes Column Line 11 wall From M to P From 117'-6" to 135'

-3" 2'-0" Yes C-443 Table 3.3-1 (cont.) Definition of Wall Thicknesses for Nuclear Island Buildings, Turbine Building, and Annex Building (1) Wall or Section Description Column Lines Floor Elevation or Elevation Range Concrete Thickness (2)(3) Applicable Radiation Shielding Wall (Yes/No) Column Line 11 wall From P to Q From 117'-6" to 135'

-3" 4'-0" Yes Column Line 11 wall From L to Q From 135'-3" to 153'

-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line 7.3 wall From I to shield building From 66'-6" to 100'

-0" 3'-0" Yes Column Line 7.3 wall From I to shield building From 100'-0" to 160'

-6" 2'-0" No Column Line I wall From 7.3 to 11 From 66'-6" to 100'

-0" 3'-0" No Column Line I wall From 7.3 to 11 From 100'-0" to 153'

-0" 2'-0" No Column Line I wall From 5 to 7.3 From 100'-0" to 160'

-6" 2'-0" No Column Line J wall From 7.3 to 11 From 66'-6" to 117'

-6" 2'-0" No Column Line K wall From 7.3 to 11 From 60'-6" to 135'

-3" 2'-0" Yes Column Line L wall From shield building wall to 11 From 60'-6" to 153'

-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line M wall From shield building wall to 11 From 66'-6" to 153'

-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line P wall From shield building wall to 11 From 66'-6" to 153'

-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line Q wall From shield building wall to 11 From 66'-6" to 100'

-0" 3'-0" No Column Line Q wall From shield building wall to 11 From 100'-0" to 153'

-0" 2'-0" Yes Column Line 9.2 wall From I to J and K to L From 117'-6" to 135'

-3" 2'-0" Yes Labyrinth Wall between Column Line 7.3 and 9.2 and J to K J to K From 117'-6" to 135'

-3" 2'-0" Yes Auxiliary Area Basemat From 7.3-11 and I-Q, excluding shield building From 60'-6" to 66'-6" 6'-0" No Floor From 5 to 7.3 and I to shield building wall 100'-0" 2'-0" Yes Floor From K to L and shield building wall to column line 10 100'-0" 0'-9" Yes Main Control Room Floor From 9.2 to 11 and I to L 117'-6" 2'-0" Yes Floor Bounded by shield bldg, 7.3, J, 9.2 and L 117'-6" 2'-0" Yes Floor From 9.2 to 11 and L to Q 117'-6" 2'-0" Yes Floor From 5 to 7.3 and from I to intersection with shield building wall 135'-3" 0'-9" Yes C-444 Table 3.3-1 (cont.) Definition of Wall Thicknesses for Nuclear Island Buildings, Turbine Building, and Annex Building (1) Wall or Section Description Column Lines Floor Elevation or Elevation Range Concrete Thickness (2)(3) Applicable Radiation Shielding Wall (Yes/No) Annex Building Column line 2 wall From E to H From 107'-2" to 135'

-3" 19 3/4" Yes Column line 4 wall From E to H From 107'-2" to 162'

-6" & 166'-0" 2'-0" Yes N-S Shield Wall between E and F From 2 to 4 From 107'-2" to 135'-3" 1'-0" Yes Column line 4.1 wall From E to H From 107'-2" to 135'

-3" 2'-0" Yes E-W Labyrinth Wall between column line 7.1 and 7.8 and G to H Not Applicable From 100'-0" to 112'

-0" 2'-0" N-S Labyrinth Wall between column line 7.8 and 9 and G to H Not Applicable From 100'-0" to 112'

-0" 2'-0" E-W Labyrinth Wall between column line 7.1 and 7.8 and G to H Not Applicable From 100'-0" to 112'

-0" 2'-0" Yes N-S Shield Wall on Column line. F From 4.1 North From 100'-0" to 117'

-6" 1'-0" Yes Column Line 9 wall From E to connecting wall between G and H From 107'-2" to 117'

-6" 2'-0" Yes Column Line E wall From 9 to 13 From 100'-0" to 135'

-3" 2'-0" Yes Column Line 13 wall From E to I.1 From 100'-0" to 135'

-3" 2'-0" Yes Column Line I.1 wall From 11.09 to 13 From 100'-0" to 135'

-3" 2'-0" Yes Corridor Wall between G and H From 9 to 13 From 100'-0" to 135'

-3" 1'-6" Yes Column Line 9 wall From I to H From 117'-6" to 158'

-0" 2'-0" Yes Floor 2 to 4 from shield wall between E and F to column line H 135'-3" 0'-6" Yes Floor From 4 to 4.1 and E to H 135'-3" 1'-0" Yes Floor From 9 to 13 and E to I.1 117'-6" 0'-6" Yes Floor From 9 to 13 and E to I.1 135'-3" 0'-8" Yes Containment Filtration Rm A (North Wall)

Between column line E to H From 135'-3" to 158'-0" 1'-0" Yes Containment Filtration Rm A (East wall)

Between column line E to F From 135'-3" to 158'

-0" 1'-0" Yes Containment Filtration Rm A (West wall)

Between column line G to H From 135'-3" to 158'

-0" 1'-0" Yes Containment Filtration Rm A (Floor) Between column line E to H 135'-3" 1'-0" Yes Containment Filtration Rm B (Floor) Between column line E to H 146'-3" 0'-6" Yes Containment Filtration Rm B (West wall)

Between column line G to H From 146'-3" to 158'

-0" 1'-0" Yes C-4 45 Table 3.3-1 (cont.) Definition of Wall Thicknesses for Nuclear Island Buildings, Turbine Building, and Annex Building (1) Wall or Section Description Column Lines Floor Elevation or Elevation Range Concrete Thickness (2)(3) Applicable Radiation Shielding Wall (Yes/No) Turbine Building Wall adjacent to Column Line I.2 From Col. Line 11.05 to 11.2 From 100'-0" to 161'

-0" 2'-0" No Wall along Column Line 11.2 From near I.2 to near Col. Line R From 100'-0" to 161'

-0" 2'-0" No Wall adjacent to Column Line R From Col. Line 11.2 to Col. Line 11.05 From 100'-0" to 161'

-0" 2'-0" No Wall along Column Line 11.05 From near Col. Line R to Col. Line Q From Col. Line K.4 to near Col. Line I.2 From 100'-0" to 161'

-0" From 100'-0" to 161'

-0" 2'-0" 2'-0" No No C-446 Table 3.3-2 Nuclear Island Building Room Boundaries Required to Have Flood Barrier Floors and Walls Boundary/ Maximum Flood Level (inches)

Between Room Number to Room Number Room with Postulated Flooding Source Adjacent Room Floor/36 12306 12211 Floor/3 12303 12203/12207 Floor/3 12313 12203/12207 Floor/1 12300 12201/12202/12207 12203/12204/12205 Floor/3 12312 12212 Wall/36 12306 12305 Floor/1 12401 12301/12302/12303 12312/12313 Wall/1 12401 12411/12412 Floor/36 12404 12304 Floor/4 12405 12305 Floor/36 12406 12306 Wall/36 12404 12401 Wall/1 12421 12452 Floor/3 12501 12401/12411/12412 Floor/3 12555 12421/12423/12422 Wall/36 12156/12158 12111/12112

C-447 Table 3.3-3 Class 1E Divisions in Nuclear Island Fire Areas Fire Area Number Class 1E Divisions A C B D Auxiliary Building Radiologically Controlled 1200 AF 01 Yes Yes - - 1204 AF 01 Yes - - - Auxiliary Building Non

-Radiologically Controlled 1200 AF 03

- - Yes Yes 1201 AF 02

- - Yes - 1201 AF 03

- - - Yes 1201 AF 04

- - Yes Yes 1201 AF 05

- - Yes Yes 1201 AF 06

- - Yes Yes 1202 AF 03

- Yes - - 1202 AF 04 Yes - - - 1220 AF 01

- - Yes Yes 1220 AF 02

- - - Yes 1230 AF 01 Yes Yes - - 1230 AF 02

- - Yes Yes 1240 AF 01 Yes Yes - - 1242 AF 02 Yes - Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

Table 3.3-4 is not used.

C-448 Table 3.3-5 Key Dimensions of Nuclear Island Building Features Key Dimension Reference Dimension (Figure 3.3

-14) Nominal Dimension Tolerance Distance between Outside Surface of walls at Column Line I &

N when Measured at Column Line 1 X1 91 ft-0 in +3 ft -1 ft Distance from Outside Surface of wall at Column Line 1 to Column Line 7 when Measured at Column Line I X2 138 ft-0 in +3 ft -1 ft Distance from Outside Surface of wall at Column Line 11 to Column Line 7 when Measured at Column Line I X3 118 ft-0 in +3 ft -1 ft Distance between Outside Surface of walls at Column Line I & Q when Measured at Column Line 11 X4 117 ft-6 in +3 ft -1 ft Distance from Outside Surface of wall at Column Line Q to Column Line N when Measured at Column Line 11 X5 29 ft-0 in +3 ft -1 ft Distance between Outside Surface of shield building wall to shield building centerline when Measured on West Edge of Shield Building X6 72 ft-6 in +3 ft -1 ft Distance between shield building centerline to Reactor Vessel centerline when Measured along Column Line N in North-South Direction X7 7 ft-6 in +/- 3 in Distance from Bottom of Containment Sump to Top Surface of Embedded Containment Shell

- 2 ft-8 in +/- 3 in Distance from top of Basemat to Design Plant Grade

- 33 ft-6 in +/- 1 ft Distance of Design Plant Grade (Floor elevation 100'

-0") relative to Site Grade

- 0 ft +/- 3 ft-6 in Distance from Design Plant Grade to Top Surface of Shield Building Roof

- 229 ft-0 in +/- 1 ft C-449 Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 762 3.3.00.01 1. The physical arrangement of the nuclear island structures and the annex building is as described in the Design Description of this Section 3.3 and Figures 3.3

-1 through 3.3

-14. The physical arrangement of the radwaste building, the turbine building, and the diesel generator building is as described in the Design Description of this Section 3.3. An inspection of the nuclear island structures, the annex building, the radwaste building, the turbine building, and the diesel generator building will be performed.

The as-built nuclear island structures, the annex building, the radwaste building, th e

turbine building, and the diesel generator building conform with the physical arrangement as described in the Design Description of this Section 3.3 and Figures 3.3

-1 through 3.3

-14. 763 3.3.00.02a.i.a 2.a) The nuclear island structures, including the critical sections listed in Table 3.3-7, are seismic Category I and are designed and constructed to withstand design basis loads as specified in the Design Description, without loss of structural integrity and the safety

-related functions.

i) An inspection of the nuclear island structures will be performed. Deviations from the design due to as

-built conditions will be analyzed for the design basis loads.

i.a) A report exists which reconciles deviations during construction and concludes that the as

-built containment internal structures, including the critical sections, conform to the approved design and will withstand the design basis loads specified in the Design Description without loss of structural integrity or the safety-related functions.

764 3.3.00.02a.i.b 2.a) The nuclear island structures, including the critical sections listed in Table 3.3-7, are seismic Category I and are designed and constructed to withstand design basis loads as specified in the Design Description, without loss of structural integrity and the safety

-related functions.

i) An inspection of the nuclear island structures will be performed. Deviations from the design due to as

-built conditions will be analyzed for the design basis loads.

i.b) A report exists which reconciles deviations during construction and concludes that the as-built shield building structures, including the critical sections, conform to the approved design and will withstand the design basis loads specified in the Design Description without loss of structural integrity or the safety-related functions.

C-450 Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 765 3.3.00.02a.i.c 2.a) The nuclear island structures, including the critical sections listed in Table 3.3-7, are seismic Category I and are designed and constructed to withstand design basis loads as specified in the Design Description, without loss of structural integrity and the safety

-related functions.

i) An inspection of the nuclear island structures will be performed. Deviations from the design due to as

-built conditions will be analyzed for the design basis loads.

i.c) A report exists which reconciles deviations during construction and concludes that the as-built structures in the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building, including the critical sections, conform to the approved design and will withstand the design basis loads specified in the Design Description without loss of structural integrity or the safety

-related functions.

766 3.3.00.02a.i.d 2.a) The nuclear island structures, including the critical sections listed in Table 3.3-7, are seismic Category I and are designed and constructed to withstand design basis loads as specified in the Design Description, without loss of structural integrity and the safety

-related functions.

i) An inspection of the nuclear island structures will be performed. Deviations from the design due to as

-built conditions will be analyzed for the design basis loads.

i.d) A report exists which reconciles deviations during construction and concludes that the as

-built structures in the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building, including the critical sections, conform to the approved design and will withstand the design basis loads specified in the Design Description without loss of structural integrity or the safety

-related functions.

7 67 3.3.00.02a.ii.a 2.a) The nuclear island structures, including the critical sections listed in Table 3.3-7, are seismic Category I and are designed and constructed to withstand design basis loads as specified in the Design Description, without loss of structural integrity and the safety

-related functions.

ii) An inspection of the as

-built concrete thickness will be performed.

ii.a) A report exists that concludes that the containment internal structures as

-built concrete thicknesses conform to the building sections defined in Table 3.3-1. 768 3.3.00.02a.ii.b 2.a) The nuclear island structures, including the critical sections listed in Table 3.3-7, are seismic Category I and are designed and constructed to withstand design basis loads as specified in the Design Description, without loss of structural integrity and the safety

-related functions.

ii) An inspection of the as

-built concrete thickness will be performed.

ii.b) A report exists that concludes that the as

-built concrete thicknesses of the shield building sections conform to the building sections defined in Table 3.3-1.

C-451 Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 769 3.3.00.02a.ii.c 2.a) The nuclear island structures, including the critical sections listed in Table 3.3-7, are seismic Category I and are designed and constructed to

withstand design basis loads as specified in the Design Description, without loss of structural integrity and the safety

-related functions.

ii) An inspection of the as

-built concrete thickness will be performed.

ii.c) A report exists that concludes that as

-built concrete thicknesses of the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building sections conform to the building sections defined in Table 3.3-1. 770 3.3.00.02a.ii.d 2.a) The nuclear island structures, including the critical sections listed in Table 3.3-7, are seismic Category I and are designed and constructed to withstand design basis loads as specified in the Design Description, without loss of structural integrity and the safety

-related functions.

ii) An inspection of the as

-built concrete thickness will be performed.

ii.d) A report exists that concludes that the as

-built concrete thicknesses of the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building sections conform to the building sections defined in Table 3.3-1. 771 3.3.00.02a.ii.e 2.a) The nuclear island structures, including the critical sections listed in Table 3.3-7, are seismic Category I and are designed and constructed to withstand design basis loads as specified in the Design Description, without loss of structural integrity and the safety

-related functions.

ii) An inspection of the as

-built concrete thickness will be performed.

ii.e) A report exists that concludes that the as

-built concrete thicknesses of the annex building sections conform with the building sections defined in Table 3.3-1. 772 3.3.00.02a.ii.f 2.a) The nuclear island structures, including the critical sections listed in Table 3.3-7, are seismic Category I and are designed and constructed to withstand design basis loads as specified in the Design Description, without loss of structural integrity and the safety

-related functions.

ii) An inspection of the as

-built concrete thickness will be performed.

ii.f) A report exists that concludes that the as

-built concrete thicknesses of the turbine building sections conform to the building sections defined in Table 3.3-1. 773 3.3.00.02b 2.b) Site grade level is located relative to floor elevation 100'

-0" per Table 3.3-5. Inspection of the as

-built site grade will be conducted.

Site grade is consistent with design plant grade within the dimension defined on Table 3.3-5. 774 3.3.00.02c 2.c) The containment and its penetrations are designed and constructed to ASME Code Section III, Class MC.(2) See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, and 3.b. See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, Items 2.a, 2.b, 3.a, and 3.b.

2. Containment isolation devices are addressed in subsection 2.2.1, Containment System.

C-452 Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 775 3.3.00.02d 2.d) The containment and its penetrations retain their pressure boundary integrity associated with the design pressure.

See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, Items 4.a and 4.b. See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, Items 4.a and 4.b. 776 3.3.00.02e 2.e) The containment and its penetrations maintain the containment leakage rate less than the maximum allowable leakage rate associated with the peak containment pressure for the design basis accident.

Se e ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, Items 4.a, 4.b, and 7. See ITAAC Table 2.2.1-3, Items 4.a, 4.b, and 7.

777 3.3.00.02f 2.f) The key dimensions of nuclear island structures are defined on Table 3.3-5. An inspection will be performed of the as-built configuration of the nuclear island structures.

A report exists and concludes that the key dimensions of the

as-built nuclear island structures are consistent with the dimensions defined on Table 3.3-5. 778 3.3.00.02g 2.g) The containment vessel greater than 7 feet above the operating deck provides a heat transfer surface. A free volume exists inside the containment shell above the operating deck.

The maximum containment vessel inside height from the operating deck is measured and the inner radius below the spring

line is measured at two orthogonal radial directions at one elevation.

The containment vessel maximum inside height from the operating deck is 146'

-7" (with tolerance of +12", -6"), and the inside diameter is

130 feet nominal (with tolerance of +12", -6"). 779 3.3.00.02h 2.h) The free volume in the containment allows for floodup to support long

-term core cooling for postulated loss

-of-coolant accidents.

An inspection will be performed of the as-built containment structures and equipment. The portions of the containment included in this inspection are the volumes that flood with a loss-of-coolant accident in passive core cooling system valve/equipment room B (11207). The in

-containment refueling water storage tank volume is excluded from this inspection.

A report exists and concludes that the floodup volume of this portion of the containment is less than 73,500 ft 3 to an elevation of 108'.

C-453 Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 780 3.3.00.03a

3. Walls and floors of the nuclear island structures as defined on Table 3.3-1 except for designed openings or penetrations provide shielding during normal operations.

Inspection of the as

-built nuclear island structures wall and floor thicknesses will be performed.

a) A report exists and concludes that the shield walls and floors of the containment

internal structures as defined in Table 3.3-1, except for designed openings or penetrations, are consistent with the concrete wall thicknesses provided in Table 3.3-1. 781 3.3.00.03b

3. Walls and floors of the nuclear island structures as defined on Table 3.3-1 except for designed openings or penetrations provide shielding during normal operations.

Inspection of the as

-built nuclear island structures wall and floor thicknesses will be performed.

b) A report exists and concludes that the shield walls of the shield building structures as defined in Table 3.3-1 except for designed openings or penetrations are consistent with the concrete wall thicknesses provided in Table 3.3-1. 782 3.3.00.03c

3. Walls and floors of the nuclear island structures as defined on Table 3.3-1 except for designed openings or penetrations provide shielding during normal operations.

Inspection of the as

-built nuclear island structures wall and floor thicknesses will be performed.

c) A report exists and concludes that the shield walls and floors of the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building as defined in Table 3.3-1 except for designed openings or penetrations are consistent with the concrete wall thicknesses provided in Table 3.3-1. 783 3.3.00.03d

3. Walls and floors of the nuclear island structures as defined on Table 3.3-1 except for designed openings or penetrations provide shielding during normal operations.

Inspection of the as

-built nuclear island structures wall and floor thicknesses will be performed. d) A report exists and concludes that the shield walls and floors of the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building as defined in Table 3.3-1 except for designed openings or penetrations are consistent with the concrete wall thicknesses provided in Table 3.3-1.

C-454 Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 784 3.3.00.04a 4.a) Walls and floors of the annex building as defined on Table 3.3-1 except for designed openings or penetrations provide shielding during normal operations.

Inspection of the as

-built annex building wall and floor thicknesses will be performed.

A report exists and concludes that the shield walls and floors of the annex building as defined on Table 3.3-1 except for designed openings or penetrations are consistent with the minimum concrete wall thicknesses provided in Table 3.3-1. 785 3.3.00.04b 4.b) Walls of the waste accumulation room in the radwaste building except for designed openings or penetrations provide shielding during normal operations.

Inspection of the as

-built radwaste building wall thicknesses will be performed.

A report exists and concludes that the shield walls of the waste accumulation room in the radwaste building except for designed openings or penetrations are consistent with the minimum concrete wall thicknesses of 1'-4". 786 3.3.00.04c 4.c) Walls of the packaged waste storage room in the radwaste building except for designed openings or penetrations provide shielding during normal operations.

Inspection of the as

-built radwaste building wall thicknesses will be performed.

A report exists and concludes that the shield walls of the packaged waste storage room in the radwaste building except for the wall shared with the waste accumulation room and designed openings or penetrations are consistent with the minimum concrete wall thicknesses of 2'.

787 3.3.00.05a 5.a) Exterior walls and the basemat of the nuclear island have a water barrier up to site grade.

An inspection of the as

-built water barrier will be performed during construction.

A report exists that confirms that a water barrier exists on the nuclear island exterior walls up to site grade.

788 3.3.00.05b 5.b) The boundaries between rooms identified in Table 3.3

-2 of the auxiliary building are designed to prevent flooding of rooms that contain safety-related equipment.

An inspection of the auxiliary building rooms will be performed.

A report exists that confirms floors and walls as identified on Table 3.3-2 have provisions to prevent flooding between rooms up to the maximum flood levels for each room defined in Table 3.3

-2.

C-455 Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 789 3.3.00.05c 5.c) The boundaries between the following rooms, which contain safety-related equipment

- PXS valve/accumulator room A (11205),

PXS valve/accumulator room B (11207), and CVS room (11209)

- are designed to prevent flooding between these rooms. An inspection of the boundaries between the following rooms which contain safety

-related equipment

- PXS Valve/ Accumulator Room A (11205),

PXS Valve/Accumulator Room B (11207), and CVS Room (11209)

- will be performed.

A report exists that confirm s that flooding of the PXS Valve/ Accumulator Room A (11205), and the PXS/Accumulator Room B (11207) is prevented to a maximum flood level as follows: PXS A 110'-2", PXS B 110'-1"; and of the CVS room (11209) to a maximum flood level of 110'-0". 790 3.3.00.06a 6.a) The available room volumes of the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building between floor elevations 66'-6" and 82'-6" exceed the volume of the liquid radwaste storage tanks (WLS

-MT-05A, MT-05B, MT-06A, MT-06B, MT-07A, MT-07B, MT-07C, MT-11). An inspection will be performed of the as-built radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building between floor elevations 66'

-6" and 82'

-6" to define volume.

A report exists and concludes that the as

-built available room volumes of the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building between floor elevations

66'-6" and 82'-6" exceed the volume of the liquid radwaste storage tanks (WLS

-MT-05A, MT-05B, MT-06A, MT-06B, MT-07A, MT-07B, MT-07C, MT-11). 791 3.3.00.06b 6.b) The radwaste building package waste storage room has a volume greater than or equal to 1293 cubic feet. An inspection of the radwaste building packaged waste storage room (50352) is performed.

The volume of the radwaste building packaged waste storage room (50352) is greater than or equal to

1293 cubic feet.

792 3.3.00.07aa 7.a) Class 1E electrical cables, communication cables associated with only one division, and raceways are identified according to applicable color-coded Class 1E divisions.

Inspections of the as-built Class 1E cables and raceways will be conducted.

a) Class 1E electrical cables, and communication cables inside containment associated with only one division, and raceways are identified by the appropriate color code.

793 3.3.00.07ab 7.a) Class 1E electrical cables, communication cables associated with only one division, and raceways are identified according to applicable color-coded Class 1E divisions.

Inspections of the as

-built Class 1E cables and raceways will be conducted.

b) Class 1E electrical cables, and communication cables in the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building associated with only one division, and raceways are identified by the appropriate color code.

C-456 Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 794 3.3.00.07ac 7.a) Class 1E electrical cables, communication cables associated with only one division, and raceways are identified according to applicable color-coded Class 1E divisions.

Inspections of the as

-built Class 1E cables and raceways will be conducted.

c) Class 1E electrical cables, and communication cables in the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building associated with only one division, and raceways are identified by the appropriate color code.

795 3.3.00.07ba 7.b) Class 1E divisional electrical cables and communication cables associated with only one division are routed in their respective divisional raceways. Inspections of the as

-built Class 1E divisional cables and raceways will be conducted.

a) Class 1E electrical cables and communication cables inside containment associated with only one division are routed in raceways assigned to the same division. There are no other safety division electrical cables in a raceway assigned to a different division. 796 3.3.00.07bb 7.b) Class 1E divisional electrical cables and communication cables associated with only one division are routed in their respective divisional raceways. Inspections of the as

-built Class 1E divisional cables and raceways will be conducted.

b) Class 1E electrical cables and communication cables in the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building associated with only one division are routed in raceways assigned to the same division. There are no other safety division electrical cables in a raceway assigned to a different division. 797 3.3.00.07bc 7.b) Class 1E divisional electrical cables and communication cables associated with only one division are routed in their respective divisional raceways. Inspections of the as

-built Class 1E divisional cables and raceways will be conducted.

c) Class 1E electrical cables and communication cables in the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building associated with only one division are routed in raceways assigned to the same division. There are no other safety division electrical cables in a raceway assigned to a different division.

C-457 Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 798 3.3.00.07c.i.a 7.c) Separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions in accordance with the fire areas as identified in Table 3.3-3. i) Inspections of the as

-built Class 1E division electrical cables, communication cables associated with only one division, and raceways located in the fire areas identified in Table 3.3-3 will be conducted.

i.a) Results of the inspection will confirm that the separation between Class 1E divisions in the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building is consistent with Table 3.3

-3. 799 3.3.00.07c.i.b 7.c) Separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions in accordance with the fire areas as identified in Table 3.3-3. i) Inspections of the as-built Class 1E division electrical cables, communication cables associated with only one division, and raceways located in the fire areas identified in Table 3.3-3 will be conducted.

i.b) Results of the inspection will confirm that the separation between Class 1E divisions in the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building is consistent with Table 3.3-3. 800 3.3.00.07c.ii.a 7.c) Separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions in accordance with the fire areas as identified in Tab le 3.3-3. ii) Inspections of the as

-built fire barriers between the fire areas identified in Table 3.3

-3 will be conducted.

ii.a) Results of the inspection will confirm that fire barriers exist between fire areas identified in Table 3.3-3 inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building. 801 3.3.00.07c.ii.b 7.c) Separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions in accordance with the fire areas as identified in Table 3.3-3. ii) Inspections of the as

-built fire barriers between the fire areas identified in Table 3.3

-3 will be conducted.

ii.b) Results of the inspection will confirm that fire barriers exist between fire areas identified in Table 3.3-3 inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building.

802 3.3.00.07d.i 7.d) Physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cables.

Inspections of the as

-built Class 1E raceways will be performed to confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

i) Within the main control room and remote shutdown room, the minimum vertical separation is

3 inches and the minimum horizontal separation i s 1 inch. Results of the inspection will confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

i) Within the main control room and remote shutdown room, the vertical separation is 3 inches or more and the horizontal separation is 1 inch or more.

C-458 Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 803 3.3.00.07d.ii.a 7.d) Physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cables.

Inspections of the as

-built Class 1E raceways will be performed to confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

ii) Within other plant areas (limited hazard areas), the minimum separation is defined by one of the following:

1) The minimum vertical separation is 5 feet and the minimum horizontal separation is 3 feet.

2) The minimum vertical separation is 12 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 6 inches for raceways containing only instrumentation and control and low

-voltage power cables <2/0 AWG. 3) For configurations that involve exclusively limited energy content cables (instrumentation and control),

the minimum vertical separation is 3 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 1 inch. 4) For configurations involving an enclosed raceway and an open raceway, the minimum vertical separation is 1 inch if the enclosed raceway is below the open raceway.

5) For configuration involving enclosed raceways, the minimum separation is 1 inch in both horizontal and vertical directions.

Results of the inspection will confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceway s and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

ii.a) Within other plant areas inside containment (limited hazard areas), the separation meets one of the following:

1) The vertical separation is

5 feet or more and the horizontal separation is 3 feet or more except.

2) The minimum vertical separation is 12 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 6 inches for raceways containing only instrumentation and control and low-voltage power cables <2/0 AWG. 3) For configurations that involve exclusively limited energy content cables (instrumentation and control),

the minimum vertical separation is 3 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 1 inch. 4) For configurations that involve an enclosed raceway and an open raceway, the minimum vertical separation is 1 inch if the enclosed raceway is below the raceway.

5) For configurations that involve enclosed raceways, the minimum vertical and horizontal separation is 1 inch.

C-459 Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 804 3.3.00.07d.ii.b 7.d) Physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cables.

Inspections of the as

-built Class 1E raceways will be performed to confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

ii) Within other plant areas (limited hazard areas), the minimum separation is defined by one of the following:

1) The minimum vertical separation is 5 feet and the minimum horizontal separatio n is 3 feet.

2) The minimum vertical separation is 12 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 6 inches for raceways containing only instrumentation and control and low

-voltage power cables <2/0 AWG. 3) For configurations that involve exclusively limited energy content cables (instrumentation and control),

the minimum vertical separation is 3 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 1 inch. 4) For configurations involving an enclosed raceway and an open raceway, the minimum vertical separation is 1 inch if the enclosed raceway is below the open raceway.

5) For configuration involving enclosed raceways, the minimum separation is 1 inch in both horizontal and vertical directions.

Results of the inspection will confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

ii.b) Within other plant areas inside the non

-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (limited hazard

areas), the separation meets one of the following:

1) The vertical separation is

5 feet or more and the horizontal separation is 3 feet or more except.

2) The minimum vertical separation is 12 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 6 inches for

raceways containing only instrumentation and control and low-voltage power cables

< 2/0 AWG. 3) For configurations that involve exclusively limited energy content cables (instrumentation and control),

the minimum vertical separation is 3 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 1 inch. 4) For configurations that involve an enclosed raceway, the minimum vertical separation is 1 inch if the enclosed raceway is below the raceway. 5) For configurations that involve enclosed raceways, the minimum vertical and horizontal separation is 1 inch.

C-460 Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 805 3.3.00.07d.ii.c 7.d) Physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cables.

Inspections of the as

-built Class 1E raceways will be performed to confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

ii) Within other plant areas (limited hazard areas), the minimum separation is defined

by one of the following:

1) The minimum vertical separation is 5 feet and the minimum horizontal separation is 3 feet.

2) The minimum vertical separation is 12 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 6 inches for raceways containing only instrumentation and control and low

-voltage power cables <2/0 AWG. 3) For configurations that involve exclusively limited energy content cables (instrumentation and control),

the minimum vertical separation is 3 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 1 inch. 4) For configurations involving an enclosed raceway and an open raceway, the minimum vertical separation is 1 inch if the enclosed raceway is below the open raceway.

5) For configuration involving enclosed raceways, the minimum separation is 1 inch in both horizontal and vertical directions.

Results of the inspection will confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

ii.c) Within other plant areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building (limited hazard areas), the separation meets one of the following:

1) The vertical separation is

5 feet or more and the horizontal separation is 3 feet or more except. 2) The minimum vertical separation is 12 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 6 inches for raceways containing only instrumentation and control and low-voltage power cables < 2/0 AWG. 3) For configurations that involve exclusively limited energy content cables (instrumentation and control),

the minimum vertical separation is 3 inches and the minimum horizontal separation is 1 inch. 4) For configurations that involve an enclosed raceway and an open raceway, the minimum vertical separatio n is 1 inch if the enclosed raceway is below the raceway.

5) For configurations that involve enclosed raceways, the minimum vertical and horizontal separation is 1 inch.

C-461 Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 806 3.3.00.07d.iii.a 7.d) Physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cables.

Inspections of the as

-built Class 1E raceways will be performed to confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

iii) Where minimum separation distances are not maintained, the circuits are run in enclosed raceways or barriers are provided. Results of the inspection will confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

iii.a) Where minimum separation distances are not met inside containment, the circuits are run in enclosed raceways or barriers are

provided. 807 3.3.00.07d.iii.b 7.d) Physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cables.

Inspections of the as

-built Class 1E raceways will be performed to confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

iii) Where minimum separation distances are not maintained, the circuits are run in enclosed raceways or barriers are provided. Results of the inspection will confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

iii.b) Where minimum separation distances are not

met inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building, the circuits are run in enclosed raceways or barriers are provided. 808 3.3.00.07d.iii.c 7.d) Physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cables.

Inspections of the as

-built Class 1E raceways will be performed to confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

iii) Where minimum separation distances are not maintained, the circuits are run in enclosed raceways or barriers are provided. Results of the inspection will confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and

between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

iii.c) Where minimum separation distances are not met inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building, the circuits are run in enclosed raceways or barriers are provided.

C-462 Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 809 3.3.00.07d.iv.a 7.d) Physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cables.

Inspections of the as

-built Class 1E raceways will be performed to confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

iv) Separation distances less than those specified above and not run in enclosed raceways or provided with barriers are based on analysis Results of the inspection will confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

iv.a) For areas inside

containment, a report exists and concludes that separation distances less than those specified above and not provided with enclosed raceways or barriers have been analyzed.

810 3.3.00.07d.iv.b 7.d) Physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cables.

Inspections of the as

-built Class 1E raceways will be performed to confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

iv) Separation distances less than those specified above and not run in enclosed raceways or provided with barriers are based on analysis Results of the inspection will confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

iv.b) For areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building, a report exists and concludes that separation distances less than those specified above and not provided with enclosed raceways or barriers have been analyzed.

C-463 Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 811 3.3.00.07d.iv.c 7.d) Physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cables.

Inspections of the as

-built Class 1E raceways will be performed to confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

iv) Separation distances less than those specified above and not run in enclosed raceways or provided with barriers are based on analysis Results of the inspection will confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

iv.c) For areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building, a report exists and concludes that separation distances less than those specified above and

not provided with enclosed raceways or barriers have been analyzed.

812 3.3.00.07d.v.a 7.d) Physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cables.

Inspections of the as

-built Class 1E raceways will be performed to confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

v) Non-Class 1E wiring that is not separated from Class 1E or associated wiring by the minimum separation distance or by a barrier or analyzed is considered as associated circuits and subject to Class 1E requirements.

Results of the inspection will confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

v.a) For areas inside containment, non

-Class 1E wiring that is not separated from Class 1E or associated wiring by the minimum separation distance or by a barrier or analyzed is treated as Class 1E wiring.

C-464 Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 813 3.3.00.07d.v.b 7.d) Physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cables.

Inspections of the as

-built Class 1E raceways will be performed to confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

v) Non-Class 1E wiring that is not separated from Class 1E or associated wiring by the

minimum separation distance or by a barrier or analyzed is considered as associated circuits and subject to Class 1E requirements.

Results of the inspection will confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

v.b) For areas inside the non-radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building, non-Class 1E wiring that is not separated from Class 1E or associated wiring by the minimum separation distance or by a barrier or analyzed is treated as Class 1E wiring.

814 3.3.00.07d.v.c 7.d) Physical separation is maintained between Class 1E divisions and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cables.

Inspections of the as

-built Class 1E raceways will be performed to confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

v) Non-Class 1E wiring that is not separated from Class 1E or associated wiring by the minimum separation distance or by a barrier or analyzed is considered as associated circuits and subject to Class 1E requirements.

Results of the inspection will confirm that the separation between Class 1E raceways of different divisions and between Class 1E raceways and non-Class 1E raceways is consistent with the following:

v.c) For areas inside the radiologically controlled area of the auxiliary building, non

-Class 1E wiring that is not separated from Class 1E or associated wiring by the minimum separation distance or by a barrier or analyzed is treated as Class 1E wiring.

815 3.3.00.07e 7.e) Class 1E communication cables which interconnect two divisions are routed and separated such that the Protection and Safety Monitoring System voting logic is not defeated by the loss of any single raceway or fire area. Inspections of the as

-built Class 1E communication cables will be conducted.

Class 1E communication cables which interconnect two divisions are routed and separated such that the Protection and Safety Monitoring System voting logic is not defeated by the loss of any single raceway or fire area.

C-465 Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 816 3.3.00.08 8. Systems, structures, and components identified as essential targets are protected from the dynamic and environmental effects of postulated pipe ruptures.

Following as

-built reconciliation, an inspection will be performed of the as

-built high and moderate energy pipe rupture mitigation features for systems, structures, and components identified as essential targets.

An as-built Pipe Rupture Hazard Analysis Report exists and concludes that systems, structures, and components identified as essential targets can withstand the effects of postulated pipe rupture without loss of required safety function. 817 3.3.00.09 9. The reactor cavity sump has a minimum concrete thickness as shown in Table 3.3

-5 between the bottom of the sump and the steel containment.

An inspection of the as

-built containment building internal structures will be performed.

A report exists and concludes that the reactor cavity sump has a minimum concrete thickness as shown on Table 3.3-5 between the bottom of the sump and the steel containment.

818 3.3.00.10.i

10. The shield building roof and PCS storage tank support and retain the PCS water sources. The PCS storage tank has a stainless steel liner which provides a barrier on the inside surfaces of the tank. Leak chase channels are provided on the tank boundary liner welds.

i) A test will be performed to measure the leakage from the PCS storage tank based on measuring the water flow out of the leak chase collection system.

i) A report exists and concludes that total water flow from the leak chase collection system does not exceed

10 gal/hr. 819 3.3.00.10.ii

10. The shield building roof and PCS storage tank support and retain the PCS water sources. The PCS storage tank has a stainless steel liner which provides a barrier on the inside surfaces of the tank. Leak chase channels are provided on the tank boundary liner welds.

ii) An inspection of the PCS storage tank exterior tank boundary and shield building tension ring will be performed before and after filling of the PCS storage tank to the overflow level. The vertical elevation of the shield building roof will be measured at a location at the outer radius of the roof (tension ring) and at a location on the same azimuth at the outer radius of the PCS storage tank before and after filling the PCS storage tank. ii) A report exists and concludes that inspection and measurement of the PCS storage tank and the tension ring structure, before and after filling of the tank, shows structural behavior under normal loads to be acceptable.

C-466 Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 820 3.3.00.10.iii

10. The shield building roof and PCS storage tank support and retain the PCS water sources. The PCS storage tank has a stainless steel liner which provides a barrier on the inside surfaces of the tank. Leak chase channels are provided on the tank boundary liner welds.

iii) An inspection of the PCS storage tank exterior tank boundary and shield building tension ring will be performed before and after filling of the PCS storage tank to the overflow level. The boundaries of the PCS storage tank and the shield building roof above the tension ring will be inspected visually for excessive concrete cracking.

iii) A report exists and concludes that there is no visible water leakage from the PCS storage tank through the concrete and that there is no visible excessive cracking in the boundaries of the PCS storage tank and the shield building roof above the tension ring.

11. Deleted 821 3.3.00.12 12. The extended turbine generator axis intersects the shield building.

An inspection of the as

-built turbine generator will be performed.

The extended axis of the turbine generator intersects the shield building.

822 3.3.00.13 13. Separation is provided between the structural elements of the turbine, annex and radwaste buildings and the nuclear island structure. This separation permits horizontal motion of the buildings in the safe shutdown earthquake without impact between structural elements of the buildings.

An inspection of the separation of the nuclear island from the annex, radwaste and turbine building structures will be performed. The inspection will verify the specified horizontal clearance between structural elements of the adjacent buildings, consisting of the reinforced concrete walls and slabs, structural steel columns and floor beams.

The minimum horizontal clearance above floor

-structural elements of the annex and radwaste buildings and the nuclear island is

4 inches. The minimum horizontal clearance above

-between the structural elements of the turbine building and the nuclear island is 4 inches. 823 3.3.00.14 14. The external walls, doors, ceiling, and floors in the main control room, the central alarm station, and the secondary alarm station are bullet-resistant to at least Underwriters Laboratory Ballistic Standard 752, level 4. Type test, analysis, or a combination of type test and analysis will be performed for the external walls, doors, ceilings, and floors in the main control room, the central alarm station, and the secondary alarm station. A report exists and concludes that the external walls, doors, ceilings, and floors in the main control room, the central alarm station, and the secondary alarm station are bullet-resistant to at least Underwriters Laboratory Ballistic Standard 752, level 4.

15. Deleted

C-467 Table 3.3-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 824 3.3.00.16 16. Secondary security power supply system for alarm annunciator equipment and non

-portable communications equipment is located within a vital area.

An inspection will be performed to ensure that the location of the secondary security power supply equipment for alarm annunciator equipment and non

-portable communications equipment is within a vital area.

Secondary security power supply equipment for alarm annunciator equipment and non-portable communication equipment is located within a vital area.

825 3.3.00.17 17. Vital areas are locked and alarmed with active intrusion detection systems that annunciate in the central and secondary alarm stations upon intrusion into a vital area.

An inspection of the as

-built vital areas, and central and secondary alarm stations are performed.

Vital areas are locked and alarmed with active intrusion detection systems and intrusion is detected and annunciated in both the central and secondary alarm stations.

18. Deleted

C-468 Table 3.3-7 Nuclear Island Critical Structural Sections Containment Internal Structures South west wall of the refueling cavity South wall of the west steam generator cavity North east wall of the in

-containment refueling water storage tank In-containment refueling water storage tank steel wall Column supporting the operating floor Auxiliary and Shield Building South wall of auxiliary building (column line 1), elevation 66'

-6" to elevation 180'

-0" Interior wall of auxiliary building (column line 7.3), elevation 66'

-6" to elevation 160'

-6" West wall of main control room in auxiliary building (column line L), elevation 117'

-6" to elevation 153'

-0" North wall of MSIV east compartment (column line 11 between lines L and M), elevation 117'-6" to elevation 153'-0" Roof slab at elevation 180'

-0" adjacent to shield building cylinder Floor slab on metal decking at elevation 135'

-3" 2'-0" slab in auxiliary building (tagging room ceiling) at elevation 135'

-3" Finned floor in the main control room at elevation 135'

-3" Shield building roof, exterior wall of the PCS water storage tank Shield building roof, interior wall of the PCS water storage tank Shield building roof, tension ring and air inlets Divider wall between the spent fuel pool and the fuel transfer canal Shield building SC cylinder Shield building SC to RC connection Nuclear Island Basemat Below Auxiliary Building Bay between reference column lines 9.1 and 11, and K and L Bay between reference column lines 1 and 2 and K

-2 and N Figure s 3.3-1 t hrough 3.3

-1 4 contain Security-R elated Information.

(S ee Attachment 1 to Tu rkey P oint U nit COL Appendix C)

C-469 3.4 Initial Test Program No ITAAC for this system

. 3.5 Radiation Monitoring Design Description Radiation monitoring is provided for those plant areas where there is a significant potential for airborne contamination, for those process and effluent streams where contamination is possible, and in accessible areas to provide indication of unusual radiological events as identified in Tables 3.5

-1, 3.5-2, 3.5-3, 3.5-4, and 3.5

-5. The radiation monitoring component locations ar e as shown in Table 3.5-7. 1. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5

-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

2. The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 3.5

-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

3. Separation is provided between system Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non-Class 1E cable.

4. Safety-related displays identified in Table 3.5

-1 can be retrieved in the main control room (MCR). 5. The process radiation monitors listed in Table 3.5

-2 are provided.

6. The effluent radiation monitors listed in Table 3.5

-3 are provided.

7. The airborne radiation monitors listed in Table 3.5

-4 are provided.

8. The area radiation monitors listed in Table 3.5

-5 are provided.

C-470 Table 3.5-1 Equipment Name Tag No. Seismic Cat. I Class 1E Qual. for Harsh Envir. Safety-Related Display Containment High Range Monitor PXS-RE160 Yes Yes Yes Yes Containment High Range Monitor PXS-RE161 Yes Yes Yes Yes Containment High Range Monitor PXS-RE162 Yes Yes Yes Yes Containment High Range Monitor PXS-RE163 Yes Yes Yes Yes MCR Radiation Monitoring Package A (1) VBS-JS01A Yes Yes No No MCR Radiation Monitoring Package B (1) VBS-JS01B Yes Yes No No Containment Atmosphere Monitor (Gaseous)

PSS-RE026 Yes No No No Containment Atmosphere Monitor (gaseous, for RCS pressure boundary leakage detection)

PSS-RE027 Yes No No No Notes: (1) Each MCR Radiation Monitoring Package includes particulate, iodine and gaseous radiation monitors.

C-471 Table 3.5-2 Process Radiation Monitors Equipment List Equipment No.

Steam Generator Blowdown BDS-RE010 Steam Generator Blowdown BDS-RE011 Component Cooling Water CCS-RE001 Main Steam Line (1) SGS-RY026 Main Steam Line (1) SGS-RY027 Service Water Blowdown SWS-RE008 Primary Sampling System Liquid Sample PSS-RE050 Primary Sampling System Gaseous Sample PSS-RE052 Containment Air Filtration Exhaust VFS-RE001 Gaseous Radwaste Discharge WGS-RE017 Note: 1. Each main steam line monitor includes a noble gas detector and primary

-to-secondary side leak detector.

Table 3.5-3 Effluent Radiation Monitors Equipment List Equipment No.

Plant Vent (Normal Range Particulate)

VFS-RE101 Plant Vent (Normal Range Iodine)

VFS-RE102 Plant Vent (Normal Range Radiogas)

VFS-RE103 Plant Vent (Mid Range Radiogas)

VFS-RE104A Plant Vent (High Range Radiogas)

VFS-RE104B Turbine Island Vent (1) TDS-RY001 Liquid Radwaste Discharge WLS-RE229 Wastewater Discharge WWS-RE021 Note: 1. The turbine island vent includes a low and a high range detector.

C-472 Table 3.5-4 Airborne Radiation Monitors Equipment List Equipment No.

Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Radiation Monitor VAS-RE001 Auxiliary Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor VAS-RE002 Annex Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor VAS-RE003 Health Physics and Hot Machine Shop Exhaust Radiation Monitor VHS-RE001 Radwaste Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor VRS-RE023 Table 3.5-5 Area Radiation Monitors Primary Sampling Room RMS-RE008 Containment Area

- Personnel Hatch Operating Deck (135'

-3" Elevation)

RMS-RE009 Main Control Room RMS-RE010 Chemistry Laboratory RMS-RE011 Fuel Handling Area 1 RMS-RE012 Rail Car Bay/Filter Storage Area (Auxiliary Building Loading Bay)

RMS-RE013 Liquid and Gaseous Radwaste Area (1) RMS-RY014 Control Support Area RMS-RE016 Radwaste Building Mobile Systems Facility RMS-RE017 Hot Machine Shop RMS-RE018 Annex Staging and Storage Area RMS-RE019 Fuel Handling Area 2 RMS-RE020 Containment Area

- Personnel Hatch Maintenance Level (100'

-0" Elevation)

RMS-RE021 Note: 1. This monitor includes multiple detectors to monitor the areas of interest.

C-473 Table 3.5-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 826 3.5.00.01.i 1. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

i) Inspection will be performed to verify that the seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

i) The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 is located on the Nuclear Island.

827 3.5.00.01.ii

1. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

ii) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses of seismic Category I equipment will be performed.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the seismic Category I equipment can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function. 828 3.5.00.01.iii

1. The seismic Category I equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 can withstand seismic design basis loads without loss of safety function.

iii) Inspection will be performed for the existence of a report verifying that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

iii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built equipment including anchorage is seismically bounded by the tested or analyzed conditions.

829 3.5.00.02.i

2. The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

i) Type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses will be performed on Class 1E equipment located in a harsh environment.

i) A report exists and concludes that Class 1E equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 as being located in a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

830 3.5.00.02.ii

2. The Class 1E equipment identified in Table 3.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment can withstand the environmental conditions that would exist before, during, and following a design basis accident without loss of safety function for the time required to perform the safety function.

ii) Inspection will be performed of the as-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations located in a harsh environment.

ii) A report exists and concludes that the as

-built Class 1E equipment and the associated wiring, cables, and terminations identified in Table 3.5-1 as being qualified for a harsh environment are bounded by type tests, analyses, or a combination of type tests and analyses.

831 3.5.00.03 3. Separation is provided between system Class 1E divisions, and between Class 1E divisions and non

-Class 1E cable. See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d). See ITAAC Table 3.3-6, item 7.d).

C-474 Table 3.5-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 832 3.5.00.04 4. Safety

-related displays identified in Table 3.5-1 can be retrieved in the MCR. Inspection will be performed for retrievability of the displays in the MCR. Safety-related displays identified in Table 3.5-1 can be retrieved in the MCR.

833 3.5.00.05 5. The process radiation monitors listed in Table 3.5

-2 are provided.

Inspection for the existence of the monitors will be performed.

Each of the monitors listed in Table 3.5-2 exists. 834 3.5.00.06 6. The effluent radiation monitors listed in Table 3.5

-3 are provided.

Inspection for the existence of the monitors will be performed.

Each of the monitors listed in Table 3.5-3 exists.

835 3.5.00.07 7. The airborne radiation monitors listed in Table 3.5

-4 are provided.

Inspection for the existence of the monitors will be performed.

Each of the monitors listed in Table 3.5-4 exists. 836 3.5.00.08 8. The area radiation monitors listed in Table 3.5-5 are provided.

Inspection for the existence of the monitors will be performed.

Each of the monitors listed in Table 3.5-5 exists. Table 3.5-7 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Containment High Range Radiation Monitor PXS-RE160 Containment Containment High Range Radiation Monitor PXS-RE161 Containment Containment High Range Radiation Monitor PXS-RE162 Containment Containment High Range Radiation Monitor PXS-RE163 Containment MCR Radiation Monitoring Package A VBS-RY01A Auxiliary Building MCR Radiation Monitoring Package B VBS-RY01B Auxiliary Building Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitor (Gaseous)

PSS-RE026 Auxiliary Building Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitor (gaseous, for RCS pressure boundary leakage detection)

PSS-RE027 Auxiliary Building Steam Generator Blowdown Radiation Monitor BDS-RE010 Turbine Building Steam Generator Blowdown Radiation Monitor BDS-RE011 Turbine Building Component Cooling Water Radiation Monitor CCS-RE001 Turbine Building Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor SGS-RY026 Auxiliary Building Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor SGS-RY027 Auxiliary Building Service Water Blowdown Radiation Monitor SWS-RE008 Turbine Building

C-475 Table 3.5-7 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Primary Sampling System Liquid Sample Radiation Monitor PSS-RE050 Auxiliary Building Primary Sampling System Gaseous Sample Radiation Monitor PSS-RE052 Auxiliary Building Containment Air Filtration Exhaust Radiation Monitor VFS-RE001 Annex Building Gaseous Radwaste Discharge Radiation Monitor WGS-RE017 Auxiliary Building Plant Vent (Normal Range Particulate) Radiation Monitor VFS-RE101 Auxiliary Building Plant Vent (Normal Range Iodine) Radiation Monitor VFS-RE102 Auxiliary Building Plant Vent (Normal Range Radiogas) Radiation Monitor VFS-RE103 Auxiliary Building Plant Vent (Mid Range Radiogas) Radiation Monitor VFS-RE104A Auxiliary Building Plant Vent (High Range Radiogas) Radiation Monitor VFS-RE104B Auxiliary Building Turbine Island Vent Radiation Monit or TDS-RY001 Turbine Building Liquid Radwaste Discharge Monitor WLS-RE229 Radwaste Building Wastewater Discharge Radiation Monitor WWS-RE021 Turbine Building Fuel Handling Area Exhaust Radiation Monitor VAS-RE001 Auxiliary Building Auxiliary Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor VAS-RE002 Auxiliary Building Annex Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor VAS-RE003 Auxiliary Building Health Physics and Hot Machine Shop Exhaust Radiation Monitor VHS-RE001 Annex Building Radwaste Building Exhaust Radiation Monitor VRS-RE023 Radwaste Building Primary Sampling Room RMS-RE008 Auxiliary Building Containment Area

- Personnel Hatch

- Operating Deck RMS-RE009 Auxiliary Building Main Control Room RMS-RE010 Auxiliary Building Chemistry Laboratory RMS-RE011 Auxiliary Building Fuel Handling Area 1 RMS-RE012 Auxiliary Building Rail Car Bay/Filter Storage Area (Auxiliary Building Loading Bay)

RMS-RE013 Auxiliary Building Liquid and Gaseous Radwaste Area RMS-RY014 Radwaste Building Control Support Area RMS-RE016 Annex Building Radwaste Building Mobile Systems Facility RMS-RE017 Radwaste Building

C-476 Table 3.5-7 Component Name Tag No. Component Location Hot Machine Shop RMS-RE018 Annex Building Annex Staging and Storage Area RMS-RE019 Annex Building Fuel Handling Area 2 RMS-RE020 Auxiliary Building Containment Area

- Personnel Hatch

- Maintenance Level RMS-RE021 Auxiliary Building

3.6 Reactor

Coolant Pressure Boundary Leak Detection Design Description The reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage detection monitoring provides a means of detecting and quantifying the reactor coolant leakage. To detect unidentified leakage inside containment, the following diverse methods are provided to quantify and assist in locating the leakage: Containment Sump Level Reactor Coolant System Inventory Balance Containment Atmosphere Radiation Leakage detection monitoring is accomplished using instrumentation and other components of several systems.

1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety

-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.

Table 3.6-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 837 3.6.00.01.i 1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety

-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.

See sections:

i) See ITAAC Table 2.3.10-4, Item 7.a for the sump level measuring instruments WLS-034 and WLS-035. See sections:

i) See ITAAC Table 2.3.10-4, Item 7.a for the sump level measuring instruments WLS-034 and WLS-035. 838 3.6.00.01.ii

1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety

-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.

See sections:

ii) See ITAAC Table 3.5-6, Item 1 for the containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor PSS

-RE027. See ITAAC sections: ii) See ITAAC Table 3.5-6, Item 1 for the containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor PSS

-RE027.

C-477 Table 3.6-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 839 3.6.00.01.iii

1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety

-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.

See sections:

iii) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4 , Items 5a, 7a, and 10 for the pressurizer level measuring instruments RCS

-195A, RCS-195B, RCS-195C, and RCS-195D. See sections:

iii) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, Items 5a, 7a, and 10 for the pressurizer level measuring instruments RCS

-195A, RCS-195B, RCS-195C, and RCS-195D. 840 3.6.00.01.iv

1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety

-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.

See sections:

iv) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4 , Items 5a and 7a for the RCS hot and cold leg temperature instruments RCS

-121A, RCS-121B, RCS-121C, RCS-121D, RCS-122A, RCS-122B, RCS-122C, RCS-122D, RCS-131A, RCS-131B, RCS-131C, RCS-131D, RCS-132A, RCS-132B, RCS-132C, and RCS-132D. See sections:

iv) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4 , Items 5a and 7a for the RCS hot and cold leg temperature instruments RCS

-121A, RCS-121B, RCS-121C, RCS-121D, RCS-122A, RCS-122B, RCS-122C, RCS-122D, RCS-131A, RCS-131B, RCS-131C, RCS-131D, RCS-132A, RCS-132B, RCS-132C, and RCS-132D. 841 3.6.00.01.v

1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety

-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.

See sections:

v) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, Items 5a, 7a, and 10 for the RCS pressure instruments RCS

-140A, RCS-140B, RCS-140C, and RCS-140D. See sections:

v) See ITAAC Table 2.1.2-4, Items 5a, 7a, and 10 for the RCS pressure instruments RCS-140A, RCS-140B, RCS-140C, and RCS

-140D. 842 3.6.00.01.vi

1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety

-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.

See sections:

vi) See ITAAC Table 2.3.2-4, Item 13 for the letdown and makeup flow instruments CVS-001 and CVS-025. See sections:

vi) See ITAAC Table 2.3.2-4 , Item 13 for the letdown and makeup flow instruments CVS-001 and CVS-025. 843 3.6.00.01.vii

1. The diverse leak detection methods provide the nonsafety

-related function of detecting small leaks when RCS leakage indicates possible reactor coolant pressure boundary degradation.

vii) See ITAAC Table 2.3.10-4, Item 10 for the reactor coolant drain tank level instrument WLS-002. vii) See ITAAC Table 2.3.10-4, Item 10 for the reactor coolant drain tank level instrument WLS

-002.

C-478 3.7 Design Reliability Assurance Program The Design Reliability Assurance Program (D

-RAP) is a program that will be performed during the detailed design and equipment specification phase prior to initial fuel load. The D

-RAP evaluates and sets priorities for the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) in the design, based on their degree of risk significance. The risk

-significant components are listed in Table 3.7-1. The objective of the D

-RAP program is to provide reasonable assurance that risk

-significant SSCs (Table 3.7-1) are designed such that: (1) assumptions from the risk analysis are utilized, (2) SSCs (Table 3.7-1) when challenged, function in accordance with the assumed reliability, (3) SSCs (Table 3.7-1) whose failure results in a reactor trip, function in accordance with the assumed reliability, and (4) maintenance actions to achieve the assumed reliability are identified.

1. The D-RAP ensures that the design of SSCs within the scope of the reliability assurance program (Table 3.7

-1) is consistent with the risk insights and key assumptions (e.g., SSC design, reliability, and availability).

Tabl e 3.7-1 Risk-Significant Components Equipment Name Tag No. Component Cooling Water System (CCS)

Component Cooling Water Pumps CCS-MP-01A/B Containment System (CNS)

Containment Vessel CNS-MV-01 Hydrogen Igniters VLS-EH-1 through

-64 Chemical and Volume Control System (CVS)

Makeup Pumps CVS-MP-01A/B Makeup Pump Suction and Discharge Check Valves CVS-PL-V113 CVS-PL-V160A/B Letdown Discharge Isolation Valves CVS-PL-V 045 CVS-PL-V047 Diverse Actuation System (DAS)

DAS Processor Cabinets and Control Panel (used to provide automatic and manual actuation)

DAS-JD-001 DAS-JD-002 DAS-JD-003 DAS-JD-004 OCS-JC-020 Annex Building UPS Distribution Panels (provide power to DAS)

EDS 1-EA-1, EDS 1-EA-14 , EDS2-EA-1, EDS2-EA-14 Rod Drive MG Sets (Field Breakers) PLS-MG-01A/B C-479 Tabl e 3.7-1 Risk-Significant Components Equipment Name Tag No. Containment Isolation Valves Controlled by DAS CVS-PL-V 045 , -V 047 VFS-PL-V 003 , -V 004 , -V 009 , -V 010 WLS-PL-V055, -V057 Main ac Power System (ECS)

Reactor Coolant Pump Switchgear ECS-ES-31 , -32 , -41 , -42 , -51, -52, -61, -62 Ancillary Diesel Generators ECS-MS-01, -02 6900 Vac Buses ECS-ES-1, -2 Main and Startup Feedwater System (FWS)

Startup Feedwater Pumps FWS-MP-03A/B General I&C IRWST Level Sensors PXS-045, -046, -047, -048 RCS Hot Leg Level Sensors RCS-160A/B Pressurizer Pressure Sensors RCS-191A/B/C/D Pressurizer Level Sensors RCS-195A/B/C/D Steam Generator Narrow

-Range Level Sensors SGS-001 , -002 , -003 , -004 , -005, -006, -007, -008 Steam Generator Wide

-Range Level Sensors SGS-011 , -012 , -013 , -014 , -015, -016, -017, -018 Main Steam Line Pressure Sensors SGS-030 , -031 , -032 , -033 , -034, -035, -036, -037 Main Feedwater Wide

-Range Flow Sensors FWS-050B/D/F, -051B/D/F Startup Feedwater Flow Sensors SGS-055A/B, -056A/B CMT Level Sensors PXS-011A/B/C/D, -012A/B/C/D, -013A/B/C/D, -014A/B/C/D Class 1E dc Power and Uninterruptible Power System (IDS) 250 Vdc 24

-Hour Batteries IDSA-DB-1A/B, IDSB-DB-1A/B, IDSC-DB-1A/B, IDSD

-DB-1A/B 250 Vdc 24

-Hour Buses IDSA-DS-1, IDSB-DS-1 IDSC-DS-1, IDSD-DS-1 250 Vdc 24-Hour Battery Chargers IDSA-DC-1, IDSB-DC-1 , IDSC-DC-1, IDSD-DC-1 250 Vdc and 120 Vac Distribution Panels IDSA-DD-1, IDSA-EA-1/-2 , IDSB-DD-1, IDSB-EA-1/-2/-3 , IDSC-DD-1, IDSC-EA-1/-2/-3 , IDSD-DD-1, IDSD-EA-1/-2 C-480 Tabl e 3.7-1 Risk-Significant Components Equipment Name Tag No. Fused Transfer Switch Boxes IDSA-DF-1, IDSB-DF-1/-2 , IDSC-DF-1/-2, IDSD-DF-1 250 Vdc Motor Control Centers IDSA-DK-1, IDSB-DK-1 , IDSC-DK-1, IDSD-DK-1 250 Vdc 24

-Hour Inverters IDSA-DU-1, IDSB-DU-1 , IDSC-DU-1, IDSD-DU-1 Passive Containment Cooling System (PCS)

Recirculation Pumps PCS-MP-01A/B PCCWST Drain Isolation Valves PCS-PL-V001A/B/C Plant Control System (PLS)

PLS Actuation Software (used to provide control functions)

Refer to Table 3.7

-2 PLS Actuation Hardware (used to provide control functions)

Refer to Table 3.7

-2 Protection and Monitoring System (PMS)

PMS Actuation Software (used to provide automatic control functions)

Refer to Tables 2.5.2

-2 and 2.5.2

-3 PMS Actuation Hardware (used to provide automatic control functions)

Refer to Tables 2.5.2

-2 and 2.5.2

-3 MCR 1E Displays and System Level Controls OCS-JC-010, -011 Reactor Trip Switchgear PMS-JD-RTS A01/02 , B01/02 , C01/02, D01/02 Passive Core Cooling System (PXS)

IRWST Vents PXS-MT-03 IRWST Screens PXS-MY-Y01A/B/C Containment Recirculation Screens PXS-MY-Y02A/B CMT Discharge Isolation Valves PXS-PL-V014A/B, -V015A/B CMT Discharge Check Valves PXS-PL-V016A/B, -V017A/B Accumulator Discharge Check Valves PXS-PL-V028A/B, -V029A/B PRHR HX Control Valves PXS-PL-V108A/B Containment Recirculation Squib Valves PXS-PL-V118A/B, -V120A/B IRWST Injection Check Valves PXS-PL-V122A/B, -V124A/B IRWST Injection Squib Valves PXS-PL-V123A/B, -V125A/B IRWST Gutter Bypass Isolation Valves PXS-PL-V130A/B C-481 Tabl e 3.7-1 Risk-Significant Components Equipment Name Tag No. Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

ADS Stage 1/2/3 Valves (MOVs)

RCS-PL-V 001A/B, -V011A/B RCS-PL-V 002A/B, -V 012A/B RCS-PL-V003A/B, -V013A/B ADS Stage 4 Valves (Squibs)

RCS-PL-V004A/B/C/D Pressurizer Safety Valves RCS-PL-V005A/B Reactor Vessel Insulation Water Inlet and Steam Vent Devices RCS-MN-01 Reactor Cavity Doorway Damper

- Fuel Assemblies 157 assemblies with tag numbers beginning with RXS-FA Normal Residual Heat Removal System (RNS)

Residual Heat Removal Pumps RNS-MP-01A/B RNS Motor-Operated Valves RNS-PL-V011, -V022, -V023, -V055 RNS Stop Check Valves RNS Check Valves RNS-PL-V 015A/B RNS-PL-V017A/B RNS Check Valves RNS-PL-V007A/B, -V013, -V056 Spent Fuel Cooling System (SFS)

Spent Fuel Cooling Pumps SFS-MP-01A/B Steam Generator System (SGS)

Main Steam Safety Valves SGS-PL-V 030A/B, -V 031A/B, -V 032A/B, -V 033A/B, -V034A/B, -V035A/B Main Steam Line Isolation Valves SGS-PL-V040A/B Main Feedwater Isolation Valves SGS-PL-V057A/B Service Water System (SWS)

Service Water Cooling Tower Fans SWS-MA-01A/B Service Water Pumps SWS-MP-01A/B Nuclear Island Nonradioactive Ventilation System (VBS)

MCR Ancillary Fans VBS-MA-10A/B I&C Room B/C Ancillary Fans VBS-MA-11, -12 C-482 Tabl e 3.7-1 Risk-Significant Components Equipment Name Tag No. Containment Air Filtration System (VFS)

Containment Purge Isolation Valves VFS-PL-V 003 VFS-PL-V 004 VFS-PL-V 009 VFS-PL-V010 Chilled Water System (VWS)

Air Cooled Chiller Pumps VWS-MP-02, -03 Air Cooled Chillers VWS-MS-02, -03 Liquid Radwaste System (WLS)

Sump Containment Isolation Valves WLS-PL-V 055 WLS-PL-V057 Onsite Standby Power System (ZOS)

Engine Room Exhaust Fans VZS-MY-V01A/B, -V02A/B Onsite Diesel Generators ZOS-MS-05A/B Note: Dash (-) indicates not applicable.

C-483 Table 3.7-2 PLS D-RAP Control Functions CVS Reactor Makeup RNS Reactor Injection from cask loading pit Startup Feedwater from CST Spent Fuel Cooling Component Cooling of RNS and SFS Heat Exchangers Service Water Cooling of CCS Heat Exchangers Onsite Diesel Generators Hydrogen Ignitors

C-484 Table 3.7-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 844 3.7.00.01 1. The D-RAP ensures that the design of SSCs within the scope of the reliability assurance program (Table 3.7-1) is consistent with the risk insights and key assumptions (e.g., SSC design, reliability, and availability).

An analysis will confirm that the design of RAP SSCs identified in Table 3.7-1 has been completed in accordance with applicable D

-RAP activities.

An analysis report documents that safety

-related SSCs identified in Table 3.7-1 have been designed in accordance with a 10 CFR 50 Appendix B quality program.

An analysis report documents that non-safety-related SSCs identified in Table 3.7-1 have been designed in accordance with a program that satisfies quality assurance requirements for SSCs important to investment protection.

C-485 C.3.8 Emergency Planning ITAAC C.3.8.1.1 Emergency Classification System Table C.3.8

-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 84 5 C.3.8.01.0 1.01 1.1 A standard emergency classification and emergency action level (EAL) scheme exists, and identifies facility system and effluent parameters constituting the bases for the classification scheme. [D.1**] [**D.1 corresponds to NUREG

-0654/ FEMA

-REP-1 evaluation criteria.]

1.1.1 An inspection of the main control room, Technical Support Center (TSC), and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be performed to verify that they have displays for retrieving facility system and effluent parameters as specified in the Emergency Classification and EAL technical basis document for the unit, and the displays are functional.

1.1.1 The specified parameters are retrievable in the main control room, TSC and EOF, and the ranges of the displays encompass the values specified in the Emergency Classification and EAL technical basis document for the unit.

846 C.3.8.01.01.02 1.1 A standard emergency classification and emergency action level (EAL) scheme exists, and identifies facility system and effluent parameters constituting the bases for the classification scheme. [D.1**]

[**D.1 corresponds to NUREG

-0654/ FEMA

-REP-1 evaluation criteria.]

1.1.2 An analysis of the EAL technical bases will be performed to verify as-built, site

-specific implementation of the EAL scheme.

1.1.2 The ranges available in the main control room, TSC, and EOF envelop the values for the specific parameters identified in the EALs in Emergency Plan, Annex 2 and 3, Attachment 1.

C-486 C.3.8.1.2 Notification Methods and Procedures Table C.3.8

-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 84 7 C.3.8.01.0 2.01 2.1 The means exist to notify responsible State and local organizations within 15 minutes after the licensee declares an emergency. [E.1]

2.1 A test will be performed to demonstrate the capabilities for providing initial notification to the offsite authorities after a simulated emergency classification.

2.1 The State of Florida and the counties of Miami

-Dade, and Monroe received notification within 15 minutes after the declaration of an emergency in the main control room and the EOF. 84 8 C.3.8.01.0 2.02 2.2 The means exist to notify emergency response personnel.

[E.2] 2.2 A test of the primary and backup emergency response organization (ERO) notification systems will be performed.

2.2 A test of the primary and backup ERO notification systems results in:

ERO personnel received the notification message; Mobilization communication was validated by personnel response to the notification system or by telephone Response to electronic notification and plant page system was demonstrated during normal working hours, and off hours.

8 49 C.3.8.01.0 2.03 2.3 The means exists to notify and provide instructions to the populace within the plume exposure emergency planning zone (EPZ). [E.6]

2.3 A full test of the alert and notification system and emergency alert system capabilities will be conducted.

2.3 Notification

and clear instructions to the public are accomplished in accordance with the emergency plan requirements.

C-487 C.3.8.1.3 Emergency Communications Table C.3.8

-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 85 0 C.3.8.01.03.01 3.1 The means exists for communications between the main control room, TSC, EOF, principal State and local emergency operations centers (EOCs), and field monitoring teams. [F.1.d]

3.1 A test will be performed of the capabilities. The test for the contact with the principal EOCs and the field monitoring teams will be from the main control room and the EOF. The TSC communication with the main control room and the EOF will be performed.

3.1 Communications

(both primary and secondary methods/systems) are established among the main control room and the EOF with the State of Florida Division of Emergency Management warning point and EOC, Miami

-Dade County warning point and EOC, and Monroe County warning point and EOC.

Communications are established between the main control room and the EOF with the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant (PTN) field monitoring teams.

851 C.3.8.01.03.02 3.2 The means exists for communications from the main control room, TSC and EOF to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) headquarters and regional office EOCs (including establishment of the emergency response data system (ERDS) or its successor system between the onsite computer system and the NRC operations center). [F.1.f]

3.2 A test is performed of the capabilities to communicate using the emergency notification system from the main control room, TSC and EOF to the NRC headquarters and regional office EOCs. The health physics network is tested to ensure communications between the TSC and EOF with the NRC operations center. The ERDS is established, or its successor system, between the onsite computer systems and the NRC operations center.

3.2 Communications

are established from the main control room, TSC and EOF to the NRC headquarters and regional office EOCs using the emergency notification system. The TSC and EOF demonstrated communications with the NRC operations center using the health physics network.

The access port for ERDS, or its successor system, is provided and successfully completes a transfer of data from the unit to the NRC operations center.

C-488 C.3.8.1.4 Public Education and Information Table C.3.8

-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 85 2 C.3.8.01.0 4.01 4.1 The licensee has provided space that may be used for a limited number of news media. [G.3.b] 4.1 An inspection of the facility/area provided for the news media will be performed in the emergency news center (ENC). The space provides adequate equipment to support the ENC operation, including communications with the site and with the EOCs in the State and counties as well as a limited number of news media.

4.1 The ENC includes equipment to support the ENC operations, including communications with the EOF and State and county EOCs. Designated space is available for news media briefings.

C.3.8.1.5 Emergency Facilities and Equipment Table C.3.8

-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 85 3 C.3.8.01.0 5.01.01 5.1 The licensee has established a TSC and onsite operations support center (OSC). [H.1]

5.1 An inspection of the TSC and OSC will be performed, including a test of their capabilities.

5.1.1 The TSC has at least 3,000 square feet of floor space consistent with NUREG-0696 (75 square feet/person) and is large enough for required systems, equipment, records and storage. 854 C.3.8.01.0 5.01.02 5.1 The licensee has established a TSC and onsite operations support center (OSC). [H.1]

5.1 An inspection of the TSC and OSC will be performed, including a test of their capabilities.

5.1.2 The TSC is located outside the Protected Area, and procedures are in place to enhance passage through security checkpoints expeditiously.

855 C.3.8.01.0 5.01.03 5.1 The licensee has established a TSC and onsite operations support center (OSC). [H.1]

5.1 An inspection of the TSC and OSC will be performed, including a test of their capabilities.

5.1.3 Communications

equipment is installed and voice transmission and reception are accomplished between the main control room, the OSC, and EOF.

C-489 Table C.3.8

-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 8 56 C.3.8.01.0 5.01.04 5.1 The licensee has established a TSC and onsite operations support center (OSC). [H.1]

5.1 An inspection of the TSC and OSC will be performed, including a test of their capabilities.

5.1.4 The TSC ventilation system includes a high

-efficiency particulate air (HEPA), and charcoal filter and radiation monitors are installed. Controls and displays exist in the TSC to control and monitor the status of the TSC ventilation system including heating and cooling, and the activation of the HEPA and charcoal filter system upon detection of high radiation in the TSC.

857 C.3.8.01.05.01.05 5.1 The licensee has established a TSC and onsite operations support center (OSC). [H.1]

5.1 An inspection of the TSC and OSC will be performed, including a test of their capabilities.

5.1.5 The TSC has the means to receive, store, process, and display plant and environmental information, as listed in design control document (DCD) Table 7.5

-1 and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Table 7.5

-201, and to initiate emergency measures and conduct emergency assessment.

858 C.3.8.01.05.01.06 5.1 The licensee has established a TSC and onsite operations support center (OSC). [H.1]

5.1 An inspection of the TSC and OSC will be performed, including a test of their capabilities.

5.1.6 A reliable and backup electrical power supply is available for the TSC.

859 C.3.8.01.05.01.07 5.1 The licensee has established a TSC and onsite operations support center (OSC). [H.1]

5.1 An inspection of the TSC and OSC will be performed, including a test of their capabilities.

5.1.7 There

is an OSC located inside the Protected Area. It is separate from the main control room.

860 C.3.8.01.05.01.08 5.1 The licensee has established a TSC and onsite operations support center (OSC). [H.1]

5.1 An inspection of the TSC and OSC will be performed, including a test of their capabilities.

5.1.8 Communications

equipment is installed, and voice transmission and reception are accomplished between the OSC and OSC teams, the TSC and the main control room.

C-490 Table C.3.8

-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 8 61 C.3.8.01.0 5.0 2.0 1 5.2 The licensee has established an EOF. [H.2]

5.2 An inspection of the EOF will be performed, including a test of the capabilities.

5.2.1 The EOF working space is a minimum of 5625 square feet consistent with NUREG-0696 (75 square feet/person) and is large enough for required systems, equipment, records, and storage.

8 62 C.3.8.01.0 5.0 2.0 2 5.2 The licensee has established an EOF. [H.2]

5.2 An inspection of the EOF will be performed, including a test of the capabilities.

5.2.2 Communications

equipment is installed, and voice transmission and reception are accomplished between the main control room, TSC, EOF, field monitoring teams, NRC, State and county agencies, and ENC. 8 63 C.3.8.01.0 5.0 2.0 3 5.2 The licensee has established an EOF. [H.2]

5.2 An inspection of the EOF will be performed, including a test of the capabilities.

5.2.3 Radiological

data identified in each Plan Annex, meteorological data, and plant system data pertinent to determining offsite protective measures as listed in DCD Table 7.5-1 and FSAR Table 7.5-201 are available and displayed in the EOF, when activated.

C.3.8.1.6 Accident Assessment Table C.3.8

-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 8 64 C.3.8.01.0 6.01 6.1 The means exist to provide initial and continuing radiological assessment throughout the course of an accident. [I.2]

6.1 A test will be performed to demonstrate that the means exist to provide initial and continuing radiological assessment throughout the course of an accident through the plant computer or communications with the main control room, TSC, and EOF during the course of drills and/or exercises.

6.1 The means are available to provide initial and continuing radiological assessment through displays of instrumentation indicators in the main control room, TSC and EOF during the course of drills and/or exercises.

C-491 Table C.3.8

-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 8 6 5 C.3.8.01.0 6.02 6.2 The means exist to determine the source term of releases of radioactive material within plant systems, and the magnitude of the release of radioactive materials based on plant system parameters and effluent monitors. [I.3]

6.2 A test will be performed to demonstrate that the means exist to determine the source term of releases of radioactive material within plant systems, and the magnitude of the release of radioactive materials based on plant system parameters and effluent monitors. 6.2 Emergency plan implementing procedure s (EPIPs), through use in training and drills, provide direction to accurately calculate the source terms and the magnitude of the release of postulated accident scenario releases. 8 6 6 C.3.8.01.0 6.03 6.3 The means exist to continuously assess the impact of the release of radioactive materials to the environment, accounting for the relationship between effluent monitor readings, and onsite and offsite exposures and contamination for various meteorological conditions. [I.4]

6.3 A test will be performed to provide evidence that the impact of a radiological release to the environment is able to be assessed by using the relationship between effluent monitor readings, and onsite and offsite exposures and contamination for various meteorological conditions.

6.3 Demonstrate

that the means exist to continuously assess the impact of the release of radioactive materials to the environment, accounting for the relationship between effluent monitor readings, and onsite and offsite exposures and contamination for various meteorological conditions under drill conditions.

8 6 7 C.3.8.01.0 6.04 6.4 The means exist to acquire and evaluate meteorological information. [I.5]

6.4 A test will be performed to acquire and evaluate meteorological data/ information.

6.4 Meteorological

data exists at the EOF, TSC, main control room, offsite NRC operations center, and the State of Florida, and that this data is in the format needed for the appropriate EPIPs.

8 68 C.3.8.01.0 6.05 6.5 The means exist to determine the release rate and projected doses if the instrumentation used for assessment is off

-scale or inoperable. [I.6]

6.5 A test will be performed of the capabilities to determine the release rate and projected doses if the instrumentation used for assessment is off

-scale or inoperable.

6.5 The release rate and projected doses can be determined with off

-scale or inoperable instrumentation during training or a drill.

8 69 C.3.8.01.0 6.06 6.6 The means exist for field monitoring within the plume exposure EPZ. [I.7]

6.6 A test will be performed of the capabilities for field monitoring within the plume exposure EPZ.

6.6 The field monitoring teams were dispatched and demonstrated ability to locate and monitor a radiological release within the plume exposure EPZ.

87 0 C.3.8.01.0 6.07 6.7 The means exist to make rapid assessments of actual or potential magnitude and locations of radiological hazards 6.7 A test will be performed of the capabilities to make rapid assessments of actual or potential magnitude and 6.7 The field monitoring teams were activated. They demonstrate an ability to make rapid assessment of actual or

C-492 Table C.3.8

-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria through liquid or gaseous release pathways, including activation, notification means, field team composition, transportation, communication, monitoring equipment, and estimated deployment times. [I.8]

locations of radiological hazards through liquid or gaseous release pathways, including activation, notification means, field team composition, transportation, communication, monitoring equipment, and estimated deployment times.

potential magnitude and locations of any radiological hazards through simulated liquid or gaseous release pathways. A qualified field monitoring team was notified, activated, briefed, and dispatched from the EOF during a radiological release scenario. The team demonstrated the procedural guidance in team composition, use of monitoring equipment, communication from the field, and locating specific sampling locations.

871 C.3.8.01.06.08 6.8 The capability exists to detect and measure radioiodine concentrations in air in the plume exposure EPZ, as low as 10-7 µCi/cc (microcuries per cubic centimeter) under field conditions. [I.9]

6.8 A test will be performed of the capabilities to detect and measure radioiodine concentrations in air in the plume exposure EPZ, as low as 10-7 µCi/cc under field conditions.

6.8 A field monitoring team was dispatched during a radiological release scenario and demonstrated the use of sampling and detection equipment for air concentrations in the plume exposure EPZ, as low as 10-7 µCi/cc. 872 C.3.8.01.06.09 6.9 The means exist to estimate integrated dose from the projected and actual dose rates, and for comparing these estimates with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) protective action guides. [I.10]

6.9 A test will be performed of the capabilities to estimate integrated dose from the projected and actual dose rates, and for comparing these estimates with the EPA protective action guides.

6.9 The means are available to estimate integrated dose from the dose assessment program and the field monitoring team reading during a radioactive release scenario. The results were compared with the EPA protective action guides.

C-493 C.3.8.1.7 Protective Response Table C.3.8

-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 87 3 C.3.8.01.0 7.01 7.1 The means exist to warn and advise onsite individuals of an emergency, including those in areas controlled by the operator, including: [J.1] employees not having emergency assignments visitors contractor and construction personnel other persons who may be in the public access areas, on or passing through the site, or within the Owner-Controlled Area.

7.1 A test will be performed of the capabilities to warn and advise onsite individuals of an emergency, including those in the Owner-Controlled Area, and the immediate vicinity.

7.1 Means

exist to successfully warn and advise onsite individuals including:

nonessential employees visitors contractor and construction personnel other personnel within the Owner-Controlled Area, and the immediate vicinity.

C-494 C.3.8.1.8 Exercises and Drills Table C.3.8

-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 8 74 C.3.8.01.08.01.01 8.1 Licensee conducts a full participation exercise to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, which includes participation by the State and local agency within the plume exposure EPZ, and the State within the ingestion control EPZ. [N.1]

8.1 A full participation exercise (test) will be conducted within the specified time periods of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.

8.1.1 The exercise is completed within the specified time periods of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E; onsite exercise objectives listed below have been met, and there are no uncorrected onsite exercise deficiencies.

A. Accident Assessment and Classification

1. Demonstrate the ability to identify initiating conditions, determine emergency action level (EAL) parameters, and correctly classify the emergency throughout the exercise. Standard Criteria:

a. Determine the correct highest emergency classification level based on events which were in progress, considering past events and their impact on the current conditions, within 15 minutes from the time the initiating condition(s) or EAL is identified.

B. Notifications

1. Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify and mobilize site emergency response personnel.

Standard Criteria:

a. Complete the designated checklist and perform the C-495 Table C.3.8

-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria announcement concerning the initial event classification of Alert or higher.

b. Activate the emergency recall system within 5 minutes of the initial event classification for an Alert or higher. 2. Demonstrate the ability to notify responsible State and local government agencies within 15 minutes and the NRC within 60 minutes after declaring an emergency.

Standard Criteria:

a. Transmit information using the designated checklist in accordance with approved EPIPs within 15 minutes of event classification.

b. Transmit information using the designated checklist in accordance with approved EPIPs within 60 minutes of last transmittal for a follow

-up notification to State and local authorities.

c. Transmit information using designated checklist within 60 minutes of event classification for an initial notification of the NRC. 3. Demonstrate the ability to warn or advise onsite individuals of emergency conditions. Standard Criteria:

a. Initiate notification of onsite individuals (via plant C-496 Table C.3.8

-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria page or telephone) using designated checklist.

4. Demonstrate the capability of the Alert and Notification System (ANS) for the public, to operate properly when required. Standard Criteria:

operate properly as indicated by the siren feedback system.

C. Emergency Response

1. Demonstrate the capability to direct and control emergency operations.

Standard Criteria:

a. Command and control is demonstrated by the main control room in the early phase of the emergency and by the TSC within 60 minutes from notification of an Alert or higher event classification with at least minimum staffing. 2. Demonstrate the ability to transfer emergency direction from the main control room (simulator) to the TSC.

Standard Criteria:

a. Evaluation of briefings that were conducted prior to turnover responsibility. Personnel document transfer of duties.

3. Demonstrate the ability to prepare for 24

-hour staffing requirements.

C-497 Table C.3.8

-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria Standard Criteria:

a. Complete 24

-hour staff assignments.

4. Demonstrate the ability to perform assembly and accountability for all personnel in the Protected Area within 30 minutes of an emergency requiring Protected Area assembly and accountability.

Standard Criteria:

a. Protected Area personnel assembly and accountability completed within 30 minutes of an emergency requiring Protected Area assembly and accountability.

D. Emergency Response Facilities

1. Demonstrate activation of the OSC and the TSC and EOF within 60 minutes of event classification with at least minimum staffing.

Standard Criteria:

a. The TSC and OSC are activated within 60 minutes from notification of an Alert or higher event classification with at least minimum staffing. b. The EOF is activated within 60 minutes from notification of a Site Area Emergency or higher event classification with at least minimum staffing. 2. Demonstrate the adequacy of equipment, security C-498 Table C.3.8

-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria provisions, and habitability precautions for the TSC, OSC, EOF and ENC, as appropriate.

Standard Criteria:

a. Evaluation of the adequacy of the emergency equipment in the emergency response facilities including availability and general consistency with the EPIPs.

b. The security manager implements and follows applicable EPIPs. c. The radiation protection manager (TSC) implements the designated checklist if an onsite/offsite release has occurred. d. Demonstrate the capability of TSC and EOF equipment and data displays to clearly identify and reflect the affected unit.

3. Demonstrate the adequacy of communications for all emergency support resources.

Standard Criteria:

a. Emergency response communications listed in the EPIPs are available and operational.

b. Communications systems are tested in accordance with the TSC, OSC, EOF and ENC activation checklists.

c. Emergency response facility personnel are able to operate all specified communications systems.

C-499 Table C.3.8

-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

d. Clear primary and backup communications links are established and maintained for the duration of the exercise.

E. Radiological Assessment and Control

1. Demonstrate the ability to obtain onsite radiological surveys and samples.

Standard Criteria:

a. Radiation Protection Technicians demonstrate the ability to obtain appropriate instruments (range and type) and perform surveys

. b. Airborne samples are taken when the conditions indicate the need for the information.

2. Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control radiation exposure to emergency workers.

Standard Criteria:

a. Emergency workers are issued self-reading dosimeters when radiation levels require, and exposures are controlled to 10 CFR Part 20 limits (unless the emergency coordinator authorizes emergency limits for onsite ERO personnel and the emergency offsite manager authorizes emergency exposures for offsite ERO personnel).

b. Exposure records are available either from the Site database or a hard copy dose report.

C-500 Table C.3.8

-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria

c. Emergency workers include Security and personnel within all emergency facilities.

3. Demonstrate the ability to assemble and dispatch field monitoring teams within 60 minutes from the decision to do so. Standard Criteria:

a. One field monitoring team is ready to be deployed within 60 minutes of being requested and no later than 90 minutes from the declaration of an Alert or higher.

4. Demonstrate the ability to satisfactorily collect and disseminate field team data.

Standard Criteria:

a. Field team data to be collected is dose rate or counts per minute (cpm) from the plume, both open and closed window, and air sample (gross/net cpm) for particulate and iodine, if applicable.

b. Radiological data is satisfactorily disseminated from the field team to the dose assessment coordinator.

5. Demonstrate the ability to develop dose projections.

Standard Criteria:

a. The on-shift Chemistry Technician performs timely and accurate dose projections, in accordance with the EPIPs.

6. Demonstrate the ability to develop appropriate Protective C-501 Table C.3.8

-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria Action Recommendations (PARs), and notify appropriate authorities within 15 minutes of a General Emergency declaration or changes in parameters that affect the previously issued PARs. Standard Criteria:

a. Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) and Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) dose projections from the dose assessment computer code or a backup method are established in accordance with the EPIPs.

b. PARs are developed within 15 minutes of data availability.

c. PARs are transmitted via voice, fax, or electronically within 15 minutes as required by the EPIPs.

875 C.3.8.01.08.01.02 8.1 Licensee conducts a full participation exercise to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, which includes participation by the State and local agency within the plume exposure EPZ, and the State within the ingestion control EPZ. [N.1]

8.1 A full participation exercise (test) will be conducted within the specified time periods of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.

8.1.2 Onsite

emergency response personnel were mobilized in sufficient numbers to fill emergency response positions identified in the Radiological Emergency Plan, Part 2, Section B, Emergency Response Organization, and they successfully performed their assigned responsibilities.

C-502 Table C.3.8

-1 (continued)

Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 87 6 C.3.8.01.08.01.03 8.1 Licensee conducts a full participation exercise to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, which includes participation by the State and local agency within the plume exposure EPZ, and the State within the ingestion control EPZ. [N.1]

8.1 A full participation exercise (test) will be conducted within the specified time periods of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.

8.1.3 The exercise was completed within the specified time periods of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, offsite exercise objectives were met, and there were no uncorrected offsite exercise deficiencies, or a license condition requires offsite deficiencies to be corrected prior to operation above 5 percent of rated power. C.3.8.1.9 Implementing Procedures Table C.3.8

-1 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 8 77 C.3.8.01.0 9.01 9.1 The licensee has submitted detailed implementing procedures for its emergency plan no less than 180 days prior to fuel load.

9.1 Confirm

that the submittal letter was submitted on time.

9.1 The date of the submittal letter from the licensee demonstrates that the detailed EPIPs for the onsite emergency plan were submitted no less than 180 days prior to fuel load.

C-5C.3.8.2Pipe Rupture Hazard Analysis Table C.3.8-2 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 8 78 C.3.8.0 2.01 1.Systems, structures, and components(SSCs), that are required to befunctional during and following adesign basis event shall be protectedagainst or qualified to withstand thedynamic and environmental effectsassociated with analyses of postulate d failures in high and moderate energypiping.Inspection of the as-designed pipe rupture hazard analysis report will be conducted. The report documents the analyses to determine where protection features are necessary to mitigate the consequence of a pipe break. Pipe break events involving high

-energy fluid systems are analyzed for the effects of pipe whip, jet impingement, flooding, room pressurization, and temperature effects. Pipe break events involving moderate

-energy fluid systems are analyzed for wetting from spray, flooding, and other environmental effects, as appropriate.

An as-designed pipe rupture hazard analysis report exists and concludes that the analysis performed for high and moderate energy piping confirms the protection of systems, structures, and components required to be functional during and following a design basis event.

C-5C.3.8.3Piping Design Table C.3.8-3 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Program Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 8 79 C.3.8.0 3.01 1.The ASME Code Section III pipi ng is designed in accordance with ASMECode Section III requirements.

Inspection of ASME Code Design Reports (NCA- 3550) and required documents will be conducted for the set of lines chosen to demonstrate compliance.

ASME Code Design Report(s) (NCA-3550) (certified, when required by ASME Code) exist and conclude that the design of the piping for lines chosen to demonstrate all aspects of the piping design complies with the requirements of ASME Code Section III.

C-5C.3.8.4Waterproof Membrane Table C.3.8-4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 880 C.3.8.04.01 1.The friction coefficient to resis tTesting will be performed to confirm that the mudmat

-waterproofing

-mudmat interface beneath the Nuclear Island basemat has a coefficient of friction to resist sliding

of 0.55. A report exists and documents that the as

-built waterproof system (mudmat

-waterproofing

-mudmat interface) has a coefficient of friction of demonstrated through material qualification testing.

C.3.8.5Concrete Fill Table C.3.8-5 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 881 C.3.8.0 5.01 1.First lift of concrete fill placed underthe nuclear island basemat, containmentbuilding, shield building, and auxiliarybuilding meets durability requirementsof ACI 201.2R

-08, Table 6.3 for Class2 sulfate exposure.Delivery tickets will be prepared according to ACI 311.5 and

inspected to ensure that the first lift of concrete fill (minimum thickness of 2.5 feet) meets durability requirements of ACI 201.2R-08, Table 6.3 for Class 2 sulfate exposure. The first lift of concrete fill

(minimum thickness of 2.5 feet) meets durability requirements of ACI 201.2R

-08, Table 6.3 for Class 2 sulfate exposure.

882 C.3.8.05.02a 2.Concrete fill placed under thenuclear island basemat, containmentbuilding, shield building, and auxiliarybuilding is designed, constructed, andtested as specified in ACI 207.1R

-05.(a)Testing will be performed in accordance with ACI 311.5 to determine the mean compressiv e strength of the concrete fill.(a)The mean 28

-day compressive strength of theconcrete fill is equal to or greater than 1500 psi.

883 C.3.8.05.02b2.Concrete fill placed under th e nuclear island basemat, containmentbuilding, shield building, and auxiliary building is designed, constructed, an d tested as specified in ACI 207.1R-05.(b)Inspection will be performe d to ensure that methods used tocontrol thermal cracking are in accordance with ACI 207.1R

-05.(b)Methods used to controlthermal cracking are in accordance with ACI 207.1R

-05.

C-5C.3.8.6Seismic Category I Structure Foundation Grouting (i) Table C.3.8-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 884 C.3.8.0 6.01.i 1.Inside the region defined by thediaphragm walls, drilling and pressuregrouting is performed. The groutclosure criteria, when used inconjunction with the specified grout borehole spacing:Will result in any remaining voidsbetween El.

-35 +/- 2 feet and El. -60+/- 2 feet (the Grouted Zone) bei ng structurally insignificant, which isaccomplished through drilling andpressure grouting of primary andsecondary grout boreholes, and, ifnecessary, as indicated by site data,tertiary and quaternary groutboreholes; andWill result in any remaining voidsbetween El.

-60 +/- 2 feet and El. -11 0+/- 2 feet (the Extended Grouted Zone)having a maximum equivalentspherical diameter of equal to or lessthan 20 feet, which is accomplishedthrough drilling and pressure grouting of primary grout boreholesand, if necessary, as indicated by sitedata, secondary grout boreholes.

i)Testing and analysis will beperformed through a grout testprogram to define grout closurecriteria for both the Grouted

Zone and Extended Groute d Zone, as follows:For both the Grouted Zone andExtended Grouted Zone, thegrout test program w ill identify and define groutclosure criteria for groutconsistency to ensure the groutflows into and fills potentia l voids in the vicinity of eachgrout borehole, andFor the Grouted Zone, thegrout test program will identify and define grout closure criteria for identifyin g when each grout borehole hasbeen filled and pressurizedwith grout and filling ma y cease or tertiary or quaternarygrout boreholes are necessary,andFor the Extended GroutedZone, the grout test programwill identify and define groutclosure criteria for identifyin g when each grout borehole hasbeen filled and pressurizedwith grout and filling ma y ceas e or secondary groutboreholes are necessary.i)The grout closure criteria,when used in conjunction withthe specified borehol e spacing, will ensure that anyvoids remaining in theGrouted Zone are structurall y insignificant and ensure thatany voids remaining in theExtended Grouted Zone ar e equal to or less than 20 fee

t.

C-5Table C.3.8-6 Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria No. ITAAC No. Design Commitment Inspections, Tests, Analyses Acceptance Criteria 885 C.3.8.06.01.ii1.Inside the region defined by thediaphragm walls, drilling and pressuregrouting is performed. The grout closure criteria, when used inconjunction with the specified groutborehole spacing:between El.

-35 +/- 2 feet and El.

-60 +/- 2 feet (the Grouted Zone) beingstructurally insignificant, which isaccomplished through drilling an d pressure grouting of primary andsecondary grout boreholes, and, ifnecessary, as indicated by site data, tertiary and quaternary grout boreholes;andbetween El.

-60 +/- 2 feet and El.

-110 +/-2 feet (the Extended Grouted Zone)having a maximum equivalent spherical diameter of equal to or less than 20 feet,which is accomplished through drillingand pressure grouting of primary groutboreholes and, if necessary, as indicated by site data, secondary grout boreholes.

ii)Inspections and analysis wi llbe performed of the as

-builtlocations, depth and spacing of all grout boreholes, both withrespect to the Grouted Zone and the Extended Grouted Zone, and the grout data associated with each grout borehole and zone.

ii)Grout closure criteria asestablished in the grout test program are met inside the region defined by thediaphragm walls and the groutboreholes meet the followingrequirements:For the Grouted andExtended Grouted Zones,primary grout boreholes ar e drilled throughout the entir e interior region defined by th e diaphragm walls and withspacing of less than or equal to 20 feet on center at theground surface,For the Grouted Zone,secondary grout boreholes ar e drilled throughout the entir e interior region defined by th e diaphragm walls and are offse t from primary grout boreholessuch that a secondary groutborehole is at the center of thesquare formed by fouradjacent primary groutboreholes at the groundsurface, andEach additional groutborehole (tertiary or quaternary) drilled to meet grout closure criteria for the Grouted Zone is located basedon a documented engineerin g evaluation consistent with thegrout closure criteriaEach additional groutborehole (secondary) drilledto meet grout closure criteri a for the Extended Groute d Zone is located based on adocumented engineering evaluation consistent with thegrout closure criteria.(i)All elevations are presented in the North American Vertical Datum of 1988 (NAVD88).

ML17088A321

Text

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Definitions

2.1 Reactor

2.1.1. Inspection

2.1.2. Inspection

2.1.3. Inspection

2.2.1 Containment

2.2.3. Inspection

2.2.4. Inspection

2.0 Table

2.2.5. Inspection

2.3.1 Component

2.3.1. Inspection

2.3.2. Inspection

2.3.3. Inspection

2.3.5. Inspection

2.3.6. Inspection

2.3.7. Inspection

2.3.8. Inspection

2.3.9. Inspection

2.4.2. Inspection

2.4.4 Steam

2.4.6. Inspection

2.4.8 Auxiliary

2.4.9 Condenser

2.5.1 Diverse

2.5.2. Inspection

2.5.5. Inspection

2.5.6. Inspection

2.5.8 Radiation

2.5.9 Seismic

1.2 seconds

2.6.3. Inspection

2.6.4. Inspection

2.6.5. Inspection

2.6.8 Cathodic

2.7.1 Nuclear

2.7.1 Inspection

2.7.3. Inspection

2.7.6. Inspection

2.7.7. Inspection

2.7.8 Radwaste

2.7.9 Turbine

3.1 Emergency

3.2 Human

3.6 Reactor

2.3 Notification

3.1 Communications

3.2 Communications

5.1.3 Communications

5.1.7 There

5.1.8 Communications

5.2.2 Communications

5.2.3 Radiological

6.3 Demonstrate

6.4 Meteorological

7.1 Means

8.1.2 Onsite

9.1 Confirm

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