IR 05000400/2007006
| ML072570275 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 09/14/2007 |
| From: | Musser R A NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4 |
| To: | Duncan R J Carolina Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| IR-07-006 | |
| Download: ML072570275 (19) | |
Text
September 14, 2007
Carolina Power & Light CompanyATTN:Mr. R. J. DuncanVice President - Harris PlantShearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantP. O. Box 1654, Mail Code: Zone 1New Hill, NC 27562-0165
SUBJECT: SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC PROBLEMIDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT NO.05000400/2007006
Dear Mr. Duncan:
On August 17, 2007, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection atthe Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspectionresults, which were discussed on August 17, 2007, with you and other members of your staff.The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate tothe identification and resolution of problems, and compliance with the Commission's rules andregulations, and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, theinspection involved examination of selected procedures and representative records,observations of plant equipment and activities, and interviews with personnel.On the basis of the samples selected for review, the inspectors concluded that in general, yourcorrective action program processes and procedures were effective; thresholds for identifyingissues were appropriately low; and problems were properly evaluated and resolved within theproblem identification and resolution program (PI&R). A safety conscious work environmentwas evident. However, the inspectors identified a few examples where corrective actions couldhave been more thorough. The inspectors noted two issues involving aspects related to your security program. Specificdetails are documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000400/2007404.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and itsenclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document CP&L2Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's documentsystem (ADAMS). Adams is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/
Randall A. Musser, ChiefReactor Projects Branch 4Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket No.:50-400License No.:NPF-63
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000400/2007006
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Informationcc w/encl: (See page 3)
_________________________OFFICERII:DRPRII:ORARII:DRSRII:DRSRII:DRPRII:DRSRII:DRPSIGNATURETXM1 by emailMXM3KXD by emailJwallo forPBO by emailJHW2GRW2 by emailNAMETMorrisseyMCheckleKDavisJMundayPO'BryanJWalloGWilliamsDATE09/14/200709/13/200709/13/200709/14/200709/13/200709/13/200709/13/2007 E-MAIL COPY? YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO OFFICERII:DRPSIGNATURESONNAMESNinhDATE09/10/20079/ /20079/ /20079/ /20079/ /20079/ /20079/ /2007 E-MAIL COPY? YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO YESNO CP&L3cc w/encls:Paul Fulford, ManagerPerformance Evaluation and Regulatory Affairs PEB 5Carolina Power & Light CompanyElectronic Mail DistributionChris L. BurtonDirector of Site OperationsCarolina Power & Light CompanyShearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantElectronic Mail DistributionJ. Wayne GurganiousTraining Manager-Harris PlantProgress Energy Carolinas, Inc.Harris Energy & Environmental CenterElectronic Mail DistributionThomas J. Natale, ManagerSupport ServicesCarolina Power & Light CompanyShearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantElectronic Mail DistributionDavid H. Corlett, SupervisorLicensing/Regulatory ProgramsCarolina Power & Light CompanyShearon Harris Nuclear Power PlantElectronic Mail DistributionDavid T. ConleyAssociate General Counsel - LegalDepartmentProgress Energy Service Company, LLCElectronic Mail DistributionJohn H. O'Neill, Jr.Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge2300 N. Street, NWWashington, DC 20037-1128Beverly Hall, Chief, Radiation Protection SectionN. C. Department of Environmental Commerce & Natural ResourcesElectronic Mail DistributionPublic Service CommissionState of South CarolinaP. O. Box 11649Columbia, SC 29211Chairman of the North Carolina Utilities Commissionc/o Sam Watson, Staff AttorneyElectronic Mail DistributionRobert P. GruberExecutive DirectorPublic Staff NCUC4326 Mail Service CenterRaleigh, NC 27699-4326Herb Council, ChairBoard of County Commissioners of Wake CountyP. O. Box 550Raleigh, NC 27602Tommy Emerson, ChairBoard of County Commissioners of Chatham CountyElectronic Mail Distribution CP&L4Letter to R. from Randall A. Musser dated September 14, 2007
SUBJECT: SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC PROBLEMIDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT Distribution w/encl
- M. Vaaler, NRRC. Evans, RIIL. Slack, RIIRIDSNRRDIRSOE MailPUBLIC EnclosureU.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONREGION IIDocket Nos:50-400License Nos:NPF-63Report No:05000400/2007006Licensee:Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L)Facility:Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1Location:5413 Shearon Harris RoadNew Hill, NC 27652-0165Dates:July 30 - August 3 and August 13-17, 2007Inspectors:T. Morrissey, Senior Resident Inspector, Crystal River 3 (Lead Inspector)M. Checkle, RII Allegations Coordinator (Week 1)K. Davis, RII Security InspectorP. O'Bryan, Senior Resident Inspector, HarrisJ. Wallo, RII Senior Security Inspector (Week 2)G. Williams, Resident Inspector, CatawbaApproved by:R. Musser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
EnclosureIR 05000400/2007006; 07/30-08/03, 2007; 08/13-17, 2007; Shearon Harris NuclearPower Plant; Identification and Resolution of Problems.The inspection was conducted by two Region II (RII) senior resident inspectors, a RIIbased senior security inspector, a resident inspector, a RII based security inspector anda RII based allegation coordinator. No findings of significance were identified. TheNRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactorsis described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process", Revision 4, dated December 2006.Identification and Resolution of ProblemsThe inspectors determined that in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated,prioritized, and corrected within the licensee's problem identification and resolutioninspection. Evaluation of issues was generally comprehensive and technicallyadequate. Formal root cause evaluations for issues classified as significant conditionsadverse to quality were comprehensive and detailed. Overall, corrective actionsdeveloped and implemented for issues were effective in correcting problems. However,the inspectors identified a few examples where corrective actions could have been morethorough. The processes and procedures of the corrective action program (CAP) were generallyadequate; thresholds for identifying issues were appropriately low, and in most cases,corrective actions were adequate to address conditions adverse to quality. NuclearAssessment Section audits and departmental self-assessments were effective inidentifying issues and directing attention to areas needing improvement.Management emphasized the need for staff to identify and resolve issues using theCAP. Based on discussions and interviews with plant employees from variousdepartments, the inspectors did not identify any reluctance to report safety concerns. Asafety conscious work environment was evident.The inspectors noted two issues involving aspects related to the security program. Specific details are documented in NRC inspection report 05000400/2007404.A.Inspector Identified Findings NoneB.Licensee Identified Findings None Enclosure
REPORT DETAILS
4.OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)4OA2Problem Identification and Resolution a.Effectiveness of Problem Identification
.1 Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program (CAP) procedureswhich described the administrative process for initiating and resolving problems.
Anuclear condition report (NCR) is initiated to document problems that are significantconditions adverse to quality (Priority 1), conditions adverse to quality (Priority 2),conditions adverse to quality with low significance (Priority 3), or improvement items(Priority 5). The inspectors selected NCRs for review which involved issues covering theseven cornerstones that reflect the essential safety aspects of facility operation asidentified in the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process (ROP). The selected samples weretaken from approximately 5900 NCRs that had been initiated by the licensee since July2005 (coinciding with the last NRC baseline problem identification and resolutioninspection (PI&R)) to verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriatelycharacterized, and entered into the CAP. The reviews primarily focused on issuesassociated with risk significant plant safety systems: emergency diesel generator(EDG), auxiliary feedwater (AFW), 125 volt DC power, emergency service water (ESW),essential services chilled water (ESCW), containment isolation valve (CIV) and reactorcoolant and main steam power operated and safety relief valves systems.
Theinspectors reviewed NCRs, maintenance history, and selected completed work orders(WOs) for the systems and reviewed associated system health reports to verify thatequipment deficiencies were being appropriately entered into the CAP. The inspectorsconducted plant walkdowns of accessible equipment associated with the above systemsto assess the material condition and to look for any deficiencies that had not beenentered into the CAP. The inspectors reviewed the main control room (MCR) deficiencylist and control room operator logs for the period July 1 through July 31, 2007, to verifythat equipment deficiencies were entered into the CAP. The inspectors reviewedcorrective actions associated with the findings documented in NRC inspection reports(IRs) issued since the last PI&R inspection. In addition to the system reviews, theinspectors selected a sample of NCRs that had been initiated by the followingdepartments to ensure complete coverage of all cornerstones: operations, healthphysics, chemistry, maintenance, work controls, engineering, security, and emergencypreparedness. The inspectors reviewed selected industry operating experience (OE)items, including NRC generic communications, to verify that OE items wereappropriately evaluated for applicability and whether issues identified through thesereviews were entered into the CAP. The inspectors reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments (focusing primarily on problem identification and resolution) to verify thatfindings were entered into the CAP and to verify that these findings were consistent withthe NRC's assessment of the licensee's CAP. The inspectors attended several plantdaily status, unit evaluator and CAP meetings to observe CAP unit evaluator and 4Enclosuremanagement oversight functions in the corrective action process. The inspectors alsointerviewed personnel from operations, maintenance, engineering, security, healthphysics, chemistry, and emergency preparedness to evaluate their threshold foridentifying issues and entering them into the CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in theAttachment..2 AssessmentThe inspectors determined that the licensee was generally effective in identifyingproblems and entering them into the CAP. The threshold for problem evaluation waslow based on observed samples, independent walkdowns, staff interviews and thenumber of items entered into the CAP. NCRs typically provided complete and accuratecharacterization of the subject issues. Equipment performance issues involvingmaintenance effectiveness were being identified at an appropriate level and entered intothe CAP. Trending was generally effective in monitoring equipment performance.However, the inspectors noted two issues involving aspects related to the securityprogram. Specific details are documented in NRC inspection report 05000400/2007404. The licensee was effective in evaluating internal and external industry operatingexperience items for applicability and entering issues into the CAP. Department self-assessments and audits performed by the Nuclear Assessment Section (NAS) wereeffective in identifying issues and entering the deficiencies into the CAP. Sitemanagement was actively involved in the CAP and focused attention on significant plantissues.
b.Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues
.1 Inspection ScopeThe inspection reviewed the NCRs, including root and apparent cause evaluations, siteand departmental trend reports, and observed other activities as discussed in Section4OA2.a to verify that the licensee appropriately prioritized and evaluated problems inaccordance with their risk significance.
The inspection was intended to verify that thelicensee adequately determined the cause of the problems, including root causeanalysis where appropriate, and adequately addressed operability, reportability,common cause, generic concerns, extent of condition and extent of cause. The reviewincluded the appropriateness of the assigned significance, the timeliness of resolutions,level of effort in the investigation, the scope and depth of the causal analysis. Thereview was also performed to verify that the licensee appropriately identified correctiveactions to prevent recurrence and that those actions had been appropriately prioritized.The inspectors also reviewed a sample of cancelled NCRs to verify they were cancelledfor appropriate reasons. The inspectors also attended several plan of the day meetings,CAP unit evaluator meetings, CAP meetings and a Plant Nuclear Safety Committee(PNSC) meeting to determine if plant issues were being properly characterized,prioritized, assigned, and if appropriate management attention was applied to significantplant issues.
5Enclosure.2AssessmentThe inspectors determined that overall the licensee had appropriately assessed andprioritized issues. The priority level and department assignment for each NCR wasdetermined during the CAP unit evaluator meeting. Each NCR was then later reviewedby management during the daily CAP meeting. This review was thorough and adequate consideration was given to system operability and plant risk. In addition, the inspectors,through attendance of one PNSC and review of prior PNSC meeting minutes, concludedthat additional quality was added to the licensee's CAP process by the PNSC. Theinspectors concluded that evaluation of issues was generally comprehensive andtechnically adequate. The inspectors did find one example where an NCR thatdocumented a deficient condition was inappropriately cancelled to another NCR that waslater rejected. However, all corrective actions were properly completed.
c.Effectiveness of Corrective Actions
.1 Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed a sample of NCRs, selected licensee effectiveness reviews,and work orders initiated to resolve NCRs to verify the licensee had identified andimplemented timely and appropriate corrective actions to address problems.
Theinspectors verified that the corrective actions were properly assigned, documented, andtracked to ensure completion. The review was also conducted to verify the adequacy ofcorrective actions to address equipment deficiencies and maintenance rule (MR)functional failures of risk significant plant safety systems..2AssessmentThe inspectors determined that overall, corrective actions were effective in correctingplant problems. The effectiveness of corrective actions was correlated to good materialcondition of the systems reviewed. The mechanical systems inspected were generallyfree of water and oil leaks; and external corrosion. The inspectors identified that mostcorrective actions implemented by the licensee were appropriate for the severity and risksignificance of the problem identified. However, the inspectors identified a fewexamples where corrective actions could have been more thorough. *Two NCRs (191879 and 211525) were written addressing improper finger plateinstallation in two diaphragm valves (one containment isolation valve and theother a non-safety equipment drain valve). Since the contractor maintenancepersonnel who worked these valves were no longer on-site, no other correctiveaction other than repairing the valves were specified. As a result of inspectorquestioning, the licensee initiated NCR 242824 documenting additional actions toprovide pre-outage training of valve technicians on this issue and to addadditional detail to the preventative maintenance (PM) procedure on properfinger plate installation.
6Enclosure*The inspectors identified an example where the licensee developed an interimcorrective action that was questionable in regard to its effectiveness. Thiscorrective action was associated with a service water containment isolationcheck valve that had failed its local leak rate test (LLRT) during refueling outageRFO11 (NCR 146449). The interim corrective action PM to inspect, lubricate andclean the valve each refueling outage was put in place until an engineeringchange could be developed, approved and implemented. The valve passed itsRFO12 LLRT, however, it was noted that the PM was performed prior to theLLRT. Since an as-found LLRT was not performed, the inspectors questionedwhether the LLRT would have passed prior to performing the PM. In thesubsequent refueling outage (RFO13), the PM was again performed prior to theLLRT, however in this instance, the licensee determined that the as-found LLRTwould have not have passed based on the as-found condition of the valve. Thelong-term engineering change to replace the valve internals has been approvedand scheduled for the RFO14 outage. *After conducting a Priority 1 root cause investigation and taking correctiveactions (NCR 160859) for Operations staff not promptly recognizing andresponding to a degraded component in 2005, the Operations staff similarlyfailed to promptly recognize and respond to degraded equipment on twosubsequent occasions in 2007 (NCRs 221803 and 228947). AlthoughOperations did not promptly recognize and respond to the degraded equipmenton these occasions, the delay did not result in the equipment being inoperablefor greater than the technical specification allowed outage time.
d.Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment (SCWE)
.1 Inspection ScopeThe inspectors conducted interviews with randomly selected members of the plant staff,including operations, maintenance, health physics, engineering, chemistry, and securitypersonnel, to develop a general perspective of the safety-conscious work environment atthe site and the willingness of personnel to use the CAP and employee concernsprogram (ECP).
The interviews were also to determine if any conditions existed thatwould cause employees to be reluctant to raise safety concerns. The inspectors alsoreviewed the licensee's ECP which provides an alternate method to the CAP foremployees to raise concerns and remain anonymous. The inspectors reviewed a selectnumber of ECP reports completed since July 2005 for completeness, file documentation,response to the concerned individuals and response to "recommended actions" bystation management, and to verify the investigations conducted were adequate. Theinspectors also interviewed the ECP coordinator to gain insight into areas needingadditional attention. The inspection included verification that concerns were beingproperly reviewed and identified deficiencies were being resolved in accordance withprocedure REG-NCCC-0001, Employee Concerns Program.
7Enclosure.2AssessmentIn general, the inspectors determined that the Safety-Conscious Work Environment atthe site appeared to be adequate, where people felt free to raise issues without fear ofretaliation. The inspectors concluded that employees felt comfortable bringing up issueswith management, and were aware of the other venues available for reporting safetyconcerns, such as the ECP. The inspectors determined that licensee management emphasized the need for allemployees to identify and report problems using the appropriate methods establishedwithin the administrative programs, including the CAP, ECP, and Work Order System. These methods were readily accessible to all employees. Licensee managementencouraged employees to promptly identify nonconforming conditions. It was noted thatthe security organization had implemented an excellence plan which emphasized theimportance of a safety conscious work environment through staff training and otheractions.
Based on discussions conducted with a sample of plant employees from variousdepartments, the inspectors determined that employees felt free to raise issues and feltthat management wanted issues placed into the CAP for resolution. Site staff that hadused the CAP felt that the program was effective in resolving issues and was a veryeffective tool in keeping track of issue resolution. During review of ECP reports, the inspectors determined that the investigationsconducted by the ECP were thorough, complete and the recommended correctiveactions were appropriately focused to address the actions needed to resolve theindividual concerns. It was noted that licensee management generally implementedrecommended actions that resulted from ECP investigations and initiated conditionreports in the CAP for any condition adverse to quality that had been identified in the file. Some SCWE concerns were noted in the ECP files reviewed but they had been resolvedand were not evident in the staff interviews. The inspectors also did not identify anyreluctance to report safety concerns.4OA6Management MeetingsThe inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Duncan, and other members oflicensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on August 17, 2007. Theinspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined duringthe inspection.ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- M. Findlay, Superintendent, Security
- D. Alexander, HNP Superintendent, Environmental and Chemical
- D. Corlett, Supervisor - Li
censing/Regulatory Programs
- W. Saunders, HNP Superintendent, System Engineering
- S. O'Connor, Manager - Engineering
- C. Burton, Director - Site Operations/Acting General Manager
- C. Kamilaris, Manager - Nuclear Assessment
- L. Morgan, Supervisor - Self Evaluation Unit
- P. Morales, Employee Concerns Program
- T. Natale, Manager - Outage and Scheduling
- G. Simmons, Superintendent - Radiation Control
- J. Warner, Operations Manager
- T. Mitchell, Quality Assurance
NRC personnel
- R. Musser, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
ProceduresADM-NGGC-0101Maintenance Rule Program, Rev. 19ADM-NGGC-0107Equipment Reliability Process Guideline, Rev. 7CAP-NGGC-0200Corrective Action Program, Rev. 19CAP-NGGC-0201Self Assessment and Benchmarking Program, Rev. 11CAP-NGGC-0202Operating Experience Program, Rev. 11CAP-NGGC-0204Human Performance Program, Rev. 0CAP-NGGC-0205Significant Adverse Condition Investigation, Rev. 5CAP-NGGC-0206Corrective Action Program Trending and Analysis, Rev.2REG-NGGC-0001Employee Concerns Program, Rev. 13AP-930Plant Observation Program, Rev. 5FPP-004Transient Combustible Control, Rev. 19OPS-NGGC-1308Plant Status Control, Rev. 0OMM-001Operations - Conduct of Operations, Rev. 70WCM-005 Work Order Prioritization Process, Rev. 2SEC-NGGC-2166Site Access Controls, Rev. 3AP-002Plant Conduct of Operations, Site Access Training. Rev. 43EGR-NGGC-0005Engineering Change, Rev. 26Operating Experience Documents
- A-2Attachment183867 Westinghouse NSAL 6-01 Incorrect `Pressurizer Volume160621 NRC
- IN 2005-14, Loss of Seal Cooling in Westinghouse RCPs235541Westinghouse
- IN 2006-024 Pressurizer and Main Steam Safety/Relief Valve Lift Set points226354 CR3 Reactivity Management Self Assessment210587 NRC
- IN 2006-022 New Ultra-low Sulfur Diesel Fuel Oil could Adversely Impact DieselEngine Performance202883 Part 21 DC Cook EDG's FME from Manufacturer209957 K1 Contactor Failure in EDG at Palo Verde184536 Unexpected Isolation of Unit 1 Letdown (Prairie Island)225046 Non-conservative EDG Calculation for Loading221173 Leaks in EDG Jacket Water Heat Exchangers NUREG -1416, Operational Experience and Maintenance Programs for Transamerica Delaval,Inc Diesel Generators154939 Essential Cooling Water Pump Damage190387 Part 21 Flow Serve Check Valve194029 CCW HT Exchanger SW Outlet Valve Failures202835 NRC
- 23014 NRC
- IN 2006-06 Common Cause Vulnerab ilities Essential Service WaterNCRs Related to NRC Findings158247165629152362163435162600194627196258
- 211012
- 211188 150114162600207186209999218902214414212169229491153904170184NCRs Related to Focus SystemsAFW 185045231724203119185884
- 200342 125VDC Electrical Distribution233153192043217940236710Emergency Diesel Generator
- A-3Attachment175679196458199999212491149912176839214268186213214329214732222749209755Containment Isolation Valves1951551983592115042115251464491976831889897928190521194173194175196750219732218093119086191103216766224208231755Pressurizer and Main Steam PORV/Safety Valves
- 51122 140962Emergency Service Water165629163797166150163469167886166766172385180100164858192803192310192655193569208135210385210970234097184061169831Essential Services Chilled Water158621158303164607164924173729179935183389222730228947221803160859Miscellaneous NCRS213861051122162675161800194268221084221074224561221442157565160150165959173468212169212669214414201670178281179287191576181958220238193110191881206462191941192939196776191879227685142335152491234097184061169831190942181033184579218902214414229491207186166098217147242735180276223798173637190989227518179475193185230302183913210860232356210404180186234495206709164179234504210336165489165492
- A-4Attachment165493165734216815215943153904168741190357226365178491191239229214181292206352230305184577212371233380195201232817234498207186164906234506215934215935216119216269165251170184168105220240172725190809227406179301192357230021183892210397230373191235178887233990200284162766234501210120164912243044165168241178212169167825218543189455225826177413191158228202181070193916230303183914211432233379191640180611234496207059164753234505210352164914198736240418209999167470217150240995169896190530226652178883191707229491183888208432230310190173214084233540197613162658234500209999164911235910Cancelled/Rejected NCRS215517221084226693229243229816213763235508164426162675193720Work Orders9599909532127573056861966812166714759790204062444567546951061931481981186265496265481042615855602980305892682745819554342430803626840754135408310
- 856568665458683851686237711341823001836292968413995228101606310357311067381
- A-5AttachmentDrawingsCAR-2166-G-042501 250VDC, 125V DC & 120 V AC One Line Wire DiagramCPL-2165-S-1300 Reactor Coolant SystemCPL-2165-S-0544 Feed Water SystemCPL-2165-S-0545 Condensate and Air Evacuation SystemsCPL-2165-S-0542 Main Steam SystemOther DocumentsOST-1211, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A-SA Operability Test Quarterly Interval performedMarch 2007OST-1076, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B-SB Operability Test Quarterly Interval performed May
- 2007OST-1411, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1AX-SAB Operability Test Quarterly Interval performedApril 2007HNP Security Backlog and Performance Indicators Report Dated July 18, 2007Power Plant Mechanics Level 1 Qualification Checkout Card for Repairing Diaphragm ValvesCM-E0001, Station Battery Equalizing Charge, Rev. 15MST-E0011, 1E Battery Quarterly Test, Rev. 14PM-M0077, Check Valve Inspection Program, Rev. 26PM-M0102, ITT Grinnell 3/8 - 6 Inch Diaphragm Valve N
onmetallic Component Replacement,Rev. 0Security Event Logs, 2005-2007Harris Physical Security Plan, Revision 3Vital Area Door History Report, August 7 -August 8, 2007Key Security Performance Indicator Data, 2006-2007Design Engineering/ Configuration Management Standards, Rev. 11NED-C/STRU-1009 Design Report for Guard Post and Support Structures for NRC SecuritySecurity Post Orders, Post A5 and A14, dated 11/6/06Security Weapons Inventory, dated 7/13/07Weapons Semi-Annual Test Fire Records, dated 3/30/06 and 9/22/06Weapons Preventive Maintenance and Repair Record, dated 3/30/06CM-M0192, Crosby Relief Valve Disassembly, Maintenance, and Reassembly, Rev. 19
- OP-148, Essential Services Chilled Water System, Rev. 38AOP-022, Loss of Service Water, Rev. 27SP-007, Access Control and Personnel IdentificationPLP-620 Service Water Program (GL 89-13) Rev. 12OP-139 Service Water System Rev. 64Self Assessments and Trend reports Problem Identification and Resolution Preparation 216602Harris Radiation Protection Assessment H-RP-06-01Harris Environmental and Chemistry Assessment H-EC-06-01
- A-6AttachmentHarris Nuclear Plant Operations Assessment H-OP-07-01Harris Nuclear Plant Operations Assessment H-OP-05-01Human Performance Corrective Actions Self-Assessment Report 179970Harris Engineering Support Section Self-Assessment June 2007Chemistry Self Evaluation Rollup and Trend Analysis - 4
th Quarter 2006Operations Self Evaluation Rollup and Trend Analysis - 4
th Quarter 2006Operations Benefits of Self Evaluation Summary - June 2007HNP - Site Trend Report Self Evaluation Rollup & Trend Analysis 1
st Quarter 2007Radiation Protection Benefits of Self Evaluation Summary - 1
st Quarter 2007Radiation Protection Benefits of Self Evaluation Summary - June 2007Chemistry Benefits of Self Evaluation Summary - June 2007Support Services Benefits of Self Evaluation Summary - 2nd Quarter 2007Nuclear Security CAP Rollup & Trend Analysis - 2
nd Quarter 2007HNP Security Work Order Backlog and Performance Indicator Report July 2007Outage & Scheduling Benefits of Self Evaluation Summary, April 2007Outage & Scheduling Unit Trend Report, April - June, 2007Maintenance Benefits of Self Evaluation Summary, January - March 2007Maintenance Benefits of Self Evaluation Summary, June 2007H-MA-06-01 Harris Nuclear Plant Maintenance Assessment, August 30Plant Nuclear Safety Committee Meeting MinutesPNSC Meeting Minutes 05-33PNSC Meeting Minutes 05-41PNSC Meeting Minutes 06-03PNSC Meeting Minutes 06-14PNSC Meeting Minutes 06-22PNSC Meeting Minutes 07-03Operations LogsJuly 1 - July 31, 2007
- System Health ReportsAuxiliary Feedwater 2
nd Quarter
- 2007125 VDC Electrical Distribution 2
nd Quarter 2007Containment Isolation Valves System Health Report, January to June 2007Emergency Diesel Generator System Health Report, January to June 2007Containment Isolation Valves System Health Report, January to June 2007
- A-7AttachmentMiscellaneousObservation Program Database January 2007 - July 31, 2007HNP Nuclear Security Excellence Plan 2005/2006, Rev. January, 2006 PNSC Meeting Agenda July 31, 2007Open Corrective Maintenance Work Order Report for Focus Systems July 12, 2007Harris Top Ten Equipment List July 16, 2007HNP CAP Health Index Report July 13, 2007Harris Human Performance WEB Page Including Unit Improvement Plans2007 Human Performance Review Board Meeting SummaryEngineering Change
- EC 63911, 1A-SA Emergency Service Water Pump Refurbishment