Text

IR 05000400-14-008, 04/21-25/2014 - 05/5-9/2014, Shearon Harris, NRC Triennial Fire Protection
	ML14175B542
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	06/23/2014
From:	Shaeffer S M; NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB2
To:	Kapopoulos E J; Progress Energy Carolinas
References
	IR-14-008
	Download: ML14175B542 (26)
	v • d • e

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 June 23, 2014 Ernest J. Kapopoulos, Jr.

Vice President Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant

5413 Shearon Harris Road

New Hill, NC 27562-0165

SUBJECT: SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000400/2014008

Dear Mr. Kapopoulos:

On May 9, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed with Mr. J. Dufner and other members of your staff on May 9, 2014. Following completion of additional post-inspection analysis of the inspection findings and review of additional information by the NRC in the Region II office, a final exit was held by telephone with you and other members of your staff on June 23, 2014, to provide an update on changes to the preliminary inspection findings.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they related to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

One NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified during this inspection. This finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance of this violation and because it was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV)

consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest this NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Managem ent System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/

Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Engineering Branch 2 Division of Reactor Safety Docket No.: 50-400 License No.: NPF-63

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 05000400/2014008

w/Attachment:

Supplementary Information

cc: Distribution via Listserv

_ML14175B542_______________ SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE FORM 665 ATTACHED OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRP RII:DRP SIGNATURE RA RA RA RA RA RA RA NAME MTHOMAS PBRAXTON DJONES JMONTGOMERY GWISEMAN GMacDONALD GHOPPER DATE 6/23/2014 6/23/2014 6/23/2014 6/20/2014 6/20/2014 6/23/2014 6/23/2014 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OFFICE RII:DRS SIGNATURE RA NAME SSHAEFFER DATE 6/23/2014 6/ /2014 6/ /2014 6/ /2014 6/ /2014 6/ /2014 6/ /2014 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO Enclosure U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II Docket No.: 50-400 License No.: NPF-63

Report No.: 05000400/2014008

Licensee: Duke Energy Progress, Inc.

Facility: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1

Location: New Hill, NC 27562 Dates: April 21-25, 2014 May 5-9, 2014

Inspectors: P. Braxton, Reactor Inspector D. Jones, Senior Reactor Inspector J. Montgomery, Reactor Inspector M. Thomas, Senior Reactor Inspector (Lead Inspector)

G. Wiseman, Senior Reactor Inspector

Accompanying G. MacDonald, Senior Reactor Analyst Personnel: W. Monk, Reactor Inspector J. Patel, Reactor Inspector

Approved by: Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Engineering Branch 2

Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

IR 05000400/2014008; 04/21/2014 - 05/09/2014; Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; Fire Protection - NFPA 805 (Triennial)

The report covers an announced two-week triennial fire protection inspection by a team of five regional inspectors. One Green non-cited violation was identified. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow,

Red) and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process, dated June 2, 2011. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, "Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas," dated December 19, 2013. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy dated July 9, 2013. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process" Revision 5, dated February 2014.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green.

An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.48 (c) and National Fire Protection Association Standard (NFPA) 805 Section 2.4.3.2 was identified for the licensee's failure to address in the Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (Fire PRA) the risk contribution associated with all potentially risk significant fire scenarios for a given fire compartment/fire area. The licensee did not identify and evaluate all targets that were within the zone of influence (ZOI) of ignition sources for selected fire scenarios which could potentially contribute to the risk for the fire scenarios. The licensee entered the issue in the corrective action program as Nuclear Condition Reports 682633 and 685355 and established an hourly roving fire watch as compensatory measures.

The licensee's failure to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(c) and NFPA 805 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the reactor safety mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (i.e., fire) and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The missed targets in the ZOI for the selected fire scenarios had the potential to impact the ability to achieve safe and stable conditions. The finding was screened in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, "Significance Determinat ion Process," Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," which determined that an IMC 0609, Appendix F, "Fire Protection Significance Determination Process," review was required as the finding affected post-fire SSD. Using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, "Fire Protection Significance Determination Process Worksheet," the finding was screened as Green in step 1.6.1 "Screen by Licensee PRA-Based Safety Evaluation." An SDP Phase 3 analysis was performed to document the review of the risk determination of the missed ignition source-target interactions using the licensee's Fire PRA model. A senior reactor analyst performed the Phase 3 SDP analysis in accordance with the guidance in IMC 0609 Appendix F and NUREG/CR-6850 Revisions 0 and 1. The evaluation determined that the missed ignition source-target interactions resulted in a CDF increase of 5.91E-8/year, a Green finding of very low safety significance. There was no cross cutting aspect assigned to this finding because it was not indicative of current licensee performance since the original ignition source and target walkdowns were performed in 2006 and 2007. (Section 1R05.06).

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R05 Fire Protection

This report documents the results of a Triennial Fire Protection Inspection (TFPI) at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (HNP), Unit 1. The inspection was conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05XT, "Fire Protection - NFPA 805 (Triennial)," issued January 31, 2013. The objective of the inspection was to review a minimum sample of two risk-significant fire areas (FAs) [also referred to as fire compartments (FCs)] to verify implementation of the HNP Fire Protection Program (FPP). An additional objective was to review site specific implementation of one mitigating strategy from Section B.5.b of NRC Order EA-02-026, "Order for Interim Safeguards and Security Compensatory Measures" (commonly referred to as B.5.b), as well as the storage, maintenance, and testing of B.5.b mitigating equipment. Section 71111.05-05 of the IP specifies a minimum sample size of two FAs and one B.5.b mitigation strategy for addressing large fires and explosions. The inspectors selected four FAs based on available risk information as analyzed onsite by a senior reactor analyst from Region II, data obtained from in-plant walkdowns regarding potential ignition sources, location and characteristics of combustibles, and location of equipment needed to achieve and maintain the reactor in a safe and stable condition. Other considerations for selecting the FCs/FAs were the relative complexity of the post-fire safe shutdown (SSD) procedures, information contained in FPP documents, and results of prior NRC TFPIs. In selecting the B.5.b mitigating strategy sample, the inspectors reviewed licensee submittal letters, safety evaluation reports, licensee commitments, B.5.b implementing procedures, and previous NRC inspection reports. This inspection fulfilled the requirements of the procedure by selecting a sample of four FAs and one B.5.b mitigating strategy. The following FCs/FAs/fire scenarios were selected for review.

FC35/FA 1-A-SWGRB, Switchgear Room B, was a performance based FA. Focus was on fire scenario FC35_S0716 involving the 1B DC Distribution Panel DP-1B-SB.

FC03/FA 12-A-CRC1, Control Room Complex (PIC Room), was a performance based FA which involved shutdown from a primary control station. Focus was on fire scenario FC03_S1527 involving Train A Output Cabinets 1 & 2.

FC18/FA 1-A-BAL-B, Reactor Auxiliary Building, was a performance based FA. Focus was on fire scenario FC18_S0460 involving motor control center MCC 1B35-SB. Other fire scenarios reviewed for FA 1-A-BAL-B included FC18_S0495 BOS, Chiller 2A small oil fire; FC18_S0495 B98, Chiller 2A 40hp motor 98 th percentile small thermal fire; and FC18_S3007 BHEAF, Bus Duct HEAF scenario 36.

FC28/FA 1-A-BAT-B, Battery Room B, was a deterministic based FA. Focus was on classical fire protection features such as detection and suppression for fire scenario FC28_S0584 for 1EE-E115 - 125V Emergency Battery Bank 1B-SB fire and fire scenario FC28_S3391 for TRANS-28-A - 1-A-BATB transient combustible fire.

For each FC/FA/fire scenario selected, the inspectors evaluated the licensee's FPP against applicable NRC requirements and licensee design and licensing basis documents. The B.5.b mitigation strategy selected for review was spent fuel pool external makeup using the portable pump. Specific licensing and design basis documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Attachment.

.01 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors examined HNP fire response abnormal operating procedures (AOPs)and compared them to the NFPA 805 Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment (NSCA) and Fire Safety Analysis (FSA), system flow diagrams, and other design basis documents to determine if equipment required to achieve post-fire safe and stable plant conditions was properly identified and adequately protected from fire damage in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(c) and the HNP approved FPP.

The inspectors reviewed applicable sections of the AOPs for the selected FCs/FAs and fire scenarios to verify that the shutdown methodology properly identified the components and systems necessary to achi eve and maintain safe and stable plant conditions. The inspectors performed walk-throughs of procedure steps to ensure the implementation and human factors adequacy of the procedures. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel credited for procedure implementation had procedures available, were trained on implementation, and were available in the event a fire occurred. The inspectors verified that the operators could reasonably be expected to perform the specific actions within the time required to maintain plant parameters within specified limits.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.02 Passive Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted in-plant inspections and examined the material condition and as-built configuration of accessible passive barrier features both surrounding and within the FCs/FAs selected for review to evaluate the adequacy of their fire confinement in accordance with the associated design basis documents (DBD) and NFPA 805 FSA calculations. Fire barrier features in use included poured concrete walls, ceilings, floors, fire doors, dampers, electrical raceway fire barrier systems (ERFBS), safety system fire resistive cable and NFPA 805 monitoring program floor drains and curbs.

The inspectors reviewed licensing bases documentation, such as 10 CFR 50.48(a), 10 CFR 50.48(c), the NRC NFPA 805 Safety Evaluation Report (SER), Underwriters Laboratories (UL) listing data, construction details; supporting fire endurance test data, applicable NFPA Code of Record requirements and a sample Existing Engineering Equivalence Evaluations (EEEEs) for selected fire barrier configurations to verify that passive barrier as-built configurations met the FPP fire resistance requirements, engineering design basis, standard industry practices, and were properly evaluated or qualified by appropriate fire endurance tests. In addition, a sample of completed NFPA 805 Monitoring Program credited surveillances and maintenance procedures for selected fire doors, fire dampers, ERFBS and floor drains were reviewed to ensure that these passive barrier features were being properly inspected and maintained. The passive barriers reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.03 Active Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees active fire suppression which included the fire pumps and water distribution system, conventional fire detection systems, very early warning fire detection systems and manual fire-fighting fire hose and standpipe systems protecting the FAs selected for review.

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of the design, installation, and operation of the conventional automatic fire detection and alarm system to actuate in the early stage of a fire. The review included walk downs of the of the as-built configurations and an examination of detector equipment specifications, detector spacing, the licensee's technical evaluation of the detector locations, and the ceiling, steel beam reinforcing plans to assess whether the areas were protected by fire detectors appropriate for the types of fire hazards that existed in the selected FAs and were in accordance with the Code of Record requirements (NFPA 72E, 1978 Edition). The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's alarm response procedures, NFPA 805 FSA calculations, NFPA 805

license amendment request (LAR) submittals; associated NRC NFPA 805 safety evaluation report (SER). The inspectors used the NRC approved Fire Dynamics Tools (FDT) fire modeling to independently evaluate the fire detection system response to selected NFPA 805 fire scenarios and to verify that the conventional fire detection and alarm systems for the selected FAs would perform in accordance with the established design and licensing bases of the plant.

The inspectors reviewed fire pre-plans and fire response procedures for the selected FAs to determine if appropriate information was provided to fire brigade members to facilitate suppression of an exposure fire that could impact NSCA strategies. The inspectors walked down the selected FAs to compare the associated pre-fire plans and drawings with as-built plant conditions and fire response procedures. This was done to verify that fire pre-fire plan instructions and drawings were consistent with the fire protection features and potential fire conditions described in the NFPA 805 FSA calculations. The inspectors also evaluated whether the fire response procedures and pre-plans for the selected FAs could be implemented as intended. Additionally, fire brigade response time-to-drill scenarios that transpired since 2011 were reviewed to verify that fire brigade response time performance basis monitoring criteria were met.

The inspectors also performed in-plant observations of the material condition and operational lineup of the fire water pumps and fire protection water supply distribution piping including, manual fire hose and standpipe systems for the selected FCs/FAs.

Using operating and valve cycle/alignment procedures as well as engineering drawings, the inspectors examined the electric motor-driven and the diesel-driven fire pumps and accessible portions of the fire main piping system to evaluate operational status, consistency of as-built configurations with engineering drawings, and to verify correct system valve lineups (i.e. position of valves). During plant tours, the inspectors observed placement of the fire hoses, fire extinguishers, fire hose nozzle types, and fire hose lengths to verify they were not blocked and that adequate reach and coverage was provided consistent with the fire pre-plans and FPP documents. In addition, a sample of completed NFPA 805 Monitoring Program credited surveillances and maintenance procedures for the conventional fire detection systems, very early warning fire detection systems and fire hose and standpipe systems were reviewed to ensure that these active fire protection systems were being properly inspected and maintained. Specific documents reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.04 Protection from Damage from Fire Suppression Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated whether the ability to achieve the nuclear safety performance criteria could be adversely affected due to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of manual fire suppression systems.

The inspectors walked down the selected FCs/FAs to compare the associated fire pre-plan fire attack tactics and guidelines and checked that fire fighting water would either be contained in the fire affected area or be safely drained off through floor drains or stairwells. The inspectors also reviewed available documentation related to flooding analysis from fire protection activities as well as potential flooding through unsealed concrete floor cracks. The inspectors addressed the possibility that a fire in one FC/FA could lead to the migration of manual smoke or hot gases to other plant areas. Air flow paths out of the selected FCs/FAs identified on heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) drawings were reviewed to verify that inter-area migration of smoke or hot gases would not inhibit necessary post-fire recovery actions for the selected FCs/FAs.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed flow diagrams and engineering calculations associated with the 'B' train battery room HV AC systems. This review was done to verify that systems used to accomplish post-fire SSD would not be inhibited by a potential hydrogen gas fire in the 'B' battery room due to inoperable ventilation supply and exhaust fans. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.05 Shutdown from a Primary Control Station

a. Inspection Scope

For postulated fire scenarios in FCs/FAs 12-A-CR, 12-A-CRC1, and 12-A-HVIR, which may impair main control room (MCR) functions, the licensee credited shutdown from primary control stations to achieve safe and stable plant conditions. This would involve transferring plant controls from the MCR to the auxiliary control panel (ACP). The process monitoring instruments which were relied on to support safe shutdown were examined to verify that they were either electrically or physically independent of the FAs. The inspectors reviewed the ACP transfer switch testing methodology to assess the functionality of the isolation feature of the transfer switches. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's FPP as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 9.5.1, the NSCA, piping and instrumentation drawings, electrical drawings, and other supporting documents. The reviews focused on ensuring that the required functions for post-fire SSD and the corresponding equipment necessary to perform those functions were included in the fire response AOPs. The review included assessing whether safe and stable plant conditions from the primary control stations outside the MCR could be implemented and that transfer of control from the MCR to the ACP could be accomplished in accordance with procedure AOP-004, "Remote Shutdown." This review also included verification that safe and stable conditions could be achieved and maintained from the primary control station with and without the availability of offsite power.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.06 Circuit Analysis

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that the licensee performed a NSCA for the selected FCs/FAs and that the assessment identified the structures, systems and components important for achieving safe and stable conditions. For each FC/FA, the inspectors reviewed the electrical schematics, flow diagrams, and the NSCA to identify any potential fire-induced cable damage that could directly affect post-fire recovery actions. The review also focused on ensuring that the required functions for post-fire safe shutdown and the corresponding equipment specified as necessary to perform those functions were included in the procedures. The inspectors reviewed a sample of circuit diagrams to verify that transfer/isolation switches needed for shutdown from a primary control station were provided with circuit isolation at appropriate points in the circuits. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's breaker/fuse coordination analysis for distribution panel 1B-SB and MCC 1B35-SB to verify that SSD components had proper breaker and fuse selective coordination.

b. Findings

Introduction:

An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.48

(c) and National Fire Protection Association Standard (NFPA) 805 Section 2.4.3.2 was identified for the licensee's failure to address in their Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (Fire PRA) the risk contribution associated with all potentially risk significant fire scenarios for selected FCs/FAs. The licensee did not identify and evaluate all targets within the zone of influence (ZOI) of ignition sources for selected fire scenarios which could potentially contribute to the risk for the fire scenarios.

Description:

Walkdowns of the selected FCs/FAs during this TFPI inspection resulted in the identification of numerous missed targets within the ZOI of ignition sources that were not evaluated for their risk contribution to the selected risk significant fire scenarios. The targets were missed when the original ignition source walkdowns were performed in 2006 and 2007 during the licensee's initial fire scenario development to support the HNP Fire PRA. Specifically, the licensee did not identify and evaluate several conduits and cable trays that were within the ZOI of ignition sources which could potentially contribute to a risk increase for the selected fire scenarios. The licensee evaluated the risk contribution of the missed targets which resulted in a delta core damage frequency (CDF) of 5.34E-8/year for the selected fire scenarios. The licensee completed extent of condition reviews of fire scenarios in additional risk significant FCs/FAs (FC35/FA 1-A-SWGRB, FC34/FA 1-A-SWGRA, and FC41/FA 1-G Turbine Building) by identifying targets of interest associated with impor tant equipment and evaluation of the ignition sources ZOI around the targets to determine if the ignition sources impacted the targets. This extent of condition review identified an additional 21 previously unanalyzed ignition source-target ZOI interactions. The risk contribution for the 21 unanalyzed targets resulted in a delta CDF of 4.99E-9/year. Similarly another extent of condition review was performed in other risk significant FCs/FAs (FC16/FA 1-A- ACP, FC19/FA 1-A-BAL-C, and FC32/FA 1-A-EPB) which resulted in the identification of 9 unanalyzed ignition source-target interactions and a delta CDF of 7.21E-10/year. The missed targets identified during the three walkdowns resulted in a total delta CDF of 5.91E-8/year. The licensee documented this issue in the corrective action program (CAP) in nuclear condition reports (NCRs) 682633 and 685355 and established an hourly roving fire watch as compensatory measures.

Analysis:

The licensee's failure to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(c) and NFPA 805 is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it is associated with the reactor safety mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (i.e., fire) and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The missed targets in the ZOI for the selected fire scenarios had the potential to impact the ability to achieve safe and stable conditions. The finding was screened in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process," dated June 2, 2011; Attachment 4, "Initial Characterization of Findings," dated June 19, 2012; which determined that an IMC 0609, Appendix F, "Fire Protection Significance Determination Process," dated September 20, 2013, review was required as the finding affected post-fire SSD. Using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, "Fire Protection Significance Determination Process Worksheet," dated September 20, 2013, the finding was screened as Green in step 1.6.1 "Screen by Licensee PRA-Based Safety Evaluation." An SDP Phase 3 analysis was performed to document the review of the risk determination of the missed ignition source-target interactions using the licensee's Fire PRA model. A senior reactor analyst performed the Phase 3 SDP analysis in accordance with the guidance in IMC 0609 Appendix F and NUREG/CR-6850 Revisions 0 and 1. The dominant sequence was a 75 th percentile thermal fire in the WC2 chiller motor which remained unsuppressed long enough to result in damage to targets in the ZOI. The fire damage would cause a transient and loss of offsite power to the 6.9kV

safety buses and impact operator alignment of offsite breakers. The fire damage combined with random emergency diesel generator common cause failure to run and a random failure to run of the turbine driv en auxiliary feedwater pump would result in failure of secondary side heat removal and lead to core damage due to lack of core cooling. The risk was mitigated by the small impact the missed ignition source-target interactions had on the required SSD equipment for the specific scenarios. The evaluation determined that the missed ignition source-target interactions resulted in a CDF increase of 5.91E-8/year, a Green finding of very low safety significance. There was no cross cutting aspect assigned to this finding because it was not indicative of current licensee performance since the original ignition source and target walkdowns were performed in 2006 and 2007.

Enforcement:

Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Renewed Facility Operating License Condition 2.F requires the licensee to implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved FPP that comply with 10 CFR 50.48 (c), "National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805," as specified in the NRC safety evaluation report dated June 28, 2010. NFPA 805 Section 2.4.3.2 states that the probabilistic safety assessment (HNP Fire PRA) evaluation shall address the risk contribution associated with all the potentially risk-significant fire scenarios.

Contrary to the above, since 2007 the licensee failed to address the risk contribution of all targets within the ZOI of ignition sources associated with all potentially risk significant fire scenarios for selected fire compartments resulting in potentially underestimating the post-fire SSD risk. Because the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) and

was entered into the licensee's CAP as NCRs 682633 and 685355, this finding is being treated as a NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement policy. This finding is identified as NCV 05000400/2014008-01, Failure to Identify and Evaluate All Targets Within the Zone of Influence of Ignition Sources.

.07 Communications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the communications capabilities required to support plant personnel in the conduct and coordination of their required actions to achieve safe and stable conditions. The inspectors also verified that portable radio communications and fixed emergency communications systems were available, operable, and adequate for the performance of designated activities to support fire event notification and fire brigade firefighting activities. The inspectors observed the licensee conducting a communication test with the sound powered phone systems and the fire brigade radios to verify the equipment was operational. The inspectors verified, through inspection, the contents of designated emergency storage lockers. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the design and location of communications equipment, such as repeaters and transmitters, would not cause a loss of communications during a fire. The inspectors reviewed preventive maintenance and surveillance test records and vendor manuals to verify that the communications equipment was being properly maintained and tested.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.08 Emergency Lighting

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the adequacy of the emergency lighting units (ELUs) used to support plant personnel during post-fire safe shutdown for the selected fire compartments. The inspectors performed plant walkdowns and observed the placement and coverage area of fixed 8-hour battery pack emergency lights credited for SSD, to evaluate their adequacy for illuminating access and egress pathways and any equipment requiring local operation and/or instrumentation monitoring for post-fire SSD. The inspectors reviewed maintenance and test procedures and completed test records of ELU battery 8-hour capacity tests to ensure that they were sized, tested, and maintained consistent with vendor guidance, license requirements, and licensee commitments. The specific documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.09 Cold Shutdown Repairs

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and the Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment to verify that the licensee had evaluated the need for cold shutdown repairs. The inspectors determined that the licensee does not require transitioning to cold shutdown to achieve the safe and stable condition, and therefore does not credit repairs to cold shutdown components.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.10 Compensatory Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the administrative controls for out-of-service, degraded, and/or inoperable fire protection features (e.g., detection and suppression systems, passive fire barriers, SSD). The compensatory measures that had been established were compared to those specified in the FPP for the applicable fire protection feature.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.11 Radiological Release

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified that the licensee analysis of radioactive release had been examined on a fire area basis and was addressed in applicable NFPA 805 FSA calculations and fire pre-plans in accordance with NFPA 805, Section 2.2.4. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's transient radioactive material fire pre-plan and walked down the selected FCs/FAs to verify that the associated pre-fire plan tactics and instructions were consistent with the potential radiological conditions identified in the NFPA 805 FSA calculations.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.12 Non-Power Operations

a. Inspection Scope

One of the requirements in NFPA 805 is for licensees to implement FPP controls during non-power operational modes. Although HNP did not enter an outage during the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed plant calculations, procedures, and analyses that defined the key safety functions required to maintain the plant in a safe and stable condition during non-power operational modes. The inspectors also verified that where the licensee had identified specific areas or "pinch points

" where one or more key safety functions could be lost

, additional actions had been established which would be taken during high-risk evolutions in the locations of the "pinch points

" where key safety functions could be lost.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.13 Monitoring Program

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed procedure AD-EG-ALL-1503, "National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 Monitoring," and calculation HNP-M/BMRK-0019, "HNP NFPA 805 Monitoring," to verify that a monitoring program was established to ensure that the availability and reliability of the fire protection systems and features credited in the performance-based analyses are maintained and to assess the performance of the FPP in meeting the performance criteria in accordance with NFPA 805. The licensee established performance monitoring groups that provide a link between components and functions that are monitored together. The items in scope were being monitored for performance based on the established criteria as part of the system health reports process. The inspectors reviewed a sample of completed NFPA 805 Monitoring Program credited surveillances and maintenance procedures for the conventional fire detection systems, very early warning fire detection systems and fire hose and standpipe systems to ensure that these active fire protection systems were being properly inspected and maintained. The inspectors also verified that the monitoring program instituted appropriate corrective actions to return availability, reliability, and performance of systems that fall outside of established levels.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.14 Plant Change Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed plant change evaluation forms and engineering change evaluations to verify that the modifications met the requirements of the fire protection license condition for self-approved changes to the fire protection program. The documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.15 Control of Combustibles and Ignition Sources

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the administrative controls of combustible materials and ignition sources to verify that the FPP performance requirements of NFPA 805 Chapter 3 were satisfied. Plant administrative procedures were reviewed to determine if adequate controls were in place to control the potential ignition sources of welding and grinding and the handling of transient combustibles in the plant. The inspectors walked down numerous areas in the plant, including the selected FCs/FAs, for control of combustible materials, storage of in-plant materials, transient combustibles, and general housekeeping. The inspectors verified that safety can containers with combustibles or flammable liquids were UL or Factory Mutual listed. The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that the licensee was addressing marginal performance in the area of transient combustible controls noted in the 4 th quarter 2013 FPP Health Report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.16 B.5.b Mitigating Strategy

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed on a sample basis, the licensee's preparedness to handle large fires or explosions by reviewing the spent fuel pool external makeup mitigating strategy.

To verify that the licensee continued to meet the requirements of their B.5.b license condition and 10 CFR 50.54 (hh)(2), the inspectors reviewed procedures to ensure that they were being maintained and were adequate; and performed walkdowns with licensee personnel to ensure that the actions were feasible, the required equipment was properly staged, and that personnel were properly trained to implement the strategy. The inspectors also reviewed maintenance and testing records of equipment to ensure

that the equipment was being maintained c onsistent with vendor recommendations and licensee requirements.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed recent independent licensee assessments for thoroughness, completeness and conformance to FPP requirements. The inspectors also reviewed other CAP documents, including completed corrective actions documented in selected NCRs and operating experience program documents, to verify that industry identified fire protection issues (actual or potential) affecting HNP were appropriately entered into the CAP for resolution. Items included in the operating experience program effectiveness review were NRC information notices, regulat ory guides, regulatory issues summaries, industry or vendor generated reports of defects and non-compliances submitted pursuant to 10 CFR Part 21, and vendor information letters. The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of the corrective actions for the identified issues. The inspectors reviewed CAP documents to verify that the licensee was addressing the marginal performance in the control of transient combustible noted in the 4 th quarter 2013 FPP Health Report. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On May 9, 2014, the lead inspector presented the preliminary inspection results to Mr. J.

Dufner, HNP Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee's staff, who acknowledged the results. Following completion of additional reviews in the Region II office, another exit meeting was held by telephone with Mr. E. Kapopoulos and other members of the licensee's staff on June 23, 2014, to provide an update on changes to the preliminary inspection findings. The licensee acknowledged the findings.

Proprietary information was not included in this inspection report.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

S. Allen, Lead Engineer, Regulatory Programs

D. Brewer, Director, Organization Effectiveness

J. Caves, Engineer, Regulatory Affairs

D. Corlett, Manager, Regulatory Affairs

R. Davis, PRA Manager

J. Dufner, Plant General Manager

R. Dukes, Safe Shutdown Engineer, Harris Engineering Support Section (HESS)

J. Ertman, Manager, Fleet Fire Protection

M. Grantham, Director, Design Engineering

D. Griffin, Manager, Nuclear Training

D. Hayes, Operations Manager

E. Kapopoulos, Site Vice President, Harris Plant

T. Kazukynas, Fire Protection Engineer, HESS

C. Kidd, Harris Engineering Director

D. Lewis, Fire Protection Program Manager, HESS

J. MacIntyre, Fleet Fire Protection Engineer

K. Miller, Manager, Engineering Programs, HESS

T. Mitchell, Manager, Maintenance

J. Nobles, Site Fire Marshall, Operations

S. O'Connor, General Manager, Engineering

R. Rhodes, Principal Engineer - Safe Shutdown Program Manager, HESS

B. Scharff, Fire Protection System Engineer, HESS

G. Simmons, Manager, Emergency Preparedness

H. Stiles, Fleet PRA Engineer

J. Warner, Manager, Work Management

G. Wilson, Lead Engineer, Regulatory Affairs

NRC Personnel

J. Austin, Senior Resident Inspector

P. Lessard, Resident Inspector

T. Reis, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Region II

S. Shaeffer, Chief, Engineering Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety, Region II

LIST OF REPORT ITEMS

Opened and Closed

05000400/2014008-01 NCV Failure to Identify and Evaluate All Targets

Within the Zone of Influence of Ignition

Sources (Section 1R05.06)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R05.02.a: List of Passive Fire Barrier Features Inspected Fire Barrier Floors/Walls/Ceiling Identification

Description Poured Concrete Wall Construction

FA 1-A-BAT-B

Fire Door Identification

Description

D0241

FA 1-A-SWGRB D0243

FA 1-A-BAT-B D0249

FA 1-A-SWGRB D0472

FA 12-A-CRC1

Fire Damper Identification

Description

FDAS 11-1

FA 1-A-BAT-B

FDAS 42-1

FA 1-A-SWGRB FDAS 29-1

FA 1-A-BAL-B

Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier System Identification

Description

HEMYCŽ and MTŽ ERFBS fire barriers

FA 1-BAL-B

MeggittŽ Fire Resistive Electrical Cables

FA 1-BAL-B

NFPA 805 Monitoring Program Curb Identification

Description Water Confinement Curb at Access Door D0241

FA 1-A-SWGRB

Water Confinement Curb at Access Door D0243

FA 1-A-BAT-B

NFPA 805 Monitoring Program Floor Drain Identification Description Floor Drain FBS D004

FA 1-A-BAL-B

Section 1R05.06: List of Safe Shutdown Components Inspected

1A-1

Breaker 107 SAT to Bus 1A 1B-3

Breaker 127 SAT to Bus 1B

1E-3

Breaker 121 SAT to Bus 1E

1A-3

Breaker 108 UAT to Bus 1A 1B-5

Breaker 128 UAT to Bus 1B 1D-1

Breaker 102 UAT to Bus 1D

1E-1

Breaker 122 UAT to Bus 1E

1AF-50

Motor Driven AFW Valve to SG C

1AF-51

Motor Driven AFW Valve to SG B

PDT 2180

Turbine Driven Differential Pressure Transmitter

Procedures

AD-EG-ALL-1503, National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 Monitoring, Rev. 0

ADM-NGGC-0110, Oversight of Contractors, Shared Resources, Vendors, and Technical Representatives (Supplemental Personnel), Rev. 11

APP-ALB-023, Annunciator Panel Procedure, Auxiliary Panel No. 1 Annunciation RAB SWGR

RM B EXH E29SB TRBL, Rev. 46

APP-ALB-030, Annunciator Panel Procedure, Main Control Board, Rev. 33

AOP-004, Remote Shutdown, Rev. 62 and Rev. 63

AOP-022, Loss of Service Water, Rev. 34

AOP-036, Safe Shutdown Following a Fire, Rev. 47

AOP-036.03, Fire Area: 1-A-BAL-B, 1-A-BAL-E, Rev. 21

AOP-036.06, Fire Areas: 1-A-BAT-A, 1-D-DGA, 1-D-DTA, 12-I-ESWPA, 1-A-BAT-B, 1-D-DGB,

1-D-DTB, 12-I-ESWPB, Rev. 12

AOP-036.08, Fire Areas: 1-A-SWGRA, 1-A-SWGB, Rev. 19

EDMG-001, Extreme Damage Event Initial Actions, Rev. 0

EGR-NGGC-0104, Low Voltage AC and DC Fuse Selection, Rev. 5

EGR-NGGC-0106, AC and DC Overcurrent Protection and Coordination, Rev. 4

FIR-NGGC-0007, Nuclear Generation Group NFPA 805 Fire Brigade Training Program, Rev. 0

FIR-NGGC-0009, NFPA 805 Transient Combustibles and Ignition Source Controls

Program, Rev. 5

FIR-NGGC-0101, Fire Protection Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment (NSCA), Rev. 4

FPP-001, Fire Protection Program Manual, Rev. 37

FPP-002, Fire Emergency, Rev. 40

FPP-003, Fire Investigation Report, Revision 8

FPP-004, Fire Protection Water Pressure Calculation, Rev. 5

FPP-008, Control of Fuel Gases and Oxygen, Revision 11

FPP-013, Fire Protection-Minimum Requirements, Mitigating Actions and Surveillance

Requirements, Rev. 77

FPT-3001 Motor Driven Main Fire Pump Functionality Test, Monthly Interval, Rev. 14

FPT-3002, Fire Main Valve Position Verification, Rev. 25

FPT-3101, Hose Rack Inspection, Auxiliary Building, Quarterly Interval, Rev. 15

FPT-3151, Fire Extinguisher Inspection, Auxiliary Building, Monthly Interval, Rev. 6

FPT-3152, Fire Extinguisher Inspection, Waste Processing Building, Rev. 6

FPT-3153, Fire Extinguisher Inspection, Turbine Building and Operations Building, Rev. 5

FPT-3154, Fire Extinguisher Inspection, Fuel Handling Building, Rev. 6

FPT-3155, Fire Extinguisher Inspection, Diesel Generator Building, Rev. 4

FPT-3156, Fire Extinguisher Inspection, Support Structures, Rev. 15

FPT-3157, Fire Extinguisher Inspection, Containment Building, Rev. 3

FPT-3205A, Fire Detector Functional Test, Local Control Panel 5, Monthly Interval, Rev. 2

FPT-3560, Fire Wrap Inspection, 18-Month Interval, Rev. 12

FPT-3561, Fire Barrier Inspection, 18-Month Interval, Rev. 10

FPT-3581, Fire Barrier Structural Elements Inspection, 18-Month Interval, Rev. 7

GP-008, Draining the Reactor Coolant System, Rev. 43

ISG-FAFC, Function Availability Flow Chart, Rev. 0

ISG-SFP, Spent Fuel Pool, Rev. 0

MPT-E0038, Sound Powered Phones, Rev. 4

MPT-E0030, Self-Contained DC Emergency Lighting System Inspection, Rev. 27

MPT-E0032, Self-Contained DC Emergency Lighting System Eight Hour Life Test, Rev. 28

NGGM-PM-0007, Quality Assurance Program Manual, Rev. 21

OP-155, Diesel Generator Emergency Power System, Rev. 71

OPT-3130, Fire Response Vehicle Inspection Monthly Interval, Rev. 17

ORT-1407, Safe Shutdown Materials Audit Semiannual, Rev. 20

ORT-1813, Remote Shutdown: Test of Additional Components on the ACP, Rev. 13

ORT-3001, Fire Equipment Inspection Monthly Interval, Rev. 24

OST-1855, Containment Fan Cooler

AH-1 and

AH-4 Test Transferred to the ACP, Rev. 6

OST-1857, Remote Shutdown System Operability, Accumulator Isolation Valve and Letdown Isolation Valve Testing, Rev. 18

OST-1860, Remote Shutdown: Reactor Trip Breakers, Rev. 7

OST-1861, Remote Shutdown: Individual Component Test, Rev. 10

Calculations, Evaluations & Specifications

E-5523.000, Instrumentation, Control and Transfer Switches for Components Credited in the

Event of a Fire Requiring Control Room Evacuation, Rev. 8

E-5526, Fuse Coordination Study for Safe Shutdown in Case of Fire, Rev. 1

E-5506, Safe Shutdown (Including NPO) Common Power Supply Coordination and MHIF Study,

Rev. 9

EC 96487, Evaluation of

NCR 686919, Create Calculation to Document Usage of MOVs in

AOP-036.XX, Rev. 0 and Rev. 1

E5-0001, Analysis of Motor Output Torque for AC Motor Operated Valves, Rev. 12

FP-0004, Fire Protection Water Pressure Calculation, Rev. 5

HNP-E/ELEC-0001, Safe Shutdown Analysis in Case of Fire, Rev. 6

HNP-E/ELEC-0002, NFPA 805 Transition Non-Power Operational Modes Review, Rev. 2

HNP-E/ELEC-0003, Safe Shutdown Analysis Manual Action Feasibility, Rev. 3

HNP-F/PSA-0071, Harris Fire

PRA-Plant Partitioning and Ignition Frequency, Rev. 4

HNP-F/PSA-0075, Harris Fire

PRA-Human Reliability Analysis, Rev. 2

HNP-F/PSA-0077, Harris Fire

PRA-Component Selection and Fire Induced Model Calculation, Rev. 1

HNP-F/PSA-0078, Harris Fire PRA- Fire Scenario Data, Rev. 3

HNP-F/PSA-0079, Harris Fire

PRA-Quantification, Rev. 3

HNP-M/BMRK-0001, Code Compliance Evaluation NFPA 72E, Automatic Fire Detectors, Rev. 5

HNP-M/BMRK-0003, Code Compliance Evaluation NFPA 80, Standard for Fire Doors and Windows, Rev. 4

HNP-M/BMRK-0004, Code Compliance Evaluation NFPA 90A, Air Conditioning and Ventilating

Systems, Rev. 2

HNP-M/BMRK-0005, Code Compliance Evaluation NFPA 10, Portable Fire Ext., Rev. 2

HNP-M/BMRK-0006, Code Compliance Evaluation NFPA 14, Standpipe and Hose Systems,

Rev. 3

HNP-M/BMRK-0011, Code Compliance Evaluation NFPA 805, Performance Based Standard for

Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants-2001 Edition, Rev. 1

HNP-M/BMRK-0014, Code Compliance Evaluation NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible

Liquids Code, Rev. 0

HNP-M/BMRK-0019, HNP NFPA 805 Monitoring, Rev. 0

HNP-M/MECH-1103, Hemyc ERFBS Rating Calculation, Rev. 3

HNP-M/MECH-1111, NFPA 805 Transition Fire Area 1-A-BATB Fire Safety Analysis, Rev. 2

HNP-M/MECH-1117, NFPA 805 Transition Fire Area 1-A-BAL-B Fire Safety Analysis, Rev.3

HNP-M/MECH-1123, NFPA 805 Transition Fire Area 1-A-SWGRB Fire Safety Analysis, Rev. 2

HNP-M/MECH-1126, NFPA 805 Transition Fire Area 12-A-CRC1 Fire Safety Analysis, Rev. 2

HNP-M/MECH- 1129, Fire Zone of Influence Calculation, Rev. 0

HNP-M/MECH-1140, Fire Area 1-A-BAL-B Fixed and Transient Ignition Source Fire Modeling

Analysis, Rev 0

SW-0051, H04065 - Emergency Service Water System Performance, Rev. 8

9-RAB-6B, SWGR RM "B" Ventilation Sys Served by

AH-13, Hydrogen Concentration, Rev. 2

Work Orders

(WO)

WO 02080245, Rev. 1,

MPT-E0038, Sound Powered Phone Test, 2/12/2013

WO 02175028, Rev. 1,

MPT-E0032, Self-Contained DC Emergency Lighting System Eight Hour Life Test, 1/14/2013

WO 02201525, Rev. 1,

MPT-E0032, Self-Contained DC Emergency Lighting System Eight Hour Life Test, 9/4/2013

WO 02192211, Rev. 1,

MPT-E0032, Self-Contained DC Emergency Lighting System Eight Hour

Life Test, 11/12/2013

WO 02162975, Rev. 1,

MPT-E0032, Self-Contained DC Emergency Lighting System Eight Hour Life Test, 8/21/2013

WO 02152194, Rev. 1,

MPT-E0032, Self-Contained DC Emergency Lighting System Eight Hour

Life Test, 7/25/2013

WO 02148891, Rev. 1,

MPT-E0032, Self-Contained DC Emergency Lighting System Eight Hour Life Test, 8/1/2013

WO 02265459 Rev. 1,

MPT-E0030, Self-Contained DC Emergency Lighting System Inspection,

8/29/2013

WO 02272640 Rev. 1, Recharge Battery in Stores, 12/19/2013

Drawings

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1250, Emergency Diesel Generator 1B-SB Breaker 126-SB, Rev. 11

CAR 2116 B-401 Sheet 1978, Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine 1X-SB Governor System SB, Rev. 8

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1084, Transfer Panel 1B (Sect SB) Sheet 1, Rev. 11

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1097, Transfer Relays 43T/SB Development Sheet 7, Rev. 10

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 822, Auxiliary Transfer Panel-SB (Sect SB), Rev. 9

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1749, Emergency Diesel Generator 1B-SB Breaker 126

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1730, 6.9KV Emergency Bus 1B-SB Relays and Instrumentation Potential, Rev. 15

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1573, Generator Lockout Relay 86/G1I Sheet 1, Rev. 15

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1618A, B Startup Transformers Lockout Relay 86/Stub & Test Switches Development, Rev. 9

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1660, Startup Transformer 1B Y-Winding Breaker 121 Sheet 2, Rev. 8

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1628, Startup Transformer 1B Y-Winding Breaker 121 Sheet 2, Rev. 20

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1572 Generator Lockout Relay 86/G1A Sheet 3, Rev. 14

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1639, Startup Transformer 1B Y-Winding Breaker 101 Sheet 2, Rev. 10

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1626, Startup Transformer 1B Y-Winding Breaker 101 Sheet 1, Rev. 22

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1575, Gen Lockout Relay 86/GIB Sheet 3, Rev. 12

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1589, 6.9 KV Breaker Synchronizing Sheet 1, Rev. 8

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1621, Unit Aux transformer 1A "X" Winding Breaker 108, Rev. 21

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1585, Generator No. 1 230 KV South Bus CB (52-7), Rev. 15

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1586, Generator No. 1 230 KV North Bus CB (52-9), Rev. 13

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1584, Gen & Transfer breakers trip Think Switch, Rev. 2

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1625 Startup Transformer 1A "X" Winding Breaker 107, Rev. 20

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1575A, Generator Lockout Relay Test Switches Development Generator Relay Panel 1B, Rev. 6 6-B-401, Gen and Main Transformer Multi-Function Relays Contact Schedule

GRP-1B Sheet

1575B, Rev. 0

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1977, Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine 1X-SB Stop Valve SB Solenoid Trip, Rev. 7

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1957, Auxiliary Feedwater Instrumentation, Rev. 5

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1921, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A-SA (Motor Driven), Rev 11

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1921 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B-SB (Motor Driven), Rev. 13

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1942, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B-SB Discharge Press Control Valve (PCV- 21508-SB) 3AF-P258-1, Rev. 5

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1946, Auxiliary Feedwater TD S/G 1C Reg Valve (

FCV-2051C-SA)

3AF-F25A-1, Rev. 6

CAR 2166 B-401 Sheet 1945, Auxiliary Feedwater TD S/G 1B Reg Valve (FCV-2051B-SA)

3AF-F3SA-1), Rev. 7 1364-32889, Fire Detection System- Detector Location RAB

EL 261 Unit 1, Rev.5 1364-90042, RAB System 'D" Zone 1A-1-261, Rev. 4

CAR-2166-B-401, Control Wiring Diagram SWGR Room HVAC Exhaust Fan, RAB, Rev. 15

CAR-2168-G-517, HVAC System Flow Diagram, Reactor Auxiliary Building, Rev. 22

CPL-6-S-2106, Fire Protection Reactor Auxiliary Building Elevation 286', Rev. 11

CPL-2165-S-0556, Sheet 2, Fire Protection System Flow Diagram, RAB, Rev. 15

CPL-2166-S-2108, Fire Protection Reactor Auxiliary Building, Fire Hazards Analysis, Rev. 4

CPL-2166-S-2705, Sheet 6, Transient and Fixed Ignition Source, RAB, Rev. 0

CPL-2168-G-033, Sheet 6, Fire and Control Door Schedule, Rev. 13

CPL-2168-G-528, Sheet 5,

HVAC-Fire Damper Penetrations, Rev. 6

CPL-2168-G-700, Sheet 3, Architectural Floor Plans, Elevation 286', Rev. 8

CPL-2165 S-0542, Simplified Flow Diagram, Main Steam System, Rev. 26

CPL-2165-S-0544, Simplified Flow Diagram Feedwater System Unit 1, Rev. 44

CPL-2165 S-0547, Simplified Flow Diagram, Circulation & SW Systems, Sheet 1, Rev. 55

CPL-2165-S-0998, Simplified Flow Diagram HVAC Essential Services Chilled Water-

Distribution Unit 1 - SA, Rev. 7

CPL-2165-S-0999, Simplified Flow Diagram HVAC Essential Services Chilled Water-

Distribution Unit 1 - SB, Rev. 6

CPL-2165-S-1301, Simplified Flow Diagram Reactor Coolant System Sheet 2, Rev. 10

CPL-2165-S-1304, Simplified Flow Diagram CVCS System Sheet 2, Rev. 12

CPL-2165 S-1305, Simplified Flow Diagram, Chemical & Volume Control System, Rev. 26

CPL-2165 S-1322, Simplified Flow Diagram, Component Cooling Water Sys, Sheet 5, Rev. 12

CPL-2165 S-1324, Simplified Flow Diagram, Residual Heat Removal System, Rev. 11

PD 5165

BC 0001, AC Power Distribution system, Rev. 13

Completed Surveillance Procedures, Test Records

FPT-3120, Fire Hose Valve Functionality Test: RAB, Three-Year, completed 2/26/2014

FPT-3181, Fire Barrier Inspection, 18-Month, completed 8/6/2013

FPT-3505, Fire Door Inspection-RAB, Semi-Annual, completed 9/16/2013

ORT-1407, ACP/SSD Materials Audit Semiannual Interval Modes 1-6, completed 10/01/2012

ORT-1407, ACP/SSD Materials Audit Semiannual Interval Modes 1-6, completed 4/01/2013

ORT-1407, ACP/SSD Materials Audit Semiannual Interval Modes 1-6, completed 10/05/2013

WO 02167861,

MPT-IO175, Rev. 9, Annual Surveillance of Incipient Fire Detection System Switchgear Room B, completed 12/22/2013

WO 13329948,

PM-IO062, Rev. 8, Quarterly Maintenance on Incipient Fire Detection System

PIC Room, completed 2/24/2014

WO 02289476,

PM-IO062, Rev. 8, Quarterly Maintenance on Incipient Fire Detection System

PIC Room, completed 3/10/2014

WO 13305552,

PM-IO062, Rev. 8, Quarterly Maintenance on Incipient Fire Detection System Switchgear Room B, completed 4/8/2014

Plant Modifications and Engineering Changes (EC)

EC 62820, Upgrade Reliability of Operator SSD Communications at the ACP for a Postulated

Fire in the MCR, Rev. 1

EC 71147, Meggitt Fire Rated Cables, Rev. 5

EC 71911, Portable Radio System Enhancements, Rev. 2

EC 80046, Three New Areas Added to the List of Permanent Storage Areas, Rev. 0

EC 96488, Evaluation of Potential Run-out of A-SA ESW Pump, Rev. 0

Plant Change Evaluation Form

EC 74822, 1-A-BAL-D, 1-A-BAL-L (New), 1-A-BAL-M (New)

Rev. 0 Plant Change Evaluation Form

EC 80046, Three New Areas Added to the List of Permanent Storage Areas, Rev. 0

Plant Change Evaluation Form -

FIR-NGGC-0003, Rev. 0

Fire Fighting Pre-Plan Strategies

FPP-A18-5-261-0600, RAB Elevation 261' Fire Pre-Plan, Checklist A18, Rev.11

FPP-A18-5-261-0602, RAB Elevation 261' Fire Pre-Plan, Checklist A19, Rev.11

FPP-A20-5-261-0604, RAB Elevation 261' Fire Pre-Plan, Checklist A20, Rev.11

FPP-A35-6-286-0641, RAB Elevation 286', 1-A-SWGRB Fire Pre-Plan, Checklist A35, Rev.13

FPP-A38-6-286-0647, RAB Elevation 286', 1-A-BATB Fire Pre-Plan, Checklist A38, Rev.13

FPP-A55-7-305-0212, RAB Elevation 305', 12-A-CRC1 Fire Pre-Plan, Checklist A55, Rev.13

FPP-012-02-RAB 261, RAB Elevation 261' Fire Pre-Plan, Checklist A22, Rev.11

FPP-012-10-TRM, Transient Radioactive Material Fire Pre-Plan, Rev. 3

A22-5-261-0606, 1-A-BAL-B, Rev. 11

Applicable Codes and Standards

NFPA 13, Installation of Sprinkler Systems, 1978 Edition NFPA 14, Standard for the Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems, 1976 Edition

NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, 1977 Edition

NFPA 72, National Fire and Safety Code, 2007 Edition

NFPA 72D, Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, and Use of Proprietary Protection

Signaling Systems, 1975 Edition NFPA 72E, Automatic Fire Detectors, 1978 Edition

NFPA 80, Standard on Fire Doors and Windows, 1979 Edition

NFPA 90A, Standard on Air Conditioning and Ventilating Systems, 1981 Edition

NFPA 600, Standard on Industrial Fire Brigades, 2000 Edition

Technical Manuals, Vendor Information and Fire Tests Datasheet for Justrite Safety Cans, dated 2010

Datasheet for Akron Style 1720, Turbojet Fire Hose Nozzle, Flow and Reach Data, 05/2014

Datasheet for Thermotech Inc., Rate Anticipation Heat Detector, Model 302, dated 4/13/1999

Datasheet for Nittan Inc., Product of Combustion Ionization Smoke Detector Model

NID-48F, dated 06/1991 Datasheet for Air Balance Static Fire Damper, Model 319, Underwriters Laboratories File

R4708, dated 2/2013

Ebasco Specification

CAR-SH-AS-54, Fire and Control Door and Hardware, Rev. 7

Steel Door Institute,

SDI 118-01, Basis Fire Door Requirements, Rev. 2001

CAR-SH-AS-54, Specification Fire and Control Doors and Hardware, Rev.

VM-SFD, Safe Fire Detection, Inc., Air Sampling Fire Detector (Incipient Detection), Rev. 1

VM-TNZ, Spectron Series Dual-Lite/Light Guard, Lighting, Rev. 7

Ingersoll-Rand Pump Curve, CURVE080A, dated 03/04/1997

Audits and Self Assessments

648866, Fire Protection Triennial Readiness Self-Assessment, dated 01/09/2014 H-FP-15-01, Audit of Fire Protection, dated 04/10/2014 Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment/NFPA 805 Fire Protection Program Health Report for Period 1

st Qtr 2013 (1/1/2013 - 3/31/2013), dated 04/24/2013

Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment/NFPA 805 Fire Protection Program Health Report for

Period 2

nd Qtr 2013 (4/1/2013 - 6/30/2013), dated 07/25/2013

Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment/NFPA 805 Fire Protection Program Health Report for Period 4

th Qtr 2013 (10/1/2013 - 12/31/2013), dated 01/28/2014