05000382/FIN-2012003-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure To Establish Adequate Procedural Guidance To Control Feedwater Heater Level Control Valves |
| Description | A self-revealing finding occurred because the licensee did not establish adequate procedural guidance to control feedwater heater level control valves. Specifically, the procedures used to control the settings for the valves did not contain guidance that properly adjusted the proportional gain and air pressure input to ensure the valves open quickly during a transient. As a result, multiple failures in the feedwater heater drain system resulted in a feedwater pump A trip and a subsequent reactor power cutback. The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program as CR-WF3-2012-1729 for resolution. The corrective actions included a revision of the procedure and loop calibration settings for the feedwater heater level control valves. The failure to provide adequate guidance that properly adjusted the proportional gain to ensure the valves open as designed is a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, multiple feedwater heater control valve failures resulted in a reactor power cutback that upset plant stability. The inspectors used the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, to determine the significance. The inspectors determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because it only contributed to the likelihood of a reactor trip and not the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the resources component of the human performance area in that the licensee did not ensure that complete, accurate, and up-to-date design documentation for loop calibration settings was available to assure nuclear safety |
| Site: | Waterford  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000382/2012003 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Ricketson M Davis D Allen J Laughlin R Azua D Overland N Greene |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Waterford - IR 05000382/2012003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Waterford) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Waterford)
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