IR 05000282/2008007
| ML083590119 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/2008 |
| From: | Daley R C Engineering Branch 3 |
| To: | Wadley M D Northern States Power Co |
| References | |
| IR-08-007 | |
| Download: ML083590119 (20) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III 2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210 LISLE, IL 60532-4352 December 23, 2008 Mr. Michael Site Vice President Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company-Minnesota 1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, MN 55089
SUBJECT: PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2, EVALUATION OF CHANGES, TESTS, OR EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT PLANT MODIFICATIONS BASELINE INSPECTION REPORT 05000282/2008007; 05000306/2008007(DRS)
Dear Mr. Wadley:
On December 5, 2008, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the results of the inspection, which were discussed with you and other members of your staff at the completion of the inspection on December 5, 2008. The inspectors examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of the inspection, one NRC identified finding of very low safety significance was identified, which involved a violation of NRC requirements. However, because this violation was of very low safety significance and because it was entered
into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the issue as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you contest the subject or severity of an NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60532-4352; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the Resident Inspector Office at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/ Robert Daley, Chief Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 License Nos. DPR-42, DPR-60
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000282/2008007; 05000306/2008007(DRS)
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information cc w/encl: D. Koehl, Chief Nuclear Officer Regulatory Affairs Manager P. Glass, Assistant General Counsel Nuclear Asset Manager J. Stine, State Liaison Officer, Minnesota Department of Health Tribal Council, Prairie Island Indian Community Administrator, Goodhue County Courthouse Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Commerce Manager, Environmental Protection Division Office of the Attorney General of Minnesota Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, Dakota County Law Enforcement Center
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000282/2008007, 05000306/2008007; 11/17/2008 - 12/05/2008; Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2; Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent
Plant Modifications. The inspection covered a two-week announced baseline inspection on evaluations of changes, tests, or experiments and permanent plant modifications. The inspection was conducted by three Region based engineering inspectors. One Severity Level IV Non-Cited Violation (NCV) was identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White,
Yellow, Red), using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process (SDP)." Findings for which the SDP does not apply, may be Green, or may be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006. A. Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Severity Level IV. The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV, having very low safety significance, of 10 CFR 50.59, "Changes, Tests, and Experiments," for the licensee's failure to perform a safety evaluation associated with installation of a bulk hydrogen storage facility. Specifically, the licensee had not evaluated the adverse affects on the Circulating Water System from a postulated hydrogen tank explosion in the bulk storage facility located directly above buried Circulating Water System return lines. The licensee stopped work on the installation of the bulk hydrogen facility and documented the NRC identified issues in the corrective action system. The inspectors' concerns also prompted the licensee to identify above ground Cooling Water System pipe in the nearby Turbine Building, which had not been evaluated in the hydrogen blast analysis. The finding was more than minor because the inspectors could not reasonably determine that this change would not have ultimately required prior approval from the NRC. This finding was categorized as Severity Level IV because the underlying technical issue for the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance based on a Phase 1 screening in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situation." Specifically, the inspectors answered "No" to the Mitigating Systems screening questions in the Phase 1 Screening Worksheet because the licensee had not yet filled the bulk storage facility with hydrogen, so no possibility of explosion and damage to plant equipment existed.
The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting element of Human Performance Decision Making, because the licensee failed to make conservative assumptions in decision making associated with the effects of a postulated hydrogen tank explosion (IMC 305, Section 06.07.c, Item H.1(b)). (Section 1R17.1.b)
B. Licensee-Identified Violations
No findings of significance were identified.
2
REPORT DETAILS
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R17 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications
(71111.17)
.1 Title 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluations and Screenings
a. Inspection Scope
From November 17 through December 5, 2008, the inspectors reviewed six safety evaluations performed pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 to determine if the evaluations were adequate and that prior NRC approval was obtained as appropriate. The inspectors also reviewed 17 screenings and 2 equivalency evaluations where licensee personnel had determined that a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was not necessary. The inspectors reviewed these documents to determine if:
- the changes, tests, or experiments performed were evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and that sufficient documentation existed to confirm that a license amendment was not required;
- the safety issue requiring the change, test or experiment was resolved;
- the licensee conclusions for evaluations of changes, tests, or experiments were correct and consistent with 10 CFR 50.59; and
- the design and licensing basis documentation was updated to reflect the change. The inspectors used, in part, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 96-07, "Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation," Revision 1, to determine acceptability of the completed evaluations, and screenings. The NEI document was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.187, "Guidance for Implementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments," dated November 2000. The inspectors also consulted Part 9900 of the NRC Inspection Manual, "10 CFR Guidance for 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments." This inspection constitutes six samples of evaluations and nineteen samples of changes as defined in Inspection Procedure
71111.17 - 05.
b. Findings
Failure to Perform a 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation for Bulk Hydrogen Storage Facility
Introduction:
The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.59 having very low safety significance (Green) for the failure to perform a safety evaluation for installation of a bulk hydrogen storage facility. Specifically, the licensee had not evaluated the adverse affects on the Circulating Water (CW) System 3from a postulated hydrogen tank explosion in the bulk storage facility located directly above buried CW return lines.
Description:
On December 4, 2008, the licensee had mostly installed, (but not filled), a bulk hydrogen storage facility. The inspectors identified that the licensee had not considered the effects of a postulated hydrogen tank explosion on the buried CW return header pipes running directly under this facility. The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 11.5.1 describes the design basis functions for the CW system and states that the CW system provides the heat sink for the generating plant. Specifically, excess heat from the steam leaving the turbine is transferred to circulating water flowing through the condenser tubes.
The CW system also supplies the water for the Cooling Water System and Fire Protection Systems. Water flows from the Intake Bay into the Plant Screenhouse. The Cooling Water pumps draw water from the screenhouse, pump it through the system and discharge to the
warm circulating water leaving the condensers. Thus, the CW System indirectly cools the plant auxiliary equipment. Hydrogen gas is used as the heat transfer medium to cool the main generators and for reducing the oxygen concentration in the volume control tank to less than 5 percent by volume. As described in the UFSAR Section 9.3.2.1.5, this hydrogen gas was supplied by ten portable banks of gas cylinders. In accordance with Engineering Change (EC) 12191 "Hydrogen Storage Replacement Modification," the licensee changed the original storage configuration and located the new bulk hydrogen tank storage facility directly over the Unit 1 and Unit 2 buried CW header pipes. The new bulk storage facility was comprised of three (non-portable) banks of cylindrical tanks that were designed to contain approximately twice the volume of hydrogen of the original storage facility.
These banks of tanks were attached to a metal framework supported by concrete piers, which allowed for distribution of the tank weight around the buried circulating water pipes located beneath this facility. The buried CW return headers for each unit running beneath this facility were large diameter concrete pipes located several feet below the slab elevation. The licensee had completed calculation 2008-11997 "Hydrogen Blast Analysis" to evaluate the affect of a postulated hydrogen explosion on structures identified within a the predicted blast radius that could affect plant operation. However, the inspectors identified the following concerns with this calculation: 1) The effect of a blast induced shockwave on the buried CW pipes directly beneath the facility was not evaluated. If the blast shock wave was sufficient to collapse and block the buried headers, the station would experience a loss of CW, which could also disrupt the normal operation of the safety-related Cooling Water System. 2) The calculation evaluated the blast effects from only one individual tank explosion within a given bank based on a hydrogen explosion event which occurred on a portable hydrogen trailer bank at Los Alamos National Laboratory. The licensee had not compared their storage configuration with that involved in the Los Alamos event to ensure that multiple tanks would not explode. Because, the licensee's bulk storage tanks were larger than those used on the portable trailer tanks, they would generate a larger explosive force which may be sufficient to trigger additional tank explosions.
4On August 11, 2008, the licensee approved screening 3015 "Hydrogen Tank Farm" which evaluated and determined that a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was not required to install EC 12191. This screening was inadequate, because, it failed to identify the need for a full safety evaluation to evaluate the impact of a postulated tank farm blast on the CW System and Cooling Water System functions. Specifically, a postulated hydrogen tank explosion would create a shock wave into the ground which could damage the buried CW piping and adversely affect the functions of this system. Further, if sufficient blockage occurred in the CW System, it would disrupt the normal flow of the Cooling Water System that discharges into the CW return header piping. The inspectors concluded that location of the bulk hydrogen storage facility directly over the circulating water lines without a demonstrated analysis to assess the effect on these lines would not have been acceptable under 10 CFR 50.59 and would have required approval from the NRC (e.g., license amendment). Specifically, NEI 96-07 Section 4.3.6 identifies that a new or common cause failure not bounded by previous analysis would not meet the 10 CFR 50.59 screening criteria and hence would require a license amendment. As a corrective action, the licensee stopped work on the installation of the bulk hydrogen facility and documented the NRC identified issues in Assignment Report (AR) 01161382 and AR 01161364. The inspectors' concerns subsequently prompted the licensee to identify above ground Cooling Water System piping in the nearby Turbine Building which had also not been evaluated in the hydrogen tank blast analysis (AR 01161373).
Analysis:
The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to perform a safety evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 for changes to their design basis associated with bulk hydrogen storage was a performance deficiency warranting a significance determination. Specifically, the licensee had installed a bulk hydrogen storage system at a location that could adversely affect the design basis function of the CW System. Because violations of 10 CFR 50.59 are considered to be violations that potentially impede or impact the regulatory process, they are dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process instead of the significance determination process (SDP). The finding was determined to be more than minor because the inspectors could not reasonably determine that the changes to the licensee's design basis would not have ultimately required NRC prior approval. The inspectors completed a significance determination of the underlying technical issue using NRC's inspection manual chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations," and answered "No" to the Mitigating Systems screening questions in the Phase 1 Screening Worksheet (Table 4a). The inspectors answered "No," because the licensee had not yet filled the bulk storage facility with hydrogen, so no possibility of explosion and damage to plant equipment existed. Based upon this Phase 1 screening, the inspectors concluded that the issue was of very low safety significance (Green). In accordance with IMC 305 "Operating Reactor Assessment Process," the inspectors identified a cross-cutting aspect for this finding, using available causal information. The cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting element of "Human Performance, Decision Making," because the licensee failed to make conservative assumptions in decision making. In accordance with IMC 305, Section 06.07.c, "Components Within the 5Cross-Cutting Areas," the inspectors identified Item H.1.b as applicable for this finding. Specifically, the licensee's decision to ignore the effect of a blast induced shock wave on CW piping was not conservative, and the assumption that only one cylinder in a bank of hydrogen cylinders could explode without establishing an adequate basis was non-conservative.
Enforcement:
Title 10 CFR 50.59(d)(1) states, in part, that the licensee shall maintain records of changes in the facility, of changes in procedures, and of tests and experiments. These records must include a written evaluation which provides a basis for the determination that the change, test, or experiment does not require a license amendment. Contrary to the above, as of December 5, 2008, the licensee failed to perform a written safety evaluation for installation of the bulk hydrogen storage facility (EC 12191). In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, this violation of the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 was classified as a Severity Level IV Violation because the underlying technical issue was of very low safety significance. Because this violation was of very low safety significance, was not repetitive or willful, and it was entered into the licensee's corrective action program (AR 01161382 and AR 01161364), this violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV).
(NCV 05000282/2008007-01; 05000306/2008007-01).
.2 Review of Permanent Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
From November 17, 2008 through December 5, 2008, the inspectors reviewed ten permanent plant modifications that had been installed in the plant during the last three years. This review included in-plant walkdowns for portions of the modified
Turbine Generator Control Systems, Emergency Diesel Generator Ventilation Systems, Bulk Hydrogen Storage System and the Condensate Storage Tank Freeze Protection System. The modifications were selected based upon risk significance, safety significance, and complexity. The inspectors reviewed the modifications selected to
determine if:
- the supporting design and licensing basis documentation was updated;
- the changes were in accordance with the specified design requirements;
- the procedures and training affected by the modification have been updated;
- the test documentation as required by applicable test programs has been updated; and
- post-modification testing specified was sufficient to ensure functionality of the component modified, its associated system, and any support systems. This inspection constitutes ten samples as defined in Inspection Procedure
71111.17 - 05.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Routine Review of Condition Reports
a. Inspection Scope
From November 17, 2008 through December 5, 2008, the inspectors reviewed Corrective Action Process documents that identified or were related to 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations and permanent plant modifications. The inspectors reviewed these documents to evaluate the effectiveness of corrective actions related to permanent plant modifications and evaluations for changes, tests, or experiments issues. In addition, corrective action documents written on issues identified during the inspection were reviewed to verify adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problems into the corrective action system. The specific corrective action documents that were sampled and reviewed by the inspectors are listed in the attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Management Meeting(s)
.1 Exit Meeting
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. M. Wadley and others of the licensee's staff, on December 5, 2008. Licensee personnel acknowledged the inspection results presented and did not identify any proprietary content. The inspectors returned proprietary material reviewed during the inspection to the licensee staff. ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- M. Wadley, Site Vice President
- S. Myers, Design Engineering Manager,
- M. Hopman, Engineering Supervisor
- J. Connors, Mechanical Design Engineer
- C. Sansome, Design Engineer
- J. Kivi, Regulatory Compliance Engineer
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
- 05000306/2008007-01 NCV Failure to Perform a 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation for Bulk Hydrogen Storage Facility (Section 1R17.1.b)
Discussed
None
1
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection.
- Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort.
- Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report. 1R17 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, or Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications
- CALCULATIONS
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- ENG-EE-018 Diesel Generator Sequence Loading for an SI Event Concurrent with Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) for D1 D2 D3 D5
- D6 Revision 5
- ENG-EE-021 Diesel Generator Steady State Loading for an SI Event Concurrent with Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) for D1 D2 D3 D5
- D6 Revision 3
- Revision 4
- ENG-EE-169 Charging Pump Motor & Power Cable Sizing for
- Revision 0 P003994 Charging Pump Gland Retainer Plate Assembly Brackets Revision 0
- PI-996-7-P01 #11 and 12 Accumulator Nozzle Replacement Evaluation Revision 0
- GEN-PI-076 Control Room Habitability Analyses for Offsite Hazardous Chemical Releases December 15, 2006 2008-11973-039-1 Hydrogen Blast Analysis August 22, 2008
- PI-P602232-400 Revised Auxiliary Building HELB
- Analysis Revision 1
- PI-S-031 Addendum 3 Structural Evaluation of HELB Steam Exclusion Block Walls and
- Doors December 27, 2004 996-22-M01 Mod 06D101-D1/D2 Diesel Generator Cold Weather Operation Revision 1
- ENG-ME-046 Motor Operated Valve Torque / Thrust Design Requirements Revision 4 CONDITION REPORTS
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- AR 1000779 Closeout of Modification 04AF02 Appendix R Fire Wrap of Cable October 12 2005
- AR 1003117 Outside Ambient Temperature and HVAC System Capabilities November 8 2005
- AR 1012225 Thermal Fatigue Life of Charging June 8 2006
- 2Nozzles Nearing End
- AR 1022720 Fire Doors Potentially Inoperable April 6 2006
- AR 1030354 Cladding Cracking in 12 Accumulator October 20 2006
- AR 1043653 Alteration to Ch Pump Components without Repair Plan August 9 2006
- AR 1053669 Anchor bolt holes for Sump B not acceptable November 25 2006
- AR 1063531 Water seeping into Sump From Sump Walls November 23 2006
- AR 1063724 Fuel Assembly Z70 Could not be Reconstituted January 10 2007
- AR 1064513 Apparent Cause Evaluation April 30 2006
- AR 1065804 Sump B Hilti Bolt Lost Anchor Ability December 6 2006
- AR 1093150 12 SI Pump Oil Pressure Below Normal Band May 17 2007
- AR 1094473 CDBI 07-Inclusion of D5/D6 Building Fans in EDG Load Calc May 30 2007
- AR 1111307 12 SI Pump Oil Pressure Approaching Minimum to Support Ops May 17 2007
- AR 1123127 Revise USAR as Reqd. Including Tables 8.4-1 8.4-2 to be Consistent with Engineering Analysis
- ENG-EE-021
- Revision 3
- January 8 2008
- AR 1123200 Revise USAR as Required Including Tables 8.4-3 & 8.4-4 to be Consistent
with Engineering Calc
- ENG-EE-045
- Revision 4
- January 9 2008
- CV-31382 has a Thru Wall Leak on the Body March 21 2008
- AR 1132205 PI Fire Protection Review of Modifications is Being Missed March 25 2008
- AR 1159257 08MOD - HKB3's not discussed in EM section 3.2.1.8 November 14 2008 CONDITION REPORTS PROMPTED BY NRC REVIEW
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- AR 1159491 Method Change Without 50.59
- Evaluation November 17, 2008
- AR 1159965 Revise
- ENG-EE-045 Clarify Section 5.3 November 20, 2008
- AR 1159988 Frequency Effects on EDG Loading Unaccounted for in EDG LOOP/SBO Condition Loading Calc November 20, 2008
- AR 1160064 Notation on Page 12 of
- ENG-EE-018 for Pump Speed is Inverted for All 3
- Equations November 21, 2008
- AR 1160295 Screening 2887 missed items required to be screened November 24, 2008
- AR 1160590 CST Temperature Configuration Control November 26, 2008
- AR 1160610 A typo was Identified in
- OPR 01159988-November 26, 2008
- 301 for the Frequency Adjusted Total of
- D5 on Page 3 of 5
- AR 1160903 Change label of critical characteristic for the EC12146 December 1, 2008
- AR 1160910 Revise Attachment 1 from vendor for
- EC12146 December 1, 2008
- AR 1161021 08MOD: Nonconservative flow rate used in
- ENG-ME-026 December 2, 2008
- AR 1161330 08 MOD -
- EC 12146 inadequate seismic qualification December 4, 2008
- AR 1161364 08 MOD
- EC 12191 Blast Analysis Question December 4, 2008
- AR 1161373 08 MOD
- EC 12191 Adverse Affect to SR
- CL Piping December 4, 2008
- AR 1161382 08 MOD
- EC 12191 NRC Response Question 159 for CW System December 4, 2008 DRAWINGS Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- X-HIAW-1146-11 5" D-1000-160-3 Valve Revision 76 H1717X (XH-1-633) SI Pump Outline Revision E
- NQ-161009-3 Unit 2 Loop A Nitrogen to Primary Side
- SG Tubes Revision 76
- XH-106-3620 Reactor Coolant System Revision 76
- NF-39837 Sheet 32 Chemical and Volume Control System Unit 2 ASME Code Classification Revision G
- NF-39220 Flow Diagram Condensate System Revision BF X-HIAW-1-44 Flow Diagram Unit 1 Safety Injection System Revision T
- NF-40022-1 Circuit Diagram 4 Kv & 480 V Safeguard Buses Unit 1
- Revision 76
- NE-4008 Sheet 35 Charging Pump As-built Revision 71
- NE-40406 Sheet 44 21 Fan Coil Unit Cooling Water Return Isolation Valve "A"
- MV-32147
- Revision 76
- NE-40406 Sheet 57 Cooling Water to 22 Aux. Feedwater Pump Valve
- MV-32030
- Revision 76
- NE-40406 Sheet 57 Cooling Water to 22 Aux. Feedwater Pump Valve
- MV-32030
- Revision AJ
- NF-40592-2 External Connections Motor Control Center 2A
- Revision 76
- NE-40004 Sheet 40 Generator Lockout Relaying Revision AL 1-C
- NX-62367-4 Internal Wiring Diagram E-H Governor Control Cabinet 1EH1
- Revision 0
- NX-62367-5 Internal Wiring Diagram E-H Governor Control Cabinet 1EH1
- Revision 0
- NX-62367-6,
- Internal Wiring Diagram E-H Governor Control Cabinet 1EH1, Revision 0
- 10
- CFR 50.59 EVALUATIONS
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- 1012 Revise quality classification process to align with ANSI Standard 58.14
- Revision 1 1039 Revised Auxiliary Building High Energy Line Break Analysis May 13, 2006 1050 SBLOCA Analysis Using NOTRUMP
- Code January 24, 2006 1055 Unit 2 Cycle 24 Core Reload December 7, 2006 1058 Turbine EH Control System Upgrade Project February 6, 2008 1056 Mode 4 LOCA TS Bases and Procedural Changes January 31, 2007
- CFR 50.59 SCREENINGS
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- 2887
- SP 2431 SP1431- Main Steam Safety Testing at Power June 19, 2008 2765
- ENG-ME-546 Determination of Minimum and Maximum RHR Pump Design Limits for Surveillance Flowrates September 24, 2007 2909 Sulfur Additive for Fuel Oil February 23, 2008 2704 Calc EC9074 to Evaluate Control Room Habitability for off-site Chemical Release December 15, 2006 2270 TCN to C28.6 (Condensate Storage Tank Freeze Protection System)
- February 10, 2006 2620 11 and 12 SI Accumulator Nozzle Replacement Modification April 25, 2006 2945 Fermanite Repair
- CV-31382 T-Mod April 3, 2008 3015 Hydrogen Tank Farm August 11, 2008 2422 App R Hot Short Rewire Modification July 18, 2005 2581 Revision to Tech Spec Bases B 3.7.8
and B 3.6.5, C35 September 11, 2006 2849
- ENG-EE-021 to Incorporate Addendums address
proposed Charging Pump Modification September 9, 2008 2910 Issue Rev 5 of
- ENG-EE-018 to Incorporate Addendums February 7, 2008 2940 Revise
- SP 1378 to Test Reactor Trip Breakers Due to EH Project EC Changes March 16, 2008 2709 Modification 06D101-EC7460 D1/D2
- Cold Weather Operation November 8, 2006 2662 MOV Target Thrust and Torque calculations Revision 0 2614 Charging Nozzle Thermal Transient Revision 0
- Change to
- SP 1173/ 2173 MODIFICATIONS AND CALCULATIONS (CREDITED FOR SAMPLES)
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision Engineering Change
- 20 D1000 Conversion for
- CV-31089 SG
- PORV September 11, 2006 Engineering Change
- 11442 Reactor Coolant System Double Isolation Valve Installation December 31, 2007 Engineering Change
- 7466 11
- AND 12 SI Accumulator Nozzle Replacement May 2, 2006 Engineering Change
- 2191 Hydrogen Storage Replacement Modification August 18, 2008 Engineering Change
- 346 Turbine EH Control System Upgrade Revision 0 Engineering Change
- 9451 CVCS Charging Pump Drive Replacement Revision 0 Engineering Change
- 388 Appendix R Hot Short Issues Revision 0 Engineering Change
- 2146
- 7460 D1/D2 Cold Weather Operation Revision 0 OPERABILITY EVALUATIONS
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- OPR 01049042-26 Changes in EDG Frequency will affect the Performance of the Components that are Powered from the EDG May 25, 2007
- OPR 01094473-01 EDG Loading Analyses of Record Neglected to Consider a Load that May be Running during Diesel Operation June 4, 2007
- OPR 01159988-01 Frequency Variations on Motor Loads were Unaccounted for on the EDGs in
Calculations
- ENG-EE-045 Revision 4
- ENG-EE-021
- Revision 3 OTHER DOCUMENTS
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision Equivalency evaluation Engineering Change 12146 Revision 0
- Equivalency Evaluation 1630 Replacement of Beach and Bromine Pumps June 2, 2005
- Apparent Cause Evaluation No. 1
- AR 1063724 September 27, 2007
- Evaluation Model Using the NOTRUMP
- Code Safety Injection into the Broken Loop and COSI Condensation Model July 1997 Letter L-P- 06-006 Withdrawal of License Amendment Request to Incorporate Revisions to Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Methodology into the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Licensing
- Basis February 2, 2006 Letter L-PI-05-014 License Amendment Request to Incorporate Revisions to Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident Methodology into the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Licensing Basis February 28, 2005 Liquid Penetrant Examination Report BOP PT- 06- 064 May 16, 2006 Liquid Penetrant Examination Report BOP PT- 06- 058 May 15, 2006 NRC Letter Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Unit 1 and 2 Withdrawal of an Amendment Request February 16, 2006 Technical Manual XH
- 577 33 Foxboro Model 43a Pneumatic Controller June 1965
- TCN 12A Condensate Storage Tank Freeze Protection System February 10, 2008 Weld Map 99801 05 4 May 3, 2006 Westinghouse Letter
- 304390 03 01 February 16, 2008 Work Order
- 00055697
- EC 346 Pre OP Test March 21, 2008
- Work Order
- 00055697
- EH System Startup Testing Control System Power Checks for EH
- Modification March 18, 2008
- Work Order
- 00055697
- EH System Start-up Testing Channel Check Alarm Checklists March 20, 2008 Work Order
- 00055698 Startup Testing on EHC System Power Ascension Testing July 18, 2008
- PROCEDURES
- Number Description or Title Date or Revision
- 1C20.7 D1/D2 Diesel Generators Revision 25
- TP 1459 OPC/ET Trip Block Test Revision 0
- SP 1378 Test of reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers Auxiliary Contacts Revision 6
- SP 1371 Cold Shutdown Test of RHR Pumps and Check Valves March 3
- SP 1431 Main Steam Safety Valve Test (Power Operation)
- Revision 0
- 7SP 1431 Main Steam Safety Valve Test (Power Operation)
- Revision 0.
- SP 2371 Cold Shutdown Test of RHR Pumps and Check Valves October 17, 2008.
- SP-2046 Multiple Rod Drop Test December 13, 2006 SP1596 Outage Maintenance Testing Table 1 June 1, 2006 C28.6 Condensate Storage Tank Freeze Protection System Revision 13 H1 Quality List Classification Criteria Revision 13
- SP 1173 Stress Cycle Record Revision 28 5AWI 6.2.0 Equivalent Engineering Change and Minor Modification Evaluation Revision 12 D56.3 Kwik Bolt 3 Concrete Expansion Anchor Installation Revision 2 EM 3.2.1.8 Specification for Concrete Expansion Anchors Revision 2
LIST OF ACRONYMS
- USED [[]]
- NRC [[]]